|
中國軍事力量篇 -- 開欄文:中國第四艘航母將使用核能為動力 --- A. Mendelson
|
瀏覽2,934 |回應17 |推薦1 |
|
|
|
以這篇報導做為開欄文。此外,請參見《中國軍力及戰備一瞥》讀後一欄的三篇貼文。 China building supercarrier to rival US China building supercarrier to rival US Nuclear-powered warship will match capability of USS Gerald R Ford Allegra Mendelson, 03/03/25 China is developing a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier which would be larger and more advanced than any existing vessel in its fleet, in an attempt to keep pace with the US navy. The new supercarrier would allow fighter jets to be launched from four parts of the flight deck, as opposed to its current ships which can only facilitate three, according to new satellite imagery reviewed by NBC News. That would match the capability of USS Gerald R. Ford, the largest and most advanced aircraft carrier in the US navy. Images from the Dalian shipbuilding facility in north-east China show tracks or trenches in the snow, which appear to be related to a new catapult launch system.
The tracks in the snow at the Dalian facility, which may be linked to a new catapult launch system - Maxar Technologies 請至原網頁觀看照片 Analysts said that while the images don’t show construction under way just yet, they are an indication that China is moving forward with its ambitious plans. “We think this is them testing equipment and layouts for the upcoming Type 04 carrier,” Michael Duitsman, a researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in the US, told NBC. China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, was commissioned in 2012 and its second, the Shandong, was launched in 2017. Both use the “ski-jump” method, which involves a ramp at the end of a short runway to propel the planes upward. The Dalian shipbuilding facility where a new nuclear-powered carrier could be developed - Maxar Technologies請至原網頁觀看照片 The country’s third and most advanced carrier to date, the Fujian, launched in 2022 and was upgraded with electromagnetic catapults, which are more similar to the systems used onboard US ships. All three of China’s carriers are conventionally powered, unlike the upcoming one, which experts believe would be powered by a nuclear reactor given its size and capacity. The tracks seen in the latest satellite images run at convergent angles, which experts say resemble the configuration of existing American supercarriers that have four electromagnetic catapults. Mr Duitsman said that it seems likely that China’s new carrier would resemble the USS Gerald R. Ford. The USS Gerald R. Ford is the largest and most advanced aircraft carrier in the US navy - US NAVY/ERIK HILDEBRANDT HANDOUT
China already has the largest navy in the world, with 370 military vessels, but America, with 291 vessels, has more big ships. The Gerald Ford is one of 11 supercarriers in the US navy. Rumours have circulated for years that China is preparing to build a Type 04 carrier. However, Beijing has refused to confirm any reports and very little information has been made public. The USS Gerald R Ford can launch jets from four places on the carrier’s deck, while China’s Fujian, third and most advanced carrier to date, can only launch from three請至原網頁觀看照片 Last November, analysts at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in the US revealed that China had built a land-based prototype nuclear reactor for a large surface warship. Until the satellite images from Dalian, this was the first and only piece of evidence that Beijing was developing a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. China has not commented on the latest reports about its plans for a supercarrier. However, last March, Yuan Huazhi, the political commissar of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army navy, told the state-backed Global Times that there was no bottleneck in China’s aircraft carrier technologies and development was progressing smoothly. At the time, Yuan also said that more information would be made available “soon”, but little has been heard from Beijing since. Broaden your horizons with award-winning British journalism. Try The Telegraph free for 1 month with unlimited access to our award-winning website, exclusive app, money-saving offers and more.
本文於 修改第 12 次
|
美國國防部的中國軍力評估 -- Jason Swensen
|
|
|
推薦2 |
|
|
|
Why does the Pentagon believe China’s military buildup makes U.S. ‘increasingly vulnerable’? Defense Department report asserts China’s ambition to displace US as globe’s most powerful nation Jason Swensen, 01/02/26 Even as today’s military-related headlines focus largely on developments in Venezuela, America’s defense community is keeping an unblinking eye on China. On Wednesday, China’s People’s Liberation Army completed two days of military exercises in the waters off Taiwan. The maneuvers were likely aimed at asserting its sovereignty over the island just days after the United States announced a package of arms sales to Taiwan — a move criticized sharply by Beijing, according to the Associated Press. And last week, the Department of Defense released its annual update on the Chinese military, asserting that the Asian nation’s historic military building “has made the U.S. homeland increasingly vulnerable.” “China maintains a large and growing arsenal of nuclear, maritime, conventional long-range strike, cyber, and space capabilities able to directly threaten Americans’ security,” the report noted. “In 2024, Chinese cyberespionage campaigns such as Volt Typhoon burrowed into U.S. critical infrastructure, demonstrating capabilities that could disrupt the U.S. military in a conflict and harm American interests.” For decades, China’s People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, has marshaled resources, technology and political will to achieve its vision of a world-class military. “The PLA is a key component of China’s ambition to displace the United States as the world’s most powerful nation,” according to the DOD report. “The PLA measures its concepts and capabilities against the ‘strong enemy’ of the United States. Moreover, China’s top military strategy focuses squarely on overcoming the United States through a whole-of-nation mobilization effort that Beijing terms ‘national total war’.” ‘Projecting power worldwide’ China’s current military focus, according to the lengthy DOD report, is the First Island Chain that stretches from the Japanese archipelago to the Malay Peninsula in southwest Asia. The region is the “strategic center of gravity” for its regional goals. The DOD’s China/military report to Congress states, optimistically, that under President Donald Trump’s leadership, relations between the U.S. and China are “stronger than they have been in many years” — adding that the department plans to build on those positive signs, focusing on stability and de-escalation. At the same time, the report added, America’s military is “always ready and able” to defend U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific. “We do not seek to strangle, dominate, or humiliate China. “Rather, as laid out in President Trump’s National Security Strategy, we seek only to deny the ability of any country in the Indo-Pacific to dominate us or our allies. That means being so strong that aggression is not even considered, and that peace is therefore preferred and preserved.” Trump is expected to meet with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, next April in Beijing. In turn, Trump invited Xi to the White House for a state visit later in 2026. In a Truth Social post last month, Trump wrote: “Our relationship with China is extremely strong!” China’s intent for Taiwan reunification China’s central goal — at least in the short term? Reclaiming Taiwan, which it considers a “breakaway province.” “The PLA continues to make steady progress toward its 2027 goals, whereby the PLA must be able to achieve ‘strategic decisive victory’ over Taiwan, ‘strategic counterbalance’ against the United States in the nuclear and other strategic domains, and ‘strategic deterrence and control’ against other regional countries. “In other words, China expects to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027.” The PLA’s modernization is propelled by China’s defense spending and technological development. “Since the first full year of Xi Jinping’s term as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, China’s announced defense budget has nearly doubled,” according to the report. “China continues to accelerate its development of military technology, including in military artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, and hypersonic missiles.” China’s tenuous partnership with Russia The DOD report also identified a deepening strategic partnership between China and Russia, likely driven by shared interest in countering the United States. That partnership has included combined military exercises and sharing of some military technologies. But despite continued growth in their relationship, Beijing and Moscow remain unwilling to establish a formal defense alliance with mutual security guarantees, the DOD report asserts. “China and Russia continue to harbor a mutual distrust of each other, which likely prevents cooperation on areas each side perceives as sensitive. China also has stopped short of providing Russia with lethal aid for use in its war against Ukraine.” Countering the U.S. through AI, critical technologies — and targeting intelligence The DOD’s report also emphasized China’s aggressive efforts to achieve global leadership in science and technology — focusing on emerging technologies such as AI, biotechnology, quantum technology, advanced semiconductors, and advanced energy generation and storage. “China believes that advances in AI technology will be critical to a new round of industrial change and the next revolution in military affairs,” according to the report.
“However, in 2024, China’s AI sector remained constrained by its limited access to high-performance AI accelerators.” The country, the DOD report noted, is now utilizing a series of strategies to overcome such limits. Additionally, the PLS is developing and employing “a vast array of intelligence collection capabilities” to enhance its military readiness — targeting U.S. intellectual property and defense technology. “China has a multi-faceted approach to undermining the U.S. through covert operations and clandestine actions — including economic espionage, cyber-intrusions, and the use of illegal agents. “These activities, combined with China’s substantial investments in its military and intelligence apparatus, reveal a long-term strategy of preparing to counter the United States.”
