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「中、俄關係」 – 開欄文
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瀏覽689 ｜回應4｜推薦1 |
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我在這個部落格討論過幾次「中、俄關係」，也轉載過幾篇相關的評論。但不知道什麼原因，我一直沒想到應該闢一個專欄；或許在潛意識裏，我厭惡俄國的程度更強於我厭惡日本吧(1)。
刊出《 中、俄貿易》一文後，我今天連續讀到兩篇討論關於「中、俄關係」的文章；在「亡羊補牢」的教誨下，決定開這欄。以後有空，把幾篇相關拙作和評論轉到此處。 -- 12/24/25
附註
1. 我三、四十年前讀過一篇訪問「神風特攻隊」成員家屬的文章；它讓我了解到：大多數日本人民也是執行「軍國主義」日本政、軍領袖的受害者。更重要的是：我接受「個人本位方法論」；導致我思考時有分開個別的老百姓和國家、社會、民族這類「集體名詞」的習慣。加上我在美國第一份工作期間跟一位日裔同事相交；我們是西洋棋棋友，來往比較多，他還教我打保齡球，後來成了好朋友；所以減低了我對「日本人」的敵意。我1980年前後買第一台電視機時，打定主意買RCA產品。到了店裏，看到一台三菱電視機上貼了一張「保固7年」的條子；躊躇再三後買下它。之後我就不曾再提「抵制日貨」。或許這個經驗也加強了我把「客觀現實」置於「主觀意識」之上的思考模式。最後，另一個原因可能是：日本成了戰敗國，受到一定程度的懲罰。而俄國一直吃香喝辣，在國際上屌得跟二、五、八萬。
本文於 修改第 9 次
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中國：等著俄國戰敗的盟友？ - Sergey E. Ivashchenko
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基於人道和追求和平的「信念」(偏見？)，我曾多次表達：期待習總能在俄、烏戰爭中積極地扮演「調停者」角色。看來，我這個號稱接受「現實主義」的人，還是太天真了(無知？)。
China: An Ally Waiting for Russia’s Defeat?
Sergey E. Ivashchenko, 12/22/25
From the first months of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia tried to present China as a strategic partner, capable of supporting it on the international arena. However, Beijing chose a more cautious line of behavior. Chinese statements about the necessity of negotiations and peaceful settlement sound regularly, but they remain declarative. Beijing is careful to avoid concrete steps that could turn it into a full-fledged mediator.
The reasons for such caution are obvious.
First, China strives to preserve the image of a global power, capable of influencing conflicts, but does not want to take upon itself responsibility for their outcome.
Second, direct interference in the negotiation process would put Beijing in an uncomfortable position: it would have to openly designate whose side it stands on and take upon itself quite concrete, and not declarative, commitments. In conditions when China simultaneously develops economic ties with Russia and supports trade relations with the West, such clarity is disadvantageous.
Thus, China positions itself as a “voice of reason,” but in fact remains on the sidelines. Its role in the peace process is limited to rhetoric and diplomatic gestures, which create the appearance of activity, but do not lead to real results.
China’s Support for Russia’s War Economy
Despite statements about neutrality, China plays an important role in maintaining the Russian economy and military machine. After the introduction of Western sanctions, Moscow found itself dependent on Chinese supplies. It is not only about consumer goods, but also about critically important technologies.
Through Chinese companies, Russia receives access to electronics, components for drones, industrial equipment, and other dual-use goods. These deliveries often pass through third countries or through barely noticeable “grey” trade schemes, which Moscow calls “parallel import.” This allows Beijing formally to distance itself from Russia as from the aggressor country, but at the same time Russia receives the possibility to compensate part of the sanctions pressure and perpetuate the Ukraine war.
Economic support is also manifested in energy. China increased purchases of Russian oil and gas, taking advantage of discounts which Moscow is now forced to provide. This provides Russia with currency inflows and reduces the effect of Western restrictions. For China, however, this is strategically advantageous — it receives uninterrupted cheap resources, thereby strengthening its own energy security.
In this way, China acts as a hidden donor, whose actions to some extent soften the blow to the Russian economy, caused by colossal expenditures on military spending, decline of production, and catastrophic shortage of human resources. These actions on the part of China are not publicized, but they go far in allowing Moscow to prolong the conflict.
