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台灣也差不多，要買美國武器，順便得買核能發電廠。

是"探索與爭鳴"，而非sousuo...(文中和註解都錯了)，我也找不到not adopt hegemonic tendencies一段。Jamestown基金會與葛萊儀大人屬共和黨，故她避而不提奧巴馬上台有益於美國軟權力。文長，下摘錄較為重要部分

《探索與爭鳴》 2009年第3期

內容摘要　金融危機雖然重創了美國與西方，但是遠未到顛覆其霸權的程度。美國與西方的霸權衰落早已開始，但卻是波浪式的、漸進的過程，目前它們仍然擁有很強的實力，在許多方面領先。建立國際新秩序不可能撇開西方和現有秩序另搞一套，最可行的途徑是對現有秩序進行漸進的改革。中國在新秩序建立過程中“絕不當頭”，這符合中國的戰略利益。經歷了30年的對外開放，中國仍然需要繼續向西方國家開放，同它們合作，進一步發展各種夥伴關係，特別是要繼續發展中美建設性合作關係。
        關 鍵 詞   國際金融危機　霸權衰落  中國對外戰略  國際新秩序  建設性合作關係
        作　　者　劉建飛，中共中央黨校國際戰略研究所副所長、教授、博士生導師。（北京：100091）

這場始于美國的金融危機，確實重創了美國。不僅重創了美國的經濟，進而削弱了美國的硬實力，更重創了美國資本主義經濟模式的影響力，進而削弱了美國的軟實力。對美國實力的削弱，肯定會影響美國的霸權。但是，金融危機對美國霸權的影響是相當有限的，因為世界多數國家的經濟都遭受了金融危機的打擊，能獨善其身者寥寥無幾，有些國家的損失可能比美國還要嚴重。所以，金融危機並沒有帶來國際力量結構，特別是大國力量對比的重大變化，美國作為惟一超級大國的地位並未受到動搖。

