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美國國會武裝軍兵種小組委員會提交國防部武器採購改革方案
2010-03-26
[據防務新聞網2010年3月24日報導] 美國眾議院武裝軍兵種小組委員會3月23日發佈了關於國防採辦改革的最終報告。報告的建議將在未來五年為國防部節省1350億美元。
目前存在的問題：
國防採辦的本質已經發生變化，國防部的採購體系並沒有得到保持，至今仍然主要以武器購買為主體。國防部的採辦體系尤其不適用於資訊技術購買。主要的武器系統研發時間框架都長達數十年，“導致了無法承受的成本增長，對工業界和許多案例產生消極效應，沒能及時滿足作戰需求”。
長時間的研發週期使得最前沿技術無法融入“資本集約”型（capital-intensive）系統，如飛機、軍艦和裝甲車等。使用並監察系統研發的軍隊發現，資本集約型系統意味著如果它不在系統中滿足一項被渴求的需求，就將在很長一段時間內錯過滿足這項需求的機會。因此，增加的需求擴展了研發並增加了資金的競爭，這將帶來壓力，以引入更多的需求。
五角大樓武器系統採購活動一直以來都“不受歡迎”。一份美國政府問責署（GAO）報告稱：國防部的96個重點國防採辦專案成本增長總量已經達到3000億美元，平均延遲時間達到22個月。雖然GAO的這一資料來自國防部，但國防部並沒有設立執行管理系統對問題的本質進行分析。
報告中的建議包括：
（1）國會應該充分發揮性能評估及根本原因分析辦公室（Office of Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analysis）的職能作用，該辦公室是2009年國防部成立的一個採辦監察辦公室，目的是引領五角大樓遵從2009武器採辦改革法案。該辦公室的任務應該擴展到對整個國防部進行評估，而不是僅評估主要國防採辦項目。該辦公司應該向五角大樓採辦主管彙報。
（2）專案執行辦公室人員應該與高級採辦執行人討論確定精確的測量目標，至少要涉及成本、品質、交付、採辦人員水準、市場調查水準、小型企業內在價值和最佳實踐等方面。
（3）執行情況評估應該獎勵高品質的採辦，如給予監察採辦的專案執行辦公室員工更多分紅，重組執行情況不好的採辦專案，或調動其職責。
（4）五角大樓應該把需求過程的改革作為執行情況管理的最優先項，任命參謀長聯席會副主席負責改進全部需求中影響採辦系統的執行情況。
（5）五角大樓審計員與各軍審計員應該更多地跟蹤那些以較低水準完成的開支計畫，以衡量各項目的投資情況。這些開支水準較低的組織已經申請了投資收支的月度預計與跟蹤。來自更高層的指揮應該更加注重這些執行過程的改進方法，而不是獨斷的標準。
（6）國防部應該在民用採辦和軍事人員領域都建立一個明確的、有吸引力的採辦職業生涯。（中國航太工程諮詢中心 侯丹 陳菲）
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4552821&c=AME&s=ALL
Panel Submits Ideas for DoD Weapon-Buying Reforms
By ANTONIE BOESSENKOOL
Published: 24 Mar 2010 15:07
A U.S. House Armed Services Committee panel issued its final report on defense acquisition reform March 23, after more than a dozen hearings over the past year on the issue. Its recommendations would save the Defense Department $135 billion over the next five years, the committee's defense acquisition reform panel said.
While the nature of defense acquisition has changed, the Pentagon's acquisition system hasn't kept up and is still structured mainly for buying weapons, though services are a much larger share of Pentagon buys, the panel said.
In particular, the Pentagon's acquisition system is ill-suited for information technology purchases. And major weapon systems development, set to decades-long timeframes, "has resulted in unacceptable cost growth, negative effects on industry, and in too many cases, a failure to timely meet war fighter needs," according to the panel's report.
The long development times are the result of the push to incorporate cutting-edge technology into "capital-intensive" systems like aircraft, ships and armored vehicles, the panel said: The services that use and oversee the development of these systems see that the capital-intensive nature of the systems means that if they don't get a desired requirement included on a system, they'll miss the opportunity to fulfill that requirement for an extended period.
Therefore, adding requirements extends development and increases competition for funds, which increases pressure to add more requirements.
The Pentagon's weapon systems buying performance overall has been "unacceptable," the panel said, citing a 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that said the Pentagon had seen nearly $300 billion in total cost growth and average schedule delays of 22 months on 96 major defense acquisition programs.
Although the data the GAO used for its cost-growth estimate came from the Pentagon, "the [Defense] Department had no performance management system in place to generate and analyze systematic data of this nature," the report said.
"In fact, the Panel heard direct testimony from witnesses that in many cases, senior Department officials are unaware of significant acquisition problems until they are disclosed by GAO audits. The Panel was left with little comfort that the Department's leaders have the processes and tools in place to routinely identify such issues through internal review and reporting today. The Panel concludes that the Department needs a strong internal performance assessment capability for acquisition that can serve as an internal GAO-like capability."
Among the recommendations in the report:
■ Congress should expand the role of the Office of Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analysis, an acquisition-monitoring office in DoD created late last year to bring the Pentagon into compliance with the 2009 Weapons Acquisition Reform Act. The office's role should be expanded to assess programs throughout DoD, not just major defense acquisition programs. The office should report to the Pentagon acquisition chief.
■ Program Executive Office personnel should negotiate specific measurable goals with their senior acquisition executive, at least on cost, quality, delivery, acquisition workforce quality, quality of market research, the inclusion of small businesses and best practices.
■ Performance assessments should reward high-performing acquisitions, such as with bigger bonus pools for Program Executive Office personnel overseeing an acquisition, and should reform or shift responsibilities away from low-performing acquisitions.
■ The Pentagon should make reform of the requirements process a top performance management priority and name the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to improve performance in the acquisition system across all requirements that affect the acquisition system.
■ The Pentagon comptroller and the comptrollers of the military services should rely more on the tracking of spending plans done at lower levels to measure financial performance of programs. These lower-level organizations are already required to forecast and track monthly when funds are obligated and spent. Higher commands should place greater reliance on these customized measures of performance rather than arbitrary standards.
■ DoD should establish a clear and attractive career path for civilians in acquisition, as well as for military personnel in the field.
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