http://www.dsti.net/Information/News/69072
印尼正式加入韓國KFX先進多功能戰鬥機研製項目
2011-07-15
[據法國《航宇防務》網站2011年7月12日報導]據印尼《雅加達環球報》（Jakarta Globe）報導，印尼國防部已決定加入韓國的KFX先進多功能戰鬥機研製項目，並正準備派出一支由36名工程師和空軍軍官組成的隊伍到韓國接受製造KFX戰鬥機的培訓。 KFX項目是由韓國前總統金大中于2001年批准啟動的，在起始階段所需的投資估計為80億美元，其中20%（16億美元）將由印尼提供，其餘80%由韓國提供。印尼國防部長普爾諾莫•尤斯吉安紮羅（Purnomo Yusgiantoro）在週一透露說，該機可能在2020年之前完成研製並投入批量生產，估計將生產200架，印尼打算購買其中的50架。他表示：“希望到那個時候，我們在我們國防系統的大規模現代化方面不會落後於我們的各個鄰國”。普爾諾莫還透露說：“我們還將分享該機銷售收入的20%，而韓國方面已證實它了它將轉讓技術的承諾，因此我對他們沒有任何懷疑”。印尼國防部國防裝備局局長厄裏斯•亨利安托（Eris Herryanto）則透露說，參與KFX項目是印尼2024年前國防系統大規模現代化計畫的一部分內容。 迄今，印尼政府已在未來四年的預算中為KFX專案編列了大約1.35萬億印尼盾（1.58億美元）的資金。該專案的第一階段將持續18個月（直至2013年），主要工作是技術開發；接下來將製造5架原型機（其中4架由韓國製造，1架由印尼製造），2020年之前完成試飛並投入大批量生產。 印尼國有通訊社安塔拉通訊社報導說，KFX的攻擊作戰半徑將比美制F-16戰鬥機大50%，航電系統、雷達和隱身性能也都優於F-16。不過，印尼參與該專案引起了印尼國內專家的質疑。週一就有印尼大學的一位防務分析家表示：獲得技術轉移這一目標當然好，但這裏面有一個基本的問題：KFX會是一種更便宜並且更好的戰鬥機嗎？為什麼我們不直接購買現已投入使用的機型呢？對於此類質疑，普爾諾莫表示他相信印尼的國有航宇製造商——印尼航宇公司（譯者注：即IAe，印尼名稱為德幹塔拉公司/Dirgantara Indonesia）有能力製造出具有經濟可承受性的高品質飛機，而印尼政府之所以同意加入KFX專案，是因為此前印尼航宇公司曾與韓國聯合開展過一項可行性研究，結論是該項目是可行的。（中國航空工業發展研究中心 張洋）
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/127146/indonesia-ready-to-take-20%25-stake-in-south-korea%E2%80%99s-kfx-fighter-program.html
Indonesia-South Korea Fighter Jet Deal Readies for Take-Off Amid Expert Doubts
(Source: Jakarta Globe; published July 12, 2011)
Indonesia has taken a huge gamble in a deal with South Korea to manufacture a new type of fighter plane, an expert warned on Monday, with a real risk that the project could end in disaster.
“The aim for transfer of technology is positive, but there is a basic problem in it,” said Connie Bakrie, a defense analyst from the University of Indonesia. “Will it be a cheaper and better fighter? Why don’t we buy planes already in operation?”
The warning came as the Defense Ministry prepared to deploy a 36-man team of engineers and Air Force officers to South Korea for training on building the KFX, which former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung ordered built in 2001.
The initial stage of the deal is estimated to cost $8 billion, with Indonesia required to shoulder 20 percent of the cost, or around $1.6 billion. The rest will be financed by South Korea.
Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro said on Monday that the planes were expected to be ready by 2020, with Indonesia set to buy 50 of an estimated 200 units expected to be produced under the KFX project.
“Hopefully by that year, we won’t be left behind by our neighbors in overhauling our defense systems,” Purnomo said.
State news agency Antara said the KFX would best the F-16 fighter jet with a “50 percent higher attack radius, better avionic system and better radar as well as stealth capabilities.” The F16 was first produced in the 1970s, although modern versions are improved.
