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倫理學 -- 開欄文
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我讀書的興趣和思考的重點在試圖回答：如何「做人」和如何「待人」這兩個問題。我涉獵文學、哲學、心理學、政治學、社會學、認知科學、文化研究等領域，動機都來自試圖回答以上兩個問題。
二十多年來，我在討論不同議題的文章中，依脈絡表達了我對「道德」的看法(我偏向使用「社會規範」這個概念)。今後我將把和它相關的文章集中發表在本欄。
本欄第2篇文章是2002年舊作。該文討論一個案例；同時，它在批評另一位先生大作的過程中，釐清了一些相關概念與盲點；可以做為討論和思考「道德」或「社會規範」的基礎。所以重刊於此。
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民歌音樂家拒在川普--甘迺迪音樂廳演唱 -- Geoff Herbert
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有「原則」者的行事風格；此之謂：「富貴不能淫，貧賤不能移，威武不能屈」(《孟子•·滕文公下》第7)。
Singer cancels Kennedy Center concert after Trump name change
Geoff Herbert, 12/24/25
A singer-songwriter is refusing to perform at the Trump-Kennedy Center after the venue’s name changed.
Kristy Lee announced Monday that she canceled her scheduled performance at the Washington, D.C., arts institution scheduled for Jan. 14, 2026. The move came days after President Donald Trump’s name was added to the former John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts.
“I don’t have much power, and I don’t run with the big dogs who do. I’m just a folk singer from Alabama, slinging songs for a living,” Lee wrote on social media. “Hell, my songs are really just my own diary set to music. They’re not polished or hit songs, but they’re my truth and nobody can take that from me. I’m proud of that.”
“I believe in the power of truth, and I believe in the power of people. And I’m gonna stand on that side forever. I won’t lie to you, canceling shows hurts. This is how I keep the lights on. But losing my integrity would cost me more than any paycheck,” she continued. “When American history starts getting treated like something you can ban, erase, rename, or rebrand for somebody else’s ego, I can’t stand on that stage and sleep right at night. America didn’t get built by branding. It got built by people showing up and doing the work. And the folks who carry it don’t need their name on it, they just show up. That’s all I’m doing here. I’m showing up.”
Her post went viral, generating hundreds of thousands of likes, shares and comments. She thanked fans for their support and said she plans to instead perform virtually at home on Jan. 14.
Congress designated the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in 1964 as a memorial to JFK, who was assassinated. Last week, the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees — of which Trump is the chair — voted to change its official name to The Donald J. Trump and The John F. Kennedy Memorial Center for the Performing Arts.
The move was criticized by the Kennedy family and Democratic lawmakers, who questioned whether the board can legally change the venue’s name without Congressional approval. The Broadway musical “Hamilton” also canceled a performance at the Kennedy Center earlier this year when Trump forced out its leadership and took over as chair of the board of trustees.
The naming controversy also came as Trump hosted the “Kennedy Center Honors,” which aired on CBS Tuesday night under its original name. 2025 honorees included the rock band KISS, theater star Michael Crawford, country legend George Strait, actor Sylvester Stallone, and singer Gloria Gaynor.
“Tell me what you think of my ‘Master of Ceremony’ abilities. If really good, would you like me to leave the Presidency in order to make ‘hosting’ a full time job?” Trump joked on Truth Social before the broadcast.
In a statement, Lee elaborated Tuesday that she believes “efforts to impose political branding” on the former Kennedy Center compromise its original mission to be a nonpartisan national cultural institution, honoring JFK’s “belief that the arts are essential to democracy, free expression, and the public good.” Lee added that she believes “publicly funded cultural spaces must remain free from political capture, self-promotion, or ideological pressure.”
Read the original article on syracuse.com.
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人工智能在倫理領域的適用性 - Elad Uzan
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下文一來過長；二來也過於專門 -- 全文引用了閣德大名和他的「不完整原理」共60次；我看過幾篇討論閣德和「不完整原理」的論文，不幸的是我一直沒有抓到此理論的要點。從而，我不認為自己有能力了解烏壤博士的論點；也就沒有花時間把整篇文章讀完。
在「人工智能『瘋』」猛刮的「時代精神」下，討論它在處理理倫理學議題的「適用性」，相信下文有點看頭；此外，烏壤博士也討論到人工智能運作原理，對此領域相當外行如我這樣的人，應可參考。
The incompleteness of ethics
Many hope that AI will discover ethical truths. But as Gödel shows, deciding what is right will always be our burden
Elad Uzan, Edited by Edited byNigel Warburton, 08/05/25
Imagine a world in which artificial intelligence is entrusted with the highest moral responsibilities: sentencing criminals, allocating medical resources, and even mediating conflicts between nations. This might seem like the pinnacle of human progress: an entity unburdened by emotion, prejudice or inconsistency, making ethical decisions with impeccable precision. Unlike human judges or policymakers, a machine would not be swayed by personal interests or lapses in reasoning. It does not lie. It does not accept bribes or pleas. It does not weep over hard decisions.
Yet beneath this vision of an idealised moral arbiter lies a fundamental question: can a machine understand morality as humans do, or is it confined to a simulacrum of ethical reasoning? AI might replicate human decisions without improving on them, carrying forward the same biases, blind spots and cultural distortions from human moral judgment. In trying to emulate us, it might only reproduce our limitations, not transcend them. But there is a deeper concern. Moral judgment draws on intuition, historical awareness and context – qualities that resist formalisation. Ethics may be so embedded in lived experience that any attempt to encode it into formal structures risks flattening its most essential features. If so, AI would not merely reflect human shortcomings; it would strip morality of the very depth that makes ethical reflection possible in the first place.
Still, many have tried to formalise ethics, by treating certain moral claims not as conclusions, but as starting points. A classic example comes from utilitarianism, which often takes as a foundational axiom the principle that one should act to maximise overall wellbeing. From this, more specific principles can be derived, for example, that it is right to benefit the greatest number, or that actions should be judged by their consequences for total happiness. As computational resources increase, AI becomes increasingly well-suited to the task of starting from fixed ethical assumptions and reasoning through their implications in complex situations.
But what, exactly, does it mean to formalise something like ethics? The question is easier to grasp by looking at fields in which formal systems have long played a central role. Physics, for instance, has relied on formalisation for centuries. There is no single physical theory that explains everything. Instead, we have many physical theories, each designed to describe specific aspects of the Universe: from the behaviour of quarks and electrons to the motion of galaxies. These theories often diverge. Aristotelian physics, for instance, explained falling objects in terms of natural motion toward Earth’s centre; Newtonian mechanics replaced this with a universal force of gravity. These explanations are not just different; they are incompatible. Yet both share a common structure: they begin with basic postulates – assumptions about motion, force or mass – and derive increasingly complex consequences. Isaac Newton’s laws of motion and James Clerk Maxwell’s equations are classic examples: compact, elegant formulations from which wide-ranging predictions about the physical world can be deduced.
Ethical theories have a similar structure. Like physical theories, they attempt to describe a domain – in this case, the moral landscape. They aim to answer questions about which actions are right or wrong, and why. These theories also diverge and, even when they recommend similar actions, such as giving to charity, they justify them in different ways. Ethical theories also often begin with a small set of foundational principles or claims, from which they reason about more complex moral problems. A consequentialist begins with the idea that actions should maximise wellbeing; a deontologist starts from the idea that actions must respect duties or rights. These basic commitments function similarly to their counterparts in physics: they define the structure of moral reasoning within each ethical theory.
Just as AI is used in physics to operate within existing theories – for example, to optimise experimental designs or predict the behaviour of complex systems – it can also be used in ethics to extend moral reasoning within a given framework. In physics, AI typically operates within established models rather than proposing new physical laws or conceptual frameworks. It may calculate how multiple forces interact and predict their combined effect on a physical system. Similarly, in ethics, AI does not generate new moral principles but applies existing ones to novel and often intricate situations. It may weigh competing values – fairness, harm minimisation, justice – and assess their combined implications for what action is morally best. The result is not a new moral system, but a deepened application of an existing one, shaped by the same kind of formal reasoning that underlies scientific modelling. But is there an inherent limit to what AI can know about morality? Could there be true ethical propositions that no machine, no matter how advanced, can ever prove?
These questions echo a fundamental discovery in mathematical logic, probably the most fundamental insight ever to be proven: Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. They show that any logical system powerful enough to describe arithmetic is either inconsistent or incomplete. In this essay, I argue that this limitation, though mathematical in origin, has deep consequences for ethics, and for how we design AI systems to reason morally.
表單的底部
Suppose we design an AI system to model moral decision-making. Like other AI systems – whether predicting stock prices, navigating roads or curating content – it would be programmed to maximise certain predefined objectives. To do so, it must rely on formal, computational logic: either deductive reasoning, which derives conclusions from fixed rules and axioms, or else on probabilistic reasoning, which estimates likelihoods based on patterns in data. In either case, the AI must adopt a mathematical structure for moral evaluation. But Gödel’s incompleteness theorems reveal a fundamental limitation. Gödel showed that any formal system powerful enough to express arithmetic, such as the natural numbers and their operations, cannot be both complete and consistent. If such a system is consistent, there will always be true statements it cannot prove. In particular, as applied to AI, this suggests that any system capable of rich moral reasoning will inevitably have moral blind spots: ethical truths that it cannot derive. Here, ‘true’ refers to truth in the standard interpretation of arithmetic, such as the claim that ‘2 + 2 = 4’, which is true under ordinary mathematical rules. If the system is inconsistent, then it could prove anything at all, including contradictions, rendering it useless as a guide for ethical decisions.
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems apply not only to AI, but to any ethical reasoning framed within a formal system. The key difference is that human reasoners can, at least in principle, revise their assumptions, adopt new principles, and rethink the framework itself. AI, by contrast, remains bound by the formal structures it is given, or operates within those it can modify only under predefined constraints. In this way, Gödel’s theorems place a logical boundary on what AI, if built on formal systems, can ever fully prove or validate about morality from within those systems.
Most of us first met axioms in school, usually through geometry. One famous example is the parallel postulate, which says that if you pick a point not on a line, you can draw exactly one line through that point that is parallel to the original line. For more than 2,000 years, this seemed self-evident. Yet in the 19th century, mathematicians such as Carl Friedrich Gauss, Nikolai Lobachevsky and János Bolyai showed that it is possible to construct internally consistent geometries in which the parallel postulate does not hold. In some such geometries, no parallel lines exist; in others, infinitely many do. These non-Euclidean geometries shattered the belief that Euclid’s axioms uniquely described space.
This discovery raised a deeper worry. If the parallel postulate, long considered self-evident, could be discarded, what about the axioms of arithmetic, which define the natural numbers and the operations of addition and multiplication? On what grounds can we trust that they are free from hidden inconsistencies? Yet with this challenge came a promise. If we could prove that the axioms of arithmetic are consistent, then it would be possible to expand them to develop a consistent set of richer axioms that define the integers, the rational numbers, the real numbers, the complex numbers, and beyond. As the 19th-century mathematician Leopold Kronecker put it: ‘God created the natural numbers; all else is the work of man.’ Proving the consistency of arithmetic would prove the consistency of many important fields of mathematics.
The method for proving the consistency of arithmetic was proposed by the mathematician David Hilbert. His approach involved two steps. First, Hilbert argued that, to prove the consistency of a formal system, it must be possible to formulate, within the system’s own symbolic language, a claim equivalent to ‘This system is consistent,’ and then prove that claim using only the system’s own rules of inference. The proof should rely on nothing outside the system, not even the presumed ‘self-evidence’ of its axioms. Second, Hilbert advocated grounding arithmetic in something even more fundamental. This task was undertaken by Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead in their monumental Principia Mathematica (1910-13). Working in the domain of symbolic logic, a field concerned not with numbers, but with abstract propositions like ‘if x, then y’, they showed that the axioms of arithmetic could be derived as theorems from a smaller set of logical axioms. This left one final challenge: could this set of axioms of symbolic logic, on which arithmetic can be built, prove its own consistency? If it could, Hilbert’s dream would be fulfilled. That hope became the guiding ambition of early 20th-century mathematics.
It was within this climate of optimism that Kurt Gödel, a young Austrian logician, introduced a result that would dismantle Hilbert’s vision. In 1931, Gödel published his incompleteness theorems, showing that the very idea of such a fully self-sufficient mathematical system is impossible. Specifically, Gödel showed that if a formal system meets several conditions, it will contain true claims that it cannot prove. It must be complex enough to express arithmetic, include the principle of induction (which allows it to prove general statements by showing they hold for a base case and each successive step), be consistent, and have a decidable set of axioms (meaning it is possible to determine, for any given statement, whether it qualifies as an axiom). Any system that satisfies these conditions, such as the set of logical axioms developed by Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica, will necessarily be incomplete: there will always be statements that are expressible within the system but unprovable from its axioms. Even more strikingly, Gödel showed that such a system can express, but not prove, the claim that it itself is consistent.
Gödel’s proof, which I simplify here, relies on two key insights that follow from his arithmetisation of syntax, the powerful idea of associating any sentence of a formal system with a particular natural number, known as its Gödel number.
First, any system complex enough to express arithmetic and induction must allow for formulas with free variables, formulas like S(x): ‘x = 10’, whose truth value depends on the value of x. S(x) is true when x is, in fact, 10, and false otherwise. Since every statement in the system has a unique Gödel number, G(S), a formula can refer to its own Gödel number. Specifically, the system can form statements such as S(G(S)): ‘G(S) = 10’, whose truth depends on whether S(x)’s own Gödel number equals 10.
Second, in any logical system, a proof of a formula S has a certain structure: starting with axioms, applying inference rules to produce new formulas from those axioms, ultimately deriving S itself. Just like every formula S has a Gödel number G(S), so every proof of S is assigned a Gödel number, by treating the entire sequence of formulas in the proof as one long formula. So we can define a proof relation P(x, y), where P(x, y) holds if and only if x is the Gödel number of a proof of S, and y is the Gödel number of S itself. The claim that x encodes a proof of S becomes a statement within the system, namely, P(x, y).
Third, building on these ideas, Gödel showed that any formal system capable of expressing arithmetic and the principle of induction can also formulate statements about its own proofs. For example, the system can express statements like: ‘n is not the Gödel number of a proof of formula S’. From this, it can go a step further and express the claim: ‘There is no number n such that n is the Gödel number of a proof of formula S.’ In other words, the system can say that a certain formula S is unprovable within the system. Fourth, Gödel ingeniously constructed a self-referential formula, P, that asserts: ‘There is no number n such that n is the Gödel number of a proof of formula P.’ That is, P says of itself, ‘P is not provable.’ In this way, P is a formal statement that expresses its own unprovability from within the system.
It immediately follows that if the formula P were provable within the system, then it would be false, because it asserts that it has no proof. This would mean the system proves a falsehood, and therefore is inconsistent. So if the system is consistent, then P cannot be proved, and therefore P is indeed unprovable. This leads to the conclusion that, in any consistent formal system rich enough to express arithmetic and induction, there will always be true but unprovable statements, most notably, the system’s own claim of consistency.
The implications of Gödel’s theorems were both profound and unsettling. They shattered Hilbert’s hope that mathematics could be reduced to a complete, mechanical system of derivation and exposed the inherent limits of formal reasoning. Initially, Gödel’s findings faced resistance, with some mathematicians arguing that his results were less general than they appeared. Yet, as subsequent mathematicians and logicians, most notably John von Neumann, confirmed both their correctness and broad applicability, Gödel’s theorems came to be widely recognised as one of the most significant discoveries in the foundations of mathematics.
Gödel’s results have also initiated philosophical debates. The mathematician and physicist Roger Penrose, for example, has argued that they point to a fundamental difference between human cognition and formal algorithmic reasoning. He claims that human consciousness enables us to perceive certain truths – such as those Gödel showed to be unprovable within formal systems – in ways that no algorithmic process can replicate. This suggests, for Penrose, that certain aspects of consciousness may lie beyond the reach of computation. His conclusion parallels that of John Searle’s ‘Chinese Room’ argument, which holds that this is so because algorithms manipulate symbols purely syntactically, without any grasp of their semantic content. Still, the conclusions drawn by Penrose and Searle do not directly follow from Gödel’s theorems. Gödel’s results apply strictly to formal mathematical systems and do not make claims about consciousness or cognition. Whether human minds can recognise unprovable truths as true, or whether machines could ever possess minds capable of such recognition, remains an open philosophical question.
However, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems do reveal a deep limitation of algorithmic reasoning, in particular AI, one that concerns not just computation, but moral reasoning itself. Without his theorems, it was at least conceivable that an AI could formalise all moral truths and, in addition, prove them from a consistent set of axioms. But Gödel’s work shows that this is impossible. No AI, no matter how sophisticated, could prove all moral truths it can express. The gap between truth claims and provability sets a fundamental boundary on how far formal moral reasoning can go, even for the most powerful machines.
This raises two distinct problems for ethics.
The first is an ancient one. As Plato suggests in the Euthyphro, morality is not just about doing what is right, but understanding why it is right. Ethical action requires justification, an account grounded in reason. This ideal of rational moral justification has animated much of our ethical thought, but Gödel’s theorems suggest that, if moral reasoning is formalised, then there will be moral truths that cannot be proven within those systems. In this way, Gödel did not only undermine Hilbert’s vision of proving mathematics consistent; he may also have shaken Plato’s hope of fully grounding ethics in reason.
The second problem is more practical. Even a high-performing AI may encounter situations in which it cannot justify or explain its recommendations using only the ethical framework it has been given. The concern is not just that AI might act unethically but also that it could not demonstrate that its actions are ethical. This becomes especially urgent when AI is used to guide or justify decisions made by humans. Even a high-performing AI will encounter a boundary beyond which it cannot justify or explain its decisions using only the resources of its own framework. No matter how advanced it becomes, there will be ethical truths it can express, but never prove.
The development of modern AI has generally split into two approaches: logic-based AI, which derives knowledge through strict deduction, and large language models (LLMs), which predict meaning from statistical patterns. Both approaches rely on mathematical structures. Formal logic is based on symbolic manipulation and set theory. LLMs are not strictly deductive-logic-based but rather use a combination of statistical inference, pattern recognition, and computational techniques to generate responses.
