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倫理學 -- 開欄文
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瀏覽4,315 ｜回應24｜推薦3 |
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我讀書的興趣和思考的重點在試圖回答：如何「做人」和如何「待人」這兩個問題。我涉獵文學、哲學、心理學、政治學、社會學、認知科學、文化研究等領域，動機都來自試圖回答以上兩個問題。
二十多年來，我在討論不同議題的文章中，依脈絡表達了我對「道德」的看法(我偏向使用「社會規範」這個概念)。今後我將把和它相關的文章集中發表在本欄。
本欄第2篇文章是2002年舊作。該文討論一個案例；同時，它在批評另一位先生大作的過程中，釐清了一些相關概念與盲點；可以做為討論和思考「道德」或「社會規範」的基礎。所以重刊於此。
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「『人』為主體論」 - Bennett Gilbert
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請參見本欄上一篇《引言》。
All that we are
The philosophy of personalism inspired Martin Luther King’s dream of a better world. We still need its hopeful ideas today
Bennett Gilbert, Edited by Sam Dresser, 07/23/24
0. 前言 -- 金恩博士
On 25 March 1965, the planes out of Montgomery, Alabama were delayed. Thousands waited in the terminal, exhausted and impassioned by the march they had undertaken from Selma in demand of equal rights for Black people. Their leader, Martin Luther King, Jr, waited with them. He later reflected upon what he’d witnessed in that airport in Alabama:
As I stood with them and saw white and Negro, nuns and priests, ministers and rabbis, labor organizers, lawyers, doctors, housemaids and shopworkers brimming with vitality and enjoying a rare comradeship, I knew I was seeing a microcosm of the mankind of the future in this moment of luminous and genuine brotherhood.
In the faces of the exhausted marchers, King saw the hope that sustained their hard work against the violence and cruelty that they had faced. It is worth asking: why was King moved to try to create a better world? And what sustained his hope?
A clue can be found in the PhD dissertation he wrote at Boston University Divinity School in 1955:
Only a personal being can be good … Goodness in the true sense of the word is an attribute of personality.
The same is true of love. Outside of personality loves loses its meaning …
What we love deeply is persons – we love concrete objects, persistent realities, not mere interactions. A process may generate love, but the love is directed primarily not toward the process, but toward the continuing persons who generate that process.
King subordinates everything to the flourishing of human persons because goodness in this world has no home other than that of persons. Their wellbeing is what makes the events of our lives and of our collective history worthy of effort and care. In order to demonstrate that we are worth the struggle within and among ourselves, King sought to find love between the races and classes on the basis of philosophical claims about personhood. A decade after his dissertation, he was at the forefront of the Civil Rights movement, marching to Montgomery.
Can we still grasp and live the hope that King found? Capitalism, imperialism, nationalism, racism – like iron filings near a magnet, all these historical forces seem to be pulled together today into one fatal, immiserating direction. They teach us hateful ways to behave and promote heinous vices such as pride and greed. Desires flee beyond prudent limits and rush toward disaster. It seems we are not worth all that we used to think we are worth. Can we replace our narcissism with a virtuous self-regard? The philosophical tradition of personalism tells us that we can and do have hope for our future.
1. 「『人』為主體論」溯源
King’s hope came from his understanding of Christianity through the philosophy of personalism. He largely acquired this line of thought during his graduate studies at Boston. His advisors in Divinity School had been students of Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910), the first philosophy professor at Boston University. Bowne founded Boston personalism, which, with William James’s pragmatism, was one of the two earliest American schools of philosophy. For Bowne, personhood is not the bundles of characteristics we call ‘personality’ (人格). Instead, it is the intelligence that makes reality coherent and meaningful. The core of his thought is that personhood is ‘the deepest thing in existence … [with] intellect as the concrete realisation and source’ of being and causality.
Bowne says that if we dismiss abstractions because they are static and have no force in the world, what is left is solely the ‘power of action’. Action for Bowne is intelligence understood as a force that activates the concrete reality of things. This reality is not static substance but the ceaseless business of the effect that entities have on other entities. Personhood is the non-material and non-biological power of relations among things, which activates all the processes of the world. Reality itself is thus deeply personal. Without personhood, it would be atomised and inactive – and therefore unintelligible. In Bowne’s view, only the concept of intelligent selves is adequate for explaining how things are constituted and inter-related. Being is nothing without causality; causality is nothing without intelligence. Reality is nothing without idea; idea is nothing without reality. This intimate connection of mind and the world means that nothing can be understood apart from the intelligence that perceives and understands it, replacing inert substances with the ever-flowing labours of our human need to find meaning in life as we encounter it.
Bowne’s ideas had many predecessors, from Latin Christianity through Immanuel Kant, using many different theories and concepts, about what a human being is and about the personhood of God in its relation to our own personhood. His forceful argumentation influenced James, who helped found the American philosophical tradition of pragmatism shortly after Bowne’s first books were published and who drew increasingly close to personalism, as did the idealist philosopher Josiah Royce. Bowne was at the centre of this troika of canonical American philosophers at the turn of the 20th century. His teaching rippled out through personalist philosophers on the West Coast and through his students at Boston, notably Edgar S Brightman and Harold DeWulf, both of whom later became teachers of King.
2. 「『人』為主體論」在歐洲
Many other forms of personalism had been developed in Europe in the previous century: theistic and non-theistic, socialist or communitarian and libertarian, abstractly metaphysical and concretely ethical. It is more an approach to thinking than a method, doctrine or school. Personalism always begins its analysis of reality with the person at the centre of consciousness, to which it attaches the most profound worth. Some versions develop this through ontology or metaphysics; some, through theologies associated with most denominations of the Abrahamic religions; and some, through the intersubjective and communitarian nature of human life. My own version makes the structure of moral meaningfulness the first step and first philosophy, as I will explain below. All versions seek an integrated, ethically strong comprehension of personhood as the heart of the life of humankind.
3. 各類 人種提升論及其根源
Though personalism continues to be a field of robust philosophical research, in American academic philosophy after the Second World War it faded under the hegemony of analytic philosophy. But in King’s hands it became forceful as a practice for justice and other moral ends. Its resources have not been exhausted. Careful revision and updating can make it a source of illumination and hope in the circumstances we face a half-century after King.
Why should we update personalism, and what useful purpose will this serve? Our ideas about the nature of human beings are today undergoing a severe challenge by the new philosophies of transhumanism. Through personalism, we can understand and appreciate our purposes and obligations, as well as the dangers posed by transhumanism.
The best known of these transhumanist philosophies is effective altruism (EA). The Centre for Effective Altruism was founded at the University of Oxford in 2012 by Toby Ord and William MacAskill; largely inspired by Peter Singer’s utilitarianism, EA has been an influential movement of our time. As MacAskill defines it in Doing Good Better (2015):
Effective altruism is about asking, ‘How can I make the biggest difference I can?’ And using evidence and careful reasoning to try to find an answer. It takes a scientific approach to doing good.
This is not as clear cut as it might seem, and it has often led to the uncomfortable conclusion that the accumulation of capital by the wealthy is morally necessary in order to affect the world for the better in the future, largely regardless of the consequences for living persons. Its proponents argue that society does not sufficiently plan for the distant future and fails to store up the wealth that our successors will need to solve social and existential challenges.
Other transhumanist theories include longtermism, the idea that we have a moral obligation to provide for the flourishing of successor bioforms and machinic entities in the very distant future, at times regardless of consequences for those now living and their proximate next generations. There is also a kind of rationalism that justifies the moral calculations on which provision for the future instead of for the living is based; cosmism, the vision for exploration and colonisation of other worlds; and transhumanism, which aspires to assemble technologies for the evolution of humankind into successor species or for our replacement by other entities as an inevitable and thereby moral duty. All of these, including the various versions, are sometimes named by the acronym TESCREAL (transhumanism, extropianism, singularitarianism, cosmism, rationalism, effective altruism, longtermism). Here I refer to these as ‘transhumanism’.
The core argument common to these lines of thinking, according to the philosopher Émile Torres writing in 2021, is that:
[W]hen one takes the cosmic view, it becomes clear that our civilisation could persist for an incredibly long time and there could come to be an unfathomably large number of people in the future. Longtermists thus reason that the far future could contain way more value than exists today, or has existed so far in human history, which stretches back some 300,000 years.
From this point of view, human suffering today matters little by the numbers. Nuclear war, environmental collapse, injustice and oppression, tyranny, and oppression by intelligent technology are mere ripples on the surface of the ocean of history.
4. 闡述「『人』為主體論」
Each element of these transhumanist ideologies regards human personhood as a thing that is expiring and therefore to be replaced. As the longtermist Richard Sutton told the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in 2023: ‘it behooves us [humans] … to bow out … We should not resist succession.’ Their proponents argue for the factual truth of their predictions as a way to try to ensure the realisations of their prophecies. According to the theorist Eliezer Yudkowsky, by ‘internalising the lessons of probability theory’ to become ‘perfect Bayesians’, we will have ‘reason in the face of uncertainty’. Such calculations will open a ‘vastly greater space of possibilities than does the term “Homo sapiens”.’
A personalist approach deflates these transhumanist claims. As the historian of science Jessica Riskin has argued, a close examination of the science of artificial intelligence demonstrates that the only intelligence in machines is what people put into them. It is really a sleight-of-hand; there is always a human behind the curtain turning the wizard wheels. As she put it in The New York Review of Books in 2023:
Turing’s literary dialogues seem to me to indicate what’s wrong with Turing’s science as an approach to intelligence. They suggest that an authentic humanlike intelligence resides in personhood, in an interlocutor within, not just the superficial appearance of an interlocutor without; that intelligence is a feature of the world and not a figment of the imagination.
Longtermists’ notions of future entities lack everything we know about conscious intelligence because they use consciousness or living beings as empty black-box words into which even meaningless notions will fit.
Effective altruists dismiss the worth attributable to every human, squashing it by calculations that cannot prescribe moral value, whatever these proponents claim. As we can see in the theories of longtermists such as Nick Bostrom and effective altruists such as Sam Bankman-Fried, instead of working with human ethical values, they work with numerical values, ignoring the massive body of thought from anthropologists such as Webb Keane and from phenomenologists such as Rasmus Dyring, Cheryl Mattingly and Thomas Wentzer showing that values are neither empirical nor quantifiable but nonetheless real forces in human affairs.
Transhumanism as a whole assigns agency to alien beings and electronic entities that do not exist – and perhaps are inconceivable.
This idea of the agency of the inorganic is one of the key arguments for decentring the human. Consider, for example, salt. Salt affords certain effects in certain conditions: it produces a specific taste, it corrodes other materials, it serves certain functions in organisms. But it is humans who organise these events under the concept of causality. What salt does, it does without consciousness. Consciousness neither starts nor halts its effects, broadly speaking. What sense is there, then, in saying that salt has agency when it is more illuminating to say that it is a cause of effects under some conditions?
In ordinary language, we frequently speak of machinery or ideas ‘doing’ things in our lives. But they do nothing. People – human persons – produce, operate and apply their creations. The problem with assigning agency, even informally, to the nonhuman is that this disguises the strength of human control, limited though it is in other respects. It leaves us unaware when a more toxic and cunning human drives to take control because we are busy trying to control the world rather than ourselves. Although some people think that machines or ideas are in control of them, it is really other humans. If we overlook this truth, we accept an untruth – an untruth that condemns us to the mercy of our worst drives and behaviours. When we devalue humanity, we unleash our self-destructive drives, thereby turning reason into destructive irrationality. In this way, we are in fact governed by our own human drive for self-destruction.
This drive seems to differentiate us from other animals as much as language or historicity do. If we provoke this drive too much, we shall have nowhere else to turn in our struggle to flourish in the natural world. We must, instead, search out our integrity and worth because the alternative is despair.
The great and encompassing thing that humans create is our story: human history, the sum of our behaviour and our deeds. We create it with and amid the world around us out of our need to make sense of the world. This need, which builds our moral life, is part of what drives everything we do. It drives the ways we pursue survival, for, without a sense of meaning, we have little will to survive. The pursuit of survival can lead us to meaningfulness but, if it fails to do so, the pursuit itself ceases. We guide ourselves by the stories we choose, for storytelling inhabits all ways of knowing and acting. If the meaning we seek as human persons is overtaken by the story that our self-destructive drive presents in the form of transhumanism, we shall not survive.
Persons are worth more than even justice and goodness are, because it is for the sake of persons that we fight for justice and goodness. In the face of possible profound changes, it often seems we must choose between being good and just to ourselves, and being good and just toward nature. The possibility of these radical changes legitimately requires that we profoundly deflate our anthropocentrism, since overblown self-regard has served us poorly. But how do we do this while encouraging our fraught capabilities and appreciating the worth of our flawed species?
The kind of personalism that I have developed out of Bowne’s ideas as a response to this and other questions I call moral agency personalism. Moral agency is the activity of judging and choosing between good and evil, right and wrong, justice and injustice. In my view, every thing that has such moral agency is a person, and all persons are moral agents. (The evidence that some nonhuman species make moral choices, sometimes based on memory and history, has been accumulating.) Adding this possibility to personalism formally recognises worth in all persons, nonhuman as well as human. As a belief and a practice, it can ground a virtuous, as opposed to vicious, self-regard that human and nonhuman persons can exercise for themselves and for other persons. This kind of self-regard is distinct from self-importance.
We can develop a moral agency personalism that has some of the resources we need in facing the human future. We can find these by altering some fundamental concepts of personalism. These updates include: accepting the fact of nonhuman moral agents or persons; including the body in our understanding of individual lives and of interpersonal relations; and rethinking the idealist ontology in personalism in order to make it an ethics-as-first-philosophy approach, with less emphasis on ontology. The guiding idea of these changes is that, in making moral sense out of experience, personal moral agency enlarges our relations to the whole range of our lives and our care for all beings.
Personalism gives us robust resources for identifying our worth and for believing in it. It can encourage us to enhance our worth by our acts in seeking goodness, compassion and justice, and guide us to the richest possible moral life. Because our personhood is the home base of our point of view, there is no way forward other than to maintain our integrity while learning what we must in order to thrive.
The initial and most basic of these resources we should tap is the strength not to do more harm. We are the ones who deploy transhumanist projects into the only world that sustains us. We are the ones degrading the environment. And we are the only ones who can stop us from doing both. For this, we need to respect ourselves as persons with the power to decide not to continue to harm. This is the minimum we must do.
