Photos of the Chinese-made stealth aircraft began appearing on websites earlier this month

The confirmation came after images of the 15-minute flight in Chengdu appeared on several Chinese websites.

Mr Hu said that the flight had not been timed to coincide with Mr Gates' visit, the US defence secretary said.

The US is currently the only nation with a fully operational stealth plane.

But both Russia and China are known to be working on prototypes of stealth fighters, which are invisible to radar.

Mr Gates' three-day visit to Beijing comes amid US concern over the speed at which China's military is modernising and upgrading its technology.

"I asked President Hu about it directly, and he said that the test had absolutely nothing to do with my visit and had been a pre-planned test. And that's where we left it," Mr Gates was quoted as saying by Reuters news agency.

Leaked images of what was said to be China's J-20 fighter first appeared earlier this month during taxi tests at the Chengdu Aircraft Design Institute.

On Tuesday, the plane took off and flew for about 15 minutes, according to eyewitness accounts published on unofficial Chinese web portals.

A video clip of the flight was also posted on the web.

China says it expects the stealth plane to be operational some time between 2017 and 2019.

But earlier this month the Pentagon played down concerns over the fighter.

"Developing a stealth capability with a prototype and then integrating that into a combat environment is going to take some time," said US director of naval intelligence Vice Admiral David Dorsett.

China's official military budget quadrupled between 1999 and 2009 as the country's economy grew. In 2010 it stood at $78bn (£50bn).

But the US has by far the largest defence budget in the world at just over $700bn.

China Expands Naval Presence through Jeddah Port Call

China’s naval presence on the global stage is expanding. While counter-piracy and escort operations in the Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea have significantly contributed to the Chinese navy's growing profile, foreign port visits by its naval vessels to the Gulf region are emerging as an important element in Chinese naval strategy.  China’s overseas naval presence is an important measure of its great power status, and port visits are an effective means of projecting naval power. The Chinese Navy's growing naval activism was recently highlighted by an unprecedented visit by the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) at Jeddah Port in Saudi Arabia. On November 27, China's sixth naval escort flotilla arrived at the port of Jeddah. The port call was officially billed as a five-day "goodwill" visit and marks the first ever call to Saudi Arabia by Chinese naval vessels (Xinhua News Agency, November 28; Fmprc.gov.cn, November 29). In light of the apparent expansion of the diplomatic mission of the PLAN, a careful study of Chinese port visit activities may provide useful insights into Chinese foreign policy objectives.

The sixth naval escort flotilla just completed a five-month long escort mission in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, the flotilla, which is under the command of the chief of staff of the PLAN South Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral Wei Xueyi, included the Chinese Navy’s largest surface combatant, the amphibious dock landing ship Kunlunshan, missile destroyer Lanzhou, and supply ship Weishanhu (Xinhua News Agency, November 28). A reception that was reportedly organized on the deck of Kunlunshan was attended by Rear Admiral Abdullah Al-Sultan, the commander of the Saudi Navy's Western Fleet and other officers. Chinese Ambassador Yang Honglin, Consul General Wang Yong, Military Officer Zhang Zhuoyong, and hundreds of people from the business community were also in attendance (China Review News, November 28; Fmprc.gov.cn, November 29).

The Chinese Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Yang, hailed the sixth naval flotilla's port call as an important milestone in the two countries’ military exchanges that will benefit the deepening of their "strategic friendly relations" (China Review News, November 28).  Rear Admiral Abdullah Al-Sultan expressed hope that the visit will help advance the two countries' military exchanges and cooperation, and contribute to the comprehensive development of bilateral relations (China Review News, November 28). Indeed, the port visit will likely enhance cooperation between the Chinese and Saudi navies, promote mutual understanding, and further strengthen lines of communication between the two militaries.