….美國各界對2008年總統選舉的政治意義給予了高度評價。一位美國國務院官員在選舉結果揭曉後稱，這次選舉是“民主的勝利”。此前他擔心，有雄厚民意基礎的奧巴馬如果敗選，就真的表明，美國民主制度快要完蛋了。美國前國家安全事務助理布熱津斯基在大選後接受筆者採訪時說，美國的民主制度確實有許多弊端，但是卻在不斷改進，這次選舉確實使美國民主制度在人民心目中的形象改善了一些。有觀察家稱，這次選舉再次證明，美國民主制度是一種能夠使人才不拘一格湧現出來的有效機制。而人才是一個國家能否保持活力或者從衰落中重振的關鍵因素。?2?….
  國際新秩序如何構建
        現行的國際政治經濟秩序是在以美國為首的西方的主導下建立起來的，其規則基本上是西方制定的，肯定有不合理、不公正的地方。就拿作為政治秩序主要載體的聯合國來說，作為首腦機構的安全理事會有五個擁有否決權的常任理事國，西方就占了三個，無論是國家數量還是人口數量都占絕對多數的發展中國家只有中國一個。至於有小聯合國之稱的八國集團，有七個是西方國家，發展中國家一個也沒有。經濟秩序更是如此，世界貿易組織、國際貨幣基金組織、世界銀行基本上都在西方的操控之下。在這樣的秩序下，廣大發展中國家的利益會經常受到侵害，它們強烈要求建立新的國際秩序。
        然而，國際新秩序的建立不是一朝一夕的事情，不可能一蹴而就，尤其不可能是“革命式”的突變，也不會是“破舊立新”的模式。在西方力量仍處於明顯優勢，而廣大發展中國家又必須同西方國家進行經濟往來並加入現有國際秩序的當今世界，新秩序的建立只能通過對現有秩序進行不斷的、漸進的改革，使其越來越公正、合理。
        更需要重視的是，在新秩序建立過程中，不能忽視西方的作用和影響。當今世界，絕大多數國家都不同程度地加入了現行的國際秩序，多數發展中國家都同西方國家有著千絲萬縷的聯繫。有的在經濟上同西方國家互相依賴、深度捆綁；有的在安全上尋求西方大國的保護，反倒把周邊大國視為威脅；有的同西方享受著相同或相近的文化和宗教；有的認同西方的價值觀，實行西方式的政治制度。當非洲聯盟與美洲國家組織在美國華盛頓舉行“民主之橋論壇”的時候，這兩大組織與美國儼然成了在世界推進民主的“同志”；當印度與美國以“最大的民主國家”和“最強的民主國家”相互讚美之時，它們實際上已經成了“民主夥伴”。儘管非洲、拉美和印度在經濟上與美國有很深的矛盾，不滿意現行的國際經濟秩序。尤其是隨著非傳統安全威脅日益嚴重，全球性問題越來越突出，發展中國家與西方發達國家之間的共同安全利益逐漸增大，雙方在國際事務中越來越難以相互分離。因此，國際秩序的改革不可能沒有西方的參與。
        實際上，同西方國家一道對現行國際秩序進行漸進式的改革，已經成了發展中國家不得已的選擇。2005年聯合國首腦大會通過的關於聯合國改革的《成果文件》，就是發展中國家與西方發達國家進行博弈、妥協的產物。在《成果文件》中，發展中國家的利益得到了比較多的尊重。這個結果表明，西方發達國家也認識到，在當今世界，它們不可能撇開發展中國家獨自享受發達、繁榮，不可能讓現行國際秩序只為它們自己服務。世界需要共同發展。?3?
        當前的金融危機儘管重創了西方，也暴露了現存國際經濟秩序存在的弊端，但遠未到顛覆現存國際秩序的程度。更何況，應對危機還有賴於現行國際經濟秩序的有效運作，而這又需要世界主要經濟體的通力合作。華盛頓20國峰會的舉行，已經突顯出新興經濟體願意同西方一道來應對它們不可能置身事外的金融危機。當然，20國峰會也體現了新興經濟體和廣大發展中國家國際地位的提升。西方國家再也不能像過去那樣僅僅依靠西方自己的力量來渡過危機了，這對增強發展中國家在國際事務中的話語權，進而推動國際秩序改革提供了良好的契機。
        中國在建立新秩序上的戰略選擇
        中國早在上個世紀70年代就提出了建立國際經濟新秩序的主張，以後又提出建立國際政治新秩序。然而，隨著中國的發展和改革開放的推進，中國逐漸加入現行的國際秩序，並從中獲益。改革開放30年的歷程表明，中國是現行國際秩序的受益者。當然，中國也付出了一定的代價，中國深受西方國家利用國際秩序進行打壓之苦，如西方七國1989年聯合制裁中國，對中國加入世貿組織設置重重障礙等。
        中國作為最大的發展中國家和提出和諧世界理念的國家，有責任與世界各國一道積極推進國際新秩序的建立。然而，作為現行秩序的獲益者，中國不冀望以“革命”的方式建立新秩序，也不冀望發展中國家拋開西方發達國家和現行秩序另搞一套，更不想在建立新秩序過程中充當領袖，因為“絕不當頭”是中國對外戰略的方針之一。
        特別值得強調的是“絕不當頭”。按說，中國有當頭的氣質和條件。中國是世界人口最多的國家，又是最大的發展中國家；中國有五千年文明史，其博大精深絕不輸于西方文明；中國正在走出一條獨具特色的發展道路，而這條道路很有可能對西方發展模式構成嚴峻挑戰，並為許多發展中國家借鑒；中國是新興大國中保持自己的民族特質最多、受西方影響最小的國家；特別是隨著中國經濟快速發展，中國已躍升為世界第三經濟大國，而且還有望繼續躍升。許多發展中國家期望中國當它們的領袖；一些國人也鼓動中國當頭，渴望享受“世界領袖”國民的感覺。然而，中國堅定不移地貫徹“絕不當頭”的戰略方針，因為這符合中國的戰略利益。
        歷史上，大國崛起通常遭到現有大國的抵制和遏制。中國作為一個意識形態、社會制度、民族文化與西方有很大差異的國家，它的崛起更易遭到抵制和遏制。建立新秩序很容易被看成是要破掉西方主導的現存秩序，如果中國在這個過程中自覺或不自覺地當頭，極有可能促使西方團結一致地干擾、阻止中國崛起。而希冀建立新秩序的力量卻是分散的，難以整合、統一，甚至有些發展中國家還會尋機靠近西方，同西方一道來遏制中國。如此一來，中國的戰略環境將嚴重惡化，戰略機遇期喪失，和平崛起的進程將大大推遲。而以犧牲中國的和平崛起為代價，也未必能換來國際新秩序的建立。
        也許正是因為認識到了建立國際新秩序只能走漸進的道路，而且必須同西方國家合作共建，特別是中國不能當頭，中國共產黨十七大政治報告改變了以往的“建立公正合理的國際政治經濟新秩序”的提法，轉而採用“推動國際秩序朝著更加公正合理的方向發展”。比較起來，後一種提法更溫和一些，也更符合實際情況。而前一種提法，很容易被誤讀成是“破舊立新”。而“破舊立新”式的建立新秩序的過程，一般都需要有個大國充當“領袖”，宣導“建立新秩序”的國家則很容易被懷疑有想當這個“領袖”的意圖。
        西方仍是中國的合作夥伴
        中國要順利走和平發展道路，成功實現和平崛起，需要妥善應對西方霸權衰落，特別是美國霸權衰落。
        回顧改革開放30年歷程，可以洞見，中國改革開放、和平崛起的進程與中美關係發展是相伴而行的。當作為中國歷史轉捩點的中國共產黨十一屆三中會會召開之際，也正是中美建交談判成功之時。這兩件大事都是改革開放的總設計師鄧小平親自抓的。隨後，鄧小平就跨越太平洋，訪問美國。鄧小平何以如此重視對美關係？這恐怕要從中國大戰略的角度去考察，而不僅僅是出於安全的考慮。
