Putin Orders Start of Syria Withdrawal, Saying Goals Are Achieved
By NEIL MacFARQUHAR and ANNE BARNARD

MOSCOW — President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia on Monday ordered the withdrawal of the “main part” of Russian forces in Syria, a surprise move that reflected what he called the Kremlin’s achievement of nearly all its objectives in the war-torn country.

The news upended expectations in Western capitals and among ordinary Syrians, setting off fevered speculation about Russia’s intentions, much as Mr. Putin’s unexpected military plunge into the Syrian battlefield five months ago changed the course of the war.

Perhaps the most urgent questions were how the move would affect the war’s outcome and what it meant for President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, whose rule had been increasingly threatened by a string of military losses before Russian forces backed him up.

The Russian decision could signal a new confidence in Mr. Assad’s stability or an effort to pressure him to negotiate with his political adversaries — or both.

Mr. Putin has made his move at a particularly critical moment, as the upheaval in Syria enters its sixth year and a United Nations mediator in Geneva tries to revive peace talks to stop the war, which has displaced millions and created a humanitarian catastrophe.

A Russian military pullback will not leave Mr. Assad’s forces completely alone, because he also has support from Iran and from Hezbollah in Lebanon. And the Kremlin made clear it was keeping its new air base in the coastal Mediterranean province of Latakia, in addition to the naval refueling station it has kept nearby in Tartus since Soviet times.

Mr. Putin has a history of unpredictability and is known for public statements that do not always align with Russia’s actions. In eastern Ukraine, for example, fighting by Moscow-backed rebels has continued even though Mr. Putin has pledged to honor a peace treaty.

But Russia is also facing deepening economic problems caused by the collapse in global oil prices, and the announcement may reflect Mr. Putin’s desire to declare victory and extricate his country from a costly military venture.

The Kremlin declared its plans hours after the United Nations mediator, Staffan de Mistura, met with the Syrian government delegation in Geneva.

There have been growing signs of differences between Russia and the Syrian government over the Geneva talks, which Moscow has pressed hard for, along with Washington. And for Mr. Assad, the prospect of Russia’s leaving him to fend for himself is sure to focus his mind on following its lead — advice that Russian officials have publicly offered him in recent days.

“I seriously doubt Moscow is breaking with Assad,” said Andrew J. Tabler, a scholar on Syria at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Rather, he said, the Russian announcement appeared to be “putting the military burden back on Assad so as to soften up his negotiating position.”

Moscow has recently evinced a measure of frustration. Three times in the past two weeks, Mr. Assad and his advisers have made public statements noticeably out of sync with Russia’s declared goal of substantive talks — most recently on Saturday, when Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem of Syria declared that Mr. Assad’s rule was a “red line” and that there would be no discussion of presidential elections.

Speculation about Russia’s announcement grew so intense, including among Syrian government loyalists on social media, that by Monday night, Mr. Assad’s office issued a statement to dispel rumors that the president had been caught flat-footed. It blamed “partners in Syrian bloodshed” for the conjecture and said that the announcement had been made “with full coordination” after “extensive study” of recent military successes and that “Syria and Russia are, as always, together fighting terrorism.”

The Russian move may also be a reflection that Mr. Putin is now supremely confident in Mr. Assad’s renewed stability and can afford to step back a bit and play statesman.

Mr. Putin has achieved many of his main goals: bringing Russia back to center stage as a global power; preventing, on principle, regime change by outside powers, particularly Western ones; gaining a stronger foothold in Syria; picking off Russian jihadists on the Syrian battlefield; and strengthening Mr. Assad.

The Syrian leader appeared more threatened last summer than he had been in years, as American-backed and Islamist insurgents coordinated more effectively and began to threaten his coastal strongholds. But the Russian intervention turned the tables.

Now, many of those insurgent gains have been reversed, and Russian air power helped cut off critical opposition supply lines into Turkey, isolating the rebel-held portion of Aleppo, Syria’s largest city. That does not put Mr. Assad in a position to retake the entire country, but it does, at least, restore the deadlock that he had maintained through 2014.

And it can be argued that Mr. Putin has little to lose: Russia can easily resume strikes from its base at will, and it can keep supporting the Syrian military and Mr. Assad’s other allies on the ground — Iranian-backed militias from Hezbollah, Iraq and elsewhere — with Russian weapons while floating cash to the Syrian government.

“The goal was to preserve the regime in some form and guarantee that Russia will keep its presence in the region, in terms of a naval facility and now also with an air base,” said Aleksei Makarkin, the deputy head of the Center for Political Technologies in Moscow.

But Russia remains mindful of its history of getting bogged down in a long war in Afghanistan in the 1980s — and of the $3 million daily cost of its involvement in Syria while collapsing oil prices and economic sanctions are harming Russia’s financial health.

