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‘民主人权’和‘兴亡继绝’

（2010-11-10）

于时语

　　刚结束的美国中期选举，众议院席位出现有史以来的最大逆转，若不是茶党人弄巧成拙，民主党连参议院多数都难保。从内政讲，可说奥巴马目前是只斗败的公鸡。他此时展开亚洲四国之行，唯独绕开美国亚洲政策的中心中国，代表了相当尖锐的外交攻势，也不无在政绩上面对国内败局“堤外损失堤内补”的用意。

　　在国际政治上，奥巴马此行无非是笔者十多年前就分析过的“离强合弱”和“抑强扶弱”地缘战略的具体步骤，是对中国取代日本，成为全球第二大经济实体的自然反应。另一方面，也是默认以其民主制度被大力唱好的印度，在华盛顿眼中实在并非中国对手。

　　然而也不能不看到，奥巴马出访反映了亚洲近期来外交局势的某种急速变化，其触发点，除了上述世界GDP排名换位，便是北京宣布南中国海属于中国“核心利益”，以及钓鱼岛领土争议升温。这一急变是否如美国朝野众多人士（包括《新闻周刊》国际主编扎卡利亚）声称，使得中国多年来对周边国家的“笑脸外交”成果一朝化为乌有，颇可争辩；但是变化中的亚洲局势十分有利于华盛顿制约北京的外交攻势，自不待言。

　　这里的悖论是中美两国经济实力的消长。我曾经分析美国内政急速变幻，是经济实力衰落大气候之下频繁出现的“异常气象”，今年的中期选举结果，是其最新例证。这不能不对美国的国际影响产生负面效果。《纽约时报》新近便评论，印度朝野担心虽然目前受到华盛顿力挺，后来会不会被实力不继的美国晾在干岸上。东盟（亚细安）各国对南越西贡政权被山姆大叔抛弃的先例，自然也记忆犹新。

　　另一方面，是中国经济实力的空前增长，从中亚、韩国到东南亚，周边邻国在经贸和经济发展上日益依赖中国，甚至连甲午战争以来的“世仇”日本的经济复苏也不例外。可是从美国公开卷入南中国海领土争议、五角大楼宣布钓鱼岛属于日美安保条约防务范围、国务卿希拉里告诫柬埔寨不要单独依赖北京，到奥巴马这次出访亚洲四国，华盛顿能够在这样的“经济逆境”下，发起制约中国周边影响力的全面攻势，发人深省。

道德价值弥补美国经济实力的不足

　　华盛顿的外交优势，固然有长远战略投资的回报，除了韩国、日本、菲律宾、澳大利亚等正式军事盟国，东盟（亚细安）各国，尤其泰国和印度尼西亚也是华盛顿长期的事实盟国。对比之下，北京的正式盟国只有三代世袭而成为国际笑柄的平壤，不免形单影只（巴基斯坦是美国的“非北约盟国”）。

　　更有力的是华盛顿在文化和政治上的“软力量”。美国传媒纷纷宣扬奥巴马这次出访四国都是民主国家，明显突出了华盛顿以民主和人权代表的“共同价值观”来制约和围堵中国的策略，并且收到相当的成效。

　　但是回顾一下历史，便可以看到以道德价值作为大国政治武器，却是亚洲的地缘政治传统，也是中国主导的东亚传统政治秩序的有机部分。

　　以1592年爆发的万历朝鲜之役（壬辰倭乱）为例，在日本全面入侵之下，朝鲜面临亡国之危，国王宣祖已经准备逃亡中国。明廷以“兴亡继绝”作为抑强扶弱的道德宣传，援朝抗日，获得了从琉球到东南亚的周边邻国支持，明朝远征军中包括了缅甸和暹罗（泰国）部队。这在军事上固然像美国在伊拉克和阿富汗的“盟军”一样属于点缀，却代表了中国领导亚洲政治秩序的道德权威。

　　这种抑强扶弱、兴亡继绝的道德宣传游戏，被主导亚洲大陆的初唐政权玩到极致，唐高宗居然在西域册封了一位“兴昔亡可汗”和一位“继往绝可汗”，成为唐朝全面控制中亚的先声。

　　美国最新出版了一本关于唐代族群认同的专项研究，笔者受邀为其撰写书评，详读了书中突出的唐人文化和道德价值认同，而并非今日“愤青”的狭隘民族主义。唐代成为世界性大国，离不开这种文化道德上的号召力。

　　由此上溯到“犯强汉者，虽远必诛”的两汉。中国传统的尊老“孝道”，是汉政权强大的“人权”宣传武器，使得“贵壮健，贱老弱”的匈奴政权受到很大的道德文化压力，而被迫东施效颦。无独有偶，“孝道”也是马其顿亚历山大大帝在从小亚细亚一路远征到中亚和北印度时，对付“野蛮人”的文化武器，说明即便在古代，道德权威仍是确立政治控制和秩序的重要工具。