本文於 修改第 2 次
|
九月槍影:閱兵之舞機弄飛彈 - John S. Van Oudenaren
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
這篇文章雖然有些老、舊,信息量還值得存檔備查;轉載於此。正文內之中譯為作者手筆;轉換為繁體則是編者下的指令。 Guns of September: What a Parade May Reveal About China’s Military Modernization John S. Van Oudenaren, China Brief Notes, 08/28/25 Executive Summary: * The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) upcoming military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII will serve as both a symbolic display and an operational exercise, highlighting the PLA’s advancements in new combat domains—such as unmanned systems, directed energy, and electronic warfare—while also revealing improvements in command structure and organizational capacity. The parade aims to underscore loyalty to Xi Jinping as central to combat readiness, even as recent purges expose deep institutional instability and a persistent “trust deficit” between the CCP and the PLA. These tensions underscore the regime’s challenge in balancing political control with genuine military professionalization. * The PLA will use the parade to demonstrate its growing joint capabilities, showcasing an integrated “Four Services + Four Arms” model and the role of new branches like the Aerospace and Cyberspace Forces. The involvement of militia units and strategic strike formations further emphasizes the whole-of-force approach underpinning China’s military modernization trajectory. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is finalizing plans for its massive 80th anniversary commemoration of victory in the “Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression” (中國人民抗日戰爭) and “World Anti-Fascist War” (世界反法西斯戰爭) (People’s Daily, June 25). The event, to be held in Beijing on September 3, will feature a troop review and speech by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi Jinping. Global attention will likely fixate on the long columns of entirely domestically produced armored vehicles, missiles, and warplanes rolling through Tiananmen Square, highlighting the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) growing firepower (China Daily, June 24; Xinhua, June 25). The parade will also contain important indications about PLA command structure, organizational capacity, and operational readiness. New Combat Forces on Display In addition to traditional weapons and equipment, the parade will showcase “new combat forces” (新型作戰力量), according to Major General Wu Zeke (吳澤棵), deputy director of the Military Parade Leading Group Office and deputy director general of the CMC Joint Staff Department’s Operations Bureau. Speaking at a June 24 state press conference on the planning for the commemoration, he said that this would reflect the PLA’s “strong ability to adapt to the scientific and technological developments and the evolution of conflict to win future wars” (適應科技發展和戰爭形態演變、打贏未來戰爭的強大能力) (State Council Information Office (SCIO), June 24). At a follow-up press conference on August 20, Wu detailed additional capabilities that will highlight the PLA’s improving combat capabilities in new domains and technological areas. These are set to include new land, sea, and air unmanned intelligent systems, directed energy weapons, and electronic jamming systems. The PLA will, per Wu, also use the parade to demonstrate its formidable strategic deterrent capability by exhibiting hypersonic, air and missile defenses, and strategic missiles (SCIO, August 20). Non-Material Indicators of Military Modernization Beyond a burgeoning arsenal, the parade also will illuminate two less tangible yet equally essential elements of PLA modernization: command structure and organizational capacity. On both counts, it will seek to show it can rise to the mantra of “Toward 100 Years, Toward Victory” (向百年,向勝利), now ubiquitous in PRC propaganda (81.cn; China Military Network, July 25). The slogan reflects increased emphasis under Xi on reaching the goals set by his predecessors; namely, realizing full military modernization by 2035 and becoming a “world-class military” by mid-century. As a steppingstone in these efforts, Xi added the PLA’s centennial in 2027 as a key benchmark for several key elements of military modernization: advancing mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization; modernizing doctrine, organization, personnel management, and technology; maximizing resources; and building a strong defense industrial base (China Brief, March 26, 2021). At the August 20 briefing, Major General Xu Guizhong (徐貴忠) of the PLA Central Theater Command (解放軍中部戰區) stressed the parade’s operational nature as a test of the force’s organizational capacity, noting that effectively marshaling tens of thousands of troops and hundreds of weapons platforms is like “organizing for a major battle” (如同組織一場戰役) (SCIO, August 20). Indeed, CCTV reported that the second exercise in preparation for the parade on August 16-17 involved 40,000 troops (81.cn, August 17). Loyalty Remains a Weak Link At the June press conference, Wu Zeke emphasized the link between political uprightness, loyalty to Xi and the Party, and military effectiveness (SCIO, June 24). He stressed that the parade would showcase the PLA’s “political construction, new force structure, progress in modernization, and achievements in combat readiness” (政治建軍新風貌、力量結構新佈局、現代化建設新進展、備戰打仗新成效), all downstream of “resolutely following the Party’s command” (堅決聽黨指揮). Wu made certain to praise Xi, exclaiming how his leadership enables the PLA to “advance the spirit of the War of Resistance” (弘揚抗戰精神). Loyalty was a prominent theme again on Army Day (August 1), with a PLA Daily editorial calling for “forging political loyalty” (鑄牢政治忠誠) and fighting the “decisive battle” (攻堅之戰) to achieve the PLA’s centenary goals (PLA Daily, August 1). The article pledges that the PLA will thoroughly implement Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military and the CMC Chairman Responsibility system. The shift over the past decade toward this new system and away from the previous CMC Vice-Chairman Responsibility System reflects Xi’s efforts to centralize organizational control over the PLA, which has enjoyed substantial autonomy throughout the reform era (China Leadership Monitor, July 14). As analysts Joel Wuthnow and Philip Saunders note in China’s Quest for Military Supremacy, Xi has pulled multiple levers to tighten the CCP’s grip on the PLA: re-emphasizing Party work and indoctrination as a part of a broader recommitment to Marxist principals; promoting his personal authority, including through promulgating Xi Jinping Thought in the military; implementing stricter personnel control; and strengthening oversight regimes (Google Books, March 10, 2025).
The Party must manage a careful balancing act between demanding loyalty while allowing the PLA a degree of autonomy on organizational, technical, and even operational matters to achieve modernization. As a result, the scourge of corruption in the military and defense industry persists, and loyalty to the CCP appears to remain conditional, predicated on the PLA’s occupation of a place of privilege in the PRC system (Observer Research Foundation, December 2, 2024). The difficulty of maintaining this balance has been laid bare in the upheaval at the top levels in recent months. The CMC has been decimated by purges, to the extent that only three of six uniformed military seats are now filled, with several members removed or disappeared since 2023, including apparent Xi loyalists, underscoring what K. Tristan Tang describes as Xi’s “trust deficit” with the PLA (China Brief, April 11). [1] Joint Enough The upcoming parade is an opportunity for the PLA to show it is sufficiently “joint” to achieve the ambitious goals laid out by Xi’s Thought (CGTN, October 11, 2022). The troop review will seek to demonstrate the PLA’s improving capacity for joint operations that integrate different services, groups, and teams via the new joint command, operations, and support model (SCIO, June 24). At the August 20 press conference, Major General Wu stated the parade reflects the PLA’s new “Four Services + Four Arms” (支軍種+4支兵種) structure (SCIO, August 20). This system was codified on Army Day, when Xi conferred flags on the aerospace, cyberspace, and information support forces established in April 2024, as well as the Joint Logistics Support Force created in 2016 to coordinate logistical support for major military operations (Xinhuanet, September 13, 2016; China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), April 22, 2024; 81.cn, July 31). [2] The elevation of these organizations underscores the PLA’s growing cognizance that the complexity of network-centric warfare requires the adoption of a military structure more akin to a U.S.-style joint force (Defense One, April 28, 2024). The parade’s equipment formation will be organized according to practical joint combat strategies, including land and maritime combat groups, air and missile defense groups, information combat groups, unmanned combat groups, support groups, and strategic strike groups (SCIO, August 20). The aerial formation will highlight the systematization and rapidly improving combat capabilities of the PLA’s air combat forces (SCIO, June 24). This includes continuing refinement of its division of labor in terms of aerospace operations between the Air Force (bolstered by the recent transfer of former PLA Navy aviation units), the Rocket Force, the Aerospace Force, the remaining PLAN aerial assets, and the PLA Army Aviation and Air Defense Branches (CASI, July 31, 2023, July 2024). Militia forces also will participate in the parade, an important reminder that the PLA includes not only its services and arms and the People’s Armed Police (including the Coast Guard) but also a large militia (SCIO, June 24).The militia, which is organized by local People’s Armed Forces Departments and includes maritime militia operating in the South China Sea, serves as a reserve and auxiliary force for the PLA (China Brief, March 15). Conclusion The operational aspect of the military parade preparations underscores that readiness remains paramount for the PLA. As the scholar Taylor Fravel recently observed, despite the costs to operational readiness of Xi’s recent large-scale purges, the PLA must be prepared to fight now, not just by 2035 or 2049 (Foreign Affairs, July 18). Fravel notes that, from 1949 to 1979, Chinese leaders often felt compelled to go to war at moments when the PLA’s readiness was questionable. In the same way, while the force that struts through Beijing next month may be doing so to honor past victory, the troops will be marching in preparation for the next war and, in their eyes, future triumph. Notes [1] See also Zi Yang, “Five Key Factors Behind Irregular Leadership Changes in the People’s Liberation Army,” February 14, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/five-key-factors-behind-irregular-leadership-changes-in-the-peoples-liberation-army/; Kenneth Allen, “Assessment of PLA Leaders at the End of 2024,” China Brief, January 17, 2025, https://jamestown.org/program/assessment-of-pla-leaders-at-the-end-of-2024/ [2] For more on these new arms, see China Brief, April 26, 2024 [McReynolds & Costello], [Costello 1], [Costello 2].
