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0. 前言
「哲學」不是我閱讀的重點領域；但在指示「思」、「辨」活動之外，它同時有「(學問)基礎論」之意(該欄2023/11/21貼文)，我有時也就不免涉獵一、二。
對我影響最大的兩位哲學家是笛卡爾和尼切(1)；我深受兩位的「啟示」。前者在「方法論」層面，他的：「方法論」是我求知、思考、和寫作的基本指導原則。
尼切思想則是我形成「道德」和倫理學兩方面觀點的基礎；此外，他也是近代最有影響力的思想家。由於近一年來在《媒介》網誌看到許多討論尼切學說的評論，有了為他建立一個專欄的想法。一時三刻間我整理不出什麼系統性的文章；借用2010/11/17我寫給向台大一位黃教授請教的信，來權充本欄開欄文(2)。
1. 關於尼切思想的幾則討論
1.0 本節前言
我從台哲會論文集拜讀到大作 -- 《論尼切「未來的人性」》。我相信妳掌握到尼切「人性觀」的要點，但是整個論述似乎可以更充分和更明確。我有三個意見，請參考。
1.1 「權力意志」
妳沒有對「權力意志」做一個清楚明確的詮釋。因此，雖然妳就它和「人性觀」兩者之間的關係做了一些認定，但是我(相信其他讀者亦然)看不出尼切的「人性觀」和「權力意志」這個概念兩者間的相關性和思路上的邏輯或推論關係。或者說，你需要為妳的「認定」提出一些說明或論證。
如果用我對尼切 ”will to power” 的翻譯或詮釋 -- 「發揮潛能的意志」，則(我相信)妳的論述可能更具有一致性。妳對尼切「人性觀」的詮釋也就能夠更充分和更相容。(妳第二節中的「而其關係也會一再地重新確定。」、「而是人對於自我解釋與確定的問題，」、和「流變」一詞等，以及第三節中1、2兩小節的闡釋，和「發揮潛能的意志」這個觀點相容。)
1.2 「存在先於本質」
沙特在《存在主義也是人本主義》這篇演講中，簡要的說明了存在主義「存在先於本質。」這個口號或命題的意涵。如果我沒有記錯，他的大意是：
「人的本質(不斷的)由一個人的選擇、決定、和行動來創造(塑造、定義、… 等等)。」
我不敢說這個觀點繼承尼切的思想體系而來，但如果妳的「生成著」指一個「進行式」過程，則它和妳對尼切思想的詮釋 -- 「人『存在』的意義或人禽之別不是任何被賦予之物，而是在某種生成著的東西。」相通。它也和「發揮潛能的意志」(以及上述妳第二節和第三節的闡釋)相通。
如果妳對「生成著」這個概念以及「如何生成著」的過程做進一步的闡述，我相信大作會更有力道。
1.3 行文的嚴謹度
以下摘錄7段我認為大作中可以略加修正的說法。
1) 「我們在尼切的文本中看不到其對於人之本質的規定與研究；」v「尼切清楚地以『未來的人性』為題，處理了其對『人性』與『神聖性』概念的發展與理解。」
「人之本質」和「人性」在概念上應該沒有多少差異。「神聖性」一詞可能有更適當的表達方式。(「神聖」一詞在尼切思想中可能沒有什麼地位；他用holy一字時，通常有諷刺意味。)
2) 「權力意志的鬥爭過程是所有有機體的『真實』」(Wirklichkeit)。
「所有有機體」是全稱名詞。「有機體」包含所有生物。
3) 「一方面代表著，權力意志被視為人作為有機體的根本性質，」vs「人無法經由權力意志或任何事物而與其他存有者本質地區分開來，因為不再有任何所謂的『本質』(Wesen)存在。」
「根本性質」和「本質」在概念上應該沒有多少差異。
4) 「藉著它，『不是一個主體、而是一個戰鬥在自我維持。』」
「戰鬥」指什麼而言？在中文裏「戰鬥」是一個動詞，當名詞用的時候，通常它不指一個有意識的物體。
5) 「他在大地上的存在(Dasein)沒有目標；『人為了什麼(wozu Mensch überhaupt)？』-- 曾經是一個沒有答案的問題。」
我不懂德文。但根據英譯：
His existence on earth contained no end; “What is the purpose of man at all?” was a question without answer; …
或許這樣的中譯比較達意：
人存在於世界上其實沒有目的；「人為什麼活著？(或，地球上為什麼有人？)」這個問題也從來沒有一個答案。(「曾經是」蘊含「現在已不是」。)
6) 「這個『有效』(es gilt)才是真正的『這是』(das ist)，唯一的『這是』」。
很抱歉，我看不懂這句話。也看不出它和上一句話的邏輯或推論關係。或許es gilt有比「有效」更適當的中譯？此外，以「這是」當「補詞」用不合中文語法；我不知道「存在性」在這裏是否比較適當。
7) 「人性有效作為什麼？」
很抱歉，我看不懂這句話，我相信它也不合中文語法。
2. 結語
我是一個退休工程師，對哲學和尼切思想可說是門外漢。偶而翻翻書而已。以上意見完全出於「獻曝」之意。請指正。如果有胡說八道之處，希望海涵。
附註：
1. 笛卡爾思想對我的幫助，請見：拙作《敬覆SCFtw2兄賜教》第2.2小節(該欄開欄文，2022/11/24)。
2. 見以下第1節(文字略有修改，意旨無更動)；我在網上搜尋不到黃教授大作原文；只找到這則相關訊息。
本文於 修改第 1 次
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討論「痛苦的人沒有悲觀的權利」
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** 下文原於2010/10/05在本部落格刊出；對文字、標點、標題、和文章分節等略做編輯後，移置於本欄。造成不便，請見諒。
0. 前言
大概在2007 – 2008左右，【新聞對談】登載了一篇作者署名為 “Wenson” 的短文(1)；就我引用徐志摩先生所翻譯尼切：「痛苦的人沒有悲觀的權利」這句話，提出指教(2)。本文回覆該短文並略做探討。
在引用Wenson的文字時，我保留他/她所用「尼采」的通譯；我的文字則採用「尼切」這個音譯。
1. Wenson的詮釋
1.1 Wenson就【新聞對談】引用尼切原句的批評
謝謝dus網友將何荷網友這篇舊評重新找出來。讓我有機會看到Wenson的原文。他/她說：
「偶然在網路上看見此文，見到版主談論『痛苦的人沒有悲觀的權利』。
實則這句話乃是錯譯，徐志摩在文章裡寫的原文是："the sufferer has no right to pessimism"；然則此文出自尼采已出版的著作《人性的，太人性的》第二部序言的第五篇。
原句為："ein Leidender hat auf Pessimismus noch kein Recht!"
