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hegel_phenomenology_of_spirit_preface_part_2.mp3
13. On the one hand, the initial appearance of the new world is just the whole enshrouded
in its simplicity, that is, its universal ground, while on the other hand, the wealth of its
bygone existence is in recollection still present for consciousness. In that newly
appearing shape, consciousness misses the both the dispersal and the particularization of
content, but it misses even more the development of the form as a result of which the
distinctions are securely determined and are put into the order of their fixed relationships.
Without this development, science has no general intelligibility, and it seems to be the
esoteric possession of only a few individuals - an esoteric possession, because at first
science is only available in its concept, that is, in what is internal to it, and it is the
possession of a few individuals, since its appearance in this not yet fully unfurled form
makes its existence into something wholly singular. Only what is completely determinate
is at the same time exoteric, comprehensible, and capable of being learned and possessed
by everybody. The intelligible form of science is the path offered to everyone and
equally available for all. To achieve rational knowledge through our own intellect is
the rightful demand of a consciousness which is approaching the status of science. This is
so both because the understanding is thought, the pure I as such, and because what is
intelligible is what is already familiar and common both to science and to the unscientific
consciousness alike, and it is that through which unscientific consciousness is
immediately enabled to enter into science.
14. At its debut, where science has been brought neither to completeness of detail nor to
perfection of form, it is open to reproach. However, even if it is unjust to suppose that
this reproach even touches on the essence of science, it would be equally unjust and
inadmissible not to honor the demand for the further development of science. This
opposition seems to be the principal knot which scientific culture at present is struggling
to loosen and which it does not yet properly understand. One side sings the praises of the
wealth of its material and its intelligibility; the other side at any rate spurns the former
and insists on immediate rationality and divinity. Even if the first is reduced to silence,
whether by the force of truth alone or just by the bluster of the other side, and even if it
feels overwhelmed by the basics of the subject matter which is at stake, still, for all that,
it is by no means satisfied about those demands, for although just, those demands have
not been fulfilled. Only half of its silence is due to the other side's victory; the other half
is due to the boredom and indifference which result from the continual awakening of
expectations by promises never fulfilled.
15. When it comes to content, at times the other side certainly makes it easy for itself to
have a vast breadth of such content at its disposal. It pulls quite a lot of material into its
own domain, namely, what is already familiar and well-ordered, and since it principally
traffics in rare items and curiosities, it manages to put on the appearance of being in full
possession of what knowledge had already finished with but which at the same time had
not yet been brought to order. It thereby seems to have subjected everything to the
absolute Idea, and in turn, the absolute Idea itself therefore both seems to be discerned
in everything and to have matured into an wide-ranging science. However, if the way it
spreads itself out is examined more closely, it turns out not to have come about by way of
one and the same thing giving itself diverse shapes but rather by way of the shapeless
repetition of one and the same thing which is only externally applied to diverse material
and which contains only the tedious semblance of diversity. The Idea, which is true
enough on its own, in fact remains ensnared in its origin as long as its development
consists in nothing but the repetition of the same old formula. Having the knowing
subject apply the one unmoved form to whatever just happens to be on hand and then
externally dipping the material into this motionless element contributes as much to
fulfilling what is demanded as does a collection of purely arbitrary impressions about the
content. Rather, what is demanded is for the shapes to originate their richness and
determine their distinctions from out of themselves. To an even greater degree, this
consists in merely a monochrome formalism which arrives at the distinctions in its
material because the material itself has already been prepared for it and is something well
known.
16. In so doing, this formalism asserts that this monotony and abstract universality is the
absolute, and it assures us that any dissatisfaction with such universality is merely an
incapacity to master the absolute standpoint and keep a firm grip on it. Even if there had
been a time when the empty possibility of imagining things differently was sufficient to
refute a view, and even if the general thought, the same mere possibility, had also at
that time the entirely positive value of actual cognition, nowadays we see the universal
Idea in this form of non-actuality get all value attributed to it, and we see that what
counts as the speculative way of considering things turns out to be the dissolution of the
distinct and the determinate, or, to an even greater degree, turns out to be simply the act
of casting of what is distinct and determinate into the abyss of the void, something which
is an act lacking all development or having no justification in itself at all. In that mode,
to examine any existence in the way in which it exists in the absolute consists in nothing
more than saying it is in fact being spoken of as, say, a "something," whereas in the
absolute, in the A = A, there is no such "something," for in the absolute, everything is
one. To oppose this one bit of knowledge, namely, that in the absolute everything is the
same, to the knowledge which makes distinctions and which has been either brought to
fruition or is seeking and demanding to be brought to fruition - that is, to pass off its
absolute as the night in which, as one says, all cows are black - is an utterly vacuous
naiveté in cognition. - The formalism which has been indicted and scorned by the
philosophy of recent times and which has been generated once again in it will not
disappear from science even though its inadequacy is well known and felt. It will not
disappear until the knowledge of absolute actuality has become completely clear about its
own nature. - Taking into consideration that working out any general idea is made
easier by first having it right before us, it is worth indicating here at least very roughly
what those ideas are. At the same time, we should also take this opportunity to rid
ourselves of certain habits of thought which only impede philosophical cognition.