Balancing Peace Rhetoric and War Reality
The role of China in the Ukraine war is reflected in its international image. On the one hand, Beijing tries to present itself as a peacemaker, offering a “settlement plan” and speaking in favor of negotiations. On the other hand, its factual support of Russia leads to criticism from the West and strengthens suspicions about Beijing’s true motives.
For China this is a dual situation. On the global level it strives to strengthen the image of an alternative center of power, capable of challenging the United States and its allies. Support of Russia in this context looks like part of a strategy for creating a multipolar world. However, the position has its costs: China risks losing the trust of European countries, which see in its actions as complicity in Russia’s aggression.
In addition, participation in the conflict indirectly influences the economic prospects of China. Western companies and investors more and more often consider Beijing as an unreliable partner, which may lead to reduction of investments and technological cooperation. In the long-term perspective this limits the possibilities of China for modernization and growth.
Nevertheless, China continues to strike a balance. It does not want openly to become an ally of Russia, but also will not join Western sanctions. Such a strategy allows it to preserve flexibility and to use the war as an instrument for strengthening its own position in global geopolitics.
An Ally Awaiting Defeat?
Russia faces growing dissatisfaction at home. Colossal human losses at the front, the ongoing, though hidden, mobilization of that part of the population which is still able to hold weapons, and rapidly growing inflation, including food products — all this is that detonator which may lead to a social explosion. But even such an outcome would not be the worst-case scenario. In separate republics of the Federation, separatism is ripening. This is especially evident in the Caucasus republics, as well as in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, in Yakutia, in the Far East and in Siberia, while in a special position remains the Kaliningrad enclave.
For the United States and Europe, the perspective of the disintegration of Russia looks like a catastrophe: chaos, the threat of uncontrolled use of nuclear weapons, ecological risks for the whole world. But for China this scenario opens a “window of opportunities.” Specifically, there’s a chance at a long-awaited prize — the return of “historic territories,” which in Chinese historiography are interpreted as “lost heritage”: the Far East and Siberia. On Chinese official maps these territories are colored in the colors of Chinese territory. Access to the Arctic Ocean, for the sake of which Beijing actively builds an icebreaker fleet, becomes part of this strategy.
“Return of historical justice” for China means not only territorial acquisitions. Importantly, it represents full access to the richest resources of these regions: oil, gas, rare earth metals, diamonds, platinum, forest and fresh water. These resources are capable of ensuring economic growth of China for generations ahead and of consolidating its status as a global power.
相關報導：
Biding Time? China’s Slow Takeover of Russia’s Far East (04/24，需訂閱)
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西伯利亞對中國的經濟價值 – Raj K
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請參見本欄上一篇和所附參考文章。
Something Huge Is Brewing Between Russia and China
Russia’s Future is Being Rewritten in China
Raj K, 11/29/25
The Russia-Ukraine war is now almost four years old, yet Russia has not gained anything from Ukraine that it can proudly say, “Yes, we have won.” Instead, these days, Russia is trying to put international pressure on Ukraine.
Anyway, if we keep the Ukraine war aside, the one who has gained the most from this war is China — something I have talked about many times before.
From the Ukraine war, China has clearly understood one thing: Russia’s military is not as powerful as Moscow shows to the world, and the people of Russia’s Far East and western regions do not have any special attachment to Moscow.
Old weapons, weak supply lines, poor training, and leadership that does not even understand modern war — not only China, but the whole world has now seen that this is no longer the same Russia that was called an “unbreakable military power” during the Soviet era.
Second, the population of Siberia and the Far East already felt distant and ignored by Moscow. In a crisis, they do not look ready to fight for the capital. Resources are sent to Moscow, development stays stuck there, and the feeling has grown among local people that they are only part of Russia on the map, not a real priority for Moscow.
Russian-Chinese Energy Business
By buying Russian oil, China has directly saved around 20 billion dollars from 2022 until now. When Western countries put sanctions on Russian oil after the Ukraine war started, China saw the opportunity and started buying huge amounts of discounted oil from Russia. Imports from the Middle East declined, and Russia became China’s biggest supplier, accounting for about 20% of imports.
The head of Russia’s biggest oil company, Rosneft, Igor Sechin, openly said at a Russian-Chinese energy business forum that the discount China gets on Russian oil has turned into savings of almost 20 billion dollars in the last three years.
