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中美關係討論
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以下轉貼Hugh WhiteRory Medcalf兩位教授就中、美關係未來發展及美國策略的論辯。過去本市已發表/轉貼過多篇關於此議題的論述;請見以下所附索引。

 

如我常說:「凡論述必有前提;凡判斷必有立場。」以及「論述無所謂對、錯;只問是否說得通。」。而「說得通」的要件是一致、相容、和能與部份現實印證。各位可參考這三個判準,自行決定各家觀點的「說得通度」。當然,這三個判準也適用於各位的「論述」和「判斷」。

 

歡迎參加討論。

 

**************************************************

 

中美關係評論索引

 

以下是我用中美關係」做「關鍵字」在本市搜尋的結果。我相信還有其他的相關評論,以後再增補。前三篇是區區、小弟、在下、老夫、我的拙作。重新看了一下,內容大致沒有需要修改或補充之處。

 

淺談中、美關係

https://city.udn.com/2976/1196451

 

淺評中、美關係 -- 詮釋專家的意見

https://city.udn.com/2976/3889533#rep3889533

 

美國衰落大概不是好事

https://city.udn.com/2976/1551447#rep1551447

 

中美關係持續穩定 - 白樂琦

https://city.udn.com/2976/4823423#rep4823423

 

暗潮洶湧的中、美關係 -- M. Calabresi

https://city.udn.com/2976/4435380#rep4435380

 

中、美關係的實際與外交詞令 -- B. Feller

https://city.udn.com/2976/4428102#rep4428102

 

解讀中美關係現狀未來 - 羅蘭提供

https://city.udn.com/2976/4424757

 

朱成虎:中美共治是忽悠中國 -- 中時記者 亓樂義

https://city.udn.com/2976/4214323

 

中國自認老二:美國還是老大 ---- 中央社

https://city.udn.com/2976/3887443

 

帝國主義亡我之心從未死過 - niya511

https://city.udn.com/2976/2882075#rep2882075

 

還有這篇:中國應幫助美國稱霸 - lukacs

https://city.udn.com/2976/1556941#rep1556941

 

全球經濟的中美共治時代 已經來臨? -- 徐麗玲

https://city.udn.com/2976/3321757?tpno=12&cate_no=80786

 

希拉蕊訪中 - MATTHEW LEE

https://city.udn.com/2976/3296327?tpno=12&cate_no=80786

 

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合則兩利的美國對華政策 ---- D. Gross
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How U.S. Can Profit from China's Transition

 

Donald Gross, 11/20/12

 

China's current political transition offers Washington a window of opportunity to improve relations with Beijing. Rather than risk a continuing downward spiral in the critical U.S.-China relationship, President Barack Obama must move quickly in his second term in order to take advantage of this opportunity.

 

At last week's 18th Party Congress, Beijing began a once-in-a-decade leadership transition. The country's new leaders -- including President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang -- know first hand some of the worst excesses of China's Communist Party. They were victims of Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, when an entire generation of young people - many from prominent families - were "sent down" to rural areas for years to perform backbreaking manual labor.

 

Having experienced and survived widespread human rights abuses that occurred between 1966 and 1976, the year of Mao's death, China's new leaders will be more receptive to calls for political reform from the country's middle class and liberal intellectuals, who are highly critical of increasing corruption and cronyism within the Communist Party.

 

Pressure from the middle class is driving a push for political reform, while, at the same time, China's leaders are dealing with daunting challenges arising from rapid economic development - among them, glaring social inequality, inflation, frequent "mass incidents," social unrest and environmental degradation.

 

China's new leaders will welcome overtures from the United States, along with any U.S. policies that aim to assist the country in meeting the challenges it faces. But harsh American trade measures or increased U.S. military pressure will likely be met with a tough response, as the new leaders seek to prove their mettle and their ability to defend China's national interests.

 

Beijing's political transition comes at a time when the United States stands at a crossroads in U.S-China relations. We urgently need a national debate to rethink U.S. China policy and prevent doing permanent damage to American interests in Asia.

 

Increased tensions with China could hold a number of dire consequences. They could lead to a serious military conflict over Taiwan's political status, over whether Japan or China holds sovereignty to a group of uninhabitable islands in the East China Sea or over the ownership of small islands and energy resources in the South China Sea. In a worst case scenario, those conflicts could escalate, by accident or design, to a nuclear exchange.

 

It is essential to remember that China's rise strengthens America's economy and future prosperity. Trade with China -- America's third-largest export market -- as aided America's recovery during the global financial crisis.

 

Between 2000 and 2011, U.S. exports to China increased by about 640 percent, going from $16 billion to $104 billion. China is the largest growth market in the world for U.S. exports, and it supports thousands of high-quality American jobs.

 

The best way to overcome the "China threat" and advance U.S. interests in the region is by achieving a stable peace with China through the resolution of outstanding security and economic conflicts between the two countries. This would enable the U.S. to deal decisively with the very legitimate concerns many Americans have over China's commercial practices, including infringement of intellectual property rights, undervalued currency and protectionist measures that favor domestic industries.

 

Through a new policy approach, we can ensure China is a future partner and not a threat to American interests. This new policy would:

 

• Significantly reduce China's current and potential military threat to Taiwan, thus securing Taiwan's democracy;
• Achieve a pull-back of Chinese forces from a defined coastal security zone surrounding Japan;
• Have China submit its maritime disputes in the South and East China seas to an independent international judicial body;
• Increase security cooperation with China on both regional and global issues;
• Substantially increase China's military transparency, especially in the development of new weapons systems;
• Facilitate new bilateral and regional free trade agreements that will unleash unprecedented levels of international trade and investment, generating hundreds of thousands of new American jobs;
• Greatly strengthen the advocates of human rights and democracy in China by depriving security forces of their "most dependable weapon," in the view of former Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky: an external security threat from the United States which is now used to legitimize internal political repression.