Just as axioms provide a foundation for mathematical reasoning, LLMs rely on statistical relationships in data to approximate logical reasoning. They engage with ethics not by deducing moral truths but by replicating how such debates unfold in language. This is achieved through gradient descent, an algorithm that minimises a loss function by updating weights in the direction that reduces error, approximates complex functions that map inputs to outputs, allowing them to generalise patterns from vast amounts of data. They do not deduce answers but generate plausible ones, with ‘reasoning’ emerging from billions of neural network parameters rather than explicit rules. While they primarily function as probabilistic models, predicting text based on statistical patterns, computational logic plays a role in optimisation, rule-based reasoning and certain decision-making processes within neural networks.
But probability and statistics are themselves formal systems, grounded not only in arithmetic but also in probabilistic axioms, such as those introduced by the Soviet mathematician Andrey Kolmogorov, which govern how the likelihood of complex events is derived, updated with new data, and aggregated across scenarios. Any formal language complex enough to express probabilistic or statistical claims can also express arithmetic and is therefore subject to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. This means that LLMs inherit Gödelian limitations. Even hybrid systems, such as IBM Watson, OpenAI Codex or DeepMind’s AlphaGo, which combine logical reasoning with probabilistic modelling, remain bound by Gödelian limitations. All rule-based components are constrained by Gödel’s theorems, which show that some true propositions expressible in a system cannot be proven within it. Probabilistic components, for their part, are governed by formal axioms that define how probability distributions are updated, how uncertainties are aggregated, and how conclusions are drawn. They can yield plausible answers, but they cannot justify them beyond the statistical patterns they were trained on.
At first glance, the Gödelian limitations on AIs in general and LLMs in particular may seem inconsequential. After all, most ethical systems were never meant to resolve every conceivable moral problem. They were designed to guide specific domains, such as war, law or business, and often rely on principles that are only loosely formalised. If formal models can be developed for specific cases, one might argue that the inability to fully formalise ethics is not especially troubling. Furthermore, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems did not halt the everyday work of mathematicians. Mathematicians continue to search for proofs, even knowing that some true statements may be unprovable. In the same spirit, the fact that some ethical truths may be beyond formal proof should not discourage humans, or AIs, from seeking them, articulating them, and attempting to justify or prove them.
But Gödel’s findings were not merely theoretical. They have had practical consequences in mathematics itself. A striking case is the continuum hypothesis, which asks whether there exists a set whose cardinality lies strictly between that of the natural numbers and the real numbers. This question emerged from set theory, the mathematical field dealing with collections of mathematical entities, such as numbers, functions or even other sets. Its most widely accepted axiomatisation, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory with the Axiom of Choice, underlies nearly all modern mathematics. In 1938, Gödel himself showed that the continuum hypothesis cannot be disproven from these axioms, assuming they are consistent. In 1963, Paul Cohen proved the converse: the continuum hypothesis also cannot be proven from the same axioms. This landmark result confirmed that some fundamental mathematical questions lie beyond formal resolution.
The same, I argue, applies to ethics. The limits that Gödel revealed in mathematics are not only theoretically relevant to AI ethics; they carry practical importance.
First, just as mathematics contains true statements that cannot be proven within its own axioms, there may well be ethical truths that are formally unprovable yet ethically important – the moral equivalents of the continuum hypothesis. These might arise in systems designed to handle difficult trade-offs, like weighing fairness against harm. We cannot foresee when, or even whether, an AI operating within a formal ethical framework will encounter such limits. Just as it took more than 30 years after Gödel’s incompleteness theorems for Cohen to prove the independence of the continuum hypothesis, we cannot predict when, if ever, we will encounter ethical principles that are expressible within an AI’s ethical system yet remain unprovable.
Second, Gödel also showed that no sufficiently complex formal system can prove its own consistency. This is especially troubling in ethics, in which it is far from clear that our ethical frameworks are consistent. This is not a limitation unique to AI; humans, too, cannot prove the consistency of the formal systems they construct. But this especially matters for AI because one of its most ambitious promises has been to go beyond human judgment: to reason more clearly, more impartially, and on a greater scale.
Gödel’s results set a hard limit on that aspiration. The limitation is structural, not merely technical. Just as Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity places an upper speed limit on the Universe – no matter how advanced our spacecraft, we cannot exceed the speed of light – Gödel’s theorems impose a boundary on formal reasoning: no matter how advanced AI becomes, it cannot escape the incompleteness of the formal system it operates within. Moreover, Gödel’s theorems may constrain practical ethical reasoning in unforeseen ways, much as some important mathematical conjectures have been shown to be unprovable from standard axioms of set theory, or as the speed of light, though unreachable, still imposes real constraints on engineering and astrophysics. For example, as I write this, NASA’s Parker Solar Probe is the fastest human-made object in history, travelling at roughly 430,000 miles (c700,000 km) per hour, just 0.064 per cent of the speed of light. Yet that upper limit remains crucial: the finite speed of light has, for example, shaped the design of space probes, landers and rovers, all of which require at least semi-autonomous operation, since radio signals from Earth take minutes or even hours to arrive. Gödel’s theorems may curtail ethical computation in similarly surprising ways.
There is yet another reason why Gödel’s results are especially relevant to AI ethics. Unlike static rule-based systems, advanced AI, particularly large language models and adaptive learning systems, may not only apply a predefined ethical framework, but also revise elements of it over time. A central promise of AI-driven moral reasoning is its ability to refine ethical models through learning, addressing ambiguities and blind spots in human moral judgment. As AI systems evolve, they may attempt to modify their own axioms or parameters in response to new data or feedback. This is especially true of machine learning systems trained on vast and changing datasets, as well as hybrid models that integrate logical reasoning with statistical inference. Yet Gödel’s results reveal a structural limit: if an ethical framework is formalised within a sufficiently expressive formal system, then no consistent set of axioms can prove all true statements expressible within it.
To illustrate, consider an AI tasked with upholding justice. It may be programmed with widely accepted ethical principles, for example fairness and harm minimisation. While human-made models of justice based on these principles are inevitably overly simplistic, limited by computational constraints and cognitive biases, an AI, in theory, has no such limitations. It can continuously learn from actual human behaviour, refining its understanding and constructing an increasingly nuanced conception of justice, one that weaves together more and more dimensions of human experience. It can even, as noted, change its own axioms. But no matter how much an AI learns, or how it modifies itself, there will always be claims about justice that, while it may be able to model, it will never be able to prove within its own system. More troubling still, AI would be unable to prove that the ethical system it constructs is internally consistent – that it does not, somewhere in its vast web of ethical reasoning, contradict itself – unless it is inconsistent, in which case it can prove anything, including falsehood, such as its own consistency.
Ultimately, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems serve as a warning against the notion that AI can achieve perfect ethical reasoning. Just as mathematics will always contain truths that lie beyond formal proof, morality will always contain complexities that defy algorithmic resolution. The question is not simply whether AI can make moral decisions, but whether it can overcome the limitations of any system grounded in predefined logic – limitations that, as Gödel showed, may prevent certain truths from ever being provable within the system, even if they are recognisable as true. While AI ethics has grappled with issues of bias, fairness and interpretability, the deeper challenge remains: can AI recognise the limits of its own ethical reasoning? This challenge may place an insurmountable boundary between artificial and human ethics.
The relationship between Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and machine ethics highlights a structural parallel: just as no formal system can be both complete and self-contained, no AI can achieve moral reasoning that is both exhaustive and entirely provable. In a sense, Gödel’s findings extend and complicate the Kantian tradition. Kant argued that knowledge depends on a priori truths, fundamental assumptions that structure our experience of reality. Gödel’s theorems suggest that, even within formal systems built on well-defined axioms, there remain truths that exceed the system’s ability to establish them. If Kant sought to define the limits of reason through necessary preconditions for knowledge, Gödel revealed an intrinsic incompleteness in formal reasoning itself, one that no set of axioms can resolve from within. There will always be moral truths beyond its computational grasp, ethical problems that resist algorithmic resolution.
So the deeper problem lies in AI’s inability to recognise the boundaries of its own reasoning framework – its incapacity to know when its moral conclusions rest on incomplete premises, or when a problem lies beyond what its ethical system can formally resolve. While humans also face cognitive and epistemic constraints, we are not bound by a given formal structure. We can invent new axioms, question old ones, or revise our entire framework in light of philosophical insight or ethical deliberation. AI systems, by contrast, can generate or adopt new axioms only if their architecture permits it and, even then, such modifications occur within predefined meta-rules or optimisation goals. They lack the capacity for conceptual reflection that guides human shifts in foundational assumptions. Even if a richer formal language, or a richer set of axioms, could prove some previously unprovable truths, no finite set of axioms that satisfies Gödel’s requirements of decidability and consistency can prove all truths expressible in any sufficiently powerful formal system. In that sense, Gödel sets a boundary – not just on what machines can prove, but on what they can ever justify from within a given ethical or logical architecture.
One of the great hopes, or fears, of AI is that it may one day evolve beyond the ethical principles initially programmed into it and simulate just such self-questioning. Through machine learning, AI could modify its own ethical framework, generating novel moral insights and uncovering patterns and solutions that human thinkers, constrained by cognitive biases and computational limitations, might overlook. However, this very adaptability introduces a profound risk: an AI’s evolving morality could diverge so radically from human ethics that its decisions become incomprehensible or even morally abhorrent to us. This mirrors certain religious conceptions of ethics. In some theological traditions, divine morality is considered so far beyond human comprehension that it can appear arbitrary or even cruel, a theme central to debates over the problem of evil and divine command theory. A similar challenge arises with AI ethics: as AI systems become increasingly autonomous and self-modifying, their moral decisions may become so opaque and detached from human reasoning that they risk being perceived as unpredictable, inscrutable or even unjust.
Yet, while AI may never fully master moral reasoning, it could become a powerful tool for refining human ethical thought. Unlike human decision-making, which is often shaped by bias, intuition or unexamined assumptions, AI has the potential to expose inconsistencies in our ethical reasoning by treating similar cases with formal impartiality. This potential, however, depends on AI’s ability to recognise when cases are morally alike, a task complicated by the fact that AI systems, especially LLMs, may internalise and reproduce the very human biases they are intended to mitigate. When AI delivers a decision that appears morally flawed, it may prompt us to re-examine the principles behind our own judgments. Are we distinguishing between cases for good moral reasons, or are we applying double standards without realising it? AI could help challenge and refine our ethical reasoning, not by offering final answers, but by revealing gaps, contradictions and overlooked assumptions in our moral framework.
AI may depart from human moral intuitions in at least two ways: by treating cases we see as similar in divergent ways, or by treating cases we see as different in the same way. In both instances, the underlying question is whether the AI is correctly identifying a morally relevant distinction or similarity, or whether it is merely reflecting irrelevant patterns in its training data. In some cases, the divergence may stem from embedded human biases, such as discriminatory patterns based on race, gender or socioeconomic status. But in others, the AI might uncover ethically significant features that human judgment has historically missed. It could, for instance, discover novel variants of the trolley problem, suggesting that two seemingly equivalent harms differ in morally important ways. In such cases, AI may detect new ethical patterns before human philosophers do. The challenge is that we cannot know in advance which kind of departure we are facing. Each surprising moral judgment from AI must be evaluated on its own terms – neither accepted uncritically nor dismissed out of hand. Yet even this openness to novel insights does not free AI from the structural boundaries of formal reasoning.
That is the deeper lesson. Gödel’s theorems do not simply show that there are truths machines cannot prove. They show that moral reasoning, like mathematics, is always open-ended, always reaching beyond what can be formally derived. The challenge, then, is not only how to encode ethical reasoning into AI but also how to ensure that its evolving moral framework remains aligned with human values and societal norms. For all its speed, precision and computational power, AI remains incapable of the one thing that makes moral reasoning truly possible: the ability to question not only what is right, but why. Ethics, therefore, must remain a human endeavour, an ongoing and imperfect struggle that no machine will ever fully master.
Elad Uzan is a departmental lecturer at the Blavatnik School of Government, as well as a member of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford. He was awarded the American Philosophical Association’s Baumgardt Memorial Fellowship in 2023 and will present the Baumgardt Memorial Lectures at the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics in 2025.
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海爾博士的大作介紹基於天主教思想的倫理學(請見本欄上一篇)。
我認為：海爾博士的論述前提 -- 「(人)本有的尊嚴」和「(人)『理性』而『自由』」(見下文第1段) -- 並沒有堅實的基礎；它們甚至也可視為一種「意識型態」(見下文第2段)，只不過性質溫和且不以吃人為目的而已。但兩者仍然有妨礙人們認清現實從而有效處理之的負面作用。
從第7段起，海爾博士介紹希爾德布蘭博士的學說。可惜只有陳述而無論說，不足以讓有不同立場者信服。
「道德的邪惡起於邪惡意念」這個命題顯然難逃「套套邏輯」之譏；「邪惡起於『驕傲』和『慾望』」則近於不食人間煙火(兩者見第8段)。不客氣的說，在羅馬教會神職人員性侵青少年醜聞全球飛後，這類象牙塔式論述只有「食古不化」足堪比擬。
第9 – 11三段則進一步闡釋希爾德布蘭博士對「驕傲」、「慾望」、和「邪惡」的理解和口誅筆伐。如我上一段的批評，他完全無視於人「存在」的「生活世界」，而從一個處於虛無飄渺環境的視野立論。
全文最後5段從略。
總之，我的論述前提和兩位博士的出發點完全不同；我們觀點間的南轅北轍也就其理甚明了。
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邪惡之源 -- John-Paul Heil
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What turns men into moral monsters?
John-Paul Heil, 07/04/25
Pope Leo XIV has evil on his mind. Following in his predecessor’s footsteps, the first American pontiff remains deeply concerned with the problems facing modernity. While his initial comments about AI, couched within the context of his choice of papal name, have received significant and insightful attention, the Pope seems to view artificial intelligence as emblematic of a larger second Industrial Revolution, which risks degrading the inherent dignity of the human person. His comments remind us of Leo XIII’s critique of communism and unchecked consumptive labor practices during the first Industrial Revolution. Dehumanizing cultural forces can only exist within a world that has more broadly rejected an adequate anthropology of the human being as rational and free, male and female, created for and only fulfilled by a complete and total gift of self to another.
When this vision of the human person is lost, and societies embrace a reductive view of what it means to be human, atrocities will undoubtedly follow. Something like a second Industrial Revolution, and the threat it poses to the dignity of humanity and the value of human labor, can only arise in “a world that suffers a great deal of pain due to wars, violence and poverty.” The pope echoed this in his recent calls to fellow religious leaders to reject “ideological and political conditioning” and to “be effective in saying ‘no’ to war and ‘yes’ to peace, ‘no’ to the arms race and ‘yes’ to disarmament, ‘no’ to an economy that impoverishes peoples and the Earth and ‘yes’ to integral development.” But this still does not address the origins of evil, and how war, violence, and an impoverished world can emerge in the first place.
Fortunately, we can uncover further insight in a recently rediscovered philosophical treatment of where evil comes from, stemming from the same traditions that formed Pope Leo. Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889–1977) was a Catholic philosopher steeped in the critiques of modernity articulated by Leo XIII, which prepared him to be an early and staunch activist against the rise of Nazism in Germany. Hildebrand was, like John Paul II and Edith Stein, a phenomenologist greatly occupied with what it means for human beings to be persons, and with how our being persons distinguishes us from the rest of creation and reality. Personhood reveals our particular dignity, inspired deeply by the thought of St. Augustine.
These two strands of Hildebrand’s thought, phenomenology and personalism, led him to compose Ethics, an account of how human action comes about and what constitutes a good or evil act. Though an extremely influential text, Hildebrand’s Ethics only treated the origins of moral evil—and especially evil’s emergence from pride and concupiscence—in passing. Recently, however, Czech scholar Martin Cajthaml located an enormous treatise on this subject in Hildebrand’s Nachlass (his unedited notes and documents left behind as part of his literary estate) now collected and revised for the first time as The Roots of Moral Evil.
The release of this text corresponds providentially with the election of Pope Leo XIV, as Hildebrand’s arguments reveal greater insight into the philosophical and theological groundwork of this pontificate. As the early comments of his papacy show, and recent studies of his dissertation as a young Augustinian confirm, Leo’s vision of the Church is rooted in Vatican II’s Christian personalism and the phenomenological concerns that occupied Hildebrand as much as John Paul II, especially how the human heart turns away from the love of the one, beautiful, true, and good to the love of lesser things. To understand how Pope Leo is addressing the evils of our world, we should consult Hildebrand.
As a student of Edmund Husserl, Hildebrand became an early and central thinker in the new philosophy of phenomenology, focused on what scholar Michael Waldstein calls “an account of what is itself present or given in our conscious awareness or experience,” or, more simply, that sees the path to objective truth as rooted in our real and subjective (though not relativistic) encounter with things as they are. Phenomenology begins not with the postulation of hypotheticals but with our being in reality. Through our real encounter with the being of things, we begin to see (at least in the phenomenology of Christian philosophers like Hildebrand and John Paul II) Being itself as something real which is not itself a thing, even a very powerful or supreme thing. Rather, Being underpins and goes beyond material phenomena.
With this attention to subjectivity, the dignity of the human person becomes clear. We recognize in our encounter with real Being its total infinitude and absolute glory beyond reality itself, yet we can only begin to understand Being through analogy with reality, something strongly emphasized by Augustine. Augustine also highlights how Being is not some ultimate monad, disinterested unmoved mover, nor transcendent Platonic form pouring out existence because it cannot help it. Rather, Being is personal, inviting us through the Logos into a transcendent life which is an interpersonal and eternal pure act of love. Inscribed into each human being is the call to be with divine Being, which is mysteriously and simultaneously beyond us and for us, completely perfect and needing nothing, and yet desiring a perfect union of love with each human being. We see imaged in our natures, in the desire to make a complete and total gift of ourselves to another through love, a perfect analogy for the interpersonal love that is the life of Being and a universal call to happiness and perfection with the Truth, a being-with-Being, that is only possible if we love others as we have been loved into being: through a gratuitous and sacrificial gift.
If this is our call, why do we reject it? Explaining this is Hildebrand’s herculean task. As Cajthaml notes in his introductory study, Hildebrand rejects the Platonic and Aristotelian notions of evil as ignorance or hamartia, missing the mark. Rather, like Augustine, Hildebrand “locates moral evil in evil will” rather than a malformed intellect: “pride and concupiscence,” Hildebrand writes, both of which are failures of the will, “are always at the basis of all moral evil.”
Hildebrand sees concupiscence as being “characterized by the turning to the merely subjectively satisfying as the one exclusive measure of our life—implying an outspoken indifference toward the reign of morally relevant values and any value or importance-in-itself.” Straightforwardly, this means that we tend to choose, to will, to pursue something we find pleasurable in the moment rather than seek after that which we know to be right. We often prefer the action that gives us subjective pleasure over something that’s intrinsically better. We will take the lesser pleasure for ourselves rather than the higher good because we want the lesser pleasure, darn it!