17. In my view, which must be justified by the exposition of the system itself, everything
hangs on apprehending and expressing the truth not merely as substance but also equally
as subject. At the same time, it is to be noted that substantiality comprises within itself
the universal, that is, it comprises not only the immediacy of knowledge but also the
immediacy of being, that is, immediacy for knowledge. - If taking God to be the one
substance shocked the age in which this was articulated, then that was in part because of
an instinctive awareness that in such a view self-consciousness merely perishes and is not
preserved. However, on the other hand, the opposite view, which itself clings to thought
as thought, that is, which holds fast to universality, is exactly the same simplicity, that is,
it is itself undifferentiated, unmoved substantiality. But, thirdly, if thought merely unifies
the being of substance with itself and grasps immediacy, that is, intuition, as thought,
then there is the issue about whether this intellectual intuition does not then itself relapse
into inert simplicity and thereby present actuality itself in a fully non-actual mode.
18. Furthermore, the living substance is the being that is in truth subject, or, what
amounts to the same thing, it is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of self-
positing, that is, that it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself. As
subject, it is pure, simple negativity, and precisely by virtue of that, it is the estrangement
of what is simple, that is, it is the doubling which posits oppositions and which is once
again the negation of this indifferent diversity and its opposition. That is, it is only this
self-restoring parity, the reflective turn into itself in its otherness - What is the truth is
not an originary unity as such, that is, not an immediate unity as such. It is the coming-
to-be of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal and has its end for its
beginning, and which is actual only through this accomplishment and its end.
19. Although the life of God and divine cognition might thus be articulated as a game
love plays with itself, this Idea will be downgraded into edification, even into triteness,
if it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labor of the negative. In
itself that life is indeed an unalloyed parity and unity with itself, since in such a life there
is nothing serious in otherness and alienation nor in overcoming this alienation.
However, this in-itself is abstract universality, in which both its nature, which is to be for
itself, and the self-movement of the form are left out of view. If the form is said to be in
parity with the essence, then it is for that very reason a bald misunderstanding to suppose
that cognition can be content with the in-itself, that is, the essence, but can do without the
form - that the absolute principle, or the absolute intuition, can make do without working
out the former or without the development of the latter. Precisely because the form is as
essential to the essence as the essence is to itself, the essence must not be grasped and
expressed as mere essence, which is to say, as immediate substance or as the pure self-
intuition of the divine. Rather, it must likewise be grasped as form in the entire richness
of the developed form, and only thereby is it grasped and expressed as the actual.
20. The truth is the whole. However, the whole is only the essence completing itself
through its own development. This much must be said of the absolute: It is essentially a
result, and only at the end is it what it is in truth. Its nature consists precisely in this: To
be actual, to be subject, that is, to be the becoming-of-itself. As contradictory as it might
seem, namely, that the absolute is to be comprehended essentially as a result, even a little
reflection will put this mere semblance of contradiction in its rightful place. The
beginning, the principle, or the absolute as it is at first, that is, as it is immediately
articulated, is merely the universal. But just as my saying "all animals" can hardly count
as an expression of zoology, it is likewise obvious that the words, "absolute," "divine,"
"eternal," and so on, do not express what is contained in them; - and it is only such words
which in fact express intuition as the immediate. Whatever is more than such a word,
even the mere transition to a proposition, is a becoming-other which must be redeemed,
that is, it is a mediation. However, it is this mediation which is rejected with such horror
as if somebody, in making more of mediation than in claiming both that it itself is
nothing absolute and that it in no way exists in the absolute, would be abandoning
absolute cognition altogether.
21. However, this abhorrence of mediation stems in fact from a lack of acquaintance with
the nature of mediation and with the nature of absolute cognition itself. This is so
because mediation is nothing but self-moving parity-with-itself, or it is a reflective turn
into itself, the moment of the I existing-for-itself, pure negativity, that is, simple coming-
to-be. The I, or coming-to-be, this act of mediating, is, precisely in terms of its
simplicity, immediacy in the process of coming-to-be and is the immediate itself. -
Hence, reason is misunderstood if reflection is excluded from the truth and is not taken to
be a positive moment of the absolute. Reflection is what makes truth into the result, but
it is likewise what sublates the opposition between the result and its coming-to-be. This
is so because this coming-to-be is equally simple and hence not different from the form
of the true, which itself proves itself to be simple in its result. Coming-to-be is to an even
greater degree this return into simplicity. - However much the embryo is indeed in itself a
person, it is still not a person for itself; the embryo is a person for itself only as a
culturally formed rationality which has made itself into what it is in itself. This is for the
first time its actuality. However, this result is itself simple immediacy, for it is self-
conscious freedom which is at rest within itself, a freedom which has not merely set the
opposition off to one side and left it merely lying there but has been reconciled with it.
