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阿富汗戰事結束後的新疆
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如果北京接受薛理泰的分析,那麼最好的政策是什麼呢?設法讓阿富汗戰事永不平息?伊朗與美國的矛盾遠較與中國大,伊朗擁核後向伊拉克發展的可能性遠較向東的可能性高。

 薛理泰 

  一位美國高官日前表示,北約可能會商請中國同意,借用瓦罕走廊向北約在阿富汗的駐軍提供後勤補給。看來華盛頓遲早會向北京提出這項建議。 

  阿富汗戰事似乎不至於同中國戰略利益有什麽關聯。然而,由於宗教、政治、地域甚至歷史的因素,大西北的政治穩定受到鄰國政治格局的重大影響。筆者思忖,阿富汗戰事平息之日,可能即新疆烽火連天之時。 

  2001年,美軍攻勢犀利,重創了塔利班,控制了阿富汗全境。塔利班原本奄奄一息,卻趁美國對伊拉克開戰之際,在同北約軍隊周旋的過程中,死灰復燃,終於捲土重來,像墨迹污染四邊似的,在“面”上控制了大部分地區。去年以來,塔利班聲勢益熾,攻勢更加淩厲。去年年中,北約駐軍的陣亡人數居然超過了美軍在伊拉克的陣亡人數,令人驚怵。 

   

阿富汗是外軍墳場 

  阿富汗全境多險峻山區和崎嶇山路,交通極爲不便。運輸手段僅公路交通和空運,路況相當差。尤其是在吉爾吉斯迫使美國空軍基地遷離該國以後,北約駐軍37000(其中美軍34000)的後勤補給日趨困難。 

  奧巴馬就任美國總統以後,旋即宣佈美國將在阿富汗增加實戰部隊和後勤保障單位共17000人。然則,奧巴馬的決定又帶來新問題。今後美國如何爲在當地綿亙不斷的山區分散部署的五、六萬駐軍確保後勤補給,十分棘手。 

  歷史經驗證明,不論阿富汗軍隊同外國軍隊在武器裝備上相差多麽懸殊,多山之國阿富汗多次成爲進駐該國的外國軍隊的墳場,屢試不爽。先從近代史說起。 

  1840年,英國在對中國發動第一次鴉片戰爭的同時,出動近16000人的兵力,入侵這個多山之國,旋即攻佔首都喀布爾。其後,阿富汗武裝對抗行動日趨激烈,英軍眼看陷入絕境,乃於18421月被迫全部從喀布爾南撤。英軍沿途遭到各部族武裝的截擊,又受到風雪饑寒的襲擊,最終居然“匹馬不返”,僅一名印度翻譯獲准逃離阿富汗,爲的是讓他向外界傳遞英軍全軍覆滅的消息。

197912月,蘇軍分陸、空兩路大舉入侵阿富汗,迅即佔領了主要城市和交通要道,並控制了阿富汗與鄰國的邊境要地。阿政府軍未予抵抗,歸順了蘇聯扶植的卡爾邁勒政權。侵阿蘇軍兵力達12萬人,擁有各種現代化的軍事打擊手段,加上傀儡政權7萬人的兵力,卻始終無法重創人數約10萬、裝備窳劣的遊擊隊。蘇軍鏖戰十年,迄未達到預定的戰略目標。截至1989年蘇軍全部撤離阿富汗前夕,蘇軍傷亡人數多達五萬多人。蘇聯在國際政治格局中的地位隨之被弱化,甚至對數年以後蘇聯的崩潰起到了不容低估的作用。 

美國求助其意何居 

  如今美軍在阿富汗形格勢禁:進則戰爭未有窮期,難以達到既定的戰略目標;退則前功盡棄,多年努力毀於一旦。美國在阿富汗血戰累年,欲求體面撤軍則遙遙無期,一鬆手則“戰果”盡失。這種狀況同當年越戰僵局如出一轍。 

  奧巴馬政府怵于金融危機造成的嚴重後果,強調今後要依靠“巧實力”,亦即要結合“軟實力”和“硬實力”,並且著重“軟實力”。這反映了美國在全球範圍內的影響力已經趨向低潮,美國在上世紀九十年代以來實施的軍事擴張也開始處於收縮的狀態。 

  由此可見,美國在阿富汗的增兵只是暫時的手段,如何體面地撤軍才是終極的目的。假如有人認爲美國增兵的最終目的是爲了在可以預期的將來從西邊構成對中國的軍事壓力,不免本末倒置了。 

  再想深一層,阿富汗戰局的變化倒有可能牽涉到中國大西北地區政局的穩定或者動蕩。阿富汗戰火平息之日,可能即西陲烽火連天之時。 

  當年美軍從南越撤軍,河內反華派認爲越南可以騰出手來對付中國了,頓時甚囂塵上。隨後兩國關係趨向惡性互動,中國南疆迅即陷入了局部戰亂(1979年中、越邊界戰爭至1988年諒山戰役告終) 

  歷史教訓值得汲取。以此類推,假若最終北約被迫從阿富汗撤軍,標誌著西方反恐怖戰爭進入低潮,而阿富汗政教合一的伊斯蘭政權一定氣焰囂張,因爲橫跨三個世紀的歷史經驗已經充分證明,該國武裝力量能夠在境內戰勝甚至殲滅任何強國的軍隊。與越南情況不同,阿富汗政權還同新疆恐怖主義、分裂主義和極端主義勢力之間,有著千絲萬縷的聯繫,是這三股勢力的天然盟友。 

   

