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中國軍事力量篇 -- 開欄文：中國第四艘航母將使用核能為動力 --- A. Mendelson
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瀏覽3,472 ｜回應21｜推薦1 |
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以這篇報導做為開欄文。此外，請參見《中國軍力及戰備一瞥》讀後一欄的三篇貼文。
China building supercarrier to rival US
China building supercarrier to rival US
Nuclear-powered warship will match capability of USS Gerald R Ford
Allegra Mendelson, 03/03/25
China is developing a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier which would be larger and more advanced than any existing vessel in its fleet, in an attempt to keep pace with the US navy.
The new supercarrier would allow fighter jets to be launched from four parts of the flight deck, as opposed to its current ships which can only facilitate three, according to new satellite imagery reviewed by NBC News.
That would match the capability of USS Gerald R. Ford, the largest and most advanced aircraft carrier in the US navy.
Images from the Dalian shipbuilding facility in north-east China show tracks or trenches in the snow, which appear to be related to a new catapult launch system.
The tracks in the snow at the Dalian facility, which may be linked to a new catapult launch system - Maxar Technologies 請至原網頁觀看照片
Analysts said that while the images don’t show construction under way just yet, they are an indication that China is moving forward with its ambitious plans.
“We think this is them testing equipment and layouts for the upcoming Type 04 carrier,” Michael Duitsman, a researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in the US, told NBC.
China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, was commissioned in 2012 and its second, the Shandong, was launched in 2017. Both use the “ski-jump” method, which involves a ramp at the end of a short runway to propel the planes upward.
The Dalian shipbuilding facility where a new nuclear-powered carrier could be developed - Maxar Technologies請至原網頁觀看照片
The country’s third and most advanced carrier to date, the Fujian, launched in 2022 and was upgraded with electromagnetic catapults, which are more similar to the systems used onboard US ships.
All three of China’s carriers are conventionally powered, unlike the upcoming one, which experts believe would be powered by a nuclear reactor given its size and capacity.
The tracks seen in the latest satellite images run at convergent angles, which experts say resemble the configuration of existing American supercarriers that have four electromagnetic catapults.
Mr Duitsman said that it seems likely that China’s new carrier would resemble the USS Gerald R. Ford.
The USS Gerald R. Ford is the largest and most advanced aircraft carrier in the US navy - US NAVY/ERIK HILDEBRANDT HANDOUT
China already has the largest navy in the world, with 370 military vessels, but America, with 291 vessels, has more big ships.
The Gerald Ford is one of 11 supercarriers in the US navy.
Rumours have circulated for years that China is preparing to build a Type 04 carrier. However, Beijing has refused to confirm any reports and very little information has been made public.
The USS Gerald R Ford can launch jets from four places on the carrier’s deck, while China’s Fujian, third and most advanced carrier to date, can only launch from three請至原網頁觀看照片
Last November, analysts at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in the US revealed that China had built a land-based prototype nuclear reactor for a large surface warship.
Until the satellite images from Dalian, this was the first and only piece of evidence that Beijing was developing a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.
China has not commented on the latest reports about its plans for a supercarrier. However, last March, Yuan Huazhi, the political commissar of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army navy, told the state-backed Global Times that there was no bottleneck in China’s aircraft carrier technologies and development was progressing smoothly.
At the time, Yuan also said that more information would be made available “soon”, but little has been heard from Beijing since.
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本文於 修改第 12 次
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中國海上長城之千船大陣 ----- Inquirer.net
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請參考：
* The Dangers From China's Fishing Fleets
* 《中國海軍艦艇的數量、品質、與戰場存活率》(本欄2025/09/27，作者諾雅先生)
* 《中國建造巨型登陸駁船》(該欄2025/04/05，作者戴維斯先生)
* 中國漁船屢大規模集結東海 專家疑為侵台演練一環
* 專題報告：中共海上民兵對國安影響及因應措施
如下文結尾時舒格特先生所說：「中國政府的真正企圖我不得而知；但這些行為至少顯示：中國政府正在充份準備，並展現出她在2027進行武裝統一的宣示，並非虛聲恫嚇」。
至於這些「準備」和「能力」是否足以赫阻美國政府，威迫她大軍勿動，只作壁上觀，那是習總需要傷腦筋的問題了。
Thousands of Chinese boats mass at sea, raising questions
Inquirer.net, 03/13/26
Infographic with maps of the East China Sea, showing geometric formations of about 2,000 Chinese fishing boats on December 25, 2025 and about 1,000 on January 11, 2026 detected via the vessels’ automatic identification systems, a GPS-type signal that commercial ships use to avoid collisions, based on data analyzed by Agence France-Presse —GRAPHIC BY SABRINA BLANCHARD AND PATRICIO ARANA / AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE 東海地區資訊圖(照片與地圖)
TAIPEI, Taiwan — Thousands of Chinese fishing boats have been massing in geometric formations in the East China Sea, in coordinated actions that experts believe are part of Beijing’s preparations for a potential regional crisis or conflict.
Monitoring ship-tracking data on Christmas Day, Jason Wang could tell something “unusual” was underway as fishing boats swarmed into two parallel inverted Ls, each about 400 kilometers long.
Wang could see the roughly 2,000 fishing boats among the many thousands of vessels that ply the busy waterway through their automatic identification systems (AIS)—a GPS-type signal that commercial ships use to avoid collisions.
The vessels, which were as close as 500 meters to each other, held their positions for about 30 hours in near gale-force winds and then suddenly scattered.
“Something didn’t look right to me because in nature very rarely do you see straight lines,” said Wang, chief operating officer of ingeniSPACE, which analyses satellite imagery and ship signals data.
“We’ve seen like two, 300, up to a thousand (Chinese fishing boats congregate), but anything exceeding a thousand I thought was unusual.”
Maritime and military experts told Agence France-Presse the massing of Chinese fishing boats on December 25, about 300 kilometers northeast of Taiwan, was on a scale they had never seen before.
Another incident detected in early January involved around 1,000 Chinese fishing vessels clustered in an uneven rectangle, about 400 kilometers long, for more than a day in the same area of the East China Sea.
Hundreds of those vessels were also detected in the December 25 event, Wang told AFP in an interview in Taipei.
Last week, around 1,200 boats massed in two parallel lines further east of the January and December events and held their positions for about 30 hours, Wang said.
China’s massive fishing fleet operates in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and the South China Sea, competing with fishers from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
While there is debate about why so many Chinese fishing vessels would gather in geometric formations in the open sea, experts widely agree that they were not there to fish.
Some experts said the only plausible explanation was that China was testing its ability to marshal a large number of fishing vessels that could potentially be deployed in a military operation, such as a blockade or invasion of Taiwan, or a crisis with Japan.
“I’ve never seen a massing of Chinese fishing boats in these numbers anywhere outside of port ever,” Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said of the December 25 event.
The maneuvers were a “demonstration with a military lens” to show those watching that the boats had the ability to coordinate their movements, said Jennifer Parker, a former Australian naval warfare officer.
“I‘ve sailed around the entire world, and I‘ve not seen fishermen operating in that proximity to each other, in that degree of concentration,” said Parker, now an Expert Associate at the National Security College of the Australian National University.
‘They’re definitely not fishing’
Global Fishing Watch chief scientist David Kroodsma said the Chinese fishing fleet was “highly coordinated” and it was possible that the vessels were ordered not to fish in a certain area.
“Most of the time when you see lines of boats, it’s because they’re right up against some boundary where they‘re not allowed to be. In this region, that’s what you see most of the time,” Kroodsma said.
”If you look across the year, you see many, many examples of when there’s clearly a line that they’re not supposed to fish across at different time periods. We don’t know why.
‘State operation’
AFP’s reporting for this story involved the analysis of AIS data and nighttime satellite imagery, and interviews with experts from ingeniSPACE, Starboard Maritime Intelligence, CSIS and Global Fishing Watch, who also observed the December and January formations.
Unseenlabs, a French company specializing in maritime surveillance, verified the December 25 data for AFP, describing the concentration of vessels as “surprising and unusual”.
The experts were confident that the majority of the vessels were real and not spoofed, which is when AIS data is manipulated to give misleading information about a vessel’s location or identity.
