我的一點想法。

倘在中國衰頹之際，如蘇聯末期，一個不親中的統一的韓國是有可能的，例如德國；但至少當時德國也以堅持了陽光政策約廿餘年，俄國領導層不會積極反對步向統一的德國。雖然他們期望的中立的、做為新一極的德國仍然沒有出現。

在中國上升之際，只可能、可以出現一個親中的韓國/朝鮮，要中國吞下戰略形勢惡化的果實是辦不到的。這樣一個新韓國，對於誰的利益比較不利？倘若北韓的政經結構、意識形態沒有崩潰，而是緩步整合到新韓國架構中，那麼整個朝鮮半島的主體政經結構就會轉變為以北方的政經集團與南方的左傾集團結合的多數集團為主，從而使南方的親美日的、甚至繼承了日治時期皇民化利益與身分的右翼集團被邊緣化。

南北持續對立，對於南方的右翼保守集團是根本性的利益。除非是在美國支持下擊毀北方的既有統治集團，使北方的所謂中下層的熱愛民主的(雖然目前沒有這種東西)、被重新扶持起來的新統治集團當家，這樣就可以使朝鮮半島整個的右傾化。中國當然不能接受這個東西，對於北韓統治集團更是致命的。

所以現在還是個零和遊戲。

　　温家宝表示， “天安号”沉没是一起不幸事件。我们理解韩国人民、尤其是遇难者家属的悲痛心情。中方对遇难者表示哀悼，对韩国人民和遇难者家属表示慰问。

　　温家宝强调，中国是负责任的国家，我们重视韩方和其他国家进行的联合调查及各方的反应。中方将根据事情的是非曲直，客观、公正作出判断，决定立场。中方一贯主张并致力于维护朝鲜半岛和平稳定，反对和谴责任何破坏半岛和平稳定的行为。

　　温家宝呼吁各方保持冷静克制，防止事态升级，尤其要避免发生冲突，共同维护半岛来之不易的和平稳定。

　　温家宝指出，有关各方应着眼长远，积极推进六方会谈进程，解决朝鲜半岛核问题，实现半岛的长治久安。

　　温家宝希望韩国政府妥善处理“天安号”事件。中方愿与韩方保持密切沟通。

http://www.zaobao.com.sg/yl/yl100527_001.shtml

朝鲜半岛危机 朝鲜半岛危机—— 短期利益和长期后果

（2010-05-27）

于时语

　　韩国“天安”号军舰被击沉事件，引发了朝鲜半岛前所未有的紧张局面，战争威胁之外，也迅速成为联合国安理会的重要议题。中国作为朝鲜政权唯一的“衣食父母”，遇上了相当严重的外交难题。更重要的是，鉴于平壤金氏王朝面临后继乏人的继承瓶颈，北京在这场危机中的举动，很可能对东亚未来的永久地缘政治布局，造成难以预卜的冲击。

　　朝鲜半岛对中华大陆有强烈影响传统。我曾经提到明清两朝的灭亡，都有日本入侵朝鲜的触因。再上溯千年，隋朝灭亡的起因是隋炀帝劳而无功的三征高句丽。唐朝承继了这一东征政策，终于在唐高宗总章元年（公元668年）摧毁了高句丽。但在这来之不易的胜利之后，唐政权却主动退出了朝鲜半岛。据著名史家陈寅恪分析，其后的原因是吐蕃借唐朝东顾而崛起，形成西线严重的安全威胁。这样的历史巧合使得朝鲜今天成为独立国家，也是西藏卷入东亚政治、最终成为中国一部分的起点。朝鲜与西藏局势的历史联系，也许值得重温。

　　如果说这些都是不受个人意志转移的历史大势，那么在中国近代史上，却有不少缺乏远见的个人行为或外交政策，酿成历史大错的例子。影响最大的也许是冯玉祥的短视私仇，帮助促成了外蒙古独立。