　　总之，东亚的传统政治秩序，在基于军事和经济实力的“霸道”之外，更有建筑在当时“普世”道德文化价值上的“王道”。中国在经济实力飞速增长之下的亚洲外交困局，说明北京在道德权威上的内外赤字和被动局面，是亚洲向传统政治秩序回归的一大障碍。

　　中評社香港10月19日電／德國之聲網10月18日編發德新社報道《美中尋求太空合作可能》，摘要如下：
 
　　美國國家航空航天局（NASA）局長博爾登（Charles Bolden）10月16日開始訪問中國。他將與這個世界上最大的崛起中的太空力量對話，尋求合作的可能。 

　　博爾登此次為期六天的中國之行受到一些美國政治家的反對，他們認為在航天領域，北京是競爭者，而不是潛在的合作夥伴。

　　今年4月NASA的一次會議上，博爾登在談到國際空間站的未來時說，“除了美國之外，所有的合作夥伴都在與中國對話。認為我們能孤立中國，那是一種幻想。被孤立的將是美國自身。”這一表態在NASA網站上公布的會議紀要中可見。博爾登當時還表示，與中國的合作還沒有做出決策。

　　美國海軍戰爭學院的中國宇航項目問題專家約翰森-弗立茲（Joan Johnson-Freese）認為，疑慮主要基於中國在一系列問題上的立場，從人權到台灣問題，從擴充軍備到2007年中國的反衛星試驗。還有些人擔心美國不知道該如何與中國合作，包括運作程序、預算、技術和交流等方面。 

　　針對美國共和黨參議員沃爾夫（Frank Wolf）的質疑，博爾登回覆說，他與中國的對話將具有“探索性質”。這封在網上公開發表的信中說，對話將不會提出任何有關載人太空航行或者其它領域合作的具體建議。

　　去年11月，美國總統奧巴馬首次訪問中國後的美中聯合聲明中曾寫道，雙方尋求在透明、相互合作和互惠的基礎上，就載人太空航行和太空探索展開對話。約翰森-弗立茲表示，這一聲明反映出與布什政府政策的不同，但迄今並未有切實的提議，“布什政府認為中國的太空項目完全是競爭性的。奧巴馬政府則打開了潛在的合作之門。不過，美中關係目前處在整體下降趨勢——中國認為美國實行遏制政策——這不利於開展合作。”

　　2005年，中國成為第三個將宇航員送入太空軌道的國家。未來20年，中國計劃發展自己的空間站，而且似乎打算與美國主導的國際空間站（ISS）平分秋色。接下來的一步，中國將進行太空對接演練。今年10月1日，中國已發送了嫦娥2號探月衛星。

　　北京航空航天大學一位專家表示，中美有可能在分享衛星數據上展開合作。中國可以通過分享美國全球定位系統（GPS）的數據增加本國獲取數據的精准度。美國則可以分享中國嫦娥2號收集的數據。中國軍控與裁軍協會一位專家則認為，NASA可能認為與中國的合作有助於美國未來克服太空項目中的障礙。

越南會攻太平島？台將如何舉措？

原題：國軍是為誰守護南海？

近期參加座談。外方安全領域學者指出，對於蔑視人權更嚴重的沙特，美國從來不置一詞。但台方學者不分藍綠，關心的仍是美日台同盟。並認為中國在東海與南海的主張，毫無道理。因為根本沒有"自古屬於XX"。

但當說到台灣是否應該放棄太平島，因為南沙自古不屬台灣，台方學者又無人置一詞。大概是想，如果美越願意與台灣同盟，大可放棄南沙。

許多人乾脆投機或正確的開始學習中文，為什麼？登公之前常說台灣有一新的歷史性集團興起，我們用這個概念，也可以分析周邊各國的新群體出現；周邊的中文學習人口有意識或無意識的等待著美中權力交替，如果沒有這個權力交替，他們就是在浪費青春與金錢。

美國名校的中文教師們，多數似乎看衰中國，厭惡共產黨。校園內的學術菁英基於其理想主義，多數是反中(共)的。商界似乎是另一回事，但也頗多猶疑。我在河濱分校旁聽某名師課程，他在課內談人權，中國操縱匯率讓美國人失業也拿來講，毛澤東的勞改營是其中ㄧ大重點，還有史達林、希特勒、波布、南非種族隔離等等，我不好意思把鴉片戰爭和黑奴貿易提出來講。這老師覺得中國政權垮了好，我問他之後的想定是什麼，他說他沒有想。類似這樣的想法，在南加大也一樣；據聞UCLA不會有差別。這樣教出來的，美國教育下的各國菁英，當然對中國崛起都是要抵觸排拒的。

所以中國要多招一點留學生。太重要了。學中文、到中國交流，長居等等，看看能不能調整一番。

焦慮是會傳染的...需要治療...

