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我在這個部落格討論過幾次「中、俄關係」，也轉載過幾篇相關的評論。但不知道什麼原因，我一直沒想到應該闢一個專欄；或許在潛意識裏，我厭惡俄國的程度更強於我厭惡日本吧(1)。
刊出《 中、俄貿易》一文後，我今天連續讀到兩篇討論關於「中、俄關係」的文章；在「亡羊補牢」的教誨下，決定開這欄。以後有空，把幾篇相關拙作和評論轉到此處。 -- 12/24/25
附註
1. 我三、四十年前讀過一篇訪問「神風特攻隊」成員家屬的文章；它讓我了解到：大多數日本人民也是執行「軍國主義」日本政、軍領袖的受害者。更重要的是：我接受「個人本位方法論」；導致我思考時有分開個別的老百姓和國家、社會、民族這類「集體名詞」的習慣。加上我在美國第一份工作期間跟一位日裔同事相交；我們是西洋棋棋友，來往比較多，他還教我打保齡球，後來成了好朋友；所以減低了我對「日本人」日本人的敵意。我1980年前後買第一台電視機時，打定主意買RCA產品。到了店裏，看到一台三菱電視機上貼了一張「保固7年」的條子；t躊躇再三後買下它。之後我就不曾再提「抵制日貨」。或許這個經驗也加強了我把「客觀現實」置於「主觀意識」之上的思考模式。最後，另一個原因可能是：日本成了戰敗國，受到一定程度的懲罰。而俄國一直吃香喝辣，在國際上屌得跟二、五、八萬。
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中俄領土議題該提上檯面了 -- Oleh Cheslavskyi
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請參閱拙作《烏克蘭危機之數典忘史》(該欄《開欄文》2022/02/15第3則)和《《中國目標在西伯利亞而不是台灣》短評》(該欄2025/07/06)，以及《中、俄領土議題之過去與現在》。
“Seven Million Square Kilometers Must Not Be Lost”: Chinese Media Openly Discusses Carving Up Russia
Oleh Cheslavskyi, 12/16/25
While Kremlin propaganda feeds Russians fairy tales about “great friendship” and “strategic partnership without limits,” Chinese media calmly discusses exactly how those limits will be redrawn. Not someday in the distant future — but when Russia collapses. And according to Chinese authors, preparations should begin now.
On December 14, 2025, NetEase (網易) — one of China’s largest media platforms with hundreds of millions of users — published an article with a telling headline: “China Must Prepare for the Worst: If Russia Collapses, This 7 Million Square Kilometer Territory Must Not Be Lost.”
The subject is Russia’s Far East. The very region Putin so proudly “pivoted” toward after the West closed its doors to him.
Chicken Scraps for the Dragon
The Chinese author doesn’t mince words. The Far East is a “chicken rib” for Russia — enormous but useless, because there’s no money for development, no people, and the war in the west is draining the last resources. For China, however, it’s a “treasure” — gold, diamonds, oil, gas, timber. Everything the Middle Kingdom desperately needs.
And here’s where it gets interesting. The author literally outlines a strategy for soft annexation:
“One should not attempt to seize it by force; this would lead to global encirclement, as happened with Crimea. The smart approach is to be more accommodating, continue investing money and human resources, sign long-term contracts, and support pro-Chinese forces in the region. Nominally independent, but practically dependent on Chinese support.”
This isn’t conspiracy theory or speculation. It’s a direct quote from Chinese media. Spelled out plainly: create economic dependence, introduce the yuan, build infrastructure, bind with loans — and wait for the “political landscape to change.”
Historical Accounting
The Chinese, unlike Russians, remember history well. And they count every square kilometer.
The article reminds readers: in 1858, the Treaty of Aigun (《璦琿條約》) saw Russia slice off 600,000 square kilometers north of the Amur 阿穆爾，即黑龍江) from a weakened Qing Empire. Two years later, the Convention of Peking (《北京條約》) added another 400,000 — including Vladivostok (海參崴) and Sakhalin (庫頁島). Total: over a million square kilometers.
For Chinese readers, this isn’t ancient history. It’s an open account. “Unequal treaties” — that’s what China officially calls the 19th-century agreements. A formulation implying: the debt remains unpaid.
And now, with Russia mired in war, its GDP “smaller than a single Chinese province,” and fewer than “50,000 troops remaining in the Far East — essentially an empty shell” — Chinese media openly writes: time to prepare for collection.