Though concupiscence and pride share a common denominator -- egocentrism –they differ insofar as the concupiscent man “plunges into subjectively satisfying goods and throws himself away on them,” while the prideful man “is characterized by a reflexive gazing at himself.” The concupiscent man, Hildebrand suggests, “exclusively seeks to taste the various pleasures and views the world under the category of the agreeable,” whereas the proud man “is centered on his self-glory, the consciousness of his own importance, and excellence, and his masterly sovereignty.” Drawing explicitly on Augustine, Hildebrand distinguishes concupiscence and pride by concluding that “concupiscence refers to a having; pride to a being. Concupiscence is a perversion in the sphere of the possession of a good; pride is a perversion in the attitude toward one’s own perfection.” The worst type of pride is satanic, a “reversal of St. Catherine’s prayer … ‘That Thou be all and I, nothing.’ Its innermost gesture repeats to God: ‘That I may be, and Thou shalt not be.’”
The egocentrism that underlies all evil, from the least serious form of concupiscence to this lowest and most extreme form of metaphysical pride, always requires those who will it to undertake a self-blinding. If the heart of phenomenology and the realization of our human dignity requires an encounter with being, with created reality, then the roots of moral evil stem from the choice to turn our backs on what we see. We will ourselves to pay attention to something we know is less important, or something that gives us a certain kind of self-satisfying pleasure at the expense of a better good. It is particularly common for us to want to pay too much attention to ourselves.
This self-blinding results from what Hildebrand identifies as an absorption in an immanent logic, by which he means the logic of a particular activity. Though this absorption does not always result in evil and indeed is a prerequisite for human craft—an attentive mechanic, for instance, should be absorbed in the immanent logic of a car he is repairing—“as soon as this immanent logic absorbs us to such an extent that we no longer situate the end of our activity within the hierarchy of values, that we are no longer concerned with the place that our ends holds in this hierarchy, we have fallen prey to the immanent logic of our activity.” We will, consciously or otherwise, to hold something of lesser value as more important than something of greater value: Hildebrand uses the example of a leader of a charitable organization who, though initially well-intentioned, becomes so wrapped up in the practical and monetary affairs of getting the organization off the ground that he is led to sin.
Hildebrand’s arguments show that the roots of moral evil and the temptation to self-blind, to dis-order the hierarchy of values which has at its summit the love of God and neighbor, are relentless. Though we may be inclined to believe that our disordered subjective pleasures remain only with us, Hildebrand warns that sinful absorption into immanent logic can not only be taken up by whole societies but also brought to bear against their most vulnerable.
Hildebrand encountered this firsthand. As papal biographer George Weigel noted, Hildebrand resigned in 1933 from Germany’s leading Catholic academic society to protest the “‘ignominious affair’” of one of their lecturers declaring that “the Third Reich [was] the realization of the Body of Christ in the secular world”—a fascistic disordering that revealed the Reich as sacrilegious in its theology as it was anthropologically and morally bankrupt. Hildebrand immediately wrote to friends to argue that “‘it is completely immaterial if [this] Antichrist refrains from attacking the Church for political reasons, or if he concludes a Concordat with the Vatican. What is decisive is the spirit that animates him, the heresy he represents, the crimes committed at his behest. God is offended regardless of whether the victim of murder is a Jew, a Socialist, or a bishop. Blood that has been innocently spilled cries out to heaven.”
In the Third Reich’s supremely prideful immanent logic, ideology is ordered above innocence, above the human person, and above God. Pope Leo identifies this same sort of immanent logic, the logic of a new industrialization that seeks to void all aspects of the imago Dei inscribed into our natures, as threatening the human person on all sides. What, then, can practically break us out of a pleasure-focused concupiscence, a self-centered pride, or a totalizing immanent logic? What helps us to see reality well?
Leo seems to be following Hildebrand’s path. Hildebrand’s personalism developed into an account of the sexual difference, nuptial gift, and family that was foundational for John Paul II’s famous theology of the body. Leo echoes this turn in his recent declarations that “it is the responsibility of government leaders to work to build harmonious and peaceful civil societies [which] can be achieved above all by investing in the family, founded upon the stable union between a man and a woman.” Our families force us to reexamine our priorities, remind us that we are not living for ourselves and our pleasures alone, shake us out of believing that we are perfect, and break us out of immanent logics that demand too much from us: they force us to encounter reality. Hildebrand and Leo both point us to how concupiscence, pride, and immanent logic are toxic to the life of the family, the very life that reflects, better than anything else in reality, the life of the Being that moves the universe through love.
John-Paul Heil is a Core Fellow at Mount St. Mary's University. His writing has appeared in TIME, The Week, and Smithsonian.
Book Reviewed：
The Roots of Moral Evil by Dietrich von Hildebrand
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普通(人的)倫理學：「虛無主義」、「自由意志」、和「社會規範」
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0. 前言
這篇文章介紹我的「倫理觀」；我把它稱之為「普通(人的)倫理學」。本文組織如下：
1) 第1節列舉我所接受的四種「前提」和/或「立場」；它們是我思路的起點和論述的前提/依據。
2) 第2節批判我所了解的「虛無主義」；我認為建立任何「倫理學」論述之前，必須破除這個思想。
3) 第3節討論我對「自由意志」概念的了解，並肯定它的存在；這是我建立自己「倫理觀」的基礎。第2、3兩節屬於「倫理學基礎論」領域。
4) 第4節分析「社會規範」的概念；它屬於「應用倫理學」領域。
5) 第5節做一個簡單的總結。
我在「後記」一節中，附上20多年來討論和本文相關議題的拙作，以及一部份我讀到學者的評論；請參考。
1. 論述前提和判斷立場
在許多學者對知識的「社會性」做了深入研究，得到廣泛的共識後，「學術中立」的觀念已經過時。代之而起的是：
1) 文化和社會對知識的制約。
2) 理論/學問的「宰制性質」。
前者指的是：任何學說或理論都是建構在某些預設的「論述前提」和「判斷立場」之上。「立場」在此指：我們從自己文化傳承和「社會存在」形塑而成的個人「定位」/「認同」。
後者指的是：許多理論/學問都有為特定階層、群體、集團、利益組合「服務」的「性質」和/或「目的」。「『誰』的知識？」這個戰鬥口號把這種觀點表達得淋漓盡致
我基本上也接受這兩種看法。以下列舉我現在所接受的、和這篇文章相關的四種前提和/或立場。
1) 在本體論上，我接受「唯物論」；我採取「自然環境客觀存在」這個觀點。
2) 在認識論上，我接受「經驗論」和「相對觀」；在處理公共議題上我盡可能使用理性思考的方式。
3) 在倫理學上，我接受「相對觀」和「效益論」。
這些觀點或立場的內容以及我接受它們的原因，不在這篇文章討論範圍。我把它們列舉在這裏的目的是：幫助讀者了解本文思考的方向和方式，以及我推論所依據的「基本假設」。
2. 虛無主義
尼切對「(倫理學)虛無主義」的描述是：
「從根本上否定價值、意義、和對目的的追求(欲望)」(1)。
屠格涅夫給虛無主義的定義則是：
「一個『虛無主義者』拒絕承認任何權威；她/他也拒絕接受任何一個未經證實的原則，不論該原則被多少人尊重」。
尼切和達斯妥也夫斯基對虛無主義的「立場」請見此處。
如果虛無主義成立，倫理學就沒有立論的基礎。所以我認為：在討論倫理學之前，應該先全面檢討虛無主義的適用性。在尼切對虛無主義的定義中，我們可以從「否定」的程度，將它分別成三個層次：
1) 全面性的虛無主義；
2) 局部性的虛無主義；
3) 策略性的虛無主義。
2.1 本體論
本體論中的虛無主義至少要同時包含下面兩個主張：
1) 無神論；也就是說：不承認有上帝或絕對精神之類的說法。
2) 絕對唯心論；也就是說：不承認自然環境的客觀存在。
中國傳統哲學大多承認天、地的存在。就我所知，傳統中國哲學中很少有主張絕對唯心論的學者。在文藝復興以前，西方學者中不承認神、上帝、或絕對精神之類說法的哲學家，大多是唯物論者。所以，中、西思想史上在近代之前，本體論中很少有採取虛無主義立場的學者。
佛教的中觀學派是思想史上最接近虛無主義的本體論學說。
絕對唯心論者，往往在本體論上接近虛無主義；柏克萊就是一個例子。另一方面，正是因為一個人肯定了上帝的存在，她/他才能有把握否定物的存在。但當上帝存在與否本身成為問題時，絕對唯心論者在本體論上就有無家可歸的徬徨了。中國有句老話：「皮之不存，毛將焉附」；我們可以順著它的思考模式說：「物之不存，心將焉附」。這是絕對唯心論者在本體論上的困境。
2.2 認識論
凡是具備以下任何一個主張的學說，都可被看成認識論中的虛無主義：
1) 否定客觀知識的可能性；也就是說：認為知識完全是主觀的建構。
2) 否定語言、文字具有確定或客觀的意義；也就是說：對一篇文章或作品的任何詮釋，都具有同等級的意義，或都沒有意義。
傅柯和李歐塔是第一種主張的代表；德希達則代表第二種主張。有學者把他們的主張稱為「工具論的虛無主義」。
認識論虛無主義包含四個有意或無意的盲點：
a. 混淆了資訊和知識兩者的分別；
b. 混淆了自然科學和非自然科學(社會、人文科學)兩者的分別；
c. 混淆了(一個)語言/文字起始意義(核心意義)和它衍生意義兩者的分別
d. 混淆了(一個)語言/文字本身意義和它(對讀者/聽者)所引起反應/影響兩者的分別。
本文不討論認識論或認知科學，對資訊和知識的分別、只簡單陳述於下：
資訊描述：何時、何地、何人、何物、何種外觀、和何種情況等等「事實」(或現象)。我們用「合、不合事實」來評估資訊；它幫助我們做決定。
知識解釋：一個事件或現象為什麼會發生；為什麼是這樣或那樣的情況；以及兩個事件或現象間的因果關係等。我們用「實用、不實用」來評估知識。它幫助我們做決定和/或解決困難。
我們通常可以在數量、性質、和程度各方面，確認並控制自然科學研究對象的自變數。如果我們接受自然環境的客觀存在，那麼研究它的結果，通常可以重複、驗證、以及根據它來做某種預測。
雖然社會或人文科學研究的對象也是客觀存在，我們通常不但不可能確認並控制研究對象所包含變數的數量、性質、和程度；我們甚至很難確切掌握那些特徵是自變數，那些特徵是他變數。因此，社會、人文科學研究的結果通常難以重複和驗證，也幾乎不可能根據它來做某種預測。
自然科學的研究結果之所以有價值，不在於它們所建構的理論是否完美，而在於它們所帶來的實際應用。凡是用過電腦、大哥大，坐過汽車、飛機，或者生過大病而還健在的人，大概都和我一樣，很難了解李歐塔關於知識無非是「大敘述」這類「大敘述」。如果他和傅柯願意在「知識」前面加上「社會科學」或「人文科學」之類的形容詞，他們的說法就說得通了。不過這樣一來，他們的「大敘述」就不再「大」而有點「老」。
當第一個講中文的原始人用「ㄇㄚˇ」(或和它相近的音)來指示一個臉很長、高高大大、尾巴像佛塵一樣，有四條腿而且跑很快的動物時，這個或這類動物就是「ㄇㄚˇ」。這個或這類動物也就是「ㄇㄚˇ」這個音的起始意義。同樣的，當第一個中國人用「馬」這個字(或符號)來代表「ㄇㄚˇ」這個音時，上面所描述的動物，就是「馬」這個字的「起始意義」。經過幾千年時間、不同社會、和各個地區的使用，「ㄇㄚˇ」這個音和「馬」這個字「衍生」出許多其它意義。一個字有多重意義並不表示它沒有一個「確定」的意義，更不表示它「沒有」意義；如「馬相很好」。維根斯坦有句名言：「一個字的意義就是它的用處」。如果有人說：「一個東西因為有『許多』用處，所以它等於沒有一個『確定』的用處，或根本『沒有』用處」；大家一定會認為她/他的想法很奇怪。
一個鼓吹認識論虛無主義的學者，很難通過「以子之矛，攻子之盾」的測試。如果有人認為：語言文字都沒有意義；那她/他發表文章做什麼? 如果傅柯真的認為：知識都是為權力服務；那他的理論又在為誰服務?
2.3 倫理學
1) 虛無主義的來源
全面虛無主義者的觀點，可以用上面引述過尼切的話為代表：
「從根本上『否定』價值、意義、和對目的的追求(欲望)」。
局部虛無主義者則認為：
倫理學中的「原則」或「標準」沒有「絕對」的價值或意義；從而，拒絕全面接受原則或標準的約束。
我不在這裏引用尼切的分析；只站在普通人的觀點，看看虛無主義的念頭從何而來。
只要不是乖乖牌或完全被「醬缸文化」浸泡得透不過氣來，一個人遲早會問：「如果我喜歡，為什麼不可以?」；想必它在你腦海中三不五時也曾一閃而過。您有答案嗎? 這個問題有許多負面的答案，例如：
「我不想坐牢」；
「我不想被別人戳脊梁骨」；
「我不想做一個過街老鼠」。
從負面來回答這些問題就埋下了虛無主義發芽的種子。何以故？因為大多數生活在現實中的人，很少心干情願的接受現成或教條式的答案。人都會問「為什麼?」。例如，看了許多活生生「竊鉤者誅，竊國者侯」的個案後，再聽到「不可偷盜」的教誨時，「為什麼？」的迷惘就會在大多數人心中油然而起。
對類似誡條或正道在理論上的權威性起了懷疑後，自然就會從功能或效益的觀點來思考它們。從懷疑到否定大概只要一小步，從功能論和效益論看問題，頂多只要一大步就會走向虛無主義。
2) 虛無主義的困境
祈克果和達斯妥也夫斯基是十九世紀中期面對虛無主義挑戰的兩大思想家。他們都沒有成功，也都只能各自選擇了他們願意接受的答案：祈克果的基督教，達斯妥也夫斯基的東正教和斯拉夫主義。不過，他的《地下室手記》則使我對虛無主義感到有趣，也同時開始質疑的書；只是我在22 – 24歲讀此書，細節不復記得，眼下已經沒有能力好好寫一篇讀後感。
尼切和卡夫卡就沒有這樣幸運；到了他們的時代，做為救贖之道的基督教早已顯示出「此路不通」的徵兆。尼切勇敢而悲壯的提出了他的答案：「發揮自身潛能」(2)。卡夫卡的三部中篇小說，《亞美利加》、《城堡》、和《審判》可說是虛無主義者悲歌的三部曲 – 掙扎、困境、和絕望(3)。
二十世紀中葉的沙垂和卡木，對虛無主義提出了他們的描述和解答。後者的《沉淪》可以視為一部「虛無者悲傖交響曲」。這本小說的主角(巴蒂斯塔)和達斯妥也夫斯基《魔鬼》這本小說的主角(斯特羅夫金)有異曲同悔之悲。前者沒有做他(自己認為)應該做的事，後者做了他(自己認為)不應該做的事。結果一個得了精神分裂症；一個變成行屍走肉。這是因為：上帝也許死了，但「良心」永遠和我們同在(4)。至於它是與生俱來，還是由社會/文化建構在我們腦海中，我就留給生物學家和社會學家來闡述。
3) 虛無主義的消解
上面第1)小節提到虛無主義的起源；第2)小節描述了它導致的困境。這一節談談如何避免掉進這個泥淖。
我認為：「道德」和「價值」都是我所說的「人定概念」(2025/05/26，0.2-1)-c小節)；它們本身並不具有超驗性或內在性。如果虛無主義挑戰「道德」的高高在上性，我建議從「目的」和「偏好」來建立其功能性，從而確立其「存在的理由」。
「社會契約論」者認為：
人為了增加自己存活的機率，不得不接受：「交出某些權力來換取一個有秩序環境的安排」(我的詮釋)。
如果同意這個說法，也就會同意：「價值觀念」和「行為規則」都具有維持社會穩定、和諧等的功能。則我們遵守「規則」和/或「道德」的終極理由是：
一個想存活下去的人，為了「增加自己存活的機率」，同意接受某些社會規範所加諸的限制。
另一方面，如果一個人在面對「要不要活下去」這個問題時，選擇了「我要活下去」；她/他接著得進一步選擇進入「那一種」ㄟ。這是因為：「活下去」不是抽象的觀念，而是具體的活動。它必須滿足一定的物質條件。人既然無法單獨生存，「進入社會」和「進入生產關係」成為「活下去」的前置條件。「生產關係」蘊含了：扮演某個角色；執行某類功能；承擔某種責任，或俗話說的：「不能掉鏈子」。下面第3、4兩節對相關概念會做進一步討論。
2.4 解構虛無主義
本體論、認識論、及倫理學這三個傳統哲學上的課題彼此相關，但並不具有必然的相關性。因此，一個人可以在其中任何一個課題上採取虛無主義「立場」，而不影響她/他在其餘兩個領域的觀點。例如，佛教徒對涅槃的追求，或懷有普渡眾生的慈悲。
「『後現代』思潮」大師如傅柯、李歐塔、和德希達等，在倫理學上並沒有採取虛無主義。我認為：他們了解到目前沒有動搖資本主義生產模式(下層建築)的可能性；於是採取逆勢操作的戰術，用上面所說認識論中的虛無主義來瓦解資產階級的意識型態(上層建築)。它們希望有一天，資產階級用來控制一般民眾的學術思想被徹底「解構」以後；資本主義的生產模式也會跟著被推翻。「『後現代』思潮」是政治/社會運動的成分，遠大於它是學術思潮的成分。我雖然批評他們的理論，但為他們唐•吉訶德式的鬥爭喝采。他們可說是在當代理論上，「以虛無主義為鬥爭工具」的革命家。
一個百分百的「虛無主義者」，理論上不一定要自殺，理論上甚至要求他繼續活著。因為自殺是一個要下功夫、非反射性的行為。任何一個要下功夫、非反射性的行為都為了達到一個目的。而「虛無主義者」並沒有目的。一個「虛無主義者」可以取暖、喝水、吃飯、打炮。這並不表示她/他要活下去；她/他可能只是在避免不舒服的感覺。虛無主義的重點在拒絕「肯定」，不在採取「逃避」。
「主義」是「一種思想、信仰、或力量」。從以上我對虛無主義的描述來看，「虛無主義」是一種思想；但做為一種信仰，「虛無主義」是一個自相矛盾的名詞。一個採取虛無主義的人，因為不接受任何遊戲規則，當然也就不用接受「矛盾」概念的限制。所以他們不但在理論上不必維持一致性，在理論和行為上也不必一致。他們當可以自稱：「虛無主義者」。
3. 自由意志
在人類思想史上，「自由意志」一直是個重要而沒有定論的問題。在下不揣淺陋，提出幾點看法。
3.1 意識
「意識」有很多層次或形式(5)；感覺、(反射式)反應、知覺、懷疑、感受、情緒、意志、思考、計劃、決策、思想等。以上這些層次排列的順序，並不指示它們形成的先後或層級的高下。「意識」是認知科學的課題，這篇文章不詳細討論什麼是意識。根據唯物主義者的觀點，意識不是超驗的、先天的、內在的、或浮現的等等，意識只需要，而且只能從：神經細胞的互動、神經系統的結構、以及神經組織的功能和機制等層面來解釋(6)。我認為生物要具備感覺和(反射式)反應以外的意識，需要具備儲存資訊的器官和比較、分辨資訊的能力。這些器官越複雜、這些能力越發達，生物意識的範圍越廣、功能越強、結果越深遠。
我們可以說，在文化、環境、和生理結構(包含遺傳基因)這三個因素相互作用/影響下，「意識」使一個人具有「意志」和「決策」能力。換句話說，意志和決策是意識呈現的種種方式中的兩種。一個人意志的「自由度」和決策的「有效性」，則和她/他的經驗、知識、掌握的資訊、以及處理資訊的能力成正比。
3.2 自由
1) 人沒有絕對的自由
人沒有選擇到或不到這個世界來的自由，也沒有選擇一生下時來所處文化、社會這類大環境的自由，當然也沒有選擇家庭、自身基因、教育方式、成長經驗等這些小環境的自由。這些大、小環境制約和限定著我們成年以後的思想和行為兩者的模式。就像孫悟空跳不出如來佛的手掌心一樣，我們也跳不出這些大、小環境的框架。所以說：人沒有絕對的自由。
2) 人的「有限自由」
沿用上面的比喻，人被局限在框架裏，但她/他並沒有被釘在一根柱子上。所以，人有揮灑的空間；就這個空間內的活動來說，人具有「有限自由」。「自由」在這個脈絡指的是：此人能夠「選擇」各種項目的「集合」；「集合」在此為數學術語。
人大腦內的神經網路連接決定人的思考模式；記憶細胞所儲存的資訊，數以億計；它們的排列組合，形成資訊的多面性；神經網路重新聯接的可能性，以及資訊的多面性，建構成人類想像、選擇、決定等的n-向度空間。n 的數值，因人而定，但總是有限的，所以人沒有絕對的自由。另一方面，n大於或等於 2。我們可以用「否定性」和德希達所批判的「兩端對立」概念兩者，支持n至少等於2的說法。所以，人有「有限自由」。 .