本文於 修改第 1 次
|
中國航空母機的處女飛–老司機馬識途
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
這篇報導下載自《百度》;原網頁不詳。作者署名:樞密院十號,老司機馬識途 請參考:China’s High-Flying Swarm Mothership Drone Has Flown 中國“空中航母”首飛成功! 樞密院十號,老司機馬識途,12/11/25 去年在珠海航展上備受關注的“空中航母”——“九天”無人機,已經於12月11日成功首飛。 中國航空工業集團透露,由陝西無人裝備科技有限責任公司委託,航空工業一飛院設計的“九天”無人機11日在陝西蒲城圓滿完成首飛任務,這標誌著我國大型無人機技術實現新突破,其規模化應用將加速產業鏈與創新鏈無縫對接、良性互動,為低空經濟領域新質生產力發展注入新動能。 據瞭解,作為我國自主創新的大型通用無人機平臺,“九天”無人機的機長達16.35米,翼展25米,最大起飛重量16噸,最大任務飛行高度1.5萬米,最大飛行速度每小時700公里,航時達12小時,轉場航程達7000公里,載荷能力達6噸,性能指標位居同類產品前列。 提到“九天”無人機,關注中國軍工發展的中國網友們應該都不陌生。去年它在珠海航展亮相時,就憑藉龐大的體型、豐富的掛載能力,成為明星展品之一。 它突出的特點就是可以攜帶“異構蜂巢任務艙”。所謂“異構”是指這種任務艙可以攜帶不同質性的無人機組成編隊,數量可多達幾十乃至上百架。而“蜂巢”意味著攜帶的這些小型無人機能一起出動,以“蜂群”的形式執行任務。“九天”無人機的機翼下還可掛載中型無人機,通過“九天”無人機發射出去後,機載中型無人機可單獨執行察打任務,或是扮演指揮官的角色,指揮蜂群無人機執行任務。 也正因為這個特色,它被中國網友乃至外媒稱之為“空中航母”。 此外,該無人機也有豐富的載荷攜帶能力。它的機頭可以配備各種光電和雷達偵查載荷,機翼上的8個外掛點,可以掛載空對空導彈、反艦導彈、空對地導彈、滑翔炸彈等有人駕駛戰鬥機所攜帶的常規武器裝備。特別是它攜帶的霹靂-12雷達制導中距空對空導彈,表明它還具備超視距作戰的能力——要知道,幾天前澳大利亞空軍一架MQ-28A“幽靈蝙蝠”無人機發射了一枚AIM-120中程空對空導彈,就被西方媒體恨不得吹成“舉世無雙”。 事實上,從珠海航展的武器掛載清單看,“九天”無人機強大的外掛能力,還讓它可以發射反艦導彈執行海上反艦任務。也就是說,除了對空作戰以外,它還可執行對地、對海以及對水下目標的打擊任務,堪稱是無人機中的“六邊形戰士”。更重要的是,“九天”無人機在整體設計上採用“通用平臺+模組化任務載荷”設計理念,可以很方便地根據需要換裝不同的任務載荷,執行對應的任務,在多工能力方面甚至超過了有人駕駛飛機。 如果說去年的地面展示只表明“九天”無人機帶來的可觀未來前景,如今它真的上天了,顯示其進展非常順利,為這些前景成真打下了堅實的基礎——這也充分展示了中國無人機產業的穩步推進。 樞密院十號,老司機馬識途 #優質圖文扶持計畫#
本文於 修改第 1 次
|
中國核武實力現況 -- Morgan Phillips
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
China military reaches 'war footing' with new missile silos and advanced AI warfare systems Congressional report warns Beijing's rapid buildup could erode America's deterrence edge in Indo-Pacific Morgan Phillips, Fox News, 11/17/25 China’s military buildup has reached what a new congressional report calls a "war footing," with hundreds of new missile silos and expanding nuclear capabilities that could erode America’s long-standing deterrence edge in the Indo-Pacific. China has built roughly 350 new intercontinental missile silos and expanded its nuclear warhead stockpile by 20% in the past year, part of a sweeping military expansion that the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission says could strain U.S. readiness to counter Chinese aggression. The commission’s 2025 annual report to Congress says Beijing’s rapid nuclear buildup, combined with new artificial intelligence-driven warfare systems, is transforming the People’s Liberation Army into a force "capable of fighting and winning a war against the United States" — even without matching U.S. nuclear numbers. According to the report, China has unveiled an AI-powered electronic warfare system capable of detecting and suppressing U.S. radar signals as far as Guam, the Marshall Islands and Alaska, and is now deploying 6G-based platforms across its armed forces. China displays YJ-19 hypersonic anti-ship missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, in Beijing, Sept. 3, 2025. 請至原網頁觀看照片 The report says China unveiled a new 6G-based electronic warfare platform in mid-2025, capable of coordinating radar jamming and signal interception across long distances. The system reportedly uses high-speed data links and artificial intelligence to synchronize attacks on U.S. and allied radar networks — a preview of what Beijing calls "intelligentized warfare." At a military parade in Beijing this September, China for the first time displayed a full nuclear triad — missiles launchable from land, air and sea. 請至原網頁觀看照片 The commission warns these advances, paired with China’s political crackdown and economic leverage, could allow Beijing to act "quickly and decisively in a crisis," shortening the time the U.S. and its allies would have to respond to aggression. A nuclear-powered Type 094A Jin-class ballistic missile submarine navigates during a military display by China's navy in the South China Sea. 請至原網頁觀看照片 The commission is urging Congress to require the Pentagon to conduct a full audit of U.S. readiness to defend Taiwan, warning that Washington may no longer meet its legal obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. The report calls for a classified and unclassified assessment of whether U.S. forces could "resist any resort to force or coercion" by China — even in a scenario where the United States is also facing simultaneous aggression from Russia, Iran or North Korea. A war over Taiwan, the commission cautions, could wipe out up to 10% of global GDP — a shock on par with the 2008 financial crisis — and carry a "cataclysmic" risk of nuclear escalation and wider conflict in the Indo-Pacific. China now holds around 600 nuclear warheads. The Pentagon has assessed China is aiming to own 1,000 by 2030. The report further warns that China’s economic coercion is compounding the threat, pointing to Beijing’s dominance in foundational semiconductors, rare earth minerals, and printed circuit boards. It says these dependencies could leave the United States "reliant on its rival for the backbone of its modern economy and military." Among 28 recommendations, the commission calls for Congress to bar Chinese-made components from U.S. power grids, create a unified economic statecraft agency to enforce export controls, and reaffirm diplomatic backing for Taiwan — including its partnership with the Vatican, one of Taiwan’s few remaining formal allies that Beijing has sought to isolate through church diplomacy. "China’s rapid military and economic mobilization shortens U.S. warning timelines," the report concludes, warning that without a coordinated response, America’s deterrence posture "risks falling short" against Beijing’s expanding capabilities. Original article source: China military reaches 'war footing' with new missile silos and advanced AI warfare systems 相關閱讀 High Stakes On The High Seas As Us, China Test Limits Of Military Power China’s Energy Siege Of Taiwan Could Cripple Us Supply Chains, Report Warns Click Here To Download The Fox News App
本文於 修改第 1 次
|
中國海軍艦艇的數量、品質、與戰場存活率 - That Guy, Noah
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
除了下文作者提到的「裝備品質」,以及由它衍生的「戰場存活率」之外,解放軍「戰鬥力」也是一個未知的「變數」。俄軍在俄、烏戰爭初期的表現,明白顯示:「戰鬥力」不能從紙上或演習得知;它必須在實戰中取得和證實。 就我所知,在1979 – 1981的中越戰爭過程,解放軍的表現並沒有中國官方所宣稱的那樣傑出。或許,在大戰略考量之外,未經驗證的「戰鬥力」議題,也是當前兩岸關係「不獨、不統、不和、不戰、不談」局面的背景因素之一? China’s Strength In Numbers Warships Might Have Been A Mistake. Detailed Comparison To US Warships. The Massive Dent In China’s Destroyer Shared More About China’s Navy Than The Past 20 Years. That Guy, Noah, 08/19/25 I have been thinking about the recent incident in the South China Sea (The Sea isn’t theirs, but they claim it is), where one Chinese destroyer managed to hit another one with its nose. In my view, given the terrifically small speed, that sort of dent, which basically collapsed the entire front of the warship, shouldn’t have really happened. To provide some background, the Communist Party runs China. Communism in general has shown the interest in producing a lot of military equipment, more than any democratic country. Most of those traits were seen in the Soviet Union, as well. The regime at that time, instead of focusing on producing actually good-quality vehicles, for instance, instead focused on producing large quantities of less armored, less sophisticated vehicles compared to the sort of equipment Europe at that time had. In reality, when you look at Nazi Germany, most of its tanks were absolute monsters; the Tiger 1 was an absolute monster. Later, the Tiger 2 came out with even thicker armor. Then eventually a war broke out between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, and Germany sent its Tiger 1s and 2s to control the situation, eventually reaching Kursk, which historically overpowered the cheap Soviet Union’s T-34s. In fact, one Tiger 1 is said to have received 252 hits, with more than 90-ish percent of them not penetrating through, but bouncing off. While the latter is hard to confirm, as the data on this is mixed, but the general view is there, the Tiger 1 reportedly wiped out numerous Soviet Union platoons of around 12 if each is assigned 4 T-34 tanks. The point is that’s how the Soviet Union functioned; it put all its hope into quantities rather than quality. There were plenty of reports claiming that T-34s were never comfortable, although most of the tanks from that era were like that. However, modern-day Russia goes the exact same route, and so does China. Although, most of the information concerning China is harder to find due to how information is handled there. However, based on evidence, China is going the exact same route as the Soviet Union did. While most of China’s weapons are arguably much better than today’s Russia’s, there are still a lot of nuances. The US has been manufacturing its most lethal destroyers, part of the US Navy’s Arleigh Burke DDGs class, but the US only manages to squeeze out 1.6 of these destroyers a year, according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies. Meanwhile, China is doubling that number, producing 3.1 destroyers a year. As you can tell from these numbers, there’s a massive problem on the US side, or so one would think. Russian and Chinese sources have been praising Chinese destroyers ever since media has gained traction on them. They look very well-made, too, while looking at the outside. However, the massive difference in production output is a massive issue. China’s navy already outnumbers US warships at sea, and the situation will likely get worse as time moves forward. Former United States Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has said the following regarding China’s output of warships per year: Look at the difference in shipbuilding between the United States and China. Deeply concerning. We have to do better in this arena, or we will not be the great naval power that we need to be for the 21st century. China is currently outnumbering US naval vessels on the Sea, with only exception of adding small speed boats, and regular small ships into the consideration, without that US still