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33Conscience.mp3
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Conscience
From this critique of the moral consciousness, Hegel moves to a kind of ethical outlook that he calls conscience, which sets out to escape the aporias that beset morality. Conscience thus rejects 'the internal divisions which gave rise to the dissemblance [of morality], the division between the in-itself and the self, between pure duty qua pure purpose, and reality qua a Nature and sense opposed to pure purpose'. Conscience thus has none of the (feigned) self-doubts that beset morality. It takes itself to know how to act in particular cases, and does not feel any tension between pure and specific duties, 'for the fact is that pure duty consists in the empty abstraction of pure thought, and has its reality and its content only in a specific reality, in a reality which is the reality of a consciousness itself, and consciousness not as a mere “thought-thing” but as an individual'; nor does conscience feel its 'natural self' as a check to such knowledge or moral action. Likewise, it does not worry about whether or not nature will frustrate its goals, because what matters to it is that others see it has at least tried to act well: 'What is done with the conviction of duty is, therefore, at once something that has standing and a real existence. There is, then, no more talk of good intentions coming to nothing, or of the good man faring badly'.
Nonetheless, Hegel argues that the situation for conscience is not as straightforward as it claims, and it too involves elements of dissemblance. For, first, conscience holds that it can determine what is right in particular concrete situations by thinking through the consequences of its possible actions; but how can it claim to have a full understanding of what those consequences might be, given the complexity involved?: 'it does not possess that full acquaintance with all the attendant circumstances which is required, and . . . its pretence of conscientiously weighing all the circumstances is vain'. Similarly, conscience only denies that the real situation involves a clash of moral duties because it thinks it can rely on its 'gut feelings' to tell it what it ought to do. Conscience defends this position by arguing that depending on one's point of view, it is possible to see almost anything as a morally legitimate action, so that only such 'gut feelings' can really count in the end: '[Conscience] places in duty, as the [empty] universal in-itselfness, the content that it takes from natural individuality; for the content is one that is present within itself'. However, the individual cannot be sure that others will share his moral intuitions, and thus cannot be sure how he will be judged by them. Conscience therefore asks to be judged merely on its conscientiousness: that is, whether it was acting correctly by its own lights:
Whether the assurance of acting from a conviction of duty is
true, whether what is done is actually a duty – these questions
To ask whether the assurance is true would presuppose that the inner intention is different from the one put forward, i.e. that what the individual self wills, can be separated from duty . . . But this distinction between the universal consciousness and the individual self is just what has been superseded, and the super-session of it is conscience. The self's immediate knowing that is certain of itself is law and duty.
At first, the inwardness of conscience brings great consolation, as it appears to the agent that he can now make it impossible for others not to recognize his 'moral genius', as he can make sure that at the very least they acknowledge his good intentions: 'The spirit and substance of their association are this assurance of their conscientiousness, good intentions, the rejoicing over their moral purity, and the refreshing of themselves in the glory of knowing and uttering, of cherishing and fostering, such an excellent state of affairs'. However, the individual comes to see that the best way to secure his reputation for integrity in the eyes of others is to refrain from acting, as action might lead to a misinterpretation of his motives; the 'moral genius' thus becomes the 'beautiful soul': 'It lives in dread of besmirching the splendour of its inner being by action and an existence; and, in order to preserve the purity of its heart, it flees from contact with the actual world, and persists in its self-willed impotence to renounce its self which is reduced to the extreme of ultimate abstraction'. (For a useful study that puts Hegel's discussion of the beautiful soul in its intellectual context, see Norton.) Faced with the 'emptiness' of the beautiful soul, conscience realizes that it must act; but it still sees itself as morally authoritative, so that there is an inevitable conflict between individual consciousnesses, and between individuals and the universal qua established moral order:
'As a result, the antithesis of individuality to other individuals, and to the universal, inevitably comes on the scene, and we have to consider this relationship and its movement'. As a result, the individual who acts from conscience will look evil to others who abide by the established moral order, because he refuses to act in accordance with the duties laid down by that order; the individual will also be accused of hypocrisy, because he claims to be interested in acting morally while at the same time flouting the moral rules: 'In contrast to this internal determination [of conscience] there thus stands the element of existence or universal consciousness, for which the essential element is rather universality, duty; while individuality, on the other hand, which in contrast to the universal is for itself, counts only as a superseded moment. For the consciousness which holds firmly to duty, the first consciousness counts as evil, because of the disparity between its inner being and the universal; and since, at the same time, this first consciousness declares its action to be in conformity with itself, to be duty and conscientiousness, it is held by the universal consciousness to be hypocrisy'. In fact, however, Hegel argues, there is little to choose between these two forms of consciousness. In condemning the individual conscience, the dutiful majority show themselves to be more interested in criticizing others than in acting themselves, while their accusation of hypocrisy betrays a mean-minded spirit, blind to the moral integrity of the moral individualist: 'No man is a hero to his valet; not, however, because the man is not a hero, but because the valet – is a valet'. The moral individualist thus comes to see that its critic has much in common with itself, and that both are equally fallible: it therefore 'confesses' to the other, expecting the other to reciprocate. However, at first the other does not do so, remaining 'hard hearted': it thus itself becomes a 'beautiful soul' taking up a position of deranged sanctimoniousness. With this evident failure, the 'hard heart' is forced to reconcile itself with the moral individualist, as each recognizes the one-sidedness of its position, and hence overcomes it. In this insight (and the move from hard heartedness to forgiveness it brings), Hegel sees the attainment of a properly dialectical standpoint, a moment of 'being at home’ that constitutes the realization of Spirit:
The reconciling Yea, in which the two 'I's let go their antithetical existence, is the existence of the 'I' which has expanded into a duality, and therein remains identical with itself, and, in its complete externalization and opposite, possesses the certainty of itself: it is God manifested in the midst of those who know themselves in the form of pure knowledge.
With this abrupt reference to God, Hegel completes his discussion of Spirit in this chapter, and gives himself a bridge to the discussion of religion in the next, where a number of remaining dialectical tensions remain to be played out.
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