Respecting the moral worth of persons also ignites our capacity to care for others. We respond with aid to calls for help when we learn to recognise moral obligation pertaining to every person, including ourselves, and toward every other person. Furthermore, our humanitarian disposition is frequently a sure way to developing sympathy for the natural world and the life within it.
Understanding our personal moral agency enables a wise combination of the two general forces of moral action: power and compassion. Power is the logic by which we carry ideas and lines of thought to fulfilment in activity. Compassion is the potentially unbounded lovingkindness with which we temper power and extend love to widening spheres in our lives. So far as we know, we are the only living beings who can use these forces in moral decision-making. But even if other beings have moral personhood, nothing of the sort relieves us of the moral obligation that our possession of these two capabilities makes it possible to accept and to follow.
We possess our history, just as we make it – another resource that is unique to us, so far as we know. History is the engine of self-awareness. As the substance of all that we have done and the actual conditions for the possibility of all that is and will be, historical consciousness serves us as the indispensable locus of reflection and deliberation. No unchanging and antiquated images of ourselves restrain our understanding of history because we create the past anew whenever we study it and reflect on it. It is therefore the great endowment for a renewed humanistic extension of personhood to all humankind and to all life.
There are two more resources, pointing to opposite ends of the spectrum of our concerns. The first is that the personalist grasp of what we are worth supports democracy. Democracy has depended on a powerful conception of personal agency and responsibility that cultural and political changes now challenge, in addition to the material issues of human life in the Anthropocene era. These social and natural developments closely reflect each other. Learning to live together is the worthy goal of democracy. But if we are to pursue concord and peace by that road, we must value ourselves, accept our moral nature with its obligations, submit our desires to what the moral worth of every living being requires of us, and work in response to present and patent human suffering and real human joy.
At the opposite end, on the cosmic scale, lies another possibility for virtuous human self-regard afforded us by personalism. Simply put, it is this: it might become clear to us that the universe is constitutively pervaded by consciousness, or is conscious in all its parts, or is inside of a super-consciousness. These are versions of the notion of cosmic consciousness called panpsychism. Panpsychism is not just about what we can know or do but about reality itself. This appeals to those who have for a moment felt the life of the universe in a small experience and do not want to dismiss what that feeling says and means to them just because it is not empirically verifiable. In our best moments, our lives feel epiphanous.
At the same time, however, panpsychism can conflict with the empiricism that is so valuable because it is used to make things that work well for us. And yet other kinds of things, such as erotic love and spirituality, also work well for us and are not conducive to the usual demands of empiricism. For now, it is easy to think that a universal consciousness makes our consciousness unimportant, but there might be ways of getting the opposite outcome. Current advances in physics and biology are starting to support the belief that our consciousness affects reality by working with reality as a consciousness that includes ours. That is, our observing and predicting are inside, not outside, the phenomena we encounter. We are not the crown jewels of creation, but our self-referentiality, our critical awareness and our moral lives form personhood as an important part of a universe that is thereby less alien and cold.
If a suitable form of panpsychism is true, human personhood means more to reality than is usually thought. This kind of personalism puts us into a community or, rather, into many communities made up of conscious beings capable of moral responsibility. The moral agency of persons thrives when agents reflectively act in obligation to their individual and collective selves rather than in seeing themselves through the needs of imagined others in the undetermined future.
What King observed in Montgomery airport in 1965 was actual persons developing their moral purchase with each other. He saw this as the processes of goodness and love at work in their proper sphere: our common existence. King wanted us not only to recognise the unique and infinite value of every person, but to understand it so powerfully that we would feel ourselves obliged to take the action that this recognition requires. As he wrote, we need only look around us at the struggles for a decent and free life that others wage to sense the profundity of human worth and to see that we all depend on one another. That this has the power to inspire us to fight for change sustained his hopes.
We face an urgent present choice. We might prefer that algorithms or despots act for us because our own power of judgment is too explosive to manage. That would suit the purposes of infomaniacal hypercapitalism, which seeks to control consumers rather than to enrich persons. But turning over our judgment to machines does not lock away our power to destroy ourselves and others. We must govern ourselves even as we evolve. This requires an enduring connection to our humanity and a willingness to work hard with one another. This can be successful only if and when we hold fast to all that we are.
Bennett Gilbert is adjunct assistant professor of history and philosophy at Portland State University, US. He is the author of A Personalist Philosophy of History (2019) and Power and Compassion: On Moral Force Ethics and Historical Change (forthcoming from Amsterdam University Press), as well as numerous papers, and is co-editor of Ethics and Time in the Philosophy of History: A Cross-Cultural Approach (2023).
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History of ideasThinkers and theoriesValues and beliefs
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《「『人』為主體論」》引言
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我在一年多以前讀到這篇文章(請見本欄下一篇)；由於它近4,000字，我一時之間沒能仔細讀完。前幾天整理檔案夾時，瀏覽了一下，覺得值得介紹。雖然目前沒有功夫就該文作者介紹的思想做深入了解，好歹必須把它放到《優先閱讀清單》上。
先就該文作者吉爾柏教授大作主題 ”personalism” 一字的中譯做個詮釋。由於我們已經有「人文主義」(視其內涵或譯「人本論」)，我只好就我的了解，將此倫理學思想譯為「『人』為主體論」。是否信、達，尚祈指正。
原文沒有分節；為了便於指涉和討論，我照慣例將各段落依主旨分節並加上「子標題」與序號(包括「前言」)。如有誤解或錯誤，敬請指教。
該文用到許多哲學專業名詞，我先提供其中兩個的索引：
a. effective altruism：效益利他論(以效益為行動指標的利他思想)
b. transhumanism：人種提升論；「人種」在此為生物學或分類學的「用法」，不是政治語言或社會衝突的「用法」。
最後，我先做三個短評(以後再長篇大論之)：
1) 我同意，也支持：「『人』為主體論」的基本思想；吉爾柏教授大作中自然有可商酌之處。
2) 某些「人種提升論」者—尤其是有專業知識的人—由於不敢或不願面對自己當下責任，拿這個概念做地洞或遮羞布；他/她們以「提升」來掩飾自己的沒有種。
3) 我接受「個人本位方法論」，也曾把它幾度應用到政治分析場合(此文第4節)。所以，我非常同意吉爾柏教授在其大作第4節第8段的評論(1)。
附註：
1. “In ordinary language, we frequently speak of machinery or ideas ‘doing’ things in our lives. But they do nothing. People – human persons – produce, operate and apply their creations. The problem with assigning agency, even informally, to the nonhuman is that this disguises the strength of human control, limited though it is in other respects. It leaves us unaware when a more toxic and cunning human drives to take control because we are busy trying to control the world rather than ourselves. …”
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新教教義：面對暴力第三條路 - Paul Ian Clarke
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我對古希伯萊地區的文化和社會毫無所知，無法為下文作者克拉克牧師的「詮釋」背書，當然也無從否定它們。
尼切相當博學，又是鑽研「訓詁學」出身；他對古希伯萊文化和社會應該知之甚詳。如果我這個了解成立；在克拉克牧師的「詮釋」下，則尼切對基督教倫理的批判就有偏頗之嫌。請參考《道德沿革考》的簡介(視頻，約42分鐘)。我沒有能力申論這麼大的議題，只在此根據常理提出一點淺見。這是我認為克拉克牧師「詮釋」欠缺說服力的原因之一。
另一方面，閱讀和解讀典籍，需要了解和根據其立論脈絡(時代、社會、文化、目的、…)，是「審問」、「慎思」、「明辨」一系列步驟的立論基礎。
Turning the Other Cheek Isn’t What You Think
Why Jesus’ words were never about being a doormat — and how they reveal a creative path to justice
Paul Ian Clarke, 08/30/25
We’ve all heard the phrases: “an eye for an eye,” “turn the other cheek,” “go the extra mile.” They’ve slipped into our everyday speech, but do we really understand what they meant in Jesus’ day? And what they might mean for us now?
Let’s start with that old phrase, “an eye for an eye.”
To modern ears, it sounds harsh, even barbaric. But when it was first written into the law of Moses 3,000 years ago, it was groundbreaking. Before then, tribal feuds could last for years, spiralling from one insult into bloodshed that consumed entire communities. This law was about limiting revenge: if someone wronged you, the punishment could go this far and no further. It drew a line under endless cycles of violence.
But then Jesus comes along, on that Galilean hillside, and says: “You’ve heard it said, an eye for an eye… but I tell you, do not resist an evildoer. If anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also.”
On the surface, that sounds like submission. Keep quiet, let people walk all over you, be a doormat for the glory of God. But is that really justice?
The False Choice: Violence or Submission
We tend to think our only options are fight back with violence or give in completely.
* If a child is falsely accused by a teacher, should she rage in the head’s office, or quietly accept a punishment she doesn’t deserve?
* If an employee is unfairly dismissed, does he shout at his boss, or just go home in silence?
* If a woman is trapped in an abusive relationship, does she lash out, or remain a victim of violence?
* If two nations face off on the brink of war, must they either fight, or surrender their moral ground?
Violence or submission. Neither looks much like justice.
Yet, Jesus offers a third way, a way that resists injustice without mirroring it, and reclaims dignity without perpetuating harm.
Turning the Other Cheek
In first-century Palestine, striking someone with the back of the right hand wasn’t random violence, it was a way of asserting dominance over someone considered “beneath you,” like a servant or slave.
If the victim “turned the other cheek,” the aggressor faced a dilemma. They couldn’t use their left hand (that was reserved for unclean tasks), and to slap with the open hand was to treat the other as an equal. By offering the other cheek, the victim wasn’t submitting, they were demanding dignity.
“Hit me again if you must,” the gesture says, “but do it as an equal.”
Hand Over Your Cloak
Jesus then adds: “If anyone sues you for your coat, give them your cloak as well.”
In first-century terms, your cloak was what kept you from being exposed, literally. To offer your cloak as well as your coat would leave you naked, but it also flipped the shame onto the accuser. In Jewish law, seeing another’s nakedness brought dishonour. By giving everything, the victim shifted the power dynamic and the oppressor was the one left shamed.
Going the Extra Mile
We often hear “go the extra mile” as a motivational slogan. Work harder, do more. But in Jesus’ time, it had a far sharper edge.
Under Roman law, a soldier could force a civilian to carry his gear, but only for one mile. Going further wasn’t an act of generosity; it put the soldier himself at risk of punishment. Suddenly the power shifts. The centurion, once so commanding, is begging you to stop.
This is not passive submission. This is creative resistance.
From Jesus to Gandhi to King
History shows us how powerful this “third way” can be. Gandhi drew on these very teachings in his movement for Indian independence. Martin Luther King Jr. embraced them in the Civil Rights Movement.
Both refused to return violence with violence. Both refused to be silent victims. Both stood firm with dignity, and in doing so, changed the course of history.
The Justice Jesus Offers
As theologian Tom Wright puts it, “Jesus offers a new sort of justice, a creative, healing, restorative justice.”
Turning the other cheek, handing over the cloak, walking the second mile, these aren’t calls to submission. They are acts of bold, nonviolent defiance. They are ways to stand firm against injustice without becoming part of its endless cycle.
Maybe that’s what our world needs now more than ever: people brave enough to choose neither violence nor silence, but a third way, the way of restoration.
Written by Paul Ian Clarke
I’m an Anglican Priest and the Curator of Sacred and Secular, who loves exploring how we navigate faith in our modern lives. If you’d like more reflections like this, I write daily for my Sacred & Secular newsletter here.
I also write about the strange and beautiful places where faith meets ordinary life. Join my newsletter at www.sacredandsecular.co.uk
Published in Backyard Church
Thoughts on applying a 2000 year old religion to 21st Century life.
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又一位不賣川普帳的藝術家 -- Aleena Fayaz
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Kennedy Center president rebukes performer who called off Christmas Eve show over addition of Trump’s name
Aleena Fayaz, CNN, 12/27/25
Kennedy Center president Richard Grenell lambasted a performer’s decision to cancel an annual Christmas Eve jazz concert, following the addition of President Donald Trump’s name to the Washington, DC, arts venue.
In a letter, which the Kennedy Center shared a copy of with CNN, Grenell sharply criticizes jazz artist Chuck Redd’s actions and praises Trump for his leadership as the center’s chairman — a role the president’s handpicked board elected him to early in his second term after he ousted his predecessor.
“Your decision to withdraw at the last moment—explicitly in response to the Center’s recent renaming, which honors President Trump’s extraordinary efforts to save this national treasure—is classic intolerance and very costly to a non-profit Arts institution,” Grenell, a longtime Trump confidant, wrote to Redd on letterhead bearing the new “Trump Kennedy Center” logo.
The Associated Press first reported on the letter.
Redd told CNN on Wednesday that he canceled the holiday jazz concert, which he has hosted for nearly two decades, after seeing the board’s move to rename the building last week.
“I’ve been performing at the Kennedy Center since the beginning of my career and I was saddened to see this name change,” Redd said.
Grenell goes on to fault Redd for financial fallout relating to what he called a “political stunt” and said the center will seek $1 million in damages.
CNN has reached out to Redd for comment on the letter.
Roma Daravi, vice president of public relations at the Kennedy Center, echoed Grenell’s sentiment, arguing that Redd “failed to meet the basic duty of a public artist: to perform for all people.”
“Art is a shared cultural experience meant to unite, not exclude,” Daravi said in a statement to CNN. “The Trump Kennedy Center is a true bipartisan institution that welcomes artists and patrons from all backgrounds—great art transcends politics, and America’s cultural center remains committed to presenting popular programming that inspires and resonates with all audiences.”
The cancelation of the free “Jazz Jam” show followed a vote by the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts’s board of trustees to rename the cultural institution for both the Democratic former president and Trump last week.
In the hours after the vote, the center updated its website and the following day installed new signage to the facade of the building bearing Trump’s name.
The move quickly sparked outrage from Kennedy family, lawmakers and patrons of the historic center, including a lawsuit from one Democratic congresswoman challenging whether the board has the authority to rename the facility, which Congress designated in 1964 as a memorial to the 35th president.
Prior to the renaming, Trump’s overhaul of the center was already raising concerns about lost revenue as both artists and audiences flee for other venues. Artists including Issa Rae, Renée Fleming, Shonda Rhimes and Ben Folds resigned from their leadership roles or canceled events at the space. And Jeffrey Seller, producer of the hit musical “Hamilton,” canceled the show’s planned run earlier this year.