 

In his second term, President Obama should seize the opportunity created by the emergence of China's new leadership to stabilize U.S.-China relations -- by pursuing a diplomatic strategy that minimizes conflict, emphasizes peaceful coexistence and significantly expands trade and investment between the two countries.

 

Donald Gross is a former White House and State Department official, whose new book, The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from China's Rise and Avoid Another Cold War, was published by Bloomsbury on October 25. Visit www.donaldgross.net.

 

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/11/20/how_the_us_can_profit_from_china_transition_100357.html



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美國中心論
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J. A. Bosco先生的觀點十足表現出「美國中心論」者的思考模式,或者說:「只許美國放火;不許他國點燈」的虛妄意識。



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中、美關係的五個癥結議題 -- J. A. Bosco
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Five tough truths about US-China relations

 

The more American and Chinese officials proclaim their innocent intentions toward each other, the deeper the level of mistrust they generate. China watchers worry about strategic miscalculation by one side or the other.

 

Understatement, subtlety, and nuance are the hallmarks of diplomacy and are Washington’s preferred tools for avoiding confrontation with China. But when professions of benign intent don't reflect actions and policies, the parties can actually increase mutual suspicion.

 

Official candor on five key truths about US-China relations will likely contribute to a more mature bilateral relationship and could help halt a potential slide to conflict.

 

Joseph A. Bosco, July 12, 2012

 

1.     China is trying to supplant the US as the leading military and political power in Asia.

 

Beijing’s first regional interest is Taiwan, which it claims as part of China. Control of the island would extend Beijing’s reach an additional hundred miles into the Pacific and the South China Sea. In 1942, Japan used Taiwan to launch its invasion of the Philippines – where China is now aggressively pursuing territorial claims.

 

For 60 years, America has blocked China from seizing Taiwan, first when it was a dictatorship and now as a flourishing democracy. But when asked directly by Chinese officials in 1995, Washington said it no longer knows whether it will defend Taiwan. It has repeated that “strategic ambiguity” mantra ever since.

 

OPINION: 3 reasons why China isn't overtaking the US

 

Beijing’s response has been less nuanced: It has acquired the naval, air, and cyber arsenal needed to attack Taiwan. To deter American involvement, it has developed area denial and anti-access weapons like attack submarines and the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missiles. Chinese generals have added nuclear threats against US cities in a Taiwan conflict.

 

Similarly, Beijing has claimed the South China Sea – which, since World War II, the US Navy has kept open to global commerce, including China’s – as a “core interest” like Taiwan and Tibet. When Beijing employs bullying tactics against countries with competing claims, it warns Washington not to interfere in China’s affairs. The United States takes no position on the merits of the claims as long as they are settled peacefully, and it has pledged to ensure freedom of navigation in the area.

 

China also vehemently protests America’s Asian bases and military exercises as further evidence of Washington’s strategic “encirclement” of China, rather than a natural reaction to its own increasingly assertive actions. Clearly, China wants the US out of the way as it seeks to work its will in Asia.

 

2.     The United States is trying to contain China’s military rise.

 

Since Nixon went to China, America and the West have been working to expand China’s economic rise and to integrate it diplomatically and politically into the international system. That part of the engagement policy has worked, to China’s great advantage and the benefit of millions of Chinese.

 

Even in the security realm, Washington had been willing to give China the benefit of the doubt during its dramatic military buildup. Putting the best face on it, US policymakers acknowledge that economic power usually leads to military power, if for no other reasons than the accrual of international prestige and the defense of expanding economic interests.

 

THE MONITOR'S VIEW: Can Obama cut the military in the face of a rising China?

 

But that tolerant view ignores three facts:

 

1) China faces no external threat requiring its huge military investment,

2) the US Navy has protected China’s commercial interests along with everyone else’s by keeping the world’s sea lanes open, and

3) China hardly needs weapons systems like long-range ballistic missiles just to ward off Somali pirates.

 

When China decided to accompany its military build-up with threatening rhetoric and actions against the interests of the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian countries, alarm bells finally went off in Washington and the region. Chinese actions are starting to evoke unpleasant memories of Japan’s rise in the 1930s.

 

The bottom line is that Washington is committed to deterring an aggressive, expansionist China and is expanding its regional security ties for that purpose. When Beijing warns its neighbors to remember, “you are small and we are big,” it practically invites big friends of those small countries to undertake some serious containment.

 

3. China and the US don’t share the same concerns about North Korea’s nuclear program.

 

Ever since it was clear that Pyongyang was pursuing a nuclear weapons program, US officials and Asia experts have assured the world that Beijing was every bit as worried as the rest of us – indeed, that proximity to its volatile ally gave it even more cause for concern.

 

Those assurances glossed over the fact that Chinese nuclear technology was the starting point for the North Korean program, both directly and through the proliferation network of Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan, who originally got it from China. They also ignored Beijing’s overwhelming leverage over Pyongyang given the latter’s dependence on Chinese food and fuel.

 

Western equanimity regarding Chinese intentions prevailed despite almost two decades of Beijing’s UN Security Council obstructionism, which shielded North Korea from serious international sanctions.

 

OPINION: Do we really want China to be a responsible stakeholder in global affairs?

 

Moreover, Chinese officials never expressed any of the concerns attributed to them by Western officials and scholars. Instead, they talked blandly of “peaceful resolution” and “the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula,” meaning elimination of a US nuclear deterrent against renewed North Korean aggression.