Many countries in the world kept a distance from Russia, but China turned this situation into its own economic benefit — energy security became stronger on one side, and a huge amount of foreign currency was saved on the other side.
Chinese factories today are running on cheap inputs, so their products are now even cheaper than European factories. The difference in energy cost is very big — electricity prices in China and Russia are less than half of America’s and three to four times cheaper than in many European countries. This energy advantage directly makes the Chinese industry stronger in global competition.
Along with this, China has been clever in its energy transition, too. It is not suddenly giving up coal; instead, it is first building solar, wind, and hydropower on a very large scale, and then slowly removing old coal plants — that is its strategy.
In natural gas, China is also getting the same benefit. Russia now meets more than 20% of China’s total gas needs, and this share is increasing every year. This year, China also started buying Russian LNG. Before 2022, Saudi Arabia was China’s biggest oil supplier, followed by Malaysia. But after the war, the whole picture changed. Russia reached number one, Saudi Arabia slipped to second, and Malaysia to third.
In 2024, the price difference in oil has become a game-changer for China. Russian oil costs China an average of 574 dollars per ton, while Saudi oil reaches up to 609 dollars per ton — meaning direct savings on every ton.
In 2005, China bought very little oil from Russia — only 12.8 million tons. At that time, Russia was not a major energy supplier for China. But by 2024, this amount has increased eight times to 108.5 million tons.
China’s Growing Hold on Siberia
China is, of course, taking advantage of oil and energy, but it is taking another advantage too. During the war against Ukraine, the thing Russia has ignored the most is its own huge eastern border.
Siberia and the Russian Far East — both areas have very low population but are full of natural resources: oil, natural gas, fresh water, rare minerals — everything in huge quantities, and they directly share a border with China. Moscow’s control over these regions is slowly slipping.
In many towns and areas of Siberia and the Far East, the state police are unable to even do their basic duties because Moscow has almost stopped funding.
Where police became weak, private armed groups have taken their place — groups that Russian oligarchs fund for their own interests, so that people start seeing them as the new local “power centers.”
At the same time, a terrible shortage of petrol, diesel, and daily items has made the situation even worse. The fuel crisis is all over Russia, but in Siberia and the Far East, it has become the biggest struggle of life.
In China’s eyes, the biggest value of Siberia is two things: water and energy. Northern China still suffers from a huge water shortage; rivers are shrinking, and groundwater levels keep falling.
Exactly opposite to that, Siberia has natural wealth like Lake Baikal (貝加爾湖) — the world’s largest store of fresh water, a source that China sees as the long-term solution to its water thirst.
The second thing is oil and natural gas. A large part of Russia’s total oil and gas exports now goes to China, and after Western sanctions, this share has increased even more. But China is buying all of this at very low prices — sometimes 30–40% below world market price.
For China, this deal is not just trade; it has become the foundation of energy security. China knows: the weaker Russia becomes, the cheaper and more reliable supplier it will remain at China’s doorstep.
China has not sent soldiers to Siberia, but its companies have started a kind of “quiet occupation” on the ground. Thousands of hectares of land have already been taken on lease — farming is happening somewhere, timber cutting somewhere else, and mining in many places.
All of this is happening under the cover of economic investment, but the effect is completely geopolitical. The biggest shock is that these Chinese companies clearly avoid giving jobs to local Russians; they bring their own workers, engineers, and entire workforce directly from China.
Shop signs are written in Chinese, market transactions happen in Chinese, and in many areas, even social life has started becoming completely under Chinese influence. Something similar happened between 1990 and 2010, too, but at that time, strict restrictions were put on Chinese migration.
But today Russia is so economically weak and politically so isolated that it is watching the same old danger rise again — and it is in no position to stop it.
Since 2022, Beijing has started writing many Russian cities on its official maps again with their old Chinese names — Vladivostok is now called Haishenwai, Khabarovsk has become Boli (伯力), and cities like Ussuriysk (雙城子) are also being changed in the same pattern.
This is not just a game of changing names. China used the same strategy in the South China Sea, Arunachal Pradesh (藏南地區), and Aksai Chin (阿克賽欽) — first mark the claim on maps, then make a political claim later, and finally get actual control.