        在結束了“文革”十年動亂和之後的兩年徘徊後，中國共產黨實現了工作中心的轉移，她要帶領中國人民一心一意謀發展，要搞現代化，為此要改革，要對外開放。這個對外開放主要是對西方國家開放，因為對發展中國家和社會主義國家開放的問題或者早已解決了，或者並不突出。鄧小平在上世紀70年代主政時一再強調：“現在是我們向世界先進國家學習的時候了。關起門來，固步自封，夜郎自大，是發達不起來的。”?4?那麼誰是先進國家呢？如果說在新中國成立時，中國領導人心目中的先進國家是蘇聯，那麼到了70年代，鄧小平的看法已經變了，他心目中的先進國家（在經濟、科技上）不是蘇聯，而是西方。“所謂現代化水準，就是接近或比較接近現在發達國家的水準”，也就是“通常所說的西方的水準”。?5?他還坦言：“過去，我們很多方面學蘇聯，是吃了虧的。”?6?鄧小平在訪美時表達了良好的願望：“我們相信中美關係正常化能為美國用先進的東西幫助我們實現四個現代化創造更有利的條件。”?7? 在鄧小平出訪美國期間，陪同訪問的一位資深國際問題專家曾問鄧小平，中國為何要開放，又為什麼主要向美歐開放？鄧小平回答說，跟著美國的那些國家都富強了。?8? 如果聯繫此前中日簽署和平友好條約和鄧小平訪日，更能體現出鄧小平對發展同西方國家關係的重視。
        不可否認，在上世紀70年代末，中國發展同西方國家的關係，仍然存在著維護安全的動力，因為畢竟這時中國同蘇聯的關係尚未實現正常化，蘇聯仍然對中國構成嚴重的軍事威脅，就在中國啟動改革開放之時，蘇聯入侵了中國的鄰國阿富汗。中國要集中精力搞現代化建設，需要借重西方特別是美國、日本這些大國的力量來抗衡蘇聯威脅，維護和平穩定的外部環境。但是，這時的蘇聯威脅與60年代末相比，已經大大減弱，中蘇邊境的局勢相對穩定。這說明，到了70年代末，安全動力只是中國發展同西方國家關係的動力之一，而且還不是最主要的動力。最主要動力是對外開放，中國要向西方國家開放，向它們學習先進的科技和管理，學習發展經濟、搞現代化的經驗。為了順利展開對外開放，中國需要同西方國家保持良好的關係。
        中國改革開放30年的巨大成就，在一定程度上得益於同包括美國在內的西方國家一直保持著良好的關係，得益於中國逐漸加入了西方所主導的國際秩序。現在，中國正處在崛起的進程中，同西方發達國家相比在經濟、科技等方面仍有相當大差距。中國沒有理由放棄過去30年行之有效的戰略，即同美國及西方進行合作，建立、發展建設性的合作關係或夥伴關係。
        當然，西方國家，特別是美國，不願意看到中國崛起。出於地緣戰略的考慮，它們擔心崛起的中國會挑戰它們的霸權，甚至威脅它們的安全；出於意識形態的考慮，它們更擔心堅持走社會主義道路的中國一旦崛起，還會對西方的制度和模式構成挑戰，從而顛覆西方霸權賴以存在的制度基礎。然而，在全球化時代，西方也需要中國，需要同中國合作。過去30年的歷史表明，西方同中國合作的動力遠大於要遏制中國崛起的動力。只要雙方妥善處理相互間的分歧，著眼於雙方的長遠利益，雙方的合作關係就能夠不斷發展，儘管中間會有摩擦、波折。
        發展中美建設性合作關係
        中國同西方關係的關鍵是中美關係，因為美國是西方世界的領袖，它的對外政策走向對其他西方國家有很大的影響力。中美關係目前的定位是建設性合作關係，其含義是多重的。按筆者的理解，中美建設性合作關係有四個方面的內容：
        1.非傳統安全和地區安全上的合作夥伴。從美國的角度看，安全事務主要有三個方面：非傳統安全、傳統的軍事安全和涉及美國重要利益的地區安全。中國所關注的安全事務大體也是這幾方面，當然更側重於同自己的領土和主權完整密切相關的傳統軍事安全。中美在反恐、防擴等非傳統安全問題上已經進行了很好的合作，是合作夥伴。此外，在經濟安全、能源安全、金融安全、環境安全、衛生安全等方面，中美也有很大的合作潛力。在地區安全方面，中美在東北亞、南亞等重要地區都在進行合作，也是合作夥伴。
        2.經濟上的利益攸關方。當今世界大國，不管有什麼樣的國家發展戰略和安全戰略，都將發展經濟作為基礎。中美兩國也不例外。對中國來說，以經濟建設為中心是一項長期的戰略方針。對美國來說，不管國家安全戰略的側重點是什麼，擴展經濟都是一大支柱，因為美國深知，它之所以會“不戰而勝”，成為冷戰的贏家，最根本的原因就是它在經濟上超越了蘇聯。美國也深知，要想維護“一超獨霸”地位，雄厚的經濟實力仍然是基礎。冷戰後美國出臺的所有國家安全戰略報告都設專章來講經濟問題，強調要同其他重要經濟體和新興市場國家發展關係。擴展經濟是冷戰後美國發展對華關係的最重要動因之一。近幾年，中美戰略經濟對話的啟動和推進，特別是在應對金融危機上兩國的合作，表明中美兩國經濟已經深度捆綁，利益攸關。
        3.傳統軍事安全上的和平競爭對手。在傳統軍事安全上，中美之間存在著利益矛盾，美國將中國看成是潛在的戰略競爭對手，要防範中國，並且利用臺灣問題來牽制中國。美國的政策必然導致中國要防範美國。儘管如此，中美兩國並不想走向軍事對抗。從兩國軍事關係的不斷發展、深化來看，兩國都在致力於避免軍事對抗和衝突，這實際上也是一種合作。避免對抗與衝突符合兩國的根本利益。
        4.政治上的和平較量對手。在美國全球戰略中，在政治領域一直將中國作為對手。美國要在世界推進西方式的民主，中國顯然是一個重要對象。而中國要走社會主義道路，這是堅定不移的。不過，中美在政治上並不是要對抗。鄧小平說：“（有一種觀點）認為中國政府信奉的意識形態旨在摧毀類似美國這樣的政府。這樣的觀點至少不是八十年代的觀點，也不是七十年代的觀點，而是恢復了六十年代的觀點。”?9? 如果說20世紀50~60年代，中國信奉的意識形態有與美國對抗的成份的話，那麼到了70年代以後，這樣的成份已經被擯棄。中國明確提出，在發展同包括美國在內的發達國家之間的關係時要“超越社會制度和意識形態差異”，“對彼此之間的分歧，要堅持對話，不搞對抗”。?10? 雖然美國在對外政策中一直未“超越”意識形態因素，而且還將推廣美國的意識形態和價值觀作為對外政策的一個重要目標，並且將之貫徹到對華政策中，但是美國的戰略是要通過合作、接觸來影響中國，促使中國走向美國所希望的道路。合作、接觸總比對抗要好，從某種程度上講是可取的，是值得歡迎的。在不走向政治對抗這一點上，中美是有共同利益的。從某種意義上說，作為意識形態和社會制度不同的兩個大國，它們之間存在著政治上的較量是難免的，也是很正常的，但是，中美之間的較量不同於冷戰時期美蘇之間的意識形態對抗。中美之間的較量是和平的、非對抗的，是以合作為基礎的。
        從上述建設性合作關係的架構來看，有兩種力量在影響著中美關係，一種是推動合作的力量（經濟、非傳統安全與地區安全），一種是阻障合作的力量（政治、傳統軍事安全）。從世界大勢和中美兩國的發展趨勢來看，有利於中美合作的因素在增多，推動合作的力量在增強，與此同時，能導致中美對抗的因素在減少，妨礙合作的力量在減弱。?11?
        布希政府8年任期中，對外政策乏善可陳，但中美關係卻是一大亮點。奧巴馬雖然無外交經驗，更無處理對華事務的經歷，但是他的顧問班子基本都是“知華派”，他們深知中美關係對美國的意義，也瞭解如何同中國打交道。預計，奧巴馬政府不會刻意同中國找麻煩，不會人為地製造中美關係的“動盪期”。當然，民主黨歷來重視人權問題，重視維護美國勞工的利益。因此，不能排除奧巴馬政府會在人權問題、西藏問題、貿易問題、人民幣匯率等問題上同中國搞摩擦的可能性。但是，只要中國應對得當，就不會影響中美關係的大局，而且對有些問題，可以通過預防性外交，使可能出現的摩擦盡可能地延遲，或者即使出現，也能使其造成的負面影響被限制在最低限度。

Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Decline and Power

Chinese President Hu Jintao (L) and President Barack Obama

For the past few years, the Western world has been abuzz with talk of China’s rise. Most statesmen, pundits and academics have concluded that China’s rise is inevitable, but as of yet there has been no consensus on the implications of China’s rise for the rest of the world.  While Westerners debate issues like whether and how China can be “molded” into becoming a responsible stakeholder in the international system, the Chinese have been quietly conducting a debate of their own.  After more than a decade of judging the international structure of power as characterized by “yi chao, duo qiang” (one superpower, many great powers) [1]—with a substantial gap between the United States and other major powers—Chinese scholars are debating whether U.S. power is now in decline and if multipolarity (duojihua)  is becoming a reality. A key precipitating factor is the global financial crisis, which has sown doubts in the minds of some Chinese experts about the staying power of U.S. hegemony in the international system.  

Chinese perceptions of American power are consequential. China’s assessment of the global structure of power is an important factor in Chinese foreign policy decision-making.  As long as Chinese leaders perceive a long-lasting American preeminence, averting confrontation with the United States is likely seen as the best option. If Beijing were to perceive the U.S. position as weakening, there could be fewer inhibitions for China to avoid challenging the United States where American and Chinese interests diverge.  Since the late-1990s, Beijing has judged the United States as firmly entrenched in the role of sole superpower.  As long as the comprehensive national power of China and the other major powers lagged far behind the United States, and the ability of China to forge coalitions to counterbalance U.S. power remained limited, Beijing concertedly avoided challenging U.S. interests around the world; for example, when the United States invaded Iraq.  Yet, China’s recent evaluation that the United States is overextended with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with a perceived U.S. weakness in the wake of the financial crisis, could imbue Chinese policy makers with the confidence to be more assertive on the international stage in ways that may be inconsistent with American interests.

The debate in China over a possible U.S. decline is not new, however. After the end of the Cold War, Chinese experts embarked on a rigorous examination of the new global environment that would emerge after the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in Eastern Europe. At that time other rapidly expanding economies, especially Japan and Germany, were perceived as having become powerful U.S. competitors in high technology.  Some Chinese experts began to predict the emergence of a post-Cold War multipolar world order, a greater balance among major powers, resistance toward “Western values” and an increased emphasis worldwide on economic and diplomatic approaches as opposed to military might [2]. These predictions proved overly optimistic, however, and Beijing subsequently concluded that the United States would maintain its status as “sole superpower” for the next 15 to 20 years, if not longer [3].

Recent events, notably U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and the financial crisis, juxtaposed against China’s sustained economic growth, have rekindled the debate in China about the sustainability of a U.S.-dominated international structure and China’s role in that new structure of power. In particular, many Chinese experts are viewing the recent U.S.-led financial crisis as sounding the death knell for unfettered American economic and hard power predominance and the dawn of a more inclusive multipolar system in which the United States can no longer unilaterally dictate world events.

Signs that the debate has been rejuvenated surfaced in 2006 with a provocative newspaper article by Wang Yiwei, a young scholar at Shanghai’s Fudan University, who posed the question, “How can we prevent the USA from declining too quickly?”. The article, which suggested that a precipitous decline in U.S. power would harm Chinese investments, predicted the United States would soon fall to the status of a regional power rather than a global power because of its arrogance and imperial overreach and advised Washington to “learn to accept Chinese power on the world stage.” Wang’s article generated a tremendous response from readers and intellectuals, which spurred further debate within China about whether U.S. power was in decline [4].