This holiday season, lagging ticket sales have also impacted “The Nutcracker,” historically one of the center’s most popular events. Approximately 10,000 seats were sold for this year’s production across seven performances, compared with around 15,000 seats each in the 2021 through 2024 performances, according to internal sales data reviewed by CNN.
The Kennedy Center comped (免費、贈送) approximately five times more tickets for the performances this year than in the past four years, the data showed. And this year’s show has fallen about half a million dollars short of its $1.5 million budgeted revenue goal.
This story has been updated with additional details.
CNN’s Betsy Klein contributed to this report.
For more CNN news and newsletters create an account at CNN.com
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民歌音樂家拒在川普--甘迺迪音樂廳演唱 -- Geoff Herbert
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有「原則」者的行事風格；此之謂：「富貴不能淫，貧賤不能移，威武不能屈」(《孟子•·滕文公下》第7)。
Singer cancels Kennedy Center concert after Trump name change
Geoff Herbert, 12/24/25
A singer-songwriter is refusing to perform at the Trump-Kennedy Center after the venue’s name changed.
Kristy Lee announced Monday that she canceled her scheduled performance at the Washington, D.C., arts institution scheduled for Jan. 14, 2026. The move came days after President Donald Trump’s name was added to the former John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts.
“I don’t have much power, and I don’t run with the big dogs who do. I’m just a folk singer from Alabama, slinging songs for a living,” Lee wrote on social media. “Hell, my songs are really just my own diary set to music. They’re not polished or hit songs, but they’re my truth and nobody can take that from me. I’m proud of that.”
“I believe in the power of truth, and I believe in the power of people. And I’m gonna stand on that side forever. I won’t lie to you, canceling shows hurts. This is how I keep the lights on. But losing my integrity would cost me more than any paycheck,” she continued. “When American history starts getting treated like something you can ban, erase, rename, or rebrand for somebody else’s ego, I can’t stand on that stage and sleep right at night. America didn’t get built by branding. It got built by people showing up and doing the work. And the folks who carry it don’t need their name on it, they just show up. That’s all I’m doing here. I’m showing up.”
Her post went viral, generating hundreds of thousands of likes, shares and comments. She thanked fans for their support and said she plans to instead perform virtually at home on Jan. 14.
Congress designated the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in 1964 as a memorial to JFK, who was assassinated. Last week, the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees — of which Trump is the chair — voted to change its official name to The Donald J. Trump and The John F. Kennedy Memorial Center for the Performing Arts.
The move was criticized by the Kennedy family and Democratic lawmakers, who questioned whether the board can legally change the venue’s name without Congressional approval. The Broadway musical “Hamilton” also canceled a performance at the Kennedy Center earlier this year when Trump forced out its leadership and took over as chair of the board of trustees.
The naming controversy also came as Trump hosted the “Kennedy Center Honors,” which aired on CBS Tuesday night under its original name. 2025 honorees included the rock band KISS, theater star Michael Crawford, country legend George Strait, actor Sylvester Stallone, and singer Gloria Gaynor.
“Tell me what you think of my ‘Master of Ceremony’ abilities. If really good, would you like me to leave the Presidency in order to make ‘hosting’ a full time job?” Trump joked on Truth Social before the broadcast.
In a statement, Lee elaborated Tuesday that she believes “efforts to impose political branding” on the former Kennedy Center compromise its original mission to be a nonpartisan national cultural institution, honoring JFK’s “belief that the arts are essential to democracy, free expression, and the public good.” Lee added that she believes “publicly funded cultural spaces must remain free from political capture, self-promotion, or ideological pressure.”
Read the original article on syracuse.com.
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人工智能在倫理領域的適用性 - Elad Uzan
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下文一來過長；二來也過於專門 -- 全文引用了哥斗大名和他的「不完整原理」共60次；我看過幾篇討論哥斗和「不完整原理」的論文，不幸的是我一直沒有抓到此理論的要點。從而，我不認為自己有能力了解烏壤博士的論點；也就沒有花時間把整篇文章讀完。
在「人工智能『瘋』」猛刮的「時代精神」下，討論它在處理理倫理學議題的「適用性」，相信下文有點看頭；此外，烏壤博士也討論到人工智能運作原理，對此領域相當外行如我這樣的人，應可參考。
The incompleteness of ethics
Many hope that AI will discover ethical truths. But as Gödel shows, deciding what is right will always be our burden
Elad Uzan, Edited by Edited byNigel Warburton, 08/05/25
Imagine a world in which artificial intelligence is entrusted with the highest moral responsibilities: sentencing criminals, allocating medical resources, and even mediating conflicts between nations. This might seem like the pinnacle of human progress: an entity unburdened by emotion, prejudice or inconsistency, making ethical decisions with impeccable precision. Unlike human judges or policymakers, a machine would not be swayed by personal interests or lapses in reasoning. It does not lie. It does not accept bribes or pleas. It does not weep over hard decisions.
Yet beneath this vision of an idealised moral arbiter lies a fundamental question: can a machine understand morality as humans do, or is it confined to a simulacrum of ethical reasoning? AI might replicate human decisions without improving on them, carrying forward the same biases, blind spots and cultural distortions from human moral judgment. In trying to emulate us, it might only reproduce our limitations, not transcend them. But there is a deeper concern. Moral judgment draws on intuition, historical awareness and context – qualities that resist formalisation. Ethics may be so embedded in lived experience that any attempt to encode it into formal structures risks flattening its most essential features. If so, AI would not merely reflect human shortcomings; it would strip morality of the very depth that makes ethical reflection possible in the first place.
Still, many have tried to formalise ethics, by treating certain moral claims not as conclusions, but as starting points. A classic example comes from utilitarianism, which often takes as a foundational axiom the principle that one should act to maximise overall wellbeing. From this, more specific principles can be derived, for example, that it is right to benefit the greatest number, or that actions should be judged by their consequences for total happiness. As computational resources increase, AI becomes increasingly well-suited to the task of starting from fixed ethical assumptions and reasoning through their implications in complex situations.
But what, exactly, does it mean to formalise something like ethics? The question is easier to grasp by looking at fields in which formal systems have long played a central role. Physics, for instance, has relied on formalisation for centuries. There is no single physical theory that explains everything. Instead, we have many physical theories, each designed to describe specific aspects of the Universe: from the behaviour of quarks and electrons to the motion of galaxies. These theories often diverge. Aristotelian physics, for instance, explained falling objects in terms of natural motion toward Earth’s centre; Newtonian mechanics replaced this with a universal force of gravity. These explanations are not just different; they are incompatible. Yet both share a common structure: they begin with basic postulates – assumptions about motion, force or mass – and derive increasingly complex consequences. Isaac Newton’s laws of motion and James Clerk Maxwell’s equations are classic examples: compact, elegant formulations from which wide-ranging predictions about the physical world can be deduced.
Ethical theories have a similar structure. Like physical theories, they attempt to describe a domain – in this case, the moral landscape. They aim to answer questions about which actions are right or wrong, and why. These theories also diverge and, even when they recommend similar actions, such as giving to charity, they justify them in different ways. Ethical theories also often begin with a small set of foundational principles or claims, from which they reason about more complex moral problems. A consequentialist begins with the idea that actions should maximise wellbeing; a deontologist starts from the idea that actions must respect duties or rights. These basic commitments function similarly to their counterparts in physics: they define the structure of moral reasoning within each ethical theory.
Just as AI is used in physics to operate within existing theories – for example, to optimise experimental designs or predict the behaviour of complex systems – it can also be used in ethics to extend moral reasoning within a given framework. In physics, AI typically operates within established models rather than proposing new physical laws or conceptual frameworks. It may calculate how multiple forces interact and predict their combined effect on a physical system. Similarly, in ethics, AI does not generate new moral principles but applies existing ones to novel and often intricate situations. It may weigh competing values – fairness, harm minimisation, justice – and assess their combined implications for what action is morally best. The result is not a new moral system, but a deepened application of an existing one, shaped by the same kind of formal reasoning that underlies scientific modelling. But is there an inherent limit to what AI can know about morality? Could there be true ethical propositions that no machine, no matter how advanced, can ever prove?
These questions echo a fundamental discovery in mathematical logic, probably the most fundamental insight ever to be proven: Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. They show that any logical system powerful enough to describe arithmetic is either inconsistent or incomplete. In this essay, I argue that this limitation, though mathematical in origin, has deep consequences for ethics, and for how we design AI systems to reason morally.
表單的底部
Suppose we design an AI system to model moral decision-making. Like other AI systems – whether predicting stock prices, navigating roads or curating content – it would be programmed to maximise certain predefined objectives. To do so, it must rely on formal, computational logic: either deductive reasoning, which derives conclusions from fixed rules and axioms, or else on probabilistic reasoning, which estimates likelihoods based on patterns in data. In either case, the AI must adopt a mathematical structure for moral evaluation. But Gödel’s incompleteness theorems reveal a fundamental limitation. Gödel showed that any formal system powerful enough to express arithmetic, such as the natural numbers and their operations, cannot be both complete and consistent. If such a system is consistent, there will always be true statements it cannot prove. In particular, as applied to AI, this suggests that any system capable of rich moral reasoning will inevitably have moral blind spots: ethical truths that it cannot derive. Here, ‘true’ refers to truth in the standard interpretation of arithmetic, such as the claim that ‘2 + 2 = 4’, which is true under ordinary mathematical rules. If the system is inconsistent, then it could prove anything at all, including contradictions, rendering it useless as a guide for ethical decisions.
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems apply not only to AI, but to any ethical reasoning framed within a formal system. The key difference is that human reasoners can, at least in principle, revise their assumptions, adopt new principles, and rethink the framework itself. AI, by contrast, remains bound by the formal structures it is given, or operates within those it can modify only under predefined constraints. In this way, Gödel’s theorems place a logical boundary on what AI, if built on formal systems, can ever fully prove or validate about morality from within those systems.
Most of us first met axioms in school, usually through geometry. One famous example is the parallel postulate, which says that if you pick a point not on a line, you can draw exactly one line through that point that is parallel to the original line. For more than 2,000 years, this seemed self-evident. Yet in the 19th century, mathematicians such as Carl Friedrich Gauss, Nikolai Lobachevsky and János Bolyai showed that it is possible to construct internally consistent geometries in which the parallel postulate does not hold. In some such geometries, no parallel lines exist; in others, infinitely many do. These non-Euclidean geometries shattered the belief that Euclid’s axioms uniquely described space.
This discovery raised a deeper worry. If the parallel postulate, long considered self-evident, could be discarded, what about the axioms of arithmetic, which define the natural numbers and the operations of addition and multiplication? On what grounds can we trust that they are free from hidden inconsistencies? Yet with this challenge came a promise. If we could prove that the axioms of arithmetic are consistent, then it would be possible to expand them to develop a consistent set of richer axioms that define the integers, the rational numbers, the real numbers, the complex numbers, and beyond. As the 19th-century mathematician Leopold Kronecker put it: ‘God created the natural numbers; all else is the work of man.’ Proving the consistency of arithmetic would prove the consistency of many important fields of mathematics.
The method for proving the consistency of arithmetic was proposed by the mathematician David Hilbert. His approach involved two steps. First, Hilbert argued that, to prove the consistency of a formal system, it must be possible to formulate, within the system’s own symbolic language, a claim equivalent to ‘This system is consistent,’ and then prove that claim using only the system’s own rules of inference. The proof should rely on nothing outside the system, not even the presumed ‘self-evidence’ of its axioms. Second, Hilbert advocated grounding arithmetic in something even more fundamental. This task was undertaken by Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead in their monumental Principia Mathematica (1910-13). Working in the domain of symbolic logic, a field concerned not with numbers, but with abstract propositions like ‘if x, then y’, they showed that the axioms of arithmetic could be derived as theorems from a smaller set of logical axioms. This left one final challenge: could this set of axioms of symbolic logic, on which arithmetic can be built, prove its own consistency? If it could, Hilbert’s dream would be fulfilled. That hope became the guiding ambition of early 20th-century mathematics.
It was within this climate of optimism that Kurt Gödel, a young Austrian logician, introduced a result that would dismantle Hilbert’s vision. In 1931, Gödel published his incompleteness theorems, showing that the very idea of such a fully self-sufficient mathematical system is impossible. Specifically, Gödel showed that if a formal system meets several conditions, it will contain true claims that it cannot prove. It must be complex enough to express arithmetic, include the principle of induction (which allows it to prove general statements by showing they hold for a base case and each successive step), be consistent, and have a decidable set of axioms (meaning it is possible to determine, for any given statement, whether it qualifies as an axiom). Any system that satisfies these conditions, such as the set of logical axioms developed by Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica, will necessarily be incomplete: there will always be statements that are expressible within the system but unprovable from its axioms. Even more strikingly, Gödel showed that such a system can express, but not prove, the claim that it itself is consistent.
Gödel’s proof, which I simplify here, relies on two key insights that follow from his arithmetisation of syntax, the powerful idea of associating any sentence of a formal system with a particular natural number, known as its Gödel number.
First, any system complex enough to express arithmetic and induction must allow for formulas with free variables, formulas like S(x): ‘x = 10’, whose truth value depends on the value of x. S(x) is true when x is, in fact, 10, and false otherwise. Since every statement in the system has a unique Gödel number, G(S), a formula can refer to its own Gödel number. Specifically, the system can form statements such as S(G(S)): ‘G(S) = 10’, whose truth depends on whether S(x)’s own Gödel number equals 10.
Second, in any logical system, a proof of a formula S has a certain structure: starting with axioms, applying inference rules to produce new formulas from those axioms, ultimately deriving S itself. Just like every formula S has a Gödel number G(S), so every proof of S is assigned a Gödel number, by treating the entire sequence of formulas in the proof as one long formula. So we can define a proof relation P(x, y), where P(x, y) holds if and only if x is the Gödel number of a proof of S, and y is the Gödel number of S itself. The claim that x encodes a proof of S becomes a statement within the system, namely, P(x, y).
