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Philosophy as dialectic
Absolute Knowing
In the previous chapter, we saw that for Hegel, it made sense to claim that there might be common ground between religion and philosophy, in so far as both in their highest form (as Christianity and Hegelianism respectively) will allow us to find satisfaction in the world and to be 'at home'. However, while in Christianity the idea of this satisfaction finds expression in the stories and myths of religious representation, in philosophy this idea is given a more literal meaning, once the aporias that prevent us comprehending the world in a rational form are resolved. Hegel calls this kind of rational insight 'absolute knowing', and the form of consciousness that achieves it he calls 'absolute Spirit': 'The content of this picture-thinking [at the level of religion] is absolute Spirit; and all that now remains to be done is to supersede this mere form, or rather, since this belongs to consciousness as such, its truth must already have yielded itself in the shape of consciousness'.
At the end of the Phenomenology, it is now clear to consciousness how this absolute knowing is to be achieved. For it now understands that it has failed to find satisfaction in the world because it has come to the world in the wrong way, adopting limited conceptions that must be made more complete: absolute knowing therefore relates to the idea of complete or unimpaired rational cognition of the world, rather than to knowledge of some non-worldly entity ('the absolute'). Hegel thus briefly sketches ways in which consciousness must learn to bring these limited conceptions together, recapitulating the various stages that the dialectic has already taken. He begins with Consciousness and he argues that it should now be apparent to us, as phenomenological observers, that the standpoints adopted by consciousness (Sense-certainty, Perception, and Understanding) were one-sided, and that the truth lies in seeing how no one of them does justice to the way in which individuality, particularity and universality are related in the object:
Thus the object is in part immediate being or, in general, a Thing - corresponding to immediate consciousness; in part, an othering of itself, its relationship or being-for-an-other, and being-for-itself, i.e. determinateness - corresponding to perception; and in part essence, or in the form of a universal - corresponding to the Understanding. It is, as a totality, a syllogism or the movement of the universal through determination to individuality, as also the reverse movement from individuality through superseded individuality, or through determination, to the universal. It is, therefore, in accordance with these three determinations that consciousness must know the object as itself.
Now, it is not immediately clear from the Phenomenology what this conception of individuality, particularity and universality as applied to our thinking about objects involves: but on my reading this is not surprising, because we should expect this positive account to be elaborated elsewhere, in the Logic (as indeed it is. For further discussion, see Stern and Winfield). The Phenomenology is thus a via negativa for consciousness, showing how anything less than this complex conception will fail, and bringing to light the dialectical limitations that have brought about this failure. It has therefore served its essentially pedagogical and motivational function, of leading us on to the Logic, where the positive doctrine is systematically elaborated in terms of pure categories and thought-forms. Likewise, Hegel discusses the various standpoints of Self-Consciousness, Reason, and Spirit, reminding us how each on its own proved to be incomplete and that what is now required is to find a way of unifying them into a more complex whole: 'These are the moments of which the reconciliation of Spirit with its own consciousness proper is composed; by themselves they are single and separate, and it is solely their spiritual unity that constitutes the power of this reconciliation. The last of these moments is, however, necessarily this unity itself and, as is evident, it binds them all into itself'. As Hegel makes clear, the role of the Phenomenology has been to put these 'single and separate' moments alongside one another, to show where each is inadequate when taken on its own: 'Our own act here has been simply to gather together the separate moments, each of which in principle exhibits the life of Spirit in its entirety'. Hegel then goes on to consider what makes the standpoint of consciousness at the end of the Phenomenology distinctive, as it prepares to undertake Science: that is, a reflective examination of its categories in an attempt to overcome the kind of one-sided positions we have just traversed. For such a Science to be possible, consciousness must have come to see, through a process of self-examination, that it can arrive at a view of the world that will make the world fully intelligible, where until then it has appeared alien to consciousness. Thus Science, by taking us through the categories corresponding to the limited forms of consciousness portrayed in the Phenomenology, can help us to achieve the kind of dialectical outlook that absolute knowing requires. By showing us how these categories have operated when instantiated in various world-views, the Phenomenology therefore constitutes 'the Science of Knowing in the sphere of appearances' (PS: 493); its preparatory role having been completed, we are now ready to move to the more abstract level of the Logic, where these categories can be examined in their own right:
Spirit, therefore, having won the Notion, displays its existence and movement in this ether of its life and is Science. In this, the moments of its movement no longer exhibit themselves as specific shapes of consciousness, but - since consciousness' difference has returned into the Self - as specific Notions and as their organic self-grounded movement.
In this way, Hegel prepares us for his transition within the system, from the 'shapes of consciousness' of the Phenomenology, to the
'specific Notions' (the concepts or categories) of the Logic, and thus for Science in its pure and abstract form, 'in this ether of its life'.
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