22. What has just been said can also be expressed by saying that reason is purposive
activity. Both the exaltation of a nature supposedly above and beyond thought, an
exaltation which misconstrues thought, and especially the banishment of external
purposiveness have brought the form of purpose completely into disrepute. Yet, in the
sense in which Aristotle also determines nature as purposive activity, purpose is the
immediate, is what is at rest, is self-moving, that is, it is subject. Its abstract power to
move is being-for-itself, that is, pure negativity. For that reason, the result is the same as
the beginning because the beginning is purpose - that is, the actual is the same as its
concept only because the immediate, as purpose, has the self, that is, pure actuality,
within itself. The purpose which has been worked out, that is, existing actuality, is
movement and unfolded coming-to-be. However, this very unrest is the self, and for that
reason, it is the same as the former immediacy and simplicity of the beginning because it
is the result which has returned into itself. - What has returned into itself is precisely the
self, and the self is self-relating parity and simplicity.
23. The need to represent the absolute as subject has helped itself to such propositions as
"God is the eternal," or "God is the moral order of the world," or "God is love," etc. In
such propositions, the true is directly posited as subject, but it is not presented as the
movement of reflection-taking-an-inward-turn. One proposition of that sort begins with
the word, "God." On its own, this is a meaningless sound, a mere name. It is only the
predicate that says what the name is and brings the name to fulfillment and gives it
meaning. The empty beginning becomes actual knowledge only at the end of the
proposition. To that extent, one cannot simply pass over in silence the reason why one
cannot speak solely of the eternal, the moral order of the world, etc., or, as the ancients
did, of pure concepts, of being, of the one, etc., that is, of what the meaning is, without
appending the meaningless sound as well. However, the use of this word only indicates
that it is neither a being nor an essence nor a universal per se which is posited; what is
posited is what is reflected into itself, a subject. Yet, at the same time, this is something
only anticipated. The subject is accepted as a fixed "point" on which the predicates are
attached for their support by means of a movement belonging to what it is that can be
said to know this subject and which itself is also not to be viewed as belonging to the
"point" itself, but it is solely through this movement that the content would be portrayed
as the subject. Because of the way this movement is constituted, it cannot belong to the
"point," but after the "point" has been presupposed, this movement cannot be constituted
in any other way, and it can only be external. Thus, not only is the former anticipation
that the absolute is subject not the actuality of this concept, but it even makes that
actuality impossible, for it posits the concept as a "point" wholly at rest, whereas the
concept is self-movement.
24. Among the many consequences that follow from what has been said, this in particular
can be underscored: It is only as a system that knowledge is actual and can be presented
as science; and that any further so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of
philosophy, if it is true, is for this reason alone also false just because it is a fundamental
proposition or a principle. - it is consequently very easily refuted. Its refutation consists
in demonstrating its defects; however, it is defective because it is merely the universal, or
merely a principle, that is, it is only the beginning. If the refutation is thorough, then it is
derived from and developed out of that fundamental proposition or principle itself - the
refutation is not pulled off by bringing in counter-assertions and impressions external to
the principle. Such a refutation would thus genuinely be the development of the
fundamental proposition itself; it would even be the proper augmentation of the
principle's own defectiveness if it were not to make the mistake of focusing solely on its
negative aspect without taking note of its results and the advances it has made in their
positive aspect. - Conversely, the genuinely positive working out of the beginning is at
the same time equally a negative posture towards its beginning, namely, a negative
posture towards its one-sided form, which is to exist at first only immediately, that is, to
be purpose. It may thereby be taken to be the refutation of what constitutes the ground of
the system, but it is better taken as showing that the ground, that is, the principle, of the
system is in fact only its beginning.
25. That the true is only actual as a system, or that substance is essentially subject, is
expressed in the representation that articulates the absolute as spirit - the most sublime
concept and the one which belongs to modernity and its religion. The spiritual alone is
the actual; it is the essence, that is, what exists-in-itself. - It is self-relating, that is, the
determinate itself, that is, otherness and being-for-itself - and, in this determinateness,
that is, in its being-external-to-itself, it persists within itself - that is, it exists in and for
itself. - However, it is first of all this being-in-and-for-itself for us, or in itself, which is to
say, it is spiritual substance. It has to become this for itself - it must be knowledge of the
spiritual, and it must be knowledge of itself as spirit. This means that it must be an object
in its own eyes, but it must likewise immediately be a mediated object, which is to say, it
must be a sublated object reflected into itself. It is for itself solely for us insofar as its
spiritual content is engendered by itself. Insofar as the object for itself is also for itself,
this self-engendering, the pure concept, is in its eyes the objective element in which it has
its existence, and in this manner, it is, for itself in its existence, an object reflected into
itself. Spirit knowing itself in that way as spirit is science. Science is its actuality, and
science is the realm it builds for itself in its own proper element.
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