“We’ve had enough other corroborating data… to confirm that those vessels were clearly out there,” Poling said.
As part of his efforts to verify the data, Mark Douglas, a former New Zealand naval officer and now a maritime domain analyst at Starboard, said he examined fishing patterns in the same area over the previous two years.
“At no time has the behavior been the same as this,” Douglas said. “During other periods of adverse weather, the vessels returned to port, rather than massing offshore in these kinds of formations.”
“I can’t speak to the why… but the how certainly seems to be that there was direction provided to these vessels that this is what they needed to do,” Douglas said.
The number of vessels involved indicated a “state operation”, said Thomas Shugart, a former US Navy submarine warfare officer and now an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security.
“There’s no commercial entity that controls that many fishing boats that I know of,” Shugart said.
‘Maritime militia’
China‘s navy ranks number one in the world in terms of the number of warships and submarines on the Global Firepower list.
Beijing is also tapping its huge civilian fleet, including fishing boats, ferries, and cargo ships, as part of its preparations for a regional crisis or conflict, including over Taiwan, experts say.
China has threatened to use force, if necessary, to seize Taiwan, which it claims is part of its territory, and US officials have flagged 2027 as a possible timeline for an attack.
In its 2025 report to Congress on China’s military power, the US Department of Defense said: “The PLA continues to make steady progress toward its 2027 goals” and “China expects to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan” by the end of that year.
Beijing has stepped up military pressure on Taiwan in recent years, deploying fighter jets and warships around the island on an almost daily basis.
China has also held multiple large-scale exercises around Taiwan that are often described as rehearsals for a blockade and seizure of the territory.
Civilian vessels were “absolutely central” to Chinese military planning for an operation against Taiwan, said Shugart.
China’s navy does not have enough landing vessels to deliver the troops and equipment it would need to make an invasion of Taiwan feasible.
“In the absence of that dual-purpose, civil-military maritime mass, I don’t think they can invade Taiwan,” Shugart said. “With that, (it) turns into a ‘maybe they can’.’
Many of the fishing boats involved in the December and January massing events were likely part of China’s maritime militia, some experts said.
The maritime militia is made up of fishing boats trained to support the military and the fleet has been used to assert China’s territorial claims, including in the South China Sea where they have swarmed contested reefs.
AIS data showed the “vast majority” of vessels congregating in the East China Sea appeared to be from the eastern province of Zhejiang, where several maritime militia ports are located, said Poling.
“Like militia on land in China, they get called up from time to time for reserve service,” Poling said.
“My guess is that this was an effort to just see if the militia could muster. These are civilians, these are not the professional militia in the South China Sea, they’re fishermen,” he said.
Maritime militia would have a “range of roles” in a military operation, said Parker, such as harassing warships or acting as decoys for missiles fired by opposing forces, though she noted their presence could also interfere with China’s own ability to hit targets.
“It’s clear that China’s operations planning in the South China Sea and around Taiwan include the maritime militia as a force multiplier,” she said.
“It‘s reasonable to assume that this would also be the case in the event of a military crisis with Japan.”
Threats of retaliation
The maritime militia’s role in the South China Sea has expanded beyond swarming reefs to helping the Chinese coastguard in “blocking and harassing” Philippine fishing boats and even using water cannon against Filipino fishermen, Philippine Coast Guard spokesman Jay Tarriela said.
“They don’t have covert roles anymore,” Tarriela said.
“They’re actually part of the (Chinese) government, a flotilla, advancing their illegal interests in the South China Sea.”
Beijing has not publicly commented on the fishing boat formations in the East China Sea.
Japan’s coast guard declined to comment when contacted by AFP. Tokyo is involved in a deepening spat with Beijing after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi suggested that Japan would intervene militarily if China sought to take Taiwan by force.
Responding to China’s grey zone activities—coercive actions that fall short of an act of war—or military operations in the region is “really hard”, a diplomat told AFP on the condition of anonymity.
“China often threatens or implies retaliation—what is often unclear,” the diplomat said.
Experts said the fishing boat maneuvers were consistent with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s overall aim of preparing the military so it could potentially seize Taiwan.
“I can’t tell you if Xi Jinping’s going to decide to pull the trigger or not,” said Shugart.
“But as an analyst, it sure looks like the PLA is, as directed, developing the capabilities required to credibly threaten an invasion in 2027.” /cb
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潛艇戰山雨欲來之調研船出海 - Pete Mckenzie
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China maps ocean floor as it prepares for submarine warfare with US
Pete Mckenzie, Reuters, 03/24/26
SYDNEY — China is conducting a vast undersea mapping and monitoring operation across the Pacific, Indian and Arctic oceans, building detailed knowledge of marine conditions that naval experts say would be crucial for waging submarine warfare against the United States and its allies.
In one example, the Dong Fang Hong 3, a research vessel operated by Ocean University of China, spent 2024 and 2025 sailing back and forth in the seas near Taiwan and the U.S. stronghold of Guam, and around strategic stretches of the Indian Ocean, ship-tracking data reviewed by Reuters shows.
In October 2024, it checked on a set of powerful Chinese ocean sensors capable of identifying undersea objects near Japan, according to Ocean University, and visited the same area again last May. And in March 2025, it criss-crossed the waters between Sri Lanka and Indonesia, covering approaches to the Malacca Strait, a critical chokepoint for maritime commerce.
According to the university, the ship was carrying out mud surveys and climate research. But a scientific paper co-written by Ocean University academics shows it has also conducted extensive deep-sea mapping.
Naval-warfare experts and U.S. Navy officials say the type of deep-sea data being collected by the Dong Fang Hong 3 – via mapping and placement of sensors in the ocean – is giving China a picture of the subsea conditions it would need to deploy its submarines more effectively and hunt down those of its adversaries.
Dong Fang Hong 3, a deep-sea research vessel, docks at a pier in Qingdao, Shandong province, China. (cnsphoto via Reuters) 照片
The Dong Fang Hong 3 isn’t operating alone. It is part of a broader ocean mapping and monitoring operation involving dozens of research vessels and hundreds of sensors.
In tracing this effort, Reuters examined Chinese government and university records, including journal articles and scientific studies, and analyzed more than five years of movement by 42 research vessels active in the Pacific, Indian or Arctic oceans using a ship-tracking platform built by New Zealand company Starboard Maritime Intelligence.
While the research has civilian purposes – some of the surveying covers fishing grounds or areas where China has mineral prospecting contracts – it also serves a military one, according to nine naval-warfare experts who reviewed Reuters’ findings.
To gather information about underwater terrain, research vessels map the sea floor while traveling back and forth in tight lines. The tracking data shows that type of movement by the vessels Reuters tracked across large sections of the Pacific, Indian and Arctic oceans.
At least eight of the vessels Reuters tracked have conducted seabed mapping, while another 10 have carried equipment used for mapping, according to a review of Chinese state media articles, vessel descriptions published by Chinese universities, and press releases by government organizations.
The vessels’ survey data “would be potentially invaluable in preparation of the battlespace” for Chinese submarines, said Peter Scott, a former chief of Australia’s submarine force. “Any military submariner worth his salt will put a great deal of effort into understanding the environment he’s operating in.”
The ship-tracking data show that China’s seabed-surveying effort is focused in part on militarily important waters around the Philippines, near Guam and Hawaii, and near U.S. military facilities on Wake atoll in the north Pacific.
“The scale of what they’re doing is about more than just resources,” said Jennifer Parker, an adjunct professor of defense and security at the University of Western Australia and former Australian anti-submarine warfare officer. “If you look at the sheer extent of it, it’s very clear that they intend to have an expeditionary blue-water naval capability that also is built around submarine operations.”
Moreover, Parker and other experts added, even where data is gathered for scientific purposes, the integration of civilian scientific research and military technology development has become a key focus of the Chinese government under President Xi Jinping. Beijing refers to this approach as “civil-military fusion.”
China’s ministries of defense, foreign affairs and natural resources didn’t respond to requests for comment about the seabed mapping and ocean-monitoring activities.