外交决策的短视导致长期苦果

　　辛亥革命之后，外蒙古实际沦为俄国的殖民地，宣布“独立”，后来改为“自治”，中国在外蒙的主权丧失殆尽。1919年，任西北筹边使兼西北边防军总司令的徐树铮将军挥师出塞，进军库伦（今乌兰巴托），迫使外蒙取消“自治”，回到中华民国怀抱。徐树铮并派军驻扎乌里雅苏台、科布多、唐努乌梁海等地，赢得了孙中山先生的高度赞扬。

　　这一重大历史功绩，却因为军阀冯玉祥为了报复个人私仇，派人于1925年底乘徐树铮途经京津间廊坊车站时予以劫持枪杀，而难以为继。外蒙最终沦为苏联附庸而“独立”，固然还有其他因素，但是冯玉祥挟仇杀害徐树铮，显然是主要的民族罪人。冯最后不明不白地死于苏联轮船失火，实有其宜。

　　另外一个短视外交例子，是毛泽东以“世界革命领袖”自居，全力支持越南战争以外，还为了打击华盛顿，不放过任何一个场合宣扬“冲绳”属于日本，帮助促成美国在没有经过其他二战战胜国同意，以及琉球公民投票之下私相授受，使得琉球重陷日本。这一发展不仅触发了钓鱼岛争端，更成为今天中国开发东海、东进太平洋和统一台湾的重大战略障碍。

　　这还不提越南金兰湾先是成为苏联海军基地，时下又成为美国太平洋舰队觊觎的目标，直接威胁中国对南海诸岛的主权。

　　具有战略远见的北京外交政策，首推邓小平在苏联侵入阿富汗之后毅然联美抗苏，中美加巴基斯坦的三国“轴心”，成为苏维埃帝国在阿富汗失败后随之瓦解的重要因素，因此消除了外蒙独立之后，苏军曾经扬言不出两周可以直逼北京城下的北方军事威胁。

　　邓小平决策与韩国建交，是北京在东北亚的外交高招。此后中韩经济和文化关系的迅猛发展，在很大程度上化解了华盛顿联合日韩抗衡中国的战略，并且在在地缘政治上有效地制约了日本。

　　我不厌其烦地列举以上历史，是因为北京对于朝鲜半岛最新危机的外交决策，很有可能具有类似的历史性后果，而对中国的长远国家利益造成难以逆转的重大利弊影响。

中韩有联合为朝鲜善后的共同利益

　　北京的短期利益，显然是尽力维持朝鲜半岛的现状。这是北京高层新近决定在经济上大幅度增加对平壤援助的原因。但是从长远角度，平壤政权在生理、经济和政治上都日渐病入膏肓，眼看气数将尽。欧美有论客猜测中国可能会在平壤政权突变时，全面接管朝鲜。但是以中国近年在边疆省份的“维稳”记录，要接管经济崩溃和社会危机深重的朝鲜，决非北京可以顺利承受的风险策略。

　　因此从长远角度，北京无法避免与韩国携手共同处理朝鲜政权的“善后”局面。说到底，对于首尔来说。要在平壤政权一旦崩溃之后全面负担起朝鲜的民生，是仅仅次于南北开战的噩梦。北京因此有与韩国合作的重大空间。

　　由于平壤的“杀熟”外交，不仅韩国的左翼“阳光政策”全面衰落，中国在韩国的利益也受到严重打击。《华盛顿邮报》报道，“天安”舰事件以来，韩国民众对中国的不满达到前所未有的高度。

　　北京必须看到，平壤金氏王朝最后只会是历史长河的一瞬， 而整个朝鲜半岛才是中国永远的“唇齿邻邦”。

作者在北美从事科研工作

漢和：胡錦濤和金正日漸行漸遠

中廣新聞／劉芳

    最新一期「漢和防務評論」月刊指出，北韓領導人金正日最近訪問大陸，中國國家主席胡錦濤和他會晤時，沒有同志式的擁抱，這顯示中國和北韓漸行漸遠。

    「漢和」的評論表示，中國和北韓目前的關係可由最近胡錦濤和金正日兩人會面的情況觀察得知，一是兩人首次沒有擁抱；二是金正日穿的是戰鬥服而非中山裝。這說明中方已不對金正日抱太大希望，且意味著兩國不再是具有特殊意涵的黨國關係。