Initially, Russia said it was intervening in Syria to take the fight to the Islamic State militant group. But it soon came under criticism for concentrating on other insurgents — groups fighting Mr. Assad that do not belong to the Islamic State and sometimes clash with it, including some that were supported by the West. Russian officials said any groups coordinating with the Qaeda-linked Nusra Front, as many of those groups have done, were fair game.

By declaring, in effect, mission accomplished, Russia is in a way acknowledging that destroying the Islamic State was never the primary goal; the group is still deeply entrenched in much of northern and eastern Syria.

Yet Russian airstrikes are pummeling Palmyra, a historic city held by the Islamic State. If government troops manage to retake it, Mr. Putin could claim to have saved an archaeological treasure by preventing the extremist group from further destroying some of the world’s most significant ancient ruins. (Some antigovernment activists there say, however, that the airstrikes are endangering the ruins, as well as civilians.)

Russia has been accused of targeting noncombatants and civilian infrastructure, like hospitals, which it has denied; opposition groups said Russian airstrikes had accounted for over half of civilian casualties since September.

But under a partial truce — flawed and wobbly, but holding for the past few weeks — the rate of airstrikes has plunged, though opposition groups still accuse Russia of violations.

The announcement on Monday surprised people on all sides of the conflict. State Department officials, Syrian antigovernment activists, Mr. Assad’s supporters and Syrian opposition negotiators all reacted with disbelief, not sure whether to lament, celebrate or laugh.

In Idlib Province, held by a combination of insurgents that range from the Nusra Front to American-backed rebels, people fired guns in the air.

“People are distributing sweets and calling ‘God is great’ from the mosques,” said a fighter who gave his name as Ahmed. “There’s optimism, but we don’t know what’s hidden.”

Farther south, in Homs, an antigovernment activist, Firas — who, like Ahmed, asked that only his first name be used for safety reasons — was worried. “The Russians were sponsoring the cease-fire,” he said. “Now the regime will bomb again and the Russians will leave us for the Iranians, a disaster.”

Even in Geneva, the opposition spokesman, Salem al-Muslet, reflected that ambivalence, resenting Russia’s support for Mr. Assad but seeing Mr. Putin as the only figure who could force Mr. Assad to negotiate in earnest.

“Nobody knows what is in Putin’s mind, but the point is, he has no right to be in our country in the first place,” he said at first. “Just go.” Later, he added, “If it’s true, this is a good sign and a good start to a political solution.”

President Obama spoke by telephone with Mr. Putin, a White House statement said. Mr. Obama welcomed the reduction in violence in Syria since the cease-fire began last month, but he emphasized “that continuing offensive actions by Syrian regime forces risk undermining” both the cessation of hostilities and a political resolution led by the United Nations.

“The president underscored that a political transition is required to end the violence in Syria,” the statement said.

撤軍敘國 普亭打什麼算盤?

普亭半年前出乎意外進軍敘利亞，西方和敘利亞反抗軍怒不可遏，斥其敗事有餘，他14日出乎意外宣布從敘利亞撤軍，全球一片詫異，競忖他是何用心，欲成何事。

從美國國務院，到敘利亞反政府勢力，阿塞德的支持者，阿塞德政權官員，全都嚇一跳，咸感難以置信，不知該惋嘆、慶祝，還是大笑。據傳阿塞德本人也措手不及。

普亭自言局部撤軍的理由是俄軍達成在敘利亞的階段任務，為和議創造了條件。

他的確達成他許多目標：使俄國重新以全強權之姿返回國際舞台中心；防止外力（主要是西方）改變敘利亞政權；莫斯科在敘利亞站得更穩；在敘利亞戰場重挫伊斯蘭極端分子；最重要者，使俄國介入以前有搖搖欲墜之象的阿塞德再度屹立。

《紐約時報》分析普亭的多層次用心，其一是莫斯科與華府斡旋停火，力推和議，但阿塞德團隊兩周以來三度公開與普亭不同調，包括宣布總統選舉是「紅線」，不得列入會談。

普亭自認已將阿塞德扶植到立於不敗之地，總統選舉穩握勝券，因此禁得起稍退一步，演出勸和不勸戰的政治家風範，雖然他所舉撤軍理由等於承認去年9月出兵其實不是要消滅IS，而是為阿塞德助拳。

另一方面，俄國有其內憂。1980年代俄國陷入阿富汗泥淖，餘痛猶新，方今國際油價崩解，加上西方制裁，頗傷俄國財政健康，用兵敘利亞，空軍轟炸，連帶地面部隊，日費三百萬美元（台幣9870萬元），不是小數目。

原文參照：
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/world/middleeast/putin-syria-russia-withdrawal.html

紐約時報中文版翻譯：
http://cn.nytimes.com/world/20160315/c15russia/zh-hant/

2016-03-15．聯合晚報．A6．國際焦點．編譯彭淮棟