Third, building on these ideas, Gödel showed that any formal system capable of expressing arithmetic and the principle of induction can also formulate statements about its own proofs. For example, the system can express statements like: ‘n is not the Gödel number of a proof of formula S’. From this, it can go a step further and express the claim: ‘There is no number n such that n is the Gödel number of a proof of formula S.’ In other words, the system can say that a certain formula S is unprovable within the system. Fourth, Gödel ingeniously constructed a self-referential formula, P, that asserts: ‘There is no number n such that n is the Gödel number of a proof of formula P.’ That is, P says of itself, ‘P is not provable.’ In this way, P is a formal statement that expresses its own unprovability from within the system.
It immediately follows that if the formula P were provable within the system, then it would be false, because it asserts that it has no proof. This would mean the system proves a falsehood, and therefore is inconsistent. So if the system is consistent, then P cannot be proved, and therefore P is indeed unprovable. This leads to the conclusion that, in any consistent formal system rich enough to express arithmetic and induction, there will always be true but unprovable statements, most notably, the system’s own claim of consistency.
The implications of Gödel’s theorems were both profound and unsettling. They shattered Hilbert’s hope that mathematics could be reduced to a complete, mechanical system of derivation and exposed the inherent limits of formal reasoning. Initially, Gödel’s findings faced resistance, with some mathematicians arguing that his results were less general than they appeared. Yet, as subsequent mathematicians and logicians, most notably John von Neumann, confirmed both their correctness and broad applicability, Gödel’s theorems came to be widely recognised as one of the most significant discoveries in the foundations of mathematics.
Gödel’s results have also initiated philosophical debates. The mathematician and physicist Roger Penrose, for example, has argued that they point to a fundamental difference between human cognition and formal algorithmic reasoning. He claims that human consciousness enables us to perceive certain truths – such as those Gödel showed to be unprovable within formal systems – in ways that no algorithmic process can replicate. This suggests, for Penrose, that certain aspects of consciousness may lie beyond the reach of computation. His conclusion parallels that of John Searle’s ‘Chinese Room’ argument, which holds that this is so because algorithms manipulate symbols purely syntactically, without any grasp of their semantic content. Still, the conclusions drawn by Penrose and Searle do not directly follow from Gödel’s theorems. Gödel’s results apply strictly to formal mathematical systems and do not make claims about consciousness or cognition. Whether human minds can recognise unprovable truths as true, or whether machines could ever possess minds capable of such recognition, remains an open philosophical question.
However, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems do reveal a deep limitation of algorithmic reasoning, in particular AI, one that concerns not just computation, but moral reasoning itself. Without his theorems, it was at least conceivable that an AI could formalise all moral truths and, in addition, prove them from a consistent set of axioms. But Gödel’s work shows that this is impossible. No AI, no matter how sophisticated, could prove all moral truths it can express. The gap between truth claims and provability sets a fundamental boundary on how far formal moral reasoning can go, even for the most powerful machines.
This raises two distinct problems for ethics.
The first is an ancient one. As Plato suggests in the Euthyphro, morality is not just about doing what is right, but understanding why it is right. Ethical action requires justification, an account grounded in reason. This ideal of rational moral justification has animated much of our ethical thought, but Gödel’s theorems suggest that, if moral reasoning is formalised, then there will be moral truths that cannot be proven within those systems. In this way, Gödel did not only undermine Hilbert’s vision of proving mathematics consistent; he may also have shaken Plato’s hope of fully grounding ethics in reason.
The second problem is more practical. Even a high-performing AI may encounter situations in which it cannot justify or explain its recommendations using only the ethical framework it has been given. The concern is not just that AI might act unethically but also that it could not demonstrate that its actions are ethical. This becomes especially urgent when AI is used to guide or justify decisions made by humans. Even a high-performing AI will encounter a boundary beyond which it cannot justify or explain its decisions using only the resources of its own framework. No matter how advanced it becomes, there will be ethical truths it can express, but never prove.
The development of modern AI has generally split into two approaches: logic-based AI, which derives knowledge through strict deduction, and large language models (LLMs), which predict meaning from statistical patterns. Both approaches rely on mathematical structures. Formal logic is based on symbolic manipulation and set theory. LLMs are not strictly deductive-logic-based but rather use a combination of statistical inference, pattern recognition, and computational techniques to generate responses.
Just as axioms provide a foundation for mathematical reasoning, LLMs rely on statistical relationships in data to approximate logical reasoning. They engage with ethics not by deducing moral truths but by replicating how such debates unfold in language. This is achieved through gradient descent, an algorithm that minimises a loss function by updating weights in the direction that reduces error, approximates complex functions that map inputs to outputs, allowing them to generalise patterns from vast amounts of data. They do not deduce answers but generate plausible ones, with ‘reasoning’ emerging from billions of neural network parameters rather than explicit rules. While they primarily function as probabilistic models, predicting text based on statistical patterns, computational logic plays a role in optimisation, rule-based reasoning and certain decision-making processes within neural networks.
But probability and statistics are themselves formal systems, grounded not only in arithmetic but also in probabilistic axioms, such as those introduced by the Soviet mathematician Andrey Kolmogorov, which govern how the likelihood of complex events is derived, updated with new data, and aggregated across scenarios. Any formal language complex enough to express probabilistic or statistical claims can also express arithmetic and is therefore subject to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. This means that LLMs inherit Gödelian limitations. Even hybrid systems, such as IBM Watson, OpenAI Codex or DeepMind’s AlphaGo, which combine logical reasoning with probabilistic modelling, remain bound by Gödelian limitations. All rule-based components are constrained by Gödel’s theorems, which show that some true propositions expressible in a system cannot be proven within it. Probabilistic components, for their part, are governed by formal axioms that define how probability distributions are updated, how uncertainties are aggregated, and how conclusions are drawn. They can yield plausible answers, but they cannot justify them beyond the statistical patterns they were trained on.
At first glance, the Gödelian limitations on AIs in general and LLMs in particular may seem inconsequential. After all, most ethical systems were never meant to resolve every conceivable moral problem. They were designed to guide specific domains, such as war, law or business, and often rely on principles that are only loosely formalised. If formal models can be developed for specific cases, one might argue that the inability to fully formalise ethics is not especially troubling. Furthermore, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems did not halt the everyday work of mathematicians. Mathematicians continue to search for proofs, even knowing that some true statements may be unprovable. In the same spirit, the fact that some ethical truths may be beyond formal proof should not discourage humans, or AIs, from seeking them, articulating them, and attempting to justify or prove them.
But Gödel’s findings were not merely theoretical. They have had practical consequences in mathematics itself. A striking case is the continuum hypothesis, which asks whether there exists a set whose cardinality lies strictly between that of the natural numbers and the real numbers. This question emerged from set theory, the mathematical field dealing with collections of mathematical entities, such as numbers, functions or even other sets. Its most widely accepted axiomatisation, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory with the Axiom of Choice, underlies nearly all modern mathematics. In 1938, Gödel himself showed that the continuum hypothesis cannot be disproven from these axioms, assuming they are consistent. In 1963, Paul Cohen proved the converse: the continuum hypothesis also cannot be proven from the same axioms. This landmark result confirmed that some fundamental mathematical questions lie beyond formal resolution.
The same, I argue, applies to ethics. The limits that Gödel revealed in mathematics are not only theoretically relevant to AI ethics; they carry practical importance.
First, just as mathematics contains true statements that cannot be proven within its own axioms, there may well be ethical truths that are formally unprovable yet ethically important – the moral equivalents of the continuum hypothesis. These might arise in systems designed to handle difficult trade-offs, like weighing fairness against harm. We cannot foresee when, or even whether, an AI operating within a formal ethical framework will encounter such limits. Just as it took more than 30 years after Gödel’s incompleteness theorems for Cohen to prove the independence of the continuum hypothesis, we cannot predict when, if ever, we will encounter ethical principles that are expressible within an AI’s ethical system yet remain unprovable.
Second, Gödel also showed that no sufficiently complex formal system can prove its own consistency. This is especially troubling in ethics, in which it is far from clear that our ethical frameworks are consistent. This is not a limitation unique to AI; humans, too, cannot prove the consistency of the formal systems they construct. But this especially matters for AI because one of its most ambitious promises has been to go beyond human judgment: to reason more clearly, more impartially, and on a greater scale.
Gödel’s results set a hard limit on that aspiration. The limitation is structural, not merely technical. Just as Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity places an upper speed limit on the Universe – no matter how advanced our spacecraft, we cannot exceed the speed of light – Gödel’s theorems impose a boundary on formal reasoning: no matter how advanced AI becomes, it cannot escape the incompleteness of the formal system it operates within. Moreover, Gödel’s theorems may constrain practical ethical reasoning in unforeseen ways, much as some important mathematical conjectures have been shown to be unprovable from standard axioms of set theory, or as the speed of light, though unreachable, still imposes real constraints on engineering and astrophysics. For example, as I write this, NASA’s Parker Solar Probe is the fastest human-made object in history, travelling at roughly 430,000 miles (c700,000 km) per hour, just 0.064 per cent of the speed of light. Yet that upper limit remains crucial: the finite speed of light has, for example, shaped the design of space probes, landers and rovers, all of which require at least semi-autonomous operation, since radio signals from Earth take minutes or even hours to arrive. Gödel’s theorems may curtail ethical computation in similarly surprising ways.
There is yet another reason why Gödel’s results are especially relevant to AI ethics. Unlike static rule-based systems, advanced AI, particularly large language models and adaptive learning systems, may not only apply a predefined ethical framework, but also revise elements of it over time. A central promise of AI-driven moral reasoning is its ability to refine ethical models through learning, addressing ambiguities and blind spots in human moral judgment. As AI systems evolve, they may attempt to modify their own axioms or parameters in response to new data or feedback. This is especially true of machine learning systems trained on vast and changing datasets, as well as hybrid models that integrate logical reasoning with statistical inference. Yet Gödel’s results reveal a structural limit: if an ethical framework is formalised within a sufficiently expressive formal system, then no consistent set of axioms can prove all true statements expressible within it.
To illustrate, consider an AI tasked with upholding justice. It may be programmed with widely accepted ethical principles, for example fairness and harm minimisation. While human-made models of justice based on these principles are inevitably overly simplistic, limited by computational constraints and cognitive biases, an AI, in theory, has no such limitations. It can continuously learn from actual human behaviour, refining its understanding and constructing an increasingly nuanced conception of justice, one that weaves together more and more dimensions of human experience. It can even, as noted, change its own axioms. But no matter how much an AI learns, or how it modifies itself, there will always be claims about justice that, while it may be able to model, it will never be able to prove within its own system. More troubling still, AI would be unable to prove that the ethical system it constructs is internally consistent – that it does not, somewhere in its vast web of ethical reasoning, contradict itself – unless it is inconsistent, in which case it can prove anything, including falsehood, such as its own consistency.
Ultimately, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems serve as a warning against the notion that AI can achieve perfect ethical reasoning. Just as mathematics will always contain truths that lie beyond formal proof, morality will always contain complexities that defy algorithmic resolution. The question is not simply whether AI can make moral decisions, but whether it can overcome the limitations of any system grounded in predefined logic – limitations that, as Gödel showed, may prevent certain truths from ever being provable within the system, even if they are recognisable as true. While AI ethics has grappled with issues of bias, fairness and interpretability, the deeper challenge remains: can AI recognise the limits of its own ethical reasoning? This challenge may place an insurmountable boundary between artificial and human ethics.
The relationship between Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and machine ethics highlights a structural parallel: just as no formal system can be both complete and self-contained, no AI can achieve moral reasoning that is both exhaustive and entirely provable. In a sense, Gödel’s findings extend and complicate the Kantian tradition. Kant argued that knowledge depends on a priori truths, fundamental assumptions that structure our experience of reality. Gödel’s theorems suggest that, even within formal systems built on well-defined axioms, there remain truths that exceed the system’s ability to establish them. If Kant sought to define the limits of reason through necessary preconditions for knowledge, Gödel revealed an intrinsic incompleteness in formal reasoning itself, one that no set of axioms can resolve from within. There will always be moral truths beyond its computational grasp, ethical problems that resist algorithmic resolution.
So the deeper problem lies in AI’s inability to recognise the boundaries of its own reasoning framework – its incapacity to know when its moral conclusions rest on incomplete premises, or when a problem lies beyond what its ethical system can formally resolve. While humans also face cognitive and epistemic constraints, we are not bound by a given formal structure. We can invent new axioms, question old ones, or revise our entire framework in light of philosophical insight or ethical deliberation. AI systems, by contrast, can generate or adopt new axioms only if their architecture permits it and, even then, such modifications occur within predefined meta-rules or optimisation goals. They lack the capacity for conceptual reflection that guides human shifts in foundational assumptions. Even if a richer formal language, or a richer set of axioms, could prove some previously unprovable truths, no finite set of axioms that satisfies Gödel’s requirements of decidability and consistency can prove all truths expressible in any sufficiently powerful formal system. In that sense, Gödel sets a boundary – not just on what machines can prove, but on what they can ever justify from within a given ethical or logical architecture.
One of the great hopes, or fears, of AI is that it may one day evolve beyond the ethical principles initially programmed into it and simulate just such self-questioning. Through machine learning, AI could modify its own ethical framework, generating novel moral insights and uncovering patterns and solutions that human thinkers, constrained by cognitive biases and computational limitations, might overlook. However, this very adaptability introduces a profound risk: an AI’s evolving morality could diverge so radically from human ethics that its decisions become incomprehensible or even morally abhorrent to us. This mirrors certain religious conceptions of ethics. In some theological traditions, divine morality is considered so far beyond human comprehension that it can appear arbitrary or even cruel, a theme central to debates over the problem of evil and divine command theory. A similar challenge arises with AI ethics: as AI systems become increasingly autonomous and self-modifying, their moral decisions may become so opaque and detached from human reasoning that they risk being perceived as unpredictable, inscrutable or even unjust.
Yet, while AI may never fully master moral reasoning, it could become a powerful tool for refining human ethical thought. Unlike human decision-making, which is often shaped by bias, intuition or unexamined assumptions, AI has the potential to expose inconsistencies in our ethical reasoning by treating similar cases with formal impartiality. This potential, however, depends on AI’s ability to recognise when cases are morally alike, a task complicated by the fact that AI systems, especially LLMs, may internalise and reproduce the very human biases they are intended to mitigate. When AI delivers a decision that appears morally flawed, it may prompt us to re-examine the principles behind our own judgments. Are we distinguishing between cases for good moral reasons, or are we applying double standards without realising it? AI could help challenge and refine our ethical reasoning, not by offering final answers, but by revealing gaps, contradictions and overlooked assumptions in our moral framework.