After the onset of the financial crisis in the United States in 2008, which quickly reverberated globally, more articles appeared in Chinese newspapers positing a radical shift in the global structure of power.  In a May 18, 2009 article in China’s official state-run newspaper China Daily, Fu Mengzi, assistant president of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, maintained that “the global financial crisis offers global leaders a chance to change the decades-old world political and economic orders. But a new order cannot be established until an effective multilateral mechanism to monitor globalization and countries' actions comes into place. And such a mechanism can work successfully only if the old order gets a formal burial after extensive and effective consultations and cooperation among world leaders” [5].

Li Hongmei, editor and columnist for People's Daily online, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, framed the argument more assertively in a February 2009 article by predicting an “unambiguous end to the U.S. unipolar system after the global financial crisis,” saying that in 2008, U.S. hegemony was “pushed to the brink of collapse as a result of its inherent structural contradictions and unbridled capitalist structure.” Li forecast that “in 2009, as a result of this decline, the international order will be reshuffled toward multipolarity with an emphasis on developing economies like China, Russia and Brazil” [6].

Li Hongmei and others highlight what they see as the main source of U.S. power decline: economics; and especially share of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  The IMF’s recently published figures on global GDP points out that in 2003, GDP in the United States accounted for 32 percent of the world total, while the total GDP of emerging economies accounted for 25 percent.  In 2008 however, the figures were reversed, with the total GDP of emerging economies at 32 percent and U.S. GDP at 25 percent of the world total respectively [7]. From Li’s perspective, the recent financial crisis portends a continuation of the downward trend for the United States.

Scholars such as Wu Xinbo, professor and associate dean of the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University, and Zhang Liping, senior fellow and deputy director of Political Studies Section at the Institute of American Studies in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), highlight a major shift in U.S. soft power and legitimacy after the U.S. invasion of Iraq.  According to Wu, the United States “lost its ‘lofty sentiments’ after it invaded Iraq and is feeling more ‘frustrated and lonely’ which will lead it to seek more cooperation with other big powers” [8].  Similarly, Zhang points to a diminution in U.S. soft power, a decrease in its ability to influence its allies, and diminished ability to get countries ‘on board’ with U.S. foreign policy initiatives after the invasion of Iraq—all signs that augur a decline in America’s legitimacy abroad [9].

Not all Chinese experts are in agreement, however, and some warn explicitly against drawing a premature conclusion that U.S. power is on the decline.  Notable among these voices is Wang Jisi, dean of Beijing University’s School of International Studies, who harshly criticizes Chinese analysts who view U.S. power as being in decline.  Wang argues, for example, that “there really is no reliable basis for saying at this point that the United States has experienced a setback from which it cannot recover.”  While acknowledging that the invasion of Iraq damaged U.S. soft power and legitimacy abroad, Wang maintains that he does not see any fundamental change to the global balance of power. “To date,” Wang says, “no country has been able to constitute a comprehensive challenge to the United States, and the current international power structure of ‘one superpower and many great powers’ will continue for the foreseeable future.” Wang also advises China’s leaders to “avoid becoming embroiled in the central maelstrom of world politics and concentrate on managing its own affairs first” [10].

Xu Jin, researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of World Economics and Politics, and Zhu Feng, director of the International Security Program in the School of International Studies at Peking University, insist that the financial crisis “will not bring substantive changes to the international pattern of ‘one superpower and many great powers.’” Xu anticipates that the financial disparity between the United States and other powers will narrow as a result of the financial crisis, possibly leading to a decline in U.S. economic hegemony.  Yet, he concludes that any harm the financial crisis inflicts on the United States will have limited damage on its overall global position, since economic prowess is only one of the “many elements of U.S. comprehensive power” [11]. Zhu adds that “even if America takes a hit with the financial crisis, the large gap between America and world in economic terms is so large, and other markets are so firmly enmeshed with the U.S., that no fundamental shift will occur to America’s relative position in the world” [12].

Echoing this view is Liu Jianfei, professor and associate director of the International Strategy Institute at the Communist Party Central School.  In a recent issue of Sousuo yu Zhengming, a periodical published by the Shanghai Social Science Association, Liu presents a comprehensive analysis of the post-financial crisis world and cautions China against coming to premature conclusions about a rapid decline in U.S. overall power.  “The financial crisis will undoubtedly weaken U.S. hard power, but it might end up affecting the economies of other countries even more,” says Liu.  “The overall negative influence affecting the power of American hegemony—in military, economic and soft power terms—will remain limited” [13].

Liu Jianfei sees U.S. influence as indispensable in shaping a new world order and cautions China about taking “too high a profile,” or “seeking to be a leader” of the international system.  “China still needs more time to develop and open up to the outside world,” he says.  “Many are calling for China to be the new leader in the new world order, but we need to continue down the road of reform and development and not adopt hegemonic tendencies.  China also needs the cooperation and trade of the United States and other Western countries in order to succeed” [14].

What emerges is a lively debate in China about whether the international system is undergoing a fundamental shift that heralds the decline of U.S. power.  As evidenced by the wide range of opinions, experts are far from reaching agreement on the core question of whether the United States is in decline.  The vast majority maintains that the prevailing international structure of power will not last; it eventually will give way to a multipolar era in which China and other emerging economies have an increasing say about issues of global importance.  At the same time, many experts also caution that the transition to multipolarity will be a prolonged process, and that for the foreseeable future the United States will maintain its position at the helm of the international structure of power.  Only a minority of experts view the United States as already in decline and the world on the cusp of becoming truly multipolar.