新疆境內三股勢力

倘若北約軍隊在阿富汗受挫撤走,新疆境內的三股勢力必然爲之鼓舞,仿佛注射了一劑強心針,變得十分驕橫,並且加緊同阿富汗等國的伊斯蘭政權聯繫,以百倍的瘋狂、十倍的出擊頻率,挑戰中國核心的安全利益。何況,屆時伊朗多半已經擁有了核武器,伊斯蘭世界原教旨主義勢力以此爲護符,作爲新疆境內三股勢力的後盾,爲之撐腰,從而成爲北京的心腹之患。 

  當初蕞爾小國如車臣,人口不過一百余萬,尚且在長達十多年的期間內,挑戰俄國的核心利益,戰亂甚至波及莫斯科,攪得俄國周天寒徹,屢次爆發震驚世界的重大新聞。何況,“樹欲靜而風不止”,新疆三股勢力被啟動之後,各地分裂勢力蠢蠢欲動,當局必然給予打擊,分裂勢力訴諸反擊,難免會發生一連串的惡性互動。 

  一旦大西北戰事兵連禍結,或許會把在中國分佈最廣的少數民族回族牽連進來,這就增加了更大的變數。在中國少數民族中,回族人口僅次於壯族,而且也信仰伊斯蘭教,民族凝聚力特別強。回顧一部中國近代史,假若政治風波牽涉到回族,都不免動搖半壁江山,不能善了。 

  作者是斯坦福大學國際安全和合作中心研究員 

阿富汗局勢與新疆無必然關聯

 葛壯(上海) 

  《聯合早報》320日發表薛理泰題爲《阿富汗戰事結束後的新疆》的文章(簡稱薛文),引起了筆者的濃厚興趣。作者提出的阿富汗戰事與中國大西北政治穩定的聯動關係,確實值得中國政府的高度關注。 

  不過,薛文前後幾番提到的“阿富汗戰事平息之日,可能即新疆烽火連天之時”的推斷,卻讓人感到未免有點危言聳聽。以筆者之見,目前阿富汗戰事的結束,未必就是新疆面臨兵燹之厄的開始,二者之間並無必然的因果關係。理由有二: 

  一是從歷史上來看,九一一之前的阿富汗,基本上都掌控在塔利班政權手中,其首領奧馬爾甚至與奧薩馬·本拉登的基地組織沆瀣一氣,公開爲推動“疆獨”的東突勢力張目撐腰,還專門訓練從事分裂的武裝人員。但即便如此,也絲毫未能撼動新疆的穩定局面。 

  二是且不論北約部隊如何在阿富汗收場,阿富汗的局勢如何發展本身,就是很大的未知數。其國內的普什圖人與其他少數民族的固有矛盾及利益衝突,包括遜尼派的阿富汗與鄰國伊朗什葉派政權的教派宿怨,還有巴基斯坦政權對阿富汗的影響,都會産生難以估量的影響。屆時阿富汗自顧尚且不暇,遑論騰出手來對偌大的強鄰中國張牙舞爪? 

新疆不必然會受外部影響 

  換言之,有“外軍墳墓”之實力的阿富汗(如薛文所稱“該國武裝力量能夠在境內戰勝甚至殲滅任何強國的軍隊”),並不定然就是“外國的夢魘”。 

  至於薛文提到塔利班政權是新疆境內三股勢力的天然盟友,確實也有所依據,但文中進一步引發的論述卻有幾處未能讓筆者苟同。首先是新疆境內的三股勢力,在中國政府長期嚴陣以待、從未掉以輕心的情況下,並沒有達到公開肆虐于新疆各地的程度。而薛文中所謂“必然爲之鼓舞……變得十分驕橫,……以百倍的瘋狂,十倍的出擊頻率,挑戰中國核心的安全利益”之說,似有誇大之嫌。 

  其次,如“屆時伊朗多半已經擁有了核武器,伊斯蘭世界原教旨主義勢力以此爲護符,作爲新疆境內三股勢力的後盾,爲之撐腰,從而成爲北京的心腹之患”之語,也不夠慎重。因爲,文章沒有考慮到伊斯蘭世界的教派分野事實,伊朗和阿富汗的塔利班之間其實非常敵對,僅僅套用“伊斯蘭世界原教旨主義”的名義,將二者在這種制造反華分裂的事情上方鑿圓枘地硬扯在一起,不免有點牽強。 

  最後,更讓人難以接受的是薛文在文章結尾提出的觀點,即“一旦大西北戰事兵連禍結,或許會把在中國分佈最廣的少數民族回族牽連進來,這就增加了更大的變數。在中國少數民族中,回族人口僅次於壯族,而且也信仰伊斯蘭教,民族凝聚力特別強。回顧一部中國近代史,假若政治風波牽涉到回族,都不免動搖半壁江山,不能善了”。

這種說法,反映出作者雖系東亞問題專家,但可能是“術業有專攻”之故,並未見得對中國伊斯蘭教歷史及分佈最廣的少數民族回族有詳盡的瞭解。 

回族愛國貢獻巨大 

  第一,根據上世紀90年代和2000年的全國人口統計,在中國少數民族中,回族人口次於壯族和滿族,列居第三位。 

  第二,如對回族歷史有正確完整的瞭解,特別對講漢語、長期受中華文明熏染的回族文化心理有所認識的話,是不會得出上述錯誤論斷的。穆聖關於“愛國是伊瑪尼的一部分”之教導,始終被穆斯林視爲必須恪守的天職。事實上,每每在中國歷史的重要關節點上,回族的愛國心理都表現得特別明顯。以1900年的“庚子之役”而論,面對八國聯軍的進犯,駐守京城正陽門的甘軍馬福祿及其親屬子侄五人戰死,其弟馬福祥(馬鴻逵之父)和其他回族將領如馬海晏父子則保皇室出京,中途馬海晏病死,其子馬麒(馬步芳之父)繼任。甘軍的忠勇甚至引來“秋後算賬”的洋人仇恨,非要追加其罪不可。 

  再以新疆而論,民國前期,楊增新治理新疆十七年(19111928年)堪稱穩定,其人利用回族來對付維族的統治手法固然出自歷史上“以夷制夷”的羈縻之術,該手段也難免爲後人所詬病,但其中透射出的信息不正說明回族在新疆扮演的是對中華大家庭的向心力作用嗎? 