The U.S. Defense Department didn’t respond to questions from Reuters
Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarines USS Annapolis and USS Asheville in formation off the coast of Guam, Dec. 17, 2025. (Lt. James Caliva/U.S. Navy) 照片
In testimony to a congressional commission this month, Rear Admiral Mike Brookes, the commander of the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, said China had dramatically expanded its surveying efforts, providing data that “enables submarine navigation, concealment, and positioning of seabed sensors or weapons.”
He added that “potential military intelligence collection” by Chinese research vessels “represents a strategic concern.”
America recently overhauled its own efforts to map and monitor the ocean, but it typically does so with military vessels that are allowed to turn off the tracking system monitored by civilian software. China’s civilian survey ships also sometimes disable tracking, meaning its campaign may go further than Reuters could determine.
This is the first time the extent of China’s mapping and monitoring across the Pacific, Indian and Arctic oceans has been reported. Previous reporting has revealed a portion of the effort around Guam and Taiwan, and in parts of the Indian Ocean.
“It is frankly astonishing to see the enormous scale of Chinese marine scientific research,” said Ryan Martinson, an associate professor specializing in Chinese maritime strategy at the U.S. Naval War College.
“For decades, the U.S. Navy could assume an asymmetric advantage in its knowledge of the ocean battlespace,” added Martinson. China’s efforts “threaten to erode that advantage. It is obviously deeply concerning.”
‘PARANOID ABOUT BEING BOXED IN’
The data that Chinese research vessels are collecting about the seabed and water conditions is critical to submarine operations and anti-submarine warfare, according to naval experts. Most obviously, said Australian defense scholar Parker, commanders need information about underwater terrain to avoid collisions and hide their vessels.
But that data is also essential for detecting submarines, which operate within a few hundred meters of the surface. Typically, submarines are identified through the sounds they emit or echoes from signals sent by sonar systems.
Tom Shugart, a former U.S. submarine commander who is now an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, said the movement of those sound waves changes depending on the underwater landscape.
Sound waves and submarine movements are also affected by water temperature, salinity and currents.
The vessels involved belong to Chinese state entities like the Ministry of Natural Resources or state-affiliated research institutions like Ocean University, whose president in 2021 publicly celebrated its “close ties” to China’s navy and commitment to “the construction of a maritime power and national defense.” The university didn’t respond to a request for comment.
China has done its most comprehensive ocean surveying east of the Philippines, which sits along the First Island Chain, the string of territories largely controlled by America’s allies that runs from the Japanese islands in the north through Taiwan and on to Borneo in the south. The chain forms a natural barrier between China’s coastal seas and the Pacific.
“They’re paranoid about being boxed in to the First Island Chain,” said Peter Leavy, formerly Australia’s naval attache to the U.S. and now president of the Australian Naval Institute. China’s mapping “indicates a desire to understand the maritime domain so they can break out.”
The tracking data shows that China’s mapping also covers waters surrounding Guam – where some American nuclear submarines are stationed.
Strikingly, Chinese vessels have also mapped waters around Hawaii, one of America’s other regional military hubs; examined an underwater ridge north of a naval base in Papua New Guinea to which the U.S. recently gained access; and scouted around Christmas Island, an Australian territory on a route between the South China Sea and a vital Australian submarine base.
China’s efforts extend further. It has mapped large swaths of the Indian Ocean, a critical route for Chinese imports of oil and other resources from the Middle East and Africa.
“China has some key vulnerabilities when it comes to dependencies on maritime trade,” said Parker, the former anti-submarine warfare officer. The surveying “indicates that they will likely be conducting more submarine operations in the Indian Ocean.”
Shipping vessels and oil tankers line up on the eastern coast of Singapore, July 22, 2015. (Reuters) 照片
China’s vessels have also mapped the seabed west and north of Alaska, an essential sea route into the Arctic. Beijing has identified the Arctic as a strategic frontier and declared its ambition to become a polar great power by the 2030s.
The extensive surveying and Beijing’s growing undersea capability are “symptomatic of China’s rise as a premier maritime power,” said Shugart, the former submarine commander.
A ‘TRANSPARENT OCEAN’
Around 2014, Wu Lixin, a scientist at Ocean University, proposed an ambitious effort to create a “transparent ocean” by deploying sensors that would give China a comprehensive view of water conditions and movement through specific areas, according to a statement published by the state-affiliated Chinese Academy of Sciences. The proposal quickly received at least $85 million in support from the Shandong provincial government, according to comments by Shandong officials.
The project began in the South China Sea, where Ocean University public statements boast it has now built an observation system covering the deep-sea basin.
Brookes, the director of the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, told the congressional commission that China is building undersea surveillance networks that “gather hydrographic data – water temperature, salinity, currents – to optimize sonar performance and enable persistent surveillance of submarines transiting critical waterways like the South China Sea.”
After surveying the South China Sea, Chinese scientists expanded the transparent ocean project to the Pacific and Indian oceans. In the Pacific, records from the Chinese Ministry of Natural Resources, Ocean University and the Shandong government show that China has deployed hundreds of sensors, buoys and subsea arrays to detect changes in water conditions like temperature, salinity and subsea movement through the ocean east of Japan, east of the Philippines, and around Guam.
In the Indian Ocean, documents from the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Ministry of Natural Resources describe a sensor array ringing India and Sri Lanka, including along an underwater mountain range known as Ninety East Ridge. The ridge – which Chinese vessels have also combed, according to the Starboard data – is one of the world’s longest undersea mountain ranges and sits astride the approach to the strategically essential Malacca Strait, through which much of China’s oil supply passes.
Ocean University and the Institute of Oceanology, which is part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, have said the wider network of sensors now provides China with real-time data about water conditions and subsea movements.
Some naval-warfare experts expressed caution about that claim, given technical challenges with real-time communication of data from underwater. But even delayed data is valuable, Parker said, as it could help China detect U.S. submarine operations.
Many sensors are placed in sensitive locations. For example, Reuters recently reported on a U.S. effort to fortify a key strait between Taiwan and the Philippines to cut off Chinese access to the Pacific. Ocean University studies show that China has deployed advanced sensors in parts of the strait through which U.S. submarines would move to reach the South China Sea.
Chinese scientists say these sensors monitor changes in climate and ocean conditions. But in 2017, government officials from Shandong province said the transparent ocean project was intended to “ensure maritime defense and security” and explicitly compared the project with a U.S. military effort to build an American ocean-sensor network.
Shandong’s government, the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Oceanology didn’t respond to requests for comment.
Mapping-program founder Wu now oversees the network through the Qingdao National Laboratory for Marine Science and Technology, whose partners include China’s Naval Submarine Academy, according to the academy’s website. Wu didn’t respond to Reuters questions.
‘NEW TYPES OF COMBAT CAPABILITIES’
Together, China’s mapping and monitoring give it sophisticated tools to detect rival submarines and deploy its own in some of the world’s most contested waters.
“This is a manifestation of China’s far-seas reach,” said Collin Koh, a senior fellow in maritime security at Singapore’s RSIS Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. “They now have a reasonably good picture of the maritime domain they hope to operate in, either in peacetime or in war.”
Chinese researchers, similarly, see strategic value in their work. Zhou Chun, an Ocean University researcher who oversees the Indian and Pacific ocean sensor arrays, was quoted last year in an Ocean University press release as saying that his work had shown him “the rapid development of my country’s maritime defense and military capabilities.” He didn’t respond to Reuters questions.
Going forward, Zhou pledged to “transform the most advanced scientific and technological achievements into new types of combat capabilities for our military at sea.”
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中國超音速飛彈多久到美國？ - Asad Kashif
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請參看本欄上一篇。請注意下文的最後一段：
如果你在美國叫披薩當午餐時，中國同時按下東風5C超音速飛彈發送鍵，飛彈會比披薩先到你家。
How Fast Can A Hypersonic Missile Launched In China Reach The US?
Asad Kashif, 02/16/26
Technological advancements are a double edged-sword. Telecommunication and fast transport through airplanes have made life much more convenient, and medical advancements have made conditions easier to treat. However, that same science is used to create weapons of mass destruction that can potentially leave everlasting stains on human history. A hypersonic missile is one of the scariest, being able to traverse the globe faster than sound.