Conspicuously absent from the debate is discussion of how a multipolar system would operate and what role China would play in the new world order.  Would a more equal power distribution among major powers result in greater competition or cooperation, in balancing or bandwagoning, for example?  If future international developments persuade Chinese leaders that the United States is in decline and that a multipolar world has arrived, Chinese experts will need to more closely examine such questions.  

An emerging multipolar world could prompt Beijing to adopt a more assertive foreign policy and military posture, but could also provide incentives for China to be cooperative.  Tensions over territorial claims with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan continue to simmer, and a perceived power vacuum in the area could embolden China to assert greater influence over these disputed islands.  Furthermore, the potential for China to adopt coercive policies against Taiwan is an ever-present danger looming over U.S.-China relations.  Yet, Beijing might instead see its interests best served by working cooperatively with the other major powers to ensure a soft landing as the world transitions from “one superpower, many major powers” to a new multipolar pattern.  Significant disincentives will exist to a revisionist shift in China’s foreign and defense policies.  Assertiveness or aggression by China would likely cause the other major powers to band together to counter the emergent Chinese threat.  Unless China perceives a threat to its vital interests (such as a declaration of independence by Taiwan), Beijing may see strong incentives to act cautiously.  The time may then come for China to discard Deng Xiaoping’s dictum to “keep a low profile,” and become the “responsible stakeholder” that the world hopes for rather than the next global hegemon.

Notes

1.The first mention of “yi chao duo qiang” that the authors were able to find was by Liao Yonghe, “The Right and Wrong of the ‘America in Decline’ Theory,” Dangdai Shijie, 1995 Vol. 3.  See also Michael Pillsbury’s China Debates the Future Security Environment, National Defense University Press, January 2000.
2.Pillsbury, Michael, “China’s Perceptions of the USA: The View from Open Sources,” Testimony prepared for U.S.-China Security and Economic Review Commission, Oct. 19, 2001.
3.For more on this reassessment, see Finkelstein, David M, China Reconsiders Its National Security: The Great Peace and Development Debate of 1999, Project Asia - CNA Corporation, Dec. 2000.
4.Wang Yiwei, “How can we prevent the USA from declining too quickly?” Global Times Online, Aug. 12, 2006.
5.Fu Mengzi, “Old Order Should Yield Place to New,” Peoples Daily Online, May 18th, 2009.
6.Li Hongmei, “U.S. Hegemony Ends, Era of Global Multipolarity Begins,” Peoples Daily Online, Feb. 24, 2009, Open Source Center (OSC), CPP20090224701001.
7.Ibid.
8.Wu Xinbo, “China Rise Startles U.S. into Sobriety,” Global Times, Dec. 23, 2007*.
9.Zhang Liping, “Is America in Decline after 9/11?” Shijie Zhishi, July 2007, Vol. 21*.
10.Wang Jisi, “Roundtable on U.S.-China Relations,” Nanfeng Chuang, Oct. 20, 2008.
11.Xu Jin, “The Financial Crisis Will Not Upset the ‘One Superpower and Many Powers’ Structure,” Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi; Dec. 14, 2008, OSC, CPP20090223671003.
12.Zhu Feng, “The Obama Administration Foreign Policy: Afterthoughts on our Fieldwork in America,” International and Strategic Studies Report, Center for International and Strategic Studies, Peking University, March 20, 2009.*
13.Liu Jianfei, “Chinese Foreign Strategy in Wake of the Financial Crisis,” Sousuo yu Zhengming; May 2009, Vol. 3*.
14.Ibid.

*  (Translated from Chinese by authors)

基于资源的大国博弈初见端倪

（2009-07-03）http://www.zaobao.com/yl/yl090703_003.shtml

　　最近几条新闻值得注意：

　　第一条：6月23日，美国与欧盟就中国限制出口稀有金属问题向WTO（世界贸易组织）提起诉讼。此前，美国和欧盟未能说服中国削减出口关税并提高锌、锡、钨和黄磷等原材料的配额。据悉，这将成为1月份奥巴马上任后，美国向WTO起诉中国的首案。欧盟在一份声明中称：“欧盟23日提请WTO审查有关中国限制出口几种主要的稀有金属问题，这一决定违背了国际贸易准则。”

第二条：2009年6月5日，中国铝业集团的澳大利亚（澳洲）的合作对手、力拓矿业集团单方面撕毁195亿美元的注资协议。宣告中铝并购失败。

第三条：中国铁矿石谈判进入艰难阶段。

类似的新闻还有一些，表面没有什么联系，但从深层次表现出大国开始收紧资源，一场大国基于资源的博弈即将开始。随着金融危机的深化，各个国家大量的注入货币，世界经济经历一场阵痛是不可避免的。在山雨欲来的情况下，各个国家都在考虑应对危机和未来发展，而对于未来经济的复苏和抢占新经济周期中有利地位来讲，资源，特别是稀缺资源的作用将是巨大的。任何一个政府都明白这点，因此都开始收紧自己的资源，同时加大购买稀缺资源。

资源博弈将转为定价权之争

　　美国并非石油的生产大国，但金融集团掌握着石油和大宗商品的定价权，从而为美国获取了巨大的经济利益。随着经济危机的深化，各个国家开始认识到定价权的重要性。如果要获得定价权，必然从本国有自身优势的资源出发，通过控制核心资源的供给量达到控制价格的目的。出于自身的利益，抬升自有核心资源价格是最佳选择。

从另外一个角度讲，各个主要国家大量的注入货币后，在经济形势没有好转的情况下，一定会流向以资源为主的大宗商品，从而推动大宗商品的价格。这两股力量将主导未来以资源为代表的大宗商品市场，从而完成国家与国家之间的利益重新分配。

