这是继２０１１年１０月４日中俄共同否决涉叙决议草案后，安理会有关叙利亚决议草案再次未能获得通过。除俄罗斯和中国外，安理会其余１３个理事国投了赞成票。

    当天的表决原定于美国东部时间上午９时举行，由于安理会内部分歧明显，表决时间一再推迟，最终于美国东部时间１１时５０分举行。此前，安理会进行了近２个小时的闭门磋商。

http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2012-02/02/c_122647643.htm

联合国安理会行将就叙利亚问题投票。俄罗斯明确表示将投反对票，成为西方舆论的众矢之的。中国应支持俄罗斯，也投反对票。

　　由阿盟发起的安理会决议草案，受到西方的鼎力推动。它为外部军事干预叙利亚局势埋下伏笔。中国要考虑同阿盟的关系，投反对票有一定外交风险。尤其是叙利亚现政权被最终推翻的可能性相当高，中国为支持它而不顾其他，看上去不太值。此外拥有否决权的俄罗斯一旦投反对票，中国投弃权票并不影响投票结局。

　　但是中国投弃权票，会陷俄罗斯于孤立，而现在是莫斯科最需要外交支持的时候。中俄战略协作伙伴关系对两国的重要性都因西方的进逼，变得逐渐紧迫。叙利亚问题是中国以付出一定代价，主动给中俄战略关系加入一根钢筋的机会。北京应敢于同莫斯科结为在安理会的投票同盟。

　　中俄成为完全的盟友不现实，也没必要。但美国对中俄两国的态度，以及西方不断增加的压力，在逼中俄将彼此关系做实际的升级。两国必须在关键性国际问题上，特别是在安全问题上，形成准盟友的协调能力。这将是两国未来安全的基石。

　　叙利亚已是中东地区不受西方控制的孤岛，尽管它有可能被西方最终攻克，但叙局势远未走到尽头。安理会决议草案虽以阿盟名义提交，但阿盟内部的态度并非真正一致。此外，阿盟并无左右大国行为的野心，我们应有勇气在阿盟面前保持在安理会投票的自主性。

　　俄罗斯对中国的期待，远比阿盟的高，因为俄罗斯的朋友比阿盟的少。中国是否支持，对阿盟的意义是能否通过提案，对俄罗斯的意义则是是否能打破孤立。中国投什么票，必然影响莫斯科对俄中战略协作伙伴关系究竟有多少含金量的评估。

　　其实无论怎么投票都很难，中国只能两害相权取其轻。当权衡都不好做的时候，就应另换角度思考。

　　中国越难投，越说明我们这一票重要。重要的原因在于中国实力大。只要中国的实力越来越大，我们对各方的重要性今后只会增加，即使有谁今天对我们不悦。对中阿关系和中俄关系，道理是一样的。

　　莫斯科的特殊性是，中国今后有可能需要俄罗斯关键性的战略支持，甚至需要它在某个时刻同中国结为共同对付美国的力量。从现在开始，我们应当为那个时刻未雨绸缪。

　　国际政治的结构性宏观变数，说到底跟中国崛起有关。西方围绕中国的紧张，比围绕俄罗斯的紧张要深刻得多，未来西方围绕中国的战略布局，也会是最活跃的。中国今后需要战略上借重俄罗斯的时候会越来越多。

　　阿盟也是中国的朋友，对中国很重要。但中国投反对票是基于反对强行用外力改变一个国家基本政权的原则。中国的反对票不应是安理会的意外。

　　相信阿盟能够理解中国投反对票的外交合理性，世界也会因此对中国的自主外交有更多认识。说到底，中国无论怎么投，都谈不上它能决定我们的命运。我们是有力量并能制造各种回旋空间和机会的大国。我们别看轻自己。（海南海洋安全与合作研究院研究员 戴旭）

    巴尼说，北约在打击卡扎菲武装方面取得积极成果。随着卡扎菲政权的倒台，利比亚现在已经不需要在其领空设置禁飞区，过渡委对安理会取消禁飞区的决定表示欢迎。

    安理会今年３月１７日通过第１９７３号决议，授权“采取一切必要措施”以保护利比亚境内可能遭受袭击的平民和平民居住区，并同意在利比亚上空设立禁飞区。随后，美英法等多国联军对利比亚发动空袭。后来，北约接管军事行动指挥权，直接帮助过渡委武装在地面战场扭转战局，最终推翻卡扎菲政权。本月２７日，安理会一致通过决议，决定于利比亚当地时间１０月３１日２３时５９分取消利比亚禁飞区，并终止北约在利比亚的军事行动。