Hypersonic missiles move at five times the speed of sound, meaning they can go over Mach 5 (3,836 miles per hour). Most commercial airplanes are slower than Mach 1, making such high speeds impossible to comprehend. China has a number of terrifying technologies at its disposal — such as its large aircraft carrier with a 100 drone capacity or high-powered drone-frying microwave – but even a simple missile is more than a significant threat. If China suddenly targeted U.S. soil, how fast would a hypersonic missile land, and would we even have enough time to intercept it?
To answer, we'd need to calculate wind turbulence, the angle of projection, the curvature of the earth, gravity, and additional factors that require a group of engineers. Fortunately, we don't need all that to get a good estimate. We can just use the formula for speed, distance, and time: Time = Distance/Speed. Generally, it can take anywhere from around an hour to less than 20 minutes, depending on certain factors.
Hypersonic missiles to Hawaii, Seattle, and New York
China's DF-17 hypersonic missile flying in front of the Chinese flag in the background - Mr Changezi/Shutterstock 東風-17 造型
China has many different weapons with varying speeds and distances. For this calculation, we'll use the DF-27A due to its high maneuverability and relatively fast speed –- though China has faster missiles around.
We can assume the missile originates from China's Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center in Shanxi which is 5,130 miles to Hawaii, 5,650 miles to Seattle, and 7,080 miles to New York. The DF-27A is said to reach average speeds of around Mach 8.6, which means it can cover 6,598 miles in an hour. Plugging these numbers into the formula, the missile would take 47 minutes to reach Hawaii, 51 to Seattle, and 64 to New York from mainland China.
Keep in mind that these only account for a specific scenario, though. If China chose to target an island like Guam — just 2,676 miles away from Shanxi — the missile will reach in just 24 minutes. If China launches it from a coastal city like Fuzou — where the distance to Guam becomes just 1,864 miles — it'll only take 17 minutes for the missile to hit.
Is it possible for China to attack the U.S. with a hypersonic missile?
A metallic hypersonic missile with red accents flying above clouds - Alexyz3d/Getty Images 超音速飛彈高於雲端照片
Even if China could send a hypersonic missile at America out of the blue, our theoretical experiment isn't as simple as it seems. China is fully capable of attacking certain U.S. cities, but an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) like the DF-27 simply isn't built for such distances. The missile could still hit Guam or other remote islands, but it can't travel further away in Central America.
This doesn't mean that China can't target Central American cities, though, just that a hypersonic missile like the DF-27 wouldn't be what they use. High-supersonic Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) like the DF-31, the DF-41, and the DF-5C can all travel much further, with DF-5C specifically having global access. The DF-27 is considered more of a threat because of its use of a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) that is significantly harder to predict the path of – something that might become even scarier with China getting access to better NVIDIA AI chips.
A DF-5C nuclear warhead would take less than half the time to the American mainland as a DF-27. Resources estimate its speed at tens of Mach, with some claiming it can reach Mach 22. At Mach 22, it'll take 6 minutes to reach Guam, 19 minutes to Hawaii, 20 minutes to Seattle, and 25 minutes to New York. If you order pizza at the same time China presses launch, the missile will likely reach first.
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中國需要長程轟炸機的原因 -- Hamza Farooq
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Why Does China Want a B-2-Like Bomber if It Has Superior Missiles?
A simple explanation.
Hamza Farooq, 01/28/26
For those who don’t know, China is currently working on its own B-2-like stealth bomber, the H-20. It has been in development since 2016, and based on all initial, unverified, and open-source information available, it’s believed to be at par with its American counterpart in all technological aspects, if not superior in some.
And it is now also a well-recognized fact that China, as well as Russia, are much ahead of the US in the hypersonic missiles race.
So, you might naturally think that whatever a stealth bomber can target, Chinese missiles can target as well. This naturally begs the question: why is China so obsessed with developing a bomber? What is the need? Why not rely on its superior missile program alone in case of a conflict? After all, both have the same purpose.
Well, you are right, but only partially. This is because there’s a solid reason why a bomber is preferable over missiles for China in a potential conflict. And to understand that reason, we need to look at the scenario in which China will most likely deploy it.
That scenario is China’s push to break what it calls “its containment in the Pacific”. It’s about the South China Sea and beyond.
The US has long pursued a strategy based on the concept of island chains. It means that the US-friendly island nations and archipelagos to China’s east could potentially host US military bases. For instance, Japan and the Philippines, which are just 1,000 kilometers away from the Chinese coast, already host such bases. And if you go 3,000 further east, you will find Guam, a US-controlled island with massive strategic military installations.
The purpose of this strategy is to block the Chinese navy’s access to the open ocean in case of any conflict in the region. This strategy works because of the natural choke points between the islands where US bases are present. Just as Iran can block the Strait of Hormuz and restrict the Gulf’s oil exports, the US could theoretically block the sea lanes between these islands and restrict Chinese naval movement.
The Island Chain Strategy: Pictorial Description. Image Link. 「第一島鏈」地圖
For China, this would be a huge military and economic setback, and this is where the need for such bombers arises.
China needs a stealth bomber that can take off, penetrate defenses, and bomb key US military bases on these islands in case of a blockade, thereby securing unrestricted movement in the ocean beyond.
Having understood this, now comes the answer to the question of why to use bombers and not just advanced missiles.
The truth is that bombers offer specific advantages that missiles alone cannot.
The foremost reason is the volatility of the situation around China. If China and the US were to have a direct confrontation, it could escalate to a nuclear war or a scenario like the Cuban Missile Crisis. Having a bomber, however, reduces that risk. Here’s how.
If missiles are launched, they can never be called back. But if the weapons are carried by a stealth bomber, they can be called back any time until they are released from their carrier.
So, if the US ever backs down during a crisis, China would have a short but very useful window to de-escalate in real time rather than being locked into an irreversible strike.
Secondly, missiles are expensive and less effective if the target is mobile, like a warship or an aircraft carrier, for instance. In such a scenario, bombers excel. They can even conduct follow-up strikes if initial bomb or missile drops miss their target.
And thirdly, stealth bombers are extremely stealthy. In fact, they’re so stealthy that they rely almost entirely on this quality; they have few other defence mechanisms against hostile aircraft. They primarily defend themselves by simply not showing on enemy radar. And this is what makes them a better option than missiles in some cases.
A missile can be detected, intercepted, and even its path can be predicted. A stealth bomber, on the other hand, is largely free of these vulnerabilities.
So, in essence, China feels the need to develop its own B-2-like bomber to prepare for potential military confrontations that demand the proactivity, adaptability, and stealth that its advanced missiles cannot provide.
Written by Hamza Farooq
I envisage a world governed by rules and moral values. But I analyze everything through a realistic lens. Freelance Work: hamzafcontent@gmail.com
I’m available for freelance work. If you need SEO-optimized, high-ranking content on geopolitics, international affairs, or political analysis, connect with me via email or Upwork.
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Published in The Geopolitical Economist
In The Global geopolitics, truth is one, but the wise interpret it differently.— Here, we interpret these diversions
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美國國防部的中國軍力評估 -- Jason Swensen
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Why does the Pentagon believe China’s military buildup makes U.S. ‘increasingly vulnerable’?
Defense Department report asserts China’s ambition to displace US as globe’s most powerful nation
Jason Swensen, 01/02/26
Even as today’s military-related headlines focus largely on developments in Venezuela, America’s defense community is keeping an unblinking eye on China.
On Wednesday, China’s People’s Liberation Army completed two days of military exercises in the waters off Taiwan.
The maneuvers were likely aimed at asserting its sovereignty over the island just days after the United States announced a package of arms sales to Taiwan — a move criticized sharply by Beijing, according to the Associated Press.
And last week, the Department of Defense released its annual update on the Chinese military, asserting that the Asian nation’s historic military building “has made the U.S. homeland increasingly vulnerable.”
“China maintains a large and growing arsenal of nuclear, maritime, conventional long-range strike, cyber, and space capabilities able to directly threaten Americans’ security,” the report noted.
“In 2024, Chinese cyberespionage campaigns such as Volt Typhoon burrowed into U.S. critical infrastructure, demonstrating capabilities that could disrupt the U.S. military in a conflict and harm American interests.”
For decades, China’s People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, has marshaled resources, technology and political will to achieve its vision of a world-class military. “The PLA is a key component of China’s ambition to displace the United States as the world’s most powerful nation,” according to the DOD report.
