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這是「顧此失彼」(相對於烏克蘭)，還是「腹背受敵」(相對於西伯利亞 -- 該欄12/25/25到12/27/25三篇文章)？
索引：
Kaliningrad：加里寧格勒
We Will Burn Kaliningrad: Poland’s Stark Warning to the Kremlin
Kaliningrad and the Return of Baltic Tensions
Raj K, 12/19/25
Kaliningrad, a separated and isolated Russian enclave, is located on the shore of the Baltic Sea. This was the area from which Russia could maintain military pressure on NATO and Europe.
But by the end of 2025, this same Kaliningrad is becoming, instead of a symbol of the Kremlin’s strength, its biggest weakness and an open wound.
Western countries, especially Poland and Lithuania, are very wisely exploiting this delicate situation. Kaliningrad does not have direct land contact with Russia, and NATO countries surround it. Now the situation is such that the land routes have almost been closed.
When the land routes were closed, Moscow’s eyes turned to the sea route. The hope was that a regular and safe supply could continue through the sea route from St. Petersburg to the ports of Kaliningrad.
But the promise of this sea route collided with harsh geopolitical reality. Shipping costs touched the sky, and delivery time doubled.
Many truck drivers reported that they had to wait for more than two months at the ports. This had a direct impact on the industry.
Many factories in Kaliningrad were dependent on European components and parts, which were no longer able to arrive on time.
The result was that the region’s major automotive and motorcycle manufacturers, such as Avtotor and Baltmotors, suddenly had to stop their operations.
The sharpest and most shocking sign of this pressure came from Warsaw. On December 11, 2025, a Polish general publicly said that if needed, we will burn everything up to a distance of 300 kilometers, and we will send fire up to 900 kilometers.
The purpose of this statement was not just to show fear, but to convey that Poland is serious about its military capability and intentions. The general described Kaliningrad as a kind of “bunker”.
In the past few years, Warsaw has massively increased its defense budget, emphasized the modernization of the army, and established itself as a frontline country within NATO.
Poland now sees itself not just as a member country, but as the first security shield standing in front of Russia.
Russian military planners are aware of this. They accept that if there is a large and open conflict with NATO, Kaliningrad will be cut off from the rest of Russia in a very short time.
The main reason for this is not any strategic mistake, but geography. NATO countries surround Kaliningrad, and it has no direct land contact with Russia.
In such a situation, maintaining supply, reinforcement, and continuous military support becomes extremely difficult. The sea and air routes will also not remain safe after the initial phase.
In addition, in recent years, Russia has had to recall some of its military units from Kaliningrad. The first and biggest reason for this was the ongoing war against Ukraine, where the Russian army is constantly struggling with a shortage of resources.
The second reason is Finland’s joining NATO. After that, Russia’s direct border with NATO became much longer, which made additional military deployment on the new Finnish border necessary.
Kaliningrad no longer seems to be as important to the Russian Military and is now an example of how difficult it will be for Russia to protect its own assets with long front lines of operation.
Kaliningrad was once thought to be one of Russia’s most important forward bases against the West and is now an indicator of Russia’s ability to protect its assets from other countries.
The conflict between Russia and NATO continued to grow in 2025. Russia accused NATO of planning a blockade on Kaliningrad. As such, Lithuania is now a concern for Russia.
Lithuania is developing a new military training ground near the Suwalki Gap. This area is considered strategically very sensitive because it is the narrow land strip that can connect Kaliningrad to Belarus.
In the event of any major conflict, this gap will be extremely important for Russia, while for NATO, it is a point where pressure can be applied to cut off Kaliningrad completely.
Fear of Separatism
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the way geopolitical conditions changed, its impact was not limited only to governments and armies, but reached the daily lives of ordinary people.
A lot of locals are starting to feel that the old system is coming to an end; instead of waiting for a decision or a reaction from the Kremlin as to what happens next, many are now making decisions about how to plan out their futures.
Daily life has been affected by the difficulty in obtaining goods and services from EU countries, but this has also brought on several new ways.
Some have started promoting local production, some have searched for alternative trade routes, and some have changed their consumption habits themselves.
Due to growing unemployment, daily insecurity, and deepening corruption, out of fear of all these things, many people have also started migrating.
At least one out of every five adult residents of the Kaliningrad Region has at least one close relative or family member who has left the Kaliningrad Region or is planning to leave the Kaliningrad Region.
Between 2022 and 2025, 50,000–150,000 people have emigrated from the Kaliningrad Oblast, with the Kremlin ignoring the issue of migration from the Kaliningrad Oblast or underreporting the same as well.
And it is not that the people migrating are ordinary citizens who only ask for two meals a day; among them are generally highly educated youth connected to IT, engineering, and industrial sectors, who are going out in search of a better future.
For them, countries like Poland, Lithuania, and Germany have emerged as the most attractive destinations.
On paper, the unemployment rate may appear to be at a record low level of 2.2%, but the reality is that industries are facing a severe shortage of qualified and trained employees.
For the people who have remained in the region, the situation is becoming even more hopeless. According to an rbc.ru report, there has been a shocking 21.7% increase in the number of unemployed since the beginning of the year.
Impact of the War
Kaliningrad has become increasingly apparent as a difficult and precarious situation for Russia since the inception of its deployment of Russian military equipment and weapons systems.
At first glance, the quantity of weapons and the number of troops deployed to Kaliningrad appear formidable; however, in an actual crisis scenario involving the potential involvement of other European countries (Germany or Poland), all would be able to render all Russian capabilities at Kaliningrad, ineffective within a matter of hours.
If there is any conflict, supplying Kaliningrad will be a major challenging task, because NATO’s presence in the Baltic Sea will not make it easy.
This geographical weakness is now Russia’s biggest concern, because it increases the possibility of isolating the enclave.
Along with this, Lithuania has made its position absolutely clear in this context. It has given clear signals that if the security situation deteriorates, it can completely stop the transit going towards Kaliningrad.
The problem is not only of military insecurity, but also of the growing gap between cost and utility. The maintenance of the military infrastructure present in Kaliningrad is becoming more expensive every year, while its strategic utility is continuously decreasing in the changing geopolitical circumstances.
In such a situation, the threats given by Putin mostly appear as a political show, not a real display of power.
From a logical point of view, the most sensible option for Russia would be to leave this region and concentrate its resources elsewhere. But in a dictatorial system, logic often loses out to politics.
Putin cannot politically afford to leave Kaliningrad, because doing so would be like accepting weakness and would deal a deep blow to the nationalist image he has built.
On YouTube, I explore ideas that inspire people to take action. On Medium, I write about lessons from geopolitics, the Russia-Ukraine war, and shifts in the US.
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