 

Still, Western governments accepted Beijing’s assurance of cooperation and made it the key player in the six-party talks devoted to reining in the North Korean nuclear program. China’s elevated status as a putative responsible stakeholder brought not only world prestige but also great leverage over Washington in negotiations on a range of other internal and international issues. American officials were reluctant to press China on human rights, Taiwan, or trade because “we need them on North Korea.”

 

Meanwhile, the Pyongyang problem has been a major distraction for US diplomacy and strategic planning, a result not unwelcome in Beijing. As befits longtime allies, China and North Korea, despite occasional frictions, work together to serve their own and each other’s interests, not those of the international community.

 

4. Economic reform will not lead inexorably to political reform.

 

For 30 years, China’s communist leadership has succeeded in largely disproving the liberal Western faith that decentralizing control over the economy would necessarily foster political reform. Taiwan, South Korea, and others have shown that when prosperity builds a middle class and technology provides access to global information, the people will inevitably demand their civil and human rights.

 

But Beijing offers a different, non-democratic, development model for Asia, Africa, and even South America: Discarding most Marxist theory and practice, it retains its Leninist system of governance. Beijing is betting that relative prosperity will keep its populace satisfied and stable and will substitute for the political legitimacy lacking in one-party rule. It also hedges its bet by periodically stirring up Chinese nationalism against perceived threats from outside powers led by the US.

 

5. Washington wants to change China's government.

 

Taiwan and South Korea made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy because their American protector maintained the pressure for political reform. China has been able to defy modern history because the West, without the same leverage over Beijing, has refrained from holding it accountable for its lack of political progress.

 

The shock of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre has long faded, and the broken promises of democratic progress that were prerequisites to awarding Beijing the 2008 Olympics are forgotten. While Western countries sporadically decry China’s terrible human rights record, they never allow the criticism to interfere with business as usual.

 

OPINION: Six reasons to keep America as No. 1 superpower

 

But Western reticence does not mean the ultimate, unstated, goal of a democratic China has disappeared. Washington’s appeals for Beijing to move toward the rule of law, religious liberty, and freedom of expression are inherently subversive for one-party dictatorship. A Chinese government that makes those changes could no longer be called communist. America has more in common with the aspirations of the Chinese people than it does with the interests of China’s present rulers. Beijing understands, and resents, that fact.

 

Joseph A. Bosco served in the office of the secretary of Defense as China country desk officer and previously taught graduate seminars on China-US relations at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. He now writes on national security issues.

 

·          8 reasons America is not in decline

·          3 reasons why China isn't overtaking the US

 

http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0712/Five-tough-truths-about-US-China-relations/China-is-trying-to-supplant-the-US-as-the-leading-military-and-political-power-in-Asia



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二戰以來中美關係紀要 - Allen
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前言

 

美中關係的真正問題是中國的崛起已不可避免,亦無法阻止;美國如何看待此一問題,將決定今後雙方關係的發展。中共的影響力在全世界,尤其在亞洲,只會增加不會減少。而美國當前的戰略是不允許歐亞大陸出現另一個強權。在國際社會中,一個新起的強權往往會對原來的強權挑戰,而原來的強權也力圖壓制新強權的興起,結果不是熱戰就是冷戰。十九世紀末的德國之於英國,二十世紀40年代的德國、日本之於美國,以及50年代之後的蘇聯不都是這種例子嗎?

 

美國在後冷戰時代本可以減少對外干涉,促進多元的國際合作關係;但相反的,美國卻一味以「獨斷主義」(unilateralism),全力鞏固美國的霸權(hegemony)。美國更新的戰略是以「片面保證毀滅」(unilaternally assured destruction)來代替「互相保證毀滅」(mutually assured destruction)。換言之,今後我們生存的國際社會,只有美國可以核子武器攻擊或毀滅其他國家,其他國家均不能對抗或威脅美國。不過,九一一事件證明美國這種想法是不切實際的。美國如不能以平等對待其他國家,如不能公正的處理國際爭端,消除種族仇恨,美國的安全是無法確保的。

 

美國重返東亞的全球策略,在東北亞以聯盟日本鞏固第一島鏈為主,在南亞則以加強越南和菲律賓軍事合作來攪混南海海域。有鑑於此,回顧二次世界大戰以來的中美關係之波折起伏,或許可以讓我們窺見其中之奧秘,並設法致力於中美關係的改善,對世界和平做出一點努力(以下紀要除一些網站搜索整理得來之外,還包括俞力工、關中等先生所提供的資料)- Allen

 

美國出賣中國與俄簽定「雅爾達協定」

 

19452月為了爭取蘇聯對日發動進攻,美國同意恢復在1905年日俄戰爭時蘇俄在中國東北失去的特權為代價,而與史達林簽訂出賣中國的東北和外蒙利益的「雅爾達協定」。

 

韓戰爆之前(1950/6/25)美國準備放棄台灣

 

在中共政權成立之後(1949/10/1)到韓戰爆之前(1950/6/25),美國的政策是放棄台灣,準備承認中共的。1949/10/26 - 27日國務卿艾其遜主持的內部會議決定放棄國民政府,並取消軍援。1223日國務院對駐外單位指示,強調台灣從歷史上,地理上都是中國的一部份,並舉開羅宣言和波茨坦公告,說明台灣歸還中國的經過,還特別指出台灣被中共佔領也不會構成對美國的傷害。195015日,杜魯門公開聲明不干涉中國的內戰。112日艾其遜在演講中,把台灣排除在美國西太平洋防線之外。

 

美國主導《舊金山對日和約》

 