  歷史事實也表明,193410月剿滅新疆第一個冠名“東土耳其斯坦伊斯蘭共和國”政權的,正是由回族士兵爲主的馬仲英軍隊(時由馬虎山統領)。在抗日戰爭爆發後,回族中從平民到軍人的愛國表現更是可圈可點,不絕於書。所以,薛文關於回族的說法實在欠妥,好似一杆子打翻一船人,只依照信仰來劃線站隊,卻罔顧了歷史真實的發展。 

作者爲上海市宗教學會秘書長、上海社科院宗教所研究員

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阿富汗问题“伊斯坦布尔进程”高官会在北京举行

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2014-07-10 15:53:59
关键字 >> 阿富汗伊斯坦布尔进程伊斯坦布尔进程高官会伊斯坦布尔进程高官会外长级会议美国外交家杂志中国外交亚信峰会新丝绸之路

阿富汗问题伊斯坦布尔进程高官会10日在北京召开。中国外交部副部长刘振民与阿富汗副外长艾哈迈迪共同主持会议,伊斯坦布尔进程成员国及支持方共42方高级别代表出席。此次高官会将讨论伊斯坦布尔进程各领域建立信任措施合作进展,并就阿当前局势交换意见,为8月份在天津举行外长会做准备。美国“外交家”网站9日撰文称,2014年是中国的多边外交年。阿富汗目前正在进行总统大选,今年也是阿富汗在政治、经济和安全上经历转型的一年。伊斯坦布尔进程外长会议无疑是中方主办的最具影响力的会议之一。文章编译如下,略有删减:

阿富汗问题伊斯坦布尔进程高官会10日在北京召开。中国外交部副部长刘振民与阿富汗副外长艾哈迈迪共同主持会议,伊斯坦布尔进程成员国及支持方共42方高级别代表出席。此次高官会将讨论伊斯坦布尔进程各领域建立信任措施合作进展,并就阿当前局势交换意见,为8月份在天津举行外长会做准备。美国“外交家”网站9日撰文称,2014年是中国的多边外交年。阿富汗目前正在进行总统大选,今年也是阿富汗在政治、经济和安全上经历转型的一年。伊斯坦布尔进程外长会议无疑是中方主办的最具影响力的会议之一

阿富汗问题“伊斯坦布尔进程”高官会在北京举行

即将在北京召开的伊斯坦布尔进程会议(高官会)会让中国在阿富汗问题上占据主导地位。

随着美国国务卿约翰•克里抵达北京,全世界的目光都集中在中美战略经济对话会议上。不过,这并不是本周在中国举行的唯一一次外交会议。中国外交部发言人洪磊7月8日宣布,伊斯坦布尔进程前期会议将于7月10日在北京召开。

伊斯坦布尔进程创立于2011年, 是一个致力于推动阿富汗和其邻国在安全、经济和政治议题上的合作的区域性平台。该进程包括14个区域国家(其中包括阿富汗、中国、俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦、印度、巴基斯坦、伊朗和土耳其)和28个“支持伙伴”(包括16个域外国家比如美国和英国,以及联合国、上合组织等12个国际组织)。第四次外长级会议计划于8月底在天津举行,本周的会议(副外长级)是为8月底会议的准备会。

中国似乎把2014当成一个多边外交年——中国举办了多场国际性会议,包括5月份的亚洲相互协作与信任措施会议(亚信会议)和将于11月在北京举行的亚太经合组织(APEC)峰会。但是在这些高级别的会议中,伊斯坦布尔进程会议无疑是最具影响力的。

当下,中国以及全世界都把目光集中在阿富汗身上,因为今年是阿富汗在政治、经济和安全上经历转型的一年。阿富汗正在进行总统大选,不过,对于选举舞弊的指控其实已经破坏了选举的最后进程。同时,阿富汗也在为北约撤军和重建更可持续的经济做准备。这三个转型中的任何一个都是相当棘手的;而三个转型几乎同时发生也暗示了政府失控的可能性。

阿富汗问题伊斯坦布尔进程高官会10日在北京召开。中国外交部副部长刘振民与阿富汗副外长艾哈迈迪共同主持会议,伊斯坦布尔进程成员国及支持方共42方高级别代表出席。此次高官会将讨论伊斯坦布尔进程各领域建立信任措施合作进展,并就阿当前局势交换意见,为8月份在天津举行外长会做准备。美国“外交家”网站9日撰文称,2014年是中国的多边外交年。阿富汗目前正在进行总统大选,今年也是阿富汗在政治、经济和安全上经历转型的一年。伊斯坦布尔进程外长会议无疑是中方主办的最具影响力的会议之一

