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川、普野合後之歐洲--開欄文
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2025/02/17 16:08 瀏覽961 ｜回應13｜推薦1 |
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英國首相強硬.表態 -- David Mercer
(此為本文原標題，02/24改為現在的標題。「川、普」 者，「川普與普丁」之合稱也。)
我不熟悉歐洲政局，也很少關注。偶而讀到的評論，對史塔默並不看好。但從他這個正式發言，我認為他的國際觀相當靠譜。做為二流國家的領袖，真是「好樣的！」
下文中的 “Before attending an emergency summit with European leaders in Paris on Monday, …”，請見下一篇報導。也請參考《國際現勢：2025》，以及《歐洲各國領袖積極準備第三次世界大戰》一欄。
PM 'ready' to put troops on ground in Ukraine to protect peace
David Mercer - BBC News, 02/17/25
Sir Keir Starmer has said he is "ready and willing" to put UK troops on the ground in Ukraine to help guarantee its security as part of a peace deal.
Writing in the Daily Telegraph, the UK prime minister said securing a lasting peace in Ukraine was "essential if we are to deter Putin from further aggression in the future".
Before attending an emergency summit with European leaders in Paris on Monday, Sir Keir said the UK was prepared to contribute to security guarantees to Ukraine by "putting our own troops on the ground if necessary".
"I do not say that lightly," he wrote. "I feel very deeply the responsibility that comes with potentially putting British servicemen and women in harm's way."
The prime minister added: "But any role in helping to guarantee Ukraine's security is helping to guarantee the security of our continent, and the security of this country."
The end of Russia's war with Ukraine "when it comes, cannot merely become a temporary pause before Putin attacks again", Sir Keir said.
UK troops could be deployed alongside soldiers from other European nations alongside the border between Ukrainian-held and Russian-held territory.
Sir Keir's announcement comes after the former head of the Army, Lord Dannatt, told the BBC the UK military was "so run down" it could not lead any future peacekeeping mission in Ukraine.
The PM has previously only hinted that British troops could be involved in safeguarding Ukraine after a ceasefire.
He is due to visit President Donald Trump in Washington later this month and said a "US security guarantee is essential for a lasting peace, because only the US can deter Putin from attacking again".
Sir Keir is meeting with other European leaders in response to concerns the US is moving forward with Russia on peace talks that will lock out the continent.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio plans to meet Russian officials in Saudi Arabia in the coming days, US officials say.
On Saturday the US special envoy to Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, said European leaders would be consulted only and not take part in any talks between the US and Russia.
A senior Ukrainian government source told the BBC on Sunday that Kyiv has not been invited to talks between the US and Russia.
Trump earlier this week announced he had had a lengthy conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and that negotiations to stop the "ridiculous war" in Ukraine would begin "immediately".
Trump then "informed" Zelensky of his plan.
On Sunday, Trump said that he expected Zelensky to be involved in the talks. He also said he would allow European nations to buy US weapons for Ukraine.
Asked by the BBC about his timetable for an end to fighting, Trump said only that "we're working to get it done" and laid the blame for the war on the previous administration's Ukraine policies.
Writing in the Telegraph, Sir Keir said "peace cannot come at any cost" and "Ukraine must be at the table in these negotiations, because anything less would accept Putin's position that Ukraine is not a real nation".
He added: "We cannot have another situation like Afghanistan, where the US negotiated directly with the Taliban and cut out the Afghan government - in reference to a deal negotiated by Trump's first administration, which was later enacted by the Biden administration.
"I feel sure that President Trump will want to avoid this too," said Sir Keir
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Sir Keir said Ukraine's path to Nato membership was "irreversible" and European nations "must increase our defence spending and take on a greater role" in the alliance.
The UK currently spends around 2.3% of GDP on defence and has committed to increase defence spending to a 2.5% share of the economy, without giving a timeframe for this.
Trump has called for Nato members to spend 5% of GDP on defence, while Nato secretary general Mark Rutte has suggested allies should spend more than 3%.
Lord Dannatt - who was head of the Army from 2006 to 2009 - told the BBC up to 40,000 UK troops would be needed on rotation for a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine and "we just haven't got that number available".
He said, in total, a force to keep the peace would require about 100,000 troops on the ground and the UK would have to supply "quite a proportion of that and we really couldn't do it".
The meeting in Paris called by French President Emmanuel Macron will see Sir Keir joined by leaders from Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark along with the presidents of the European Council and European Commission, and Rutte.
相關訊息：
Ukraine end game: What each side wants from peace deal
Ukraine in maps: Tracking the war with Russia
Trump wants peace. Ukrainians fear what that might look like
Analysis: Vance's blast at Europe ignores Ukraine and defence agenda
本文於 2025/02/25 06:13 修改第 8 次
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軍備支出與社會福利不可得兼 - Ralph Schoellhammer
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2025/03/17 12:02 推薦1 |
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請參見本欄上一篇評論，並請參考：Rearmament is a noble lie: Magical thinking has left Britain defenceless；其主旨應該跟下文相當。我沒有訂閱《獨立思考》網誌，無法閱讀和轉登此文。
EU defence proposal is just a debt-union, not a serious course correction
Ralph Schoellhammer, 03/14/25
It is not entirely without irony that the “The Most Successful Peace Project in the History of Mankind” is currently planning the continent’s most ambitious armaments programme since the end of World War Two. The successful maintenance of peace was not so much due to the wisdom of European leaders, but because the people of Europe were understandably exhausted after the two world wars and happily pushed for economic and political integration under the protection of Washington. Don’t get me wrong, I never joined the ranks of those who complained about the vassalisation of Europe and its condition as a protectorate of the United States. The term “vassal” appears to indicate that Europeans are slaving away for their American masters, but in truth it is the exact opposite: the average American takes 14 vacation days per year, compared to 24 in the EU.