對日戰爭勝利後,韓戰爆發,美國開始炮製台灣由美國或聯合國託管之計畫,由於當時美國正占領日本,日本形同附庸,於是有了1951年美國主導,日本附和,特定49國背書,但中國卻未參加的所謂「美日舊金山和約」。《舊金山和約》,只規定日本放棄台灣及澎湖列島,但卻刻意廻避對台、澎的歸屬作出任何處置,意圖將台灣永遠從中國分裂出去。「美日舊金山和約」在國際行為上是炮製出來的「假條約」,它完全不具正當性,甚至炮製的主要策畫人,當時美國助理國務卿魯斯克(Dean Rusk)後來在回憶錄裡都自承:「這些程序規則是蠻橫的,想起我自己在這些會議策略中所扮演的角色,使我臉紅!」。它是強權自認的超法律行為,這種炮製行為在美國外交史屢見不鮮,「台灣地位未定論」不過是一例而已。

 

韓戰爆之後美國支持「台灣地位未定」

 

1950625日韓戰爆發,美國為了防止戰爭擴大,宣佈台灣海峽中立化。該年10月中共參戰之後,正式與美為敵,美國重新支持台灣,強調「台灣地位未定」,並稱「中共非中國」,拒絕承認中共,並對中共禁運。

 

台灣與美國簽訂《中美共同防禦條約》

 

美國為貫徹其圍堵政策,1954年,亟亟把台灣納入西太平洋的反共軍事聯盟,台灣與美國簽訂《中美共同防禦條約》,成為圍堵共產世界的一環,美國也幾乎在簽訂此條約的同時,正式把釣魚島劃入其託管範圍。1972年,又把該島嶼與琉球一道「移交」給日本。

 

美國開始研究改變對中共政策之可能性

 

1950年代,雖然美國對中共進行圍堵政策,並加強與台灣的聯盟關係,但兩次台海危機(1955年和1958),也使美國體會到中共存在的事實以及與中共直接衝突的危險。因此,美國一方面以大使級談判與中共保持溝通的管道,另方面,也開始研究改變對中共政策之可能性。1959年代美國一個研究機構提出建議,主張美國應採取「一中一台」政策,解除對中共的禁運,使中共取代台灣成為聯合國的常任理事國,此即有名的「康隆報告」。

 

台灣被迫放棄對外蒙古入會的否決權

 

19619月,中國代表權問題首次列入聯合國大會議程,在該年的大會中,由於美國的壓力,台灣被迫放棄對外蒙古入會的否決權。

 

美國推動與中共推動關係正常化

 

1960年代,美國已接受中共「存在」的事實,並企圖以「兩個中國」或「一中一台」來試圖與中共建立關係。由於嗣後美國大力介入越戰,中共與蘇聯的爭執愈演愈烈,以及中共內部之「文化大革命」,一時阻止了美國和中共關係的改善。19697月尼克森在關島提出「尼克森主義」,美國急欲脫身越戰,但美國認為如不能與中共「和解」,此一目標將無法達成,所以美國決心進行與中國關係正常化;一方面,訓令美國駐波蘭大使史托賽爾(Walter Stoessel),以減少在台灣軍力為餌,與中共重啟大使級談判。另一方面,片面宣布一系列對中共示好的措施,如放寬對中共貿易、旅遊的限制,結束第七艦隊在台灣海峽長達19年的巡邏任務。此外,並透過法國、巴基斯坦、和羅馬尼亞等國,向中共轉達改善關係的意圖。

 

「台獨」與「獨台」

 

透過《舊金山和約》這個假條約,美國達到將台灣納為被保護國的目的,它一直延續到1979年的「台灣關係法」,以及2004年美日「二加二會談」將台灣納為日本「周邊有事」的武力干涉範圍。台灣成為美日武力干涉範圍,乃是今天台灣出現「台獨」與「獨台」的原因。「台獨」是台灣成為美日的保護國並改變國號。「獨台」則是承認被保護但不改變國號。

 

中共成為潛在敵人和競爭對手

 

1991年蘇聯解體及東歐國家放棄共產主義制度之後,中共成為世界上「僅存」的共產主義大國。美國既不能放棄其冷戰時代的既得利益,又要以其強大的軍力維持霸權地位,只有把中共當做其潛在敵人和競爭對手,才能說服美國人民繼續支持其對外的強硬政策。美國在第二次世界大戰後,從事長達40幾年的冷戰,主要的理論依據就是「反共」。

 

季辛吉密訪大陸

 

19714月,中共對美國的試探有了正面反應,邀請在日本參加比賽的美國乒乓球對訪問大陸。尼克森立即決定派季辛吉密訪大陸。19717月,季辛吉經由巴基斯坦密訪北京,以美國「不支持兩個中國,不支持一中一台,不支持台獨」向中共交心,並承諾在尼克森第二任的頭兩年內承認中共。季辛吉一開始便向中共保證將協助中共對抗蘇聯的威脅,並主動向中共提供有關蘇聯對中共軍事部署的情報。季辛吉事後稱其訪問為「懷著希望而來,帶著友誼而去」。

 

中共進入聯合國

 

197110月,季辛吉再訪中共,研究安排尼克森訪問中共與發表公報之內容。在同時間,聯合國大會通過接納中共入會,排除台灣的議案。

 

尼克森訪問中共並發表「上海公報」

 

19722月,尼克森訪問中共並發表「上海公報」,正式開啟雙方「關係正常化」的序幕。尼克森稱其訪問為「改變世界的一週」。事實上,雙方以擱置台灣問題來建立共同對抗蘇聯的戰略合作。美國放棄「台灣地位未定」來換取中共支持對越南停火協議的支持;中共則默許美國繼續在亞洲維持軍力,以阻止蘇聯在亞洲建立霸權。

 

中共建交的三條件「斷交、撤軍、廢約」

 

中共對建交的三條件為美國必須與台灣「斷交、撤軍、廢約」,卡特則希望:

 

1.     繼續對台出售武器;

2.     維持對台灣的半官方關係;

3.     中共保證台灣問題和平解決。

 