阿富汗总统选举至今结果未明

阿富汗问题伊斯坦布尔进程高官会10日在北京召开。中国外交部副部长刘振民与阿富汗副外长艾哈迈迪共同主持会议,伊斯坦布尔进程成员国及支持方共42方高级别代表出席。此次高官会将讨论伊斯坦布尔进程各领域建立信任措施合作进展,并就阿当前局势交换意见,为8月份在天津举行外长会做准备。美国“外交家”网站9日撰文称,2014年是中国的多边外交年。阿富汗目前正在进行总统大选,今年也是阿富汗在政治、经济和安全上经历转型的一年。伊斯坦布尔进程外长会议无疑是中方主办的最具影响力的会议之一

阿富汗安全部队已经不得不应对针对选举委员会的袭击

中国对阿富汗的未来尤为关注。外交部部长王毅强调,阿富汗的命运将会直接影响到中国西部地区的稳定和安全。新疆的暴乱和恐怖主义已经成为中国领导层重点关注的问题;如果新疆西部边境存在一个垮台的政府,对中国官方来说将会是噩梦般的存在。在这一特殊时期,中国已经有针对性地参与到阿富汗的合作中去。王毅在今年2月访问了坎布尔,5月,阿富汗总统哈米德•卡尔扎伊在亚信峰会期间与习近平主席会面。在这两次会议中,安全问题在两国关系中的重要性越发明显。

在政治上的频繁合作并不意味着中国与阿富汗在经济领域就没有合作的共同基础。中国的投资和合作,特别是在矿业上,已经被视为阿富汗重建独立经济体的潜在基础。同时,中国的“丝绸之路经济带”将会为中亚国家提供重要的基础设施,这样一来,阿富汗便能获得更多的境外市场。(丝绸之路经济带将会是阿富汗未来经济增长的一个关键点。)

和对反恐和安全问题的关注一样,伊斯坦布尔进程本身也关注一些“软”议题(比如教育和灾难管理)。教育交流、灾难上的管理和预防以及反毒品走私等方面的合作将会为阿富汗和其他区域伙伴建立信任基础。但是,归根结底,最终目标仍是确保阿富汗的稳定。经济和贸易合作本身虽然很有吸引力,但它们总的来说也还是维护阿富汗稳定的手段:如果没有稳定的经济,伊斯坦布尔政府将会很快对整个国家失去控制。

在本周举行的准备会将努力就8月底伊斯坦布尔进程外长会决议草案进程磋商。当下正是阿富汗国内政治、经济和安全三位转型的时期,作为会议举办方的中国将会在最后的决议上产生重大影响。通过亚信会议和上海合作组织,以及将融合整个地区的丝绸之路经济带上的影响,中国正在逐步寻求区域性主导地位。2014的伊斯坦布尔进程会议将会为中国提供一个在重大区域问题上占据主导地位的机会,而对中国政府来说,这也是一个会在国内产生深远影响的议题。

阿富汗问题伊斯坦布尔进程高官会10日在北京召开。中国外交部副部长刘振民与阿富汗副外长艾哈迈迪共同主持会议,伊斯坦布尔进程成员国及支持方共42方高级别代表出席。此次高官会将讨论伊斯坦布尔进程各领域建立信任措施合作进展,并就阿当前局势交换意见,为8月份在天津举行外长会做准备。美国“外交家”网站9日撰文称,2014年是中国的多边外交年。阿富汗目前正在进行总统大选,今年也是阿富汗在政治、经济和安全上经历转型的一年。伊斯坦布尔进程外长会议无疑是中方主办的最具影响力的会议之一

当前正是阿富汗国内政治、经济和安全转型时期

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China to turn Silk Road city into special economic zone

China hopes Kashgar, the crossroads of Europe and Asia, will become the launch pad for goods into South and Central Asia. But Uighur residents worry that the real goal is to weaken their identity.

November 17, 2010|By Barbara Demick, Los Angeles Times

At the Sunday market in Kashgar, it isn't a wild stretch to imagine commerce as it might have been in the 13th century when Marco Polo passed through this Silk Road oasis: Smooth-faced boys wrangle with horses, sheep and camels. Mounds of melons and grapes are stacked on the bare wooden planks of mule-drawn carts. A wizened man wearing a skullcap sharpens knives on a lathe operated by foot pedals.

But modernity is catching up with a vengeance, as the Chinese government yanks the nation's westernmost city, despite the misgivings of many residents, into the 21st century.

Kashgar is slated to become a special economic zone, and the signs of change are already visible.

Developers from China's east coast are snapping up land in the area, residents say. Concealed behind a row of graceful poplar trees along the main road to the airport, newly erected green wire fences delineate plots of land slated for development: a factory that makes instant ramen noodles for export to Pakistan and Tajikistan, a warehouse for wheat also headed for central Asia.

Tents for construction workers are pitched near empty lots behind the Kashgar Central and Southern Asia Industrial Park, which according to the state press, is being expanded from two square miles to 60. Even on a Sunday afternoon, crews were leveling an access road.

"This land used to be desert. Nobody was interested in it," said a 35-year-old local businessman. "Now rich people from the east are coming and buying everything they can.... They buy the land. They put in roads. Then they put a wall around it."

Chinese officials hope the economic zone status will do for Kashgar what it did for Shenzhen, the South China Sea fishing village that 30 years ago launched China's transformation into a manufacturing superpower. Whereas Shenzhen's wares head by sea to Korea, Japan, Australia, Europe and the United States, Kashgar is viewed increasingly as the launch pad into Pakistan and India, as well as some of the former Soviet republics in Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

"We want to restore Kashgar to the position it had in the days of the Silk Road," said Wang Ning, an economist with the government-run Academy of Social Sciences in Xinjiang, the far-western region where Kashgar lies.

"The plan is that by 2020 we should close the gap between east and west and allow the west to share in the prosperity of the east," said Wang, who is based in Xinjiang's capital, Urumqi.