And this is just the tip of the iceberg. In Austria, for example, you have a right to five weeks of paid vacation, in addition to 13 public holidays (also paid) and – which sounds almost unbelievable – employers have to pay 14 salaries each year (the so-called vacation and Christmas money). Whenever I tell this to American friends, they accuse me of making things up, and I have to admit sometimes I have a hard time believing it myself. Well, until I check my bank account during a three-week vacation in Italy, fully paid by my employer.
Alas, the comforts of being a “vassal” are coming to an end. Europe will be forced to take care of its own defence, and despite promises by leading politicians to the opposite, this will cut into the welfare state. Not surprisingly, resistance is already forming: in a close vote (73 against 71) the Dutch parliament has rejected the EU’s “ReArm Europe” plan. The argument the Netherlands is making is compelling. Taking out massive new debt in the amount of €800 billion for defence purposes will create incentives to reassign all kinds of things as being necessary for “defence.” The EU proposal is a debt-union through the back door, and Amsterdam does not trust its partners. The temptation to abuse debt-making to prop up overburdened welfare programmes could be too much to resist for states like France, Italy, or Germany. In Berlin, in fact, resistance against new spending is so fierce that Mr. Merz is trying all kinds of tricks to get the legislative to approve taking out more debt.
He is attempting to convene the old parliament (the one elected in 2021) in a special session to approve his proposed spending splurge in the amount of €500 billion. He knows that the new parliament based on the February 23 election would not vote for the suspension of the so-called debt-bmereak that is enshrined in the German constitution. Whether this is even legally possible will be decided by the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe in the coming days, as the opposition parties are suing this attempt as unconstitutional.
What is even more outrageous, however, is that Mr. Merz is not only trying to use a lame-duck parliament to push through some of the most far reaching changes to the post WW2 German constitution, but he does so while explicitly breaking campaign promises from just a few weeks ago. The CDU’s party programme released in January 2025 states explicitly that there will be no tampering with the debt brake. On page 14 it explains the CDU’s supposedly prudent financial policy that hinges on the triad of adhering to the constitutional debt brake, implementing tax relief, and making necessary investments. According to the programme, the debt brake helps prevent today’s debts from turning into tomorrow’s tax hikes, ensuring Germany remains a pillar of stability in the eurozone.
Now, not even a month after the elections, the programme is no longer worth the paper it is written on. Even less surprising, all that “defence” and “infrastructure” spending will once again contain all kinds of Green boondoggles for “climate protection.” Merz needs the votes of the Greens, and they have decided to extract as high a price as possible, balking at his proposals and demanding more money for their pet projects. As things currently stand, it is quite likely that he will comply. Although one can have some sympathy for the Greens who were pushing for a weakening of the debt break, only to be rebuffed by the CDU which then moved on to try the exact same thing after the election.
It’s easy to envision that in order to get the €500 billion approved, the money will eventually have to be distributed among various party interests, including further funding for climate policies that have already done significant harm to the German economy. The credibility of Mr. Merz’s proposal will soon face a challenge from Germany’s nuclear engineering lobby, which asserts that as many as six nuclear power plants could be rapidly brought back online. Reliable and affordable energy is deemed essential for maintaining a viable arms industry, so any serious proposal cannot focus on solar panels and wind turbines, but must include nuclear.
Alas, the future government of “conservatives” and Social Democrats has agreed that Germany will abandon fission and focus on fusion. So instead of using a technology that has stood the test of time (nuclear fission), Germany is betting on a technology that has not even left the experimental stage. All of this is a joke and shows that there is no desire for serious course correction but only the continuation of failed policies with new partners.
It is doubtful that things will go differently in other European countries. The willingness of the electorate to give up on the living standards they have grown accustomed to will have limits, so all the proposed defence spending will most likely find its way into the welfare state.
本文於 2025/03/17 12:09 修改第 4 次
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停火後烏克蘭維和規畫的實務 – J. Watling/M. Kofman
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2025/03/17 09:09 推薦1 |
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到目前為止，本欄與本部落格的報導和評論，都偏向於支持烏克蘭抵抗俄國。其原因當然是基於我個人成見而來的「立場」。為了資訊平衡，以下刊登兩篇性質有些不同的文章：
1) 第一篇評論的主旨是「維和實務」(見下文)；雖然兩位作者「挺烏抗俄」的立場跟我一樣，但他們指出歐洲國家成立「維和部隊」上可能面臨的一些實際困難。
2) 第二篇評論則分析歐洲國家政治上和經濟上會面臨到的阻力(見本欄下一篇)。
兩篇評論都強調：「決心」是歐洲各國領袖克服困難最大的考驗，它也將是和平的試金石。總之，烏克蘭和歐洲國家的和平之路前途多舛，不容樂觀。
Willpower, Not Manpower, is Europe’s Main Limitation for a Force in Ukraine
Jack Watling and Michael Kofman, 03/03/25
Following a dramatic meeting in the White House, U.S. military support for Ukraine is perilously uncertain. Sustaining Ukraine in this war, and afterwards, is a responsibility that Europe will have to shoulder sooner rather than later. Washington may now cut support for Ukraine well before any agreement is reached and try to compel Ukraine to accept an unstable ceasefire. This will leave Ukraine in a perpetual state of insecurity, and Europe bracing for a possible renewal of the war. There is a significant risk that following a cessation in large-scale combat operations Russia continues its effort to destabilize Ukraine politically, pressure it economically, and set the conditions for a third war on far more favorable terms for Moscow. To prevent this, the Ukrainian military will need to be sustained in the field and reconstituted, while Russia is effectively deterred.
