美國國會中國軟權力報告 - 中國星火論壇

In March this year I had the opportunity to serve as a panelist in a public symposium at Harvard University, “Soft Power and Public Diplomacy,” cosponsored by the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, the Social Science Research Council, and Harvard’s Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies.¹ I was impressed by the fact that although it was a weekday evening there was a standing-room-only audience in the 150-seat auditorium. Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr., of Harvard, who coined the term “soft power,” was surprised at the turnout, remarking that it was highly unusual these days to see such a crowd at a symposium on Japan-U.S. relations.

An indication of the rising interest in the subject of soft power can be seen in the fact that when I ran an English-language Google search of the term around the time of the symposium I found some 42 million hits (a Japanese-language search revealed about 60,000 hits). This compares with about 60,000 English-language hits and 3,000 Japanese-language hits a year earlier. At the time of writing (August 2006), there are about 94 million English-language hits and 130,000 Japanese-language hits. Because Google tweaks its algorithm from time to time, one cannot make a simple comparison, but it is clear that there has been an amazing increase.

The significance of soft power

It is well known that soft power refers to a country’s ability to obtain the outcomes it wants not through coercion or rewards but through its attractiveness—specifically, the attractiveness of its culture, political values, and policies. This concept underlies the philosophy of the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu’s adage “It is best to win without fighting.” It is regarded as another form of power, one that cannot be disregarded in the context of international politics, which tends to be discussed solely in terms of hard power (military and economic power).

According to Nye, to disparage soft power threatens the legitimacy of the exercise of hard power, raising the costs of the accomplishment of policy objectives. A good example is Turkey ’s refusal, out of concern for domestic anti-American sentiment, to permit U.S. forces to make use of bases in Turkey , which significantly limited U.S. forces’ options for its 2003 Iraq invasion.

What interests me most about the concept of soft power is the similarity of the thinking behind it to the thinking behind the concept of social capital that has been attracting so much attention in recent years. Social capital, a concept developed by Nye’s colleague Robert Putnam, refers to the characteristics that support social institutions in fundamental ways by encouraging cooperative behavior—trust, norms, networks, and so on. An important point in Putnam’s argument is his identification of such cooperative behavior as “capital” because it enhances the operational efficiency of institutions and society. Articulating the dynamics of foreign policy and society—traditionally treated as peripheral or second-order issues because they are hard to quantify, even though everyone acknowledges their importance—in terms of soft power (Nye) and social capital (Putnam) and thus placing them on the platform of debate is a major achievement.

It is interesting that although Nye and Putnam, two of America ’s leading political scientists, specialize in different fields—foreign policy (international relations) and society (civil society), respectively—they have similar viewpoints. American political science gives the impression of being totally dominated these days by rational-choice theory making maximal use of mathematical models, and one is often disillusioned by its superficial understanding of humanity. On the other hand, the emergence of arguments like those of Nye and Putnam impresses one with the depth of American political science. Evaluation of the concept of soft power must be grounded in this intellectual context.

Misunderstandings of soft power

In a recent article Kazuo Ogoura, president of the Japan Foundation, writes, “Confusion over the concept of soft power has arisen because it has been somewhat distorted, misused, and in extreme cases abused.”² Here I would like to advance a number of points I have noticed in this connection.

First, the main point of soft power is that it lowers the costs (what systems theory calls transaction costs) of accomplishing policy objectives; it is not just about the promotion of “soft content” industries. Perhaps because of the use of the term “attractiveness” in discussing soft power, or perhaps because of a kind of snobbism, there seems to be a tendency to call anything “attractive” soft power. Attractiveness enriches life, but attractiveness on its own is not soft power.

More precisely, attractiveness can be a source of soft power, but whether it can become soft power depends on the policy objective itself, of course, and also policy aims and context and the methods employed. Moreover, naturally enough, in gauging how attractive a source is there is a perception gap between the sender and the receiver, or within each. One must not conflate source and soft power. The matter is more complex.