But Kashgar residents are suspicious of such claims, knowing that economic development in China often involves policies that allow outsiders to grab most new wealth. Until a decade ago, 90% of Kashgar's 355,000 permanent residents were Uighurs, a Turkic people whose language, appearance and Islamic faith more closely link them to Central Asia than to Beijing. New census data won't be available until next year, but activists suspect that the Uighur population has dropped to 70% with the migration of of about 150,000 Han Chinese to Kashgar.

Ignoring protests from preservationists abroad, the Chinese government last year bulldozed most of Kashgar's historic old city, destroying 85% of the labyrinthine alleys of mud-brick houses in the name of earthquake safety. The ochre-colored alleys and archways were so evocative of Old Kabul that the old city was used as the setting in 2007 for the filming of "The Kite Runner." Only a small section is left today for tourists. About 200,000 people, almost all Uighurs, are being relocated to bland, modern apartment buildings in the suburbs.

"It is all part of a wholesale attack on the Uighur identity," said Nury Turkel, a Kashgar-born lawyer and activist who lives in Washington, D.C. He believes the economic zone will be more of the same, with the best opportunities accruing to Han Chinese outsiders. "The Uighurs can't even get loans from banks. How are they going to open businesses?"

Although the Uighurs, by dint of their location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, were traditionally traders, they have been squeezed out by tough Chinese policies that have made it difficult to obtain passports.

"If you go to Bishkek, you'll see maybe 50 Uighurs, but thousands of Chinese. They're making easy money," said the 35-year-old businessman, who like most Uighurs in Kashgar would not permit his name to be used because of the perils of criticizing the Chinese government. The economic zone, he said, may "help some of our young people get jobs in factories at low salaries, but the big money is not for us."

Other than Tibet, no region in China is more ethnically fraught than Xinjiang (Chinese for "new territory"). Sporadic bombings and attacks have included an incident two years ago in Kashgar in which two men rammed a dump truck into a crowd of police officers out on a jog.

The worst race riots in recent Chinese history, which left hundreds dead, erupted last year in Urumqi, about 700 miles away. The initiative for the economic zone grew in part from that unrest. Many economists, Han Chinese and Uighur alike, saw the roots of the violence in high rates of unemployment among young Uighur men.

And so in May, Chinese President Hu Jintao announced a $15-billion-a-year investment package at a special meeting of the Politburo on Xinjiang's economic future. The economic zone, like its inspiration, Shenzhen, will feature tax breaks, investment incentives and easing of regulatory requirements for new businesses. Along with the central government, the city of Shenzhen is sponsoring the Kashgar project, transferring $1.5 billion this year alone to support the new zone.

Much of the property in Kashgar is now owned by investors from Wenzhou, a city near Shanghai whose entrepreneurs are considered modern-day Marco Polos for their love of exploring and tapping the wealth of exotic realms.

Real estate agents from Kashgar were quoted by the Xinjiang Business Daily saying that prices for apartments went up as much as 30% and commercial property as much as 40% from March to July.

"Before locals bought apartments just for themselves. Now more and more speculators are coming in," one real estate sales manager told the newspaper.

Shortly after the article ran July 1, the General Administration for Press and Publications forced the newspaper and one other that reported on the real estate boom to run retractions and pay fines of $4,200 each for stories that "caused serious negative impact."

For China, Kashgar is a modern-day version of the wild west, a remote and exotic destination far closer to Afghanistan (160 miles) than to Beijing (2,100 miles). The first direct flights were introduced only in September.

The city is a convenient shopping hub for Central Asian businessmen, who arrive on tour buses and leave with vinyl shopping bags stuffed with Chinese-made wristwatches, DVD players, cellphones and athletic shoes to sell back home. With the exception of some artisanal knives and rugs, almost all the merchandise today is manufactured on China's east coast, something that should change with the economic zone status.

However, the Shenzhen phenomenon won't be easily replicated. The routes to western border crossings out of China run through harsh desert and wind-swept mountain passes frequently closed by weather and political turmoil.

Dru Gladney, an expert on Xinjiang at Pomona College, says Uighur economists believe job preference should be given to people with local hukous, or residency permits, so Kashgar's Uighurs as well as longtime Han Chinese residents get first crack at jobs. But he is pessimistic.

"If these guys are coming from Wenzhou to invest in Kashgar from outside, they're going to hire people from Wenzhou. That's how it works in China," Gladney said.

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中国与哈萨克斯坦达成一系列巨额交易
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2011年02月23日 07:15 AM

中国与哈萨克斯坦达成一系列巨额交易

 

哈萨克斯坦周二宣布与中国达成巨额交易,突显中亚逐渐从莫斯科转向北京。

哈萨克斯坦总统努尔苏丹•纳扎尔巴耶夫(Nursultan Nazarbayev)周二在北京与中国国家主席胡锦涛会晤,双方签署了一系列协议,涵盖高速铁路、铀供应以及一笔50亿美元的能源基础设施贷款。

多年来,中国在哈萨克斯坦的投资一直聚焦于石油开采,但周二达成的交易显示,北京方面的触角现已伸到能源以外的行业。

上述协议包括:中国向哈萨克斯坦的全国福利基金提供一笔17亿美元贷款;大约5.5万吨哈萨克铀的供应协议,以满足中国不断增长的核能需求;以及中国铁道部协助建设阿斯塔纳-阿拉木图(Astana-Almaty)高速铁路的谅解备忘录。