It is increasingly less likely that the United States will continue extending military or financial assistance, with Washington’s policy objective to shift the burden onto European capitals. Despite President Volodymyr Zelensky’s efforts, the United States has made it clear that it does not intend to offer Ukraine security guarantees or directly contribute to any forces supporting Ukraine after the imposition of a ceasefire. It therefore falls upon Europe to plan for such a force. This is a serious undertaking. Can European powers field such a force without hollowing out Europe’s ability to defend NATO’s borders, all while the United States potentially withdraws forces from the continent?
While the length of front and the size of Russian ground forces may give the impression that the task is infeasible, in our view it is practicable if European nations are willing to pay the cost. With the right force balance, investment, and political framework Europe could generate a credible commitment.
There is nothing fantastical about a European mission in Ukraine. France and the United Kingdom are considering such a proposal and, as recent reporting suggests, have discussed it during President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to Washington. Turkey may be open to contributing to such a force as well. Indeed, while Zelensky’s meeting with Trump in Washington was a catastrophe, it may have increased European will to do much more than it might have otherwise. However, the conversation remains ill-informed in terms of requirements, either implying that a token force will be sufficient or inflating the necessary troop levels to a point that renders such a policy impossible. We seek to set a realistic marker for what would be required if Europe were to deploy forces in Ukraine.
Bounding the Mission
NATO is more secure with Russia facing an independent Ukraine with a credible military. Attacking NATO under these circumstances would leave Ukraine on Russia’s flank, while reducing the frontage over which Russia poses a threat. The first vital mission is therefore to partner with the armed forces of Ukraine to train and support their reconstitution, including the regeneration of a reserve and mobilization system in circumstances where many veterans have left the force.
The size of Ukraine, and the extensive front line, spanning over 750 miles (1200 kilometers) can lead one to presume that the requirements for a force are beyond the means of NATO’s European militaries. Yet what Ukraine needs is not a traditional peacekeeping or separation force which has to be stretched along the line of contact. As such, it’s not about the size of the front. Although European leaders may call it a “peacekeeping” force, this is not going to be a traditional U.N. peacekeeping mission. The force would serve two functions. First, assure Ukraine. With Western backing, Ukraine should be able to maintain a force sufficient to man, or patrol, key sectors of the front line. Second, enhance deterrence against future aggression from Russia through both the capability deployed and the inherent risk of directly engaging Western forces.
The multinational task force envisioned does not need to be everywhere in Ukraine. It needs to have a presence on three directions, and with sufficient mobility to redeploy as necessary along the front. Any future Russian attack would invariably be along several predictable directions. Today, most of the fighting is concentrated typically along three to four sectors of the front at a time. Hence, a relatively small force package can be sufficient for introducing risk into Russian calculus. The most obvious directions would be Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Donetsk. Western formations would deploy to these regions not as frontline troops, but as supporting echelons backing Ukrainian forces.
A European commitment would also help avoid a worst-case scenario after any ceasefire, in which Ukraine sees itself as abandoned without any security commitment or Western military presence. The army will demobilize and many of the men may then leave abroad, which would shrink the force significantly. Essentially, this is also about Ukrainians seeing that they have a future and that, in the event of another Russian invasion, they also have a chance.
Deploying Forces
Given the significant degradation in Russian force quality over the course of the last three years of fighting, the initial force deployed could be as few as three combat brigades, or their equivalents. The force may need to grow over time as Russia reconstitutes. This would amount to perhaps 15,000 to 20,000 personnel in country, with another 30,000 to 40,000 required for sustained rotation, for a total of 45,000 to 60,000 troops. A notional force structure would include a divisional headquarters, three maneuver brigades, a logistics brigade, and a fires brigade. Conversely, nations could set up their own national support elements in place of a logistics brigade.
This effort should also envision moving the multinational INTERFLEX training mission for Ukrainian troops, currently running in the United Kingdom, into Ukraine. Britain’s 11 Security Force Assistance Brigade, which is the unit at the core of that effort, should also be deployed. This would address Ukraine’s longtime request for greater in-country training of its forces, and adaptation of its basic training regimen. Keeping the force size manageable will be a challenge. Multinational formations tend to be larger than the mission requirements, because of duplication of functions between units, separate support elements for individual nation’s unique logistical requirements, and everyone wanting a seat at the table in the headquarters.
European leaders may worry what will happen if this force is engaged by Russian strike capabilities. There is a somewhat fraught discussion at present about the need for robust air defenses. Yet the war has shown that dispersal is highly effective, as is entrenchment, and Ukrainian air defense (much of it Western systems) intercepts a significant percentage of Russian strikes. If anything, the experience has illustrated that air and missile defenses are more effective than expected, while a force that is properly dispersed is a very unattractive target for prestige strike systems. A multinational force could manage its footprint in country to make itself a hard target, in much the same way as hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian troops do every day. Indeed, mass casualty events are rare, even relatively close to the front line. If losses take place from skirmishes, or incidents, there’s no reason they would lead to a war with Russia, and in many similar cases have not in the past.
Sustaining this presence in Ukraine would mean that European nations would have to revisit existing commitments to rapid reaction forces, and those made under NATO regional defense plans. But Europe has the capacity to do this and given the recently made pledges to increase defense spending, could certainly increase it sufficiently to meet both a sustained deployment in Ukraine and other commitments over time.
The force as conceived would be a multinational division, operating under its own command. Units in the rear could help train Ukrainian forces, conduct joint exercises, and support other activities while learning from Ukrainian experience. Western forces could also be backed by their own airpower, based within the territory of bordering NATO members. This is a comparative advantage for countries like the United Kingdom and France, which have significant airpower available that’s largely uncommitted to other missions. This would provide a visible force multiplier, and additional air protection for units in-country. However, the mission would be under European, rather than Ukrainian command. Such a force would be additive given existing Ukrainian military capability. It would backstop Ukrainian forces manning the line of contact, rather than serving as the principal deterrent in the theatre.