maintains an upper hand in terms of large ships, including destroyers. However, I just couldn’t forget that incident in the South China Sea involving two Chinese 052D-class destroyers. And before I say anything, I want to recommend everyone check out the footage from that incident. That Chinese destroyer that rammed into another destroyer was rapidly reducing speed and wasn’t even operating at even 50% of its maximum potential in terms of knot speed. That dent was absolutely massive for such a modern warship. If you think critically about this, the China’s 052D warships are basically identical to US Navy Arleigh Burke DDGs class warships, in terms of capabilities. However, it just so happens that there’s a massive weight difference. I already find that very odd. If you compare a US-made DDG-51 destroyer with a Chinese-made 052D, you arrive at an interesting conclusion. DDG-51 at full load capacity weighs from 8,300 to 9,700 tons; that’s absolutely massive weight for a warship. But then you compare a Chinese 052D to the US-made DDG-51 destroyer, and the Chinese 052D is said to only weigh 7,500 tons at max loads. As you can see, there’s a problem here, but there’s only one specific type of problem. Both these destroyers, in terms of capabilities and weapons on board, are the same. The US destroyer is 1 knot faster (31 knots) compared to that Chinese destroyer, whose maximum speed is 30 knots. So, there’s already a difference in engine performance. I thought that was interesting to point out. However, both of these destroyers have similar weapons on board; it is just that one is a Chinese variant compared to a US variant in terms of sensors and radars, VLS cells, and cannons. However, there’s a small difference already. The US DDG-51 is able to carry a maximum amount of 90 VLS cells, which basically are the vertical missile launching systems destroyers carry. They have long ranges and are able to destroy another warship without a person’s vision of that ship, thanks to the radar use. The Chinese-made 052D is able to carry only 64 VLS cells; however, that still doesn’t explain the large, over 2 thousand ton gap between the two warships, which is where the problem is. US warships have been built with very strong framing; some would call it overengineering, but as a democratic country and a country that values the lives of people and their safety on those ships, maximum survivability of its sailors was the biggest priority. You can’t say that about China’s 052D variant. If, in terms of weapons and capabilities, both the Chinese- and the US-made specified destroyers are the same in terms of capabilities and weapons on board, but there’s still a 2,000-ton gap, it is safe to assume it has to do with the overall engineering of that ship. There’s simply nothing else that I can take into consideration. In fact, the engine in 052D is weaker, but the difference in weight isn’t expected to be that different, although that information is confidential, as one can imagine. Going in depth over this, US destroyers have been made with heavy-duty framing, bulkheads (walls inside the ship, which are able to stop flooding if one part of the ship is compromised), and top-standard steel armor nicknamed hy-80 and hy-100 steel. That’s a very durable steel, but it comes with its own larger weight. Now, the only logical conclusion I can come up with is that the Chinese destroyers, based on the information I shared here and have at hand, haven’t been designed for the utmost survival, if you can call it that. All of which would explain why the 052D warship in the South China Sea managed to get its nose severely bent at extremely low speed, basically crushing the entire nose of the ship. This theoretically is already the strongest part of the ship. This is due to the triangle construction and the framing meeting the nose. I believe this is very good evidence to argue that Chinese warships have weaker framing and overall protection from foreign attacks. And this is where the whole issue comes about to; China has been very aggressive, bullying the Philippines and Taiwan. And while China’s output of warships is basically 2 times larger than the US’s, the US theoretically still has an upper hand. I say this with caution, because a sheer quantity of warships can overwhelm smaller numbers, but the amount of destroyers the US has is more than adequate to deal with the large amount of destroyers China currently has, which is 53. Compared to the US, which has 70. However, if China’s output continues, that’s when the overall issue will start, I believe. However, China values economy more than wars, which is also the only reason Taiwan still exists. So, they would never fight alone if they had to. China would be backed up by Russia, which together with their destroyer numbers would outnumber the US; that’s the only worst-case scenario that I can think of. In reality, if not for that incident in the South China Sea, we wouldn’t know a lot of information about Chinese destroyers, but it is safe to assume we now do. And while China has already been ridiculed on social media platforms for this shameful act of the captain, I am really unsure if these Chinese destroyers, which, as the name suggests, ought to handle some hits. They wouldn’t be able to handle any from a strong opponent like the US. There has been an incident in 2000 where a Yemeni speedboat rammed into a USS Cole destroyer, that was loaded with explosives, leaving a massive hole in the hull of the USS Cole. This led to 17 deaths of sailors, unfortunately, while wounding several dozen more. However, the ship survived and stayed afloat on the water. Yet, the USS Cole wasn’t engineered like today’s US destroyers are. The ship didn’t have any intriguing armor; it solely survived on its large bulkheads. And, I said all this to compare what would possibly happen to the Chinese 052D destroyer if the same occurred; likely the ship wouldn’t have made it. And remember, the USS Cole was an old ship and still made it; it was actually commissioned in 1996. I am very skeptical of how the Chinese navy would perform in actual combat against a strong navy. Their ship would immediately sink; there wouldn’t be even enough time to repair anything if you are hit by a VLS cell. Weak framing generally translates into broader damage. In the end, China’s naval capabilities aren’t as great as previously thought, thanks to the massive amount of information the incident in South China Sea brought as a result regarding China’s Navy. Written by That Guy, Noah Writer on Russo-Ukraine war, always sharing two sides of the story. Ukraine's fight for freedom and democracy supporter. Published in Predict where the future is written Get an email whenever That Guy, Noah publishes. Get an email whenever That Guy, Noah publishes. By signing up, you will create a Medium account if you don't already…
本文於 修改第 2 次
|
中國建造前進台灣的海、空軍基地 -- Allegra Mendelson
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
China builds new naval and air bases for Taiwan invasion Allegra Mendelson, 09/08/25 China is carrying out large-scale development of air and naval sites along its eastern coast, which experts say could be used to launch an invasion of Taiwan. In satellite images analysed by the Wall Street Journal, new berths for amphibious warships, as well as mega-airports, can be seen taking form. While the facilities could have multiple uses, China’s primary military focus is on Taiwan. Beijing claims Taiwan as its own, which the democratically elected government in Taipei strongly rejects, and has not ruled out the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control. “All of it goes to supporting China’s one military planning scenario, which is a Taiwan scenario,” Michael Dahm, a retired US navy intelligence officer, told the Wall Street Journal. The US and the UK have both turned their attention to the Indo-Pacific in recent years as China increases its aggression towards Taiwan and in the disputed South China Sea. 請至源網頁查看地圖 Both John Healey, the UK Defence Secretary, and Pete Hegseth, his US counterpart, have warned about Beijing’s rising threat, with Mr Hegseth claiming in May that an attack against Taiwan could be imminent. One new development that has caught analysts’ eyes is a new pier at the naval facility in Yueqing Bay (樂清灣), which is located north of Taiwan, off of China’s coastal city of Wenzhou (溫州,浙江省). The berth now measures over a mile long and could be used to dock several large ships. Approximately 20 vessels were seen docked at the pier recently, including tank transports, ship-to-shore landing craft, tankers and coast-guard cutters. Experts say that all of this hardware could be deployed in the event of an attack on Taiwan. A new helicopter base has also been built in Fujian province, which sits directly across the Taiwan Strait, which could be used to deploy troops to the country’s main island, as well as outlying islands, which are located even closer to China. 請至源網頁查看樂清灣軍港建築配置圖 Taiwan has focused its past military drills on several of these beaches, including Guanyin, Jiben, Beipu and Penghu, which are believed to be potential landing sites for an invasion. Satellite images also show the expansion of mega-airports in eastern China, with at least two in key locations for a possible attack against Taiwan – one near Xiamen and another near Fuzhou. The Xiamen Xiang’an International Airport, which is spread across Dadeng island (大膽島), has been under development for years. Dadeng is located less than 5km from one of Taiwan’s outlying islands, Kinmen, which is often referred to as a potential front line in any future assault. Images taken between 2014 and 2022 show the size of the airport nearly doubling after dredging was able to create more land. At the Fuzhou Changle International Airport, which is also strategically located across the Strait from Taiwan, a new runway has been built right on the water.