AI may depart from human moral intuitions in at least two ways: by treating cases we see as similar in divergent ways, or by treating cases we see as different in the same way. In both instances, the underlying question is whether the AI is correctly identifying a morally relevant distinction or similarity, or whether it is merely reflecting irrelevant patterns in its training data. In some cases, the divergence may stem from embedded human biases, such as discriminatory patterns based on race, gender or socioeconomic status. But in others, the AI might uncover ethically significant features that human judgment has historically missed. It could, for instance, discover novel variants of the trolley problem, suggesting that two seemingly equivalent harms differ in morally important ways. In such cases, AI may detect new ethical patterns before human philosophers do. The challenge is that we cannot know in advance which kind of departure we are facing. Each surprising moral judgment from AI must be evaluated on its own terms – neither accepted uncritically nor dismissed out of hand. Yet even this openness to novel insights does not free AI from the structural boundaries of formal reasoning.
That is the deeper lesson. Gödel’s theorems do not simply show that there are truths machines cannot prove. They show that moral reasoning, like mathematics, is always open-ended, always reaching beyond what can be formally derived. The challenge, then, is not only how to encode ethical reasoning into AI but also how to ensure that its evolving moral framework remains aligned with human values and societal norms. For all its speed, precision and computational power, AI remains incapable of the one thing that makes moral reasoning truly possible: the ability to question not only what is right, but why. Ethics, therefore, must remain a human endeavour, an ongoing and imperfect struggle that no machine will ever fully master.
Elad Uzan is a departmental lecturer at the Blavatnik School of Government, as well as a member of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford. He was awarded the American Philosophical Association’s Baumgardt Memorial Fellowship in 2023 and will present the Baumgardt Memorial Lectures at the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics in 2025.
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海爾博士的大作介紹基於天主教思想的倫理學(請見本欄上一篇)。
我認為：海爾博士的論述前提 -- 「(人)本有的尊嚴」和「(人)『理性』而『自由』」(見下文第1段) -- 並沒有堅實的基礎；它們甚至也可視為一種「意識型態」(見下文第2段)，只不過性質溫和且不以吃人為目的而已。但兩者仍然有妨礙人們認清現實從而有效處理之的負面作用。
從第7段起，海爾博士介紹希爾德布蘭博士的學說。可惜只有陳述而無論說，不足以讓有不同立場者信服。
「道德的邪惡起於邪惡意念」這個命題顯然難逃「套套邏輯」之譏；「邪惡起於『驕傲』和『慾望』」則近於不食人間煙火(兩者見第8段)。不客氣的說，在羅馬教會神職人員性侵青少年醜聞全球飛後，這類象牙塔式論述只有「食古不化」足堪比擬。
第9 – 11三段則進一步闡釋希爾德布蘭博士對「驕傲」、「慾望」、和「邪惡」的理解和口誅筆伐。如我上一段的批評，他完全無視於人「存在」的「生活世界」，而從一個處於虛無飄渺環境的視野立論。
全文最後5段從略。
總之，我的論述前提和兩位博士的出發點完全不同；我們觀點間的南轅北轍也就其理甚明了。
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邪惡之源 -- John-Paul Heil
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What turns men into moral monsters?
John-Paul Heil, 07/04/25
Pope Leo XIV has evil on his mind. Following in his predecessor’s footsteps, the first American pontiff remains deeply concerned with the problems facing modernity. While his initial comments about AI, couched within the context of his choice of papal name, have received significant and insightful attention, the Pope seems to view artificial intelligence as emblematic of a larger second Industrial Revolution, which risks degrading the inherent dignity of the human person. His comments remind us of Leo XIII’s critique of communism and unchecked consumptive labor practices during the first Industrial Revolution. Dehumanizing cultural forces can only exist within a world that has more broadly rejected an adequate anthropology of the human being as rational and free, male and female, created for and only fulfilled by a complete and total gift of self to another.
When this vision of the human person is lost, and societies embrace a reductive view of what it means to be human, atrocities will undoubtedly follow. Something like a second Industrial Revolution, and the threat it poses to the dignity of humanity and the value of human labor, can only arise in “a world that suffers a great deal of pain due to wars, violence and poverty.” The pope echoed this in his recent calls to fellow religious leaders to reject “ideological and political conditioning” and to “be effective in saying ‘no’ to war and ‘yes’ to peace, ‘no’ to the arms race and ‘yes’ to disarmament, ‘no’ to an economy that impoverishes peoples and the Earth and ‘yes’ to integral development.” But this still does not address the origins of evil, and how war, violence, and an impoverished world can emerge in the first place.
Fortunately, we can uncover further insight in a recently rediscovered philosophical treatment of where evil comes from, stemming from the same traditions that formed Pope Leo. Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889–1977) was a Catholic philosopher steeped in the critiques of modernity articulated by Leo XIII, which prepared him to be an early and staunch activist against the rise of Nazism in Germany. Hildebrand was, like John Paul II and Edith Stein, a phenomenologist greatly occupied with what it means for human beings to be persons, and with how our being persons distinguishes us from the rest of creation and reality. Personhood reveals our particular dignity, inspired deeply by the thought of St. Augustine.
These two strands of Hildebrand’s thought, phenomenology and personalism, led him to compose Ethics, an account of how human action comes about and what constitutes a good or evil act. Though an extremely influential text, Hildebrand’s Ethics only treated the origins of moral evil—and especially evil’s emergence from pride and concupiscence—in passing. Recently, however, Czech scholar Martin Cajthaml located an enormous treatise on this subject in Hildebrand’s Nachlass (his unedited notes and documents left behind as part of his literary estate) now collected and revised for the first time as The Roots of Moral Evil.
The release of this text corresponds providentially with the election of Pope Leo XIV, as Hildebrand’s arguments reveal greater insight into the philosophical and theological groundwork of this pontificate. As the early comments of his papacy show, and recent studies of his dissertation as a young Augustinian confirm, Leo’s vision of the Church is rooted in Vatican II’s Christian personalism and the phenomenological concerns that occupied Hildebrand as much as John Paul II, especially how the human heart turns away from the love of the one, beautiful, true, and good to the love of lesser things. To understand how Pope Leo is addressing the evils of our world, we should consult Hildebrand.
As a student of Edmund Husserl, Hildebrand became an early and central thinker in the new philosophy of phenomenology, focused on what scholar Michael Waldstein calls “an account of what is itself present or given in our conscious awareness or experience,” or, more simply, that sees the path to objective truth as rooted in our real and subjective (though not relativistic) encounter with things as they are. Phenomenology begins not with the postulation of hypotheticals but with our being in reality. Through our real encounter with the being of things, we begin to see (at least in the phenomenology of Christian philosophers like Hildebrand and John Paul II) Being itself as something real which is not itself a thing, even a very powerful or supreme thing. Rather, Being underpins and goes beyond material phenomena.
With this attention to subjectivity, the dignity of the human person becomes clear. We recognize in our encounter with real Being its total infinitude and absolute glory beyond reality itself, yet we can only begin to understand Being through analogy with reality, something strongly emphasized by Augustine. Augustine also highlights how Being is not some ultimate monad, disinterested unmoved mover, nor transcendent Platonic form pouring out existence because it cannot help it. Rather, Being is personal, inviting us through the Logos into a transcendent life which is an interpersonal and eternal pure act of love. Inscribed into each human being is the call to be with divine Being, which is mysteriously and simultaneously beyond us and for us, completely perfect and needing nothing, and yet desiring a perfect union of love with each human being. We see imaged in our natures, in the desire to make a complete and total gift of ourselves to another through love, a perfect analogy for the interpersonal love that is the life of Being and a universal call to happiness and perfection with the Truth, a being-with-Being, that is only possible if we love others as we have been loved into being: through a gratuitous and sacrificial gift.
If this is our call, why do we reject it? Explaining this is Hildebrand’s herculean task. As Cajthaml notes in his introductory study, Hildebrand rejects the Platonic and Aristotelian notions of evil as ignorance or hamartia, missing the mark. Rather, like Augustine, Hildebrand “locates moral evil in evil will” rather than a malformed intellect: “pride and concupiscence,” Hildebrand writes, both of which are failures of the will, “are always at the basis of all moral evil.”
Hildebrand sees concupiscence as being “characterized by the turning to the merely subjectively satisfying as the one exclusive measure of our life—implying an outspoken indifference toward the reign of morally relevant values and any value or importance-in-itself.” Straightforwardly, this means that we tend to choose, to will, to pursue something we find pleasurable in the moment rather than seek after that which we know to be right. We often prefer the action that gives us subjective pleasure over something that’s intrinsically better. We will take the lesser pleasure for ourselves rather than the higher good because we want the lesser pleasure, darn it!
Though concupiscence and pride share a common denominator -- egocentrism –they differ insofar as the concupiscent man “plunges into subjectively satisfying goods and throws himself away on them,” while the prideful man “is characterized by a reflexive gazing at himself.” The concupiscent man, Hildebrand suggests, “exclusively seeks to taste the various pleasures and views the world under the category of the agreeable,” whereas the proud man “is centered on his self-glory, the consciousness of his own importance, and excellence, and his masterly sovereignty.” Drawing explicitly on Augustine, Hildebrand distinguishes concupiscence and pride by concluding that “concupiscence refers to a having; pride to a being. Concupiscence is a perversion in the sphere of the possession of a good; pride is a perversion in the attitude toward one’s own perfection.” The worst type of pride is satanic, a “reversal of St. Catherine’s prayer … ‘That Thou be all and I, nothing.’ Its innermost gesture repeats to God: ‘That I may be, and Thou shalt not be.’”
The egocentrism that underlies all evil, from the least serious form of concupiscence to this lowest and most extreme form of metaphysical pride, always requires those who will it to undertake a self-blinding. If the heart of phenomenology and the realization of our human dignity requires an encounter with being, with created reality, then the roots of moral evil stem from the choice to turn our backs on what we see. We will ourselves to pay attention to something we know is less important, or something that gives us a certain kind of self-satisfying pleasure at the expense of a better good. It is particularly common for us to want to pay too much attention to ourselves.
This self-blinding results from what Hildebrand identifies as an absorption in an immanent logic, by which he means the logic of a particular activity. Though this absorption does not always result in evil and indeed is a prerequisite for human craft—an attentive mechanic, for instance, should be absorbed in the immanent logic of a car he is repairing—“as soon as this immanent logic absorbs us to such an extent that we no longer situate the end of our activity within the hierarchy of values, that we are no longer concerned with the place that our ends holds in this hierarchy, we have fallen prey to the immanent logic of our activity.” We will, consciously or otherwise, to hold something of lesser value as more important than something of greater value: Hildebrand uses the example of a leader of a charitable organization who, though initially well-intentioned, becomes so wrapped up in the practical and monetary affairs of getting the organization off the ground that he is led to sin.
Hildebrand’s arguments show that the roots of moral evil and the temptation to self-blind, to dis-order the hierarchy of values which has at its summit the love of God and neighbor, are relentless. Though we may be inclined to believe that our disordered subjective pleasures remain only with us, Hildebrand warns that sinful absorption into immanent logic can not only be taken up by whole societies but also brought to bear against their most vulnerable.
Hildebrand encountered this firsthand. As papal biographer George Weigel noted, Hildebrand resigned in 1933 from Germany’s leading Catholic academic society to protest the “‘ignominious affair’” of one of their lecturers declaring that “the Third Reich [was] the realization of the Body of Christ in the secular world”—a fascistic disordering that revealed the Reich as sacrilegious in its theology as it was anthropologically and morally bankrupt. Hildebrand immediately wrote to friends to argue that “‘it is completely immaterial if [this] Antichrist refrains from attacking the Church for political reasons, or if he concludes a Concordat with the Vatican. What is decisive is the spirit that animates him, the heresy he represents, the crimes committed at his behest. God is offended regardless of whether the victim of murder is a Jew, a Socialist, or a bishop. Blood that has been innocently spilled cries out to heaven.”
In the Third Reich’s supremely prideful immanent logic, ideology is ordered above innocence, above the human person, and above God. Pope Leo identifies this same sort of immanent logic, the logic of a new industrialization that seeks to void all aspects of the imago Dei inscribed into our natures, as threatening the human person on all sides. What, then, can practically break us out of a pleasure-focused concupiscence, a self-centered pride, or a totalizing immanent logic? What helps us to see reality well?
Leo seems to be following Hildebrand’s path. Hildebrand’s personalism developed into an account of the sexual difference, nuptial gift, and family that was foundational for John Paul II’s famous theology of the body. Leo echoes this turn in his recent declarations that “it is the responsibility of government leaders to work to build harmonious and peaceful civil societies [which] can be achieved above all by investing in the family, founded upon the stable union between a man and a woman.” Our families force us to reexamine our priorities, remind us that we are not living for ourselves and our pleasures alone, shake us out of believing that we are perfect, and break us out of immanent logics that demand too much from us: they force us to encounter reality. Hildebrand and Leo both point us to how concupiscence, pride, and immanent logic are toxic to the life of the family, the very life that reflects, better than anything else in reality, the life of the Being that moves the universe through love.
John-Paul Heil is a Core Fellow at Mount St. Mary's University. His writing has appeared in TIME, The Week, and Smithsonian.
