Viewing Taiwan's reform of its judicial system with respect to Kant's Copernicus turn, we are easily to conclude that the reform bounds to fail its goal. If the goal is to guarantee people the right to fair trials. It is not the reform should conform to the existing judicial system setting, but the existing judicial system should conform to the reform.
Where there is a prolonged and persistent dispute between two persons, it is often the case that the disputants are really in agreement about an assumption, hypothesis, premise, fundamental to their argument, which is false. They share a common but false premise. To jump out the slump is to negate the common false premise. In doing so, there exists a third possibility - the "Ramsey's Maxim," originated from the dialectic methodology.
The common false premise, with respect with Taiwan's judicial reform, between the reform side and the old guard side is that both sides agree on the existing judicial system setting is suitable and consistent with Taiwan's Constitution. What I mean by "the existing judicial system setting" is that a tribunal is composed of a judge, a defendant and a prosecutor, and with the judge is the arbitrator. The problem of the setting that a judge be an arbitrator comes from three folds. First, what does a judge's power to settle a dispute come from? Next, have a judge have the superior faculty to make the judgment to a dispute than that by common people? Last, what does arbitration by a judge mean?
1. First, what does the judge's power to settle a dispute come from?
UN's charter of basic human rights states people of any country should have the basic right to enjoy a fair trial. The arbitration by a judge certainly violates this human right notion. The main reason is there is no difference between a judge's judgment and any common people's judgment. A judge's knowledge of law will not make his judgment superior than that of a common people. Given another judge with equally knowledgeable of law may render a different judgment. Following this view, judges' power to settle a dispute not come from their superior judgment ability, but from the democratic system grants judges the power. Ultimately, a judge's authority comes from the people who grant him the power through legislation. People legislate to grant judges' judgment authority, for sure, people may legislate NOT to grant judges such power - the power to determine an outcome of a trial. This means a judge has the regulative power to preside the trial, but does not have the constitutive power to determine the outcome of the trial.