|
|
Hegel, the phenomenology of spirit, a guide in mp3 voice
11TheDialecticOfTheSubject_MastershipAndServitude.mp3
"click the bottom arrow to listen, or download the mp3 file"
Mp3 PDF file 111thedialecticofthesubject_mastershipandservitude.pdf download
http://jumbofiles.com/50t5u9mnlhow/111thedialecticofthesubject_mastershipandservitude.pdf.html
Text online 111thedialecticofthesubject_mastershipandservitude.txt
The dialectic of the subject
(Phenomenology, B. Self-Consciousness)
Mastership and Servitude
With the breakdown of consciousness, and the collapse of its purely object-centred theoretical attitude, we now move to self-consciousness, which takes up the opposing stance, by placing the subject at the centre of things. As one might expect, Hegel wants to show that both attitudes are one-sided: put simply, consciousness was one-sided because it tried to displace itself from the world and take up a purely objective stance, while self-consciousness is one-sided because it tries to impose itself on the world too strongly, so the self/world distinction collapses and self-consciousness is reduced to 'the motionless tautology of: "I am I"' . Hegel sets out the problem here quite clearly in the discussion of self-consciousness in the third part of the Encyclopedia (the Philosophy of Spirit):
In consciousness, we see the tremendous difference, on the one side, of the 'I', this wholly simple existence, and on the other side, of the infinite variety of the world. It is this opposition of the 'I' and the world which has not yet reached a genuine mediation, that constitutes the finitude of consciousness. Self-consciousness, on the other hand, has its finitude in its still quite abstract self-identity. What is present in the I = I of immediate self-consciousness is a difference that merely ought to be, not yet a posited or actual difference. As with his previous discussion of consciousness, Hegel attempts to bring out the one-sidedness of self-consciousness by showing that it cannot properly resolve the dialectic of universal and individual, not this time in relation to the object, but in relation to itself as subject, and the conception it has of its own identity. Having introduced the turn from consciousness to self- consciousness, Hegel feels able to move from the 'arid forms and shapeless generalities' of the theoretical attitude which concluded his discussion of consciousness, to a conception of nature that is once again 'noisy with life' . Thus, as self-consciousness begins by interacting with the world at the level of desire (as a practical rather than theoretical attitude), it finds the 'dull northern fog' has lifted to reveal a world teeming with living things:
But for us, or in itself, the object which for self-consciousness is the negative element has, on its side, returned into itself, just as on the other side consciousness has done. Through this reflection into itself the object has become Life. What self- consciousness distinguishes from itself as having being, also has in it, in so far as it is posited as being, not merely the character of sense-certainty and perception, but it is being that is reflected into itself, and the object of immediate desire is a living thing.
Hegel goes on to suggest that self-consciousness cannot be 'certain of itself' by simply identifying itself with this world of living things, for in that world there appears to be too little room for any notion of individuality; what matters at the level of life is the genus, not the particular individual, so that at this level, the I, as a particular individual, does not count for much. Self-consciousness therefore conceives of itself as more than a merely animal consciousness .
Desire
Once the subject has moved to the level of focusing on itself qua individual, so that it 'has itself as a pure "I" for object' , Hegel now sets out to show that it is no more possible for the subject to find satisfaction in its practical relation to the world if it tries to do so 'immediately' than it was for it to find satisfaction in its theoretical relation to the world through the simplistic model of sense-certainty. At its most basic, this practical relation takes the form of desire, in which the subject exerts itself as a kind of pure will, where any sense of estrangement from the world is countered by the destruction of the object, and so by a negation of its otherness in a literal sense: 'Certain of the nothingness of this other, it explicitly affirms that this nothingness is for it the truth of the other; it destroys the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty, a certainty which has become explicit for self-consciousness itself in an objective manner' . Thus, with desire the subject attempts to preserve its individuality by negating the world around it. The difficulty with desire, however, is that it involves the destruction of the object, but once this object is destroyed, the subject has nothing over which to exert its control and so demonstrate its individuality. The subject must therefore find itself another object to destroy, so the process can begin again, leading to an obviously empty regress:
'Desire and the self-certainty obtained in its gratification, are conditioned by the object, for self-certainty comes from superseding this other: in order that this supersession can take place, there must be this other. Thus self-consciousness, by its negative relation to the object, is unable to supersede it; it is really because of that relation that it produces the object again, and the desire as well' . At this point, Hegel offers one of his characteristic 'previews', where he tells us how ultimately the difficulty faced by desire will be resolved. This will happen when the single self-consciousness sees the world as containing other self-consciousnesses; for in seeing that others are selves like it, and in thereby recognizing itself in them, the subject is no longer faced by sheer otherness, where only by negating the world can the subject find itself in it. As Hegel makes clear, when the self-conscious subject is able to 'see itself in the other', we will have arrived at a decisive turning-point in the journey of consciousness through the Phenomenology, after which consciousness will be capable of a much more balanced outlook than has been achieved hitherto:
A self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much 'I' as 'object'. With this, we already have before us the Notion of Spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is - this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: the 'I' that is 'We' and the 'We' that is 'I'. It is in self-consciousness, in the Notion of Spirit, that consciousness first finds its turning- point, where it leaves behind it the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike void of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present. At the beginning of the section that follows this passage, entitled 'Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Mastership and Servitude',1 Hegel continues with his 'preview', spelling out what this mutual recognition involves . Essentially, each self- consciousness must acknowledge the other as an autonomous subject, 'as something that has an independent existence of its own, which, therefore, it cannot utilize for its own purposes, if that object does not of its own accord do what the first does to it' (the Kantian echoes of treating people as ends-in-themselves rather than as means are unmistakable); moreover, each self-consciousness must also realize and accept that its well-being and identity as a subject is bound up with how it is seen by the other self-consciousness (which is where Hegelian recognition differs from Kantian 'respect'). If this recognition is reciprocal, Hegel argues, then neither side need fear that by acknowledging the other and feeling itself bound to it (in a relationship like love, for example) 'it has lost itself' : 'Each sees the other do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the same. Action by one side only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both' . (For further discussion of Hegel's conception of recognition, )
|
本城市首頁
等級：5