Book Reviewed：
The Roots of Moral Evil by Dietrich von Hildebrand
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普通(人的)倫理學：「虛無主義」、「自由意志」、和「社會規範」
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0. 前言
這篇文章介紹我的「倫理觀」；我把它稱之為「普通(人的)倫理學」。本文組織如下：
1) 第1節列舉我所接受的四種「前提」和/或「立場」；它們是我思路的起點和論述的前提/依據。
2) 第2節批判我所了解的「虛無主義」；我認為建立任何「倫理學」論述之前，必須破除這個思想。
3) 第3節討論我對「自由意志」概念的了解，並肯定它的存在；這是我建立自己「倫理觀」的基礎。第2、3兩節屬於「倫理學基礎論」領域。
4) 第4節分析「社會規範」的概念；它屬於「應用倫理學」領域。
5) 第5節做一個簡單的總結。
我在「後記」一節中，附上20多年來討論和本文相關議題的拙作，以及一部份我讀到學者的評論；請參考。
1. 論述前提和判斷立場
在許多學者對知識的「社會性」做了深入研究，得到廣泛的共識後，「學術中立」的觀念已經過時。代之而起的是：
1) 文化和社會對知識的制約。
2) 理論/學問的「宰制性質」。
前者指的是：任何學說或理論都是建構在某些預設的「論述前提」和「判斷立場」之上。「立場」在此指：我們從自己文化傳承和「社會存在」形塑而成的個人「定位」/「認同」。
後者指的是：許多理論/學問都有為特定階層、群體、集團、利益組合「服務」的「性質」和/或「目的」。「『誰』的知識？」這個戰鬥口號把這種觀點表達得淋漓盡致
我基本上也接受這兩種看法。以下列舉我現在所接受的、和這篇文章相關的四種前提和/或立場。
1) 在本體論上，我接受「唯物論」；我採取「自然環境客觀存在」這個觀點。
2) 在認識論上，我接受「經驗論」和「相對觀」；在處理公共議題上我盡可能使用理性思考的方式。
3) 在倫理學上，我接受「相對觀」和「效益論」。
這些觀點或立場的內容以及我接受它們的原因，不在這篇文章討論範圍。我把它們列舉在這裏的目的是：幫助讀者了解本文思考的方向和方式，以及我推論所依據的「基本假設」。
2. 虛無主義
尼切對「(倫理學)虛無主義」的描述是：
「從根本上否定價值、意義、和對目的的追求(欲望)」(1)。
屠格涅夫給虛無主義的定義則是：
「一個『虛無主義者』拒絕承認任何權威；她/他也拒絕接受任何一個未經證實的原則，不論該原則被多少人尊重」。
尼切和達斯妥也夫斯基對虛無主義的「立場」請見此處。
如果虛無主義成立，倫理學就沒有立論的基礎。所以我認為：在討論倫理學之前，應該先全面檢討虛無主義的適用性。在尼切對虛無主義的定義中，我們可以從「否定」的程度，將它分別成三個層次：
1) 全面性的虛無主義；
2) 局部性的虛無主義；
3) 策略性的虛無主義。
2.1 本體論
本體論中的虛無主義至少要同時包含下面兩個主張：
1) 無神論；也就是說：不承認有上帝或絕對精神之類的說法。
2) 絕對唯心論；也就是說：不承認自然環境的客觀存在。
中國傳統哲學大多承認天、地的存在。就我所知，傳統中國哲學中很少有主張絕對唯心論的學者。在文藝復興以前，西方學者中不承認神、上帝、或絕對精神之類說法的哲學家，大多是唯物論者。所以，中、西思想史上在近代之前，本體論中很少有採取虛無主義立場的學者。
佛教的中觀學派是思想史上最接近虛無主義的本體論學說。
絕對唯心論者，往往在本體論上接近虛無主義；柏克萊就是一個例子。另一方面，正是因為一個人肯定了上帝的存在，她/他才能有把握否定物的存在。但當上帝存在與否本身成為問題時，絕對唯心論者在本體論上就有無家可歸的徬徨了。中國有句老話：「皮之不存，毛將焉附」；我們可以順著它的思考模式說：「物之不存，心將焉附」。這是絕對唯心論者在本體論上的困境。
2.2 認識論
凡是具備以下任何一個主張的學說，都可被看成認識論中的虛無主義：
1) 否定客觀知識的可能性；也就是說：認為知識完全是主觀的建構。
2) 否定語言、文字具有確定或客觀的意義；也就是說：對一篇文章或作品的任何詮釋，都具有同等級的意義，或都沒有意義。
傅柯和李歐塔是第一種主張的代表；德希達則代表第二種主張。有學者把他們的主張稱為「工具論的虛無主義」。
認識論虛無主義包含四個有意或無意的盲點：
a. 混淆了資訊和知識兩者的分別；
b. 混淆了自然科學和非自然科學(社會、人文科學)兩者的分別；
c. 混淆了(一個)語言/文字起始意義(核心意義)和它衍生意義兩者的分別
d. 混淆了(一個)語言/文字本身意義和它(對讀者/聽者)所引起反應/影響兩者的分別。
本文不討論認識論或認知科學，對資訊和知識的分別、只簡單陳述於下：
資訊描述：何時、何地、何人、何物、何種外觀、和何種情況等等「事實」(或現象)。我們用「合、不合事實」來評估資訊；它幫助我們做決定。
知識解釋：一個事件或現象為什麼會發生；為什麼是這樣或那樣的情況；以及兩個事件或現象間的因果關係等。我們用「實用、不實用」來評估知識。它幫助我們做決定和/或解決困難。
我們通常可以在數量、性質、和程度各方面，確認並控制自然科學研究對象的自變數。如果我們接受自然環境的客觀存在，那麼研究它的結果，通常可以重複、驗證、以及根據它來做某種預測。
雖然社會或人文科學研究的對象也是客觀存在，我們通常不但不可能確認並控制研究對象所包含變數的數量、性質、和程度；我們甚至很難確切掌握那些特徵是自變數，那些特徵是他變數。因此，社會、人文科學研究的結果通常難以重複和驗證，也幾乎不可能根據它來做某種預測。
自然科學的研究結果之所以有價值，不在於它們所建構的理論是否完美，而在於它們所帶來的實際應用。凡是用過電腦、大哥大，坐過汽車、飛機，或者生過大病而還健在的人，大概都和我一樣，很難了解李歐塔關於知識無非是「大敘述」這類「大敘述」。如果他和傅柯願意在「知識」前面加上「社會科學」或「人文科學」之類的形容詞，他們的說法就說得通了。不過這樣一來，他們的「大敘述」就不再「大」而有點「老」。
當第一個講中文的原始人用「ㄇㄚˇ」(或和它相近的音)來指示一個臉很長、高高大大、尾巴像佛塵一樣，有四條腿而且跑很快的動物時，這個或這類動物就是「ㄇㄚˇ」。這個或這類動物也就是「ㄇㄚˇ」這個音的起始意義。同樣的，當第一個中國人用「馬」這個字(或符號)來代表「ㄇㄚˇ」這個音時，上面所描述的動物，就是「馬」這個字的「起始意義」。經過幾千年時間、不同社會、和各個地區的使用，「ㄇㄚˇ」這個音和「馬」這個字「衍生」出許多其它意義。一個字有多重意義並不表示它沒有一個「確定」的意義，更不表示它「沒有」意義；如「馬相很好」。維根斯坦有句名言：「一個字的意義就是它的用處」。如果有人說：「一個東西因為有『許多』用處，所以它等於沒有一個『確定』的用處，或根本『沒有』用處」；大家一定會認為她/他的想法很奇怪。
一個鼓吹認識論虛無主義的學者，很難通過「以子之矛，攻子之盾」的測試。如果有人認為：語言文字都沒有意義；那她/他發表文章做什麼? 如果傅柯真的認為：知識都是為權力服務；那他的理論又在為誰服務?
2.3 倫理學
1) 虛無主義的來源
全面虛無主義者的觀點，可以用上面引述過尼切的話為代表：
「從根本上『否定』價值、意義、和對目的的追求(欲望)」。
局部虛無主義者則認為：
倫理學中的「原則」或「標準」沒有「絕對」的價值或意義；從而，拒絕全面接受原則或標準的約束。
我不在這裏引用尼切的分析；只站在普通人的觀點，看看虛無主義的念頭從何而來。
只要不是乖乖牌或完全被「醬缸文化」浸泡得透不過氣來，一個人遲早會問：「如果我喜歡，為什麼不可以?」；想必它在你腦海中三不五時也曾一閃而過。您有答案嗎? 這個問題有許多負面的答案，例如：
「我不想坐牢」；
「我不想被別人戳脊梁骨」；
「我不想做一個過街老鼠」。
從負面來回答這些問題就埋下了虛無主義發芽的種子。何以故？因為大多數生活在現實中的人，很少心干情願的接受現成或教條式的答案。人都會問「為什麼?」。例如，看了許多活生生「竊鉤者誅，竊國者侯」的個案後，再聽到「不可偷盜」的教誨時，「為什麼？」的迷惘就會在大多數人心中油然而起。
對類似誡條或正道在理論上的權威性起了懷疑後，自然就會從功能或效益的觀點來思考它們。從懷疑到否定大概只要一小步，從功能論和效益論看問題，頂多只要一大步就會走向虛無主義。
2) 虛無主義的困境
祈克果和達斯妥也夫斯基是十九世紀中期面對虛無主義挑戰的兩大思想家。他們都沒有成功，也都只能各自選擇了他們願意接受的答案：祈克果的基督教，達斯妥也夫斯基的東正教和斯拉夫主義。不過，他的《地下室手記》則使我對虛無主義感到有趣，也同時開始質疑的書；只是我在22 – 24歲讀此書，細節不復記得，眼下已經沒有能力好好寫一篇讀後感。
尼切和卡夫卡就沒有這樣幸運；到了他們的時代，做為救贖之道的基督教早已顯示出「此路不通」的徵兆。尼切勇敢而悲壯的提出了他的答案：「發揮自身潛能」(2)。卡夫卡的三部中篇小說，《亞美利加》、《城堡》、和《審判》可說是虛無主義者悲歌的三部曲 – 掙扎、困境、和絕望(3)。
二十世紀中葉的沙垂和卡木，對虛無主義提出了他們的描述和解答。後者的《沉淪》可以視為一部「虛無者悲傖交響曲」。這本小說的主角(巴蒂斯塔)和達斯妥也夫斯基《魔鬼》這本小說的主角(斯特羅夫金)有異曲同悔之悲。前者沒有做他(自己認為)應該做的事，後者做了他(自己認為)不應該做的事。結果一個得了精神分裂症；一個變成行屍走肉。這是因為：上帝也許死了，但「良心」永遠和我們同在(4)。至於它是與生俱來，還是由社會/文化建構在我們腦海中，我就留給生物學家和社會學家來闡述。
3) 虛無主義的消解
上面第1)小節提到虛無主義的起源；第2)小節描述了它導致的困境。這一節談談如何避免掉進這個泥淖。
我認為：「道德」和「價值」都是我所說的「人定概念」(2025/05/26，0.2-1)-c小節)；它們本身並不具有超驗性或內在性。如果虛無主義挑戰「道德」的高高在上性，我建議從「目的」和「偏好」來建立其功能性，從而確立其「存在的理由」。
「社會契約論」者認為：
人為了增加自己存活的機率，不得不接受：「交出某些權力來換取一個有秩序環境的安排」(我的詮釋)。
如果同意這個說法，也就會同意：「價值觀念」和「行為規則」都具有維持社會穩定、和諧等的功能。則我們遵守「規則」和/或「道德」的終極理由是：
一個想存活下去的人，為了「增加自己存活的機率」，同意接受某些社會規範所加諸的限制。
另一方面，如果一個人在面對「要不要活下去」這個問題時，選擇了「我要活下去」；她/他接著得進一步選擇進入「那一種」ㄟ。這是因為：「活下去」不是抽象的觀念，而是具體的活動。它必須滿足一定的物質條件。人既然無法單獨生存，「進入社會」和「進入生產關係」成為「活下去」的前置條件。「生產關係」蘊含了：扮演某個角色；執行某類功能；承擔某種責任，或俗話說的：「不能掉鏈子」。下面第3、4兩節對相關概念會做進一步討論。
2.4 解構虛無主義
本體論、認識論、及倫理學這三個傳統哲學上的課題彼此相關，但並不具有必然的相關性。因此，一個人可以在其中任何一個課題上採取虛無主義「立場」，而不影響她/他在其餘兩個領域的觀點。例如，佛教徒對涅槃的追求，或懷有普渡眾生的慈悲。
「『後現代』思潮」大師如傅柯、李歐塔、和德希達等，在倫理學上並沒有採取虛無主義。我認為：他們了解到目前沒有動搖資本主義生產模式(下層建築)的可能性；於是採取逆勢操作的戰術，用上面所說認識論中的虛無主義來瓦解資產階級的意識型態(上層建築)。它們希望有一天，資產階級用來控制一般民眾的學術思想被徹底「解構」以後；資本主義的生產模式也會跟著被推翻。「『後現代』思潮」是政治/社會運動的成分，遠大於它是學術思潮的成分。我雖然批評他們的理論，但為他們唐•吉訶德式的鬥爭喝采。他們可說是在當代理論上，「以虛無主義為鬥爭工具」的革命家。
一個百分百的「虛無主義者」，理論上不一定要自殺，理論上甚至要求他繼續活著。因為自殺是一個要下功夫、非反射性的行為。任何一個要下功夫、非反射性的行為都為了達到一個目的。而「虛無主義者」並沒有目的。一個「虛無主義者」可以取暖、喝水、吃飯、打炮。這並不表示她/他要活下去；她/他可能只是在避免不舒服的感覺。虛無主義的重點在拒絕「肯定」，不在採取「逃避」。
「主義」是「一種思想、信仰、或力量」。從以上我對虛無主義的描述來看，「虛無主義」是一種思想；但做為一種信仰，「虛無主義」是一個自相矛盾的名詞。一個採取虛無主義的人，因為不接受任何遊戲規則，當然也就不用接受「矛盾」概念的限制。所以他們不但在理論上不必維持一致性，在理論和行為上也不必一致。他們當可以自稱：「虛無主義者」。
3. 自由意志
在人類思想史上，「自由意志」一直是個重要而沒有定論的問題。在下不揣淺陋，提出幾點看法。
3.1 意識
「意識」有很多層次或形式(5)；感覺、(反射式)反應、知覺、懷疑、感受、情緒、意志、思考、計劃、決策、思想等。以上這些層次排列的順序，並不指示它們形成的先後或層級的高下。「意識」是認知科學的課題，這篇文章不詳細討論什麼是意識。根據唯物主義者的觀點，意識不是超驗的、先天的、內在的、或浮現的等等，意識只需要，而且只能從：神經細胞的互動、神經系統的結構、以及神經組織的功能和機制等層面來解釋(6)。我認為生物要具備感覺和(反射式)反應以外的意識，需要具備儲存資訊的器官和比較、分辨資訊的能力。這些器官越複雜、這些能力越發達，生物意識的範圍越廣、功能越強、結果越深遠。
我們可以說，在文化、環境、和生理結構(包含遺傳基因)這三個因素相互作用/影響下，「意識」使一個人具有「意志」和「決策」能力。換句話說，意志和決策是意識呈現的種種方式中的兩種。一個人意志的「自由度」和決策的「有效性」，則和她/他的經驗、知識、掌握的資訊、以及處理資訊的能力成正比。
3.2 自由
1) 人沒有絕對的自由
人沒有選擇到或不到這個世界來的自由，也沒有選擇一生下時來所處文化、社會這類大環境的自由，當然也沒有選擇家庭、自身基因、教育方式、成長經驗等這些小環境的自由。這些大、小環境制約和限定著我們成年以後的思想和行為兩者的模式。就像孫悟空跳不出如來佛的手掌心一樣，我們也跳不出這些大、小環境的框架。所以說：人沒有絕對的自由。
2) 人的「有限自由」
沿用上面的比喻，人被局限在框架裏，但她/他並沒有被釘在一根柱子上。所以，人有揮灑的空間；就這個空間內的活動來說，人具有「有限自由」。「自由」在這個脈絡指的是：此人能夠「選擇」各種項目的「集合」；「集合」在此為數學術語。
人大腦內的神經網路連接決定人的思考模式；記憶細胞所儲存的資訊，數以億計；它們的排列組合，形成資訊的多面性；神經網路重新聯接的可能性，以及資訊的多面性，建構成人類想像、選擇、決定等的n-向度空間。n 的數值，因人而定，但總是有限的，所以人沒有絕對的自由。另一方面，n大於或等於 2。我們可以用「否定性」和德希達所批判的「兩端對立」概念兩者，支持n至少等於2的說法。所以，人有「有限自由」。 .
