http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-09/24/c_12599183.htm

新華網聯合國９月２３日電 中國國務院總理溫家寶當地時間２３日在第６５屆聯大一般性辯論上發表講話，全文如下：

認識一個真實的中國

——在第６５屆聯大一般性辯論上的講話

中華人民共和國國務院總理 溫家寶
（２０１０年９月２３日 紐約）

    主席先生，各位同事：

    中國是聯合國大家庭中的一員，中國的發展變化受到國際社會的高度關注。我願就如何認識一個真實的中國，談談我的看法。

    中華人民共和國成立以來，特別是改革開放３０多年來，中國這個古老的東方大國發生了翻天覆地的變化。國家經濟實力和綜合國力大為增強，人民生活顯著改善，社會文明程度大幅提升，國際交流與合作不斷擴大。中國已經實現了由解決溫飽到總體上達到小康的歷史性跨越。

    中國對自己通過艱苦奮鬥而取得的成就感到自豪。同時，我們對今天中國在世界上的位置和作用，也有著清醒的認識。

    中國國內生產總值位居世界第三，但人均水準較低，只相當於發達國家的十分之一左右。中國經濟已保持３０多年的快速增長，但進一步發展受到能源、資源和環境的制約。中國若干重要產品產量位居世界前列，但總體上仍處於全球產業鏈的低端。中國已經成為國際貿易大國，但出口產品技術含量和附加值低，核心技術仍然大量依賴進口。中國沿海地區和一些大中城市呈現出現代化的繁榮，但中西部和廣大農村的不少地方仍然相當落後，還有１．５億人口生活在聯合國設定的貧困線之下。中國民生有了很大改善，但社會保障體系不健全，就業壓力很大。中國社會政治生活日趨活躍，公民基本權利得到較好的維護，但民主法制還不夠健全，社會不公和貪污腐敗等問題依然存在。

    中國現代化走到今天，先進落後並存，新舊矛盾交織，面臨諸多前所未有的挑戰。中國仍然處於社會主義初級階段，仍然屬於發展中國家。這就是我們的基本國情，這就是一個真實的中國。

主席先生，各位同事！

    中國的戰略目標是到本世紀中葉，基本實現現代化。展望今後幾十年，中國人民將堅定不移地沿著改革開放、和平發展的道路前進。這條道路改變了中國的命運，給全體人民帶來了福祉。我們必須堅持它、完善它，而沒有任何理由改變它。

    中國將繼續集中精力發展經濟。發展仍然是中國的第一要務，是解決一切問題的基礎。中國的發展主要依靠自己的力量。中國工業化城鎮化的推進，數以億計農民進入城鎮，將創造有史以來最為巨大的國內需求，開闢極其廣闊的市場和發展空間，為中國和世界經濟增長提供持久而強勁的動力。中國將下大力轉變經濟發展方式，調整經濟結構，走出一條均衡和可持續的發展道路。

    中國將繼續深化體制改革。我們要不斷完善社會主義市場經濟體制。毫不動搖地鞏固和發展公有制經濟，毫不動搖地鼓勵、支持、引導非公有制經濟發展。更加注重保障和改善民生，改革收入分配制度，完善養老、醫療、失業等社會保障體系，扭轉城鄉、地區和貧富差距擴大的趨勢，使每一個公民都能夠分享改革開放和發展的成果。在深化經濟體制改革的同時，要推進和搞好政治體制改革。只有這樣，經濟體制改革才能最終成功，現代化建設才能不斷發展。我們要尊重和保障人權，維護社會公平正義，實現人的自由和全面發展，這是民主法治國家的重要標誌，也是國家長治久安的基本保障。

    中國將繼續擴大對外開放。互利共贏，是我們必須長期堅持的開放戰略。我們要遵循國際通行的規則，擴大同世界各國的經貿往來。我們要進一步改善外商投資環境，優化利用外資結構，創新對外投資與合作方式。中國致力於推動建設公正公平、包容有序的國際金融新秩序和開放自由的國際貿易體系，反對各種形式的保護主義。在中國現代化的進程中，我們不僅要在經濟和科技領域繼續吸收和利用世界先進的東西，而且要在社會管理和文化建設等領域大膽借鑒人類文明的成果。

    我們將繼續發展教育科技。中國縮小同世界先進水準的差距，增強發展的後勁，根本靠什麼？一靠教育，二靠科技。中國已經制訂了發展教育、發展科技的兩個中長期規劃綱要。我們要著力抓好這兩個規劃綱要的實施，爭取在２０２０年左右，基本建成人力資源強國和創新型國家。

    我們將繼續弘揚中華優秀文化。國家發展、民族振興，不僅需要強大的經濟力量，更需要強大的文化力量。五千年中華文明所凝結的道德和智慧，屬於中國，也屬於世界。我們要大力發展文化事業，加快建立與社會主義現代化建設相適應、與中華民族傳統美德相承接的思想道德體系。我們尊重世界文明的多樣性，加強不同文明之間的對話與交流，構建人類共有的精神家園。中華民族不僅能夠創造經濟奇跡，也一定能夠創造新的文化輝煌。