The notable uptick in port calls made by the PLAN seems to reflect the Chinese renewed appreciation of the value of naval presence for its foreign policy implementation. For instance, the missile destroyer Guangzhou was sent through the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean to conduct port calls in Egypt, Greece, Italy, and then later visited Burma (Myanmar) and Singapore earlier this year (PLA Daily, July 26). The Chinese Navy's increasing role as an instrument of state policy follows in line with President Hu Jintao's 'New Historic Missions,' which underscores the PLA's role in safeguarding Chinese interests overseas. Through extended port calls, the PLAN is demonstrating its capacity and capability to promote the nation’s global interests.

While the exact purpose of the Jeddah port visit is uncertain, the motives behind the visit appear both strategic and political-diplomatic. The rapid modernization of China’s naval forces coupled by its growing naval diplomacy illustrate the rise of China as a naval power with global ambitions. The first ever port call also occurred in the context of China's broader engagement with the Middle East region, and signals the deepening of relations between Beijing and Riyadh. To be sure, Saudi Arabia is now China's leading overseas oil supplier―oil import from Saudi Arabia in 2009 stood at 41,857,127 tons―and the current impasse over Iran offers a political backdrop for the visit (See "Hobson's Choice: China's Second Worst Option on Iran," China Brief, March 18). Furthermore, the protection of China's oil interests in Sudan may have also factored into the overall calculation.

In the final analysis, increasing Chinese port visits is not itself a military feat, but does indicate a willingness to commit the PLAN in promoting Beijing’s foreign policy initiatives. It is not simply a demonstration of “showing the flag.” While Beijing is eager to portray its military expansion as in the interest of global stability, conducting port visits is a useful tool that extends China’s naval presence and exhibits the country’s soft power. As China expands its naval presence on the international stage and projects naval power in new theaters, Chinese leaders appear to be taking careful steps to balance the use of hard and soft power.

PLA's Growing Force Projection Capabilities

China’s assertiveness along its littoral—underscored by recent diplomatic disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea—has raised international concerns about how Beijing intends to project its growing military power.  While certainly worthy of attention, a narrow focus on Chinese activities along the periphery obscures a more profound trend, whereby the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is modernizing in ways that will allow it to project forces farther beyond its borders.  In the wake of President Hu Jintao’s promulgation of the “historic missions of the armed forces in the new period in the new century” (xin shiji xin jieduan wojun lishi shiming) or “new historic missions” for the PLA in 2004, China has engaged in a variety of missions abroad, including counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, disaster relief in Haiti, and non-combatant evacuation operations in the Kyrgyzstan. Indeed, Beijing has invested resources in a number of platforms—such as large amphibious ships, long-range transport aircraft, at-sea replenishment vessels, and hospital ships—that cannot be explained in the context of preparing for a Taiwan conflict.  Meanwhile, the PLA has begun training and equipping for a wider range of activities, some of which have already been demonstrated on the international stage. These types of activities are likely harbingers of Chinese force projection over the next few decades [1].

Force Projection Activities to Date

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO): As Beijing’s foreign interests and holdings continue to grow, its citizens are increasingly living abroad to manage and engage in a variety of business, manufacturing, energy, and mineral extraction activities.  This trend increases the likelihood that foreign disasters, either natural or manmade, could affect Chinese citizens overseas. In the wake of ethnic unrest in southern Kyrgyzstan this past June, China evacuated nearly 1,300 nationals using a total of nine chartered flights (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, June 17). Similar small-scale Chinese non-combatant evacuation operations have also occurred in Haiti (2010) and the Solomon Islands (2006).