While these are currently civilian airports, experts say that if a war broke out, Beijing could suspend commercial flights and use them instead for military purposes, including aircraft refuelling and resupply of ammunition. Given their optimal location so close to Taiwan, they could also be used as a hub to bring in troops or aircraft from other locations across China before their deployment. The airports were also built to support huge quantities of passengers, meaning they are well connected by rail and road, which would be helpful when bringing in equipment. Today, China has one of the largest and strongest militaries in the world, with a strength of over two-million troops. While the People’s Liberation Army has been rapidly expanding and developing its hardware over the last two decades, with the latest technology on display at China’s massive military parade last week, it’s not a tested force. Unlike the US military, China’s military has never fought on a real battlefield and experts have previously told The Telegraph that the PLA tends to progress through imitation rather than innovation, which inherently holds its development back. Although the US provides Taiwan with weapons, the current US administration refuses to comment on whether it would come to the country’s defence in the event of an attack. However, most experts predict that the conflict could turn into a face-off between Beijing and Washington. US support could take many different forms, ranging from underwater assaults with submarines to missile strikes against Chinese forces. Experts say that the extent of involvement would likely come down to how the conflict came about, how well Taiwan is able to resist and what else is going on in the world at the time. Broaden your horizons with award-winning British journalism. Try The Telegraph free for 1 month with unlimited access to our award-winning website, exclusive app, money-saving offers and more.
本文於 修改第 1 次
|
解放軍能打仗嗎? - M. Taylor Fravel
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
請參見下文的《讀後》(即將刊出);並請參考此欄各相關文章。
Is China’s Military Ready for War? What Xi’s Purges Do—and Don’t—Mean for Beijing’s Ambitions M. Taylor Fravel, 07/18/25 Anew wave of purges has engulfed the senior leadership of China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army. Since the 20th National Party Congress in October 2022, more than 20 senior PLA officers from all four services—the army, navy, air force, and rocket force—have disappeared from public view or been removed from their posts. The absences of other generals have also been reported, which could foreshadow additional purges. Most notably, since the fall of 2023, three of the six uniformed members of the party’s Central Military Commission, the top body of the Chinese Communist Party charged with overseeing the armed forces, have been removed from their posts. The first to fall was Defense Minister Li Shangfu (李尚福), who was removed in October 2023 and expelled from the CCP in June 2024. Then, this past November, Miao Hua (苗華), the director of the CMC’s Political Work Department, which manages personnel and party affairs, was suspended for “serious violations of discipline” before being formally removed from the CMC last month. And most recently, the Financial Times reported that He Weidong (何衛東1、何衛東2 – 需訂閱), the second-ranked vice chair who has not appeared in public since early March, had been purged. Never before has half the CMC been dismissed in such a short period. Even stranger is the fact that all three generals had previously been promoted by Chinese leader Xi Jinping; they were appointed to the CMC itself in 2022, after Xi consolidated his control over the party at the 20th Party Congress. He Weidong was even a member of the Politburo, one of the party’s top decision-making bodies, comprised of the 24 highest-ranking party leaders. And Miao and He have been described by analysts as being part of a “Fujian faction” within the PLA, because the generals had been stationed in that province at the same time as Xi and are believed to have close ties with him. The fact that these high-profile purges are occurring now is not lost on outside observers. In 2027, the PLA will celebrate the 100th anniversary of its founding. It is also the year by which Xi expects China’s armed forces to have made significant strides in their modernization. Finally, the year is noteworthy because, according to former CIA Director Bill Burns, Xi has instructed the PLA to be “ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion” of Taiwan. Xi’s instructions do not indicate that China will in fact invade Taiwan that year, but, as Burns put it, they serve as “a reminder of the seriousness of his focus and his ambition.” 表單的底部With such ambitious goals set for the PLA, the question then arises as to how this new wave of purges could affect the PLA’s readiness. The purges themselves are likely to slow some weapons modernization programs, disrupt command structures and decision-making, and weaken morale—all of which would degrade the PLA’s ability to fight in the near to medium term. Beijing may now be forced to exercise greater caution before pursuing large-scale military operations, such as an amphibious assault on Taiwan, even as the PLA continues to pressure Taiwan with aerial activity and naval patrols around the island. Nevertheless, it is useful to remember that Beijing has rarely waited for the right conditions before ordering the PLA into battle. In 1950, for instance, Chinese forces intervened in support of Pyongyang in the Korean War, even though China’s economy and society had been devastated by years of civil war. In 1962, the PLA attacked India, even though China’s most senior military officer had recently been purged for questioning Mao Zedong’s disastrous Great Leap Forward. And in 1979, Beijing dispatched an ill-prepared PLA to Vietnam, where Chinese troops suffered significant losses for limited political gains. Now, as then, Chinese leaders may pursue war even if the domestic economic and political conditions appear unfavorable—and even if the PLA is not ready to fight. CASTAWAYS For outside observers, it is notoriously difficult to gather detailed information and analyze the ongoing purges in China. The CCP rarely announces them, and even when they are publicized, the charges leading to dismissal are often vaguely described only as violations of discipline. Charges announced publicly may also not reflect the true underlying reason for an official’s removal from office. Still, there are several likely reasons that Li, Miao, He, and other senior officers were purged. First, a common reason for many purges is graft. Corruption has long plagued the PLA and the CCP more broadly. Since Xi came to power in 2012, Beijing has more than doubled its defense budget in order to fund the military’s rapid modernization. This flood of new money, especially related to weapons procurement and construction projects, has increased opportunities for officers and defense industry executives to pad their budgets or skim money off the top. Before becoming defense minister, Li had been in charge of the CMC’s weapons development department, which oversees the procurement process. A few months before Li’s dismissal, both the commander and commissar of the PLA Rocket Force, and two of the commissar’s deputies, were all detained. The PLARF’s rapid expansion on Li’s watch, including the construction of more than 300 silos and the significant expansion of its ballistic missile arsenal, likely offered many opportunities for self-enrichment. Some generals may also have been purged because they were engaging in bribery related to promotions and patronage networks. This has been a long-standing problem for the PLA: often, the most well-connected officers, rather than the most competent ones, are promoted to higher ranks. Miao, the head of the Political Work Department, oversaw personnel and appointments. If the promotions he signed off on were not strictly merit-based, it may have contributed to his undoing. Miao’s predecessor, Zhang Yang, was placed under investigation in 2017 for similar reasons. Less than two months later, he died by suicide, and the following year, he was posthumously expelled from the party. CMC members and other senior officers may also have been removed if they were deemed to be using personnel appointments to create their own power centers, or “mountaintops,” within the PLA. Senior officers who prioritize the accrual of personal power are a liability for Xi because they create conflicting loyalties and factional tensions within the armed forces that can harm operational readiness. Because Miao and He were newly appointed members of the CMC, they may have sought to strengthen their positions at the expense of veteran members, such as the first-ranked Vice Chair Zhang Youxia (張又俠), a childhood friend of Xi’s. Xi has kept Zhang, now 75, on the CMC despite the normal retirement age of 68. Finally, it’s possible that the purged senior officers committed no offense at all beyond incompetence: Xi may simply have been dissatisfied with their performance and lost confidence in their ability to lead and achieve his goals for the PLA. As Joel Wuthnow and Phillip Saunders observed in their new book, China’s Quest for Military Supremacy, the structure of the relationship between the party and the armed forces makes it hard for Xi to trust his generals. The PLA enjoys substantial autonomy with little direct supervision, so the party must rely on the PLA to discipline itself. Moreover, the highly specialized nature of modern military affairs means that the party lacks the expertise to ensure that the PLA is meeting the party’s modernization goals. INSECURITY DILEMMA Whatever the reasons for the recent purges, they will almost certainly degrade China’s combat readiness and the Chinese leadership’s confidence in the PLA’s capabilities. In order for the PLA to prevail in potential conflicts on China’s periphery, especially a war over Taiwan, it seeks to master joint operations, which combine elements from the different services and branches to achieve military objectives. The complexity of such operations requires unity of command and integrated planning, the interoperability of platforms within and across services, delegation and flexibility, and robust command, control, communications, and surveillance systems. Reorganizing the PLA to better conduct such operations was one of the main reasons Xi launched unprecedented organizational reforms in 2015. Now, although Xi has a number of reasons to avoid taking major military action against