The current British and French plan being discussed to deploy a force of up to 30,000 personnel suggest that while such a commitment is beyond the existing resource envelope of European NATO members, it is not beyond what is envisaged by European leaders. The question is whether they are prepared to underwrite the costs. So far European leaders have not been prepared to match their rhetorical commitments with resources. Notably, some nations with significant military capability, like Poland, appear to be reticent to be security providers. The majority contributors should not be frontline states, who have their own significant defense requirements. Therefore, Western Europe should take the leading role, ideally with Turkish participation.
There is a degree of fretting about the impact of such a deployment on NATO’s deterrence posture. However, frontline states should avoid engaging in beggar-thy-neighbor politics when it comes to European security. A European mission in Ukraine need not come at their expense. Furthermore, if European nations are incapable of collectively deploying one multinational division, then this should raise broader questions about European commitment to European security. The risk of inaction is much greater for Europe than the risk inherent in deploying a force into theatre that could be attacked, or otherwise challenged.
Managing Contingency
The question that will dominate discussions over whether to pursue such a policy is what happens if Russia attacks Ukraine. The deployed force would not be protected by NATO’s Article 5 and would not have the backing of the United States. First, in such a scenario, the mass of the force would be provided by the Ukrainian military. The goal of this proposal is not to shift the burden of deterrence and defense from the Ukrainian military onto Europe, but to enhance Ukraine’s existing capability. Whereas the Ukrainian military lacked an effective higher echelon of command, struggled to train its forces, or to coordinate fires beyond 30 kilometers during the current conflict, mentoring by European militaries could significantly strengthen aspects of operations, such that Russia would be dealing with a more capable and integrated force.
The second critical aspect of the force’s credibility would be the contribution of European air power. The Russo-Ukrainian War has demonstrated that it is possible to overcome Russian air defenses. The problem has been the scale at which such operations can be conducted and the limitations on Ukraine’s ability to exploit the gaps it creates. Europe has modern fleets of combat aircraft. Only a sliver of this capacity is used for current “air policing” missions, and out of area deployments. With appropriate training, and munitions, in a time of war these forces could suppress the Russian Aerospace Forces and offer decisive firepower to Ukrainian forces. Either way, it would add the risk to Russian considerations that European airpower might be involved in a future fight.
It will be objected that European air forces currently lack the training, munitions, or command-and-control infrastructure to execute such operations. This is in some cases correct. And initially, U.S. support may be necessary when it comes to logistical and organizational capacity. But addressing such a glaring set of deficiencies is vital to restoring NATO’s conventional deterrence posture and this is a solvable problem. Indeed, it is the problem Europe should be solving, and the foremost priority for European investment into their militaries. Making European airpower useable against its primary threat should be a driver of force planning across the continent irrespective of commitments made to Ukraine.
What of potential Russian opposition? Depending on the mandate of the force, and how this mission is framed, Moscow may accept it as part of an armistice. President Donald Trump said that he had raised the idea of peacekeepers with President Vladimir Putin as part of a deal and his impression was that “Yeah, he will accept it,” adding “I’ve asked him that question.” Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, has said though that “we cannot consider any options” when it comes to European peacekeepers, ruling it out. Hence Russia may strongly object to such a force if it is proposed in negotiations. So long, however, as a commitment is not made to exclude European forces from Ukraine after a ceasefire, then it is doubtful that a Russian military that is currently struggling to break through Ukrainian defenses would be immediately recommitted to the attack should Ukrainians on the line of contact be reinforced from European militaries. In short, Moscow may protest, but it is not clear in such a scenario that it could prevent such a policy being implemented.
The policy set out above would require significant investment and the political determination by European states that they were prepared to fight for Ukraine. It will also require reprioritization, at least in the interim, when looking at their current commitments. Strategically there is a compelling case that it is better to prevent the subjugation of Ukraine than face an emboldened Russia elsewhere on the continent. Politically, this is a matter for the member states. However, current debate on this topic veers between vague security commitments without any reference to the necessary force requirements, and wild statements of troop requirements that make the proposition insurmountable. A more careful examination of what it takes demonstrates that it is possible, but will be costly in resources and political will.
Jack Watling is senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute.
Michael Kofman is a senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment.
本文於 2025/03/17 09:11 修改第 1 次
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《馬克洪總統國防預算演說》小評
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2025/03/09 10:12 推薦1 |
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德國新政府預算 - Ryan Hogg
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2025/03/07 20:10 推薦1 |
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英、德、法、和歐盟都跟了川普下的注。在我看來，川痞手中大概就老K一對，頂多兩對；在這場世紀豪賭中，川痞要輸到脫褲了
‘Germany is back’: Coalition unveils bumper $1.3 trillion spending pledge as country breaks with constitution to revive economy
Ryan Hogg, 03/05/25
Germany finally unveiled a plan that could address years of economic decline and the war in Ukraine as the country announced plans to change its constitution and abandon its long-standing commitment to fiscal prudence.
The CDU/CSU and SPD parties agreed to a mammoth spending package on Tuesday, the headline of which was a €500 billion ($535 billion) fund over 10 years dedicated to upgrading German infrastructure, including across transport, energy, and digitization.
The coalition also sealed a groundbreaking agreement to exempt defense spending above 1% of GDP from its strict debt brake, opening a path for the country to join the rest of Europe in upping its defenses.
Speaking following the agreement, Germany’s chancellor-in-waiting, Friedrich Merz, emphasized the new reality Germany finds itself in as relations between the U.S. and Europe fracture.
“The political developments in Europe and the world are evolving faster than we anticipated just a week ago,” said Merz. “Germany and Europe must now undertake extraordinary efforts to ensure our defense capabilities.”