What’s Already Been Done
The article lists the achievements of “peaceful penetration” with unconcealed satisfaction.
The Eastern gas pipeline is operational, with a 30-year contract signed. The Heihe highway bridge is open, the Tongjiang railway bridge has been running since 2021. Chinese companies are building roads and ports, extracting resources, cultivating land. The yuan circulates ever more widely — “even small traders accept WeChat Pay.” Russia itself created “priority development territories” and invites Chinese investment.
“This looks like business, but in reality — it’s binding the relationship,” the author honestly summarizes.
The Far East economy is already “becoming part of the system.” Gas, electricity, minerals — “all locked into contracts that no one who comes to power can cancel.”
No one who comes to power. Remember that phrase.
When the Landscape Changes
The Chinese author discusses Russia’s collapse not as a hypothetical possibility, but as a matter of time. And offers practical recommendations.
The Far East population is melting away — the region is becoming “uninhabited territory.” Chinese migrants can come to work, but “should be careful not to provoke local resentment.” External powers — the US, Japan — will try to intervene, but the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will “diplomatically fence them out.”
And the main thesis, repeated several times: “Seven million square kilometers must not be lost.”
Must not be lost — meaning they already consider it theirs. Just not yet formalized.
“History teaches us that territorial vacuums are always filled. The Qing Dynasty lost territories because it lacked the strength to defend them. Now China is in a different position — it has economic leverage.”
What This Means for Russia
One could dismiss this: just one author on a blogging platform. But NetEase isn’t a fringe outlet — it’s one of China’s largest media conglomerates. And in China, where the internet is strictly censored, such publications don’t appear by accident.
When Chinese media openly discusses preparing for Russia’s collapse and the division of its territory — that’s a signal. Perhaps a trial balloon. Perhaps preparing public opinion. But definitely not coincidence.
For Russians who’ve been fed mantras about the “pivot to the East” and “reliable Chinese partner” for years, this should be a cold shower. China is not a friend or ally. China is a patient creditor waiting for the debtor’s bankruptcy.
“Whose land is this? It’s just a name — the vital arteries are in our hands,” concludes the Chinese article.
The vital arteries. In their hands. Already.
And Russian propaganda continues spinning tales of “great friendship.” One wonders: how many square kilometers is that friendship worth?
Written by Oleh Cheslavskyi
I'm a Ukrainian journalist, a committed advocate for citizen-driven reporting free from editorial constraints, and a passionate supporter of digital democracy.
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中、俄貿易-Melissa Lawford
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** 下文原發表於2025/12/23。因更改版面重新刊出；導致不便，尚請見諒。 -- 2025/12/24 **
我曾說過：「國際間就沒有『雙贏』這碼子事」；下面這篇報導多少佐證了我的判斷。另一方面，我也曾經警告：不要被普丁根習總兩人你儂我儂的假象迷惑；中、俄之間的矛盾不只是歷史性的，它也是本質上的。
Putin’s ‘dear friend’ Xi piles pain on Russia’s economy
Making an ally of China has come at a cost for Moscow’s home-grown industries
Melissa Lawford, 12/23/25
When Vladimir Putin made a four-day trip to visit Xi Jinping in September, he addressed his Chinese counterpart as a “dear friend”.
Speaking to Xi across a vast display of orchids in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, the Russian president claimed their ties were “at an unprecedentedly high level”.
Certainly on the surface it appears China’s alliance with Russia has only grown stronger since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Nowhere has this been more evident than when looking at trade between the two countries, which has boomed ever since the West slapped Putin with massive sanctions.
Last year, the value of trade between Russia and China hit a record $245bn (£182bn), fuelled by Xi becoming the world’s largest buyer of Putin’s oil and gas. Overall, China also became Russia’s biggest supplier of goods.
However, closer ties with China have come at a cost.
In particular, Russian businesses have grown increasingly frustrated at a flood of cheap Chinese goods.
Vladimir Milov, who worked in the Russian government from 1997 to 2002 before becoming a vocal Putin critic, says the economic alliance is backfiring badly for Russia.
“It is deeply disadvantageous,” he says. “China is taking advantage because it knows that Russia has nowhere to go.”
Such warnings could signal that the economic ties between the two countries are beginning to fray.
While mutual trade hit a record high in 2024, it has fallen by nearly a tenth so far this year.
