http://news.yam.com/cna/international/200807/20080718640637.html
美國防專家談軍售呼籲美政府支持台灣的民主
中央社╱中央社 2008-07-18 22:18
（中央社記者林琳紐約十八日專電）前美國國防部防禦安全合作署主管中東、亞洲與北非處長羅艾德(Edward Ross)指出，美國在選舉年面對的重大挑戰之一是對台灣軍售問題。他認為，美國政府應表明，支持台灣與中國之間緊張關係和緩的同時，美國仍是台灣民主的堅強後盾。
羅艾德在「華爾街日報」國際版發表專文指出，布希總統應該在對台軍售問題上有立即的行動。布希總統在二零零一年甫上任時即原則同意，美國將出售價值數十億美元的新型武器給台灣。
他表示，布希的決定反映出他對中國武力擴張以及基於台灣關係法美國協助保衛台灣安全承諾的關切。
不過，羅艾德也指出，台灣在前總統陳水扁執政八年期間的政治內鬥導致軍售預算被凍結。民進黨的政策激怒中國，影響到美國與中國的關係，也讓華府感到不滿。
羅艾德認為，陳水扁執政八年對於美國與台灣關係造成相當的損害。台灣的空軍、飛彈防衛系統及反潛作戰的能力都因軍購拖延而更形落後。中國在這段時間裡卻向俄羅斯購買了先進武器，並且增加國防研發計畫的資金。
他指出，台北與華盛頓之間的互信在這段時間裡也趨弱。在美國領導人對於加強美國與中國關係愈來愈關鍵之際，卻對台灣領導人失去信心。台灣方面讓國內政治考量凌駕於國家安全之上。
他表示，雖然去年立法院通過購買多項新武器的預算案，美國與台灣關係的損害已經造成，美國也愈來愈不願意因為軍售問題招致中國不滿，尤其是對台灣是否會貫徹執行並沒有信心。
馬英九總統在五月上任之後即推動兩岸和解政策，同時他也表示希望能恢復向美國購買武器。然而，過去八年留下的問題，加上布希個人不願得罪中國，一些待決的軍售問題仍被擱置。
羅艾德指出，布希八月將參加北京奧運開幕典禮，他是否會同意軍售清單上部份或全部項目，仍是問題。國務院及白宮的高級官員也擔心對台軍售會破壞台灣與中國的和解，並且對美國與中國關係造成嚴重損害。
羅艾德認為，這個問題的關鍵在於美國到底能對台灣的安全承受多大的風險。如果美國很確定台灣與中國的和解能在不犧牲台灣仍不夠茁壯的民主情況下持續進展，這些都不是問題。
但是，北京一向是要求的多而付出的少，而且會以動武或威脅使用武力作為外交的工具。羅艾德指出，台灣經由民主程序選出的總統在推動與中國和解的政策，中國方面有什麼改弦易轍的對等做法？
在中國撤除對準台灣部署的飛彈及減少台灣海峽沿海的戰機及部隊之前，美國為何要拖延台灣所要求的軍購？
羅艾德指出，下一任美國總統需要好幾個月的時間來弄清楚對中國及台灣的政策，重要的決策只會因而耽擱。而中國在美國的債券投資也讓它對美國造成的壓力只可能更增高。
他強調，台灣與中國的和解更需要美國的道義及實質支持。布希在卸任前若對軍售問題能有所行動，一方面能鞏固台灣民主，同時在軍購合約敲定及交貨時，他的繼任者也更能抗拒中國的壓力。
他認為，馬英九總統方面則必須向華府保證他對於購武以防衛台灣的承諾，而且台灣會簽署合約及有足夠的資金。
羅艾德強調，美國政府應表明，支持台灣與中國之間緊張關係和緩的同時，美國仍是台灣民主的堅強後盾。
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121632431011362871.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
Arming Taiwan
By ED ROSS
FROM TODAY'S WALL STREET JOURNAL ASIA
July 18, 2008
Among the many challenges facing the United States in an election year is the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. Before he leaves office, President Bush must decide whether or not to approve various major sales to the island, including 60 additional F-16s, Patriot PAC III missiles and Apache and Blackhawk helicopters. At present, the Department of State and the National Security Council are holding up these sales. This is an issue which deserves President Bush's immediate attention.