“The PLA measures its concepts and capabilities against the ‘strong enemy’ of the United States. Moreover, China’s top military strategy focuses squarely on overcoming the United States through a whole-of-nation mobilization effort that Beijing terms ‘national total war’.”
‘Projecting power worldwide’
China’s current military focus, according to the lengthy DOD report, is the First Island Chain that stretches from the Japanese archipelago to the Malay Peninsula in southwest Asia. The region is the “strategic center of gravity” for its regional goals.
The DOD’s China/military report to Congress states, optimistically, that under President Donald Trump’s leadership, relations between the U.S. and China are “stronger than they have been in many years” — adding that the department plans to build on those positive signs, focusing on stability and de-escalation.
At the same time, the report added, America’s military is “always ready and able” to defend U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.
“We do not seek to strangle, dominate, or humiliate China.
“Rather, as laid out in President Trump’s National Security Strategy, we seek only to deny the ability of any country in the Indo-Pacific to dominate us or our allies. That means being so strong that aggression is not even considered, and that peace is therefore preferred and preserved.”
Trump is expected to meet with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, next April in Beijing. In turn, Trump invited Xi to the White House for a state visit later in 2026.
In a Truth Social post last month, Trump wrote: “Our relationship with China is extremely strong!”
China’s intent for Taiwan reunification
China’s central goal — at least in the short term? Reclaiming Taiwan, which it considers a “breakaway province.”
“The PLA continues to make steady progress toward its 2027 goals, whereby the PLA must be able to achieve ‘strategic decisive victory’ over Taiwan, ‘strategic counterbalance’ against the United States in the nuclear and other strategic domains, and ‘strategic deterrence and control’ against other regional countries.
“In other words, China expects to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027.”
The PLA’s modernization is propelled by China’s defense spending and technological development.
“Since the first full year of Xi Jinping’s term as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, China’s announced defense budget has nearly doubled,” according to the report.
“China continues to accelerate its development of military technology, including in military artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, and hypersonic missiles.”
China’s tenuous partnership with Russia
The DOD report also identified a deepening strategic partnership between China and Russia, likely driven by shared interest in countering the United States.
That partnership has included combined military exercises and sharing of some military technologies.
But despite continued growth in their relationship, Beijing and Moscow remain unwilling to establish a formal defense alliance with mutual security guarantees, the DOD report asserts.
“China and Russia continue to harbor a mutual distrust of each other, which likely prevents cooperation on areas each side perceives as sensitive. China also has stopped short of providing Russia with lethal aid for use in its war against Ukraine.”
Countering the U.S. through AI, critical technologies — and targeting intelligence
The DOD’s report also emphasized China’s aggressive efforts to achieve global leadership in science and technology — focusing on emerging technologies such as AI, biotechnology, quantum technology, advanced semiconductors, and advanced energy generation and storage.
“China believes that advances in AI technology will be critical to a new round of industrial change and the next revolution in military affairs,” according to the report.
“However, in 2024, China’s AI sector remained constrained by its limited access to high-performance AI accelerators.”
The country, the DOD report noted, is now utilizing a series of strategies to overcome such limits.
Additionally, the PLS is developing and employing “a vast array of intelligence collection capabilities” to enhance its military readiness — targeting U.S. intellectual property and defense technology.
“China has a multi-faceted approach to undermining the U.S. through covert operations and clandestine actions — including economic espionage, cyber-intrusions, and the use of illegal agents.
“These activities, combined with China’s substantial investments in its military and intelligence apparatus, reveal a long-term strategy of preparing to counter the United States.”
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九月槍影：閱兵之舞機弄飛彈 - John S. Van Oudenaren
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這篇文章雖然有些老、舊，信息量還值得存檔備查；轉載於此。正文內之中譯為作者手筆；轉換為繁體則是編者下的指令。
Guns of September: What a Parade May Reveal About China’s Military Modernization
John S. Van Oudenaren, China Brief Notes, 08/28/25
Executive Summary:
* The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) upcoming military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII will serve as both a symbolic display and an operational exercise, highlighting the PLA’s advancements in new combat domains—such as unmanned systems, directed energy, and electronic warfare—while also revealing improvements in command structure and organizational capacity. The parade aims to underscore loyalty to Xi Jinping as central to combat readiness, even as recent purges expose deep institutional instability and a persistent “trust deficit” between the CCP and the PLA. These tensions underscore the regime’s challenge in balancing political control with genuine military professionalization.
* The PLA will use the parade to demonstrate its growing joint capabilities, showcasing an integrated “Four Services + Four Arms” model and the role of new branches like the Aerospace and Cyberspace Forces. The involvement of militia units and strategic strike formations further emphasizes the whole-of-force approach underpinning China’s military modernization trajectory.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is finalizing plans for its massive 80th anniversary commemoration of victory in the “Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression” (中國人民抗日戰爭) and “World Anti-Fascist War” (世界反法西斯戰爭) (People’s Daily, June 25). The event, to be held in Beijing on September 3, will feature a troop review and speech by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi Jinping. Global attention will likely fixate on the long columns of entirely domestically produced armored vehicles, missiles, and warplanes rolling through Tiananmen Square, highlighting the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) growing firepower (China Daily, June 24; Xinhua, June 25). The parade will also contain important indications about PLA command structure, organizational capacity, and operational readiness.
New Combat Forces on Display
In addition to traditional weapons and equipment, the parade will showcase “new combat forces” (新型作戰力量), according to Major General Wu Zeke (吳澤棵), deputy director of the Military Parade Leading Group Office and deputy director general of the CMC Joint Staff Department’s Operations Bureau. Speaking at a June 24 state press conference on the planning for the commemoration, he said that this would reflect the PLA’s “strong ability to adapt to the scientific and technological developments and the evolution of conflict to win future wars” (適應科技發展和戰爭形態演變、打贏未來戰爭的強大能力) (State Council Information Office (SCIO), June 24). At a follow-up press conference on August 20, Wu detailed additional capabilities that will highlight the PLA’s improving combat capabilities in new domains and technological areas. These are set to include new land, sea, and air unmanned intelligent systems, directed energy weapons, and electronic jamming systems. The PLA will, per Wu, also use the parade to demonstrate its formidable strategic deterrent capability by exhibiting hypersonic, air and missile defenses, and strategic missiles (SCIO, August 20).
Non-Material Indicators of Military Modernization
Beyond a burgeoning arsenal, the parade also will illuminate two less tangible yet equally essential elements of PLA modernization: command structure and organizational capacity. On both counts, it will seek to show it can rise to the mantra of “Toward 100 Years, Toward Victory” (向百年，向勝利), now ubiquitous in PRC propaganda (81.cn; China Military Network, July 25). The slogan reflects increased emphasis under Xi on reaching the goals set by his predecessors; namely, realizing full military modernization by 2035 and becoming a “world-class military” by mid-century. As a steppingstone in these efforts, Xi added the PLA’s centennial in 2027 as a key benchmark for several key elements of military modernization: advancing mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization; modernizing doctrine, organization, personnel management, and technology; maximizing resources; and building a strong defense industrial base (China Brief, March 26, 2021).
At the August 20 briefing, Major General Xu Guizhong (徐貴忠) of the PLA Central Theater Command (解放軍中部戰區) stressed the parade’s operational nature as a test of the force’s organizational capacity, noting that effectively marshaling tens of thousands of troops and hundreds of weapons platforms is like “organizing for a major battle” (如同組織一場戰役) (SCIO, August 20). Indeed, CCTV reported that the second exercise in preparation for the parade on August 16-17 involved 40,000 troops (81.cn, August 17).
Loyalty Remains a Weak Link
At the June press conference, Wu Zeke emphasized the link between political uprightness, loyalty to Xi and the Party, and military effectiveness (SCIO, June 24). He stressed that the parade would showcase the PLA’s “political construction, new force structure, progress in modernization, and achievements in combat readiness” (政治建軍新風貌、力量結構新佈局、現代化建設新進展、備戰打仗新成效), all downstream of “resolutely following the Party’s command” (堅決聽黨指揮). Wu made certain to praise Xi, exclaiming how his leadership enables the PLA to “advance the spirit of the War of Resistance” (弘揚抗戰精神).