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO): China’s first foray into United Nations peacekeeping operations occurred in 1989, when Beijing sent 20 election observers to Namibia in support of UNTAG [2].  In subsequent years, the number of Chinese deployed at any one time has swelled to over 2,000 peacekeepers [3].  During this period, Chinese personnel have also participated in a wider range of activities well beyond their original observer duties, including peacekeeping and civil policing, as well as providing engineering, transport, and medical services.  Today, Chinese peacekeeping personnel can be found in Cote D’Ivoire (UNOCI), Lebanon (UNIFIL), Liberia (UNMIL), Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Sudan (UNAMID & UNAMIS), Timor-Leste (UNMIT), and Western Sahara (MINURSO).  Participation in UN missions provides the PLA with a number of benefits such as training in a multinational context, experience in conducting military operations other than war (MOOTW), and operational knowledge of different political, ethnic, and geographic environments [4].

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR): China has contributed to at least 10 HA/DR missions since 2002 [5].  These include taking an active role in responding to Cyclone Nargis in Burma in 2007 and sending a 60-person search and rescue team to Haiti in January 2010.  Meanwhile, the recent seventh revision of the PLA’s Outline of Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE), which delineates specific training requirements, underscored the importance of humanitarian assistance/disaster response.  Both the recently built Anwei-class hospital ships and multipurpose large amphibious ships (of which one was recently added to the fleet) will contribute to the deployment of emergency response personnel overseas [6].

Sea-lines of Communication (SLOC) Protection: In December 2008, days after Chinese sailors were rescued from a pirate attack by Malaysian naval forces, the PLAN dispatched a flotilla of three ships.  This original flotilla consisted of two destroyers, an at sea replenishment ship, included helicopters and approximately 70 naval special forces, and sailed over 4,600 nm to the Gulf of Aden [7].  Now two years later, China has deployed its seventh flotilla and has maintained a continuous presence in the Gulf.  Two Fuchi-class at-sea replenishment ships have alternated duties refueling a pair of deployed PLAN surface ships (a combination of various destroyers, frigates, and recently a landing platform dock), as well as re-stocking them with drinking water and food.  The at-sea replenishment ships have made extensive use of local ports to re-supply (See “The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” China Brief, July 22).

Current and Future Capabilities

As the PLA’s force projection capabilities continue to improve over time, China will have the means to participate in a wider range of operations outside of its borders, to potentially include counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and even forcible entry operations.  Considered below are five categories of key platforms that will be crucial to China’s future force projection capabilities: transport aircraft, aerial refueling, large amphibious ships, aircraft carriers, and satellites.  The PLA will undoubtedly have to develop associated doctrine as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to effectively employ these platforms, but the actual development of the platforms is an important and necessary ingredient for force projection.

Transport aircraft: Transport aircraft are the quickest means to move troops and most materiel long distances and to send forces far inland, often necessary when infrastructure such as road and rail are lacking. Provided a friendly airfield (or at least permissive skies for airborne insertion or drop), transport aircraft are essential arrows in the quiver of force projection as they can deliver mission critical materiel to overseas units in hours or days, rather than weeks typically required by cargo ships. While only the United States and Russia possess numbers of transport aircraft ranging in the hundreds, China currently has a small but not insignificant fleet of approximately 47 large and medium transport aircraft (the Il-76M and Y-8, respectively) [8].  Augmenting China’s military airlift capability is a growing civil aviation fleet that consists of two dozen large transport aircraft and is composed of Boeing 747F, McDonnell Douglas MD-11F, and Airbus A-300F aircraft [9].

Aerial refueling: Aerial refueling presents another vital component for the projection of military force, without which many expeditionary capabilities are severely hampered.  China currently possesses approximately 13 aerial refueling aircraft that can deliver slightly over 35 percent of France’s total refueling capacity at a range of approximately 1,000 nm [10].  Cognizant of the need to improve capabilities in this realm, China has sought to purchase tankers abroad, as well as indigenously produce more aircraft capable of carrying out this task (Jane's Intelligence Review, June 12, 2008).  Currently, the indigenously produced H-6U (converted from the B-6 medium bomber) is only capable of refueling PLA Air Force and Navy J-8s and J-10s through a probe-and-drogue system. China recently demonstrated its aerial refueling capability in support of simulated long-range operations this past September during the Peace Mission 2010 multilateral exercise in Kazakhstan (See “China Showcases Expeditionary Military Power in Peace Mission 2010,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 28).

