美國失去中國與蘇聯開戰的機會只有危機準備? USA lose War to CHINA & RUSSIA?

A "Readiness Crisis": Would America Lose a War to Russia or China?

近日來美國出動自第二次世界大戰以來,最多的航空母艦戰鬥群,在全球軍演,美國左右開弓,即是項莊舞劍志在沛公? 美國有能力同時與蘇聯中國開戰?

美國這種走鋼索,左右搖擺的挑釁行為,令西方陣營大惑不解? 就竟美國葫蘆內賣的是什麼藥?

本文的作者實際的分析事實,希望美國人認清自己的角色,必竟此一時彼一時,不是上一世紀的國際局勢,更不是18-19世紀西方人船堅炮厲的時代.因而有些西方戰略家大膽預測分析認為,中國將於2050年左右的時期,將以經濟,軍事,文化,貿易會各層面,澈底擊敗美國成為世界霸主,因為那時也就是中國共產黨建政中國100年.西方戰略觀察家分析認為,在亞太地區此一時彼一時,中國強勢崛起,亞太地區美國霸主地位不保,太平洋即將與中國共享,共管,美國苦心經營100年的太平洋,就要拱手讓人,中國不費一槍一彈,一兵一卒,就晉升太平洋做老二,甚至於是老大,與美國平等待遇平起平座,美國輸掉面子與裡子,重反亞太計劃將徹底失敗,弄巧成拙,美國不干心,就這樣子拍拍屁股走人,在怎麼樣也要留下來做困獸之鬥? 因此出動2艘航空母艦戰鬥群到中國南海,東海地區,上演雙航母演習秀? 說得難聽就是公豬與母豬交配秀? 沒人理會不是嗎?

尤其甚者就是以武力妶要,逼使中國動武與美國開戰,這樣一來美國的下下策,又被中國識破,中國按兵不動,孫子兵法的上上策就是不戰而驅人之兵,中國贏定拉,而且贏得漂亮,美國在亞太地區輸不起只有滾蛋回家,數羊,數牛,喝啤酒,聽搖滾樂,哈哈哈.

話又說回來到歐洲地區,地中海及北大西洋公約組織,美國此次出動2艘航空母艦戰鬥群,直駛西方劍指蘇聯,為要報復蘇聯2014奪回克里米亞半島,重建其俄羅斯黑海艦隊,此外美國口口聲聲說打擊ISIS ,只是雷聲大雨滴小,甚至暗中支援ISIS ,擴大在中東地區的戰爭,美國好重從中謀利,制衡蘇聯在中東地區的戰略佈局,但是美國萬萬沒有料到,蘇聯在20150930閃電般的出兵敘利亞打擊IS,且戰績輝煌,更令美國吃味,嚥不下這口氣,自從美國發動2次攻打伊拉克戰爭與入侵阿富汗戰爭,都是兵敗,弄巧成拙,最後只好撤兵退出中東地區,美國這種霸權主義作風,遲早結束,因為中東地區錯綜複雜的各式各樣的利益,並不是只有美國獨自享用,美國苦心經營伊拉克與阿富汗20多年,轉眼間又喪失發牌權,看在蘇聯北極熊眼內,美國牛仔在中東地區的追逐,就彷彿走馬燈,匆匆的來又充匆忙的走人?

因為蘇聯也曾經攻打阿富汗,結果也是兵敗滾蛋.美國為要壓制蘇聯,再度況的擴張軍備,再度染指東歐,南歐與中歐,又企圖奪回昔日的華沙公約勢力範圍,美國不惜代價與NATO擴大聯合軍演,企圖壓制蘇聯的氣勢,美國拿裡知道,北大西洋公約組織NATO,及歐盟早已與美國離心離德,不再是昔日戰略盟友,因為ISIS恐怖攻擊法國,比利時及其他歐盟國家的時候,美國只是聲援並無實際行動援助,尤其是德國獨自接收將近120萬敘利亞難民,照顧其生活其他歐盟國家與加拿大,均有接受敘述難民,但是美國卻無1個,中東地區戰火由美國引起,美國人拉屎,卻要蘇聯擦屁股善後,諸位讀者們你們認為如何?

美國在歐盟早已喪失領導人的地位,要不是德國與蘇聯,法國因故無法實施策略聯盟,美國早已滾蛋出局,還搞不清楚實際狀況,美國增強在東歐,中歐,南歐的軍事佈署,結果禍害此地區的和平,好不容易脫離蘇聯老大哥的管制,現在又落在美國牛仔的戲弄?

再加上英國脫離歐盟,有可能成為事實,美國對於歐盟及NATO 的影響力,江河日下,愈來愈弱,美國窮兵黷武的妄想,東打中國,西打蘇聯,兩面同時開戰,請問諸位讀者們1根蠟燭兩頭燒的下場是什麼情況?

