How Underpaid German Workers Helped Cause Europe’s Debt Crisis
By NEIL IRWIN

To understand a crucial reason for the European financial crisis that nearly caused a global financial collapse and threatened to undo a six-decade push toward a united Europe, you could look at a bunch of charts of bond markets and current account deficits and fiscal imbalances.

Or, you could take a look at new data compiled by LIS, a group that maintains the Luxembourg Income Study Database, that shows how income is distributed in countries around the world. It offers a surprising insight about why Europe came to the financial brink.

In most advanced economies, the middle class made significant advances in earning power over the last few decades, even if the rich have done quite a lot better. But one major country stands out as the exception, with middle-income workers seeing no meaningful increase since the 1990s.

It is Germany, the largest economy in Europe. And the numbers are remarkable. From 2000 to 2010, after-tax income for people in the middle of the income distribution in Germany increased 1.4 percent. Not per year. Total.

If you look at a longer time span, from 1990 to 2010, the ordinary German worker did not fare well either. The median per-capita income rose 7.5 percent, which works out to a rate of only 0.4 percent a year.

At one time there was a good argument that middle-class German workers were overpaid relative to international competitors. In 1990, they made 10 percent more than similarly situated Dutch workers and 29 percent more than middle-income British ones. But by 2010, they made less than either.

The stagnation in wages for the German working and middle class was intentional, caused by policy decisions connected to the challenges of reunification.

As West Germany absorbed Soviet-dominated East Germany in the 1990s, the united Germany was often called the “sick man of Europe.” Wage increases outpaced productivity, and lavish unemployment benefits led many workers to stay home rather than take low-paying jobs.

Through a series of overhauls introduced by the government in concert with industry and labor unions, Germany aimed to get healthy again. The nation slashed long-term jobless benefits, which encouraged more people to enter the job market. It took steps to ensure that rising productivity of German industry translated into more people in the labor force rather than higher wages.

One result was a boon for German exports. By keeping a lid on wages, Germany made its exporters’ products more competitive in the global marketplace. Germany was making more stuff than it was consuming, and exporting the surplus to the rest of the world, especially the rest of Europe.

Which brings us back to the euro zone crisis. People (especially Germans) often view the crisis, which first became severe four years ago this spring, through this frame: Profligate, free-spending nations along Europe’s southern coast (we’re looking at you, Greece, Italy and Spain) borrowed more money than they could possibly repay; then, when the bill came due, they nearly caused the collapse of the common euro currency before being bailed out by their more responsible Northern European neighbors.

That’s not wrong, necessarily, but it is incomplete.

The run-up in debt in Spain and Greece and Italy was the flip side of Germany’s success in containing workers’ wages and improving exports. Germany sold more stuff to Southern Europe than it bought. It took the profits and, in effect, lent the money back to those same Southern European countries. In Greece and Italy, it showed up as government borrowing, and in Spain as a housing bubble fueled by bank loans.

It all fell apart once the indebtedness of the Southern European countries became too much to bear. Because all these countries use the same currency, the euro, none could relieve the pressure by devaluing their currency as they might have with their own lira, drachma or peseta.

Europe has been forced to fix its internal imbalances some other way. The approach so far has largely been one of forcing steep cuts in wages and benefits on the Southern European countries, so that they can regain competitiveness against Germany.

But there’s an easier way (or what should be an easier way). Middle-income German workers could be paid more. They could use those higher salaries to consume more, whether German-made widgets, vacations in Greece or Spanish wine. That would mean lower trade surpluses for Germany, lower trade deficits for Southern Europe, and less German savings being recycled into Greek or Spanish debt. Higher incomes for working-class Germans would mean a more prosperous, financially stable Europe — and it wouldn’t be too shabby for German workers, either.

Altogether, that would be positively wunderbar.

紐時：歐債危機 德薪資凍漲惹的禍

薪水凍漲是許多台灣人的痛。不過，紐約時報報導，歐洲最大經濟體德國，從2000至2010年間的人均實質所得中位數（median per capita income），總共只增加了百分之一點四，且德國薪資凍漲恐怕是歐債危機的主因之一。

紐約時報引用盧森堡所得研究（LIS）的分析顯示，過去數十年來，大多數先進國家的中產階級收入都有顯著增長。唯獨德國例外，而且遠自1990年代起就進入凍漲狀態。從1990到2010年，德國的人均實質所得中位數共增加百分之七點五，年增率是百分之零點四。

1990年，德國中產階級的薪資比荷蘭高百分之十，比英國高百分之廿九。到了2010年，德國反而落後荷蘭和英國。

紐時指出，德國勞工與中產階級薪資凍漲，主要是受到兩德統一所逼迫。西德概括承受共產東德後，薪資漲幅超過生產力，優厚的失業津貼讓許多人寧可家裡蹲，也不願從事低薪的工作。剛統一的德國被稱為「歐洲病夫」。

在產業與工會配合下，德國政府大砍長期失業津貼，逼使民眾回到職場，並且讓生產力的提升來自更多勞動力，而非更高的薪資。德國政策奏效，不但薪資凍漲，失業率也下降。薪資凍漲讓德國商品出口價格就很有競爭力。德國生產量大於國內消費所需，於是出口到世界各地，尤其是歐洲其他國家。

四年前爆發的歐債危機在德國人眼中，無非是希臘、義大利和西班牙等南歐國家揮霍無度，債務到期時無力償還，差點連累歐元解體。

紐時認為，此一觀點未必錯誤，但不夠全面。南歐之所以債台高築，正好是德國的對照組，也就是勞工薪資節節上揚，出口卻未跟著成長。德國對南歐的出口額遠大於進口，再把賺到的錢借給南歐，反映在希臘和義大利的問題是政府公債，西班牙則是銀行放款導致的房地產泡沫。

南歐諸國已大砍薪資和福利津貼，希望恢復對德國商品的競爭力，但「由奢返儉難」。比較簡單的方式則是德國為工人加薪，刺激消費，「由儉入奢易」。德國出超減少，代表南歐貿易赤字降低，德國民眾的儲蓄對希臘或西班牙公債也可少賠一點。

原文參照：
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/upshot/how-underpaid-german-workers-helped-cause-europes-debt-crisis.html

2014-04-24．聯合報．A15．國際．編譯張佑生