Large amphibious ships: More than any other platform, large amphibious ships arguably most embody force projection because they allow a country to place forces ashore almost anywhere.  Based on sealift capability alone, China can currently transport a theoretical maximum of nearly 12,000 PLAN marines and PLA amphibious infantry for relatively short distances to potential hot spots in the East and South China Seas with its fleet of 50+ medium and tank landing ships (LSM and LST, respectively) [11].

With the recent acquisition of a landing platform dock (LPD), Beijing has begun to develop amphibious capabilities that can achieve global reach.  As a result of its single Type-071 LPD, an amphibious battalion of up to 800 PLAN marines can potentially be placed on nearly any undefended or lightly defended shore in the world without the need to secure basing rights or over-flight permission (Globalsecurity.org).  This ability of the Type-071 LPD to operate worldwide was demonstrated recently in the aforementioned SLOC protection operations in the Gulf of Aden and could also be used to support other types of operations in the future such as an out of area HA/DR or NEO.

Though its goals are currently unknown, China is likely to develop more large amphibious ships in the future.  For example, the theoretical acquisition of an additional two Type-071 LPD would provide enough sealift for a Marine Expeditionary Unit-sized force—a unit that is arguably the United States’ most flexible tool for force projection. However, to achieve true MEU-like ability China would still need to develop or acquire a helicopter carrier such as a landing helicopter assault (LHA) or landing helicopter dock (LHD) to provide air support.

Aircraft carriers: China is by some accounts currently pressing ahead with refurbishing the Soviet-built, Ukrainian-supplied carrier Varyag. Others have suggested that Beijing is seeking to build an indigenous carrier from scratch (See “Is the PLA Navy Making Plans for a Three Carrier Battle Group?”, China Brief, January 4, 2008; “China’s ‘Charm Offensive’ Loses Momentum in Southeast Asia [Part I],” China Brief, April 29). Further speculation exists over whether the PLAN will purchase Russian built aircraft such as the Su-33 or develop an aircraft carrier capable version of the J-10, tentatively named the J-15 [12].  A future Chinese aircraft carrier would provide defensive air cover and a platform for strike aircraft, a capability that would vastly enhance force projection capabilities and flexibility, but is certainly not the only means to prosecute such operations.

Satellites: China is developing satellites for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and navigation purposes.  The Jianbing/Haiyang series of electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) reconnaissance satellites has grown over the past decade and is currently supplemented by one Tianlian data relay satellite [13].  China is expected to eventually develop a future network of six data relay satellites that will provide near real-time feeds of its various ISR satellites [14]. Not willing to fully rely on unimpeded access to the U.S. maintained GPS network in the future (a system that Washington can turn off), China sees its Beidou series of satellites as an important means of navigation.  That said Beijing has yet to expand the system for extra-regional use [15].

Conclusion

Although still relatively nascent compared to France or the United Kingdom, two countries that regularly send forces abroad, Chinese force projection capabilities are growing and expanding under the broad rubric of President Hu’s “new historic missions.”  The development witnessed in these growing operational capabilities along with an expanded strategic-level focus potentially is a double-edged sword, likely to have profound implications for both the U.S.-Sino relationship and international politics more broadly.

On the one hand, Washington’s call for China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system implies burden sharing in the maintenance of international peace and security.  In this regard, a more active and capable PLA will enable China to better contribute to multilateral efforts seeking to provide global public goods.  The ability to identify and capitalize upon opportunities for military-to-military collaboration will be a crucial task for U.S. policymakers. On the other, even in the defense of the global commons—the policing of sea-lanes, for instance—Chinese force projection capabilities have the potential to erode or displace American leadership.  A more active PLA also increases the possibility of encountering U.S. forces abroad or, even possibly, of the PLA operating at cross-purposes to American interests.  Finally, future expeditionary activities, even of a non-combat nature, will further improve the war-fighting capabilities of the PLA, a point clearly not lost on Chinese strategists.  