资源将更多的具有金融属性

　　虽然各个国家开始掌握资源的定价权，但最终还是要通过交换来实现自身需求。因此资源的博弈最终还是会体现为金融上的博弈，这样就会推动资源的金融属性被逐步挖掘出来。石油作为资源中的关键，已经渗透到了各个行业和各个家庭。因此石油明显体现出了它的金融属性。随着各个国家基金、交易市场的建立，其他资源产品会步石油的后尘，体现出更多的金融属性，甚至表现出部分“货币”属性。

中国的应对策略

　　邓小平曾经说过，“中东有石油，中国有稀土”。这句话就为中国高瞻远瞩的指明了未来的发展方向。中国利用自身的稀缺资源的优势争夺定价权，使中国在未来世界格局中体现自身价值。中国掌握着稀缺资源，但却以低廉的价格出售，同时造成资源毁灭性的开采，这些都损害着中国未来的国家利益。中国还远远没有向其他国家通过石油、铁矿石等垄断资源获得垄断利润。现在限制稀缺资源的出口可以说是及时的补救。但是，限制出口从某种意义上讲，只能说是防守，合理的建立中国的资源金融体系才能有效维护国家利益。因此，建立中国重要商品的市场，获取定价权，建立以资源为标的ETF（交易所交易基金），促进民间资本以货币储值，转向资源储值才是根本解决之道。

中国站在了整个世界大变革的前夜，应该清楚认识到资源在未来发展中的战略地位，清楚的认识到这轮基于资源的大国博弈的本质和迫切性。

　　作者从事经济、国际关系等方面的研究，文发自北京

經濟學家：中國沒理由看衰美國

亓樂義／北京報導

    　有關國際儲備貨幣多元化的問題，中國主流經濟界人士均抱以期待。中國人民銀行貨幣政策委員會委員、經濟學家樊綱認為，金融危機暴露以美元獨大的國際儲備貨幣體系種種弊端，全球應朝著多元化的國際儲備貨幣體系方向發展。

    　樊綱指出，改變現行國際儲備貨幣體系非一蹴可幾，但至少在近期內，有關雙邊貨幣互換協議、區域性儲備貨幣，以及其他儲備貨幣的安排應該得到鼓勵，讓不同的儲備貨幣體系相互競爭。

    　世界能源金融研究院執行院長、中國金融研究院院長何世紅甚至認為，中國呼籲採用一種新的國際儲備貨幣，是對國際金融體系與美元脫鉤的最新嘗試。

    　不過，知情人士指出，六月中旬「金磚四國」峰會舉行前，中國主流經濟界人士對上述議題保持低調，因中共高層擔心該峰會被視為「對抗美國的大會」，尤其不願被外界貼上「帶頭抗美」的標籤。

    　一位不具名經濟學者說，中國雖不屬於Ｇ８成員，卻和Ｇ８所有成員國存有共同利益，中國是全球化最大的受益者，尤其中國作為「美國最大債主」和「美國最大進口對象」，美國經濟衰退，中國必受波及，因此中國沒有理由看衰美國，中國希望美元保持穩定。

    　基於這個背景，今年「金磚四國」峰會的聯合聲明內容，僅止於「建立一個穩定的、可預期的、更加多元化的國際貨幣體系」，對建立「新的國際儲備貨幣」隻字未提。

    　中國現代國際關係研究院的一位研究員認為，中國目前對國際儲備貨幣體系並不熟悉，才剛剛入門，所有的發言不過是一種「政治表態」，點出當前國際金融體系的弊端，如何獻策尚需深入研究，不是說說便罷。

China will extend a $10bn (£6bn) loan to Russia and four Central Asian states to help them in the financial crisis, Chinese President Hu Jintao has said.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8102467.stm

Speaking at a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg, he said China would help member states.

The group includes Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Yekaterinburg is also hosting a meeting of the world's four emerging economies - Brazil, Russia, India and China.

美國擔心中國從這場金融危機中獲益，猶豫者要放多少權力給中國；中國也懷疑美國會放手，正所謂「朕賜給你…」

Fearing China

Beijing is challenging the world's economic and financial order. Americans had better get used to it.

By Daniel W. Drezner | Newsweek Web Exclusive

May 20, 2009 | Updated: 5:21  p.m. ET May 20, 2009

President Obama has finally selected his ambassador to China—and not a moment too soon. Because Ambassador-designate Jim Huntsman was a rumored GOP presidential candidate for 2012, most of the press reaction has been about the domestic political ramifications of the pick. This inside-the-Beltway focus overlooks a minor fact: Huntsman is about to become the point man for the most important bilateral relationship in the world.

The Chinese government has not been sitting idly by while the Obama administration has gotten into gear. Put another way, there has been chaos under heaven, and Beijing's situation is excellent. Over the past two months, Beijing has made a series of moves that could be interpreted as a challenge to the American-led economic and financial order. In March, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao explicitly voiced concerns about the direction of U.S. fiscal policy at his annual press conference. Later in March, China's central bank governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, argued that the costs of relying on the dollar as the world's reserve currency now exceeded its benefits. He proposed the creation of "a super-sovereign reserve currency" patterned after the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as a way to diversify away from the dollar. At the G20 summit in London, Wen seemed to advance that goal with an agreement to expand IMF lending in SDRs by up to $250 billion. In what the Financial Times claimed was an effort to diversify away from the dollar, China has doubled its gold holdings over the past five years. In an effort to promote greater global use of the yuan, the People's Bank of China initiated $95 billion of bilateral currency swaps with countries as diverse as Belarus, Malaysia and Argentina. China also strongly supported expanding the Chang Mai Initiative, a burgeoning ASEAN+3 arrangement of currency swaps. According to the Financial Times, Brazil is in preliminary negotiations with China to eliminate the use of the dollar from their bilateral trade.