For example, when Japanese people hear the term “Self-Defense Forces,” they tend to think of immediately of an entity that wields hard power. But depending on how and why the SDF are mobilized, and in what context, they can also be the source of soft power. Consider, too, Prime Minister Jun’ichirô Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead (including a number of men convicted as class-A war criminals after World War II), much criticized both within and outside Japan. It cannot be denied that to some conservatives, at least, “Yasukuni is soft power.”³ Of course, depending on developments in domestic politics and the international situation, Japanese public opinion as a whole may come to endorse this view; alternatively, Yasukuni may cease even to be a source of soft power.

To tell the truth, one thing that makes me uncomfortable with Nye’s articulation of soft power is that he himself disregards or oversimplifies this complexity, or at least gives the impression of doing so. For example, he names Japan ’s low birthrate and aging population structure and its poor English-language skills as constraints on its soft power. Whether these are constraints, though, depends on Japan ’s view of the ideal nation and society and the policy objectives for achieving that ideal; they cannot be itemized so simply. I think the criticism that Nye’s argument puts too much emphasis on America ’s national interest—especially what liberals consider national interest—springs from this.

Still, this is a matter of the way Nye discusses soft power; it does not devalue the idea of soft power itself. We must also understand that behind Nye’s strident advocacy of soft power lies concern over the Bush administration’s (especially the neoconservatives’) foreign policy, which seems to rely on hard power alone, and over America’s isolation in the world—that which al Qaeda most desires.

Nye is an authority on nuclear deterrence, and it is well known that as assistant secretary of defense for international security in the Clinton administration he played a central role in redefining the Japan-U.S. security relationship. Perhaps for this reason, many critics assert that for all the talk of soft power, in the end America relies on hard power, and that soft power merely camouflages the intent of great powers (especially America ) to make use of hard power. Leaving aside conspiracy theorists who see a sinister plot behind every U.S. action, Nye has responded to critics as follows: “The Soviet Union once had a good deal of soft power, but it lost much of it after the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Soviet soft power declined even as its hard economic and military resources continued to grow. Because of its brutal policies, the Soviet Union ’s hard power actually undercut its soft power.”⁴ He also points to Norway and Canada as examples of countries that exercise greater political influence than their military and economic power would suggest: Norway for its conflict mediation and Canada for its stance of international cooperation, which distances it from the United States .

Another criticism of soft power is that it is “too soft.” In other words, its efficacy is hard to measure and evaluate. But although soft power is difficult to quantify, the concept of soft power is significant precisely because the dynamics of international politics are articulated in terms of power. This criticism seems to me to put the cart before the horse.

In the field of international relations, power is seen as the skills and endowments for bringing about the outcomes a country desires. But whether it be military power or economic power, the more rigorously one thinks about power, the harder it is to measure and evaluate. Here, too, sources and power must not be conflated; even if sources can be quantified, it does not necessarily follow that the sum of sources and the sum of power will be proportionate.

When it comes to soft power, a crime committed by a single American soldier in Japan can abruptly undo all the goodwill for America built up until then. To give another example, an overheated “ Korea boom” in Japan can evoke in some people a nationalistic anti-Korean sentiment prompted by a kind of cultural defensiveness. Measurement and evaluation are a thorny business, but that does not mean that the concept of soft power is pointless or unnecessary.

The application of soft power

Nye discusses the application of soft power in the context of public diplomacy (public relations and cultural diplomacy). He divides public diplomacy into three dimensions: “daily communications” (the explanation of policy decisions), “strategic communication” (“symbolic events and communications” focused on strategic themes), and long-term cultural exchange (citizen and intellectual exchange).⁵ This classification follows the U.S. Department of State’s public diplomacy categories.

Nye also states that government cannot manage soft power to the same extent as hard power; pointing out the strong influence of such actors as civil society organizations, businesses, universities, foundations, religious organizations, ethinic groups, and international organizations, he maintains that government needs to take their influence into consideration and, when necessary, collaborate with them. It cannot be denied that underlying this consideration and collaboration is national interest, which is one reason that Nye’s concept of soft power is sometimes criticized for placing the state too much at the center of things.