主席先生，各位同事！

    人類進入２１世紀，世界並不太平。但靠戰爭最終解決問題已經過時了。和平與發展，仍然是當今世界的兩大主題。

    中國將堅定不移地走和平發展道路。和平發展的精髓是什麼？就是爭取和平的國際環境來發展自己，又以自己的發展促進世界的和平。這也是中國特色社會主義的題中應有之義。

    中國在追求自身發展的進程中，將繼續以促進人類的共同發展和繁榮為己任。中國將繼續尋求和擴大同世界各國的利益交匯點。中國的發展，不會損害任何人，也不會威脅任何人。中國絕不走“國強必霸”的路子。

    中國講友好，也講原則，堅定不移地維護國家的核心利益。在涉及主權、統一及領土完整的問題上，中國決不退讓，決不妥協。

    中國堅定不移地支援聯合國在國際事務中發揮主導作用。中國將繼續遵守《聯合國憲章》，認真履行國際公約的各項義務。中國將一如既往地加強同發展中國家的合作，支援擴大發展中國家在國際事務中的發言權。中國永遠是發展中國家的好夥伴、好兄弟！

    中國的穩定和發展，有利於建設和平的國際環境，有利於建設民主的國際秩序，有利於建設繁榮的世界經濟，也有利於建設和諧的文明世界。中國發展，世界機遇；中國好了，世界得利。歷史將會進一步證明這一點。

    主席先生，各位同事！

    一個和平發展的中國，一個充滿活力的中國，一個敢於擔當的中國，永遠與世界同行。讓我們攜起手來，為世界的持久和平與繁榮而奮鬥！

    謝謝大家！

    胡锦涛是在向由中国全国政协举办的“２１世纪论坛”发出的贺信中作上述表示的。这是中国国家领导人再次重申中国坚持走和平发展道路的决心，这一立场得到了与会政要与各国专家学者的认同。

    今年二季度，中国ＧＤＰ超过日本跃升世界第二后，国际上关于中国已不是发展中国家的声音甚嚣尘上。继“中国崩溃论”“中国威胁论”之后，“中国责任论”被“旧调重谈”，有关“中国的发展是否会威胁世界”“中国将走怎样一条发展道路”的争论再次成为各界关注的焦点。

    全国政协主席贾庆林在论坛开幕式上的主旨演讲中明确表示，中国在经济社会发展方面，取得了历史性的巨大成就，但中国仍然还是一个发展中国家。

民生问题使中国仍将韬光养晦

http://www.zaobao.com/yl/sl100316_001.shtml（2010-03-16）

　在今年中国“两会”的总理记者会上，温家宝针对中国在哥本哈根气候大会上的表现，特地澄清了西方媒体“中国傲慢说”的指控。他解释说，中国之所以只派出一名副部长，参加由美国总统奥巴马牵头的欧美领导人磋商会，并非刻意怠慢，而是他事前并没有接到任何开会的通知。他强调，虽然中国代表团同样没有接到通知，他还是决定派出外交部副部长与会，并同时向大会秘书处及美国代表团咨询。温家宝进一步指出，至今仍然没有人向中国解释为何不通知中国与会的谜团。按照中方对事件的说法，“中国傲慢说”完全是个冤枉，更别说可能还另有隐情。

　　温家宝这番不寻常的解释，不无“哀兵”的姿态，一方面化解“傲慢说”背后隐喻的中国威胁论色彩，另一方面突出中国的受害者形象，反衬事件背后若有若无的“阴谋”。同时，由总理在“两会”的正式场合公开回应，显示中国非常在意事件对其国际形象可能产生的不良影响；如果配合北京近日的一些外交举措，以及温家宝在发布会上的其他发言，或许也暗示了中国外交策略非但没有转变为主动进取，反而因为内部因素的考虑而将维持现状。

　　此前，延续中国在哥本哈根气候大会上的“傲慢”氛围，北京针对美国对台军售、奥巴马接见西藏流亡精神领袖达赖等“中国核心利益”问题做出的激烈反应，包括首次制裁涉及对台军售的美国企业，解放军将领放狠话的强硬态度，以及被视为反击华盛顿就人民币汇率的施压，在国际市场传出北京开始减持美国国债的消息，均让人形成中国外交基调变得咄咄逼人的印象。

　　事后观之，北京对美国在台湾和西藏问题上的反弹，显然存在不得不然的表态。温家宝在回答本报提问时，虽然没有直接回答中国网民对于中国崛起的自信，以及网上一些极端言论如何影响外交决策，他关于国家之间应相互尊重包容的说法，以及对国内公平正义问题的忧心，充分说明了北京必须保持现行稳健温和外交方针的制约因素。

　　在具有指标意义的对美关系方面，各种迹象皆表明，这一轮的外交风波正趋向平息。北京在3月初接受美国常务副国务卿斯坦伯格和白宫国安会亚洲事务高级主任贝德访华；中国外长杨洁篪事后在“两会”新闻发布会上表示，“坚持原则立场同是否强硬是两码事”；在奥巴马于白宫会见达赖的同时，美国尼米茨号航空母舰，连同四艘护卫舰艇的5000多名官兵却获准停靠香港四天过春节；获得美国新军购的台湾，也将继续得到大陆经贸交流政策的好处。