Beijing's flurry of activity is starting to make Americans jittery. Foreign-policy heavyweights are furiously debating the virtues and dangers of developing a new "G2" with China. Congressman Mark Kirk recently warned a group of Chinese-Americans that "China has canceled America's credit card." Economist Nouriel Roubini told The Washington Post that "already in a month [China has] done more than in the last 10 years." But surely the United States could pressure Beijing to change these policies? China watcher Nicholas Lardy soberly concluded, "We have no leverage."

Should Obama and Huntsman be jittery about China? Not really. Break this down into what happens in the long term versus the short term. Over the long run, China will eventually approach the United States in terms of relative power and influence. This is not terribly surprising, however. Both private- and public-sector analysts have been making this prediction in recent years. Indeed, the rise of China is a key theme that runs through the National Intelligence Council's Global Trends 2025 report. For now, however, China's GDP is still less than half that of America's. It will be some time before Beijing catches up to Washington.

As for the short term, most of China's actions have actually been quite modest in scope. Chinese officials acknowledge that the dollar will remain the reserve currency for quite some time. China's currency swaps are microscopic when compared to the trillions in assets and goods that are traded in dollars. Some of the stories have been hyped beyond the actual data. The doubling of China's gold reserves, for example, does not demonstrate diversification away from the dollar. Since the total value of China's foreign-exchange reserves has increased 10-fold during the same time period, the percentage of its total reserves in gold has fallen to 2 percent. Beijing has actually diversified away from gold.

If these moves do not amount to much, then why all the hubbub? To be blunt, America is out of practice at dealing with an independent source of national power. For two decades the United States has been the undisputed global hegemon. For the 40 years before that, America was the leader of the free world. As a result, American thinkers and policymakers have become accustomed to having all policy decisions of consequence go through Washington. Our current generation of leaders and thinkers are simply unprepared for the idea of other countries taking the lead in matters of the global economic order.

Most of China's recent actions do not constitute a real threat to the United States; indeed, to the extent that China helps to boost the economies of the Pacific Rim, they are contributing a public good. Obama—and Hunstman—need to make the mental adjustment to a rising China, welcoming many of China's policy initiatives while pushing back at those that threaten American core interests. If they can make this cognitive leap, then Sino-American relations can proceed on the basis of shared interests rather than mutual fears.

美國新聞周刊：美國要學會適應中國的強大

美國總統奧巴馬終於選出了美國駐華大使：喬恩·亨茨曼(中文名洪博培)。輿論猜測，奧巴馬跨越黨派挑選大使是一招妙棋，既顯示他不拘黨派任人唯賢，又可以在競選連任時減少一位潛在的對手。對於亨茨曼來說，他將成爲世界上最重要的雙邊關係——中美關係的主角之一。近來，許多國家的媒體都在討論中美將並駕齊驅成爲世界兩強。美國《新聞周刊》20日更是發表文章稱，中國當前正在重塑世界經濟和金融秩序方面發揮重要作用，美國必須要學會適應中國的強大。

　　與世界上大多數國家面對經濟危機時的混亂不同，中國的局勢非常穩定。過去2個月中，中國政府已經做出一系列動作，這些動作被視作是對美國主導的經濟和金融秩序的挑戰。

　　今年3月，中國國務院總理溫家寶在記者招待會上將目光投向了美國的財政政策。隨後，中國央行行長周小川表示，以美元爲中心的國際貨幣體系已經不符合中國利益，並提出了構建“超主權國際儲備貨幣”的設想。在4月份的二十國集團倫敦峰會上，溫家寶總理同意擴大國際貨幣基金組織的特別提款權。《金融時報》稱，過去五年中，中國的黃金儲備翻了一番，已經對美元形成挑戰。

　　中國的一系列行動讓美國非常敏感，美國外交方面的重量級人物對“G2”(中國和美國)的好處和危險進行了激烈爭辯。經濟學家魯里埃爾·魯比尼表示，中國一個月的發展比過去10年的還大。

　　但是美國應該就此向中國施壓，要求其改變這些政策嗎？中國觀察家尼古拉斯·拉迪的結論是：“我們沒有那麽長的杠杆。”

　　中國的能量和影響力越來越接近美國，但人們不必感到驚訝，分析家早在多年前就做出了這種預測，中國崛起的話題更是貫穿了美國國家情報委員會2025年之前的全球趨勢報告。可是現在，中國國民生產總值依然不到美國的一半，中國要想真正趕上美國，還需要很長時間。實際上，中國的一系列動作都是非常溫和適度的。中國的政府官員也承認，在相當長一段時間內，美元依然是世界儲備貨幣。

　　那麽，爲什麽中國的動作會令很多人大驚小怪？坦白地說，美國人已經不習慣於與一個獨立的國家共同處理問題。20多年來，美國是這個世界上當之無愧的霸主，也是自由世界的領袖。美國人已經習慣了通過華盛頓做出所有決定。當代美國及其領導人還沒有對其他國家崛起並重塑世界經濟秩序做好準備。

　　中國近來的動作並沒有對美國形成真正的威脅，從某種程度上說，中國甚至在促進全球經濟發展。奧巴馬和亨茨曼需要對中國的崛起調整心態。如果他們能夠認識到這點，中美關係將從互相害怕轉爲利益共用。(沈姝華)

http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gj/gj-hwkzg/news/2009/05-22/1704131.shtml