3) 自主性
哲學或倫理學所討論的「自由意志」，在社會學中屬於「自主性」(「主動性」)的課題
3.3 選擇
生物學家常說「追求存活」是生物與生俱來的內建程式。這是一種比喻性的說法，它並不蘊含：實際上自然或某一個造物者，賦予生物「追求存活」的程式。「存活」是一種能力或屬性，一個生物如果沒有這種能力或屬性；它的這種能力或屬性不足以讓它們應付自然的生態環境；它就不會通過自然生態環境的考驗而存活下來。所以，生存是生物具有「存活」這種能力或屬性的結果，不是是生物具有「存活」這個「目的」的結果。同樣的，人類目前所具有的種種種能力，不是「演化」的目的，而是這個過程的結果。
「有限自由」這個概念自然蘊含人能夠「選擇」，和具有「選擇能力」。雖然知識社會學和「『後現代』思潮」對人思想和行為的「自由」程度與範圍提出質疑，但資訊的普及和文化思想的交流，擴大了人選擇對象的範圍；則是客觀現實。
3.4 義務和責任 – 初探
法國哲學家勒文拿斯以「義務」的概念做為他倫理學的基礎(7)；他企圖把「義務」建構成一個絕對的概念。我不認為他提供了充分而必要的理由，「人沒有無限的自由」否定了「義務」這個概念的絕對性，如果「義務」是一個相對的概念，它的基礎還是「選擇」和「有限自由」。
存在主義「面對後果」的概念要比「義務」的概念來得實際。「選擇」不是在一個想像的「時•空」中做的，它是在一個充滿人際關係的結構中做的。應用倫理學中的許多問題，都是在這種所謂「生活世界」中進行；從而，個人也就必須在「面對後果」的限制下做選擇和決定。
4. 社會規範
先說幾句題外話，輕鬆一下。初一或之前，家父教了我兩個「作文」的套路：「起承轉合」和「能破/能立」。初一之後我靠著這兩把刷子頗受每位國文老師器重。初中能直升高中，大專聯考得進入台大，都拜家父這個指點之賜(該文第6節)。教育影響人的一生就不在話下了。我的論說文通常依照第一個脈絡展開，乃習慣使然。本文第2節可謂「破」；本節則為「立」；兩者是「真」、是「似」？則有待公論。
4.1 社會規範的肯定
「人為什麼活著?」這個問題可能沒有從科學推論出來的答案，它只有從見證或感受來了解。如果有人能回答這個問題，請盡快跟大家分享。
如果你是像我這樣一個不情願接受教條式或現成答案，而希望儘可能使用理性思考方式的人，你可能跟我一樣，找不到一個理論上或具有普遍適用性的答案。這是為什麼我在「後記」中提到：面對虛無主義，我掙扎了相當長一段時間。
如果你又是像我這樣一個對自己沒有信心，不能相信或堅持自己所選答案的人，你最好改問這兩個問題：
1) 人要不要活下去?
2) 如果要活下去，該怎麼活?
「要不要活下去?」是一個具體的問題，而且它只有兩個答案。否定性的答案會強迫你立刻去面對一個很少人有勇氣做的動作。當「活下去」和「不活下去」的理由相當時，一個採取理性方式做決定的人會選擇「活下去」。因為，她/他要保持重新做決定的可能性。沙垂「存在先於本質」這句話，當然不合本體論掛帥的邏輯。但只有從這個觀點切入，我們才能回答「如何存在」的問題(8)。
沿著這種思考模式，我們可以把倫理學上無解或多解的問題，用「決策過程」的思考方式來一一釐清可能碰到的疑惑。決策過程有兩個制約性周邊條件，第一是決策人的立場，第二是決策的目的。前者不是問題，因為本文一開始就說過，任何學說或理論都有它的預設立場。後者就牽涉到「選擇」和「自由」這兩個概念。我認為：存在主義對倫理學思想的貢獻之一，就在對這兩個概念做了深入的分析。
人有能力和權利做「選擇」或「決定」嗎?這是倫理學基礎論的課題之一，也是尼切「發揮自身潛能」這本書討論的主題。我沒有能力對這個問題做正面的答覆，只能在本節中從反面提出我的一些觀察(9)。我的基本論點是；不論我們獨處還是生活在社會中，我們都需要一些用來選擇行為的「原則」。否則我們有精神錯亂的可能，也不能有效的生活。
由於人(至少99.9999%的人)必須生活在社會中，她/他的行為與其他社會成員息息相關。同時，在一個有秩序的社會中，也就是說，在一個大多數成員願意遵守一套規則的社會中，一個人存活的機率能夠指數式的升高。因此，我把上述的「行為原則」稱為「社會規範」(該文第3.2-2)小節)。
4.2 義務和責任 – 續論
存在主義對倫理學思想的一個重大貢獻就在指出：因為人是自由的(雖然她/他有的只是「有限自由」)，人必須要為自己的行為「負責」。
「有限」是一個涵蓋質和量的概念。上面所討論的「有限」，在從量的觀點區分它和「無限」，從而否定「人要為自己行為負責」這個概念的絕對性。從質的觀點來看，人「自由」的「有限度」所產生的結果，是不是在實際上和「沒有自由」幾乎一樣呢?我不認為如此。例如，混沌理論強調「小兵立大功」。所以，人有「有限自由」的概念加上混沌理論，否定了「人『不』需要為自己行為負責」的說法。
如果人選擇活下去和進入某種生產關係(請見以上第2.3小節)，我們就有討論「義務」和「責任」這類概念的基礎。因為，不接受義務和責任的約束，我們就得面對可能「活不下去」的困境；例如，我們可能「被孤立」、「被放逐」、或「被隔離」等等。
因此，做為「『社會』人」，我們需不需要負責任，不是由我們自己決定。在一個彼此依賴、共存榮的環境中，其他人的認同和認可是我們繼續留在這個環境裏的條件之一。我們可以選擇離開；但是如果我們選擇留下來，守規矩和負責任就成為「留下來」需要付的代價。
4.3 普通(人的)倫理學 -- 理論基礎
我認為：孔子對宰我說的：「汝安則為之」(該篇第21)這句話，可以做為「如果我喜歡，為什麼不可以?」這個問題的答案。不過，本文一再強調：人活在社會中；因此，「安」與「不安」不在「天性」、基因、或「人格特質」，它們由一個人的「社會建構」過程，或本文所說的「良心」來決定。
即使「汝安則為之」只是孔子當時對宰我一種無可救藥的感嘆，今天它卻有特別的時代或「後現代」意義。它是普通(人的)倫理學的第一條原則。把這句話當做原則，代表或顯示以下我在理論上的立場和實踐上的考量：
1) 不承認有「普遍原則」和道德權威的存在。
社會規範的最後一道防線是：每個人自己所「選擇」的行為原則。如果你同意一個人的良心大部份是文化、社會所塑造的，那麼誰掌握了塑造良心的制度和機制(學校、教科書、 …等等)，誰就掌握了下一代的道德觀和行為規範(10)。
2) 道德與意識型態
在一個民主社會，如果你珍惜你自己的道德觀和行為規範，你就要(有組織的)利各種管道來鼓吹它們。同時，我們不可輕信別人所鼓吹的道德觀；我們要有「解構」的能力和習慣。因為，基本上道德觀是為某種或某類行為模式護航的意識型態(11)；俗話說的「道德綁架」即此之謂。
4.4 普通(人的)倫理學 -- 行為的選擇和決定
1) 行為的選擇和決定
行為的選擇通常根據一套既定的「行為原則」來決定。它的內容請參考《文學和倫理學之「行為指南」》(該文第2節)。
行為原則的來源只有三種：上帝、社會和文化、以及自己的選擇。這篇文章不討論：「人有能力和權力做這樣的選擇嗎」?這篇文章討論的是：「如果有一天人要做這樣的選擇，什麼是最有效的方法。」
上面一再強調：人的選擇不是在真空中做的；我們是在：社會和文化的制約下，面對特定的情況，以及(通常)為了達到一定的目標等三者，來做某種選擇與決定。
這些也是我強調「普通(人的)倫理學」的原因。像我這樣的普通人，並沒有學養和工具來思考「為什麼」或「有沒有權利」的課題；普通人往往要在一到三分鐘內選擇一種行為模式，來應付當下突發的情況。行為模式選擇的依據有三個：
1) 上述行為原則；
2) 個人規劃的人生目的；
3) 客觀環境的限制。
2) 流程圖
選擇倫理行為可以視為一個決策過程。流程圖是決策過程中協助決策者考慮所有相關因素的一個工具。熟悉它的人都知道它是一個簡便的、幫助我們做完整決定或規劃工作步驟的方法之一。不熟悉它的人，自然不清楚我在說些什麼。此處只能借用網上的專業介紹來避免我一知半解的誤導。我認為，流程圖也是一個幫助我們選擇和決定倫理行為的工具。
5. 結論
5.1 普通(人的)倫理學要點
1) 這篇文章從唯物主義、相對觀、理性思考/行動、和功能主義等立場，討論普通人的行為原則。
2) 建議用決策過程的觀點來思考/決定自己的「倫理行為」。
3) 強調「立場」和「目的」是選擇行為原則的周邊條件：
3)a 文化、社會、遺傳基因等制約人對「立場」的選擇；
3)b 「目的」則蘊含人有選擇的「自由」。
4) 指出採取理性方式的人，往往有虛無主義的傾向，但同時指出虛無主義和理性態度是矛盾的；並建議走出虛無主義情境的方向。
5.2 倫理行為的選擇
從資訊處理的觀點分析「選擇」和「自由」這兩個概念：
1) 「良心」是「選擇」的基礎；
2) 「自由」是「選擇」的前提：一個人的「自由度」是由她/他所做的「選擇」界定；
3) 「選擇」根據知識、經驗、和思考的缜密度來決定；
4) 「自由」和「選擇」蘊含「義務」和「責任」。
5.3 倫理行為的選擇方法
建議以「流程圖」概念和步驟來幫助：
1) 釐清選擇行為原則過程上需要思考的各種因素；
2) 釐清選擇行為模式過程上需要思考的各種因素。
後記：
我已經無從確認這篇文章是什麼時候寫的；只找到它發表於2004的紀載。當時我大概試圖把自己對倫理學的一些想法做個整理；但寫完後覺得第二節以後的內容相當膚淺。所以發表時只用了《淺談 虛無主義》做標題。拙作《實然與應然》的附註6中我提到：「此外，『虛無主義』也曾困擾了我至少15-20年」；因此，我把這篇舊作找出來，略做文字上的修改和補充，並加上相關「超連結」；記錄這段「困擾」的成果。
另一方面，我大概沒有能力再寫任何系統性的文章；所以改用了目前的標題。算是我閱讀和思考倫理學相關議題過程的紀念。從第二節開始，內容被增修的幅度相當大。但是，我畢竟垂垂老矣，思考能力跟著退化，加上「修改」不免受到原文現有結構的局限；此文在邏輯和「文從字順」上會有不少瑕疵。
我在別的文章提過：我的讀書旅途源於我對倫理問題的興趣。04/15 完成《實然與應然》後，就開始修補本文。拖拖拉拉的搞了一個半月。前幾天特別下了決心要在今天前完成，就我對倫理學思考歷程做過總結，算是給自己81歲的生日禮物。
20年來我在不同場合對本文所涉及各議題先後發表過許多意見；借這個機會略做整理。附錄於下，並加上其他學者的相關論述，以補本文之不足。
1) 「前提和立場」
實然與應然、自我介紹 -- 人生觀、道德觀、和知識觀 、《中國哲學的特質》讀後(該文「附錄」)、我的論述架構--發刊詞
2) 「虛無主義」
淺談「虛無主義」、淺談唯識論(該文3.2.3小節和附註18)
3) 「自由意志」
「自由意志」的討論、重談「自由意志」(該欄2018/10/18)、淺談「自由意志」(該欄2013/10/03)、自由意志 -- 開欄文、「自由意志」與「隔離制度」：「開膛手傑克」新身份的聯想、談「自主性」和「責任」、淺談「社會結構」和「人的『主動性』」、我們為什麼應該相信自己有「自由意志」？。
4) 「社會規範」
《縱欲與虛無之上：現代情境裡的政治倫理》讀後 - 倫理篇、實然與應然、《《一個怪人的夢》和《沉淪》讀後》、《文學和倫理學之「行為指南」》、道德、法律、和正義的本質 – 倫理學補遺、重新檢視「個人主義」和「自由主義」、用科學方法研究「道德內容」？本然和道德、政治與道德的關係、 倫理學和自然科學 -- 從「道德良心」談起、基於大腦神經學的道德觀、兩個關於「道德基礎」的不同認知(此為該欄開欄文)、道德規範和實踐方式(道德表現)--該欄 2009/08/09、淺談道德與歷史、現實主義和道德、道德做為論述武器、道德和良知(該欄2004/09/16)、公論與道德(該欄2004/09/14)、淺談「道德」 (該欄2023/12/30)、Both moral realism and relativism are wrong。
5) 其它
「『後現代』思潮」： 評《另類哲學：現代社會的後現代化、淺談「解構批判」。
「存在主義」：淺談「存在主義」、《《一個怪人的夢》和《沉淪》讀後》。
「自由」：「自由」和「必然性」、道德行為即自主的行為(該欄2024/03/11)、重新檢視「個人主義」和「自由主義」、黃克武教授《自由的所以然》讀後、評殷海光先生《民主與自由不是一件事》、關於「公民自由權論」、「理性」和「自由」(該欄2007/05/28)。
「自由主義」：《縱欲與虛無之上：現代情境裡的政治倫理》讀後 - 政治篇、重新檢視「個人主義」和「自由主義」、淺談「自由主義」、《當代自由主義》讀後、論古典自由主義。
「法律」：淺談法律和相關概念
「社會建構論」：淺談相對觀和社會建構論。
「相對觀」：淺談相對觀和社會建構論。
「科學方法論」：關於科學方法的討論。
「效益論」：行為、道德、和效益論、黃克武教授《自由的所以然》讀後(該文第1.3-2)小節)。
「唯物論」：唯物人文觀，淺談「唯物論」、「意識」、和「行為主義」，物理學觀點看「意識」及其科學研究(該文第1節)。
「現代性」：關於「現代性」的討論。
「理性」：理性論政的典範、理性、法治、和革命、淺談「理性」、「理性」和「自由」(該欄2007/05/28)、公共政策和理性討論(該欄2003/11/09)。
「意識」：大腦神經學：意識篇、意識的化學基礎、物理學觀點看「意識」及其科學研究、概念神經細胞、昏迷病患的意識狀態，《意識理論小百科》簡介、唯物人文觀，淺談「唯物論」、「意識」、和「行為主義」。
「意識型態」：淺談「意識型態」、關於「意識型態」、「意識型態」和「虛偽意識」。
「達斯妥也夫斯基」：兩種基督教教義觀：托爾斯泰和達斯妥也夫斯基、《《一個怪人的夢》和《沉淪》讀後》、達斯妥也夫斯基和心理學、Dostoevsky at 200： An Idea of Evil、Redemption for Dostoevsky and Nietzsche： A Comparative Analysis。
-- 2025/06/03
附註：
1. Will To Power (平裝版，第7頁，1-1節)
2. 這是我對”Will To Power”一詞的詮釋。
3. 根據我的解讀：本文所引用卡木與達斯妥也夫斯基兩位的作品，都在挑戰/批判「虛無主義」。相對而言，卡夫卡用文學的手法來描述和紀錄他的「夢境」(該文第2節)；因此，此處詮釋是我的讀後感覺和聯想；換句話說，(我認為)卡夫卡並未「有意識」的挑戰/批判「虛無主義」。
4. 拙作《《一個怪人的夢》和《沉淪》讀後》對此處提及卡木與達斯妥也夫斯基的倫理思想，以及它們跟「良心」的關係，有比較詳細的討論；請參閱。
5. The Science of Consciousness (平裝版，第122頁)；本文寫於2004年，此處和註6引用書籍都是20 - 30年前的老書。近10 – 15年我沒怎麼讀書；新知有限。請見「後記」-5)所附參考文章。
6. 此即「大腦網路連接論」；見《唯物人文觀》、How Brains Make Up Their Minds (精裝版，第39 – 41頁)、和Mind and the Brain Science in the 21 Century，第4、10，11各章。
7. 勒文拿斯主張：「不是人有義務，而是義務擁有我們」。這段話是我的解讀；當時沒有註明出處，現在沒有時間和精力去搜尋。
8. 尼切：「一個知道自己為什麼要活下去的人，能承擔任何苦難」( “He who has a why to live for can bear almost any how.”)；請參考這篇解讀。
9. 「積極自由」這個概念就在從政治學角度討論此問題；各篇涉及「自由主義」的拙作中，多少談到它(請見「後記」-5)所附參考文章)。
10. 我無意討論「教改」。但是，我要提醒大家：「教育」在「百年樹人」的功能外，它也是鞏固政權的工具。明乎此，就能了解許多荒謬口號和政策的所以然，如「去中國化」。
11. 去年選舉時，某民進黨黨工和該黨某中央級官員都曾說過這樣的話：「黑道也是人民，他們也有權利有自己的民意代表」。這句話誰都知道很荒謬，但乍聽之下，還真想不出它強詞奪理的地方在那裡。這也許是該黨(不同的)黨工，在上兩次選舉中都做了同樣的宣示。我來破解它一下：黑道者，游走於法律之外者也，民主者，法治之異名也。黑道和民主政治是兩個互相排斥的概念。所以，說上面這類話的人，在我看來，如果不是完全不了解法治和民主政治，就是替有黑道背景候選人做某種很不堪的動作(該欄2024/07/07，附註1)。-- 以上是本文第一次在2004年發表時的評論。
本文於 修改第 2 次
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轉載自：【中時電子報】 >> 【新聞對談】 >> 《道德做為論述武器》
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胡卜凱(#54)
謝謝你的問題和評論。謹答如下，並澄清或釐清幾個相關的概念：
1. 行為、行動、動作、和「自覺的」行動或動作
1) 行為
a. 「行為」：人或其他動物，所有其身體內、外的「運動」，如內分泌，腸、胃蠕動，叫春、舉手、投足、抓癢、手淫、投票、決策、助人、救人、犧牲小我來成全大我等等，都是「行為」。這是心理學上「行為主義」、社會科學中「行為學派」、和20世紀50 - 70年代「行為學」這些術語或概念中，「行為」一詞的用法。
b. 「行為主義」：認為心理學研究的對象必須是「可觀察」或「可測量」的「行為」，而不是「心靈」活動或狀態(如「欲望」、「妒忌」、「想法」等等)的觀點。
c. 「行為學派」：社會科學(尤其是政治學)中，主張只有「可觀察」或「可測量」的「行為」才能做為研究對象的學者、主張、和相關的方法論等等。
d. 「行為學」：所有以(上述所定義的)「行為」為研究對象的學科。
2) 行動和動作
有「目標」(目的)或「意義」的「行為」稱為「行動」或「動作」。
前者尤其指有相同「目標」或「意義」的一系列「動作」，或一個複雜「動作」的整個「過程」。
傳統西方哲學談到「道德」，也一定會討論「自由意志」。受到現象學、分析哲學、語言哲學的影響，在當代倫理學和社會科學中，「行動」和「目標」、「意義」、「意識」、或「意指」(意向、意圖)等等，有不可分的關係。因此，「行動」或「動作」是一個多層次、多層面的複雜概念。需要仔細的分析和檢驗。
3) 「自覺的」行動或動作
當一個行動或動作經過刻意的練習、鍛練、修飾、或規劃等，稱為「自覺的『行動』」或「自覺的『動作』」。例如：「殷勤」的招呼女士、溫文「儒雅」、「坐懷不亂」、「奉公守法」等等。我不知道中文裏是否有一個專門的詞彙來指示這類行動或動作。
4) 本節綜合討論
當我們使用以上三個概念的「所指」或「用法」，來討論西方學者在心理學、倫理學、或社會科學中對相關議題所做論述的時候，需要嚴謹的對它們加以分別。
在中文的用法裏，尤其在日常生活語言中，行為、行動、或動作三個詞彙是通用的。因此造成一些在溝通時的混淆。
2. 效益論的內容
如果「效益論」指邊沁和穆勒的主張，它的內容包含以下四點(Angeles 1981：307頁)：
a. 人的行動應以促進最大多數人的最大幸福(快樂)為原則。
b. 快樂是唯一根本的善，痛苦是唯一根本的惡。
c. (過於專門，略去。)
d. 一般而言，一個行動在道德上的價值，由其結果的好、壞來決定。
以上三點是Angeles教授的詮釋，我的中譯。
倫理學基礎論或倫理學理論的研究主題在定義：什麼是「善」、什麼是「惡」。「效益論」是一種倫理學理論，所以，它討論的是：
什麼是「善」、「惡」；同時主張以「最大多數人的最大幸福(快樂)」為「善」的判準。
因此，它和「效能」的概念沒有直接關係。請參考第四節關於「效能」的討論。
當代倫理學理論中，又有行動效益論和規則效益論之分，我不在此介紹(Lafollette 2000：165頁；183頁，Angeles 1981：307頁)。