　　中国外交保持一贯的韬光养晦方针，无疑为国际社会所乐见，其背后的动机，或许也可以从温家宝在发布会上的谈话得到启示。他在回答本报时说：“我们的对外方针还要考虑国内和国际两个大局。”温家宝口中的国内大局，正是他在发布会上念兹在兹的“社会的公平正义”。他警告，收入分配不公、贪污腐败加上通货膨胀，“足以影响社会的稳定，甚至政权的巩固”。换句话说，外部的挑战固然不小，内部的威胁其实更为严峻。中国政府需要一个相对平和的外部环境，以便集中精力化解内部累积的社会经济矛盾，放弃韬光养晦的外交指导方针，目前并非最佳的时机。

凝聚共識　加強合作
推進應對氣候變化歷史進程
——在哥本哈根氣候變化會議領導人會議上的講話
中華人民共和國國務院總理　溫家寶

中美聯合聲明

http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/11/17/politics/politicalhotsheet/entry5677524.shtml

新華網新加坡１１月１５日電  國家主席胡錦濤１５日在亞太經濟合作組織第十七次領導人非正式會議上發表題爲《合力應對挑戰　推動持續發展》的重要講話。講話全文如下：

    合力應對挑戰　推動持續發展

    ——在亞太經合組織第十七次領導人非正式會議上的講話

    （２００９年１１月１５日）

    中華人民共和國主席　胡錦濤

    尊敬的李顯龍總理，各位同事： 

    很高興同大家再次相聚，就共同關心的國際和地區問題交換意見。李顯龍總理和新加坡政府爲會議作了周到細緻的安排，我對此表示感謝。

    亞太經合組織２１個經濟體擁有世界４０％的人口、５４％的經濟總量、４４％的貿易量。世界關注我們的聲音，我們達成的共識將對世界特別是本地區發展産生重要影響。 

    去年，我們在利馬作出同舟共濟、積極應對國際金融經濟危機的堅定承諾。一年來，國際社會的協調努力初見成效。世界經濟出現企穩回升的積極迹象，亞太地區經濟復蘇好于預期，有望成爲世界經濟全面復蘇的重要推動力量。

    當前，國際金融危機的深層次影響依然存在，世界經濟形勢好轉的基礎並不牢固，各種形式的貿易和投資保護主義明顯擡頭，國際經濟體系的內在矛盾尚未得到根本解決，推動世界經濟全面恢復增長還面臨諸多不確定不穩定因素。與此同時，多哈回合談判進程艱難曲折，氣候變化、糧食安全、能源資源安全、公共衛生安全、重大自然災害等全球性問題日益突出。這些對亞太和世界經濟全面復蘇和長遠發展帶來嚴峻挑戰。

    在這樣的關鍵時刻，我們更應該團結一致，秉持開放合作、互利共贏的理念，加強協調，攜手努力，鞏固世界經濟復蘇勢頭、推動世界經濟平衡有序發展。同時，我們應該以應對國際金融危機爲契機，認真審視導致危機發生的深層次原因和各經濟體在危機中暴露出來的深層次矛盾，加快轉變經濟發展方式，切實解決經濟發展中的深層次、結構性問題，爲經濟又好又快發展奠定堅實基礎。爲此，中方提出以下主張。 

    第二，著眼長遠，促進可持續增長。要實現經濟可持續增長，必須形成資源節約、環境友好的生産方式、生活方式、消費模式，實現經濟增長、社會發展、環境保護相協調。我們應該統籌考慮當前增長和長遠發展，在推動經濟恢復增長的同時，優化能源結構，推進産業升級，大力發展綠色經濟，培育新的經濟增長點，爲經濟可持續增長創造條件。發達成員應該向發展中成員提供資金、技術轉讓、能力建設支援，確保發展中成員用得上氣候友好技術，讓氣候友好技術更好服務於全人類共同利益。發展中成員應該立足實際，努力探索符合自身情況和發展階段的可持續增長道路。 

    第三，統籌兼顧，倡導包容性增長。讓經濟全球化和經濟發展成果惠及所有國家和地區、惠及所有人群，是可持續發展在社會領域的必然要求。實現包容性增長，既有利於解決經濟發展過程中出現的社會問題，也有利於爲推進貿易和投資自由化、實現經濟長遠發展奠定堅實社會基礎。我們應該結合應對國際金融危機，優化産業結構，提高經濟發展質量，提高全社會就業水平，增強抵禦危機和風險能力。我們應該加強社會保障網路建設，著力解決教育、醫療、養老、住房等民生問題，實現發展爲了人民、發展依靠人民、發展成果由人民共用的目標。明年，中國將主辦亞太經合組織第五屆人力資源開發部長級會議，爲各方應對國際金融危機帶來的社會問題、探討實現包容性增長提供交流合作平臺。希望各方積極支援和參與。 