PacNet #41, Monday, September 13, 2010
China's Rise, the United States, and Asia's Angst

by Robert Sutter

Robert Sutter is Visiting Professor of Asian Studies at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington DC. He recently completed consultations with officials and non-government opinion leaders in 15 Asian-Pacific cities.

Americans interacting with officials and other experts in the Asia-Pacific region in recent weeks would be reassured that official and other expert opinion among US allies and associates seems to disagree with prevailing media commentary in these countries depicting the United States in decline and China emerging to challenge the US leadership in the region.

The officials and nongovernment experts recognize that China has a long way to go to emerge as Asia's leader. China has a hard job to reassure its neighbors as a result of over four decades of often very negative and disruptive behavior by the PRC in Asia from 1949 until the end of the Cold War.

China's record in the region since then has sometimes lapsed into episodes of coercion and intimidation that remind neighbors of the negative past. Patriotism and nationalism in China make compromise difficult with other equally patriotic and nationalistic Asian countries over salient territorial, economic, or other disputes.

China's win-win diplomacy is reassuring on the one hand but it also makes clear that China will do little for the Asia-Pacific region that does not benefit China in direct and concrete ways. (China's recent initial pledge of only $10 million to help longstanding Chinese associate Pakistan deal with massive flood damage underlines continued Chinese unwillingness to undertake the risks, costs, and commitments of regional leadership.)

Asian neighbors are often suspicious of China's military buildup and longer term intentions. As a result they have a tendency to engage in contingency plans while they try to benefit from economic and other exchanges with rising China. They often build up their military forces, endeavor to enmesh China into regional organizations, and encourage the United States to remain deeply involved with them and the region.

By contrast, the United States is seen to be in a unique position in providing security and economic public goods essential for Asian governments seeking legitimacy through development. Development requires stability and because Asian governments tend not to trust one another very well, they have come to rely on the very expensive and often quite risky US commitment of military forces in the region to preserve stability.

The governments recognize that no other Asian government or coalition of forces will undertake these costs, risks and commitments. They also recognize that much of the processing trade that makes up half of China's trade and much of the regional trade depends on exports out of the region, and that the United States annually absorbs several hundreds of billions of dollars of Asian goods, running a massive trade deficit that neither China nor any other Asian power would endure.

Other US strengths welcomed by China's neighbors include the active role of the US military, intelligence, and other security organizations play in interaction with almost all countries in the region; and the broad webs of longstanding positive US relations with the region developed by the uniquely active nongovernment sector in the US, including the role of millions of Asian immigrants since the change in US immigration policy in 1965.

Asia's angst--uncertainty about the future

Officials and experts in regional countries allied and associated with the United States on the one hand have tended to welcome the recent US activism in regional groups and US public postures countering unilateral Chinese claims to territorial, resource, and navigation rights in nearby international waters. On the other hand, they are anxious about a possible escalation of tensions between the United States and China that might be hard to manage and could prove to be detrimental to their concerns about preserving regional stability. They look to the US to manage differences with China in ways that off-set perceived Chinese coercion and expansionism but avoid confrontation and tension.

For now, many are preoccupied with what kind of reaction China will have in response to Secretary of State Clinton's intervention regarding stability and navigation rights in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Hanoi in July, and to the presence of a US aircraft carrier and other advanced ships off the coast of Vietnam in celebration of a recent US-Vietnamese anniversary. They also question what plans the United States has to manage China's possible responses in ways that do not undermine regional stability.

Meanwhile, many officials and nongovernment experts have strong concerns about the longer term future. They wonder whether the United States can sustain its military and economic commitments to the region. The global economic crisis and US recession have resulted in massive government debt that raises questions about future US military spending. The crisis and recession also challenge US free trade policies and the sustainability of the US asymmetrical trade relationships with Asia.

China, for its part, seems positioned to continue economic, military, and political advances. China's military buildup has already raised serious questions about US ability to come to Taiwan's defense in the event of a Chinese attack against the island. Chinese anti-access efforts might hamper US abilities to protect its interests in other areas along the Chinese periphery.

Challenges for the US

Somewhat nervous allies and associates are likely to pose special challenges for US diplomacy. As the government deepens its involvement in sensitive regional issues, Asian friends and others will be watching carefully how well the US balances efforts to off-set Chinese unilateralism and intimidation while avoiding serious and disruptive confrontation or conflict. They also will be watching how well the US sustains its military leadership and open markets for Asian trade.

US handling of sensitive issues like Taiwan are complicated as some friends in the Asia-Pacific aver privately that Taiwan's perceived gravitation into China's orbit, even with the acquiescence of the Taiwan administration, would make it more difficult for the US to reassure Japan, Australia, and other allies of its staying power as China rises. Many US friends and associates want to know what will characterize the new Asian order and how they can best position their governments in the order. Since prevailing circumstances argue for considerable flux in the Asian order for some time to come, the United States likely will be called upon repeatedly to reassure, stabilize, and avoid actions seen as disruptive or confrontational.