順便提一下：
「享樂主義」也是一種倫理學理論。它討論的是：
什麼是「善」、「惡」；同時主張以「『個人』的最大幸福(快樂)」為『善』的判準。
它不是在討論：如何享樂；也不是在主張：每個人應盡情享樂。
3. 什麼是「道德」
「道德」的基本定義是：指導或規範「行為」的原則或律條。
在中國儒家、西方古典時代、和西方中世紀時代等的道德理論中，上述定義所說的「行為」，指一個人「所有」的「行為」。因此，邪念、手淫、口交、自殺、同性戀等等都在被傳統「道德」原則或律條禁止或規範之列。
現代哲學或社會科學道德理論中，上述定義中的「行為」，多數學者不但「只」指「行動」或「動作」，而且更進一步「只」指：
一個人「『影響』到其他人的『行動』或『動作』」。
我接受這個觀點。這是我強調：「道德」是一種「社會(性)規範」的原因。
當然，「影響」的範圍是什麼，仍然需要界定。例如，「橫刀奪愛」算不算「影響」到(被奪愛的)第三者；男、女兩人在公共場所親熱，算不算「影響」到孤家寡人或剛失戀的旁觀者等等。
另外還有一個重點：
「道德」所規範的行動，只限於那些「影響」我們生活舒適的行動；如果一個「行動」的後果「影響」到我們的生存，那就沒有「道德」規範可言。
這不是說「生存」是最高的「道德」原則，而是說在碰到「生存」議題時，一般人會認為「道德」的概念不再適用。
4. 效能和道德
4.1 效能的概念
效能 = 成果/使用資源
「效能」的概念和「資源」的使用，及被使用資源所「創造」的「成果」有關。在此，「資源」和「成果」都可以用金錢來衡量，俗稱「價值」。
「效能」是由於「資源有限」的現實和「永續經營」的意圖而來。如果沒有這兩個前提，我們不需要講「效能」。所以，它也是一個由「計算」或「精打細算」的「理性」而來的概念。
4.2 「善」、「惡」的概念
「道德」規範我們日常生活中的行動。由於日常生活的「變化」、「初始條件」、或「周邊條件」的可能性太多，「道德」無法建立一個適用於所有情況的原則或律條。因而它缺乏一個固定的條文和強制的規範力。這是「道德」和法律或律條不同的原因。
中、外的倫理學家都無法清楚明白的立下一個「道德」判斷的「標準」。因此，它只能使用「善」、「惡」這種抽象概念來「教化」。這也是為什麼「善」、「惡」不可能成為「具體」的概念。因為一旦「具體」化，它們就可以量化或強制化。
至於什麼是「善」？什麼是「惡」？通常也就由有「發言權」或「詮釋權」的人來訂定。另一方面，「道德」也必須有某種程度的普遍性，所以，一般人也就可以有某種程度的發言機會。這是「道德」發展成一種「共識」的基礎和機制。
「善」、「惡」的概念，蘊含人所珍貴或珍惜的，非金錢可衡量的「價值」。此處的「價值」指真、善、美、仁、義、誠實、博愛、平等、自由之類。即使沒有「資源有限」和「永續經營」這兩個前提，我們仍然需要講「善」、「惡」的概念，才能講「道德」。
在此我們要注意分辨「價值」的兩種意義或用法。
某些學者認為我們選擇「目標」或「目的」與「道德」有關。但：
「『如何』使用最少的資源來達到最大的結果」是一個現實和具體的問題；它不可能普遍化或原則化。
也就是說「效能」的概念和「道德」沒有直接關係。前者是一個技術層次的概念。
5. 道德觀
我的原文是「道德觀」，不是「道德」。
「道德觀」指：一個人對「道德」相關議題的看法、想法、觀點、或信念。
我用「觀」來詮釋柏林的"beliefs"。
我用「道德觀」來詮釋柏林的Men's beliefs in the sphere of conduct。
他這篇文章在強調學術界需要政治哲學。他的論點以強調：
人的目的、理想、她/他對「善」、「惡」的區別，或對「應該」、「不應該」的區別等等，是人「自覺行動」的動力。
來批判「價值中立」的立場。我的詮釋基於他上、下文的意旨。
6. 政策和道德
有些政策是由「道德」立場決定的。有些政策和「道德」立場無關。例如：
一個政府的官員必須救災和防治瘟疫等等。她/他們採取這些措施不是因為它們合乎「道德」原則，或她/他們悲天憫人。而是如果她/他們不採取相關措施；或她/他們採取的相關措施沒有「效能」，她/他們就要滾蛋。這是另一個「道德」概念不一定適用的範圍。
我批評阿斌網友是因為：他的大作似乎蘊含：
政策和「道德」立場無關，我們只需要考慮一個政策的效能。
我批評你是因為：你的大作似乎蘊含：
講求「效能」是一種「道德觀」。
我的目的在指出：
1. 一個社會的政策有些是在多數成員所共有的「道德觀」制約下制定；
2. 講求「效能」並不是一種「道德觀」，而是理性思考的結果，屬於技術面的考量。
後記：
本文原標題是《功利主義和其他概念》，07/29/2006發表於我的第一個部落格。最近由於修改另一篇舊作，把它找了出來。我現在不再使用「功利主義」一詞，改用「效益論」，除此詞、文章標題、標點符號、和加上超連結之外，其它文字略有更動以求通順。
柏林的大作是那一篇已經不可考。
參考書目：
** Angeles, P. A., 1981, Dictionary of Philosophy, Barnes and Noble Books, New York
** Lafollette, H. 2000, Ed., The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, Blackwell Publishers, Malden, MA, USA
中、英詞彙對照：
「自覺的」行動或「自覺的」動作：conduct行為：behavior
行為主義：behaviorism
行為學：behavior sciences
行為學派：behavioralism (schools)
行動：action
行動效益論：act-utilitarianism
享樂主義：hedonism
效益論：utilitarianism
倫理學基礎論：meta-ethics
動作：act
規則效益論：rule-utilitarianism
本文於 修改第 1 次
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《縱欲與虛無之上：現代情境裡的政治倫理》讀後 - 倫理篇
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書名： 《縱欲與虛無之上：現代情境裡的政治倫理》
作者： 錢永祥
出版者： 聯經
出版時間：民國九十年初版
0. 前言
0.1 緣起
我在今年二、三月讀完錢永祥教授著《縱欲與虛無之上：現代情境裡的政治倫理》 (下稱「本書」)，頗有講幾句話的衝動。大概是同聲相應、同氣相求的作用吧。在06/23的編後中，我說要寫一篇本書的「書評」。仔細重讀本書後，發現當時我用錯了字眼。任何人可從本書內容看出：錢教授是一個用了很大功夫在做學問的人(1)。如果我認為自己有「評論」他思想的功力，未免浮誇。其次，本書涵蓋的範圍很廣，我聽過《聯邦論》的大名，但政治學不是我主要的閱讀興趣所在，一直不曾深入研讀該書。我雖然多少讀過幾本黑格爾、韋伯、柏林、盧卡其、馬庫色、及羅爾斯等的著作或他們思想的評介，但如果我要「評論」錢教授這本介紹或評論他們思想的書，可能還要再來個十年寒窗。我把這篇文章定位在「讀後感」，它的內容可以分成兩個部份：
1) 本書序言以及論文中，所提到的「價值」或「道德」議題，是我有興趣而且思考過的。我希望在明年春天前，能提出自己對倫理學較完整的意見。本文只對和本書相關的部份，提出一些愚見，希望錢教授和網友們不吝賜教。
2) 本書論述主題是「自由主義」。我讀過的政治哲學著作不多，所以，理論上我沒有置喙的能力。但政治是我的興趣之一，因此不揣簡陋，根據自己幾十年的觀察、和由它們而來的常識，就相關的概念提出一些看法，向錢教授請教。這一部分，稍後再發表。
0.2 基本假設和認知
在討論議題前，我通常會簡單敘述自己和該議題相關的基本假設和認知(胡卜凱，2002a)。因為這些假設和認知說明我看法的來源，並提示我看法跟別人有差異的可能原因。以下略述我對「意義」、「理性」、「知識份子」、「西方文化」、以及「人和社會」的了解。
1) 意義
「意義」有三個層面：
a. 自然意義，有實物可指，如阿里「山」、洗澡「水」的「山」、「水」。任何10個人對這類「意義」取得共識的機率，大概在 90%左右(2)。
b. 抽象意義(概念)，無實物可指，但約定俗成。如「仁者樂山、智者樂水」的「山」、「水」，或「人性」、「品質」。任何10個人對這類「意義」取得共識的機率，大概在 70%左右。
c. 人定意義(概念)，無實物可指，即使有約定俗成的意義，但在文化和社會的制約下，每個人各有自己的解讀。如「公平」、「正義」、或「價值」。任何10個人對這類「意義」取得共識的機率，大概在30%以下。(「人定意義(概念)」在原文中為「人造意義(概念)」。後經福蜀濤兄指出：「所有『概念』」皆為人『造』」；所以改為「人定意義(概念)」。取其「依人而『定』」之義。 -- 2025)
2) 理性
我對「理性」這個概念的理解如下：
a. 我傾向把「理性」看成一種處理生活情景的能力、方式、或習慣；而不是把它當做一種官能(Kant，1965)。人之所以號稱為「理性動物」，是因為在經過億萬年的演化後，人類有了大、小腦和相關的生理結構。它們是「意識」的基礎(3)。這些生理結構，提供人類的記憶官能，和由此官能而來的分類、比較、計算、以及在既定範圍中「選擇」等的能力(4)。這些能力就是傳統哲學家所稱的「理性」。如果一個人這部份生理結構受到傷害，或一個人拒絕使用它們，或一個人不習慣使用它們，或一個人不知道如何使用它們，那麼這個人實際上並沒有使用「理性」的能力、方式、或習慣。就像人有學會游泳和騎腳踏車的能力，這並不意味：「凡是人都會游泳」或「凡是人都會騎腳踏車」。
b. 並不是人類所有的活動，都要使用「理性」。它有一定的適用範圍(Kant，1965)，例如在解決問題、達成任務，同時又需要講求效率或效能的情境下，通常需要使用「理性」。但運用由經驗累積而來的「本能」或「直覺」，由情緒而來的「衝動」或「感覺」，有時也能達到同樣的目的。只是在成功的或然率上可能有差別而已。想開車安全回家時，使用理性會比較安全，例如在公路上不要亂比「手勢」。但談戀愛時，使用理性可能就比較不會達到「追到手」的目的。
c. 西方思想史中，學者對「理性」這個概念有很多種用法。它們和現代人或我們中國人所理解的「理性」，有時並不相當(5)。
3) 知識份子
知識份子通常有兩個象牙塔式的思考模式：
a. 在有意做不實的陳述時，他/她們把老百姓當白痴(胡卜凱，2002b)；在做其他論述時，他/她們以為所有的人都是「知識份子」。
b. 他/她們以為在老百姓的日常生活過程中，「理想」或「價值」和柴、米、油、鹽、醬、醋、茶有同樣的比重(6)。
因此，知識份子所關切的，往往不是一般民眾所關切的。例如奧威爾所念茲在茲的「平等」(本書67頁，以下頁數都就本書而言)，對一般人來說，80%的時間大概不值兩個銅板。管子說：「衣食足則知榮辱」，孫中山先生強調食、衣、住、行的重要。這是大政治家的思考方式不同於一般知識份子的地方。對世界上大約70%的人來說，他們生活的目標，是維持基本生活水準(活下去！)。對大約20%的人來說，他們生活的目標，是維持和鄰居相當的社會地位。大約有5%的人，過著自已所滿意的生活。關切理想或「價值」的人，大概只佔後面兩者的5%。他們之中，又可分三類：
A. 50%的人可能只是以這樣的語言或行為來混飯吃的。如一些幫閒文人或待價而沽的「政務官/立委預備軍」(7)。
B. 10%的人另有混飯吃的方式；或有祖產餘蔭；或有財多的老公/老婆。對這類人來說，「知識」是種興趣或消遣。以我為例，在下幹了30年朝9晚7、晚8、晚9、甚至晚12的高科技工程師，今天才有餘力和時間放言高論。
C. 30%的人雖然也是以「知識」為混飯吃的方式，但他/她們同時也以「知識」為「志業」(96頁)。如果兩者之間有衝突，他/她們有時會放棄前者，堅持自己的「理想」或「價值觀」。如秋瑾、陳獨秀、瞿秋白、陳文成、鄭南榕等。從本書內容來看，錢教授大概也屬於這一類型。
4) 西方文化
我沒有評論或分析西方文化的資格。這裏只是和大家分享一下我的一些看法。
a. 大家都熟知西方文化的兩大源頭是希臘哲學和基督教。我認為西方文化的主流思考模式，是受到此二者制約的唯心主義(主體主義、觀念論等)。如果沒有掌握希臘哲學和基督教的重點，它們對西方社會意識「上層建築」的影響，以及它們制約西方學者「思考模式」的程度(8)，一個人很難了解西方思想史上的各種論述。同樣的，不熟悉工業革命後100年間，西歐社會現實情況的人，也很難了解為什麼有社會主義的思潮(9)。
b. 所謂西方文化的「危機」，一部份原因就在於許多西方知識份子，沒有勇氣、眼界、或能力從唯心主義的城堡中走出來；也就是說：在面對19、20世紀上帝的概念已被其他意識型態取代的「荒原」時(本書底頁) ，他們不知道如何在新發現的「物性」現世中(胡卜凱，2002a)建立非「超越性」的價值(10，11)。韋伯的「祛魅」情結(6頁、97頁)，大概指此而言。如果以對現世的接納程度(現世化)為標準，中國社會早在春秋/戰國時代就進入了「現代」期。
5) 人和社會
任何以「道德」或「價值」為主題的論述，都受到論述者對「人」和「社會」這兩個概念想法、了解、和詮釋等等的制約。因此，我先簡述自己對它們的了解：
a. 我接受演化論對「人」的來源的說法。因此，對於西方文化中，以上帝為人性或道德基礎的說法，以及中國文化中，以天、地、自然等為人性或道德基礎的闡述，我都保持懷疑和批判的態度。
b. 在演化論的觀點下，人是從單細胞生物演化而來。「人性」建立在「生物性」這個基礎上。如果「人性」為善，則某些生物也有某種程度的「善性」，如果「人性」為惡，則某些生物也有某種程度的「惡性」。生物有善性或惡性的命題，大概是說不通的。既然道德只有在社會活動或人際關係的脈絡中才有意義，「人性」是善、是惡的爭議，和道德或價值的決定，也就並不相關。
c. 「人」是群居動物，所以人進入「社會」，並不是因為協商的結果。而是不得不如此的結果(12)。契約論的「契約」，是人進入「社會」後所演化或演變出的安排。我曾在本廣場的《發刊詞》中(胡卜凱，2002a，第4節)，簡單敘述我對個人和社會之間關係的看法。
錢教授對以上各基本議題的想法，沒有很明白的交待。也可能是我讀本書時，不夠專注或仔細。我想基本假設的不同，是我們看法間有差異的原因之一。
1. 道德的概念
1.1 道德的沿革
原始和傳統社會的資源(13)有限，這裏的「資源」，指的主要是食物和性伴侶。所謂「食、色性也」。搶奪資源，會造成社會環境的不穩定。即使身強力壯的人，在原始社會中，也不能為所欲為。因為他可能受到暗中攻擊或寡不敵眾。為了維持社會環境的穩定，社會成員對各自的行為，不得不做一些節制性的安排，這是法律和公權力的起源。另一方面，用力量來限定每個人的所有活動細節，是不可能做到的。因此，先民創造「道德」這個概念，在法律之外，幫助掌權者、管理者、及一般人維持一個穩定、共同活動而不互相傷害的環境。如果這個看法，可以說明或詮釋「道德」的沿革，那麼，道德的性質及功能和「法律」相當；只是在執行或落實層面有「力道」上的不同。我接受許多「現代」政治思想家認為：道德只有在社會活動或人際關係的脈絡中才有意義的詮釋(Strauss，1959)。從上述對「意義」的分類觀點看，道德或價值是人定「意義」。我認為：沒有「超越」社會活動或人際關係的道德或價值(14)。換句話說，我不接受：「普世價值」的論述。
我不是法學家；以我的淺見，法律由人訂定。所謂「自然法」的觀念(15)，和「君權神授」的說法一樣，不過是一種神話、或冠冕堂皇的「門面話」。。動物的基因組合中，沒有一組構成「權利」的 DNA。因此，「天賦人權」的觀念也不過就是一種戰鬥口號。權利不是與生俱來，而是爭來的、謀來的、搶來的、或交換來的。
1.2 道德的定義
我把「道德」定義為：「在不傷害自身利益的前提下，社會中人際行為的模式」。「(道德)價值」則是「在不傷害自身利益的前提下，社會中人際行為模式的指導原則」。如果我的了解接近錢教授的想法，他的「道德觀」具有相當高的個人成份，他的「道德」，可能涵蓋一般人的：「理想」、「人生觀」、「使命感」、乃至於「生命的意義」等(16)。
2. 道德的「超越」性
達斯妥也夫斯基有句名言：「如果上帝不存在，什麼事都可能」；也有人將它翻譯成：「一個人如果不相信上帝，什麼事都做得出來」。他的意思在回答：「只要我喜歡，為什麼不可以？」這個私底下誰都有過的想法(17)。達斯妥也夫斯基的說法，幫助我們了解何以在傳統的思想模式下，道德「必須」具有「超越」性。在這句話中，「上帝」這個名詞，可以用任何教條性、威權性的概念來取代。如果沒有「超越」性，道德律條就沒有規範或約束的力量，也就無法有效的完成當初設計或發明它的功能。這樣一來，「道貌」失去了「岸然」的基礎，衛道之士也就無從施展對別人行為的褒貶、評審、或說三道四的權力。這是他們不敢想像，也不願面對的(18)。
3. 弱者道德
有人說過：「法律是強者限制弱者的工具，道德是弱者限制強者的工具」。這種說法雖然有點誇張，但有它運作上的實際性(19)。尼采所批判的弱者道德(基督教道德) (Nietzsche，1967)，和儒家的「君君、臣臣、父父、子子」可說異曲同工。儒家說法的重點，在給予「君、臣」或「父、子」兩者間居於弱勢的一方，一些討價還價的「論述」依據。
尼采的「群體本能」和「弱者道德」的概念，我們可以這樣來了解：一般人自己不敢不受社會道德的束縛，因此，他們強烈的要求別人也接受同樣的束縛。所謂「道德感」，其實是「我吃不到的肥肉，你也別想吃」這種自私、自憐、或嫉妒的情緒。一般人只是以岸然的道貌，來掩飾自己怯懦的性格。
4. 現代社會的倫理情境
4.1 現代社會的多元性
現代社會的技術高速發展，資源大幅增加。人在謀生及生活方式上的選擇範圍也跟著膨脹(20)。另一方面，隨著人對自然、自己、人際關係、和社會環境的認識，社會的穩定性跟著水漲船高。許多由無知及偏見而來的，或為了維持社會穩定性所設計的禁忌，在目前或「現代」的社會中，就變得沒有太大的道理；因而逐漸消失(21)。對一般人來說，「現代社會」的功能性和利多性，除了上述的技術和資源外，在於破除了「傳統」(柏楊先生的「醬缸文化」)和「威權」(宗教、君主、和貴族)，以及它們在論述行為及其標準上的壟斷權。現代人除了這兩者所規範的模式和標準外，「可以自行棄絕或認定價值」(v頁)。錢教授的「多元」(335頁)，大概指此而言。容我再引述馬克思「社會存在決定意識，不是意識決定存在」的話來強調(見註9)：「道德」或「價值」等「意識」，是「生產模式」和「生產關係」的「函數」。當生產模式和生產關係改變時，前者就隨著改變。「生產關係」的概念在一般社會學學者論述中，通常以「角色」和「社會結」來表達。
現代社會在價值和標準方面「多元」化的結果，使「人性」或根據它所產生的「人的行為」，得以從種種束縛中得到解放。在原始和傳統社會中，這些束縛是依照當時的知識和想法，為了維持當時社會的穩定性而規劃、設定、和強制的。如果錢教授的「時代的道德要求」或「時代對於行動者的道德要求」(183頁)指此而言，我可以接受這種說法。如果錢教授的思考模式近於「時代考驗青年」的話，我想它是受到「擬人化」誤導的結果(胡卜凱，2002a，第4節)。所謂「時代對於行動者的道德要求」，從我的觀點，至少有兩個意思：
1) 「在一個時代中，其他社會『成員』，對於『自己』以外的社會成員在行為上的期待或要求」。
2) 「在一個時代中，社會『成員』採取那一種行為原則，最能達到他/她自己所選擇的生活目標」。
這兩者可能都不是錢教授使用這個概念的原意。