Nye’s idea of national interest is far from narrow, however. At the symposium he used the term “meta–soft power” in the context of the state’s capacity and introspective ability to criticize itself, saying that this most fundamentally defines a country’s attractiveness, legitimacy, and reliability. If we take this viewpoint, excluding themes, opinions, or participants critical of a nation’s policies from publicly funded cultural exchange activities on the grounds that such activities use “taxpayers’ money” can go against the national interest. Especially in today’s information-rich and highly networked society, such narrow-mindedness will immediately be known worldwide.

At the symposium Nye also declared that soft power is not a zero-sum game. In other words, through cooperation one’s own country and other countries (or other actors) can together enhance their soft power. This also sounded to me like a warning against the “power game” view of national interest predicated on war. Nye’s point is extremely important today, when national interest exists in a context of various “publics” or “public interests,” including not only relations between states but also everything from civil society to regional alliances and global society.

In Japan these days, we hear calls for strengthening soft power and nationwide solidarity so as not to “lose out” to hypothetical enemy and competitor states, but I would not like to see us lapse into a zero-sum-game way of thinking. A “cool Japan” burdened with a weird sort of nationalism or a narrowly defined national interest will simply turn off people around the world.

Unquestionably, the Japan Foundation is an organization involved with soft power rather than hard power. As an independent administrative institution, it is also most definitely an organization representing Japan’s national interest. I hope and trust that this will never be a narrowly defined national interest.

[NOTES]

1. For a discussion of the symposium (in Japanese), see Wochi Kochi 11 (June-July 2006), pp. 53–59.

2. Kazuo Ogoura, " Sofuto pawâ ron no shikaku," Wochi Kochi 11 (June-July 2006), pp. 60–65; translated under the title of "The Limits of Soft Power," Japan Echo vol. 33, no. 5 (October 2006), pp. 48–50.

3. These are the words of Hiroshi Yuasa, an editorial writer with the Sankei Shimbun newspaper.

4. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 9.

[AUTHOR PROFILE]

Yasushi Watanabe has a Ph.D. in cultural anthropology from Harvard University. He has been a visiting fellow at the universities of Oxford and Cambridge and is now a professor at Keiô University. His special fields are cultural anthropology, cultural policy, and American studies. In 2002 he was an Abe Fellow. His works include Afutâ Amerika [After America], winner of the Suntory Prize for Social Sciences and Humanities and the Hiroshi Shimizu Award of the Japanese Association of American Studies.

5. Nye, Soft Power, pp. 107–9.

This article was translated from “Sofuto pawa ron saiho,” Wochi Kochi, (a quarterly journal by the Japan Foundation,) October/November 2006, pp. 64-68.

SHANGHAI, Jan. 10 - Conquering the world is not supposed to be easy, but that's exactly how things must look some days to Xu Lin, head of the government's new effort to promote the Chinese language overseas.

Ms. Xu is creating a global network of Chinese cultural centers, called Confucius Institutes, to teach foreigners throughout the world a language with a forbidding reputation for difficulty. But far from having to round people up, Ms. Xu is finding they are beating down her door.

"There is a China frenzy around the world at the moment," she said. "The launch of this program is in response to the Chinese language craze, especially in neighboring countries."

For decades, people in those countries have viewed China with deep suspicion. But now mastering Chinese as a door to lucrative business opportunities, or simply as a matter of popular fashion, is suddenly all the vogue - not only there but in the United States and Europe as well.

Just as new, though, is the decision of the Chinese government to ride the wave, not just capitalizing on the newfound chic that surrounds the language but also determined to perpetuate it as a way of extending Chinese international influence and good will toward the country.

For some, the choice of a slightly fusty name like Confucius Institute, which evokes images of anything but a rising new power, might seem odd given Beijing's increasing penchant for high-tech imagery and slick public relations. Yet the carefully selected label speaks volumes about the country's soft power ambitions.

Among other things, using the name of the country's oldest and most famous philosopher avoids reference to the official ideology, which remains Marxism. Confucius, who was an educator and quasi-religious figure, also stands for peace and harmony, values that China insistently proclaims today, hoping to disarm fears about its rapid rise.