美國不可能永遠依賴大量無限制印製美元鈔票,擾亂世界經濟,好亂中領導世界謀利?

美國再也無法扮演世界警察的角色,美國應該學習中國的內斂謙虛也該學習蘇聯的冷靜沉著,如此一來如果美國依然故我,依依不捨的迷戀領導世界的權勢,殊不知有朝一日,中國蘇聯,歐盟,聯盟將美國擊潰,這樣一來美國就輪為3流國家,逐漸淡出世界舞台,因為未來的經濟強勢領導,在於中國,蘇聯與歐盟的結合,而領導世界,美國人的航空母艦在多,也總有一天要玩完了不是嗎?  

The United States military is at a crisis point in terms of readiness against high-end threats such as Russia or China—at least that’s the view of the House and Senate Armed Services Committee majority staffs. While part of the cause stems from the counter-insurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, much of the blame can be attributed to a moribund acquisition system that chokes the life out of innovation.

“We’re in a dramatic crisis now. There is no question that we’re capable against the threats on the counter-terrorism side, but we’ve reached a point where we’re in fact—not heading towards—but we’re already hollow against a high-end threat,” said House Armed Services Committee majority staff director Bob Simmons speaking before an audience at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) on June 21. “We lack the capacity and capability that we need to effectively deter on the high-end.”

The problem manifests itself in many ways—and it spans across the Pentagon’s entire range of capabilities in the air, on land, at sea and in space. One immediate example is U.S. Marine Corps aviation—where the service does not have enough trained maintainers to fix their aircraft. Out of a total of 271 Marine Corps strike aircraft, only about 64 are flyable at any given time, Simmons noted. The Air Force—meanwhile—is not doing much better with only 43 percent of its aircraft being full mission capable.

Because of the aircraft shortage, the Marine Corps’ naval aviators who fly those warplanes are getting far fewer hours in the air than their Russian and Chinese counterparts. These days, Marine pilots are flying only four to six hours per month instead of the twenty to thirty per month they once used to—that creates permanent experience gaps. “To put it bluntly, we fly about as much as the North Korean pilots do and about three times less than Chinese pilots do today,” Simmons said.

Meanwhile, the aircraft themselves—except for the handful of Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptors, F-35 Joint Strike Fighters and Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirits—are not able to penetrate into the teeth of enemy air defenses. Be it the Fairchild Republic A-10, Boeing F-15, Lockheed Martin F-16 or the Boeing F/A-18 Hornet, none of those warplanes can survive against the current generation of Russian and Chinese high-end air defense systems. Even the latest Russian fourth generation fighter aircraft can’t survive against Moscow’s own formidable integrated air defense products. “Could the Russian fly their aircraft over Ukraine?” Simmons asked. “Nope. If you’re flying fourth-generation aircraft in the current environment, you’re in trouble.”

The Pentagon’s lack of readiness to fight a high-end war can in many ways be attributed to the Defense Department’s byzantine, risk-averse bureaucracy that does everything it can to crush innovation. Indeed, the current debacle is a direct result of the Pentagon’s pursuit of so-called “transformational” capabilities such the F-22, F-35 and the now defunct Future Combat Systems rather than a more incremental approach. During the Cold War, the United States would evolve systems incrementally over time.  “We continued that through the Cold War, we continued that steady incremental improvement to all our weapons systems forcing them to chase us, then the Berlin Wall came down and we adopted their acquisition system,” Simmons said sarcastically. “We’re trying to get back to incrementalism.”

Fundamentally, the House and the Senate are trying to reform the Pentagon’s procurement system so that new technologies are developed and fielded faster in an incremental fashion. The country can simply no longer afford to invest tens of billions of dollars into programs that might only bear fruit two to three decades later—if at all. Enemies will catch up in the meantime, Simmons said. Indeed, in some cases—like the Army’s Future Combat Systems—billions were squandered with no appreciable result. Chris Brose, Senate Armed Services Committee majority staff director—who was also speaking at the AEI event—said he agreed with Simmons’ assessment—the current situation is not acceptable. “We’re seeing the exact same problem,” Brose said.

The House and the Senate must act now because of the shifts in geopolitics. After the post-Soviet lull, the high-end anti-access threat has reemerged but the low-end counter-terrorism threat will persist into the foreseeable future. Moreover, the current threat does not clearly fit into the Defense Department’s traditional organizational boxes—and addressing those challenges all at the same time is the fundamental problem the Pentagon faces. “The challenge that we have is the need to move faster, the need to not let the perfect be the enemy of the good,” Brose said.