Analysts expect that taken together, the spending packages could eventually surpass €1 trillion ($1.3 trillion), representing about a quarter the size of Germany’s economy.
“This is huge,” said Kathleen Brooks, research director at XTB. “For years, economists have said that Germany needed to change its spending rules to get out of the economic hole. It’s taken a Conservative Chancellor-in-waiting to pull the trigger.”
Germany’s debt brake was introduced in 2009, restricting the annual budget deficit to 0.35% of GDP. The brake proved popular with German citizens, particularly as parts of southern Europe fell into major debt crises in the 2010s.
However, the debt brake has turned burdensome as Germany’s economy endures newfound economic struggles. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine put pressure on energy prices in the country. Meanwhile, Germany’s export-heavy economy has been racked by flagging demand in China. Import tariffs on goods to the U.S. are expected to cause further pain for producers.
Germany fights back
Germany’s myriad struggles have resulted in two consecutive years of (編者：少了slow？flat？negative？) economic growth, with economists projecting a further decline in 2025. In the process, there have been growing calls to scrap the debt brake and allow Germany to spend its way out of decline.
In Morgan Stanley’s new upside scenario following the spending announcement, Germany’s economy could grow by 0.6% this year and by 1.6% in 2026.
The bank remains bullish on German defense stocks in the wake of the announcement, with the country’s biggest contractor, Rheinmetall, doubling in valuation since the start of the year.
XTB’s Brooks says Germany’s new measures would inevitably lead to rising debt, but that that was a problem for another day.
“For now, the euro is the best performing currency in the G10 FX space this week, the Dax is continuing to dominate the equity market, and rising bond yields suggest a transformed economic outlook. Germany is back.”
Germany’s defense pledge, which could see spending as a percentage of GDP exceed 3%, is a massive statement of intent from Europe’s largest economy after years of perceived underinvestment. The country has repeatedly fallen short of the NATO pledge to spend 2% of GDP on defense since the guideline was introduced in 2014.
On Tuesday, the EU announced a spending plan that could unlock €800 billion ($840 billion) for rearmament within the next four years.
This was a story featured on Fortune.com
本文於 2025/03/07 20:25 修改第 2 次
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馬克洪總統國防預算演說 –-- 路透社
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2025/03/07 13:00 推薦1 |
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這是繼德國下一任政府公佈新預算後(稍後報導)，第二個有實力主導歐洲事務國家領袖的宣示。我會對馬克洪總統演說及相關議題略表拙見。
我沒有法文的聽、讀能力，但是，我看得出下面的英譯有些「照字面翻譯」或「字思/詞意選擇」上的問題。各位可能跟我一樣，偶而會有「丈二金鋼摸不著頭」的困惑。這當然也可能來自我的英文了解能力不夠水準。
Macron's address to the French nation on ramping up defence spending
Reuters, 03/06/25
PARIS (Reuters) - French President Emmanuel Macron on Wednesday said he was willing to discuss offering European allies the protection of France's nuclear capabilities, adding that Russia represented a genuine threat to the continent's security with U.S. military support no longer guaranteed.
Below are some of the key quotes from his prime time address to the nation.
RUSSIAN THREAT
"Overall, our prosperity and security have become more uncertain. It must be said that we are entering a new era."
"Russia has already made the Ukrainian conflict a global conflict. It has mobilized North Korean soldiers and Iranian equipment on our continent, while helping these countries to arm themselves more."
"President Putin's Russia violates our borders to assassinate opponents, manipulates elections in Romania and Moldova, and organizes cyber attacks on our hospitals to block their operation. Russia is trying to manipulate our opinions with lies spread on social networks. And deep down, it is testing our limits. It does it in the air, at sea, in space and behind our screens."
"Who can believe, in this context, that Russia will stop at Ukraine? Russia has become, as I speak to you and for years to come, a threat to France and Europe."
"Faced with this world of danger, remaining a spectator would be madness. It is a question, without further delay, of making decisions for Ukraine, for the security of the French, for the security of Europeans."
END OF US SUPPORT?
"I want to believe that the United States will stand by us. But we have to be ready if that is not the case."
"Given the Russian threat that I have just described, European states must be able to defend themselves better and deter any aggression ... We must equip ourselves better, raise our defence posture, and this for peace, even to deter. In this respect, we remain committed to NATO and our partnership with the United States of America. But we must do more. Strengthen our independence in defence and security matters."
"The future of Europe does not have to be decided in Washington or Moscow. And yes, the threat is returning to the East and the innocence, so to speak, of the last 30 years, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, is now over."
RAMPING UP FRENCH DEFENCE PREPARATION
"I have asked the government to be mobilized so that, on the one hand, it strengthens our armies as quickly as possible. And on the other hand, it accelerates reindustrialization in all our regions. And I will gather with the competent ministers and the industrialists of the sector in the coming days."
"We will have to make new budgetary choices and additional investments that have now become essential. I have asked the government to work on this as quickly as possible. These will be new investments that require mobility, to mobilize private financing, but also public financing, without taxes being increased. For this, reforms, choices, and courage will be needed."
DEBATE ON SHARING FRENCH NUCLEAR UMBRELLA
"Responding to the historic call of the future German Chancellor, I have decided to open the strategic debate on the protection of our allies on the European continent through our (nuclear) deterrence. Whatever happens, the decision has always been and will remain in the hands of the President of the Republic, head of the armed forces."
IMPACT OF TARIFFS
"(U.S. President Donald Trump's tariffs) decision, incomprehensible both for the American economy and for ours, will have consequences ... It increases the difficulty of the moment, but it will not go without a response from us. So, while preparing the response with our European colleagues, we will continue ... to do everything to convince that this decision would harm us all. And I hope, yes, to convince and dissuade the President of the United States of America."