Notes:

1. I define Chinese force projection capability as the ability of the PLA to send military equipment and personnel from Mainland China to engage in overseas military operations across the full spectrum of combat and non-combat missions.
2. Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping,” SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 25, November 2009: 4-5.
3. As of February 28, 2010 China was the 14th largest contributor of currently deployed peacekeepers, ahead of the United States, France, or the United Kingdom. “Factsheet: United Nations Peacekeeping,” United Nations, accessed: December 13, 2010, www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/2010/factsheet.pdf.
4. Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping,” SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 25, November 2009: 15-16.
5. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 56.
6. The OMTE is “the authoritative guide to how the PLA organizes, implements, and evaluates training.” Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 51; Jane’s Information Group, “Anwei (Type 920) class,” Jane’s Fighting Ships, February 2010 and Jane’s Information Group, “Procurement, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, April 2009.  
7. China did not undertake this operation lightly. Beijing acted only after the passage of four related United Nations Security Council resolutions, an invitation from the Somali Prime Minister to join the operation, and public statements testing the waters of international opinion by senior PLA officials. Peter Kammerer, "Shot Across the Bow," South China Morning Post, January 9, 2009: 13.
8. The Military Balance 2010, London: IISS, 2010: 402-404; Jane’s Information Group; “Infrastructure, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, January 2010; Jane’s Information Group; “Air Force, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, August 3, 2010.
9.  “Infrastructure, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, January 2010 and “Jade Cargo International – Details and Fleet history,” Planespotters.net, accessed: December 15, 2010, www.planespotters.net/airline/jade-cargo-international.
10. It is also important to note that the B-6 has a much more limited range than France’s aerial tankers which have refueling reach well beyond 1,000 nm. These estimates are approximate and are based on simple modeling using data provided by The Military Balance 2010, London: IISS, 2010: 129; Jane’s Information Group, “XAC H-6”,” Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, May 25, 2010; Air Force Pamphlet 10-1403: Air Mobility Planning Factors, Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force, December 18, 2003.
11. These numbers exclude the Yulian-class (a ship that is limited to coastal use) and are derived from data from The Military Balance 2010, London: IISS, 2010; 402; Jane’s Information Group, “Sea Lift,” Jane’s Amphibious and Special Forces, August 27, 2009; and “Type 079 (Yulian Class) Medium Landing Ship,” Sinodefence.com, accessed: December 14, 2010, www.sinodefence.com/navy/amphibious/type079_yulian.asp.   
12. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009: 371.
13. Kim Nodskov, The Long March of Power: The New Historic Missions of the People’s Liberation Army, Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House, 2009: 246-258.
14. Ibid., 248.
15. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 36.

崑崙山類似美國的，殲二十有自己特色，共軍發展速度出人意表，那麼瓦良格之後，中國航母還是那個樣子嗎？我有些懷疑。

黃蜂級兩棲攻擊艦，或許是值得觀察的學習對象。四萬噸。

真正的大型航母，得另外設計了。

外媒议论中国航母 西方应有开阔胸襟

http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2011-01/04/c_12944742.htm

近日，有关中国将造航母的报道，再一次见诸于外国媒体。其内容不外乎猜测中国到底什么时候会建成航母，或者中国建航母会给其他国家带来什么影响等，而且依然在字里行间表达了某种“担忧”。从外媒有关中国造航母的报道越来越集中于中国建造航母本身，而不是渲染所谓“中国军力威胁”这一点来看，外国媒体多年来有关“中国造航母就是军力威胁”的炒作，至今已没有多大市场，再炒冷饭，已经没有什么人理睬。