History
It seems China’s “century of humiliation” has still not fully ended. The 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century were the decades when China was weakest, and Russia was most aggressive.
The whole Amur River region (黑龍江), Primorsky Krai (濱海邊疆區) — which includes today’s Vladivostok (海參崴) — parts of Sakhalin (庫頁島), and many other areas were once on China’s map, but under pressure of unequal treaties, they had to be handed over to Russia one by one. In Chinese history, these are not just pieces of land, but symbols of national humiliation.
These areas historically belonged to China, and taking them back in the future is part of national rejuvenation. This is the reason Russia has never been able to fully trust China as a partner.
Conclusion
Today, Russia is stuck on two fronts — Ukraine in the west, China in the east. Its economy is breaking, its army is tired, and its grip is loosening on its richest regions.
China is in no hurry and does not need to rush. Very slowly and peacefully, through economic and cultural means, it is bringing Siberia under its influence. The interesting part is that China is not only moving toward the territory — it is also making money from Russia’s weakness.
Cheap Russian oil is running its factories at the lowest cost in the world, and cheap Russian electricity is making Chinese industry even more competitive. Influence is growing on one side, savings and profit on the other.
Written by Raj K
On YouTube, I explore ideas that inspire people to take action. On Medium, I write about lessons from geopolitics, the Russia-Ukraine war, and shifts in the US.
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中俄領土議題該提上檯面了 -- Oleh Cheslavskyi
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請參閱拙作《烏克蘭危機之數典忘史》(該欄《開欄文》2022/02/15第3則)和《《中國目標在西伯利亞而不是台灣》短評》(該欄2025/07/06)，以及《中、俄領土議題之過去與現在》。
“Seven Million Square Kilometers Must Not Be Lost”: Chinese Media Openly Discusses Carving Up Russia
Oleh Cheslavskyi, 12/16/25
While Kremlin propaganda feeds Russians fairy tales about “great friendship” and “strategic partnership without limits,” Chinese media calmly discusses exactly how those limits will be redrawn. Not someday in the distant future — but when Russia collapses. And according to Chinese authors, preparations should begin now.
On December 14, 2025, NetEase (網易) — one of China’s largest media platforms with hundreds of millions of users — published an article with a telling headline: “China Must Prepare for the Worst: If Russia Collapses, This 7 Million Square Kilometer Territory Must Not Be Lost.”
The subject is Russia’s Far East. The very region Putin so proudly “pivoted” toward after the West closed its doors to him.
Chicken Scraps for the Dragon
The Chinese author doesn’t mince words. The Far East is a “chicken rib” for Russia — enormous but useless, because there’s no money for development, no people, and the war in the west is draining the last resources. For China, however, it’s a “treasure” — gold, diamonds, oil, gas, timber. Everything the Middle Kingdom desperately needs.
And here’s where it gets interesting. The author literally outlines a strategy for soft annexation:
“One should not attempt to seize it by force; this would lead to global encirclement, as happened with Crimea. The smart approach is to be more accommodating, continue investing money and human resources, sign long-term contracts, and support pro-Chinese forces in the region. Nominally independent, but practically dependent on Chinese support.”
This isn’t conspiracy theory or speculation. It’s a direct quote from Chinese media. Spelled out plainly: create economic dependence, introduce the yuan, build infrastructure, bind with loans — and wait for the “political landscape to change.”
Historical Accounting
The Chinese, unlike Russians, remember history well. And they count every square kilometer.
The article reminds readers: in 1858, the Treaty of Aigun (《璦琿條約》) saw Russia slice off 600,000 square kilometers north of the Amur (阿穆爾，即黑龍江) from a weakened Qing Empire. Two years later, the Convention of Peking (《北京條約》) added another 400,000 — including Vladivostok (海參崴) and Sakhalin (庫頁島). Total: over a million square kilometers.
For Chinese readers, this isn’t ancient history. It’s an open account. “Unequal treaties” — that’s what China officially calls the 19th-century agreements. A formulation implying: the debt remains unpaid.
And now, with Russia mired in war, its GDP “smaller than a single Chinese province,” and fewer than “50,000 troops remaining in the Far East — essentially an empty shell” — Chinese media openly writes: time to prepare for collection.
What’s Already Been Done
The article lists the achievements of “peaceful penetration” with unconcealed satisfaction.