3) 自主性
哲學或倫理學所討論的「自由意志」，在社會學中屬於「自主性」(「主動性」)的課題
3.3 選擇
生物學家常說「追求存活」是生物與生俱來的內建程式。這是一種比喻性的說法，它並不蘊含：實際上自然或某一個造物者，賦予生物「追求存活」的程式。「存活」是一種能力或屬性，一個生物如果沒有這種能力或屬性；它的這種能力或屬性不足以讓它們應付自然的生態環境；它就不會通過自然生態環境的考驗而存活下來。所以，生存是生物具有「存活」這種能力或屬性的結果，不是是生物具有「存活」這個「目的」的結果。同樣的，人類目前所具有的種種種能力，不是「演化」的目的，而是這個過程的結果。
「有限自由」這個概念自然蘊含人能夠「選擇」，和具有「選擇能力」。雖然知識社會學和「『後現代』思潮」對人思想和行為的「自由」程度與範圍提出質疑，但資訊的普及和文化思想的交流，擴大了人選擇對象的範圍；則是客觀現實。
3.4 義務和責任 – 初探
法國哲學家勒文拿斯以「義務」的概念做為他倫理學的基礎(7)；他企圖把「義務」建構成一個絕對的概念。我不認為他提供了充分而必要的理由，「人沒有無限的自由」否定了「義務」這個概念的絕對性，如果「義務」是一個相對的概念，它的基礎還是「選擇」和「有限自由」。
存在主義「面對後果」的概念要比「義務」的概念來得實際。「選擇」不是在一個想像的「時•空」中做的，它是在一個充滿人際關係的結構中做的。應用倫理學中的許多問題，都是在這種所謂「生活世界」中進行；從而，個人也就必須在「面對後果」的限制下做選擇和決定。
4. 社會規範
先說幾句題外話，輕鬆一下。初一或之前，家父教了我兩個「作文」的套路：「起承轉合」和「能破/能立」。初一之後我靠著這兩把刷子頗受每位國文老師器重。初中能直升高中，大專聯考得進入台大，都拜家父這個指點之賜(該文第6節)。教育影響人的一生就不在話下了。我的論說文通常依照第一個脈絡展開，乃習慣使然。本文第2節可謂「破」；本節則為「立」；兩者是「真」、是「似」？則有待公論。
4.1 社會規範的肯定
「人為什麼活著?」這個問題可能沒有從科學推論出來的答案，它只有從見證或感受來了解。如果有人能回答這個問題，請盡快跟大家分享。
如果你是像我這樣一個不情願接受教條式或現成答案，而希望儘可能使用理性思考方式的人，你可能跟我一樣，找不到一個理論上或具有普遍適用性的答案。這是為什麼我在「後記」中提到：面對虛無主義，我掙扎了相當長一段時間。
如果你又是像我這樣一個對自己沒有信心，不能相信或堅持自己所選答案的人，你最好改問這兩個問題：
1) 人要不要活下去?
2) 如果要活下去，該怎麼活?
「要不要活下去?」是一個具體的問題，而且它只有兩個答案。否定性的答案會強迫你立刻去面對一個很少人有勇氣做的動作。當「活下去」和「不活下去」的理由相當時，一個採取理性方式做決定的人會選擇「活下去」。因為，她/他要保持重新做決定的可能性。沙垂「存在先於本質」這句話，當然不合本體論掛帥的邏輯。但只有從這個觀點切入，我們才能回答「如何存在」的問題(8)。
沿著這種思考模式，我們可以把倫理學上無解或多解的問題，用「決策過程」的思考方式來一一釐清可能碰到的疑惑。決策過程有兩個制約性周邊條件，第一是決策人的立場，第二是決策的目的。前者不是問題，因為本文一開始就說過，任何學說或理論都有它的預設立場。後者就牽涉到「選擇」和「自由」這兩個概念。我認為：存在主義對倫理學思想的貢獻之一，就在對這兩個概念做了深入的分析。
人有能力和權利做「選擇」或「決定」嗎?這是倫理學基礎論的課題之一，也是尼切「發揮自身潛能」這本書討論的主題。我沒有能力對這個問題做正面的答覆，只能在本節中從反面提出我的一些觀察(9)。我的基本論點是；不論我們獨處還是生活在社會中，我們都需要一些用來選擇行為的「原則」。否則我們有精神錯亂的可能，也不能有效的生活。
由於人(至少99.9999%的人)必須生活在社會中，她/他的行為與其他社會成員息息相關。同時，在一個有秩序的社會中，也就是說，在一個大多數成員願意遵守一套規則的社會中，一個人存活的機率能夠指數式的升高。因此，我把上述的「行為原則」稱為「社會規範」(該文第3.2-2)小節)。
4.2 義務和責任 – 續論
存在主義對倫理學思想的一個重大貢獻就在指出：因為人是自由的(雖然她/他有的只是「有限自由」)，人必須要為自己的行為「負責」。
「有限」是一個涵蓋質和量的概念。上面所討論的「有限」，在從量的觀點區分它和「無限」，從而否定「人要為自己行為負責」這個概念的絕對性。從質的觀點來看，人「自由」的「有限度」所產生的結果，是不是在實際上和「沒有自由」幾乎一樣呢?我不認為如此。例如，混沌理論強調「小兵立大功」。所以，人有「有限自由」的概念加上混沌理論，否定了「人『不』需要為自己行為負責」的說法。
如果人選擇活下去和進入某種生產關係(請見以上第2.3小節)，我們就有討論「義務」和「責任」這類概念的基礎。因為，不接受義務和責任的約束，我們就得面對可能「活不下去」的困境；例如，我們可能「被孤立」、「被放逐」、或「被隔離」等等。
因此，做為「『社會』人」，我們需不需要負責任，不是由我們自己決定。在一個彼此依賴、共存榮的環境中，其他人的認同和認可是我們繼續留在這個環境裏的條件之一。我們可以選擇離開；但是如果我們選擇留下來，守規矩和負責任就成為「留下來」需要付的代價。
4.3 普通(人的)倫理學 -- 理論基礎
我認為：孔子對宰我說的：「汝安則為之」(該篇第21)這句話，可以做為「如果我喜歡，為什麼不可以?」這個問題的答案。不過，本文一再強調：人活在社會中；因此，「安」與「不安」不在「天性」、基因、或「人格特質」，它們由一個人的「社會建構」過程，或本文所說的「良心」來決定。
即使「汝安則為之」只是孔子當時對宰我一種無可救藥的感嘆，今天它卻有特別的時代或「後現代」意義。它是普通(人的)倫理學的第一條原則。把這句話當做原則，代表或顯示以下我在理論上的立場和實踐上的考量：
1) 不承認有「普遍原則」和道德權威的存在。
社會規範的最後一道防線是：每個人自己所「選擇」的行為原則。如果你同意一個人的良心大部份是文化、社會所塑造的，那麼誰掌握了塑造良心的制度和機制(學校、教科書、 …等等)，誰就掌握了下一代的道德觀和行為規範(10)。
2) 道德與意識型態
在一個民主社會，如果你珍惜你自己的道德觀和行為規範，你就要(有組織的)利各種管道來鼓吹它們。同時，我們不可輕信別人所鼓吹的道德觀；我們要有「解構」的能力和習慣。因為，基本上道德觀是為某種或某類行為模式護航的意識型態(11)；俗話說的「道德綁架」即此之謂。
4.4 普通(人的)倫理學 -- 行為的選擇和決定
1) 行為的選擇和決定
行為的選擇通常根據一套既定的「行為原則」來決定。它的內容請參考《文學和倫理學之「行為指南」》(該文第2節)。
行為原則的來源只有三種：上帝、社會和文化、以及自己的選擇。這篇文章不討論：「人有能力和權力做這樣的選擇嗎」?這篇文章討論的是：「如果有一天人要做這樣的選擇，什麼是最有效的方法。」
上面一再強調：人的選擇不是在真空中做的；我們是在：社會和文化的制約下，面對特定的情況，以及(通常)為了達到一定的目標等三者，來做某種選擇與決定。
這些也是我強調「普通(人的)倫理學」的原因。像我這樣的普通人，並沒有學養和工具來思考「為什麼」或「有沒有權利」的課題；普通人往往要在一到三分鐘內選擇一種行為模式，來應付當下突發的情況。行為模式選擇的依據有三個：
1) 上述行為原則；
2) 個人規劃的人生目的；
3) 客觀環境的限制。
2) 流程圖
選擇倫理行為可以視為一個決策過程。流程圖是決策過程中協助決策者考慮所有相關因素的一個工具。熟悉它的人都知道它是一個簡便的、幫助我們做完整決定或規劃工作步驟的方法之一。不熟悉它的人，自然不清楚我在說些什麼。此處只能借用網上的專業介紹來避免我一知半解的誤導。我認為，流程圖也是一個幫助我們選擇和決定倫理行為的工具。
5. 結論
5.1 普通(人的)倫理學要點
1) 這篇文章從唯物主義、相對觀、理性思考/行動、和功能主義等立場，討論普通人的行為原則。
2) 建議用決策過程的觀點來思考/決定自己的「倫理行為」。
3) 強調「立場」和「目的」是選擇行為原則的周邊條件：
3)a 文化、社會、遺傳基因等制約人對「立場」的選擇；
3)b 「目的」則蘊含人有選擇的「自由」。
4) 指出採取理性方式的人，往往有虛無主義的傾向，但同時指出虛無主義和理性態度是矛盾的；並建議走出虛無主義情境的方向。
5.2 倫理行為的選擇
從資訊處理的觀點分析「選擇」和「自由」這兩個概念：
1) 「良心」是「選擇」的基礎；
2) 「自由」是「選擇」的前提：一個人的「自由度」是由她/他所做的「選擇」界定；
3) 「選擇」根據知識、經驗、和思考的缜密度來決定；
4) 「自由」和「選擇」蘊含「義務」和「責任」。
5.3 倫理行為的選擇方法
建議以「流程圖」概念和步驟來幫助：
1) 釐清選擇行為原則過程上需要思考的各種因素；
2) 釐清選擇行為模式過程上需要思考的各種因素。
後記：
我已經無從確認這篇文章是什麼時候寫的；只找到它發表於2004的紀載。當時我大概試圖把自己對倫理學的一些想法做個整理；但寫完後覺得第二節以後的內容相當膚淺。所以發表時只用了《淺談 虛無主義》做標題。拙作《實然與應然》的附註6中我提到：「此外，『虛無主義』也曾困擾了我至少15-20年」；因此，我把這篇舊作找出來，略做文字上的修改和補充，並加上相關「超連結」；記錄這段「困擾」的成果。
另一方面，我大概沒有能力再寫任何系統性的文章；所以改用了目前的標題。算是我閱讀和思考倫理學相關議題過程的紀念。從第二節開始，內容被增修的幅度相當大。但是，我畢竟垂垂老矣，思考能力跟著退化，加上「修改」不免受到原文現有結構的局限；此文在邏輯和「文從字順」上會有不少瑕疵。
我在別的文章提過：我的讀書旅途源於我對倫理問題的興趣。04/15 完成《實然與應然》後，就開始修補本文。拖拖拉拉的搞了一個半月。前幾天特別下了決心要在今天前完成，就我對倫理學思考歷程做過總結，算是給自己81歲的生日禮物。
20年來我在不同場合對本文所涉及各議題先後發表過許多意見；借這個機會略做整理。附錄於下，並加上其他學者的相關論述，以補本文之不足。
1) 「前提和立場」
實然與應然、自我介紹 -- 人生觀、道德觀、和知識觀 、《中國哲學的特質》讀後(該文「附錄」)、我的論述架構--發刊詞
2) 「虛無主義」
淺談「虛無主義」、淺談唯識論(該文3.2.3小節和附註18)
3) 「自由意志」
「自由意志」的討論、重談「自由意志」(該欄2018/10/18)、淺談「自由意志」(該欄2013/10/03)、自由意志 -- 開欄文、「自由意志」與「隔離制度」：「開膛手傑克」新身份的聯想、談「自主性」和「責任」、淺談「社會結構」和「人的『主動性』」、我們為什麼應該相信自己有「自由意志」？。
4) 「社會規範」
《縱欲與虛無之上：現代情境裡的政治倫理》讀後 - 倫理篇、實然與應然、《《一個怪人的夢》和《沉淪》讀後》、《文學和倫理學之「行為指南」》、道德、法律、和正義的本質 – 倫理學補遺、重新檢視「個人主義」和「自由主義」、用科學方法研究「道德內容」？本然和道德、政治與道德的關係、 倫理學和自然科學 -- 從「道德良心」談起、基於大腦神經學的道德觀、兩個關於「道德基礎」的不同認知(此為該欄開欄文)、道德規範和實踐方式(道德表現)--該欄 2009/08/09、淺談道德與歷史、現實主義和道德、道德做為論述武器、道德和良知(該欄2004/09/16)、公論與道德(該欄2004/09/14)、淺談「道德」 (該欄2023/12/30)、Both moral realism and relativism are wrong。
5) 其它
「『後現代』思潮」： 評《另類哲學：現代社會的後現代化、淺談「解構批判」。
「存在主義」：淺談「存在主義」、《《一個怪人的夢》和《沉淪》讀後》。
「自由」：「自由」和「必然性」、道德行為即自主的行為(該欄2024/03/11)、重新檢視「個人主義」和「自由主義」、黃克武教授《自由的所以然》讀後、評殷海光先生《民主與自由不是一件事》、關於「公民自由權論」、「理性」和「自由」(該欄2007/05/28)。
「自由主義」：《縱欲與虛無之上：現代情境裡的政治倫理》讀後 - 政治篇、重新檢視「個人主義」和「自由主義」、淺談「自由主義」、《當代自由主義》讀後、論古典自由主義。
「法律」：淺談法律和相關概念
「社會建構論」：淺談相對觀和社會建構論。
「相對觀」：淺談相對觀和社會建構論。
「科學方法論」：關於科學方法的討論。
「效益論」：行為、道德、和效益論、黃克武教授《自由的所以然》讀後(該文第1.3-2)小節)。
「唯物論」：唯物人文觀，淺談「唯物論」、「意識」、和「行為主義」，物理學觀點看「意識」及其科學研究(該文第1節)。
「現代性」：關於「現代性」的討論。
「理性」：理性論政的典範、理性、法治、和革命、淺談「理性」、「理性」和「自由」(該欄2007/05/28)、公共政策和理性討論(該欄2003/11/09)。