Loyalty was a prominent theme again on Army Day (August 1), with a PLA Daily editorial calling for “forging political loyalty” (鑄牢政治忠誠) and fighting the “decisive battle” (攻堅之戰) to achieve the PLA’s centenary goals (PLA Daily, August 1). The article pledges that the PLA will thoroughly implement Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military and the CMC Chairman Responsibility system. The shift over the past decade toward this new system and away from the previous CMC Vice-Chairman Responsibility System reflects Xi’s efforts to centralize organizational control over the PLA, which has enjoyed substantial autonomy throughout the reform era (China Leadership Monitor, July 14). As analysts Joel Wuthnow and Philip Saunders note in China’s Quest for Military Supremacy, Xi has pulled multiple levers to tighten the CCP’s grip on the PLA: re-emphasizing Party work and indoctrination as a part of a broader recommitment to Marxist principals; promoting his personal authority, including through promulgating Xi Jinping Thought in the military; implementing stricter personnel control; and strengthening oversight regimes (Google Books, March 10, 2025).
The Party must manage a careful balancing act between demanding loyalty while allowing the PLA a degree of autonomy on organizational, technical, and even operational matters to achieve modernization. As a result, the scourge of corruption in the military and defense industry persists, and loyalty to the CCP appears to remain conditional, predicated on the PLA’s occupation of a place of privilege in the PRC system (Observer Research Foundation, December 2, 2024). The difficulty of maintaining this balance has been laid bare in the upheaval at the top levels in recent months. The CMC has been decimated by purges, to the extent that only three of six uniformed military seats are now filled, with several members removed or disappeared since 2023, including apparent Xi loyalists, underscoring what K. Tristan Tang describes as Xi’s “trust deficit” with the PLA (China Brief, April 11). [1]
Joint Enough
The upcoming parade is an opportunity for the PLA to show it is sufficiently “joint” to achieve the ambitious goals laid out by Xi’s Thought (CGTN, October 11, 2022). The troop review will seek to demonstrate the PLA’s improving capacity for joint operations that integrate different services, groups, and teams via the new joint command, operations, and support model (SCIO, June 24). At the August 20 press conference, Major General Wu stated the parade reflects the PLA’s new “Four Services + Four Arms” (支軍種+4支兵種) structure (SCIO, August 20). This system was codified on Army Day, when Xi conferred flags on the aerospace, cyberspace, and information support forces established in April 2024, as well as the Joint Logistics Support Force created in 2016 to coordinate logistical support for major military operations (Xinhuanet, September 13, 2016; China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), April 22, 2024; 81.cn, July 31). [2] The elevation of these organizations underscores the PLA’s growing cognizance that the complexity of network-centric warfare requires the adoption of a military structure more akin to a U.S.-style joint force (Defense One, April 28, 2024).
The parade’s equipment formation will be organized according to practical joint combat strategies, including land and maritime combat groups, air and missile defense groups, information combat groups, unmanned combat groups, support groups, and strategic strike groups (SCIO, August 20). The aerial formation will highlight the systematization and rapidly improving combat capabilities of the PLA’s air combat forces (SCIO, June 24). This includes continuing refinement of its division of labor in terms of aerospace operations between the Air Force (bolstered by the recent transfer of former PLA Navy aviation units), the Rocket Force, the Aerospace Force, the remaining PLAN aerial assets, and the PLA Army Aviation and Air Defense Branches (CASI, July 31, 2023, July 2024).
Militia forces also will participate in the parade, an important reminder that the PLA includes not only its services and arms and the People’s Armed Police (including the Coast Guard) but also a large militia (SCIO, June 24).The militia, which is organized by local People’s Armed Forces Departments and includes maritime militia operating in the South China Sea, serves as a reserve and auxiliary force for the PLA (China Brief, March 15).
Conclusion
The operational aspect of the military parade preparations underscores that readiness remains paramount for the PLA. As the scholar Taylor Fravel recently observed, despite the costs to operational readiness of Xi’s recent large-scale purges, the PLA must be prepared to fight now, not just by 2035 or 2049 (Foreign Affairs, July 18). Fravel notes that, from 1949 to 1979, Chinese leaders often felt compelled to go to war at moments when the PLA’s readiness was questionable. In the same way, while the force that struts through Beijing next month may be doing so to honor past victory, the troops will be marching in preparation for the next war and, in their eyes, future triumph.
Notes
[1] See also Zi Yang, “Five Key Factors Behind Irregular Leadership Changes in the People’s Liberation Army,” February 14, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/five-key-factors-behind-irregular-leadership-changes-in-the-peoples-liberation-army/; Kenneth Allen, “Assessment of PLA Leaders at the End of 2024,” China Brief, January 17, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/assessment-of-pla-leaders-at-the-end-of-2024/
[2] For more on these new arms, see China Brief, April 26, 2024 [McReynolds & Costello], [Costello 1], [Costello 2].
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中國航空母機的處女飛–老司機馬識途
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這篇報導下載自《百度》；原網頁不詳。作者署名：樞密院十號，老司機馬識途
請參考：China’s High-Flying Swarm Mothership Drone Has Flown
中國“空中航母”首飛成功！
樞密院十號，老司機馬識途，12/11/25
去年在珠海航展上備受關注的“空中航母”——“九天”無人機，已經於12月11日成功首飛。
中國航空工業集團透露，由陝西無人裝備科技有限責任公司委託，航空工業一飛院設計的“九天”無人機11日在陝西蒲城圓滿完成首飛任務，這標誌著我國大型無人機技術實現新突破，其規模化應用將加速產業鏈與創新鏈無縫對接、良性互動，為低空經濟領域新質生產力發展注入新動能。
據瞭解，作為我國自主創新的大型通用無人機平臺，“九天”無人機的機長達16.35米，翼展25米，最大起飛重量16噸，最大任務飛行高度1.5萬米，最大飛行速度每小時700公里，航時達12小時，轉場航程達7000公里，載荷能力達6噸，性能指標位居同類產品前列。
提到“九天”無人機，關注中國軍工發展的中國網友們應該都不陌生。去年它在珠海航展亮相時，就憑藉龐大的體型、豐富的掛載能力，成為明星展品之一。
它突出的特點就是可以攜帶“異構蜂巢任務艙”。所謂“異構”是指這種任務艙可以攜帶不同質性的無人機組成編隊，數量可多達幾十乃至上百架。而“蜂巢”意味著攜帶的這些小型無人機能一起出動，以“蜂群”的形式執行任務。“九天”無人機的機翼下還可掛載中型無人機，通過“九天”無人機發射出去後，機載中型無人機可單獨執行察打任務，或是扮演指揮官的角色，指揮蜂群無人機執行任務。
也正因為這個特色，它被中國網友乃至外媒稱之為“空中航母”。
此外，該無人機也有豐富的載荷攜帶能力。它的機頭可以配備各種光電和雷達偵查載荷，機翼上的8個外掛點，可以掛載空對空導彈、反艦導彈、空對地導彈、滑翔炸彈等有人駕駛戰鬥機所攜帶的常規武器裝備。特別是它攜帶的霹靂-12雷達制導中距空對空導彈，表明它還具備超視距作戰的能力——要知道，幾天前澳大利亞空軍一架MQ-28A“幽靈蝙蝠”無人機發射了一枚AIM-120中程空對空導彈，就被西方媒體恨不得吹成“舉世無雙”。
事實上，從珠海航展的武器掛載清單看，“九天”無人機強大的外掛能力，還讓它可以發射反艦導彈執行海上反艦任務。也就是說，除了對空作戰以外，它還可執行對地、對海以及對水下目標的打擊任務，堪稱是無人機中的“六邊形戰士”。更重要的是，“九天”無人機在整體設計上採用“通用平臺+模組化任務載荷”設計理念，可以很方便地根據需要換裝不同的任務載荷，執行對應的任務，在多工能力方面甚至超過了有人駕駛飛機。
如果說去年的地面展示只表明“九天”無人機帶來的可觀未來前景，如今它真的上天了，顯示其進展非常順利，為這些前景成真打下了堅實的基礎——這也充分展示了中國無人機產業的穩步推進。
樞密院十號，老司機馬識途
#優質圖文扶持計畫#
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中國核武實力現況 -- Morgan Phillips
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China military reaches 'war footing' with new missile silos and advanced AI warfare systems
Congressional report warns Beijing's rapid buildup could erode America's deterrence edge in Indo-Pacific
Morgan Phillips, Fox News, 11/17/25
China’s military buildup has reached what a new congressional report calls a "war footing," with hundreds of new missile silos and expanding nuclear capabilities that could erode America’s long-standing deterrence edge in the Indo-Pacific.