建交談判因美國堅持對台軍售,幾乎破裂,最後以雙方暫時擱置此一問題的諒解下,達成建交協議。布里辛斯基稱這是一個「歷史性的過渡時期」。

 

1982年「八一七公報」

 

1980年代美中關係的一項大事便是1982年限制對台灣軍售的「八一七公報」,此一公報係中共主動提出,因中共與美建交後,對台灣提出「和平統一、一國兩制」的訴求。在此前提下,中共要求美國逐年減少對台軍售,並希望早日停止。美國雖在公報中作了承諾,但事實上並未減少對台軍售。中共認為中美關係建立在「上海公報」、「建交公報」、和「八一七公報」三個公報的基礎上;美國則認為美國還必須要遵守「台灣關係法」。終1980年代,甚至直到今日,在這一問題上,美中雙方並無「交集」。

 

「天安門事件」

 

1989年六月四日的「天安門事件」使美中關係不僅大幅倒退、甚至瀕臨破裂的邊緣。

 

美中關係倒退

 

繼天安門事件後,1990年代之初三件大事使美中關係雪上加霜:一是蘇聯解體,美國成為世界唯一超強,中共在權力平衡上的戰略價值消失。二是波斯灣戰爭,拉大了美國與其他國家的軍力差距。三是布希為了爭取連任,宣布對台灣出售高達60億美元的150F-16高性能戰機。

 

美國國內反對與中共交往的政策辯論

 

1997 - 1998江澤民與柯林頓互訪,雙方重新建立「戰略地位關係」之際,美國國內卻引發了激烈的政策辯論,反對美國與中共交往的聲勢,為1950年代「麥加錫主義」以來所僅見。反對美國與中共交往的理由,認為中共既不穩定,也不重要,並視中共為美國之威脅,雙方衝突不可避免。所以,美國應採取「制先圍堵」(preemptive containment),及早「壓制」(constrain)中共。

 

小布希對中共的敵視

 

2000年的美國總統大選,共和黨的小布希(George W. Bush)僥倖當選,在就任之後,對中共不但冷淡,甚至敵視。尤其他堅決主張要建立「全國飛彈防禦體系」(NMD),並計劃在亞洲建立「地區飛彈防禦體系」(TMD),對中共來說已極具挑釁性。2001年上半年的美、中軍機撞擊事件,小布希對台灣的「戰略清晰化」講話,以及決定大量對台灣軍售,使得美、中關係又瀕臨「攤牌」的困境。未料「九一一事件」發生後,為了全力反恐,美國不得不爭取中共的合作和支持,雙方關係一夕改變,由小布希口中的「戰略競爭」變成了「戰略合作」關係。



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天下無不散的席 - M. Leonard
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The great Sino-American divorce

 

Mark Leonard, 08/23/12

 

All breakups are tough. But the divorces we have learned to fear the most are protracted, conflict-prone and ultimately unresolved. All the signs are that China and America are in the middle of one of these messy divorces between abusive couples who hate and need one another at the same time. As Washington and Beijing prepare for new political leaderships, they cannot avoid a major renegotiation of the terms of their relationship.

 

Since the global financial crisis in 2008, we have been living through the slow and painful end of Chimerica -- the period when the American and Chinese economies acted as one. It drove one of the longest periods of global growth and prosperity in history. This perfect symbiotic relationship -- popularized by the historian Niall Ferguson -- was based on China saving half of its GDP while America borrowed the money to finance a spending binge it could not afford. The romance ended in September 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Now the terms of the separation between the two nations risk awkward discomfort for the rest of the world.

 

On a recent visit to Beijing, I was struck by the near-universal assumption that American demand will not return to pre-2008 levels. This has led to a lively debate about how to reorient China's economy. On the one hand, China is hedging against the dollar by investing in companies and assets outside the U.S. On the other hand, Beijing is bracing itself for slower growth, while looking for substitutes for exports and fixed investment.

 

There is an ongoing discussion in China about how to encourage the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, how to stimulate domestic consumption and how to invest in social welfare rather than infrastructure. The American economic debate is less strategic, but there is a realization that the level of debt incurred in the boom years is unsustainable and some of the stimulus measures like quantitative easing will make it increasingly unattractive for the Chinese government to stockpile Treasury Bills.

 

As if in anticipation of the "Great Decoupling," the political atmosphere between Washington and Beijing has soured. A film released in the U.S. this week called "Death by China" -- narrated by the nation's favorite fictional president, Martin Sheen -- says that "China is the only major power that is systematically preparing to kill Americans." A publicity poster features a blood-soaked map of the United States stabbed by a huge knife that is engraved with the words "made in China." But the fear-mongering in the film is moderate when compared with the daily attacks on "perfidious" American leaders on Sina Weibo (the Chinese answer to Twitter) or in best-selling books such as "China is Unhappy" (an ultranationalist tract that sold over 1 million non-pirated copies in 2009).

 

Tensions have increased because the post-American world has become a reality -- driving both a weakened Washington and a strengthened Beijing to be more assertive. The hawkish Chinese academic Yan Xuetong claims the world order is changing from "a unipolar system with the United States as its center to a bipolar system with China occupying the other pole." But military conflict is not the only danger. Either protracted competition or a peaceful condominium between the two powers could be almost as damaging for the world.

 

The competition is already on. China's nervous neighbors have welcomed Washington's renewed focus on the region. Collectively the democratic Asian powers -- in alliance with the United States -- have more economic and military might than China (although their economies are utterly dependent on Beijing).

 

Professor Yan Xuetong thinks China should respond to Obama's "pivot" to Asia by revisiting its strategy of "non-alignment." It could forge a formal alliance with Russia, as well as offer security guarantees to other Asian states. Andrew Small, an insightful China watcher, warns that: "We could see a return of a lot of the negative dimensions of the Cold War where attempts to solve global problems, solve regional conflicts or build international institutions are instrumentalized in a contest to change the balance of power between the two poles."