“We will also get 20 percent of the fighter jets’ sale revenues,” Purnomo said. “South Korea has proved that it is committed to the transfer of technology, so I have no doubt about them.”
Eris Herryanto, the ministry’s secretary general, said the deal was part of a long-term plan to overhaul the country’s defense system by 2024.
The government has so far earmarked around Rp 1.35 trillion ($158 million) for the project to be released during the next four years as the project enters its production phase. The first phase will cover 18 months of technical development through 2013, after which five prototypes are expected to be built — four on South Korean soil and one in Indonesia.
By 2020, the planes will be mass produced after testing.
Despite doubts that the project would not be successful, Purnomo said he was confident that that state plane manufacturer Dirgantara Indonesia would be able to produce affordable but high-quality aircraft.
“Given the current situation, we have to be realistic,” he said, adding that updating the nation’s fleet was necessary to defense reform by 2024.
The minister said the government agreed to deal because the South Korean government and Dirgantara had commissioned a feasibility study that showed the KFX could be built.
Purnomo also cited a previous deal by state shipbuilder PAL in increasing manufacturing of platform docks to meet rising foreign demand.
The KFX project was forged in 2009 when Purnomo and his South Korean counterparts signed a memorandum of understanding during current South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to Indonesia in 2009.
The cooperation with South Korea, Purnomo said, was only a way to complement the government’s plan to revitalize the defense system by simultaneously developing and making use of the current state of domestic defense industry and procuring defense tools from other countries.
“We already have the commitment and political will to speed up the process, and it will require consistency as cabinets and administrations change from one to another until 2024,” the defense minister said.
(EDITOR’S NOTE: This story is newsworthy as it marks the formal launch of yet another major defense programs in the Pacific Rim region. However, it is far from certain that the KFX program will reach the production stage, as neither country has the technology or the know-how to manage such an ambitious project. The story below, published almost exactly one year ago, illustrates some of the difficulties.) (ends)
Indonesia-S. Korea KFX Cooperation: The Second-Best Option?
(Source: The Jakarta Post; published July 15, 2010)
Indonesia and South Korea are getting ready to sign an MoU on the joint-development of a KFX fighter jet program (dubbed Boramae) later this year, following a letter of intent in March 2009 on Indonesian participation in a KFX study. When enacted, the MOU will provide a breakthrough for both countries in terms of bilateral defense collaboration and aircraft technology indigenization.
The defense community and members of parliament believe that the cooperation will help the revitalization of the Indonesian defense industry. MPs urged the government to conduct a feasibility test before embarking on a US$2 billion venture that spans across an eight-year period. It is expected from the collaboration that five prototypes will be built before 2020.
Approximately 200+ aircraft will be manufactured for both the Indonesian and Korean Air Force. Surely there is a sense of pride creeping into every Indonesian’s minds knowing that the biggest Muslim country in the world is going to carry on an indigenize a fighter jet program, debunking the myth that only technologically advanced countries can achieve this.
Indeed, the cooperation will not only allow Indonesia to access the so-called 4.5th generation fighter jet technology, but also help South Korea preserve the bloodline for an indigenous fighter jet program since they can only afford 60 percent of the necessitate fund.
But before we indulge in a techno-nationalism fantasy, several imminent issues need to be pondered. Sarcastic remarks as to why Indonesia uses a jet fighter project as sustenance for the aerospace industry when the capacity of the Indonesian Aerospace is still limited to transport aircraft and helicopter, will inevitably raise.
Therefore, it is important to answer basic questions such as what the “indigenize fighter jet program” means in reality and how this will help revitalize the defense industry. There is also an urgency to shed some light upon the KFX program and whether it fits into the Indonesian strategic and defense-industrial interests.
The first issue is the technical and fiscal feasibility of the KFX project. The controversial project was initiated in 2001, with an estimated cost of $13 billion for the production of 120 aircraft, and has not progressed from a feasibility study since. It is acknowledged that South Korea is lacking both in technical and fiscal abilities to kick start the program, with the Korean Aerospace Industry (KAI) as a prime contractor possessing only 63 percent of technological capability needed.