    各位同事！

    全球性挑戰需要全球共同應對。一段時間以來，世界多國領導人越來越經常地聚集在一起，探討解決全球性問題之道。這說明，國際社會已經認識到，隨著經濟全球化深入發展，和衷共濟、合作共贏是我們的必然選擇。亞太各經濟體具有豐富多樣性和高度互補性，在合作應對挑戰方面積累了寶貴經驗，爲亞太經合組織合作奠定了良好基礎。結合本次會議議程，我願就當前世界和地區經濟社會發展中的突出問題談幾點看法。 

    ——堅定信心，支援多邊貿易體制健康發展。維護多邊貿易體制穩定，推動多哈回合談判加快進程並取得成功，有利於提升國際貿易開放水平、抑制貿易保護主義、推動世界經濟復蘇，符合各方共同利益。中國是貿易和投資自由化便利化的堅定支持者，始終致力於建立公平、合理、非歧視的多邊貿易體制，一直以建設性姿態參與多哈回合談判。我們願同各方一道努力，推動多哈回合談判在鎖定已有成果、尊重多哈授權的基礎上，抓緊解決遺留問題，早日取得全面、均衡的成果，實現發展回合目標。我們應該履行已經作出的承諾，堅決反對任何形式的保護主義，警惕和糾正形形色色的隱性保護主義行爲，減少和消除貿易壁壘，通過對話協商解決貿易摩擦。 

    ——多管齊下，積極推動區域經濟一體化。加快區域經濟一體化對本地區具有重要現實意義。亞太經合組織成員處在不同發展階段，多樣性明顯。我們應該在不同層次、不同範圍、通過多種途徑推動區域經濟一體化。我們應該加強經濟結構改革領域合作，促進各成員改善商業環境，降低運營成本，幫助工商界特別是中小企業渡過難關。我們應該加強各成員基礎設施等領域互聯互通，改善本地區貿易、通信、運輸網路，促進貿易、投資、人員更加便捷、順暢、安全流動。本月初，中國成功舉辦亞太經合組織港口服務網路港口發展大會，探討深化本地區港口及相關行業合作、加強港口和航運業在綜合運輸及國際供應鏈中的作用，爲密切區域聯繫作出了積極貢獻。 

    ——團結協作，共同應對非傳統安全威脅。近年來，各種全球性問題日益突出，對本地區經濟社會發展和人民生活造成重大影響。我們應該本著平等、互利、共贏的全球發展夥伴精神，加強合作，共同維護世界糧食安全。我們應該樹立和落實互利合作、多元發展、協同保障的新能源安全觀，穩定能源價格，改善能源結構，促進能源技術轉讓，減少能源貧困。我們應該加強在甲型Ｈ１Ｎ１流感防控方面的協調，開展資訊交流、早期預警、危機管理、防疫互助等合作，更好保障民衆福祉。我們應該繼續深化防災減災領域合作，總結合作中的有效做法和成功經驗，加強交流和互助，共同抗擊自然災害。

    今年是亞太經合組織成立２０周年。２０年來，亞太經合組織逐步建立起全方位、多層次、寬領域合作機制，推動了地區經濟合作，提升了亞太大家庭意識；尊重本地區多樣性突出、經濟社會發展階段不同的現實，以自主自願、協商一致、循序漸進的方式開闢了區域合作新途徑；通過單邊和集體行動計劃相結合的方式，爲推進本地區貿易和投資自由化便利化進行了有益探索；不斷創新經濟技術合作方式，爲縮小成員間發展差距、促進共同繁榮發揮了重要作用。 

    中國作爲亞太大家庭的一員，一貫重視並積極參與亞太經合組織各領域合作。中國積極推進區域貿易和投資自由化便利化，支援加快區域經濟一體化。中國是經濟技術合作的積極倡導者和參與者，提出了多項合作倡議，推動本地區經濟合作走向深入。中國致力於亞太大家庭團結，積極推動建設持久和平、共同繁榮的和諧亞太。中國通過參與亞太經合組織合作促進了自身發展，也爲本地區乃至世界經濟發展作出了重要貢獻。 

    亞太和世界經濟正在經歷深刻變革。經過２０年的發展，亞太經合組織自身也面臨一些新的挑戰和問題。回首過去，展望未來，爲充分發揮職能和作用、保持活力和動力、提升地位和影響，我們認爲，亞太經合組織應該與時俱進、順應形勢，不斷改革完善，提升合作效率。 

    第一，突出特色，繼續推動貿易和投資自由化便利化進程。亞太經合組織是本地區貿易和投資自由化便利化的倡導者和開拓者，應該堅持不懈開展區域經濟合作，不斷推進區域經濟一體化，提高各成員經濟發展水平。茂物目標事關亞太經合組織的信譽、凝聚力和未來發展。發達成員如期實現茂物目標，將展現亞太經合組織推動貿易和投資自由化、反對貿易保護主義的決心，對提振各方信心、擴大區域貿易、推進區域經濟一體化具有重要意義。中國支援將發達成員如期實現茂物目標作爲亞太經合組織近期工作重點，穩步加以推進。 