 

Fred Bergsten has long argued that -- instead of competing -- the two largest trading nations, on opposite ends of the world's largest financial imbalance, should form a legal condominium to run the global economy. Zbigniew Brzezinski extended this to the political realm by suggesting an "informal G2" that could find solutions to the global financial crisis <here>, climate change <here>, nuclear proliferation and regional conflicts.

 

This has been shot down by observers like Shi Yinhong, a Chinese academic, who argues that China and the U.S. bring out the worst in each other. "We lend too much money and the American government and people use this money to have an unhealthy mode of life," Professor Shi said."

 

Shi could go further and point to the way that China often makes American capitalists more rapacious, labor unions more protectionist, the military more hawkish and politicians more populist. The specter of American power and the attraction of American markets has a mirror effect in Beijing -- fueling the most regressive aspects of the Chinese economic model and foreign policy. Thus, it is not hard to imagine the two worst polluters in the world -- China and America -- colluding to stop a solution to global warming or undermining multilateral institutions. The competition risks turning two great powers with a history of revolutionary universalism into nations obsessed with their own exceptionalism.

 

More important, the very idea of an international condominium dictating the global order runs against the spirit of a time when citizens and nations want to determine their own futures.

 

As Chimerica dissolves, each variant of the new Sino-U.S. relationship is unattractive. War would be catastrophic, strategic competition could paralyze global governance and a G2 format could bring out the worst attitudes of the two global powers. The only way of avoiding these dystopian futures is to encourage a multilateral order made up of more united regions -- allowing China and America to have a normal relationship.

 

Other powers such as the EU or Japan will not be taken seriously by either China or the U.S. unless they solve their domestic woes and crank up their foreign policy capacity -- moves they show no sign of making at present. Unless they do, they could find themselves trapped in a horrible custody battle between the two divorcing parties.

 

(Mark Leonard, a Reuters Columnist is Co-Founder and Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations and author of "What Does China Think?")

 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/23/us-sino-american-idUSBRE87M17H20120823



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軍備競賽的三大功能
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胡卜凱

中、美之間在今後20 - 30年內發生軍事衝突的機率大概比我上街被汽車撞死的機率小得多。

 

國防規劃與軍備競賽有三個功能:

 

a.     恃吾有以待之;

b.     製造就業機會;

c.     製造牟取暴利及順勢拿回扣(= 貪污?)的機會。

 



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老丐在市長討論中日海戰欄, 以四兩撥千金為題, 回答拙見.

那是引伸解放軍考慮應付美國戰略思想, 所發展出來的戰略.

總的來說, 就是發揮太極拳的精神: 以小勝大, 用飛彈, 來對抗實力比較強大的敵人. 有古代 用弓箭射敵的思想!

其實: 最近美國攻擊伊拉克, 就是使用飛彈打頭陣. 以其治人之道, 還治其人. 美國的NMD, 雖然侉侉其辭, 美國自己最清楚: 這正是他們自己的罩門!

大陸試射東風─41射程蓋全美

  • 2012-08-23 01:18
  •  
  • 旺報
  •  
  • 【記者楊俊斌/綜合報導】

     中國大陸的核子倉庫裡多了一項選擇。射程可涵蓋全美的「東風─41」型洲際導彈,據權威的《詹氏防衛周刊》宣稱,中國二砲部隊在7月24日曾進行試射。試射的結果,讓對手美國相當震驚。

     「東風─41」洲際導彈搭載的核彈頭足以瞄準並摧毀人口超過5萬的美國城市,而且一次可配屬十枚彈頭,可分別瞄準所設定的目標。導彈試射後英國《詹氏防衛周刊》報導表示,發射的就是中國最新型的「東風─41」洲際導彈,它不僅大幅提高了射程,而且還能攜帶多達10枚核彈頭打擊不同目標。

     東風─41導彈現身公路

     《詹氏防衛周刊》22日出刊的報導中指稱,自2007年以來,中國網路上出現多張照片,顯示搭載「東風─41」導彈的運輸/起豎/發射三用車(TEL)出現行駛在高速公路上。

     報導援引美匿名官員的話說,7月24日二炮部隊發射的就是當前中國最先進的「東風─41」洲際導彈,「這是美國當局首度確認該導彈的存在。」過去多彈頭技術,只為美國及俄羅斯擁有,中國二砲部隊的成功試射,讓以美國為主的西方國家十分驚心。「東風─41」可能採用多彈頭獨立重返大氣層載具(MIRV)技術。該技術並非是簡單地在一枚導彈上裝載多枚子彈頭,而是讓每個子彈頭可獨立的飛行彈道,可調整軌跡攻擊不同目標。

     因為多彈頭技術的成熟,如此防衛國際每枚反導彈攔截系統,最多只能摧毀一個小彈頭,讓反導彈系統的效能大為降低。「東風─41」可攜帶多達10枚可導引式核彈頭,將嚴重動搖美國反導彈系統的可靠性。

     《詹氏防衛周刊》表示,和中國現役的「東風─31」洲際導彈一樣,「東風─41」可能也採用所謂的「冷發射」方式,即借助輔助動力單元,先把導彈從發射筒內彈射,在導彈到達一定高度後再點燃主引擎。

     機動平台 位置難偵測

     報導中說,「東風─41」屬三級固態燃料推進,與「東風─31」相比,彈體直徑更大,長度更長,意味著彈頭的威力和射程比過去各型導彈更為可觀。「東風─41」採機動發射車做為發射平台,對對手而言,將更難偵測到它的位置和部署方式。