The Eastern gas pipeline is operational, with a 30-year contract signed. The Heihe highway bridge is open, the Tongjiang railway bridge has been running since 2021. Chinese companies are building roads and ports, extracting resources, cultivating land. The yuan circulates ever more widely — “even small traders accept WeChat Pay.” Russia itself created “priority development territories” and invites Chinese investment.
“This looks like business, but in reality — it’s binding the relationship,” the author honestly summarizes.
The Far East economy is already “becoming part of the system.” Gas, electricity, minerals — “all locked into contracts that no one who comes to power can cancel.”
No one who comes to power. Remember that phrase.
When the Landscape Changes
The Chinese author discusses Russia’s collapse not as a hypothetical possibility, but as a matter of time. And offers practical recommendations.
The Far East population is melting away — the region is becoming “uninhabited territory.” Chinese migrants can come to work, but “should be careful not to provoke local resentment.” External powers — the US, Japan — will try to intervene, but the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will “diplomatically fence them out.”
And the main thesis, repeated several times: “Seven million square kilometers must not be lost.”
Must not be lost — meaning they already consider it theirs. Just not yet formalized.
“History teaches us that territorial vacuums are always filled. The Qing Dynasty lost territories because it lacked the strength to defend them. Now China is in a different position — it has economic leverage.”
What This Means for Russia
One could dismiss this: just one author on a blogging platform. But NetEase isn’t a fringe outlet — it’s one of China’s largest media conglomerates. And in China, where the internet is strictly censored, such publications don’t appear by accident.
When Chinese media openly discusses preparing for Russia’s collapse and the division of its territory — that’s a signal. Perhaps a trial balloon. Perhaps preparing public opinion. But definitely not coincidence.
For Russians who’ve been fed mantras about the “pivot to the East” and “reliable Chinese partner” for years, this should be a cold shower. China is not a friend or ally. China is a patient creditor waiting for the debtor’s bankruptcy.
“Whose land is this? It’s just a name — the vital arteries are in our hands,” concludes the Chinese article.
The vital arteries. In their hands. Already.
And Russian propaganda continues spinning tales of “great friendship.” One wonders: how many square kilometers is that friendship worth?
Written by Oleh Cheslavskyi
I'm a Ukrainian journalist, a committed advocate for citizen-driven reporting free from editorial constraints, and a passionate supporter of digital democracy.
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中、俄貿易-Melissa Lawford
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** 下文原發表於2025/12/23。因更改版面重新刊出；導致不便，尚請見諒。 -- 2025/12/24 **
我曾說過：「國際間就沒有『雙贏』這碼子事」；下面這篇報導多少佐證了我的判斷。另一方面，我也曾經警告：不要被普丁根習總兩人你儂我儂的假象迷惑；中、俄之間的矛盾不只是歷史性的，它也是本質上的。
Putin’s ‘dear friend’ Xi piles pain on Russia’s economy
Making an ally of China has come at a cost for Moscow’s home-grown industries
Melissa Lawford, 12/23/25
When Vladimir Putin made a four-day trip to visit Xi Jinping in September, he addressed his Chinese counterpart as a “dear friend”.
Speaking to Xi across a vast display of orchids in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, the Russian president claimed their ties were “at an unprecedentedly high level”.
Certainly on the surface it appears China’s alliance with Russia has only grown stronger since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Nowhere has this been more evident than when looking at trade between the two countries, which has boomed ever since the West slapped Putin with massive sanctions.
Last year, the value of trade between Russia and China hit a record $245bn (£182bn), fuelled by Xi becoming the world’s largest buyer of Putin’s oil and gas. Overall, China also became Russia’s biggest supplier of goods.
However, closer ties with China have come at a cost.
In particular, Russian businesses have grown increasingly frustrated at a flood of cheap Chinese goods.
Vladimir Milov, who worked in the Russian government from 1997 to 2002 before becoming a vocal Putin critic, says the economic alliance is backfiring badly for Russia.
“It is deeply disadvantageous,” he says. “China is taking advantage because it knows that Russia has nowhere to go.”
Such warnings could signal that the economic ties between the two countries are beginning to fray.
While mutual trade hit a record high in 2024, it has fallen by nearly a tenth so far this year.
Lada sales plunge
One key area of tension is cars.