Taiwan, he may also be concerned about how well the PLA would perform so soon after the purges. If the CCP uncovered corruption in the weapons procurement system, for instance, the party leadership may doubt the reliability and performance of the advanced weapons systems developed and fielded over the past decade. According to U.S. intelligence, some of China’s new ballistic missiles were filled with water, not fuel, and the blast doors constructed for new silos needed to be repaired or replaced. Efforts are likely underway to review and recertify new and planned weapons systems to ensure they will function as expected, which may slow their development and deployment. The purges also disrupt the functioning of the entire command system. The CMC, a seven-member body that Xi chairs to oversee all aspects of the PLA, has 15 subordinate units. Yet with three of its six uniformed officers missing in action, key decisions relating to operations, planning, and force development may be delayed until new permanent members are appointed. Before joining the CMC, for example, He played a key role in planning operations in his capacity as head of the Eastern Theater Command, whose forces would play a central role in any operation against Taiwan; now the apex of military decision-making in China lacks someone with his experience. Decision-making and command may also be affected in other ways. Officers at all levels are likely to become much more risk averse for fear of making decisions that could later ensnare them in a purge. The willingness of more junior officers to take initiative will also suffer, reinforcing the PLA’s already strong tendency toward centralization in decision-making that undermines effective joint operations. Officers at all levels will spend more time engaged in political work and study sessions related to party ideology and discipline at the expense of their professional military tasks. Morale may suffer, too, as officers worry who might be next, fueling distrust within the officer corps and weakening cohesion. READY OR NOT But the focus on how the leadership upheaval in the PLA may affect its operational readiness should not obscure a basic fact: Xi may well deem it necessary to fight even if the PLA is not completely prepared. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, China has usually gone to war when conditions appeared to be unfavorable. In 1950, after much debate among the party’s senior leaders, Beijing decided to intervene in the Korean War, transforming the conflict into one largely between China and the United States. At the time, the CCP was focused on consolidating control over the entire country and rebuilding the economy after its war with the Nationalists. Many senior party and military leaders, weary after years of a punishing civil war, were reluctant to go up against the strongest force in the world. Yet in the end, the strategic rationale of keeping the United States off China’s border (and ideally off the entire Korean Peninsula) trumped these concerns. Yet by the time of the armistice in 1953, China’s armed forces suffered more than 500,000 casualties, while the war ended roughly where it began, along the 38th parallel, and the United States began to build an alliance network along China’s eastern periphery. Early the following decade, China attacked India’s forces on the two countries’ disputed border. At the time, Mao was on the back foot politically after his disastrous Great Leap Forward, an industrialization campaign in which as many as 45 million people perished in famines. Yet Chinese party and military leaders concluded that war was necessary to blunt Indian pressure on Tibet and restore stability to the Chinese-Indian border. Moreover, the attack occurred only a few years after Peng Dehuai (彭德懷), China’s top military officer throughout the 1950s, was purged for questioning the wisdom of the Great Leap Forward. Peng’s dismissal also led to the removal of other senior military officers who were seen as closely tied to him, shaking up the PLA high command. In this instance, China enjoyed overwhelming superiority on the battlefield, destroying Indian forces and achieving its political objectives, as India did not challenge China on the border militarily for the next two decades. In 1979, Beijing invaded Vietnam, ostensibly to teach Hanoi a lesson for entering into an alliance with the Soviet Union, then China’s nemesis, and for invading Cambodia, which Beijing was supporting. At the time, China had only started to recover from the economic and political upheaval of the Cultural Revolution. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping remained in a power struggle with Mao’s chosen successor, Hua Guofeng. And the PLA was divided between Maoists and reformers. Deng was keenly aware of the PLA’s shortcomings, having described the force as “bloated, lax, arrogant, extravagant, and lazy”—hardly in fighting form. Deng even delayed the invasion by a month after his chief military adviser reported that the troops were not ready. Nevertheless, the need to signal resolve to counter Soviet encirclement outweighed the state of readiness. PLA forces paid a high price, with more than 31,000 casualties in just one month of fighting, and Vietnam did not withdraw its military presence from Cambodia until the late 1980s. These military actions in Korea, India, and Vietnam represent the largest uses of armed force that the PLA has undertaken since the founding of the People’s Republic. In all three cases, political calculations trumped military readiness and favorable domestic conditions. Chinese leaders viewed these operations as conflicts of necessity, not choice or opportunity. If the recent purges harm the PLA’s readiness and reflect Xi’s confidence in the PLA, then opportunistic uses of force may be less likely in the near to medium term. But if Xi views military action against Taiwan as necessary, he will still order the PLA into battle. M. TAYLOR FRAVEL is Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. More by M. Taylor Fravel 表單的頂端
Subscribe to Foreign Affairs This Week: Our editors’ top picks, delivered free to your inbox every Friday. Sign Up >> 請至原網頁訂閱《外交事務》的《本週文摘》 * Note that when you provide your email address, the Foreign Affairs Privacy Policy and Terms of Use will apply to your newsletter subscription.
本文於 修改第 2 次
|
從《中國石墨炸彈的無形殺傷力》談台海局勢
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
0. 前言 從軍事技術觀點看,伊瑟林先生的報導/分析應該放在「中國軍事力量篇」這一欄。但他談到「兩岸關係」的本質(1);以及一旦中國領導階層認為不得不採取「激烈手段」來處理台海局勢時,石墨炸彈在此情境下的應用和可能效應;因此,我覺得把它放在此欄更為適當。 補正:我本來計畫將本文和伊瑟林先生大作放在「兩岸關係」一欄,才有以上這一段話。但年紀大了,刊出時一不注意而放到此欄;重新改置又覺得難免「脫了褲子放屁」之譏;不如「將錯就錯」。 1. 台海局勢 台海局勢是否可能導致所有人都不願意看到的「兵戎相見」,是大家都很關心和常常擔憂的問題。本欄和本部落格其它各欄都有從不同角度)的相關報導/分析(隔離、封鎖、武裝衝突等等)。這是我第一次讀到「石墨炸彈」及其效應的訊息;轉載於此,跟大家分享。 在此略表淺見: 我一向認為兩岸演變成「大動干戈」的機率很低。我這個判斷的基礎不是「民族」、「文化」、或「血濃於水」這類文宣/意識型態的概念,而在於這種狀況不符合中、美兩國統治集團的「核心利益」。 我就不長篇大論的從國際局勢或經濟數字來分析(其實我也沒有這個功力);以下只「能近取譬」的說兩句: 沒有一個花了幾十年心機、心血、心力,走過出生入死情境n次,才爬上最高領導位置的人,會為了一些虛無飄渺,他們自己用來唬、騙、詐愚夫愚婦的概念或口號(該欄2025/08/21貼文第2節),去面對和承擔一旦失敗就要失去發號司令、吃香喝辣、掌控他人生死地位和權力的風險。我曾估計過(當然未必準確):如果三個月內無法「武裝解放」台灣,前線總指揮將被「陣前換將」;如果六個月內還是「師老無功」,總書記將「引咎辭職」。任何一位政治常委是這種做決定不經過大腦的人,他早就去蹲秦城監獄,不會在中南海晃悠了。 2. 結論 1) 各位兄弟姐妹安啦!台海無戰事!! 2) 上述情況當然不是百分百、板上釘釘的事。「戰爭是另一種延續政治對話的方式」(該欄2025/08/21貼文第1.1 節)!一旦因為這個或那個因素,搞到老百姓揭竿而起,或下面各山頭、軍頭蠢蠢欲動,領導人覺得手中大權即將隨風而去的時候,在「兩害相權取其輕」鐵律下,此人孤注一擲、鋌而走險的機率須是有的。 3) 至於台灣領導人,不論他/她們如何作死,在中南海高層領導人眼中,不過是小丑在跳樑,乩童在起乩;應該不會影響其既定方針,引起大動作反應。當然,如果川瘋跨越紅線,撼搖到北京政府執政的「正當性」,那就一切都不好說了。 附註: 1. 請見該文中下面這段文字:The tension across the Taiwan Strait is not about full-scale invasion. It is about narrative control.。
本文於 修改第 4 次
|
中國石墨炸彈的無形殺傷力 -- Brian Iselin
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
The Silent Weapon: How China’s Graphite Bomb Could Black Out the Next War It doesn’t explode. It doesn’t kill. But it can paralyse entire cities — here’s why graphite bombs redefine modern warfare Brian Iselin, 07/31/25 Emergency planners work to a blunt rule of thumb: communities should be self-sufficient for 72 hours when the grid fails. That isn’t prophecy — it’s logistics. Water pumping, cold chains, hospital devices, comms, payments: all sit on top of electricity. After three days without it, essential services start to fray. The Day the Lights Went Out In a town near Novi Sad in 1999, an elderly Serbian man lit a candle for his dying wife. Their respirator had stopped. Not from shrapnel. Not from bombing. But because NATO dropped filaments of carbon on the power station miles away. He didn’t know the word “graphite bomb.” All he knew was the darkness. A quarter-century later, China unveiled its own graphite bomb: a missile-borne device designed not to blast, but to blind. The People’s Liberation Army claims it can scatter 90 submunitions, each spraying synthetic carbon fibres over a 10,000-square-metre area. The effect? Widespread electrical failure without a single building flattened. This is not a step forward in warfare. It is a shift into something older, something mythic. A method of assault that disables instead of destroys. A tool that erases evidence, disrupts memory, and punishes the ordinary person most of all. What Is a Graphite Bomb? A graphite — or “blackout” — bomb disperses clouds of ultra-fine, conductive carbon filaments over air-insulated high-voltage equipment. The fibres bridge gaps, cause flashovers and shorts, trip protection, and the grid falls dark. The hardware remains largely unbroken; the effect is disruption rather than demolition. The US used variants in Iraq (1991) and Serbia/Kosovo (1999) to significant tactical effect, with power often restored in hours or days. In June 2025, China’s state broadcaster ran an animation of a domestically produced “blackout” weapon fired from a land vehicle and dispensing ~90 cylinder-shaped submunitions that burst in mid-air over a substation. The clip claimed an affected area of at least 10,000 m²; independent outlets reported an estimated ~290 km range and ~490 kg warhead, though Beijing did not confirm designation or status. Treat those numbers as indicative, not authoritative. The Silent Siege Graphite munitions attack flows — of power, information, and trust. They’re ideal for “pressure not conquest” strategies: disable grids, force emergency responses, test narratives and alliances. A 24-hour blackout across Taiwan’s west coast would disrupt ministries, ports and aviation systems without a single crater, and would probe crisis decision-making under ambiguity. What does a state do when it loses electricity but sees no enemy? How do citizens react when there is no clear aggressor? Confusion replaces fury. Inaction replaces resolve. China’s