    「漢和」創辦人兼總編輯(平可夫)認為，金正日在性格、歷練和能力上，問題太多，令北京當局沒有面子，所以兩國關係開始疏遠。

    評論文章又說，金正日性格猜疑，缺乏治理現代國家的能力，也缺乏對國際情勢的敏銳判斷。與中國不同的是，金正日沒有一套社會主義發展理論，所以改革總是虎頭蛇尾。

    平可夫指出，童年喪母的金正日有強烈的不安全感，在爭奪權力過程中，他處處提防後母(金聖愛)家族和自己的弟弟，所以無法堅持改革。

崔應九曾應邀來台訪問...崔和金都是朝鮮人常見姓氏，他們會不會是朝鮮族人？

這篇文章中美日同盟的"保護保證"讀起來像是收保護費的保護

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_CHINA_RETHINKING_NORTH_KOREA?SITE=SCFLO&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT

2009/8/2

By CHARLES HUTZLER (AP) –

BEIJING — U.S. attempts to draw up a broad contingency plan in case North Korea's government collapses are being complicated by China's refusal to talk about potential chaos engulfing its dysfunctional neighbor.

Both Washington and Beijing are growing more anxious about the stability of the Korean Peninsula, with Pyongyang's recent missile and nuclear tests, uncertainty about the health of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and the apparent designation of his 26-year-old son as successor. There's much Washington wants to go over with Beijing in a meltdown scenario: securing North Korea's nuclear weapons, dealing with panicked North Koreans overrunning borders and drawing up ground rules to keep the U.S. and Chinese militaries from clashing as they did in the 1950-53 Korean War.

The U.S. has raised the idea of joint talks in several meetings with senior Chinese officials, most recently during a visit to Beijing last month by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, The Associated Press has learned from foreign diplomats and Chinese scholars briefed on the meetings. Chinese officials rejected the overtures, although they pledged to work constructively with the U.S. on North Korea. Both the scholars and the diplomats asked to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the issue.

The Chinese foreign ministry sidestepped questions from the AP on the U.S. requests and North Korean contingency plans, saying only that "China has always been engaged in realizing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula." The State Department did not respond to a request for comment.

The U.S. has 28,000 troops stationed in South Korea and treaty obligations to defend that country and nearby Japan. China too is wary about being drawn into conflict that might destabilize its northeastern areas near the North Korean border, which have struggled economically in the past decade.

Without careful planning with China, the U.S. is concerned that both armed forces could be drawn into conflict accidentally or be ill-prepared to handle attacks by North Korea's army, the world's fourth largest. The South Korean capital, Seoul, is 40 miles (65 kilometers) from the North Korean border and a tempting target for a dying regime. If North Korea mounts an armed resistance to foreign militaries, a force larger than the U.S. committed to Iraq might be needed, a Council on Foreign Relations study said in January.

"We have to talk about the potential mess because the probability is low but it could be catastrophic," said Drew Thompson, a China expert at the Nixon Center in Washington.

However, he said, the Chinese government's unwillingness to discuss North Korea's future with Washington is understandable given the difficulty in sundering longstanding ties. "It's hard to talk about your grandma before she's gone. This is estate planning."

Beijing has ample reasons for not drawing too close to Washington. Should North Korea learn about U.S.-China talks on a post-Kim future, Beijing is worried that its already tetchy ally would become more difficult to deal with. If Kim's regime crumbles, China's communist leadership may want to preserve North Korea as a buffer state, rather than see a unified Korea ruled by U.S.-allied Seoul that could bring a democratic government and American troops to China's doorstep.