A little history helps illuminate what's going on. In 2001, shortly after President Bush took office, he approved in principle several billion dollars in new arms sales to Taiwan. This decision reflected the President's concern for China's military build-up and a continuing U.S. commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act, which obligates the U.S. to provide the island with weapons to defend itself.
During the eight-year tenure of former Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian, political infighting between the ruling Democratic Progressive Party and the opposition Kuomintang stalled the funding for these weapons purchases. At the same time, Mr. Chen's independence-leaning policies angered China's leaders. Washington was displeased by Mr. Chen's inability to push through the arms purchases, and because his actions and outspokenness interfered with improving U.S.-China relations.
The damage those eight years did to U.S.-Taiwan relations was considerable. Taiwan's relative air, missile defense and antisubmarine warfare capabilities fell further behind as important Taiwan military acquisitions were postponed. China, however, purchased advanced weapons from the Soviet Union and increased funding for its own military research and development programs.
Equally important, mutual confidence between Taipei and Washington may have been permanently weakened. U.S. leaders lost confidence in Taiwan's leaders at a time when the U.S. was becoming increasingly dependent on improved U.S.-China relations. In Taiwan, more than ever, domestic political considerations took precedence over national security issues. And although last year the Kuomintang-dominated legislature in Taipei finally passed a defense budget funding many new arms purchases, the damage to U.S.-Taiwan relations already had been done. The U.S. had become increasingly reluctant to take the heat from China over weapons sales it was not confident Taiwan would follow through on.
When Taiwan's current president, Ma Ying-jeou, assumed office in May, he ushered in a policy of Taiwan-China détente and subsequently has expressed his desire for resumed purchases of U.S. arms. Still, the lingering fallout from the previous eight years and President Bush's personal reluctance to anger Beijing continue to hold up various pending arms sales.
Whether or not President Bush approves some or all arms sales after the Beijing Olympics in August -- he will attend the opening ceremony -- remains an open question. High-ranking officials at State and the White House fear major U.S. arms sales, even then, would undermine Taiwan-China détente and do major damage to U.S.-China relations. They also ask why Taiwan needs more weapons packages now. Why not let the next U.S. President address this issue, while the sale of other, less provocative systems, training and spare parts continue?
Herein lies the crux of the problem. How much risk can the U.S. take with Taiwan's security? If it was certain that Taiwan-China détente would go forward without sacrificing Taiwan's young and still fragile democracy, none of this would be of concern.
Beijing has proven all too often, however, that it will demand much and give little and that it sees the use and threat of force as an instrument of diplomacy. Has it demonstrated otherwise? Taiwan democratically elected a president who ran on a platform of détente with China. What has changed on the China side of the equation?
Until Beijing removes short- and medium-range ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan and reduces the number of combat aircraft and troops on its side of the Taiwan Strait, why should the U.S. delay in responding to Taiwan's requests for arms purchases? It will take months for the next administration to sort out its China/Taiwan policies, only delaying important decisions further. In the meantime, China's pressure on the U.S. will only increase as it continues to finance U.S. debt and leaves Washington worried that it won't cooperate with it in the international arena if the U.S. proceeds with major arms sales.
As Taiwan enters this challenging period of détente with China, it needs strong U.S. moral and material support more than ever. By taking action on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan before he leaves office, President Bush would bolster a democratic Taiwan and make it much easier for his successor to withstand pressure from Beijing as arms sales contracts are concluded and weapons systems are delivered. At the same time, President Ma must assure Washington that he is committed to Taiwan's defense and that if Washington approves the sale of F-16s and other major weapons, Taiwan will follow through with signed contracts and adequate funding.
It is time to demonstrate clearly that, while the U.S. supports Taiwan-China détente, it stands firmly behind Taiwan's democracy.
Mr. Ross, a defense consultant, is the former principal director for operations in the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. He writes a weekly Internet column at：
http://www.ewross.com/
本文於 修改第 2 次
本城市首頁
看回應文章
等級：8