    巴尼说：“利比亚人现在有能力保卫祖国，我们现在比以前更强大了。”他同时说，利比亚将来不会允许任何外国军队驻扎，但有可能允许一些外国军事顾问帮助利比亚训练军队，实现军队现代化。

    谈及战后重建，巴尼认为利比亚军方目前面临的最大挑战是如何收缴散落民间的武器以及重组过渡委军队。

新华网北京１０月２８日电　外交部发言人姜瑜２８日证实，中国驻利比亚大使王旺生已于１０月２８日返回利比亚首都的黎波里。

    在回答记者有关中方对未来中利关系发展有何期待的问题时，姜瑜说，中利两国人民有着传统友谊。当前利比亚迈入了新的历史时期，中方愿同利方一道，在相互尊重、平等互利的基础上，发展中利友好合作关系，造福两国人民，促进共同发展。

希拉蕊已提前一日秘密抵達利比亞準備慶祝。

Gaddafi killed: A new kind of US foreign policy success

Gaddafi's death will be a relief to President Obama and his administration. That's on the fairly simple grounds that he backed NATO action, called for him to go, and now he's gone.

In an awkward phrase, coined by an anonymous official, the policy was "to lead from behind."

Most Americans see Gaddafi as a villain. They too will be glad he has gone.

Despite a brief rehabilitation when he chose to be on America's side during President George W Bush's war on terror, most will associate him with the Lockerbie bomb: a crazy, slightly sinister man, almost a caricature of a mad Middle Eastern dictator.

The road that led us to this day tells us a lot about Barack Obama's foreign policy as a whole, and its sometimes uncomfortable mix of idealism and realism.

Mr Obama's foreign policy is driven by a sense that, particularly in the Arab world, the US must step back a pace, not be seen as a bully, always hectoring or imposing its will using physical force.

It seeks to ensure that the US crafts alliances, and does not tell friends to follow.

This is reinforced by the pragmatic belief that America cannot afford to do everything, everywhere, and must choose to do only what matters most.

Inside the White House they will be pleased that Muammar Gaddafi has gone and the regime has changed. But they will be delighted that it will be seen by the world as a victory for the Libyan people, not the American president.

Obama deliberately took the back seat during the Nato action as well. He stressed that there would be no American troops on the ground and the French and British would be leading the air sorties.

This was partly for those reasons of the perception of American power. But it was also because President Obama was repeatedly told by security advisors that Libya was not a vital national interest for the US, even if it was for Europeans. So Europeans were left to take the lead.

For ages many Europeans have argued that the US should be less assertive, but when it happened it was uncomfortable for some.

For more than 50 years "the West" has grown used to the US being out in front. It is odd when it doesn't happen.

But let's not go over the top. Even though they didn't shout about it from the rooftops, American forces were deeply involved.

The total cost to the US so far stands at just over $1bn. There have been 7,725 US sorties including 145 predator drone strikes. Without American involvement behind the scenes it probably couldn't have been done.

The perception of the American position wasn't all deliberate. There really was a good deal of muddle.

As so often Obama took a while to decide what to do. Crucial allies like the UK and France were kept in the dark as some argued for intervention to prevent a humanitarian crisis, while others said that America could not afford, in any sense, another military adventure in the Arab world.

In the end it was fear of being judged a moral failure that drove the decision.

The president was told that thousands could die in a massacre in Benghazi and he wasn't going to be held responsible for that.

But if President Obama's policy has been a success on its own terms, it leaves others in the US deeply worried. They don't think their country should encourage, cajole, help and guide. They think it should lead - that it should be seen to lead in fact and in deed.

And if it doesn't it is not clever - it is defeatist, and will inevitably lead to a diminution of power. They may raise their voices, not today, but when the dust settles.

There are others still who think that backing the people in the Arab world, however quietly, is paving the way for jihadist regimes that will be hostile to American interests.