    第二，加大投入，推動經濟技術合作取得更大成果。經濟技術合作是亞太經合組織的兩大支柱之一，是推動貿易和投資自由化便利化的重要保證，也是縮小成員間發展差距、實現共同繁榮的必要手段。我們應該從促進全體成員平衡有序發展的高度重視經濟技術合作問題，加大經濟技術合作投入，積極探索新形勢下開展合作的新方式，切實幫助發展中成員開展能力建設，擴大技術轉讓，提高經濟技術合作水平。 

    爲推動亞太經合組織經濟技術合作進程，中國政府將撥款１０００萬美元設立中國亞太經合組織合作基金，用於鼓勵和支援中國相關部門和企業參與亞太經合組織經濟技術合作。 

    第三，改革創新，不斷增強機制生機活力。近年來，亞太經合組織運作機制改革取得重要進展，爲自身未來發展奠定了良好基礎。當前形勢下，亞太經合組織應該主動適應新情況、積極應對新挑戰，繼續穩步推進自身改革和機制建設。同時，應該優化資源配置，提高工作效率，增強合作效能，提升在應對重大經濟問題方面的相關性、針對性、時效性，鞏固和提高在區域合作中的影響力，爲促進區域經濟社會發展和人民生活改善作出新的更大的貢獻。 

    各位同事！

    前不久，中國人民熱烈慶祝了中華人民共和國成立６０周年。６０年來特別是改革開放３０年來，中國取得了舉世矚目的發展成就，發生了翻天覆地的巨大變化，實現了從高度集中的計劃經濟體制到充滿活力的社會主義市場經濟體制、從封閉半封閉到全方位對外開放的歷史性轉變，中國的前途命運日益緊密地同世界的前途命運聯繫在一起。中國需要和平穩定、和諧合作的國際發展環境，也願意爲營造這樣的環境貢獻自己的力量。中國將同國際社會攜手合作、同舟共濟，合力應對挑戰，努力尋求包容性、可持續、平衡的經濟增長。中國將始終不渝走和平發展道路，始終不渝奉行互利共贏的開放戰略，始終不渝謀求和平的發展、開放的發展、合作的發展，爲推動建設持久和平、共同繁榮的和諧世界作出不懈努力。

    謝謝各位。

China’s 11th Ambassadorial Conference Signals Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35691&tx_ttnews[backPid]=25&cHash=f4b74c71dd

President Hu Jintao with Chinese diplomats

This past July the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened the 11th Ambassadorial Conference in Beijing. The foreign policy conclave was attended by hundreds of Chinese ambassadors, diplomats, officials responsible for foreign affairs work from the capital as well as select provinces, regions, and municipalities, and individuals from a small number of state owned enterprises. The conference served as both a working session for Chinese foreign policy professionals and an opportunity for party leaders to discuss the prevailing international environment and the future direction of Chinese foreign relations. As in previous years, the conference provided a venue for announcing new policy directions, as well as adjusting diplomatic strategy. Although widely reported in the Chinese media, the conference has received remarkably little attention from both Western and Chinese scholars.

The conference was jointly organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Foreign Affairs Office under the CCP Central Committee. Key speeches were given by Premier Wen Jiabao and Dai Bingguo, and work reports were provided by Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi, and his vice minister, Wang Guangya. The conference’s centerpiece was a keynote speech by President Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Flanked by the other eight members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, Hu paid tribute to Deng Xiaoping’s legacy, while simultaneously hinting at updates to Deng’s long-standing foreign policy guideline discouraging China from assuming an active role in shaping international affairs.  

Several of the themes in Hu’s speech recalled key ideas presented at the 10th Ambassadorial Conference (held in 2004) and the 2006 Central Work Conference on Foreign Affairs (FAWC), the two most recent major foreign policy gatherings. For example, in keeping with both of these meetings, the 11th Ambassadorial conference cited peaceful development and adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence among the primary objectives of Chinese foreign policy. Hu also emphasized two major themes from the FAWC: (1) the increasing linkages between China’s external and internal situation brought about by globalization and (2) the necessity of harmonizing the management of foreign and domestic affairs in pursuing national objectives.

In addition to these continuities, Hu’s speech included three modest but significant supplements to his previous remarks on foreign policy. First, the speech demonstrated an increased emphasis on the role of “soft power” in building China’s comprehensive national power. Second, it called for foreign policy practitioners to adopt a more active diplomatic posture in select areas of foreign affairs. Third, Hu presented an unusually positive perspective on the international system’s progress toward multipolarity and a growing consensus among the party leadership on the importance of multilateralism in promoting China’s interests.

The “Four Strengths”

Introducing a notable new formulation, Hu urged diplomatic envoys and foreign policy officials to make efforts to give China “more influential power in politics, more competitiveness in the economic field, more affinity in its image,” and “more appealing force in morality” (Xinhua News Agency, July 20). The Chinese media quickly dubbed these four areas the “four strengths” (sili) [1], and discussions of the significance of Hu’s comments soon appeared in the Chinese blogosphere and the online version of the CCP mouthpiece People’s Daily. Confirming the importance of this new concept, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, in an August interview with China’s official news service, Xinhua News Agency, repeated Hu’s call to build the four strengths, accentuating the need for “diplomacy and other work … [to] promote each other and develop in a coordinated manner” (Xinhua News Agency, August 24).