     據了解,二炮部隊7月24日是從山西五寨導彈基地向數千英里遠的中國西部沙漠發射,而且成功落入預先設定的中國境內。

     中國過去一直表示,不會首先動用核子武器,核子反擊只用於反擊針對其領土的核襲擊。但由於裝備MIRV的洲際導彈是最理想的「第一次核打擊」(打擊軍事目標)武器,「東風─41」不僅是中國第一種攜帶多彈頭的戰略導彈,而且也具備十分可靠的「第一次核打擊能力」,這意味著中國有可能也有本錢改變「不首先使用核武器」的戰略承諾。未來二炮部隊只需要擁有32部可重新裝填的「東風─41」洲際導彈發射裝置,其攜帶的核子彈頭就足以瞄準每一座美國城市。

     最大射程 1.4萬公里

     「東風─41」洲際導彈的最大射程約1.4萬公里,從中國境內發射,射程足以打擊美國全境。早在1992年就有美國學者就提到「東風─41」存在的事實,不過事實證明,美國五角大廈還是有些輕忽新導彈研製的發展。

     熟悉二炮情況的中國軍事專家表示,具備多彈頭獨立重返大氣層載具的第三代洲際導彈,的確是二炮發展方向,但7月的試射並非以此為目的。中國的第三代洲際導彈仍處於研發階段,這次試射主要還是在測試現有導彈武器的性能和可靠性。

     中國軍事專家表示,從技術上來看,第三代洲際導彈完全可抵達全球具有威脅的戰略目標,但中國「不首先使用核武器」的承諾並未改變,中國研製新導彈並沒有明確的對象,只是做為防範可能挑釁中國的敵對勢力。




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兩虎相爭之前車之鑑 - G. Allison
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Thucydides’s trap has been sprung in the Pacific

 

Graham Allison, 08/21/12

 

China’s increasingly aggressive posture towards the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea is less important in itself than as a sign of things to come. For six decades after the second world war, an American “Pax Pacifica” has provided the security and economic framework within which Asian countries have produced the most rapid economic growth in history. However, having emerged as a great power that will overtake the US in the next decade to become the largest economy in the world, it is not surprising that China will demand revisions to the rules established by others.

 

The defining question about global order in the decades ahead will be: can China and the US escape Thucydides’s trap? The historian’s metaphor reminds us of the dangers two parties face when a rising power rivals a ruling power – as Athens did in 5th century BC and Germany did at the end of the 19th century. Most such challenges have ended in war. Peaceful cases required huge adjustments in the attitudes and actions of the governments and the societies of both countries involved.

 

Classical Athens was the centre of civilisation. Philosophy, history, drama, architecture, democracy – all beyond anything previously imagined. This dramatic rise shocked Sparta, the established land power on the Peloponnese. Fear compelled its leaders to respond. Threat and counter-threat produced competition, then confrontation and finally conflict. At the end of 30 years of war, both states had been destroyed.

 

Thucydides wrote of these events: “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable.” Note the two crucial variables: rise and fear.

 

The rapid emergence of any new power disturbs the status quo. In the 21st century, as Harvard University’s Commission on American National Interests has observed about China, “a diva of such proportions cannot enter the stage without effect”.

 

Never has a nation moved so far, so fast, up the international rankings on all dimensions of power. In a generation, a state whose gross domestic product was smaller than Spain’s has become the second-largest economy in the world.

If we were betting on the basis of history, the answer to the question about Thucydides’s trap appears obvious. In 11 of 15 cases since 1500 where a rising power emerged to challenge a ruling power, war occurred. Think about Germany after unification as it overtook Britain as Europe’s largest economy. In 1914 and in 1939, its aggression and the UK’s response produced world wars.

 

Uncomfortable as China’s rise is for the US, there is nothing unnatural about an increasingly powerful China demanding more say and greater sway in relations among nations. Americans, particularly those who lecture Chinese about being “more like us”, should reflect on our own history.

 

As the US emerged as the dominant power in the western hemisphere in about 1890, how did it behave? Future president Theodore Roosevelt personified a nation supremely confident that the next 100 years would be an American century. In the years before the first world war the US liberated Cuba, threatened Britain and Germany with war to force them to accept US positions on disputes in Venezuela and Canada, backed an insurrection that split Columbia to create a new state of Panama – which immediately gave the US concessions to build the Panama Canal – and attempted to overthrow the government of Mexico, which was supported by the UK and financed by London bankers. In the half century that followed, US military forces intervened in “our hemisphere” on more than 30 separate occasions to settle economic or territorial disputes on terms favourable to Americans, or oust leaders we judged unacceptable.

 

To recognise powerful structural factors is not to argue that leaders are prisoners of the iron laws of history. It is rather to help us appreciate the magnitude of the challenge. If leaders in China and the US perform no better than their predecessors in classical Greece, or Europe at the beginning of the 20th century, historians of the 21st century will cite Thucydides in explaining the catastrophe that follows. The fact that war would be devastating for both nations is relevant but not decisive. Recall the first world war, in which all the combatants lost what they treasured most.

 

In light of the risks of such an outcome, leaders in both China and the US must begin talking to each other much more candidly about likely confrontations and flash points. Even more difficult and painful, both must begin making substantial adjustments to accommodate the irreducible requirements of the other.