After Western manufacturers cut ties with Russia in 2022, Chinese competitors duly stepped in.
In the two years to 2024, Chinese car exports to Russia have increased sevenfold, prompting a growing number of complaints from domestic manufacturers.
Maxim Sokolov, the chief executive of Russian carmaker AvtoVAZ, has accused the Chinese of “unprecedented dumping”, which he said in December has crossed “all imaginable boundaries”.
Sales of his company’s signature Lada car have plunged, pushing the company to slash production by nearly half and move to a four-day work week at the end of September.
Russia’s largest truck manufacturer, Kamaz, also trimmed its working week in August after demand for its vehicles plunged by 60pc. At the time it blamed “excessive” imports.
To alleviate some of the criticism, the Kremlin has responded by significantly raising import fees on vehicles.
Since October 2024, Russia has more than doubled the “recycling fee” that it charges on imported cars.
This charge, which is supposedly to cover the future disposal of the vehicle but functions largely as a tariff, was 667,000 roubles (£6,275) per vehicle as of January this year.
This led to Chinese car exports to Russia halving in the first six months of 2025.
In July, Russian regulators also banned truck imports from a fleet of major Chinese brands – Dongfeng, Foton, FAW and Sitrak – which they branded a “direct threat” to public safety.
“These trade-related tensions will start to occur more and more as the market gets saturated with Chinese goods and uncompetitive Russian industries are not able to make their sales,” says John Kennedy, a research leader at Rand.
Sanctions bite
There are signs that Russia’s steel sector is also hurting.
Andrey Gartung, chief executive of the Chelyabinsk Forging and Press Plant, warned last year: “Russian enterprises competing with Chinese ones are holding on by the skin of their teeth.”
Not one to shy away, China has hit back with trade restrictions of its own.
Most notably, Xi reintroduced tariffs on Russian coal in January 2024, two years after the restrictions were first lifted.
This has already hit exports to China, with Milov claiming that the levies are adding to what is the worst crisis for Russia’s coal industry since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The sector’s revenues are expected to plummet by 12pc this year alone.
Elsewhere, China has so far refused to lift a longstanding ban on imports of Russia’s largest agricultural exports – winter wheat and barley. Instead, it buys from Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
What China does import from Russia, it gets incredibly cheaply because it has a monopoly as one of Russia’s only buyers, says Milov.
Russia’s biggest exports to China are oil and gas, which combined make up two thirds of its trade.
Igor Sechin, Rosneft’s chief executive, said that between January 2022 and June 2024, China’s savings from purchasing Russian oil compared to Middle Eastern exports amounted to as much as $18bn.
“Taking the sanctions away, Russia is what Beijing would want every trading partner to look like,” says Gregor Sebastian, of Rhodium’s China Corporate Advisory team.
“China is importing raw materials that it produces into manufactured goods that it can then resell at much higher profit margins back to Russia. That is the main bulk of the relationship.”
However, more than anything, Russia wants new technology and investment from China. And it is not getting it.
Joint projects stall
The average annual flow of Chinese investment into Russia has plummeted from an average of $1.2bn from 2011 to $400m, says Milov.
In 2022, China dropped Russia from its Belt and Road financing programme, while in July, China’s commerce ministry “strongly advised” carmakers against investing in Russia.
Many major projects that were previously announced with Chinese backing have now been scrapped or are on hold.
Russia quietly disappeared from what was supposed to be a joint development of a long-haul aircraft with the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China.
Work had already begun on the project, initially called the CR929, which stood for “China Russia”. However, the R has now been dropped, with the aircraft renamed as the C929.
Plans for Chinese CRRC Changchun Railway Vehicles to build a high-speed rail line between Moscow and Kazan in south-west Russia have also been paused.
Separately, there has been no progress on the development of the Tianjin oil refinery, a joint venture between Rosneft and the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which was approved in 2014.
After the meeting between Putin and Xi in September, Gazprom announced that the two countries had signed a deal to build a “Power of Siberia 2” gas pipeline to China.
But while this would no doubt prove to be a huge victory for Russia, China has yet to confirm the project.
This may be a sign that, for all the pomp and ceremony, the countries’ authoritarian alliance may be weaker than it appears.
“Despite all these hugs and kisses at summits, China and Russia are very much far apart,” says Milov.
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