Lada sales plunge
One key area of tension is cars.
After Western manufacturers cut ties with Russia in 2022, Chinese competitors duly stepped in.
In the two years to 2024, Chinese car exports to Russia have increased sevenfold, prompting a growing number of complaints from domestic manufacturers.
Maxim Sokolov, the chief executive of Russian carmaker AvtoVAZ, has accused the Chinese of “unprecedented dumping”, which he said in December has crossed “all imaginable boundaries”.
Sales of his company’s signature Lada car have plunged, pushing the company to slash production by nearly half and move to a four-day work week at the end of September.
Russia’s largest truck manufacturer, Kamaz, also trimmed its working week in August after demand for its vehicles plunged by 60pc. At the time it blamed “excessive” imports.
To alleviate some of the criticism, the Kremlin has responded by significantly raising import fees on vehicles.
Since October 2024, Russia has more than doubled the “recycling fee” that it charges on imported cars.
This charge, which is supposedly to cover the future disposal of the vehicle but functions largely as a tariff, was 667,000 roubles (£6,275) per vehicle as of January this year.
This led to Chinese car exports to Russia halving in the first six months of 2025.
In July, Russian regulators also banned truck imports from a fleet of major Chinese brands – Dongfeng, Foton, FAW and Sitrak – which they branded a “direct threat” to public safety.
“These trade-related tensions will start to occur more and more as the market gets saturated with Chinese goods and uncompetitive Russian industries are not able to make their sales,” says John Kennedy, a research leader at Rand.
Sanctions bite
There are signs that Russia’s steel sector is also hurting.
Andrey Gartung, chief executive of the Chelyabinsk Forging and Press Plant, warned last year: “Russian enterprises competing with Chinese ones are holding on by the skin of their teeth.”
Not one to shy away, China has hit back with trade restrictions of its own.
Most notably, Xi reintroduced tariffs on Russian coal in January 2024, two years after the restrictions were first lifted.
This has already hit exports to China, with Milov claiming that the levies are adding to what is the worst crisis for Russia’s coal industry since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The sector’s revenues are expected to plummet by 12pc this year alone.
Elsewhere, China has so far refused to lift a longstanding ban on imports of Russia’s largest agricultural exports – winter wheat and barley. Instead, it buys from Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
What China does import from Russia, it gets incredibly cheaply because it has a monopoly as one of Russia’s only buyers, says Milov.
Russia’s biggest exports to China are oil and gas, which combined make up two thirds of its trade.
Igor Sechin, Rosneft’s chief executive, said that between January 2022 and June 2024, China’s savings from purchasing Russian oil compared to Middle Eastern exports amounted to as much as $18bn.
“Taking the sanctions away, Russia is what Beijing would want every trading partner to look like,” says Gregor Sebastian, of Rhodium’s China Corporate Advisory team.
“China is importing raw materials that it produces into manufactured goods that it can then resell at much higher profit margins back to Russia. That is the main bulk of the relationship.”
However, more than anything, Russia wants new technology and investment from China. And it is not getting it.
Joint projects stall
The average annual flow of Chinese investment into Russia has plummeted from an average of $1.2bn from 2011 to $400m, says Milov.
In 2022, China dropped Russia from its Belt and Road financing programme, while in July, China’s commerce ministry “strongly advised” carmakers against investing in Russia.
Many major projects that were previously announced with Chinese backing have now been scrapped or are on hold.
Russia quietly disappeared from what was supposed to be a joint development of a long-haul aircraft with the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China.
Work had already begun on the project, initially called the CR929, which stood for “China Russia”. However, the R has now been dropped, with the aircraft renamed as the C929.
Plans for Chinese CRRC Changchun Railway Vehicles to build a high-speed rail line between Moscow and Kazan in south-west Russia have also been paused.
Separately, there has been no progress on the development of the Tianjin oil refinery, a joint venture between Rosneft and the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which was approved in 2014.
After the meeting between Putin and Xi in September, Gazprom announced that the two countries had signed a deal to build a “Power of Siberia 2” gas pipeline to China.
But while this would no doubt prove to be a huge victory for Russia, China has yet to confirm the project.
This may be a sign that, for all the pomp and ceremony, the countries’ authoritarian alliance may be weaker than it appears.
“Despite all these hugs and kisses at summits, China and Russia are very much far apart,” says Milov.
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