reveal is calculated. It is not a test. It is a message: we don’t need to invade to bring you to your knees. Soft-Kill Weapons and the Trickster Archetype These are not brute-force tools. They are archetypal trickster weapons. Devious, non-linear, disruptive. Not designed to win battles, but to upend balance. Their job is not to kill soldiers. It is to unnerve populations. When a blackout disables respirators in a hospital, death still follows. It simply doesn’t make headlines. Modern war is no longer about who holds the ground. It’s about who controls the flow: of energy, information, perception. Graphite bombs are not tools of conquest. They are tools of doubt. The Ethics of Ambiguity Western militaries called these devices “non-lethal.” The term obscures more than it reveals. Soft-kill weapons create indirect casualties. They destroy trust in systems. They force populations into survival mode. They also blur responsibility. Who do you blame when the lights go out? Is it sabotage, or accident? This ambiguity is strategic. A hesitant society is a vulnerable one. The real target of a graphite bomb is public confidence. What It Isn’t (and Isn’t Meant to Be) * Not EMP: No wide-area electromagnetic pulse; effects are local to exposed HV assets. * Not cyber: There’s debris and forensic residue; it’s physical, not code. * Not clean: “Non-lethal” is a misnomer when life-sustaining devices fail. Human rights reporting after prior power-grid strikes warned of serious civilian impact. Why China Wants This Now Graphite bombs suit a kind of warfare that values pressure over conquest. The tension across the Taiwan Strait is not about full-scale invasion. It is about narrative control. A short, sharp blackout would test resilience (老百姓的韌性) more than concrete (鋼骨水泥). It would stress hospital backups, water pressure, traffic control and data centres. The aim: fracture confidence without forcing a shooting war. That is the point of soft-kill tools: they shape the political battlespace first. Such a strike would not even need to be permanent. A blackout of 24 hours is enough to test readiness, sow distrust, and fracture alliance confidence. Attribution and Escalation Initial confusion is likely — was it equipment failure, weather, or sabotage? But graphite filaments, canister fragments and dispersion patterns are discoverable. The strategic gambit is less about deniability than tempo: impose costs quickly, avoid images of rubble, and complicate proportional response while signalling capability. We must resist the urge to sanitise these tools. The graphite bomb does not kill cleanly. It kills indirectly. Anonymously. Targeting dual-use infrastructure sits in the grey zones of proportionality and necessity. The munitions don’t shatter buildings, but they can still cost lives indirectly. Use must be carefully calibrated to target military alone, and indirectly incur the very minimum. If the effect is widespread and foreseeable, calling it “non-lethal” obscures the harm. How to Reduce Vulnerability (Practical, Not Perfect) * Harden substations: Use gas-insulated (GIS) switchgear where feasible; retrofit insulation/bird guards on AIS yards * Surge & flashover control: Install line arresters, improve grounding, and maintain vegetation/contamination clearances. * Rapid restoration: Pre-position washdown crews and equipment to remove conductive debris; stock spare transformers and mobile substations. * System design: Build microgrids, black-start paths, and islanding capability; keep manual switching procedures current. * Civic readiness: Public guidance for 72-hour self-reliance reduces panic and frees capacity for the most critical loads. China’s graphite bomb is a weapon of the future because it does not look like one. It hides behind silence. It attacks belief, not just infrastructure. * Bottom line: graphite bombs don’t end modern war; they prefigure it — shifting contests from territory to systems and from rubble to reliability. If your society can’t ride out three days without power, that’s a resilience problem your adversary has already measured. This article took 12 hours to research & write — and 3 decades of lived insight. If it gave you something valuable, consider tipping €2. That’s almost the cost of a coffee — and it fuels the next story. Buy me a coffee ☕ You’re not just supporting content. You’re backing independent thought. Written by Brian Iselin Security & Defence; World Affairs; Human Rights. Here's my new Substack. Get 10% discount before 15 June! https://biselin67.substack.com/66b02da4 My other articles on Defence and Security How Sweden Secures Europe’s North Europe’s Moral Cowardice: How the EU’s China Policy Betrays Its Own Commitment to Democracy Is NATO still the answer for Ukraine — or is it time to rethink European defence? How Norway Can Save Europe 10 Things the EU Must Do to Build Collective Defence Naked Before Our Enemies: Europe’s €500 Billion Survival Plan… The EU’s Dilemma and Ukraine’s Fight NATO’s Dangerous Blind Spot How Europe Is Defying China’s Grip 5 Reasons Sweden Crushes Submarines The Great NATO Defence Spending Illusion (Part 2/2) The Great NATO Defence Spending Illusion (Part ½) References * Asia Times. (2025, July 23). China’s new graphite bomb signals shift to ‘silent siege’ of Taiwan. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2025/07/chinas-new-graphite-bomb-signals-shift-to-silent-siege-of-taiwan/ * Caliber.az. (2025, July 24). Beijing’s “graphite web”: A new superweapon to attack power grids. Caliber.az. https://caliber.az/en/post/beijing-s-graphite-web-a-new-superweapon-to-attack-power-grids * South China Morning Post. (2025, July 22). Video teases new Chinese blackout bomb that can knock out enemy power stations. SCMP. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3316270/video-teases-new-chinese-blackout-bomb-can-knock-out-enemy-power-stations * Wikipedia contributors. (2025, August 11). Graphite bomb. In Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graphite_bomb * World Bank. (2019). Infrastructure disruptions: How instability breeds household vulnerability. World Bank Group. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/880611560861989682/pdf/Infrastructure-Disruptions-How-Instability-Breeds-Household-Vulnerability.pdf
本文於 修改第 1 次
|
從中國巨無霸秘密軍事基地剖析其全球戰略 -- Sahil Nair
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
下文洋洋大觀;從各個子標題看,內容可說面面俱到。我一時三刻還來不及消化;不能就其深入度和客觀性背書。率先登出,謹供對中國軍事、國際現勢、或地緣政治等議題有興趣的朋友們參考。 Inside China’s Secret Military Megacity: The Alarming Signs of a Coming War Sahil Nair, 07/07/25 What I saw inside this colossal military complex sent chills down my spine. Could this be the spark that ignites World War 3? Image generated by the author using Gork AI 請至原網頁查看圖片 I’ve been watching hostilities around the world for years now, but nothing prepared me for what I found about China’s newest initiative. The first time I saw satellite images of what is going up in southwest Beijing, I had to double-check the coordinates. What I discovered shocked and worried me with what this could mean to global security. The Story Behind China’s Secret Military Fortress Let me rewind to early 2022. I was reviewing routine satellite images when I saw something odd roughly 30 kilometres from Beijing’s city centre. Where once a hodgepodge of residences mixed with empty land, it was all being swept from the board. I figured it was some housing thing at first — China’s got enough of those to go around, I’m sure. But as the months went by, the scale was impossible to ignore. This would not be just another building project. The Chinese government was constructing something huge, something that would make the Pentagon look tiny. And they were doing so by hundreds of millions of Google searches with a degree of privacy that made my investigative antennae go into overdrive. Is China Building the Ultimate Wartime Command Centre? After months of investigation, the truth emerged. China is building what military analysts now call the “Beijing Military City” — a sprawling, 1,500-acre fortress of tunnels and bunkers capable of withstanding nuclear strikes and only the second city to be so thoroughly protected — that will serve as a command centre for the People’s Liberation Army. For context, the Pentagon stretches across 148 acres. What China is constructing is 10 times bigger. I’ve seen building projects but not like this. More than 100 cranes are in simultaneous operation at Miral’s site, working around the clock under floodlights that illuminate the massive complex from space. Just the underground facilities cover 5 square kilometres — space to store six months of supplies for 50,000 people. And these are not mere storage spaces. The deepest bunkers, according to intelligence reports, involve alternating layers of steel, concrete and polymer gel — a structure that functions much like a car bumper to absorb the energy of nuclear blasts. Why This Military Mega City is Sparking Global Panic The more I dug into this story, the more I realized that this isn’t happening in a vacuum. China has quietly transformed its military with one goal in mind: complete military modernization by 2027. That’s not an arbitrary date — it is the centenary of the People’s Liberation Army and the US Department of Défense sources say Beijing wants total preparedness to take Taiwan by then if needed. The timing is no coincidence. I’ve seen China’s military strategy change over the last decade and this facility is the realization of Xi Jinping’s dream. This is something other than the classic military base, dedicated to the housing of troops and war-fighting machinery; and yet, like such bases, it enables the wars of the future — wars far more detached than Attila’s sacking of Rome or Ulysses S. Grant’s reducing of Vicksburg — to be fought from underground. The Technology That Makes This Base Unique What makes this extremely scary is how high tech this facility is. In my research, I found three innovations that distinguish it from any military base I have studied:
