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台灣司法改革的假象
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jinpin1976
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The illusion of Taiwan's judicial reform

Viewing Taiwan's reform of its judicial system with respect to Kant's Copernicus turn, we are easily to conclude that the reform bounds to fail its goal. If the goal is to guarantee people the right to fair trials. It is not the reform should conform to the existing judicial system setting, but the existing judicial system should conform to the reform.

Where there is a prolonged and persistent dispute between two persons, it is often the case that the disputants are really in agreement about an assumption, hypothesis, premise, fundamental to their argument, which is false. They share a common but false premise. To jump out the slump is to negate the common false premise. In doing so, there exists a third possibility - the "Ramsey's Maxim," originated from the dialectic methodology.

The common false premise, with respect with Taiwan's judicial reform, between the reform side and the old guard side is that both sides agree on the existing judicial system setting is suitable and consistent with Taiwan's Constitution. What I mean by "the existing judicial system setting" is that a tribunal is composed of a judge, a defendant and a prosecutor, and with the judge is the arbitrator. The problem of the setting that a judge be an arbitrator comes from three folds. First, what does a judge's power to settle a dispute come from? Next, have a judge have the superior faculty to make the judgment to a dispute than that by common people? Last, what does arbitration by a judge mean?

1. First, what does the judge's power to settle a dispute come from?
UN's charter of basic human rights states people of any country should have the basic right to enjoy a fair trial. The arbitration by a judge certainly violates this human right notion. The main reason is there is no difference between a judge's judgment and any common people's judgment. A judge's knowledge of law will not make his judgment superior than that of a common people. Given another judge with equally knowledgeable of law may render a different judgment. Following this view, judges' power to settle a dispute not come from their superior judgment ability, but from the democratic system grants judges the power. Ultimately, a judge's authority comes from the people who grant him the power through legislation. People legislate to grant judges' judgment authority, for sure, people may legislate NOT to grant judges such power - the power to determine an outcome of a trial. This means a judge has the regulative power to preside the trial, but does not have the constitutive power to determine the outcome of the trial.

以康德的哥白尼倒轉來檢視台灣的司法體系改革方面,如果改革的目標是確保人民享有公正審判的權利,我們很容易地能瞭解到,針對改革的目標,改革註定要失敗。改革不應符合現行的司法制度的設置,而是現有的司法系統的設置應符合改革的目標。

如果一個存在於兩個人之間長期且持續的糾紛而呈現無解,常理下,兩方爭論者在某一兩方共同假設或前提上,根本是同意的,而這某一共同同意的假設或前提,卻是錯誤的。也就是他們同意於一個共同的錯誤前提。要跳出這種沼澤乃是去否定那共同錯誤的前提。這樣做,第三種可能性就有可能出現- 這稱為“拉姆齊的格言”,是源於辯證法。

台灣的司法改革,存在於改革派與保守派間之共同的錯誤前提,是,雙方都認為現有司法系統的設置是合適且符合台灣的憲法。我所謂“在現有司法系統的設置”是指一個法庭由法官,被告,與檢察官組成,且法官是最終仲裁者。法官是最終仲裁者為什麼是一個問題的設置,可從三方面來探討。首先,法官解決爭議的權力,從何而來?次是,法官解決爭議的判斷會優於老百姓解決爭議的判斷嗎?最後,法官的最終仲裁具有什麼意義?

1。首先,法官解決爭議的權力從何而來?
聯合國基本人權憲章指出,任何國家的人民都應該具備的基本人權,是享有公正審判的權利。法官具最終仲裁權顯然違反了這種人權概念。其主要原因是法官的判決與任何老百姓的判決並無不同。法官的法律知識不會使他的判斷較一般老百姓的判斷更優越。一位法官的判決可能會不同于來自於另一位具有同等法律知識的法官的判決。根據這一觀點,法官的仲裁權力不是來自法官超出常人的判斷能力,而是民主制度給予法官此仲裁權力。歸根結底,法官的權威來自於人民通過立法授予他此等權力。人民立法可以授予法官判決的權威,當然,人們也可以立法不授予法官此等權力 - 此等權力指的是最終仲裁權。也就是說授予法官主持審判的調控權,但不授予法官決定結果的最終仲裁權。
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