4.2 現代社會行使道德抉擇時的困擾
在現代社會中，遵守道德規範的原因和以往並無不同，主要是自保和自利。美國有位前眾議院議長，把這個道理說得淋漓盡致：「跟著混，就有得混」(22)。雖然他這句話是針對政客而言，在現實生活中，當小老百姓需要做道德抉擇時，這個建議也很適用。事實上，一般人需要做道德抉擇的機會並不多，所做抉擇的後果，通常對社會來說，也無關痛癢(23)。歷史上有幾個洪承疇和史可法？現代人比前現代的人在做道德抉擇時，有較多困擾的原因，至少有以下六個：
1) 過去的道德以維持社會穩定性為目標。現代社會的穩定性增加，因此，唯我獨尊(24)變成主流意識。形成道德規範的過程較複雜，需要的時間較長。造成主流意識和道德規範間有落差。因為教育水準及謀生方式的改變，即使不以「唯我獨尊」為原則的現代人，其自主意識要比前現代的人高出太多，因而他/她對「道德」性質的了解，也和前現代的人大不相同。
2) 社會上「弱者」相對減少，一般社會成員的「道德」標準，相對的減低(請回顧第3節)。也就是說，「看到肥肉，不吃白不吃」的做法，取代了以往「我吃不到的肥肉，你也別想吃」的想法。因此，不遵守現有道德規範的誘惑或藉口，跟著相對的增加(現有道德規範 = 傳統道德規範。
3) 大概有60%的人，發現價值系統其實是相對的，也不具權威性。因此，不遵守現有道德規範的誘惑或藉口，跟著相對的增加。但社會上仍充斥著傳統的「弱者道德」，因此，除了少數人外，多數人還是畏首畏尾，想做又不敢做。現代的司法/檢調/警政制度雖然很強勢，弱者道德仍是目前維持社會穩定的力量之一。
4) 現在的社會比較多元、複雜，造成人際間衝突的人、事、物、和機會都相對的增加。
5) 現在的社會比較多元、複雜，所以某些情境，缺乏可做參考的相關先例。
6) 現在的社會比較多元、複雜，自保和自利需要考慮的因素較多，例如長期利益和短期利益的考量。
這個簡單的分析，說明何以現有的(傳統)道德規範或價值，不足以做現代人行為的指導原則。
5. 現代人的倫理抉擇
本書《序》中提出兩個問題：
「…一旦人可以自行棄絕或認定價值，兩個問題接踵出現：第一、任何認定或棄絕，能不能提出很好的理由？甚麼樣的理據，才算是好的理由？… 第二、做下認定或棄絕的決定之後，如何承擔責任？…」(v頁)
這一節中，我先表示一些愚見，再就本書的論述方式，提出兩點建議。
5.1 價值認定
人的行為，由其大腦神經網路、各種神經激素、及各種神經信號傳導質的相互作用決定。用普通話來說，人是「習慣」動物。我在本文及其他論述中一再強調，文化、經驗(包括教育)等經由大腦神經網路，制約人的思考模式，也就制約著人在行為模式上的決定或抉擇。「諸神」也許「退隱」，現代人也許活在「荒原」上，但現代人並不活在真空中。幾百萬年的生活習慣，近百萬年的文化、傳統，不可能在200到 400年間消失；這些生活習慣、文化、和傳統仍然瀰漫、籠罩著「現代」社會或未來社會。
其次，現代人「可以自行棄絕或認定價值」(v頁)，並不表示他/她須要、需要、或會這樣做。如果說90%的前現代人「訴諸超越的秩序、內在的目的、或者有意義的傳統，作為價值的根基性的源頭」(v頁)，那麼，現代社會中，仍然有50%的人採取同樣的「訴諸」行為。另外有30%的人，也許不認為這些(超越的秩序等)足以做為價值的「源頭」，但他/她們不敢不接受法律或可能的社會輿論的約束，因此「跟著混」。我不知道這些(超越的秩序等加上對法律或社會輿論的服從)算不算「很好的理由」，但只要它們足以維繫社會的穩定，也就實現了「道德」的功能。就我的標準來說，它們和其他任何「理由」一樣「好」。
任何時代，總有5%的人，不會接受任何價值系統，他/她們或許是勇者、或許是尼采的「超人」、或許是一般人心目中的罪犯或先知、或許他/她們的基因在分裂、重組時出了點差錯。這種人的比率，在現代社會中，也許從5%增加到10%或15%，這個情況可以用法律來做部分的控制。
5.2 責任承擔
道德既是社會性的概念，所謂「承擔」，由社會其他成員的取向和要求而定(25)。道德既是由文化、經驗制約的大腦神經網路所制產生的行為模式，所謂「承擔」，也由各人所受文化、經驗的制約，及各人大腦神經網路的運作等因素而定。這是純理論的說法，在實際生活中，以下三本書把「承擔」的實踐講得透徹、入骨、和震撼(26)。
1) 卡木的《沉淪》(Camus，1956)
2) 達斯妥也夫斯基的《鬼上身》(或譯《魔鬼》，Dostoyevsky，1962)
3) 卡夫卡的《囚地》(Kafka，1971)
我讀書不多，文學修養淺薄。歡迎有興趣的朋友，推薦其他談「承擔」的著作(27)。
5.3 本書的論述方式
讀了錢教授的書，讓我感受到他對理想的執著和追求。另一方面，我不很了解錢教授的某些說法(v – vii頁)，也覺察到一些(我認為)字面上看起來不甚相容的文字。下面各舉一個例子，以供切磋琢磨。
5.3.1 論述個案
1) 「現代是一個諸神退隱、價值枯竭的荒涼情境」(本書底頁)。
我不知道在錢教授的思考模式中，「諸神退隱」和「價值枯竭」並舉是修辭的用法，還是暗示兩者間有因果關係？(請比較上引達斯妥也夫斯基的話)。錢教授也沒有明白表示他是否接受價值「多元論」的「事實」或說法(v頁，「事實」是原文)。錢教授給事實兩字加上引號，我不知道他的意思在強調還是在打折。如果錢教授對「價值多元」的「事實」，採取懷疑或批判的態度，或者他認為現代情境中被當做「價值」的各種「價值」，都不夠資格稱為「價值」，那我可以了解「價值枯竭」的用法。否則，「價值枯竭」和「價值多元」在字面上不甚相容。
2) 「前現代的責任意識之落實，表現在向一座巍然矗立的堅固磐石委身，捨棄對於自我的信任或者留戀，由此也就擺脫了自己須負的責任。殉國、殉道、都表現了這一點；…」(v頁)。
上面提到，大、小腦和相關的生理結構是「意識」的基礎。人有意識，所以有選擇「生命」以外其他意義或目標的可能性或機會。在語言、工具的使用外，這也是人不同於禽獸之處。(我並沒有說：「這也是人『高』於禽獸之處」)。對生命的珍重，不自現代人開始。所以，對過去或現在殉國、殉道的人，我們可以假定他/她們經過深思熟慮，才選擇了生命以外的價值。庸俗的人也許會說：「他/她們幹嘛ㄚ？」。
從理性思考和認定生命是最高價值的觀點，我可能不同意這些人的基本假設(價值)；如果我同意這些人的基本假設，我可能不同意這些人的推理過程；如果我同意這些人的基本假設和推理過程，我可能認為這些人的思考模式有盲點。但是，我很難接受蘇格拉底、布魯諾、文天祥、史可法等的行為，是在擺脫他們「須負的責任」這個說法(28)。
一個可能讓這個說法成立的前提是：「活下去是『每個人』的『責任』」。從相對主義的立場，我不會接受這個命題。根據我對本書的了解，錢教授大概也不會接受這個命題。
5.3.2 建議
1) 如果錢教授能(像我一樣)先簡單敘述他對倫理學基礎的基本假設、所肯定的價值、和價值判斷的標準，讀者比較能跟隨他的思路，了解他說法的脈絡，而得到更多的啟發。
2) 當一個人使用價值判斷的字眼或概念時，他/她可能要先大致界定這些「概念」(如「什麼是『好』？」)。
我引用上面已經討論過的一段話做例子來進一步說明第2點：
「…一旦人可以自行棄絕或認定價值，兩個問題接踵出現：第一、任何認定或棄絕，能不能提出很『好』的理由？甚麼樣的理據，才算是『好』的理由？」(v頁，雙引號我加的。)
一個人在做價值判斷時，她/他應該已經預設某些立場、價值、和標準。如果參與討論各方企圖對「好」理由或「好」理由的理據取得共識，我們需要先說明自己的立場、價值、和標準，以及選擇它們的依據。這是一個相當容冗長而且會有很多爭議的過程。如果把上面引用的這個問題改為：
「認定或棄絕價值，需不需要理由？如果需要，它的論述需不需要合邏輯或社會現實？」
可以簡化討論的過程。
6. 自主性
討論倫理學的文章，不談談「自主性」或「自由意志」，總有些意有未盡。我在很多篇文章中，已再三強調人的思想模式，以及根據它而來的行為，受環境(自然、文化、傳統等)、基因、社會(政治、經濟、社會組織等)、和個人經驗(家庭、教育、生活等)的制約。本文不打算申論這個說法，我只舉四個比喻：
1) 孫悟空翻不出如來佛的手掌心。
2) (木偶戲中的)傀儡無從了解自己的手舞足蹈，其實來自表演者的牽引。
3) 一隻小鳥被關在一個收藏了很多鳥籠的房屋中。它很快樂的從一個籠子飛進另一個籠子，沾沾自喜的以為自己在展現自主意識，在選擇棲身之籠。
d. 我們感到饑餓時，可以「選擇」進那一個飯店，進入飯店後，可以「選擇」吃牛肉麵或雞腿飯，也許還可以「選擇」坐那個位置。但一般人在感到饑餓時，大概沒有「選擇」不進食的意志力或能力。
我不是用這四個比喻，來「證明」我們沒有「自主性」或「自由意志」。但是它們會讓人三思：「自主性」或「自由意志」這個說法的「基礎」到底有多穩固。它們也顯示「自主性」有不同的層次和層面。我經過近20年的反覆思考，終於放棄了「自主性」的神話或大話。認識了人被制約、侷限的現實。我並不是說人沒有選擇，更不是說人的活動是命定或前定的。我說的是：
1) 人能做的選擇有一定的範圍。
2) 人的選擇行為，受到各種非個人所能控制因素的制約。
思考「自由意志」的經驗，使我深刻了解到，跳出傳統價值的框框有多困難。當然，放棄「自由意志」後，大概在倫理學上，就不能不接受相對主義。「相對主義」和「虛無主義」之間，大概只有「一念」的距離。這是我目前還沒有想清楚如何做的「抉擇」。
7. 結論
錢教授在本書序文中說：「… 現代的價值立場抉擇，不僅與前現代的景況迴異，與後現代的構想也迴異，而其差異主要是在抉擇的可能、理據與責任三方面，現代性提出了特殊的詮釋與觀點。這套詮釋與觀點，滲透了特定的價值認定。現代性對於我們的挑戰，正是問我們能不能維持這套認定」(iv頁)。
我就這段話表示一點意見，做為本文的結論。
7.1 現代性
我在此文和此文中，都討論到「現代」與「現代性」的議題，此處再略表淺見。
簡單的說，「現代性」是十八世紀後期到十九世紀初期，社會上所形成的「主流價值」。今天已經進入21世紀，難道200多年間我們的社會沒有發生「結構性」的改變？我們需要接受「現代性對於我們的挑戰」？還是需要檢討一下，200多年前的「主流價值」和「當下社會」的相關性？根據對當前社會的觀察和分析，放眼未來，人類需不需要設計另一套「主流價值」，來引導我們邁向演化旅程中的下一個「夕暉區」 (29)？
7.2 價值抉擇
1) 抉擇的可能：人在環境(自然、文化、傳統)、基因、社會、和個人經驗等因素的制約下做抉擇。
2) 抉擇的理據：人依據自己的利益(目標)、社會其他成員的期待、及現實情況等「實質性」因素做抉擇。
3) 抉擇的責任：社會其他成員的期待及個人所受的教養，界定抉擇後果的責任。
這不是在答覆錢教授這段話所提的問題，它們只是我對「價值抉擇」這個概念在論述架構或思考方向兩個層面所做的建議。請錢教授及各位網友多多指教。
後記：
本文發表於2002年8月。刊出的部落格已經不存在；我過去許多文章常常引用此文。因為這兩個原因，前些日子我把它找了出來。重讀之後，發現我20多年來還真的沒有長進。文字和標點符號略有修正，觀點和意旨未改變；增加之後一些拙作的超連結，刊登於此。 -- 2023
如上所說，我在2023就打算把這篇舊作修改、增補後發表。由於體力、精力、腦力持續階梯式下降，遲遲沒能完成。
由於拙作《實然與應然》提到：「虛無主義」，我找出2004年一篇討論「倫理學」和「虛無主義」的文章來做補充說明。該文源於這篇舊作，所以我又把它找出來，做了一些修正。考慮到上述體力等因素，如果等補齊所有「超連結」，還真不知道會拖到猴年馬月。所以除少數重點已經加上外，先行登出全文，以後再繼續完成。
在《實然與應然》一文中提及，我在兩個先、後不同時間點上的看法，可能有「矛盾」。我在增補和修正本文時，並沒有對這個問題做調和/修補的工作。我的觀點以發表時間在後拙作中所呈現者為準。-- 2025
附註：
1. 我在大學時，有幸認識當時還是高中生的錢永祥教授。出國以後，我們很少連絡。三十多年後，我很高興從這本書中看到永祥兄仍有追求理想的熱誠。希望能經過討論，重敘故人之情。
2. 此處以及下文中的比率數字，只是我根據常識做的估計(educated guess)，並不是民意調查的結果。我的目的在量化自己的論述，提供一個可以比較的基準。
3. 我不很了解錢教授對「問題意識」一詞的用法。
4. 「選擇」能力指的是：在有限的各種途徑中，「選擇」最符合預定目標的那一個途徑的能力。請見下文關於「自主性」的討論。
5. 當我初中畢業後開始接觸哲學時，一個困擾我很久的問題是：為什麼笛卡爾、萊布尼茲、和康德被稱為「理性論」者(rationalist)？這個問題當時會困擾我的原因是：我看出所謂「先驗的」，其實是「上帝給予的」的代用詞。對生活在20世紀，又沒有宗教文化背景，又年少無知的我來說，「理性」的概念和假設「上帝存在」的思考模式之間互相矛盾。由於我不是科班出身的哲學系學生，大概到我30歲時，我才了解這三位的「理性論」，是相對於「經驗論」而言。它指的是：認為「人有『天生的』認知能力」這個觀點。現在我接受：「理性所適用的範圍，不及於信仰行為」的觀點(Kant，1965)。所以我不再認為理性和信仰「上帝」存在的行為互相矛盾。
6. 例如：「自由主義為什麼關切平等？當代的一個看法」這一章第四節標題「人的最高利益：追求『理想』生活」(355頁，雙引號是我加的。)
7. 我常想：「如果黑道大哥不要爭著當立法委員，大學教授不要搶著幹政務官，台灣還真是個寶島」。
8. 這個觀點，相當於 “paradigm shift” (Kuhn，1996)的說法。本文論述即使以命題形式出現，都是相對性或條件性的。附帶一提的是：Kuhn的說法，只適用於人文、社會科學。以後我討論認知科學時，再詳細論述他的的說法。制約(conditioning)。
9. 例如錢教授說：「台灣社會的意識光譜有兩塊獨特的空白：這個社會的成員，始終沒有發展比較突出的保守主義傾向、也缺乏社會主義的反抗傳統；…」(372頁)。 我的了解：歐、美社會之所以有保守主義，因為他們有可「保守」的「利益」(知識份子大概會名之為「理想」、「價值」)：希臘哲學，羅馬制度及其意識型態；教會組織及其意識型態；既得利益階層(大資本家和貴族)及其意識型態等等。相對於希臘哲學和教會的意識型態而言，五四之後，我雖不能說中國傳統學術思想已破產，至少被打入冷宮(discredited)是事實。相對於大資本家和貴族階層而言，台灣在民國50 – 70年代只有暴發戶和黃埔官僚(大陸只有「新階級」)。他們還不懂養些「小鬼」來替他們裝點門面；所以台灣社會沒有保守主義。「小鬼」一詞指生存目的僅僅了混飯吃的第一類知識份子。其次，中國一直是農業社會、手工業社會、和小商業社會的混合體。60 – 70年代進入工業社會後，台灣社會不像工業革命後的西方社會那樣，有農業人口大量流失、大資本家殘酷的剝削、壓榨勞工、女工、童工、以及社會上充滿招搖撞騙的投資顧問等現實(現代社會「進步」的結果？！)。所以，社會主義在台灣沒有生根的環境。另一方面，大多數知識份子都被政府包養，鼓吹社會主義很難混口飯吃。再說得「現實」或庸俗一點，社會主義其實是用來(至少後來淪為)欺騙勞工，讓他們替小資產階層(市民階層)，以及他們包養的知識份子打前鋒、奪權的意識型態(神話、鬼話、門面話 …)。就和「紅衛兵」是毛澤東奪權的工具，「台獨」是民進黨選舉的口號一樣。下次討論自由主義時，我會回到這個議題。馬克思認為生產模式決定社會組織型態的說法，和「社會存在決定意識，不是意識決定存在」的名言(Marx，1972)，可以幫助研究社會活動的人，掌握研究的對象和方向。歷史中心主義和文化研究的部分觀點，都和馬克思這個說法相通。文化(傳統和歷史)是構成「存在」的成份。在歐洲以外地區的人，拿西方文化園地所釀造的老酒，來澆自己空虛現實所生的塊壘(此句借用，出處已忘)，只會落個爛醉如泥的結果。「全盤西化」論的唯心論傾向在此。(站在唯物論的立場，「唯心論傾向」其實是我客氣或有禮貌表達普通話所說的：「不顧現實」或「不用大腦」。)
10. 例如：前一陣子美國社會因「under God」被判違憲所產生的爭議。
11. 超越性往往是和上帝相關的代用詞。道德具有「超越性」，因為十誡是上帝所賜。人「超越」其他生物，因為上帝依他自己的形象造人。孔子回答宰我：「汝安則為之」的說法，則是非「超越性」倫理思想的例子。在此預告：這句話將是我論述倫理學的基礎之一。
12. 基因制約或現實需要。前者如螞蟻、蜜蜂、和猿猴類。
13. 我不是很了解錢教授對「資源」這個詞的用法，如「價值資源」(iv頁)或散見於各章的「道德資源」。
14. 這是相對主義的觀點，不是「(以)人為中心」的觀點。
15. 自然法的「法」有兩個意思，法律或法則。我接受「自然法則」有抽象意義。但我認為「自然法律」只有人工意義。也就是屬於「門面話(grand narrative)」。grand narrative見(Lyotard，1984)。
16. 依「道德是社會行為」的觀點，「理想」、「人生觀」、「使命感」、或「生命的意義」等，雖然有「價值」，但稱不上道德。例如，一個人殉情，我們可能為他/她，或他/她的親友感到婉惜。如果一個人因為自己無法解出數學難題而自殺，我們很難不認為他/她有「神經病」(應該說「精神病」)。
17. 傳統的回答如：「因為神在看」、「不是不報，時候未到」等，都是自欺欺人的說法。真正的原因是：「如果這樣做，有一天你會變成過街老鼠」。
18. 我只是借用達斯妥也夫斯基的話，不是把他歸入衛道之士。他是一位虔誠但有些疑惑的人(Hubben，1997)。我以後會討論他的著作和思想。
19. 例如：台灣許多財團的金主，各自「包養」幾個立法委員，是眾所周知的事實。前者雖不以有品味著稱，想來不是為了要和後者上床。
20. 例如：謀生方式的翻新。由於「可花費收入」增加，一般人即使理不得，也可用錢買個「心安」。此所以神棍、命理公、命理婆、和「個人修養師」充斥於後工業社會。這些人公然胡扯、騙人，也僭稱「老師」。(在以前，「赦罪卷」可是專利事業)。
21. 例如：反對同性戀、男女授受不親、反對離婚等。前一陣子，巴基斯坦一個村落裏，一個12歲男孩和一位種性階層高過他的的女童走在一起，為了處罰這個行為，村落的長老會議，決定讓幾個人在眾人圍觀下，輪暴男孩的姐姐。我相信他們也是奉「道德」之名行事。
22. Sam Rayburn。他這句話的原文是：「Go along, get along.」
23. 用美國人的說法是：「It’s not a matter of life and death.」
24. 70年代盛行於美國社會的「Me Number One」或「Me First」意識。
25. 例如：黃亂交、章不嚴、及璩光碟等。跳樑如昔，何來「承擔」之憂？繞舌加厲，暗笑世人可欺。
26. 希望黃亂交、章不嚴、及璩光碟等，看了這些書後，午夜夢醒之時，千萬不要想不開。
27. 我接觸屠格涅夫和沙特的作品是在大學時代。可能因為時間久遠及當時思想淺薄的關係，對小說故事的印象已不深刻。他們兩位對我思想的成形，有相當程度的啟發和影響。在此略表感激之意。
28. 台灣有些官員，捅了皮漏還不下台，嘶聲吶喊著：「我要負責！」。我想指出：負責不只是個主觀願望。出了皮漏，表示這些官員沒有能力或大腦完成交付給他/她們的任務。繼續從事自己沒有能力或大腦執行的任務，說不定皮漏愈捅愈大，社會成本難以估計。替他/她們擦屁股的，還是我們這些苦哈哈。希望他/她們以後要知道自己的斤兩，不要再有強烈的「責任」感。也不要把做官的欲望，當成或裝扮成「責任感」。
29. 夕暉區(twilight zone)。或譯「陰陽魔界」。「陰陽界」較達意。
參考書籍和文章：
– Camus, 1) 1956, “The Fall”, Vintage Books, New York