双方达成的协议还有:从中国西部流入哈萨克斯坦的河流的水质控制,以及在肥料行业的合作。中国对此相当重视,因为它希望哈萨克斯坦这个邻国成为一个新的食品来源。

“中国已成为中亚地区真正的强国,”牛津能源研究所(Oxford Institute for Energy Studies)研究员沙米尔•米德卡托维奇•耶尼克耶夫(Shamil Midkhatovich Yenikeyeff)表示。“中国代表着未来,(而)俄罗斯代表过去……在资金实力和有效执行大规模项目方面,中国对俄罗斯具有优势。”

自前苏联解体以来,哈萨克斯坦一直与俄罗斯保持着密切联系。俄罗斯企业拥有许多石油开发合同,还在里海勘探区域共享作业权。俄罗斯的输油管道是哈萨克石油通往世界市场的主要途径,即便哈萨克斯坦正试图实现出口渠道的多样化。

哈萨克斯坦的海关数据表明,中俄与哈萨克斯坦的双边贸易额不相上下。

中国从上世纪90年代末开始在哈萨克斯坦收购石油资产,在自己的“家门口”获得了一个新的能源来源,以便促进经济增长,减轻对中东石油的依赖。哈萨克斯坦投行Visor Capital的研究称,如今中国企业对哈萨克斯坦大约四分之一的石油产量拥有股权。

地处中亚的哈萨克斯坦拥有丰富的铀、铜、黄金和镍矿藏,这些都是中国实现经济繁荣所需的原材料。根据周二签署的铀供应协议,哈萨克斯坦将向中国供应大约5.5万吨这种放射性材料,按当前市场价格计算价值超过80亿美元。双方没有透露协议的具体条款。

中国曾协助出资并建设一条从哈萨克斯坦中部至中国西北边境的1000公里输油管道,这条横跨哈萨克斯坦的管道已在2007年开通,为中国开辟了获取里海石油资源的渠道。

全球金融危机让中国有机会加强对哈萨克石油资产的控制,并扩张进入该国其他的经济领域。

2009年,中国向哈萨克斯坦国家石油和天然气公司(KazMunaigas)提供了一笔50亿美元贷款,以未来石油供应为抵押。同时,中国还向哈萨克斯坦开发银行(Development Bank of Kazakhstan)提供了50亿美元贷款,用于交通、电信和农业项目。

“哈萨克斯坦并不希望成为中国的原材料附庸,”咨询公司“控制风险”(Control Risks)研究主管迈克尔•丹尼森(Michael Denison)表示。

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Kabul's New Patron?
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The Growing Afghan-Chinese Relationship

Christian Le Mière
CHRISTIAN LE MIÈRE is Editor of Jane's Intelligence Review.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66194/christian-le-miere/kabuls-new-patron?page=show

2010/4/13

When Afghan President Hamid Karzai visited China last month, his hosts pulled out all the stops. During his three days in Beijing, Karzai met not only with Chinese President Hu Jintao but also with Premier Wen Jiabao and the Politburo Standing Committee member Wu Bangguo. Karzai signed agreements with Chinese leaders on economic cooperation, technical training, and preferential tariffs for Afghan exports.

It was Karzai's fourth trip to China as Afghanistan's president and the latest sign that, as Washington shows its impatience with the Karzai regime (pressuring it, for example, on electoral reform), Kabul is beginning to look for new supporters and patrons. As the regional hegemon, China is the obvious choice. Successfully courting Beijing, Kabul reasons, could yield benefits in terms of trade, economic assistance, and even military training.

The interest appears to be mutual. With U.S. President Barack Obama having set a deadline of July 2011 to begin withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, China is increasingly aware that it will soon have a pivotal role in Afghanistan's security and that of the whole region.

China's interests in Afghanistan are twofold: security and trade. Afghanistan remains a source of instability to China's west, particularly as it abuts the restless Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Concerns about Islamist militancy on its western border have only heightened since the Uighur riots of July 2009 and are likely to increase as the United States withdraws. The Turkistan Islamic Party (formerly the East Turkistan Islamic Movement), which Beijing often blames for attacks within China, is based in Afghanistan and the borderlands of Pakistan. In September 2003, Hasan Mahsum, then the TIP's leader, was killed in South Waziristan by Pakistani security forces supported by Chinese intelligence officers. In February, a U.S. drone strike killed Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, the TIP's most recent leader, in North Waziristan.

As the United States begins its military withdrawal and such drone strikes become less frequent, China worries that the TIP will gain greater freedom of movement. Even if the group remains unable to launch cross-border operations into Xinjiang, the TIP's mere existence in Afghanistan and Pakistan (coupled with its increasing use of Uighur-language militant propaganda on the Internet) will continue to be a serious concern for China.

The reduced international presence in Afghanistan may also allow the heroin trade to continue unchecked. (Opium cultivation grew exponentially after the fall of the Taliban in 2001 but has decreased in the last year due to the U.S. troop surge. Questions remain, however, over whether this downward trend will hold as the Western presence in the country begins to shrink in the next couple of years.) In 2007, according to Li Xianhui, the director of drug prevention in China's Ministry of Public Security, 386 kilograms of heroin were smuggled into China from the so-called

Golden Crescent
of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, a total that exceeds the cumulative figure for 2001 to 2004.

These various threats are not likely to result in the deployment of Chinese troops in combat missions or protective roles, since the Chinese government is well aware that if it were to base troops overseas unilaterally -- even in a humanitarian role -- alarm bells about a neo-imperial Chinese foreign policy would go off in capitals such as New Delhi and Tokyo.