Three of the four strengths (political influence, image appeal and moral suasion) fall under the category of soft power, which for many Chinese encompasses political factors and thus goes beyond Joseph Nye’s definition. This emphasis underscores growing recognition by the party leadership of soft power's importance in promoting China’s “peaceful development” strategy. Hu first publicly stressed the value of soft power in his political report to the CCP’s 17th Party Congress, but in that speech he focused solely on its cultural dimensions, stating, “We must . . . enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people’s basic cultural rights and interests…” [2]. Hu’s statements at the 11th Ambassadorial Conference, however, were notable for addressing the importance of developing the political and moral aspects of soft power as well.

Hu’s reference to the importance of developing political influence and moral suasion suggests Beijing’s thinking on the issue of soft power is undergoing a significant shift. Since the 1990s, China’s academic discourse on soft power has been dominated by two schools. The first defines soft power exclusively in terms of culture and emphasizes its pull factors—what Joseph Nye has described as the ability of “a country to get other countries to want what it wants” as opposed to “ordering others to do what it wants” [3]. In contrast, the second school focuses on soft power’s push factors, maintaining that its essence resides in exerting political influence [4]. Thus far, observers of Chinese politics have credited the first school with having the strongest influence on Beijing’s soft power policies. Yet, the debut of the four strengths formulation suggests the second school has boosted its sway among Chinese leaders.

A More Proactive Stance in Foreign Affairs?

Implicit in Hu’s discussion of the four strengths is a suggestion that soft power can be used as a means for actively pursuing China’s foreign policy goals. This contrasts with prior authoritative statements on soft power, which portrayed its role in Chinese foreign policy as primarily passive [5]. Following the Ambassadorial conference, commentators suggested that this more active stance on soft power signaled a departure from taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei (keep a low profile and bide our time, while also getting something accomplished), an important guideline of Chinese foreign policy introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1989 in reaction to the dissolution of Eastern Europe’s socialist bloc [6]. For example, an editorial that appeared in the Canadian newspaper Xingdao Daily and republished on the web site of the People’s Daily claimed that Hu’s speech signaled that the taoguang yanghui concept would be discarded—this is not the case (People's Daily Online, July 24). Following the practice of the 2006 FAWC, Deng’s eight-character phrase was included in the internal documents of the 11th Ambassadorial Conference, but excluded from public reporting [7].  

There are at least two explanations for the omission of Deng’s instructions to keep a low profile from media coverage of key leadership statements on foreign policy. First, Chinese leaders are concerned that western nations have misconstrued the essence of the phrase to the detriment of Chinese interests. Some observers in the West have interpreted the phrase to mean China is “amassing its power and hiding its true intention to dominate the world” [8]. To avoid fueling the “China threat theory,” the expression has been excluded from publicly circulated Chinese policy documents. Second, to many in China the taoguang yanghui formulation implies a passive role for China in world affairs, a position that increasingly meets disapproval from a Chinese public eager for Beijing to assert itself globally. As China’s power has grown, nationalism has risen apace, and a growing number of Chinese are disenchanted with the leadership’s unwillingness to flex its newfound muscle.  According to Chinese scholars, references to Deng’s dictum are excluded from the media to limit pressure on the leadership to more aggressively protect Chinese interests around the world.

Despite its absence from public reports, Chinese sources insist that taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei remains a fixture of intraparty discussions and internal documents and that there is a consensus to preserve it for the foreseeable future [9]. Yet, at the same time, the leadership has decided to slightly modify Deng’s axiom, signaling an emphasis on the last four characters—the importance of getting something accomplished in Chinese foreign policy. According to leading Chinese scholars, Deng’s eight-character guideline was expanded to ten characters at the 11th Ambassadorial Conference. The new version calls on China to “uphold (jianchi) keeping a low profile and bide its time, while actively (jiji) getting something accomplished.” Although the difference may seem negligible, it was reported to be the subject of heated dispute. Apparently, other formulations were proposed and rejected.  In the end, the decision to add the word “actively” was made by Hu Jintao himself [10].

Specifically, Hu called for China to “actively participate in dealing with the impact of the global financial crisis” (Xinhua News Agency, July 20). There is a growing interest in re-shaping international financial institutions to strengthen the global economy and to provide China with a bigger voice in those institutions. Other possible areas where Beijing may seek to be more assertive were hinted at by Premier Wen, who stated that China should “extensively participate in international cooperation in the nontraditional security area and … dealing with climate change” (Xinhua News Agency, July 20). This reflects the higher priority China is assigning to transnational issues, especially those resulting from globalization, such as the financial crisis, energy security and climate change. Foreign Minister Yang has referred to this new component of Chinese foreign policy as “functional diplomacy” (lingyu waijiao), which, he said, would receive greater attention as China’s comprehensive national power grows [11].