– Dostoyevsky, F. 1962, “The Possessed”. New American Library, New York
– Hubben, W. 1997, “Dostoyevsky, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Kafka”, Touchstone, New York
– Kafka, F. 1971, “Franz Kafka。The Complete Stories”, Schocken Books, New York
– Kant, I. 1965, “Critique of the Pure Reason”, St. Martin's Press, New York
– Kuhn, T. 1996, “The Structure of Scientific Revolution”, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago
– Lyotard, J.-F. 1984, “The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge”, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Minnesota
– Marx, K. 1972, “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy”, International Publishers, New York, 20 - 21頁
– Nietzsche, F. 1967, “The Will To Power”, Ed., Kaufmann, W., Vintage Books, New York
– Strauss, L. 1959, “What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies”, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago，40 – 55頁
– 胡卜凱，2002a，《發刊詞 – 我的論述架構》，刊於知識和社會廣場，知識區，4月，2002。
– 胡卜凱，2002b，《判斷模式》，刊於知識和社會廣場，社會區，4月，2002
– 胡卜凱，2002c，《另類哲學：現代社會的後現代化》，刊於知識和社會廣場，4月，2002。
本文於 修改第 11 次
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全球價值觀日趨分岐 -- Ross Pomeroy
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Globalization Was Supposed to Align the World's Values. Instead, There's a Growing Rift
Ross Pomeroy, 05/03/24
“Values emphasizing tolerance and self-expression have diverged most sharply, especially between high-income Western countries and the rest of the world.”
KEY TAKEAWAYS (全文重點)
* According to a new analysis, societies’ values are not converging around notions of personal rights and freedoms. Instead, they’re growing further apart. The rift is most pronounced between rich and poor countries.
* The world’s peoples were particularly less likely to agree on the ethics of homosexuality, euthanasia, divorce, prostitution, and abortion. Residents of wealthy countries grew more comfortable with all those topics, while residents of poorer countries were less so.
* Why did the trend towards tolerance and self-expression stall in poorer nations? It’s possible that, even though these societies grew richer, their wealth gains remain insecure. Political instability, conflict, and the threat of environmental disasters might cause people to remain more conservative, nationalistic, and distrustful of others.
At the end of the Cold War, many thinkers optimistically predicted that globalization would cause global societies’ social values to converge around liberal notions of personal rights and freedoms. Since then, technology has made the Earth “smaller” than ever. Global trade delivers goods from one corner of the globe to the other. Airlines allow us to travel across oceans in hours rather than days or weeks. The internet lets us keep tabs on events thousands of miles away, engross ourselves in different cultures, and connect with others almost instantaneously.
And yet, according to a new analysis conducted by researchers at the University of Chicago, societies’ values are not converging. Instead, they’re growing further apart. The rift is most pronounced between rich and poor countries.
Diverging values
Joshua Conrad Jackson, an assistant professor of behavioral science at the Booth School of Business, and Dan Medvedev, a final-year PhD student in behavioral science at the Booth School of Business, teamed up for the study, published on April 9 in the journal Nature Communications. Together, they scoured through data in the World Values Survey.
Every five years since 1981, social scientists around the world interview tens of thousands of people spread across at least 76 countries. Using a common questionnaire, they ask respondents about their beliefs, values, and motivations. The responses provide a glimpse into the minds of people from all sorts of diverse cultures.
Jackson and Medvedev found that of the 40 values measured in the survey, 27 had diverged between 1981 and 2021. The world’s peoples were particularly less likely to agree on the ethics of homosexuality, euthanasia, divorce, prostitution, and abortion. Residents of wealthy countries grew more comfortable with all those topics, while residents of poorer countries were less so. This rich-poor value divide also widened on parenting over the past four decades. People from poorer countries valued obedience and religious faith in their kids, while people from wealthier countries placed much less importance on those two qualities.
To showcase the diverging values between rich and poor countries, Jackson and Medvedev cited Pakistan and Australia. In 1981, 39% of Australians said childhood obedience was important and 45% said divorce was justifiable. That same year, 32% and 10% of Pakistanis respectively agreed with those statements. In 2021, only 18% of Australians compared to 49% of Pakistanis said childhood obedience was important, while 74% of Australians and 15% of Pakistanis viewed divorce as justifiable.
In an additional analysis, the authors found that GDP per capita was the greatest predictor of aligning social values. Frequent trade, geographic proximity, and religious similarity also contributed, albeit to a much lesser extent.
Over the study period, pretty much every country grew wealthier. In 1981 over 40% of the world’s population lived in extreme poverty. That proportion is less than 8% today. Over that time, most countries’ social values tended to grow more tolerant, secular, and individualistic — in short, more Westernized. So in that sense, the globalist predictions from decades ago were correct. It’s just that citizens of wealthier countries tended to follow that trend to a far greater extent than citizens of the poorest nations.
Accounting for the divide
Why did the trend stall in less-well-off countries? It’s possible that, even though these societies grew richer, their wealth gains remain insecure. Political instability, conflict, and the threat of environmental disasters might cause people to remain more conservative, nationalistic, and distrustful of others.
Authoritarian governments also may be putting up roadblocks. These regimes, particularly in Iran, Russia, and China, speak out forcefully against Western values.
“Russia has framed the recent war in Ukraine as a war against Western values,” the authors noted. “Chinese politicians have spoken against countries that ‘forcibly promote the concept and system of Western democracy and human rights.'”
The researchers cautioned that their study might actually be too short to inform us of any grand changes in human values. After all, human civilization has been around for roughly 10,000 years. This study only covered 0.4% of it.
“It may be that our findings are specific to a particular period of time following decolonization and the end of the Cold War and that we would have found different results at different periods of time,” Jackson and Medvedev wrote. “Only time will tell if our findings represent a general cultural trend or a historically isolated phenomenon.”
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道德行為即自主的行為--Dana Dragunoiu
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此文雖然在介紹文學家納波可夫的思想，但其主旨則與倫理學相關；因此在此欄刊出。
原文未分節；所有子標題是我加上幫助各位和稍後將登出的《評論》對照(本攔下一篇)。請參考《納波可夫的文學觀》中一些納波可夫先生軼事。
索引：
Ada：《愛達》，納波可夫作品
consequentialism：效益論
deontology：責任論、或譯義務論、德行論(與「德性論」有別，見本文《評論》註1)
lodestar：指示方向的星星(尤指北極星) ; 範例，規範，指導原則
Lolita：《蘿莉塔》，納波可夫作品
oeuvre：(作家、畫家或其他藝術家的)全部作品，作品全集
one-upmanship：技高一籌(通常並非稱讚意思，有偷吃步或出怪招等戲謔意思)；此處指更過份，更有甚者，更進一步
pedophile：戀童癖者
Nabokov and why the moral act is the free act
How freedom and morality are intertwined
Dana Dragunoiu, 03/01/24
編者介紹
We think the consequences of our actions are key to whether they are morally right or wrong. However, for Kant, acts of sacrifice, duty or courtesy are the most powerful testaments of freedom, because they are in opposition to what is consequentially good. No one understood this better than Vladimir Nabokov. His characters (他作品中的人物們), especially in such infamous works as Lolita, are often labelled as simply morally repulsive. Yet Nabokov’s radical philosophical inquiry, as Dana Dragunoiu suggests, lies within his characters, who show moral excellence by managing to control their corrupt inclination, interests, or passions through Kantian acts of courtesy.