China has built roughly 350 new intercontinental missile silos and expanded its nuclear warhead stockpile by 20% in the past year, part of a sweeping military expansion that the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission says could strain U.S. readiness to counter Chinese aggression.
The commission’s 2025 annual report to Congress says Beijing’s rapid nuclear buildup, combined with new artificial intelligence-driven warfare systems, is transforming the People’s Liberation Army into a force "capable of fighting and winning a war against the United States" — even without matching U.S. nuclear numbers.
According to the report, China has unveiled an AI-powered electronic warfare system capable of detecting and suppressing U.S. radar signals as far as Guam, the Marshall Islands and Alaska, and is now deploying 6G-based platforms across its armed forces.
China displays YJ-19 hypersonic anti-ship missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, in Beijing, Sept. 3, 2025. 請至原網頁觀看照片
The report says China unveiled a new 6G-based electronic warfare platform in mid-2025, capable of coordinating radar jamming and signal interception across long distances. The system reportedly uses high-speed data links and artificial intelligence to synchronize attacks on U.S. and allied radar networks — a preview of what Beijing calls "intelligentized warfare."
At a military parade in Beijing this September, China for the first time displayed a full nuclear triad — missiles launchable from land, air and sea. 請至原網頁觀看照片
The commission warns these advances, paired with China’s political crackdown and economic leverage, could allow Beijing to act "quickly and decisively in a crisis," shortening the time the U.S. and its allies would have to respond to aggression.
A nuclear-powered Type 094A Jin-class ballistic missile submarine navigates during a military display by China's navy in the South China Sea. 請至原網頁觀看照片
The commission is urging Congress to require the Pentagon to conduct a full audit of U.S. readiness to defend Taiwan, warning that Washington may no longer meet its legal obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. The report calls for a classified and unclassified assessment of whether U.S. forces could "resist any resort to force or coercion" by China — even in a scenario where the United States is also facing simultaneous aggression from Russia, Iran or North Korea.
A war over Taiwan, the commission cautions, could wipe out up to 10% of global GDP — a shock on par with the 2008 financial crisis — and carry a "cataclysmic" risk of nuclear escalation and wider conflict in the Indo-Pacific.
China now holds around 600 nuclear warheads. The Pentagon has assessed China is aiming to own 1,000 by 2030.
The report further warns that China’s economic coercion is compounding the threat, pointing to Beijing’s dominance in foundational semiconductors, rare earth minerals, and printed circuit boards. It says these dependencies could leave the United States "reliant on its rival for the backbone of its modern economy and military."
Among 28 recommendations, the commission calls for Congress to bar Chinese-made components from U.S. power grids, create a unified economic statecraft agency to enforce export controls, and reaffirm diplomatic backing for Taiwan — including its partnership with the Vatican, one of Taiwan’s few remaining formal allies that Beijing has sought to isolate through church diplomacy.
"China’s rapid military and economic mobilization shortens U.S. warning timelines," the report concludes, warning that without a coordinated response, America’s deterrence posture "risks falling short" against Beijing’s expanding capabilities.
Original article source: China military reaches 'war footing' with new missile silos and advanced AI warfare systems
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中國海軍艦艇的數量、品質、與戰場存活率 - That Guy, Noah
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除了下文作者提到的「裝備品質」，以及由它衍生的「戰場存活率」之外，解放軍「戰鬥力」也是一個未知的「變數」。俄軍在俄、烏戰爭初期的表現，明白顯示：「戰鬥力」不能從紙上或演習得知；它必須在實戰中取得和證實。
就我所知，在1979 – 1981的中越戰爭過程，解放軍的表現並沒有中國官方所宣稱的那樣傑出。或許，在大戰略考量之外，未經驗證的「戰鬥力」議題，也是當前兩岸關係「不獨、不統、不和、不戰、不談」局面的背景因素之一？
China’s Strength In Numbers Warships Might Have Been A Mistake. Detailed Comparison To US Warships.
The Massive Dent In China’s Destroyer Shared More About China’s Navy Than The Past 20 Years.
That Guy, Noah, 08/19/25
I have been thinking about the recent incident in the South China Sea (The Sea isn’t theirs, but they claim it is), where one Chinese destroyer managed to hit another one with its nose. In my view, given the terrifically small speed, that sort of dent, which basically collapsed the entire front of the warship, shouldn’t have really happened.
To provide some background, the Communist Party runs China. Communism in general has shown the interest in producing a lot of military equipment, more than any democratic country.
Most of those traits were seen in the Soviet Union, as well. The regime at that time, instead of focusing on producing actually good-quality vehicles, for instance, instead focused on producing large quantities of less armored, less sophisticated vehicles compared to the sort of equipment Europe at that time had. In reality, when you look at Nazi Germany, most of its tanks were absolute monsters; the Tiger 1 was an absolute monster. Later, the Tiger 2 came out with even thicker armor.
Then eventually a war broke out between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, and Germany sent its Tiger 1s and 2s to control the situation, eventually reaching Kursk, which historically overpowered the cheap Soviet Union’s T-34s.
In fact, one Tiger 1 is said to have received 252 hits, with more than 90-ish percent of them not penetrating through, but bouncing off. While the latter is hard to confirm, as the data on this is mixed, but the general view is there, the Tiger 1 reportedly wiped out numerous Soviet Union platoons of around 12 if each is assigned 4 T-34 tanks.
The point is that’s how the Soviet Union functioned; it put all its hope into quantities rather than quality. There were plenty of reports claiming that T-34s were never comfortable, although most of the tanks from that era were like that. However, modern-day Russia goes the exact same route, and so does China. Although, most of the information concerning China is harder to find due to how information is handled there.
However, based on evidence, China is going the exact same route as the Soviet Union did. While most of China’s weapons are arguably much better than today’s Russia’s, there are still a lot of nuances. The US has been manufacturing its most lethal destroyers, part of the US Navy’s Arleigh Burke DDGs class, but the US only manages to squeeze out 1.6 of these destroyers a year, according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies.
Meanwhile, China is doubling that number, producing 3.1 destroyers a year. As you can tell from these numbers, there’s a massive problem on the US side, or so one would think. Russian and Chinese sources have been praising Chinese destroyers ever since media has gained traction on them. They look very well-made, too, while looking at the outside.
However, the massive difference in production output is a massive issue. China’s navy already outnumbers US warships at sea, and the situation will likely get worse as time moves forward. Former United States Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has said the following regarding China’s output of warships per year:
Look at the difference in shipbuilding between the United States and China. Deeply concerning. We have to do better in this arena, or we will not be the great naval power that we need to be for the 21st century.
China is currently outnumbering US naval vessels on the Sea, with only exception of adding small speed boats, and regular small ships into the consideration, without that US still maintains an upper hand in terms of large ships, including destroyers.
However, I just couldn’t forget that incident in the South China Sea involving two Chinese 052D-class destroyers. And before I say anything, I want to recommend everyone check out the footage from that incident. That Chinese destroyer that rammed into another destroyer was rapidly reducing speed and wasn’t even operating at even 50% of its maximum potential in terms of knot speed.
That dent was absolutely massive for such a modern warship. If you think critically about this, the China’s 052D warships are basically identical to US Navy Arleigh Burke DDGs class warships, in terms of capabilities.
However, it just so happens that there’s a massive weight difference. I already find that very odd. If you compare a US-made DDG-51 destroyer with a Chinese-made 052D, you arrive at an interesting conclusion.
DDG-51 at full load capacity weighs from 8,300 to 9,700 tons; that’s absolutely massive weight for a warship. But then you compare a Chinese 052D to the US-made DDG-51 destroyer, and the Chinese 052D is said to only weigh 7,500 tons at max loads. As you can see, there’s a problem here, but there’s only one specific type of problem.