Nuclear Survivability: The deepest of the bunkers are constructed 30 meters below ground in a state-of-the-art design that can withstand bunker-busting bombs. The granite mountains naturally absorb the shockwave, meaning these bunkers are 40 percent more survivable than older designs. EMP Resistant: Power lines will be below-ground and cooled using liquid nitrogen circulated in pipes — a technology borrowed from China’s quantum research labs. That is, the base can remain in operation even after electromagnetic pulse attacks that could cripple most facilities. AI Amalgamation 18 July 2024: I noticed a test here in which 1,200 drones piloted by AI took off and faked strikes on Taiwan’s defences. The coordination level was more than I’d ever seen. China’s Growing Global Military Network Image generated by the author using Gork AI 請至原網頁查看圖片 As coverage of the Beijing institution has dominated headlines, I’ve been following China’s growing international reach. What I uncovered is a global strategy being pursued in tandem worldwide, one that Western leaders need to wake up to. Djibouti: 2017 saw the official opening the China’s first overseas military base for anti-piracy work. But satellite imagery has also shown below-ground bunkers covering 23,000 square meters — big enough for missiles or drones. The geography means China is able to observe US assets in real time. Tajikistan: China constructed a base in the Pamir Mountains at 13,000 feet that was so secret the world only knew about it in 2024. I have seen leaked documents revealing that China secured full ownership in exchange for cancelling $1.2 billion of Tajik debt. Atlantic Plans: Since 2023, China has been angling for a naval base in Equatorial Guinea’s port city, Bata. This would be winging US military hubs and directly confronting NATO’s southern wing. The Link Between Military Expansion and Diplomatic Muscle In reporting this story, I found out the Beijing military city isn’t China’s only controversial endeavour. The timing clashes with China’s attempt to build a “super embassy” beside the Tower of London — one several times bigger than the Royal Albert Hall. Security and intelligence officials from both the UK and the United States have raised serious question marks over this embassy. The White House informed me that they are “deeply concerned about giving China potential access to sensitive communications of one of our closest allies” and would be willing to brief Congress on the matter. The embassy project is said to have been revived by direct intervention by Xi Jinping. These aren’t separate initiatives. But it plays into a broad Chinese approach of militarily powerful presence at home and overseas, the military fortress back home and the mammoth embassy abroad that subtly serve to consolidate China as the world’s next great power. How the World is Responding to China’s Military Buildup The global reaction has been fast and alarming. In March 2025, the Pentagon published a 200-page report with an alarming conclusion: China’s nuclear and conventional forces are expanding at a much faster rate than during any American war game. Taiwan’s Frantic Readiness: Taiwan-based TSMC supplies 92% of the world’s advanced microchips, and the stakes couldn’t be higher. Taiwan is also constructing underground factories and will produce more than 1,000 anti-ship rockets by 2026. But last month TSMC’s chairman conceded that no science can thwart a determined incursion. Japan’s Military Awakening: Japan doubled its defense spending to $55 billion in 2024, placing missiles on Okinawa’s islands a mere 110 kilometers away from Taiwan. I had never in my life seen Japan move so fast on military issues. The Philippines’ Strategic U-Turn: After years of delay, the Philippines gave the United States access to nine military bases as it confronts the South China Sea. That is diametrically opposite to the purely agnostic position they have taken in the past. India’s Border Fortifications: India expedited construction of border roads near Tibet, where Chinese and Indian troops fought a pitched battle in 2020. The mountain passes, meanwhile, are getting more and more militarized. The Nuclear Survival Strategy Behind the Bunkers One of the most fascinating aspects of my research was to discover the base’s survival technology. Currently, China has about 500 nuclear warheads, compared with America’s 5,000, although the Pentagon warns that the number could triple by 2035. The ventilation systems in the Beijing facility can filter radiation for 90 days. Hydroponic farms could also feed 10,000 people forever. This isn’t just another military base — it’s a doomsday ark for members of China’s political elite. During the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, Mao had hidden bunkers constructed outside Beijing because he was paranoid that the Soviets had nukes. And the fears our leaders face today are not as different as one might think, although our technology is so much better. The existing bunkers would make Mao’s tunnels look like subway stations. Why This Massive Investment Reveals China’s True Intentions After months of investigation, I think this facility illustrates a profound shift in China’s military strategy. For decades, the People’s Liberation Army functioned as a series of separate warring forces — the army, the navy, the air force, all fighting for resources. Xi Jinping’s answer is radical centralization. This base contrasts cyber, space, special forces command structures under one roof. A leaked 2023 PLA memo puts it in black and white: By 2027, each theatre command is to be fully integrated into Beijing’s headquarters. That’s no more rogue generals, no more miscommunications. Every rocket launch, every cyber attack is signed off from this bunker. This is a total transformation of how China wants to fight wars. The Global Power Shift This Represents What I lose sleep over is grasping what this actually means for global power relations. America’s system of 750 overseas bases was unassailable for decades. Now China is demonstrating it has the reach to match that — not just with sheer numbers, but with scale, secrecy and next-generation technology. The Beijing Military City is more than just a base. It’s a statement. China is signaling to the world it is ready to challenge American hegemony, and it has the infrastructure to support that challenge. The Debt-for-Bases Strategy That’s Reshaping Geopolitics There’s one trend I found in my research that’s extremely troubling. Wherever China has established or is contemplating a military base is in a country heavily indebted to Beijing in the form of Belt and Road loans. When Sri Lanka was unable to repay its debts in 2022, China seized control of Hambantota Port. With 22 African countries in debt distress, there may be more bases to come. This isn’t mindless growth, it is using leverage strategically to amass military will. What This Means for the Future of Global Conflict Image generated by the author using Gork AI 請至原網頁查看圖片 As I near the end of my reportorial journey, I am coming to some sobering conclusions about the shape of warfare to come in the coming decades. The Beijing Military City is China’s gamble for the future of war: centralized control, operations driven by artificial intelligence and the capacity to endure and coordinate in nuclear exchanges. Whether this will help avert with threats war or provoke fight yet to be seen. But this much, at least, is clear: the balance of global power is changing, and this sprawling complex is both tangible evidence and symbol of that shift. The Questions That Keep Military Analysts Awake After working on this story for months, I have difficult questions that don’t have any reassuring answers: Is China getting ready for defence, or is this the shallow end of the next great world war? The scale and secrecy amount to something much more than defensive readiness. And with 2027 just over the horizon — the date by which China aims to fully modernize its military — how will this installation alter the strategic calculus for confrontations involving Taiwan, the South China Sea and beyond? Is the world capable of adequately addressing this new challenge at a time when conflicts are continuing to erupt in Ukraine and the Middle East? My Final Thoughts on This Unprecedented Development I have watched military developments for years, and I can tell you, I have never seen anything like this. There is more to the Beijing Military City than militarism writ large — it signifies a significant evolution in how China sees its role in the world. The fusion of enormous scale, advanced technology and strategic positioning of the site produces capabilities that did not previously exist. Whether that makes the world safer though deterrence or more dangerous by enhancing the risk of conflict is still the most important question of the day. What I can say is this: dismissing or minimizing this trend would be a mistake. The world is different, and we have to learn what that difference is for all of us. Construction proceeds around the clock, the cranes never stop, satellite images show no means of stopping. Six years from now, China will have produced something never before seen in the history of the military-industrial complex. It’s not a matter of whether this is all different now; it’s how we respond to that difference. What do you think? Is this actually the initial stages of a novel world war, or a simple defensive stand? It could be a question that shapes the path of the next few decades. References and Sources This comprehensive analysis was compiled from multiple sources and ongoing research into China’s military developments. The information presented here draws from: Primary Sources: 1. YouTube Analysis: “China’s New Military Command Centre” - 2. The Economic Times: “Is China gearing up for World War III? New Beijing mega military city with nuclear bunker raises alarms” Additional Research Sources: * Satellite imagery analysis from various commercial providers * Pentagon reports on China’s military modernization * Intelligence assessments from multiple allied nations * Academic studies on China’s Belt and Road Initiative * Leaked military documents and strategic communications * Expert interviews with defence analysts and former military officials Methods: It took months of cross-referencing several intelligence sources against imagery analysis from space and monitoring construction through available surveillance in order to produce this story. All reports are corroborated to the extent possible from multiple sources on the ground. Disclaimer: Though effort has been made to confirm the accuracy of the information presented, the reader is advised that some details mentioned may be speculative and could not be confirmed with available sources. The analysis is based on the current evidence available at the time of publication and could change with further evidence. Written by Sahil Nair Student of Psychology and Philosophy. Opinionated writer practicing in a wandering mind... Published in The Geopolitical Economist In The Global geopolitics, truth is one, but the wise interpret it differently.— Here, we interpret these diversions
本文於 修改第 2 次
|
|
|