　　外媒猜测：千奇百怪

　　美国媒体：此方面报道最积极，认为解放军的舰载机歼-15早在2009年就已完全准备停当，又认为解放军的航母技术将借鉴英国。

　　日本媒体：一方面宣称美日联合演习就是为针对中国航母，又扬言自己已研制了“专门克制中国航母”的反舰导弹。

　　韩国媒体：在近日美国“里根”号航母开赴亚太后，绘声绘色地描绘出一幅“解放军攻击美国航母”的效果图。在韩国《中央日报》绘制的该攻击图中，解放军先用无人侦察机确定美国航母的位置，随后地对舰导弹、驱逐舰、潜艇、战斗机等从海陆空向美航母编队攻击，将其击沉。报道还专门指出，不久前展出的中国C-602、C-705和C-802A三种导弹如果同时发射，将扰乱美航母的防御网，只要有一枚导弹命中，就可以给美航母致命打击。

　　印度媒体：未雨绸缪地分析起“中国航母挺进印度洋的弱点”。

　　加拿大媒体：称中国已经聘请了乌克兰专家在帮忙造航母。

中国海军的“航母之梦”历史悠久。早在抗战时期，当时的海军司令陈绍宽就曾设想要建20艘航母，这让所有人目瞪口呆。如今，中国海军拥有官兵20多万、水面舰艇500多艘，然而让军事爱好者叹息的是，在大型舰艇方面总不“过瘾”。这其中，对航母的期盼尤其突出。

　　当今，航母已然是世界强国的“名片”。不仅美国把航母集群四处派遣，英国在马岛战争动用了航母编队，就连印度也费尽心力自己造航母。这种情况下，堂堂中国海军要是没有满载舰载机的航母，何以保卫海疆？

　　中国对航母的呼唤，还有很现实的国防意义。我国领海面积广阔，要保卫自己的领海，就需要在南沙等地投入兵力。然而，南沙最远处距离我国最南方的军用机场1500公里，而我空军的主力战机歼-8，其有效作战半径只有800公里。如果能有航母组成编队，为作战飞机提供移动的中继站，则我军可能投放到南沙的综合实力将大增。因此改革开放以来，中国民间关于“造航母”的传言几乎年年都有。前苏联解体后，中国先后购买了前苏军退役航母明斯克号、基辅号用于旅游参观。后来，前苏联尚未完工的瓦良格号又被购买并进行翻修，成为一艘“模型实体舰”。在2007年香港军备模型展上，就有仿造瓦良格号的“中国航空母舰”模型亮相。

　　正如去年3月中国海军副政委邬华扬表示的那样，中国已具备自主建造航母的经济与技术能力。至于到底造不造，什么时候造，还得根据具体条件和需要。造一艘航母耗资巨大，比如美军一艘大型航母，建造费用约40亿美元，而每年的维护费就达十多亿美元。

　　总之，如果下决心造航母，就要建立一个真正有战斗力的海外编队，而不是仅仅拼凑几艘船、几架飞机做样子。在这一步棋上，中国军方表现得谨慎、稳健。实际上，就算中国真的建造了自己的航母，也不可能拿航母编队去和谁硬拼。面对全球霸权挑战时，保家卫国主要还是依托于岸基导弹和潜艇。

西方应有胸襟 接纳中国航母

　　作为在“二战”时就已大面积使用的舰艇，航母早已不是什么新鲜军事武器。在安理会5个常任理事国当中，只有中国没有航母；在金砖四国当中，巴西、印度、俄罗斯都有航空母舰，惟独中国没有；而在亚洲地区，泰国都有航母，但比泰国规模大得多的中国却没有。

　　与日本和德国作为法西斯战败国不敢建造航母不同，中国是第二次世界大战的战胜国，也是联合国的创建者之一，因此中国没有航母，本应该是一件让人奇怪的事情。但是在一些西方媒体的炒作和歪曲下，一些人一度把中国拥有航母与“中国军事威胁论”搅和在一起，以至于形成了一个奇怪的西方舆论氛围。