「意識」：大腦神經學：意識篇、意識的化學基礎、物理學觀點看「意識」及其科學研究、概念神經細胞、昏迷病患的意識狀態，《意識理論小百科》簡介、唯物人文觀，淺談「唯物論」、「意識」、和「行為主義」。
「意識型態」：淺談「意識型態」、關於「意識型態」、「意識型態」和「虛偽意識」。
「達斯妥也夫斯基」：兩種基督教教義觀：托爾斯泰和達斯妥也夫斯基、《《一個怪人的夢》和《沉淪》讀後》、達斯妥也夫斯基和心理學、Dostoevsky at 200： An Idea of Evil、Redemption for Dostoevsky and Nietzsche： A Comparative Analysis。
-- 2025/06/03
附註：
1. Will To Power (平裝版，第7頁，1-1節)
2. 這是我對”Will To Power”一詞的詮釋。
3. 根據我的解讀：本文所引用卡木與達斯妥也夫斯基兩位的作品，都在挑戰/批判「虛無主義」。相對而言，卡夫卡用文學的手法來描述和紀錄他的「夢境」(該文第2節)；因此，此處詮釋是我的讀後感覺和聯想；換句話說，(我認為)卡夫卡並未「有意識」的挑戰/批判「虛無主義」。
4. 拙作《《一個怪人的夢》和《沉淪》讀後》對此處提及卡木與達斯妥也夫斯基的倫理思想，以及它們跟「良心」的關係，有比較詳細的討論；請參閱。
5. The Science of Consciousness (平裝版，第122頁)；本文寫於2004年，此處和註6引用書籍都是20 - 30年前的老書。近10 – 15年我沒怎麼讀書；新知有限。請見「後記」-5)所附參考文章。
6. 此即「大腦網路連接論」；見《唯物人文觀》、How Brains Make Up Their Minds (精裝版，第39 – 41頁)、和Mind and the Brain Science in the 21 Century，第4、10，11各章。
7. 勒文拿斯主張：「不是人有義務，而是義務擁有我們」。這段話是我的解讀；當時沒有註明出處，現在沒有時間和精力去搜尋。
8. 尼切：「一個知道自己為什麼要活下去的人，能承擔任何苦難」( “He who has a why to live for can bear almost any how.”)；請參考這篇解讀。
9. 「積極自由」這個概念就在從政治學角度討論此問題；各篇涉及「自由主義」的拙作中，多少談到它(請見「後記」-5)所附參考文章)。
10. 我無意討論「教改」。但是，我要提醒大家：「教育」在「百年樹人」的功能外，它也是鞏固政權的工具。明乎此，就能了解許多荒謬口號和政策的所以然，如「去中國化」。
11. 去年選舉時，某民進黨黨工和該黨某中央級官員都曾說過這樣的話：「黑道也是人民，他們也有權利有自己的民意代表」。這句話誰都知道很荒謬，但乍聽之下，還真想不出它強詞奪理的地方在那裡。這也許是該黨(不同的)黨工，在上兩次選舉中都做了同樣的宣示。我來破解它一下：黑道者，游走於法律之外者也，民主者，法治之異名也。黑道和民主政治是兩個互相排斥的概念。所以，說上面這類話的人，在我看來，如果不是完全不了解法治和民主政治，就是替有黑道背景候選人做某種很不堪的動作(該欄2024/07/07，附註1)。-- 以上是本文第一次在2004年發表時的評論。
本文於 修改第 2 次
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轉載自：【中時電子報】 >> 【新聞對談】 >> 《道德做為論述武器》
http://forums1.chinatimes.com/dailytalk/Forum.asp?ArticleID=846743&History=0&Page=1 (此網頁已不存在)
胡卜凱(#54)
謝謝你的問題和評論。謹答如下，並澄清或釐清幾個相關的概念：
1. 行為、行動、動作、和「自覺的」行動或動作
1) 行為
a. 「行為」：人或其他動物，所有其身體內、外的「運動」，如內分泌，腸、胃蠕動，叫春、舉手、投足、抓癢、手淫、投票、決策、助人、救人、犧牲小我來成全大我等等，都是「行為」。這是心理學上「行為主義」、社會科學中「行為學派」、和20世紀50 - 70年代「行為學」這些術語或概念中，「行為」一詞的用法。
b. 「行為主義」：認為心理學研究的對象必須是「可觀察」或「可測量」的「行為」，而不是「心靈」活動或狀態(如「欲望」、「妒忌」、「想法」等等)的觀點。
c. 「行為學派」：社會科學(尤其是政治學)中，主張只有「可觀察」或「可測量」的「行為」才能做為研究對象的學者、主張、和相關的方法論等等。
d. 「行為學」：所有以(上述所定義的)「行為」為研究對象的學科。
2) 行動和動作
有「目標」(目的)或「意義」的「行為」稱為「行動」或「動作」。
前者尤其指有相同「目標」或「意義」的一系列「動作」，或一個複雜「動作」的整個「過程」。
傳統西方哲學談到「道德」，也一定會討論「自由意志」。受到現象學、分析哲學、語言哲學的影響，在當代倫理學和社會科學中，「行動」和「目標」、「意義」、「意識」、或「意指」(意向、意圖)等等，有不可分的關係。因此，「行動」或「動作」是一個多層次、多層面的複雜概念。需要仔細的分析和檢驗。
3) 「自覺的」行動或動作
當一個行動或動作經過刻意的練習、鍛練、修飾、或規劃等，稱為「自覺的『行動』」或「自覺的『動作』」。例如：「殷勤」的招呼女士、溫文「儒雅」、「坐懷不亂」、「奉公守法」等等。我不知道中文裏是否有一個專門的詞彙來指示這類行動或動作。
4) 本節綜合討論
當我們使用以上三個概念的「所指」或「用法」，來討論西方學者在心理學、倫理學、或社會科學中對相關議題所做論述的時候，需要嚴謹的對它們加以分別。
在中文的用法裏，尤其在日常生活語言中，行為、行動、或動作三個詞彙是通用的。因此造成一些在溝通時的混淆。
2. 效益論的內容
如果「效益論」指邊沁和穆勒的主張，它的內容包含以下四點(Angeles 1981：307頁)：
a. 人的行動應以促進最大多數人的最大幸福(快樂)為原則。
b. 快樂是唯一根本的善，痛苦是唯一根本的惡。
c. (過於專門，略去。)
d. 一般而言，一個行動在道德上的價值，由其結果的好、壞來決定。
以上三點是Angeles教授的詮釋，我的中譯。
倫理學基礎論或倫理學理論的研究主題在定義：什麼是「善」、什麼是「惡」。「效益論」是一種倫理學理論，所以，它討論的是：
什麼是「善」、「惡」；同時主張以「最大多數人的最大幸福(快樂)」為「善」的判準。
因此，它和「效能」的概念沒有直接關係。請參考第四節關於「效能」的討論。
當代倫理學理論中，又有行動效益論和規則效益論之分，我不在此介紹(Lafollette 2000：165頁；183頁，Angeles 1981：307頁)。
順便提一下：
「享樂主義」也是一種倫理學理論。它討論的是：
什麼是「善」、「惡」；同時主張以「『個人』的最大幸福(快樂)」為『善』的判準。
它不是在討論：如何享樂；也不是在主張：每個人應盡情享樂。
3. 什麼是「道德」
「道德」的基本定義是：指導或規範「行為」的原則或律條。
在中國儒家、西方古典時代、和西方中世紀時代等的道德理論中，上述定義所說的「行為」，指一個人「所有」的「行為」。因此，邪念、手淫、口交、自殺、同性戀等等都在被傳統「道德」原則或律條禁止或規範之列。
現代哲學或社會科學道德理論中，上述定義中的「行為」，多數學者不但「只」指「行動」或「動作」，而且更進一步「只」指：
一個人「『影響』到其他人的『行動』或『動作』」。
我接受這個觀點。這是我強調：「道德」是一種「社會(性)規範」的原因。
當然，「影響」的範圍是什麼，仍然需要界定。例如，「橫刀奪愛」算不算「影響」到(被奪愛的)第三者；男、女兩人在公共場所親熱，算不算「影響」到孤家寡人或剛失戀的旁觀者等等。
另外還有一個重點：
「道德」所規範的行動，只限於那些「影響」我們生活舒適的行動；如果一個「行動」的後果「影響」到我們的生存，那就沒有「道德」規範可言。
這不是說「生存」是最高的「道德」原則，而是說在碰到「生存」議題時，一般人會認為「道德」的概念不再適用。
4. 效能和道德
4.1 效能的概念
效能 = 成果/使用資源
「效能」的概念和「資源」的使用，及被使用資源所「創造」的「成果」有關。在此，「資源」和「成果」都可以用金錢來衡量，俗稱「價值」。
「效能」是由於「資源有限」的現實和「永續經營」的意圖而來。如果沒有這兩個前提，我們不需要講「效能」。所以，它也是一個由「計算」或「精打細算」的「理性」而來的概念。
4.2 「善」、「惡」的概念
「道德」規範我們日常生活中的行動。由於日常生活的「變化」、「初始條件」、或「周邊條件」的可能性太多，「道德」無法建立一個適用於所有情況的原則或律條。因而它缺乏一個固定的條文和強制的規範力。這是「道德」和法律或律條不同的原因。
中、外的倫理學家都無法清楚明白的立下一個「道德」判斷的「標準」。因此，它只能使用「善」、「惡」這種抽象概念來「教化」。這也是為什麼「善」、「惡」不可能成為「具體」的概念。因為一旦「具體」化，它們就可以量化或強制化。
至於什麼是「善」？什麼是「惡」？通常也就由有「發言權」或「詮釋權」的人來訂定。另一方面，「道德」也必須有某種程度的普遍性，所以，一般人也就可以有某種程度的發言機會。這是「道德」發展成一種「共識」的基礎和機制。
「善」、「惡」的概念，蘊含人所珍貴或珍惜的，非金錢可衡量的「價值」。此處的「價值」指真、善、美、仁、義、誠實、博愛、平等、自由之類。即使沒有「資源有限」和「永續經營」這兩個前提，我們仍然需要講「善」、「惡」的概念，才能講「道德」。
在此我們要注意分辨「價值」的兩種意義或用法。
某些學者認為我們選擇「目標」或「目的」與「道德」有關。但：
「『如何』使用最少的資源來達到最大的結果」是一個現實和具體的問題；它不可能普遍化或原則化。
也就是說「效能」的概念和「道德」沒有直接關係。前者是一個技術層次的概念。
5. 道德觀
我的原文是「道德觀」，不是「道德」。
「道德觀」指：一個人對「道德」相關議題的看法、想法、觀點、或信念。
我用「觀」來詮釋柏林的"beliefs"。
我用「道德觀」來詮釋柏林的Men's beliefs in the sphere of conduct。
他這篇文章在強調學術界需要政治哲學。他的論點以強調：
人的目的、理想、她/他對「善」、「惡」的區別，或對「應該」、「不應該」的區別等等，是人「自覺行動」的動力。
來批判「價值中立」的立場。我的詮釋基於他上、下文的意旨。
6. 政策和道德
有些政策是由「道德」立場決定的。有些政策和「道德」立場無關。例如：
一個政府的官員必須救災和防治瘟疫等等。她/他們採取這些措施不是因為它們合乎「道德」原則，或她/他們悲天憫人。而是如果她/他們不採取相關措施；或她/他們採取的相關措施沒有「效能」，她/他們就要滾蛋。這是另一個「道德」概念不一定適用的範圍。
我批評阿斌網友是因為：他的大作似乎蘊含：
政策和「道德」立場無關，我們只需要考慮一個政策的效能。
我批評你是因為：你的大作似乎蘊含：
講求「效能」是一種「道德觀」。
我的目的在指出：
1. 一個社會的政策有些是在多數成員所共有的「道德觀」制約下制定；
2. 講求「效能」並不是一種「道德觀」，而是理性思考的結果，屬於技術面的考量。
後記：
本文原標題是《功利主義和其他概念》，07/29/2006發表於我的第一個部落格。最近由於修改另一篇舊作，把它找了出來。我現在不再使用「功利主義」一詞，改用「效益論」，除此詞、文章標題、標點符號、和加上超連結之外，其它文字略有更動以求通順。
柏林的大作是那一篇已經不可考。
參考書目：
** Angeles, P. A., 1981, Dictionary of Philosophy, Barnes and Noble Books, New York
** Lafollette, H. 2000, Ed., The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, Blackwell Publishers, Malden, MA, USA
中、英詞彙對照：
「自覺的」行動或「自覺的」動作：conduct行為：behavior
行為主義：behaviorism
行為學：behavior sciences
行為學派：behavioralism (schools)
行動：action
行動效益論：act-utilitarianism
享樂主義：hedonism
效益論：utilitarianism
倫理學基礎論：meta-ethics
動作：act
規則效益論：rule-utilitarianism
本文於 修改第 1 次
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