EUROPE'S FUTURE
"Tomorrow's solutions cannot be yesterday's habits."
"Europe has the economic strength, the power and the talent to live up to this era and to compare ourselves to the United States of America, let alone Russia. We have the means. So we must act united as Europeans and determined to protect ourselves."
"Our generation will no longer receive the dividends of peace. It is up to us to ensure that our children reap the dividends of our commitments tomorrow."
(Reporting by Gabriel Stargardter, Editing by Nick Zieminski)
本文於 2025/03/07 13:02 修改第 2 次
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歐洲宣布8千億歐元擴軍方案 - Ryan Hogg
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2025/03/05 11:22 推薦1 |
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希望馮德萊恩和歐盟各國領袖不是虛晃舌頭，空口說白話。
我相信北約歐洲各會員國的下一個大動作將是：解除烏克蘭使用遠程飛彈的限制。
Europe announces unprecedented $840 billion rearmament plan to tackle ‘grave’ threats, sending defense giants BAE and Thales soaring
Ryan Hogg, 03/05/25
Europe laid down the gauntlet as it unveiled a defense plan that could free up €800 billion ($840 billion) to rearm the continent amid the most significant shock to Western international relations in decades.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced on Tuesday a “ReArm” plan to stock up Europe’s defenses against a looming threat from Russia as the U.S. walks back its military support of Ukraine.
The announcement offered concrete figures on investment following Monday’s pledge by European leaders to beef up their defense capabilities as they rallied around Volodymyr Zelensky.
Europe is reeling from an intense opening two months of the Donald Trump administration, which has left the U.S. set to abandon its position as the West’s peace broker.
In announcing the ReArm plan, von der Leyen spoke candidly about the existential threats Europe will face in the coming years. The EU’s announcement came as the U.S. said it was suspending military aid to Ukraine following a heated argument between Trump and Zelensky in the Oval Office on Friday.
“We are living in the most momentous and dangerous of times. I do not need to describe the grave nature of the threats that we face.
“Because the question is no longer whether Europe's security is threatened in a very real way. Or whether Europe should shoulder more of the responsibility for its own security. In truth, we have long known the answers to those questions.”
Freeing up the cash to stockpile Europe will require a level of cooperation on defense unprecedented in the EU’s 32-year history.
Each of the bloc’s 27 member states will need to increase their defense spending by an average of 1.5% of GDP, which von der Leyen says would create fiscal headroom of €650 billion over the next four years.
The EU also plans to create a new instrument that would unlock €150 billion ($158 billion) in loans to member states for investment in defense.
Europe’s quest to rearm itself will inevitably leave tough decisions for the region’s policymakers. In announcing an increase in defense spending to 2.5% of GDP, U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer said the country would cut its aid spending to fill the funding gap.
“We will continue working closely with our partners in NATO. This is a moment for Europe. And we are ready to step up,” said von der Leyen.
Defense giants soar higher
As Europe ponders how to ramp up its military budget, shares in Europe’s largest defense contractors, BAE Systems, Rheinmetall, and Thales, soared as the extent of Europe’s renewed defense plans were realized. Collectively, the groups have added around $30 billion in market value since the start of the week.
Thales received an extra boost after announcing earnings on Tuesday, showing an 8.3% increase in revenues in 2024.
In a call with reporters following the company’s results, Thales CEO Patrice Caine said that Europe had the technology to fend for itself on defense, and indicated it has the capacity to meet the region’s growing defense demand.
In February, BAE similarly said it would be able to cope with Europe’s newfound military appetite.
此文原載Fortune.com。
本文於 2025/03/05 11:25 修改第 3 次
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《英、法提「歐版停火方案」》小評
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2025/03/04 16:48 推薦1 |
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1. 「方案」的背景
在我看來，這些方案可能的作用/目的有三個(方案內容請見本欄上 篇報導)：
1) 爭取協商的「主導權」；
2) 提供澤倫斯基另一個選項，減輕美國所加給他的壓力；
3) 讓北約的歐洲會員國家有籌碼坐上談判桌。
以上判斷成立的前提是：
普丁目前有如騎在老虎背上；他其實也巴不得早點脫身。
我雖然沒有百分百支撐這個「前提」的鐵證，但從他借兵北韓後，仍然不能光復失土，加上國內不時要拉防空警報；說他「吃不到羊肉還搞得一身騷」決不為過。如果他了解到川痞的漫天要價是在幫倒忙，普丁很可能選擇一個「可『下』性」比較高的台階。
2. 美、歐處境大不同
美國位置是典型的「隔岸觀火」，自然可以對烏克蘭拉高姿態，予取予求。相對而言，歐洲國家處境則是典型的「唇亡齒寒」；跟烏克蘭是難兄難弟、相濡以沫的「革命」關係。
以上描述呈現了一個顯而易見的局面。我就真搞不懂：認為川痞吃定了澤倫斯基的中國/台灣網友，如果看不出這個門道，為什麼還自以為有資格對此議題大放厥詞。
3. 梅茲
即將出任德國總理的梅茲，果然不負他直言不諱的名聲。他認為「白宮嘴砲劇」是川痞自導自演的批評，表示今後三、四年中，川痞將無所遁形。
某歐洲外交官把川痞和索取保護費的混混相提並論，坐實了「美國總統」已經是個不再讓人敬畏的頭銜(該欄2025/03/03、2025/03/02《小評》一文)。
4. 期望
我很早以前就呼籲習總積極挺身而出，主導俄、烏和議(開欄文)。不但是為了停止殺戮，更是為了爭取國際影響力，拉抬中國身價，以及在中、歐協商過程裏用調停結果來換取實利。
也許時機一直不成熟，也許習總在等待出手的快、狠、準關鍵時刻。總之，當下美、歐間不但矛盾浮上檯面，而且川痞做為調停人的可信度蕩然無存。或許習總可以考慮、考慮：
兩會之後，以和議協調者與和平保證者的雙重身份出台亮相(該欄2025/02/20兩篇貼文)。
相關報導：
UK’s Starmer says Europe is at ‘crossroads in history’ as leaders agree to steps to Ukraine peace
Zelensky joins European leaders at major Ukraine summit in London
本文於 2025/03/04 22:00 修改第 3 次
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英、法提「歐版停火方案」 -- E. Piper/J. Irish
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2025/03/04 10:32 推薦1 |
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UK says several proposals for Ukraine ceasefire on table after France floats one-month truce
Elizabeth Piper/John Irish, 03/03/25
Summary
* Trump-Zelenskiy clash has increased sense of urgency
* France says one-month truce would provide opportunity to see if Putin is serious
* Germany's says Oval Office clash was not spontaneous
* European Union to unveil proposal to boost defence spending
LONDON/PARIS, March 3 (Reuters) - Britain said on Monday there were several possible proposals on the table for a possible Ukraine ceasefire, after France floated a proposal for a month-long initial truce that could pave the way for peace talks.