But China has an active interest in ensuring that the Afghan military is effectively able to guard the border separating the two countries. This goal was underlined by the meeting in March between Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak and Chinese Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie. China's Defense Ministry pledged to continue its low-key support of Afghan forces in the form of military supply and personnel training. Both governments aim to bolster the capabilities of Afghanistan's national army and police so that, in the words of Wardak, they will be "strong enough to defend the country against internal and external threats" in a post-NATO future.

Trade and development assistance form an even larger part of the burgeoning Afghan-Chinese relationship. Although the Afghan economy accounts for just one-tenth of one percent of China's overall trade portfolio, the possibility of cheap resources on its border is of significant interest to Beijing. China has already made the largest single foreign direct investment in Afghanistan: $3.5 billion in the Aynak copper field in Logar province. Under the terms of the deal, signed in May 2008, China will also build a 400-megawatt coal-fired power plant, a freight railway running from the XUAR through Tajikistan to Afghanistan, a hospital, and a mosque.

Such agreements also meet a secondary need for China: developing its western regions. Despite the ethnic violence last July -- or perhaps because of it -- Beijing has redoubled its efforts to boost the economies of its two western provinces, the XUAR and the Tibet Autonomous Region, which also recently witnessed ethnic riots in 2008. In March, Hu said that development of the western region is a priority of China's twelfth Five-Year Plan, which will run from 2011 to 2015.

These concerns are likely driving China's development of local infrastructure in the Wakhan Corridor, the thin strip of land that leads to the only direct border crossing between Afghanistan and China. Beijing is funding the construction of the new road, supply depot, and mobile communications center that will allow greater movement and trade across the border. It is even possible that China could open the Wakhjir Pass, a high-mountain crossing that was once part of the Silk Road, to further trade to the restive XUAR.

In January, at a conference on Afghanistan in Istanbul, China's foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, said that China has provided ¥900 million ($132 million) in reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan since 2002. In 2009, Beijing converted $75 million in concessionary loans into grant assistance -- effectively writing off the debt -- with the remaining $60 million to be delivered to the Afghan government in four installments by 2013.

Of course, this development assistance pales in comparison to the contributions of other countries, most notably the United States, which provided $5.87 billion between 2002 and 2007 and budgeted $3.77 billion for 2008 and 2009. The United Kingdom's Department for International Development spent £147.5 million ($220 million) in 2008-9 in Afghanistan. Even the International Committee of the Red Cross spends approximately $70 million per year in Afghanistan, more than half of China's budget over eight years.

China's growing interest in Afghanistan cannot be separated from its longstanding concern over spheres of influence. Beijing is uncomfortable with the idea of more than 100,000 U.S. troops stationed just across its border, and India's expanding presence in Afghanistan is similarly disquieting. India is among the top donors to Afghanistan, ranking fifth behind the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Canada. Overall, New Delhi has pledged $1.2 billion in reconstruction assistance, including funds for building a new parliament building in Kabul. In recent years, Beijing has deepened its relations with India's neighbors, including Bangladesh, Myanmar (also called Burma), and Pakistan, and sought to pull Nepal and Sri Lanka away from their traditional Indian-centric foreign policies. Now, from Beijing's perspective, India appears determined to leapfrog this cordon sanitaire by building up its ties with Afghanistan.

Ultimately, Beijing would like to see the influence of foreign powers in Afghanistan decrease so that it can continue its policy of noninterventionist intervention, building trade relationships and avoiding political interventions. China has followed this policy with regimes in countries such as Iran, Sudan, and Venezuela.

This sort of arrangement will increasingly suit the needs of both capitals. Beijing can pursue its agenda of promoting trade and combating insurgent groups, while Kabul will gain a reliable, long-term partner that makes few demands in regards to corruption and democratic governance. As U.S. and NATO military commanders consider pulling out beginning in 2011, they very well may leave behind a China that has stronger regional relations and influence. This may not have been China's primary goal -- it wishes to see little more than a stable Afghanistan and little disruption to Xinjiang -- but it is certainly a welcome side effect.
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Beijing’s Afghan Gamble 北京在阿富汗居於不敗之地?
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參考Stephen Walt對這篇文章的批評

By ROBERT D. KAPLAN

IN Afghanistan’s Logar Province, just south of Kabul, the geopolitical future of Asia is becoming apparent: American troops are providing security for a Chinese state-owned company to exploit the Aynak copper reserves, which are worth tens of billions of dollars. While some of America’s NATO allies want to do as little as possible in the effort to stabilize Afghanistan, China has its eyes on some of world’s last untapped deposits of copper, iron, gold, uranium and precious gems, and is willing to take big risks in one of the most violent countries to secure them.

In Afghanistan, American and Chinese interests converge. By exploiting Afghanistan’s metal and mineral reserves, China can provide thousands of Afghans with jobs, thus generating tax revenues to help stabilize a tottering Kabul government. Just as America has a vision of a modestly stable Afghanistan that will no longer be a haven for extremists, China has a vision of Afghanistan as a secure conduit for roads and energy pipelines that will bring natural resources from the Indian Ocean and elsewhere. So if America defeats Al Qaeda and the irreconcilable elements of the Taliban, China’s geopolitical position will be enhanced.

This is not a paradox, since China need not be our future adversary. Indeed, combining forces with China in Afghanistan might even improve the relationship between Washington and Beijing. The problem is that while America is sacrificing its blood and treasure, the Chinese will reap the benefits. The whole direction of America’s military and diplomatic effort is toward an exit strategy, whereas the Chinese hope to stay and profit.