Even as Chinese leaders agreed to stress the importance of making achievements in China’s foreign policy, they cautioned that China should eschew adopting a leadership role on international issues. The 11th Ambassadorial conference apparently reiterated admonishments to “not take the lead” and “not raise banners,” which Premier Wen Jiabao had made at the FAWC, echoing language Deng used in 1989 (Xinhua News Agency, February 26, 2007). The leadership remains wary of being entangled in overseas predicaments that could divert the country from its main task of development. Indeed, President Hu Jintao placed even greater weight than in the past on the importance of China’s interest in domestic development and the essential need for foreign policy to serve the interests of that development, stating:

The relations between diplomatic work and national development have become closer. We must rely on development, serve development, promote development, and earnestly safeguard China’s development interests (Xinhua News Agency, July 20).

A Multipolar International System is Emerging, but Hasn’t Arrived

In addition to introducing the four strengths, the 11th Ambassadorial Conference was also notable for Hu’s positive assessment of the international system’s progress towards multipolarity. In his speech, Hu suggested that damage to U.S. reputation might help move the international system closer to 'true' multipolarity, a situation that most Chinese believe will benefit their national interests. “The prospect of global multipolarization has become clearer (minglang),” Hu remarked, a formulation that significantly differed from his statements at the FAWC, where he described the path toward multipolarity as “tortuous” (Xinhua News Agency, July 16; August 23, 2006). This assessment reflects a general trend in China’s perception of the international system that was signaled earlier in the year in China’s 2008 defense white paper, which referred to multipolarity as “gaining momentum (shenru fazhan)” [12].

In accordance with this positive outlook, Hu emphasized the increased importance of multilateral diplomacy, stating, China must “actively advocate multilateralism [and] promote democratization of international relations” (Xinhua News Agency, July 20). This change is indicative of the positive lessons Beijing has drawn from its participation in multilateral diplomacy in recent years and demonstrates an increased willingness to enhance China’s role in international organizations. Nevertheless, multilateralism remains positioned in fourth place in China’s diplomacy, after relations with the major powers, the neighboring countries and developing countries, unchanged from the 10th Ambassadorial Conference (Xinhua News Agency, August 29, 2004).

Although the Chinese view the process of multipolarization as more conspicuous, they are not ready to declare an end to the unipolar world dominated by the United States. Considerable controversy persists in Chinese debates over whether U.S. power is, in fact, in decline (China Brief, July 9). While a growing number of Chinese experts have taken this position, no such official judgment has been made, and financial decision makers are reputed to believe reports of the U.S.’s demise are greatly exaggerated [13].

Implications for China’s Foreign Policy

Rather than indicating a sea change in China’s foreign policy, as suggested by some commentators, the 11th Ambassadorial Conference is best described as an adjustment (tiaozheng) that affirms the trend toward China’s more active involvement in select issues that are crucial to the country’s national interests.

It is notable that the leadership rejected a proposal by the foreign ministry to hold another large-scale FAWC this year instead of the ambassadorial conference. According to several sources, Chinese leaders concluded that the international situation had not changed dramatically in the three years since the last FAWC, and therefore a more extensive review of Chinese foreign policy was unnecessary [14].

China’s foreign policy continues to serve domestic interests. Yet it is no longer sufficient for foreign policy to create a stable external environment to support China’s internal reforms, as Deng instructed three decades ago. Now, foreign policy must actively aid in the development of Chinese comprehensive national power. Domestic growth, for example, requires a more pro-active diplomacy to secure resources, markets, and technology.

The decisions taken at the 11th Ambassadorial Conference demonstrate the party leadership's increased interest in building and actively implementing Chinese soft power, as well as desire to deepen involvement in multilateral institutions. The new focus on functional diplomacy recognizes that China’s expanding interests require going beyond its traditional emphasis on bilateral relations. The Conference also signals an intention to use China’s economic weight, financial resources and growing geopolitical influence to expand its say in designing any future international and economic system. This suggests a new assertiveness in areas where the Chinese see a close internal-external linkage.

Given the conference’s emphasis on the four strengths, soft power can be expected to play a more prominent role in China’s foreign policy. Although soft power has long been a hot topic in Chinese intellectual and policy circles, Beijing has not yet articulated a comprehensive strategy for its development and use. Thus far, the development of China’s soft power has depended less on the central government than on such disparate actors as state owned enterprises and provincial-level governments. Hu’s call to build the four strengths is a natural extension of the FAWC’s emphasis on coordinating the activities of Chinese actors overseas to ensure that they serve domestic interests; there are concrete indications that efforts to develop a more comprehensive approach to managing China’s soft power are already underway. Xinhua’s recent plans to increase the presence of its foreign language networks overseas highlight Beijing’s determination to improve its image abroad (The Malaysian Insider, July 23). Wen Jiabao has also called for an expansion of China’s “going out” (zouchuqu) strategy, which encourages Chinese firms to expand overseas with the explicit, albeit secondary, purpose of strengthening ties with other nations.