"There are clearly a number of options on the table," Prime Minister Keir Starmer's spokesman said. "I'm just not getting into a running commentary on the options."
European countries, led by Britain and France, are looking at options for a peace proposal including Ukraine after last week's Oval Office rupture between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.
Starmer hosted a summit of European leaders in London on Sunday and said European leaders had agreed to draw up a Ukraine peace plan to present to the United States.
In an interview given on his way to the summit, French President Emmanuel Macron raised the possibility of a one-month ceasefire, although so far there has been no public endorsement from other allies.
"Such a truce on air, sea and energy infrastructure would allow us to determine whether Russian President Vladimir Putin is acting in good faith when he commits to a truce," French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said on Monday of Macron's proposal.
"And that's when real peace negotiations could start."
Zelenskiy, asked if he was aware of the plan for a month-long truce mentioned by Macron, told reporters in London: "I'm aware of everything."
France, Britain and potentially other European countries have offered to send troops to Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire, but say they would want support in some form from the U.S., a proposal referred to as a "backstop".
Zelenskiy says a ceasefire must come with explicit security guarantees from the West to ensure Russia, which invaded Ukraine three years ago and holds about 20% of its territory, does not attack again. Trump has refused to give any such guarantees.
European countries are adjusting to what some leaders describe as the biggest policy reversal since World War Two from Washington, especially after Friday's bust-up, when Zelenskiy left the White House abruptly after a dressing down in front of cameras by Trump and Vice President JD Vance.
MERZ SAYS OVAL OFFICE CLASH 'NOT SPONTANEOUS'
Friedrich Merz, the conservative due to become Germany's chancellor after winning the largest share of the vote in an election a week ago, suggested Friday's Oval Office argument was a trap set in advance for the Ukrainian leader.
"It was not a spontaneous reaction to interventions by Zelenskiy, but obviously a manufactured escalation," he said.
"We must now show that we are in a position to act independently in Europe," he said.
Privately, European officials have been fuming at what they saw as a betrayal of Ukraine, which had previously enjoyed staunch support from the United States since Russia's invasion.
One senior official declared in the aftermath of the blow-up: "Donald Trump has to choose if he wants to call himself a leader of the free world, or leader of an extortion gang. The latter is not interesting for Europe."
But Europeans are also still working hard to keep the U.S. on side. Peter Mandelson, Britain's ambassador to the United States, said Ukrainian-U.S. relations needed to be reset, as Trump’s initiative to end the war was "the only show in town".
Trump spoke by phone with Putin last month and then announced that negotiations to end the war would begin quickly, but his contact with Moscow blindsided the EU and Zelenskiy, raising concerns they would have a deal imposed on them.
European leaders agreed they must spend more on defence to show Trump the continent can protect itself. The European Union is due to hold an emergency summit on Thursday.
EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said she will inform member states on Tuesday about plans to strengthen the European defence industry and the EU's military capabilities.
"We need a massive surge in defence, without any question. We want lasting peace, but lasting peace can only be built on strength, and strength begins with strengthening ourselves."
Russia has openly gloated over Friday's clash between Trump and Zelenskiy, praising Trump for altering U.S. policy and denouncing Zelenskiy for challenging Trump's proposals.
"We see that the collective West has partially begun to lose its collectivity, and a fragmentation of the collective West has begun," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.
"There remains a group of countries that rather constitutes the party of war, which declares its readiness to further support Ukraine in terms of supporting the war and ensuring the continuation of hostilities."
Reporting by Elizabeth Piper and John Irish; additional reporting by Sarah Young, Richard Lough, Makini Brice, Dmitry Antonov and Guy Faulconbridge; writing by Ingrid Melander and Peter Graff; editing by Mark Heinrich
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
本文於 2025/03/04 10:32 修改第 1 次
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《歐洲各國誓為烏克蘭後盾》小評
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2025/03/03 21:58 推薦1 |
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歐峰會後各國領導人的「宣示」基本上佐證了我過去的判斷(請見本欄上一篇)：
1) 歐洲領導階層有強烈的「存在危機感」(該欄2025/02/19--《了解》第1節)；
2) 歐洲各國將「全力支持烏克蘭」(該欄2025/03/01，「底氣a」)；
3) 多數歐洲國家將「增加軍費」(本欄2025/02/25)。
我不能確定有些美國學者是真的幼稚，還是得了嚴重的認知障礙症；非常可能兼而有之。不但如此，看來很像是一種全國性的流行病。這應該是川普2.0問世的根本原因。或許，養尊處優了80 年，讓美國人民普遍取得紈褲人格；財大氣粗之外，腦子也不怎麼好使。「富不過三代」，其斯之謂與 ！
本文於 2025/03/12 13:13 修改第 3 次
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歐洲各國誓為烏克蘭後盾 --- Mark Landler等
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2025/03/03 20:09 推薦1 |
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European leaders pledged to support Ukraine
Mark Landler/Stephen Castle/Aurelien Breeden/Jeanna Smialek, 03/02/25
Declaring that “we are at a crossroads in history,” Prime Minister Keir Starmer of Britain said on Sunday that European countries would ramp up their military spending and assemble a “coalition of the willing” to defend any peace declared in Ukraine.