"It's most urgent to talk with the U.S. about this future," said 金燦榮, an international affairs expert at Renmin University in Beijing. But North Korea "will accuse us of being too colonialist for trying to arrange their future," Jin said, and "in the minds of our leaders, there's still a lack of confidence and trust in the United States."

With its interests partly aligned and partly diverging from Washington, Beijing is trying to curb North Korea's provocations while keeping its options open.

"Who isn't irritated by Kim Jong Il at this point? But what can be done about it?" said 崔應九, a retired professor of Korean at Peking University whose proteges include several officials in the foreign-policy establishment.

In signing on to recent U.N. sanctions, Beijing for the first time agreed to a travel ban on individuals, in this case North Koreans running the nuclear program and companies believed to be involved in arms-trading.

China has also repeatedly suggested to Pyongyang that it might opt out of a 48-year-old treaty that commits each to defending the other. Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told reporters last month that China's relations with North Korea are like those "with any other country around the world" — downgrading a relationship both sides often referred to as forged in the blood of war and nurtured by fraternal communist revolutionaries.

China's North Korea specialists and think tanks are studying possible post-Kim futures, from a peaceful transition to a new government to factional warfare, 崔 and other experts said.

崔 attended North Korea's Kim Il Sung University nearly 50 years ago. He regularly hosts friends from his school days — retired civil servants, policy researchers and other members of the North Korean elite — at his two-story house in Beijing's north suburbs. Recent visitors, 崔 said, have described a power shift, with Kim Jong Il throwing his support behind military hard-liners and away from economic reformers to ensure the succession of his son, Kim Jong Un.

Even if that transfer goes awry, 崔 said, the most likely outcome is neither meltdown nor reunification with South Korea but a successor regime, perhaps a military government, in Pyongyang that will need Beijing even more. "The hard-liners will have to rely on China because they won't have the political power to deal with the United States," 崔 said.

In trying to coax Beijing into talking, U.S. officials have raised the prospect that a North Korea with nuclear arms could cause longtime regional rival Japan to go nuclear. The argument does not convince 崔, Jin and others because a nuclear Japan could also be bad for Washington, undermining the American guarantee of protection that is the foundation of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

If China eventually decides to discuss a North Korean implosion with the U.S., the governments would probably be better served by letting their militaries, not civilian officials, do the talking, said Thompson, with the Nixon Center.

A meltdown would likely displace large numbers of people, and the People's Liberation Army has displayed its ability to cope in handling natural disasters like last year's Sichuan earthquake. PLA researchers told a group of U.S. scholars in 2007 that contingency plans were in place for the Chinese military to handle North Korean refugees and even go in to secure nuclear weapons and clean up nuclear contamination.

朝鲜的“杀熟”外交

（2009-07-03）

　　近日，朝鲜货船江南号涉嫌违反联合国安理会决议向缅甸输出军火，触发美国海军监控追踪，成为国际热点。真相如何不论，朝鲜与缅甸新近关系显然热火。回顾1983年，朝鲜企图刺杀韩国总统全斗焕，策划了仰光大爆炸。缅甸因此与朝鲜翻脸廿余年，直到两年前才恢复邦交，在利益驱使下平壤化敌为友的速度颇为可观。

　　与此对比，朝鲜的“杀熟”外交更令人观止。这里“杀熟”是个商业词汇，指的是以“熟”者为“宰杀”对象而获利，不单损人利己，更是损友而利己。

　　固然西方外交的格言，是国家之间没有永恒的朋友，只有永恒的利益。西方列强主导世界以来，国际利益关系确实瞬息万变。但是在传统的东亚政治秩序中，这一利益／敌友关系却相当稳定，明太祖朱元璋规定的“永不征伐之国”是个明显例子，奠定了此后五百年中国与“属国”朝鲜的和平互助关系。