0. 前言
Freedom was a value of supreme importance for Vladimir Nabokov, the Russo-American writer who authored, most famously, Lolita. Nabokov’s achievement includes a massive body of work that includes fiction, poetry, drama, translation, autobiography, and even scientific writing. What is more, Lolita, while the best-known of his novels, is one of many masterpieces alongside The Defense, The Gift, Invitation to a Beheading, Pnin, Pale Fire, Ada, as well as his memoir, Speak, Memory.
Forced into exile in 1917 by the October Revolution, Nabokov had good reasons to champion freedom as passionately and consistently as he did. From his point of view and that of most Russian émigrés, the Bolsheviks substituted the tsarist tyranny with a tyranny of their own. For Nabokov in particular, this was especially painful because his father had been one of the “liberationists” who dedicated his life to transforming Russia into a modern liberal-democratic state. His father’s political activism and his murder in a bungled political assassination by far-right extremists is one of the most poignant chapters of Nabokov’s biography. Nabokov’s philosophically complex account of freedom is a consistent seam throughout his major works – and it has also led to confusion in their popular and critical reception.
1. 錯誤詮釋
As a writer of a radically misunderstood text, Nabokov has at least two major precursors. Milton and Dostoevsky were also wildly misinterpreted at certain points in their reception histories: the romantics believed that Milton’s Satan was the rebel-hero of Paradise Lost and the existentialists believed that Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov was the rebel-hero of The Brothers Karamazov. A similar misinterpretation occurred in the wake of Lolita’s publication, when critics as astute as Lionel Trilling concluded that Lolita was a great love story and its narrator, Humbert Humbert, a romantic hero.
Looking at these texts together helps explain why such a misunderstanding occurred in the first place. Though Satan, Ivan, and Humbert are cast as villains in the works in which they appear, they are given the full scope of their creators’ eloquence. Their eloquence is so magnetic that readers come away believing that they are meant to fall under its spell. Another reason has to do with their shared aspiration for freedom. Satan and Ivan wish to be emancipated from the laws of God; Humbert wishes to be emancipated from the laws of humanity. The romantics and the existentialists were especially susceptible to such appeals because freedom was also the lodestar of their ambitions. Immersed in the context of the Cold War, the civil-rights movement, and the sexual revolution, Lolita’s first readers were also primed to respond with enthusiasm to Humbert’s arguments against arbitrary laws and culturally contingent taboos.
2. 比較研究
Nabokov’s defence of freedom was as complex as that of Milton and Dostoevsky even though he did not anchor it, as they did, in a Christian world view. Like them, he knew that freedom could be confused with license or anarchy. It is not surprising that in the afterword he wrote to Lolita, he identifies Humbert as “an anarchist.” It is also not surprising that he made Humbert channel Ivan Karamazov’s famous slogan “everything is permissible” at the very moment when he fulfils his dream of having sex with the twelve-year-old Dolly Haze. The words that Dolly whispers in his ear give him “the odd sense of living in a brand new, mad new dream world, where everything was permissible.” But just as Dostoevsky orchestrates Ivan’s defeat by making him realize that some actions are impermissible, Nabokov makes even Humbert acknowledge that having sex with a child can never be justified. He also turns on its head Ivan’s statement that one “cannot expect eloquence from a murderer” when he states -- famously as it will turn out -- that “You can always count on a murderer for a fancy prose style.” In this act of one-upmanship, Nabokov is showing Dostoevsky that one can expect eloquence not only from a murderer but also from a rapist.
If we are not seduced by Humbert’s eloquence, it is very easy to see how Nabokov condemns his actions: he does so by showing the harm that Humbert inflicts upon Dolly. That harm has immediate consequences -- she bleeds, she cries every night, she tries to claw her way to freedom, both by using physical force and by saving money -- and long-term consequences: she gets pregnant at seventeen and dies in childbirth. Like moral consequentialists, Nabokov used harm as a criterion for differentiating between moral and immoral actions throughout his writings. But Nabokov also embraced a non-consequentialist Kantian moral theory because he understood that Kant’s moral framework offered a far more powerful defence of freedom than consequentialism.
3. 德行論倫理學
For Nabokov, consequentialism’s use of outcomes as a benchmark for measuring the good was aligned too closely with determinist models of human identity. He saw himself as a self-fashioning subject whose personal freedom clashed with conceptions of human identity -- amongst these Marxist or Freudian frameworks -- that understood the self to be externally determined. He was drawn to Kant’s distinction between autonomous acts, performed from a position of freedom, and heteronomous ones, driven by necessity, self-interest, or desire. According to Kant, only acts governed by the will and answering to the call of duty qualify as “moral.” This makes him a proponent of “deontological” ethics: from the Greek deon (duty), deontology is a rule-based ethical theory that judges the morality of an action according to principles of right and wrong rather than by the consideration of outcomes. For a deontologist like Kant, the expected futility of an action is morally irrelevant.
4. 作品分析
4.1 愛達》
In Nabokov’s writings, the most reliable marker of moral excellence is an act of courtesy performed by a character for the sake of duty in opposition to inclination, interest, or passion. There are at least four near-identical scenes in Nabokov’s oeuvre that serve as images of the will’s capacity to rise to the demands of duty. There are also many variations on these four scenes that elicit the same meaning. In each case, moral excellence is signalled by a heroic act of courtesy that is disinterested, has no value beyond itself, and is directed at unlikable or incidental characters. They all affirm Kant’s claim that the capacity to do what is right (sometimes even in opposition to what appears to be consequentially good) is the most powerful testament of the will’s freedom.
Such an example can be seen in Ada. In this case, the courtesy heroine is Lucette, the half-sister of the novel’s protagonists, Van and Ada Veen. For those unfamiliar with the novel, Van and Ada love each other even though they are full siblings. Lucette is the casualty of their incestuous romance. Lucette is so desperately in love with Van that she has determined to commit suicide if she fails to seduce him. While watching together a film in the theatre of a transatlantic liner, Lucette comes very close to seducing Van when Ada’s unexpected appearance in the film makes Van suddenly abandon the theater. Robert and Rachel Robinson, “old bores of the family,” take advantage of Van’s abrupt departure to seat themselves next to Lucette.
Though Lucette is desperate to pursue Van, she nonetheless bestows upon the Robinsons “her last, last, last free gift of staunch courtesy that was stronger than failure and death.” Lucette rises to courtesy’s demands at a moment of total psychic disarray when she could reasonably claim to be exempt from such moral obligations. In doing so, she forfeits her hard-won opportunity to seduce Van and follows through with her intention to commit suicide.
Decades later, when Van writes the “family chronicle” that purports to be Ada, he seems to hold himself to a Kantian moral standard when he invokes “Kant’s eye” in response to Lucette’s accusations that he and Ada mistreated her as a child. By way of this allusion to Kant’s accusing eye, Van -- a philosopher by training -- might be acknowledging that despite his romantic swagger, it is the pathetic and doleful Lucette who asserted her freedom most convincingly by extending her courtesy to the “old” and “boring” Robinsons.
4.2 《蘿莉塔》
Lolita too is deeply invested in showing that the harm inflicted upon a child is morally unjustifiable and that no eloquence, however alluring, can change that. This is Lolita’s deepest connection to The Brothers Karamazov and to Ivan, whose argument that only a cruel deity could allow children to suffer continues to be relevant. Still, even in Lolita, Nabokov manifests his attachment to Kantian deontology even as he recognizes that questions surrounding the harm inflicted upon children render all other moral concerns trivial. He inscribes courtesy’s capacity to rise above self-interest in Dolly’s “absolutely top-notch tennis,” but here it is no radiant marker of her freedom, but an omen of her doom. Her “politeness” (as her coach calls it) on the court turns out to be a liability, and “permit[s] a second-rate but determined player, no matter how uncouth and incompetent, to poke and cut his way to victory.” Indeed, Nabokov seems to be acknowledging in Lolita that the cost of doing what is right as opposed to pursuing the consequentially good is too high. Dolly’s tennis playing is strikingly graceful, but it is ultimately “sterile” because it yields no “utilitarian results.” As one of Nabokov’s courtesy heroines, Dolly is admirable, yet the reader cannot help wishing that she had more “consequentialist” than “deontological” agency. Whereas Humbert laments that she never managed to claw her way to victory in tennis, readers lament that she had not managed to claw her way to freedom sooner and without needing the help of another pedophile.
Commentators who believe that Humbert has reformed at the end of Lolita tend to cite the passage in which he claims to experience a new-found love for the pregnant seventeen-year-old Dolly when he visits her at Coalmont. Yet the realization that he loves her in spite of “her ruined looks” makes him ask her to leave her “incidental” husband and “this awful hole” to resume her life with him. Knowing that Humbert is not in the habit of granting favours without an expectation of reward, Dolly assumes that whatever financial help he is willing to give her depends on her willingness to fulfill his sexual desires. Thus, she initially disbelieves him when he assures her that the money he is going to give her comes with “no strings attached.” The money that Humbert gives her was rightfully hers in the first place (it comes from Charlotte’s property), but -- like Dolly -- we are not accustomed to seeing Humbert do what is deontologically right. The fact that he drives off to murder Quilty after handing Dolly her inheritance shows that he is still in the grip of self-interest, but this return to his usual habits of conduct should not invalidate the moral merit of having done -- for once -- the right thing by Dolly. If anything, it becomes supremely important because it shows that Humbert is capable of acting freely and morally even if he typically opts to do otherwise.
作者：Dana Dragunoiu is the author of Vladimir Nabokov and the Art of Moral Acts (Northwestern University Press). Her upcoming book is titled Simply Nabokov.
本文於 修改第 2 次
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9月27日中國時報的《時報廣場》(此文發表於2002/10/02)，有一篇黃以德先生的《好一頂道德大帽》。薛楷莉事件及黃先生對此事件的觀點，我沒有很大的興趣。但「道德」是公共議題，我對黃先生論述涉及「道德」的部分，表示一些意見。
我對「道德」的定義是：「在不傷害自身利益的前提下，社會中人際行為的模式」。(胡卜凱，2002)。這是我以下論述的基礎。
1. 事實的認知
我和黃先生在對事實的認知上，有些差異。
1.1 「…法律還沒替薛楷莉定罪，我們卻先以道德替她判刑了。…」
薛楷莉事件是一個新聞故事。什麼是新聞？通俗的詮釋是：「狗咬人不是新聞，人咬狗才是新聞」。也就是說，稀罕的事件就有新聞價值。所謂新聞價值，指的是能吸引一般大眾肯花15元或10元去買份報紙的價值。我想一般大眾，大概不會每天花15元，去看一位酒店公關小姐削凱子的故事。但電視台新聞主播削凱子，我在美國26年，從來沒聽說過。回國10年，這也是第一遭。由於它到底不是天天發生，即使像我這樣平時一毛不拔的人，也花了好幾個15元來買報紙。因此，「以道德替她判刑了」的說法，恐怕有點過敏。
1.2 「每個國家，每個文化，對於道德都有不同的解釋。其中的差距，有時就如天與海角般遙遠。…」
第一，我不知道黃先生的說法，語出何典。第二，也許黃先生認為，用了「每個」兩字和「有時」兩字，似乎讓這句話無從反駁。事實上，任何讀過幾本(近20年出版)文化人類學或文化研究這方面著作的人，都知道黃先生這個說法，和事實有相當差距。從基因學和大腦神經學的觀點，我可以論證黃先生之言在理論上不能成立(1)。目前一般學者公認的觀點是：各文化之間，尤其是各「現代社會」的文化之間，道德觀的差別，可說是大同小異。以「天邊與海角般遙遠」來形容各現代社會間的道德標準差距，目前不會被多數研究文化的學者接受。
1.3 「…民主國家，…容納來自世界各種不同的文化，融合發酵之後，對道德的判定便失了準頭。…」
嚴格的來說，這段話和上一段話不相容。如果各國都「融合發酵各種不同的文化」，那麼，它們對於道德的解釋，差距「就如天邊與海角般遙遠」的情形，應該是不常見的事。在中文的用法，「有時」和「不常見」並不是相似詞。
1.4 「當道德不再是最客觀的認定標準時，法律便取而代之，成為民主國家的是非準則。」
我不知道黃先生所謂的「民主國家」指那些國家。我比較了解美國，就以它做例子。柯林頓在拉緊褲子拉鍊上，常常手軟。但尼克森、卡特、雷根、小布希，都是開口上帝，閉口道德的國家領袖(2)。一般人也以美國社會中的道德根基自勵(3)。以我在美國生活26年的經驗來看，一般從中高到中下階層的美國人(我只有機會和這類人來往)，尤其是基督教教友，他們的道德觀，和台灣/香港去的留學生或移民的道德觀，在伯仲之間。我雖然對英國、德國不熟悉，但從報導來看，一般人民的道德觀，不在中高到中下階層的美國人以下。法國、意大利是天主教的國家，社會的道德觀及道德風氣，依推想，也不會在美、英、德三國之下(4)。當然，就後面四個國家來說，我沒有第一手經驗。如果黃先生有實際數字或報導，我很願意受教。
1.5 「我們的法律，既然替道德定下了標準，…」
是嗎？什麼時候？「口出穢言」、「….」、「….」、「….」、的立法委員，能「替道德定下了標準」？黃先生應該知道，「我們的法律」是「口出穢言」、「….」、「….」、「….」、的「立法」委員定的吧？
1.6 「… 我不明白為什麼在大家為樂透彩高額獎金瘋狂時，還可以理直氣壯地指責薛楷莉的貪婪。…」。
如果黃先生再思考一下，應該能分別「削凱子」的貪婪和「買彩券」的貪婪吧？如果不能，我建議黃先生從「誰的荷包」這個角度來考慮。我的另一句名言是：
「如果不涉及其他的人，就無所謂道德」。
2. 道德概念的內容
就黃先生大作的內容看來，他對道德這個概念，不是很清楚明白。例如：
2.1 「我不禁想問，我們這個社會的道德標準，到底是由誰來判定的？」
任何一個社會的道德標準，在該社會的文化架構下形成。真正制定道德標準的是人。「人」有兩種：一個簡稱「傳統」，就是原始時代的長老，和相當於(目前所謂)「意見領袖」的知識份子。前者如神農氏，後者如孔子；一個簡稱「社會」，它又分兩類：意見領袖，包括編輯、作家、官員、老師、前任總統、現任總統、新聞記者、各類神棍、知名的影藝工作者、和知名的文字工作者等等；一般社會大眾，例如你、我、他(如黃先生)、和她(如璩光碟)。道德標準制定的過程，就不在此申論。
2.2 「我們的法律，既然替道德定下了標準，那麼沒有違法的事件，便『非』不到哪裏去。」
黃先生對道德的功能，顯然完全沒有概念。我在《《縱欲與虛無之上：現代情境裡的政治倫理》讀後》(胡卜凱，2002)中，簡單的敘述了我對「道德」的看法。它們當然是非常淺薄和表面的論述。不過我相信那篇文章，應該對黃先生在基本概念的了解上，有些幫助。
黃先生應該聽過警察和法官吃案的新聞。至於其他違法、亂紀、貪污、自由心證(如強吻是國際慣例)的個案，就族繁不及備載了。在實際生活上，如果我們倚賴法律，以它做為維持一個穩定社會的唯一機制，一般人的壽命可能不會超過40歲。
2.3 「…什麼樣的社會風氣下，便會產生什麼樣的公眾人物。不是群眾投票，怎麼會選出口出穢言的立法委員？…」
民主社會是一個多元社會。黃先生的說法，只有在「所有」的立法委員都口出穢言，或「所有」的電視台新聞主播都幹過「削凱子」的行為這些情況下，才能成立。換句話說，他犯了以偏概全的邏輯謬誤。上面已說過，就是因為99.99%的電視台新聞主播，都沒幹過或不會幹「削凱子」的行為，才凸顯薛楷莉事件的新聞性。至於社會大眾接受不接受這種行為，正是傳統社會設立道德機制的功能和目的。
2.4 「…她之所以是今天的她，難道社會都沒責任？」
「責任」和「道德」兩個概念，息息相通。如果黃先生不認為社會需要「道德」，我很奇怪黃先生為什麼會認為「社會」有「責任」？所謂「社會」，只是某些人或某類人的代名詞。
3. 建議
3.1 我建議黃先生在文章寫成之後，檢查幾遍再投稿。雖然文章是自己的好，多檢查幾遍，總會發現一些寫作時忽略了的地方。我也建議黃先生多讀幾本和倫理學相關科目的書(5)。讀書及思考，和寫作一樣，都是「文字工作」。孔子說：「學而不思則罔，思而不學則殆」。願共勉之！
3.2 一個報紙的編輯，也是社會的意見領袖。如果我是《時報廣場》的編輯(6)，我會簡單列舉第1、2兩節的部分意見，退回黃先生的大作。請他做適當的修改後，再考慮是否刊登。不客氣的說，刊登黃先生這篇大作，顯出《時報廣場》編輯的水準，沒有做意見領袖的資格(7)。
附註：
1. 請參考拙作《唯物人文觀》；我的論述當然也要接受大家的檢驗。
2. 這四位總統中，尼克森口是心非，卡特和雷根大概相信自己說的話，小布希大概不知道自己在說些什麼。老布希知道自己在說些什麼，所以他是當代歷任美國總統中，唯一不太胡扯的。
3. 美國人中，偽君子當然不少，但誠誠懇懇的也很多。道德根基(moral fabric)
4. 法國和意大利的社會在兩性關係上比較開放。至少這是流行的刻板印象。
5. 我曾建議哲學系學生，主修倫理學的話，應加選生物心理學、進化心理學、社會心理學、基因學、和統計學。我認為文化人類學或文化研究應該已是哲學系的必選課(請參考拙作《我對哲學的了解》，2023/11/02)。
6. 我在30多年前擔任《台大青年》編輯的時候，有一位同學翻譯了一篇湯恩比的文章。我看過之後，覺得意思不很清楚。我到圖書館找出原書，花了兩個星期的時間，幾乎重新譯了一次，然後用他的名字發表。我每次看到內容不合該雜誌、該報紙應有水準的文章，我都會想：如果我是編輯，…
7. 9月29日的《時報廣場》刊出吳麗慧小姐的《好一個法律是非觀》。內容相當中肯。
參考資料：
胡卜凱，2002，《《縱欲與虛無之上：現代情境裡的政治倫理》讀後》，當時曾刊於知識和社會廣場，即將在2024重刊於本城市。
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