 

The writer is Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University

 

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5d695b5a-ead3-11e1-984b-00144feab49a.html#axzz24HbM15Kz



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胡卜凱
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我認為「政治是爭奪資源分配權的活動」。推而廣之,「國際政治是國家與國家間爭奪資源分配權的活動」。所以,我認為你「只吃竹子」的比喻,並不適合當前中國的國情和隨之而來的政策。請參考:D. McGroarty, The Resource Wars Are Only Beginning (資源戰才剛開打), https://city.udn.com/2976/4841168,以及中國在非洲的佈局 -- Brendan O'Reilly, China's Winning Strategy in Africa, http://www.realclearworld.com/2012/08/15/chinas_winning_strategy_in_africa_139120.html

 

請參考以下評論:

 

「我認為:

美國是世界唯一的『超強』,大概在5 – 10年內,都會保持這一優勢。而中國在第二梯次各大國中,名列第一。並積極的向美國『迎頭趕上』中。

中、美的執政階層,生活在經濟掛帥的世界。其施政方針都是『將本求利』的理性計算。

中、美雙方都有可以『保證相互毀滅』的核子武器及洲際飛彈。


如果接受這個分析,我可以說,中、美雙方的整體利益,其實是糾纏在一起的。美國如果放棄『中國市場』,其國內經濟會逐漸走向蕭條和崩盤。以中國『發展中』國家的地位,它也沒有放棄『美國市場』的能力。更嚴重的是:如果中、美雙方放棄對方的市場,除了影響國內經濟外,立刻會讓另一貿易圈坐大。


如果中、美雙方有所謂的『矛盾』,那也是局部性、暫時性的。因此,如果有影響對方權益的舉動,雙方都會事先照會對方。以避免不必要的衝突,降低誤會發生的或然率。


另一方面,中、美的執政階層,都有內部的挑戰者,或者說,任何社會的內部,都有想競逐權力的其他團體,都有競逐不同利益的個別階層。因此,不論是民主或威權制度的『國家』,其政策或輿論,從來不是一致或沒有不同意見的。為了調和內部『矛盾』,執政階層的政策論述,往往也不得不表現出『多元性』或『模稜兩可性』。此外,這種國家政策的『多元性』或『兩可性』,也是對外交涉時的籌碼或說辭。(胡卜凱
2005)

我們看歷史上的戰爭或霸權,多數是源自經濟因素。為了驅使人民當炮灰,才搬出什麼『民族』、『國家』、和『宗教』等意識型態。到了今天,所有『鬼話』、『神話』、和『大話』都被解構批判後,要不要為『維持世界第一』而『維持世界第一』,我想中、美兩個國家都會將本求利、精打細算、和量力而為。

-- 胡卜凱,《淺談中、美關係https://city.udn.com/2976/1196451

 

我們人類的確有資源不足資源遞減兩大危機。但思考和解決這兩大危機的方式,未必一定是你死我(才能) (通譯-)的觀點,和根據這個觀點所規劃的策略。

 

拿中國的和平崛起來說,過去30年來中國改革開放成功的因素很多。其中有兩個結構性的必要條件:一個是資本,一個是市場。其他相關的輔助因素我就不在此列舉。

 

我不是研究經濟或貿易的,但是我相信大家回頭查查過去30年來美國在中國的投資金額和比率,以及中、美貿易數字就能了解美國在中國改革開放以及和平崛起的過程中,所扮演的角色

 

過去30年來中、美關係當然是既鬥爭又合作。但總的來說,是一個相輔相成、互助共生的過程(也就是『雙贏)。用普通話來說,中、美從眉來眼去進展到打情罵俏,現在根本就上了床,未來1020年會愛或幹得難分難解。這是討論中、美關係時,不能不面對的第二個現實。也是討論台海關係時,必須了解的現實

-- 胡卜凱,《美國衰落大概不是好事https://city.udn.com/2976/1551447#rep1551447

 

But allowing this much strategic space to China would nonetheless be very difficult politically for American leaders. Indeed it would be unprecedented. America has never dealt with another country in this way before. On the other hand, America has never had to deal with a country as strong as China before, so it is perhaps inevitable that dealing with China will take America into new, uncharted and perhaps uncomfortable territory.

-- H. White, The China Choice: A Bold Vision for U.S.-China Relations (見本欄:中美關係之平起平坐論)

 

White 教授全文主旨就在闡述「雙贏」的概念以及我常引用的「形勢比人強

 

China was a partner in global action problems -- perhaps even a G2 was in the offing! Together we would work on climate change, nonproliferation, who knows what else? Now the United States needs to pivot to Asia to keep China in check.

 

Here is another part of the uncertainty doctrine that must leave Europeans and Middle Easterners scratching their heads: The United States is pivoting to Asia (under fiscal constraint) but not abandoning its allies in Europe or the Middle East. The pivot, we tell the Chinese, is not about them. But then Manila and Tokyo ask: "What do you mean the pivot isn't about China. The Chinese are unwelcome visitors into our waters at least once a week!"

-- D. Blumenthal, The uncertainty doctrine (「說不準主義」:歐巴馬外交政策),

https://city.udn.com/2976/3091681?tpno=0&raid=4859467&cate_no=0#rep4859467

 

Blumenthal教授這段話 -- 尤其who knows what else? -- 說明美、中兩國在全球的「戰略伙伴」關係,對第三世界的老百姓來說,或許「狼狽為奸」更為如實。他的The uncertainty doctrine則印證我上面所說政策多元性」和「模稜兩可性。由於Blumenthal教授提到他用此詞來自量子物理,我把它翻譯成「說不準主義」,與前者的「測不準原理」相呼應。

 

我們看問題要根據目前的現實,以及採用「Wallerstein教授所提出的『全球體系』觀。我們不要再固執於以『國家』為思考分析的單元。而要從『全球體系』觀點來看世界局勢。」 -- 胡卜凱,《美國衰落大概不是好事https://city.udn.com/2976/1551447#rep1551447



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熊貓和老鷹
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老丐對於中美關係, 寄語在拙文: 熊貓和老鷹 

美國是老鷹, 掠食為生.

中國是熊貓, 吃竹子, 性和平.

老鷹想惹熊貓? 討不了好!

也許, 更像: 藺相如與廉頗!




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