金日成是始作俑者

　　平壤的“杀熟”传统，溯自“太祖”金日成。众所周知，金日成的军事基础，是八路军和林彪四野部队中的大批中国朝鲜族官兵，在一夜之间改组成为“朝鲜人民军”。但是金日成仍然毫无顾忌地发动朝鲜战争，扼杀了北京箭在弦上的“解放台湾”。此后金日成又绝不留情地清洗了从中国“回归”的大批“延安派”，确立了他的个人迷信。

　　这一“杀熟”策略，“太宗”金正日继位后变本加厉。据韩国《朝鲜日报》，中国每年向朝鲜提供石油消费量的90%、粮食的45%、生活必需品的80%，实在是平壤的衣食父母。

　　朝鲜坚持发展核武和远程导弹，给予日本重新武装甚至研发核武、再次干预台海问题和支持“台独”的绝好口实，此处不论，在平壤试射导弹和“核报复”的威胁下，五角大楼近日宣布激活并强化保护夏威夷群岛的反导弹防御体系。《华尔街日报》借此刊登社论，压迫奥巴马政府加紧战略反导弹系统的研发。美国反导弹系统的发展和布防，会显著削弱北京的战略地位和军事威慑力量，刺激“台独”势力。

　　平壤“杀熟”的另一对象，是韩国的“亲北”民意。曾几何时，韩国左翼的“阳光政策”享有巨大的社会支持，并引发了韩国的反美思潮上升。可是在金正日穷兵黩武的“先军”政策下，韩国民意明显右倾化，“阳光政策”面临政治破产。　

　　平壤投射远程力量的能力极为有限，军事要挟的直接对象，不出在朝鲜数万门重炮射程之内、随时可能灰飞烟灭的首尔（汉城）地区，这里居住了韩国一半人口。韩国朝野对北方的民族同情心被生存恐惧心理取代，十分自然。

　　金大中和卢武铉等中左领袖以数亿美元“贿赂”金正日，换取了先后访问平壤和两次《南北共同宣言》的表面文章。到头来卢武铉成为朝鲜核爆的变相牺牲品，而金大中则被本国传媒挖苦为被“丈夫”金正日屡屡施暴却忍气吞声的“妻子”。

有友如此何需敌人

　　在“阳光政策”下，韩国工商界以巨大投资开发了朝鲜的开城工业区。平壤却突然在工资和地租上几倍到几十倍地漫天涨价，是“杀熟”的另一实例。平壤并不隐讳驱赶韩国厂商的动机，《华盛顿邮报》披露起因是工业区向朝鲜民众泄漏了韩国发达的物质文化和“精神污染”。这也是平壤无法模仿中国和越南经改模式的例证。

　　平壤的“杀熟”，不仅严重伤害了韩国的“亲北”势力，逆转了韩美关系不断淡化的趋势，甚至还给民族世仇日本创造了空前的外交机会。日本“民间团体”新近大张旗鼓地在韩国主要报纸媒体上刊登“韩日携手改变朝鲜”的宣传广告，是个很好的例子。

　　在商业上，“杀熟”是唯短期利益是图、并无长久打算的利己手段。平壤将其应用于国际政治，反映了一种强烈的危机感，是一种眼前自我生存至上的短期算计，暴露了金氏世袭王朝面对继位瓶颈的的可持续性软肋。然而对北京和韩国的“亲北派”而言，一句恰当的英语谚语是：“有友如此，何需敌人(With friends like these, who needs enemies)？”

作者在北美从事科研工作

中美互pass the buck...劉易斯是薛理泰常年的合作者。日本要發展核武就是會發展核武，北韓不過給了更好的理由，中國不會為了不確定的利益（日本及台灣不擁核），而付出必然的代價。

中國及美國都不希望日、韓、朝、台擁核，因為會使它們成為難以控制的戰略行動者。北韓的導彈能打到東京，當然也能打到北京。Lewis的文章認為六方會談中俄、中、日是北韓潛在更大的戰略對手，美國是甚麼？honest broker