Both these destroyers, in terms of capabilities and weapons on board, are the same. The US destroyer is 1 knot faster (31 knots) compared to that Chinese destroyer, whose maximum speed is 30 knots. So, there’s already a difference in engine performance. I thought that was interesting to point out. However, both of these destroyers have similar weapons on board; it is just that one is a Chinese variant compared to a US variant in terms of sensors and radars, VLS cells, and cannons.
However, there’s a small difference already. The US DDG-51 is able to carry a maximum amount of 90 VLS cells, which basically are the vertical missile launching systems destroyers carry. They have long ranges and are able to destroy another warship without a person’s vision of that ship, thanks to the radar use.
The Chinese-made 052D is able to carry only 64 VLS cells; however, that still doesn’t explain the large, over 2 thousand ton gap between the two warships, which is where the problem is. US warships have been built with very strong framing; some would call it overengineering, but as a democratic country and a country that values the lives of people and their safety on those ships, maximum survivability of its sailors was the biggest priority.
You can’t say that about China’s 052D variant. If, in terms of weapons and capabilities, both the Chinese- and the US-made specified destroyers are the same in terms of capabilities and weapons on board, but there’s still a 2,000-ton gap, it is safe to assume it has to do with the overall engineering of that ship.
There’s simply nothing else that I can take into consideration. In fact, the engine in 052D is weaker, but the difference in weight isn’t expected to be that different, although that information is confidential, as one can imagine.
Going in depth over this, US destroyers have been made with heavy-duty framing, bulkheads (walls inside the ship, which are able to stop flooding if one part of the ship is compromised), and top-standard steel armor nicknamed hy-80 and hy-100 steel. That’s a very durable steel, but it comes with its own larger weight.
Now, the only logical conclusion I can come up with is that the Chinese destroyers, based on the information I shared here and have at hand, haven’t been designed for the utmost survival, if you can call it that. All of which would explain why the 052D warship in the South China Sea managed to get its nose severely bent at extremely low speed, basically crushing the entire nose of the ship. This theoretically is already the strongest part of the ship.
This is due to the triangle construction and the framing meeting the nose. I believe this is very good evidence to argue that Chinese warships have weaker framing and overall protection from foreign attacks.
And this is where the whole issue comes about to; China has been very aggressive, bullying the Philippines and Taiwan. And while China’s output of warships is basically 2 times larger than the US’s, the US theoretically still has an upper hand.
I say this with caution, because a sheer quantity of warships can overwhelm smaller numbers, but the amount of destroyers the US has is more than adequate to deal with the large amount of destroyers China currently has, which is 53. Compared to the US, which has 70. However, if China’s output continues, that’s when the overall issue will start, I believe. However, China values economy more than wars, which is also the only reason Taiwan still exists.
So, they would never fight alone if they had to. China would be backed up by Russia, which together with their destroyer numbers would outnumber the US; that’s the only worst-case scenario that I can think of.
In reality, if not for that incident in the South China Sea, we wouldn’t know a lot of information about Chinese destroyers, but it is safe to assume we now do.
And while China has already been ridiculed on social media platforms for this shameful act of the captain, I am really unsure if these Chinese destroyers, which, as the name suggests, ought to handle some hits. They wouldn’t be able to handle any from a strong opponent like the US.
There has been an incident in 2000 where a Yemeni speedboat rammed into a USS Cole destroyer, that was loaded with explosives, leaving a massive hole in the hull of the USS Cole. This led to 17 deaths of sailors, unfortunately, while wounding several dozen more. However, the ship survived and stayed afloat on the water.
Yet, the USS Cole wasn’t engineered like today’s US destroyers are. The ship didn’t have any intriguing armor; it solely survived on its large bulkheads. And, I said all this to compare what would possibly happen to the Chinese 052D destroyer if the same occurred; likely the ship wouldn’t have made it.
And remember, the USS Cole was an old ship and still made it; it was actually commissioned in 1996.
I am very skeptical of how the Chinese navy would perform in actual combat against a strong navy. Their ship would immediately sink; there wouldn’t be even enough time to repair anything if you are hit by a VLS cell. Weak framing generally translates into broader damage.
In the end, China’s naval capabilities aren’t as great as previously thought, thanks to the massive amount of information the incident in South China Sea brought as a result regarding China’s Navy.
Written by That Guy, Noah
Writer on Russo-Ukraine war, always sharing two sides of the story. Ukraine's fight for freedom and democracy supporter.
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中國建造前進台灣的海、空軍基地 -- Allegra Mendelson
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China builds new naval and air bases for Taiwan invasion
Allegra Mendelson, 09/08/25
China is carrying out large-scale development of air and naval sites along its eastern coast, which experts say could be used to launch an invasion of Taiwan.
In satellite images analysed by the Wall Street Journal, new berths for amphibious warships, as well as mega-airports, can be seen taking form.
While the facilities could have multiple uses, China’s primary military focus is on Taiwan.
Beijing claims Taiwan as its own, which the democratically elected government in Taipei strongly rejects, and has not ruled out the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control.
“All of it goes to supporting China’s one military planning scenario, which is a Taiwan scenario,” Michael Dahm, a retired US navy intelligence officer, told the Wall Street Journal.
The US and the UK have both turned their attention to the Indo-Pacific in recent years as China increases its aggression towards Taiwan and in the disputed South China Sea.
請至源網頁查看地圖
Both John Healey, the UK Defence Secretary, and Pete Hegseth, his US counterpart, have warned about Beijing’s rising threat, with Mr Hegseth claiming in May that an attack against Taiwan could be imminent.
One new development that has caught analysts’ eyes is a new pier at the naval facility in Yueqing Bay (樂清灣), which is located north of Taiwan, off of China’s coastal city of Wenzhou (溫州，浙江省).
The berth now measures over a mile long and could be used to dock several large ships.
Approximately 20 vessels were seen docked at the pier recently, including tank transports, ship-to-shore landing craft, tankers and coast-guard cutters.
Experts say that all of this hardware could be deployed in the event of an attack on Taiwan.
A new helicopter base has also been built in Fujian province, which sits directly across the Taiwan Strait, which could be used to deploy troops to the country’s main island, as well as outlying islands, which are located even closer to China.
請至源網頁查看樂清灣軍港建築配置圖
Taiwan has focused its past military drills on several of these beaches, including Guanyin, Jiben, Beipu and Penghu, which are believed to be potential landing sites for an invasion.
Satellite images also show the expansion of mega-airports in eastern China, with at least two in key locations for a possible attack against Taiwan – one near Xiamen and another near Fuzhou.
The Xiamen Xiang’an International Airport, which is spread across Dadeng island (大膽島), has been under development for years.
Dadeng is located less than 5km from one of Taiwan’s outlying islands, Kinmen, which is often referred to as a potential front line in any future assault.
Images taken between 2014 and 2022 show the size of the airport nearly doubling after dredging was able to create more land.
At the Fuzhou Changle International Airport, which is also strategically located across the Strait from Taiwan, a new runway has been built right on the water.
While these are currently civilian airports, experts say that if a war broke out, Beijing could suspend commercial flights and use them instead for military purposes, including aircraft refuelling and resupply of ammunition.
Given their optimal location so close to Taiwan, they could also be used as a hub to bring in troops or aircraft from other locations across China before their deployment.
The airports were also built to support huge quantities of passengers, meaning they are well connected by rail and road, which would be helpful when bringing in equipment.
Today, China has one of the largest and strongest militaries in the world, with a strength of over two-million troops.
While the People’s Liberation Army has been rapidly expanding and developing its hardware over the last two decades, with the latest technology on display at China’s massive military parade last week, it’s not a tested force.
Unlike the US military, China’s military has never fought on a real battlefield and experts have previously told The Telegraph that the PLA tends to progress through imitation rather than innovation, which inherently holds its development back.
Although the US provides Taiwan with weapons, the current US administration refuses to comment on whether it would come to the country’s defence in the event of an attack.
However, most experts predict that the conflict could turn into a face-off between Beijing and Washington.
US support could take many different forms, ranging from underwater assaults with submarines to missile strikes against Chinese forces.
Experts say that the extent of involvement would likely come down to how the conflict came about, how well Taiwan is able to resist and what else is going on in the world at the time.
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