Judging by the reactions of its long-wary neighbors, the effort appears to be paying off. Indonesia, which for three decades banned the teaching of Chinese because of Beijing's support for Communist rebels, recently lifted the prohibition. Vietnam, which has long had strained ties with Beijing, has accepted a Confucius Institute amid a boom in Chinese language instruction. In South Korea, an American ally that fought alongside the United States in a war against China's troops a half century ago, Chinese has reportedly outstripped English as the most popular foreign language among students.

"Chinese is as popular in Korea today as English is in China," Ms. Xu said enthusiastically.

Although Chinese language studies may be most advanced in neighboring countries, where the ability to understand the Mandarin dialect has traditionally been considered a mark of cultivation, they are making huge strides farther afield. Eleven Confucius Institutes are up and running, in Europe and Africa as well as Asia.

One center is already operating in the United States, at the University of Maryland, and five others are expected to open soon in Honolulu, Kansas City, Mo., San Francisco, Chicago and New York. Twelve more are under discussion.

Even before that first center opened, the College Board, the body that administers advanced placement exams, added Chinese to its list of foreign language tests, the first time an East Asian language has been included in its testing.

In a 2003 survey of American high schools, the College Board found that 50 said they would like to add advanced placement courses in Russian, about 175 said Japanese and 240 said Italian - and 2,400 said they would prefer Chinese. "We had no idea there was such an incredible interest out there," Tom Matts, a College Board official, told CNN.

Ms. Xu said that "education officials from several states, actually several dozen states, have sent us requests" to help them establish Chinese language programs.

In many respects, China's Confucius Institutes seem like a throwback to the 1950's and 1960's, when the United States, the Soviet Union and leading European countries were competing intensely for international prestige and influence. Moscow distributed magazines like Soviet Life through its embassies, and others promoted their languages through cultural organizations like the Alliance Française, the Goethe Institute and the Cervantes Institute.

As China becomes a major economic and military power and its diplomacy becomes more assertive, Beijing is also working harder at winning friends and influencing people. Indeed, taken together with China's recent launches of manned space flights, and the huge push to build world-class universities and to produce prize-winning scientific research, some have called the language initiative part of this country's "Sputnik moment," after the first artificial satellite, launched by the Soviet Union in 1957.

But where Sputnik fed a sense of alarm in the United States and elsewhere about the rise of an aggressive new superpower, the Confucius Institutes are intended to do almost the opposite, elevating the country's prestige while easing anxieties over the arrival of a new power.

"They are using Chinese culture to create a warmer, more positive image of Chinese society," said Nancy Jervis, vice president of the China Institute, a nonprofit Chinese-language study group that will be home to a Confucius Institute in New York City. "That's probably why the State Council has funded them, and why they've given a fair amount of money in turn to the College Board."

China's re-entry into the contest for global influence reflects the broader strategy of a nation that is still poor by many measures but is moving fast and making a big impression. The approach often involves advancing with frugal means through lots of hustle and word of mouth.

"The British Council spends over 3 billion pounds a year," or more than $5 billion, Ms. Xu said, adding that China is spending only about $12 million on the Confucius Institutes. Instead of building expensive new headquarters in each city, the institutes team up with local partners, taking space in their buildings or getting foreign governments to pay for their housing. Instead of sending teachers who will instruct foreigners directly, the institute sends teacher trainers who can help upgrade the skills of local Chinese teachers.

"The vision for this sort of thing has existed in China for a very long time," said Wu Yongyi, deputy dean of the International College of Chinese Studies at East China Normal University in Shanghai, who has been involved in overseas language instruction missions since the 1980's.

Mr. Wu said China worked hard to promote its language among third world nations from the 1960's to the 80's, when he got his start teaching in Africa and elsewhere overseas.

Today, about 90,000 foreign students come to China every year to study the language, he said, with 30 million more people around the world studying Chinese.

"After China's economic reforms started, we discovered we had an urgent need for communication, and we found that it's not enough that we learned foreign languages," he said. "Communications could be better if other people could speak Chinese. We need two-way communications, and now that our economy is strong, we can support this."

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