Making sure they are wrong is where the state department's focus is now. The coming weeks and months will not have the drama of the events that are unfolding. They may not even be reported in detail in much of the Western media.

But the US state department is deeply involved in how Libya develops, and that will be the true test of the success or failure of Barack Obama's policy.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13872674

Mr Frattini also said Nato must provide data on results of its bombing campaign and guidelines on targeting errors.

Arab League Chairman Amr Moussa also urged a ceasefire on Tuesday, voicing reservations about the Nato campaign.

On Sunday a Nato missile apparently misfired striking a residential area.

The Libyan government said nine people including two young children were killed in the strike.

The alliance acknowledged that civilian casualties may have resulted from it.

Meanwhile Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi described Libya's opposition National Transitional Council as an "important dialogue partner" and an "important domestic political force".

Rebel leader Mahmoud Jibril has been holding talks with the Chinese leadership in Beijing.

UN Syria failure shows declining power of the West

15 June 2011 Last updated at 18:06 GM

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-13785954

Attempts by the UK and France to push through a UN Security Council resolution censuring Syria have faltered and this tells us much about the new realities of diplomacy in a "multi-polar" world.

Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, earlier on Wednesday reiterated that his country would not allow such a vote to pass.

The UK/French draft called for UN human rights monitors to be allowed into Syria, for humanitarian access to be allowed to some of the strife-torn areas, and for countries to stop supplying weapons to the regime of President Bashar al-Assad.

Despite the non-binding nature of the proposed wording, it soon became apparent that Russia and China - both veto powers - would block it and that other countries on the council, including India also opposed it.

You might say that the opposition came for predictable reasons - that Russia is a long term ally and weapons supplier to the Assad government and China is nervous about allowing too much international intervention in the affairs of sovereign states.

All of this is true, just as it is also the case that the diplomatic factors that made UN Security Council Resolution 1973 possible - allowing air strikes against Libya - were very unusual, relying largely on the fact that Colonel Muammar Gaddafi has behaved so oddly for so many years that he is pretty much friendless.

There is, though, a deeper truth shown up by the failure of this Syrian resolution. It is a narrative of the declining power of the West and of the increasing confidence of those who dispute what are often labelled as "Western values".

In global terms the "Brics" are newly empowered - Brazil, Russia, India and China. In the context of Syrian intervention the list is different: Russia and China are still there, but Iran and Turkey are also important.

The Syrian opposition claims that Iranian advisers are active with Mr Assad's military units on the ground, helping to crush dissent. Whether or not this is true, it is certainly the case that the Iranian government has warned Western countries against interfering in Syria's internal affairs, and given diplomatic support to the government in Damascus.

As for Turkey, it has received thousands of refugees from the districts near its border with northern Syria. Turkey is also reportedly considering sending its forces inside Syria to create safe havens there.

There are plenty in the Arab world who believe the absence of a strong Western, and in particular US, lead on Syria has given latitude to Iran and Turkey to get more involved - and for Mr Assad to press ahead with repression.

If that UK/French resolution of censure could not get through, they may reason, then the chances of more sanctions, let alone military intervention must be minimal.

As for the West itself, it is divided on many issues concerning the Arab Spring and intervention.

After the parting shots by Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, predicting a "dim and dismal" future for Nato if the other members of the alliance do not do more to defend their interests, it is apparent that extending the "Libyan model" of intervention elsewhere in the troubled region would be extremely hard.

It is only fair to say that even this blueprint, which many people in Washington like because of the leading role taken by France and the UK has not yet proven itself a success - the bombing goes on.

Talking today to Nato Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, he feels that the answer both to the issue of alliance burden sharing, and maintaining influence in the Middle East, is for European members of Nato to "step up to the plate".

He argues they have cut defence too deeply in recent years and that they need to produce more effective, deployable, forces. Implicitly, he suggests that it is up to Europe to check the decline of the West.

The chances of European countries reversing defence cuts or being politically more interventionist seem remote though.

While many chose to criticise US interventionism, particularly in the Bush era, it appears that many European countries prefer to avoid entangling themselves in foreign trouble spots unless the US is in the lead.

As these industrialised countries, struggling with budget deficits and (in some cases) public war weariness chose to sit out foreign crises more often, the world seems to be becoming a less predictable and more volatile place.