The internal debate over the modest reformulation of Deng Xiaoping’s taoguang yanghui dictum suggests that even though China is willing to become more involved on the global stage, it will do so cautiously and selectively. Although Beijing appears to now be willing to “actively get something accomplished” in certain areas that directly impact domestic stability and development, it is not prepared to abandon its policy of avoiding excessive involvement in overseas commitments. China is not merely paying lip service to Deng’s guidance to “keep a low profile;” it remains a central part of China’s approach to foreign affairs. Despite calls by Obama administration officials for China to assume a leadership role on critical regional and global security issues, Beijing is likely to remain reluctant to heed this call.

Notes

1. Depending on the publication, the four strengths have also been referred to as si ge li and si ge geng youli.
2. Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 15, 2007, www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm
3. J. S Nye Jr, “Soft power,” Foreign Policy (1990): 153–171.
4. Glaser, Bonnie and Melissa E. Murphy in Carola McGiffert, Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States (CSIS, 2009), 13.
5. Li Mingjiang, “Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity, Parameter, and Prospect,” Chinese Journal of International Politics (2008).
6. Four of the eight characters are from a longer 24-character expression that is attributed to Deng Xiaoping. The original phrase called for China to “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capabilities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” See, for example, Ding Guangen “Speech at the Third Chinese National Deng Xiaoping Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics Theory Research Conference” (zai quanguo disanci Deng Xiaoping jianshe you zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi lilun yantaohui shang de jianghua), People’s Daily, December 24, 1996.
7. Interviews with PRC officials and scholars in Beijing and Washington. August, September, and October 2009.
8. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007 (Department of Defense, 2007), 7.
9. For a dissenting view, see Shulong Chu and Yuli Guo, “China's "Peaceful Development" Strategy and Model (Zhongguo "Heping Fazhan" Zhanlue Ji Moshi), no. 002 (2008): 1–9.  
10. Interviews with PRC officials and scholars in Beijing and Washington. August, September, October, 2009.
11. Yang Jiechi, “Safeguard World Peace, Promote Common Development – Commemorate the 60th Anniversary of New China’s Diplomacy,” Qiushi Online, no. 19, Oct. 1, 2009, Open Source Center, CPP20091005710001.
12. Beijing, “China's National Defense in 2008,” January 2009.
13. Interview with leading Chinese scholar August 29, 2009, Beijing.
14. Interviews with PRC officials and scholars in Beijing and Washington. August, September, and October  2009.

同舟共濟　共創未來
——在第６４屆聯大一般性辯論時的講話

2008亞歐峰會北京會議「可持續發展北京宣言：和諧社會」

http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-10/25/content_10252087_1.htm

中國駐英大使傅瑩：中國不會成為另一個西方國家

http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2008-10/01/content_10137408.htm

中國駐英大使傅瑩表示，中國的改革開放不會逆轉，仍將奉行和平、合作的外交政策，但中國不會成為另一個西方國家。 

    記者三十日從中國駐英使館獲悉，中國使館近日在英保守黨伯明罕年會期間舉辦論壇，研討“奧運後的中國——是夥伴還是挑戰？”傅瑩在論壇上說，奧運會的成功是建立在中國三十年改革開放的堅實基礎之上的，奧運會後的中國還是要在與世界的融合與互動中求得發展。

針對民主、人權等問題，傅瑩表示，改革開放以來，中國的政治體制改革與經濟體制改革都取得了很大進展。國家領導人多次強調，沒有民主，就沒有社會主義，就沒有社會主義現代化。中國政府以人為本的政策得到民眾的衷心擁護。美國皮尤研究中心所做的一項民意調查表明，百分之八十六的中國民眾對國家的發展方向感到滿意。

    傅瑩認為，判斷一個國家是否民主，不能只看有沒有一天的全國性選舉，關鍵是政府的決策過程是否民主，政府是否服務於人民的利益。她表示，西方民主制度在特定國情的土壤裏和相應的經濟、社會基礎上發展順利，但是世界上移植西式民主的國家並非都是成功的範例。“中國仍處於工業化初期，有自己的歷史、文化傳統，用西方模式衡量和要求中國是不適宜的，要求中國採用西方民主本身就是不民主的。”

    傅瑩表示，中國並不完善，在公正執法、公平分配等方面還面臨許多問題和挑戰，所以中國才一再強調要繼續堅持改革開放。她說，西方民主脫胎於西方的歷史文化傳統，在幾個世紀的工業化過程中伴隨著經濟社會發展而逐步成熟起來。但英國在工業化初期也做過不少侵害殖民地土著人權益的事。西方在婦女選舉權、少數民族等問題上也走過漫長的道路。

    談到中英關係，傅瑩說，中英兩國合作應對挑戰十分必要，兩國共同點遠遠大於分歧。當前中英關係的最大挑戰是需要進一步增進兩國間的相互理解，雙方在一些問題上存在不同認識，甚至誤解很深，但只要坦誠對話，求同存異，相信中英關係會有美好的前景。

(中新社倫敦九月三十日電 記者 李鵬)