Speaking at a news conference after hosting a meeting of 18 European leaders, including President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, Mr. Starmer said that “a number” of other nations had indicated that they could join with Britain and France and deploy troops to Ukraine in the event of a cease-fire between Kyiv and Moscow. He did not name those countries.
Mr. Starmer announced plans to allow Ukraine to use 1.6 billion pounds in British export financing, or $2 billion, to buy more than 5,000 advanced air defense missiles. And he said he had spoken to President Trump on Saturday night and believed there could be “a positive outcome” with the United States.
Other European leaders emerged from the summit, held in London, to say that the European Union would embark on a surge in military spending.
The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said the European Union would present a plan to do just that on Thursday. Europe, she said, will also fortify Ukraine with economic and military aid, aiming to turn the country into “a steel porcupine that is indigestible for potential invaders.”
NATO’s secretary-general, Mark Rutte of the Netherlands, said several European countries that he did not name had pledged to increase their military spending, calling that a “very positive” signal. Mr. Rutte also insisted that Mr. Trump was committed to NATO, telling reporters after the meeting to “please stop gossiping” about the possibility that the United States would pull out of the alliance.
And President Emmanuel Macron of France said his country and Britain would propose a one-month truce between Russia and Ukraine “in the air, on the seas and in energy infrastructures” to allow for negotiations on a peace agreement. He also told Le Figaro newspaper that European countries should aim to spend about 3 to 3.5 percent of their G.D.P. on defense, a level NATO plans to make its goal at its next summit meeting this summer.
The London summit took on greater urgency after Mr. Zelensky’s heated meeting with Mr. Trump and Vice President JD Vance in the Oval Office on Friday raised fears that the United States would try to strong-arm Ukraine’s president into making a peace deal.
At the summit, Mr. Starmer, with Mr. Zelensky beside him, told the assembled leaders: “We’re gathered here today because this is a once-in-a-generation moment for the security of Europe, and we all need to step up. Getting a good outcome for Ukraine is not just a matter of right and wrong; it’s vital for the security of every nation here, and many others, too.”
Mr. Starmer said that the European leaders had agreed at the summit to keep military aid flowing to Ukraine and maintain economic pressure on Russia, to ensure Ukraine’s sovereignty and security and to forge a “coalition of the willing” to police any cease-fire. “Those willing will intensify planning now with real urgency,” he said.
The angry exchange in Washington on Friday was the latest sign that Mr. Trump was pivoting American foreign policy away from traditional U.S. allies like Ukraine and Europe. It also illustrated the seriousness of his plans to quickly end the war in Ukraine, which could result in a deal that empowered Russia.
European leaders have lined up behind Ukraine and lauded its embattled president since the episode.
In contrast, Secretary of State Rubio criticized Mr. Zelensky’s demeanor at the Oval Office, accusing him on ABC’s “This Week” on Sunday of having “found every opportunity to try to ‘Ukraine-splain’ on every issue.” He said that he was “puzzled” by the pushback on the Trump administration and said that the president was being unfairly criticized for trying to help Ukraine by stopping the war. “The sooner people grow up and realize that, I think the more progress we’re going to be able to make,” he said.
Here’s what else to know:
* British loan: Britain on Saturday announced a nearly $3 billion loan to Ukraine aimed at bolstering the war-torn country’s military capability. It will be paid back using profits generated on sanctioned Russian sovereign assets, and the first tranche of funding is expected to be disbursed to Ukraine next week, Britain’s Treasury said.
* Cyberoperations against Russia: Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has ordered the Pentagon to halt offensive cyberoperations against Russia, a move that has not been publicly explained but may be part of a broader effort to draw Russia into talks on Ukraine. The order was issued before President Trump’s blowup in the Oval Office with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine on Friday. Read more ›
* Judge’s order: A federal judge in Washington on Saturday blocked the Trump administration from ousting the top official at a federal watchdog agency, saying that its efforts to do so were unlawful. The judge’s order will allow the official, Hampton Dellinger, to remain the head of the Office of Special Counsel, which protects federal whistle-blowers. Read more ›
* More troops on the border: The Pentagon is sending about 3,000 additional troops to the southwestern border, rushing to comply with Mr. Trump’s order to increase the military’s role in curtailing crossings. The reinforcements announced on Saturday would bring the total number of active-duty troops on the border to about 9,000, Defense Department officials said. Read more ›
Mark Landler and Stephen Castle reported from London, Aurelien Breeden from Paris and Jeanna Smialek from Brussels. Minho Kim and Yan Zhuang contributed reporting.
Mark Landler is the London bureau chief of The Times, covering the United Kingdom, as well as American foreign policy in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. He has been a journalist for more than three decades. More about Mark Landler
Stephen Castle is a London correspondent of The Times, writing widely about Britain, its politics and the country’s relationship with Europe. More about Stephen Castle
Aurelien Breeden is a reporter for The Times in Paris, covering news from France. More about Aurelien Breeden
Jeanna Smialek is the Brussels bureau chief for The Times. More about Jeanna Smialek
本文於 2025/03/03 20:10 修改第 1 次
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