如果南北韓統一(而且絕大可能是南韓主導)，結果是美韓結合以對抗中國，當然北京不願見此；南北韓統一後成為中日間更有效的緩衝國，那麼北京當樂見其成。南韓也發展過核武，有甚麼理由認為統一之後的韓國不會擁核？如果中國出兵推翻金家政權，遭遇強烈抵抗，那麼南北韓國人對中國的仇視將難以消除。

What North Korea Really Wants

By Robert Carlin and John W. Lewis

Saturday, January 27, 2007; Page A19

Those who think that dealing with North Korea is impossible are wrong. Unfortunately, those who think that it is, in fact, possible to deal with North Korea often are not much closer to the truth. The basic problem is that people of both views simply haven't figured out what it is that the North really wants.

We tend to confuse North Korea's short-term tactical goals with its broader strategic focus. We draw up list after list of things we think might appeal to Pyongyang on the assumption that these will constitute a "leveraged buyout," finally achieving what we want: the total, irreversible denuclearization of North Korea.

But this list of "carrots" (energy, food, the lifting of sanctions) does not include what the North thinks it must have. It can, of course, help keep the process on track and moving ahead, and it could help cement a final deal and hold it together through the inevitable political storms. But these things are not the ends that North Korea seeks.

North Korea feeds our misperceptions by bargaining so hard over details and raising its initial demands so high. For our part, we tend to be taken in by Western journalists' repetition of stock phrases about it being "one of the poorest nations," "one of the most isolated," "living on handouts." Accurate or not, these factors are irrelevant to Pyongyang's strategic calculations.

Those who realize that North Korea does not have visions of grand rewards sometimes move the focus to political steps that many see as "key" to a solution. These include replacing the armistice with a peace treaty, giving the North security guarantees, discussing plans for an exchange of diplomats. But these, like the economic carrots, are only shimmering, imperfect reflections of what Pyongyang is after.

What is it, then, that North Korea wants? Above all, it wants, and has pursued steadily since 1991, a long-term, strategic relationship with the United States. This has nothing to do with ideology or political philosophy. It is a cold, hard calculation based on history and the realities of geopolitics as perceived in Pyongyang. The North Koreans believe in their gut that they must buffer the heavy influence their neighbors already have, or could soon gain, over their small, weak country.

This is hard for Americans to understand, having read or heard nothing from North Korea except its propaganda, which for years seems to have called for weakening, not maintaining, the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula. But in fact an American departure is the last thing the North wants. Because of their pride and fear of appearing weak, however, explicitly requesting that the United States stay is one of the most difficult things for the North Koreans to do.

If the United States has leverage, it is not in its ability to supply fuel oil or grain or paper promises of nonhostility. The leverage rests in Washington's ability to convince Pyongyang of its commitment to coexist with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, accept its system and leadership, and make room for the DPRK in an American vision of the future of Northeast Asia. Quite simply, the North Koreans believe they could be useful to the United States in a longer, larger balance-of-power game against China and Japan. The Chinese know this and say so in private.

The fundamental problem for North Korea is that the six-party talks in which it has been engaged -- and which may reconvene soon -- are a microcosm of the strategic world it most fears. Three strategic foes -- China, Japan and Russia -- sit in judgment, apply pressure and (to Pyongyang's mind) insist on the North's permanent weakness.

Denuclearization, if still achievable, can come only when North Korea sees its strategic problem solved, and that, in its view, can happen only when relations with the United States improve. For Pyongyang, that is the essence of the joint statement out of the six-party talks on Sept. 19, 2005, which included this sentence: "The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies."

And that is why the North so doggedly seeks bilateral talks with Washington. It desires not "drive-by" encounters, not a meeting here and there, but serious, sustained talks in which ideas can be explored and solutions, at last, patiently developed.

Robert Carlin, a former State Department analyst, participated in most of the U.S.-North Korea negotiations between 1993 and 2000. John Lewis, professor emeritus at Stanford University, directs projects on Asia at the university's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Both have visited North Korea many times, most recently in November.