　　现在是西方某些国家改变这种不正常的舆论和心态的时候了。因为，不仅几千年来的历史证明，中国有着传播和平、保障和平的传统，而且“二战”以来的世界历史和中国历史也证明，中国是一个爱好和平的国家。中国的和平诚意，体现在解决与周边国家的各种领土纠纷中：中国一贯主张以和平的方式解决争端。

　　当前，中国的海外贸易也已经成为世界上最重要的财富创造和交流通道。因此，中国有责任也有义务，为保障这种造福于各国的财富创造和交流行为提供更好的安全保障。这一点，从中国舰艇参与亚丁湾打击海盗的行动上就可见一斑。

　　其实，绝大多数国家和民众是欢迎中国为世界和平与发展承担更多责任的，他们早已有了接纳中国建造航母的期待。因此，我们从未见过某个非洲国家、拉美国家公开非议中国建造航母。而一些别有用心的西方势力，也应该顺应潮流，开阔自己狭隘的胸襟。

　　关注 美军三航母 会师于亚太

　　近日，大洋上惊涛四起，美国核动力航母“里根”号驶往西太平洋，加上刚赶到关岛的“卡尔·文森”号和在日本部署的“华盛顿”号，届时美军三个航母战斗群将在亚太会师。这使得原本就剑拔弩张的朝鲜半岛局势更加阴云密布。

　　据说按照美军的习惯，在发生危机的地区，一艘航母表示警告，两艘航母表示严重警告，三艘航母则有了战争准备的味道。当前朝核问题正是紧锣密鼓的时候，“山姆大叔”把航母派来，炫耀武力的意图十分明显。

　　我外交部发言人姜瑜上月28日在回答记者提问时表示，“我们希望有关国家采取负责任的态度，多做有利于增进地区国家间互信、有利于维护本地区和平稳定的事，而不是相反。”

我国周边地区 海军力量扫描

　　日本：海上自卫队拥有4万多人，水面舰艇100多艘，其中5000吨以上大型舰艇近30艘、潜艇20多艘。其装备先进、人员训练素质高、出航经验丰富。值得一提的是，日本1.4万吨级的“日向”号、“伊势”号直升机驱逐舰已经下水，这两艘舰艇完全可能在短期内被改装成轻型航空母舰。

　　印度：海军兵力约6万人，拥有水面舰艇一百多艘，其中驱逐舰和护卫舰约20艘，潜艇十多艘。印度从英国购买了一艘二战末期的航母，排水量为2万多吨。此外向俄罗斯购买的一艘4万吨级航母正在改建中，印度还计划自建一艘中型航母。

　　越南：海军约4万余人，水面舰艇一百多艘，除了几艘护卫舰超过千吨，其余都是几百吨到几十吨的小艇，还有几艘潜艇。

　　菲律宾：海军兵力约3万人，水面舰艇百余艘，其中护卫舰1艘，轻型护卫舰13艘，其余都是小艇。

　　韩国：海军约6万人，水面舰艇一百多艘，其中驱逐舰、护卫舰约40艘，装备较为精良。

　　朝鲜：海军约4万余人，拥有护卫舰3艘，轻型护卫舰4艘，还有各式小艇数百艘和潜艇约80艘，是一支神秘之师。

　　俄罗斯：前苏联曾拥有庞大海军，如今虽实力严重下降，但“虎威”仍在。俄罗斯太平洋舰队拥有潜艇二十多艘（其中核潜艇近20艘），巡洋舰和重型驱逐舰10艘左右，依然是一支不可忽视的力量。

回到現實主義啊。

不靠相信意圖良善，相信彼此利益關聯，相信保證毀滅，相信槍桿子出霸權。

國強必霸。至少心理上，就不得不霸。

葉海林：中國不可能繼續維持「澡盆內的海軍」

http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1014/0/0/3/101400366.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=101400366&mdate=0803001925