Established through a merger of three companies in 1999, KAI has a modest experience of developing the indigenous KT-1 Wong Bee trainer, license-producing F-16K and joint-developing T-50 advanced trainer as well as making parts for F-15 (forward fuselage and wings).
It does not have an extensive track record as it exports only the KT-1 trainer to Indonesia and Turkey, and is still unable to sell a single T-50 advanced trainer jet despite having been shortlisted for procurement in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Israel, Greece, Singapore and the US.
The second issue is the “sovereignty” of technology contained in the KFX and sustainability of in-service operation, since the KFX will be using subsystems such as engine and avionics from third countries that might present political complication for Indonesia. The KFX will be developed from T-50 Golden Eagle, a supersonic advance jet trainer jointly developed by KAI and the US Lockheed Martin, with the latter provided the avionics system, flight control and wings. In addition to the US, it is possible that Israel also contributes through an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar that will be built domestically in South Korea.
With the Korean Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) statement about the necessity to bring in international partner from big players such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, EADS and Saab to help develop the KFX, obviously there will be further third country subsystems fitted into the KFX platform, which bring more complexities of supply in the future. Nevertheless, there is benefit, as Indonesia might be able to absorb world class knowledge through cooperation with those big aerospace companies and establish a position in the global supply chain.
The third issue is risk associated with developing new technology; among them are cost overruns, under performance and delay. Under the MOU, Indonesia will bear 20 percent of the initial budget worth $8 billion, but the real cost can easily stretch out along the process. The risks of cost overruns and delay have taken place in similar collaborations such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the Eurofighter.
The JSF cost overrun is almost double its initial estimated price within 10 years of project (2001-2010), whereas the Eurofighter experienced cost overrun and “eternal delay” so bad that the participating countries decided to cut down the amount of aircraft order. Indonesia needs to be clear on how flexible they can be in terms of accepting risks incurred from participation in the project and whether the risk will be worthy of being paid off.
The fourth issue is whether the KFX project will really help revitalize the Indonesian defense industry, through job creation, transfer of technology and creation of local supply chains. Jakarta needs to be articulate in the clearest way possible about the expectation of the economic benefits possibly derived from the project.
It is not clear yet as to which model of work share is to be employed, whether it is juste retour (just return) or earned work shares (participation based on demonstrated competencies), or will Jakarta only access the know-how without participating in the production line (which is nearly impossible).
For the sake of comparison, the Eurofighter project helps create 30,000 jobs across Europe. However, with a cost at $45-50 million per copy, it sees limited prospect of export when facing competition from the JSF and Gripen, not to mention competing Russian and Chinese products in the non-European market.
Aviation Week estimated the break-even-point of the KFX will be reached with production of at least 200-250 aircraft, and it is only if the unit price of each copy can be pushed down to $41 million that makes it possible for export. If Indonesia were to order around 50 aircraft, it is possible to negotiate 20-25 percent of total work-share based on “juste retour” principle, and this will materialize in a significant number of jobs. Without export, however, the long-term economic benefits will likely demise once the project completes.
Experts share doubt whether the KFX can really offer the cutting-edge technology as offered by 5th Generation fighters such as the JSF and the Indo-Russian PAKFA in 2020s, which means in terms of strategic calculation, the KFX may not be the best option to fight with a more technologically advanced enemy.
Facing the 5th G fighter jet race from China, Japan, and Indo-Russia, the South Korean government has a difficult time calculating a trade-off between strategic and industrial interest, between building an indigenous fighter or buy best off-the-shelf (OTS) available on the market. Indonesia may not face a similar dilemma as there is no imminent 5th G fighter race with neighboring countries, but it does not mean that Jakarta do not need to explore another value for the money option.
Another possibility of using defense acquisition as industrial policy tool is using an offsets obligation to accompany the OTS procurement. Alternatively, $2 billion will enable Indonesia to get more than a squadron of cutting-edge OTS technology. Neither joint-development nor procuring OTS will give sovereignty of supply, but the OTS does not only give the advantage of value for money because it bypasses the development cost, but it also ensures getting the attested technology that probably would serve both defense-industrial and strategic interests better.
-ends-
本城市首頁
看回應文章
等級：8