But what if America decides to leave, or to drastically reduce its footprint to a counterterrorism strategy focused mainly on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border? Then another scenario might play out. Kandahar and other areas will most likely fall to the Taliban, creating a truly lawless realm that wrecks China’s plans for an energy and commodities passageway through South Asia. It would also, of course, be a momentous moral victory achieved by radical Muslims who, having first defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, will then have triumphed over another superpower.

And the calculations get more complicated still: a withdrawal of any kind from Afghanistan before a stable government is in place would also hurt India, a critical if undeclared American ally, and increasingly a rival of China. Were the Taliban to retake Afghanistan, India would face a radical Islamistan stretching from its border with Pakistan deep into Central Asia. With the Taliban triumphant on Pakistan’s western border, jihadists there could direct their energies to the eastern border with India.

India would defeat Pakistan in a war, conventional or nuclear. But having to do so, or simply needing to face down a significantly greater jihadist threat next door, would divert India’s national energies away from further developing its economy and its navy, a development China would quietly welcome.

Bottom line: China will find a way to benefit no matter what the United States does in Afghanistan. But it probably benefits more if we stay and add troops to the fight. The same goes for Russia. Because of continuing unrest in the Islamic southern tier of the former Soviet Union, Moscow has an interest in America stabilizing Afghanistan (though it would take a certain psychological pleasure from a humiliating American withdrawal).

In nuts-and-bolts terms, if we stay in Afghanistan and eventually succeed, other countries will benefit more than we will. China, India and Russia are all Asian powers, geographically proximate to Afghanistan and better able, therefore, to garner practical advantages from any stability our armed forces would make possible.

Everyone keeps saying that America is not an empire, but our military finds itself in the sort of situation that was mighty familiar to empires like that of ancient Rome and 19th-century Britain: struggling in a far-off corner of the world to exact revenge, to put down the fires of rebellion, and to restore civilized order. Meanwhile, other rising and resurgent powers wait patiently in the wings, free-riding on the public good we offer. This is exactly how an empire declines, by allowing others to take advantage of its own exertions.

Of course, one could make an excellent case that an ignominious withdrawal from Afghanistan is precisely what would lead to our decline, by demoralizing our military, signaling to our friends worldwide that we cannot be counted on and demonstrating that our enemies have greater resolve than we do. That is why we have no choice in Afghanistan but to add troops and continue to fight.

But as much as we hone our counterinsurgency skills and develop assets for the “long war,” history would suggest that over time we can more easily preserve our standing in the world by using naval and air power from a distance when intervening abroad. Afghanistan should be the very last place where we are a land-based meddler, caught up in internal Islamic conflict, helping the strategic ambitions of the Chinese and others.

Robert D. Kaplan is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a correspondent for The Atlantic.

A version of this article appeared in print on October 7, 2009, on page A29 of the New York edition.



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我国在中亚首个铀资源项目开工
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我国在中亚首个铀资源项目开工
www.chinaequip.gov.cn 2009-04-30 来源:新华网  

    新华网深圳4月29日电(记者彭勇)记者29日从中国广东核电集团公司获悉,29日,中国在中亚地区的首个铀资源合资开发企业——谢米兹拜伊铀有限责任合伙企业在哈萨克斯坦共和国阿拉木图揭牌成立。此前一天,中哈合作开采的第一个铀矿——该合资企业旗下的伊尔科利铀矿开工。

    据介绍,谢米兹拜伊铀有限责任合伙企业是中国和哈萨克斯坦在核能领域的重大合作项目,由中国广东核电集团公司和哈萨克斯坦国家原子能工业公司共同出资成立,拥有伊尔科利铀矿和谢米兹拜伊铀矿两个生产基地,是哈萨克斯坦重要的铀矿企业之一。根据协议,伊尔科利铀矿和谢米兹拜伊铀矿的产品将全部用于中国核电站。

    我国与哈萨克斯坦在铀资源领域具有互利合作的坚实基础和互补优势。我国近年来核电发展迅速,建设规模已跃居世界前列。哈萨克斯坦铀资源储量居世界第二位,2009年天然铀产量将成为全球第一。按照国家部署,中广核集团2008年10月与哈萨克斯坦国家原子能工业公司签署战略伙伴合作协议,收购谢米兹拜伊铀有限责任合伙企业部分股权。

    中广核集团公司董事长钱智民表示,在谢米兹拜伊铀有限责任合伙企业投入运行后,中广核集团将进一步支持合资企业的生产经营,扩大与哈萨克斯坦的核能合作领域,共同拓展在核电工程建设、天然铀产品等方面的国际合作。

    谢米兹拜伊铀有限责任合伙企业负责人表示,此次合伙企业下属的伊尔科利铀矿开工,将带动当地经济增长和社会就业,为克孜奥尔金州谢里区提供460个工作岗位,并为当地员工提供专门培训。此外,企业还将积极参与矿区的社会项目建设,其中包括对贫困家庭和大学生提供援助,支持其他社会公益设施建设,每年为当地社会公益事业投入一定数额的资金。

    据悉,除哈萨克斯坦外,中广核集团还积极参与乌兹别克斯坦、澳大利亚、加拿大等国铀资源的开发工作,与乌兹别克斯坦纳沃伊等世界知名能源企业结成了战略合作伙伴关系,签署了一系列铀资源合作开发协议,为我国核电事业发展提供充足的铀资源和核燃料供应保障。

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巴基斯坦與新疆
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巴基斯坦和平研究所的一篇文章

Pakistan has always supported China's point of view on the issues of Tibet and Xinjiang. Regarding the Xinjiang issue Pakistan always favored China and ensured that it will help China at every position to solve that problem. But in reality Xinjiang is a major point which poses a credible question mark on the friendship of both countries.  

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