Leidender不應翻為「痛苦的人」，詳情可參見我寫的討論(3)。」
1.2 Wenson就徐志摩對尼切原句中文翻譯的討論
「痛苦的人沒有悲觀的權利」這句話是我在《紅衫軍，辛苦了！》某個留言中所引用(4)。可能在我有機會讀到Wenson的指教前，該議題欄就下線了；以致沒有及時受教。現在略表淺見。
下面是【Wenson的隨筆網站】上，Wenson在1.1節所提到「討論」的相關文字：
「《分析的、太分析的(三) – Why Analytic Philosophy?
…
徐志摩所引的英譯可謂是直譯，問題出在主詞這個 “Leidender”，尼采算是玩了些文字遊戲，德文的 “Leiden” 可當動詞，其原意較接近於『承擔、承受』，尼采慣以此字講述人類的諸多活動。
但 “Leiden” 的另一面則是 “Leidenshaft” (類似英文的 “passion”)，卻是「對生命的肯定」。
簡單來說， “Leidender” 不只是『受苦』，更有『承擔者』(或是英文的 “bearer”)的意思(5)。
在尼采來說，每個人都是 “Leidender” (除非你是超人)，所以『痛苦的人』根本是錯誤的概念。」
2. 我的理解
2.1 我「詮釋」的基礎
翻譯的第一個原則或標準是：「信、達、雅」。但同時，大多數人應該也都同意：翻譯這個活動或行為也同時在做「詮釋」。詮釋者當然不能「信口開河」或「澆自己塊壘」。我對「詮釋」的要求則是：
一個「詮釋」必須和被詮釋者文章當下的意旨和他/她的整體思想兩者相容。
我在另一網站上也找到這句話的英譯；請自行參考(6)。
我對這句話和它原文脈絡的理解如下。
我並不是尼切專家。根據我的粗淺了解，我同意Wenson認為尼采「肯定生命」的看法。但是，就我所了解，尼切是一位精英主義者。說直接一點，他不怎麼看得起一般「庶民」或小老百姓。因此，雖然他的觀點和學說是「存在主義」思想淵源之一，但如果 “Leidender”的所指是「承擔者」；而所謂「承擔者」又相當於「『士』不可以不弘毅。」這個命題中的「士」；則我無法茍同Wenson認為：
「在尼采來說，每個人都是 “Leidender” (除非你是超人)，…」這個看法。
正好相反，尼切的觀點應該是：
「除非你晉身『超人』，你沒有資格做個 “Leidender” ，…」
但如果Leidender的所指是「境遇不幸的人」或「承擔痛苦的人」，則下面這個觀察和尼切思想相容：
「除非你是超人，每個人都是 ”Leidender” …」。
其次，在尼切的思想脈絡中，我看不出「每個人都是 “Leidender” (除非你是超人)」，以及「(把 ”Leidender” 翻譯成)『痛苦的人』是錯誤的概念」兩者之間，有語意或邏輯上的相關性。
如果從以上所引用 “a sufferer has no right to pessimism because he suffers!" 這個命題或雋語英譯的上下文，以及該節(未全部摘錄)的整個脈絡兩者來看，我認為英譯相當信、達。徐先生「痛苦的人」並沒有錯誤。
我既然不懂德文，我必須承認：我的觀點不是一個「判斷」，只能說是一個「合理推論」。
2.2 申論
在此談談重讀這句話的感想。
我常常引用尼切的另一句話是：
「有些人僅僅因為自己沒有尖牙利爪，就自以為是個好人」(7)。
它和「痛苦的人沒有悲觀的權利」相容、相通。尼切的確「肯定生命」，他看不起那些因為個人際遇而「怨天由人」的人。例如此處所討論這句話的脈絡是(請參見附註6)：
“… I engaged in a tedious, patient campaign against the unscientific basic tendency of all romantic pessimism, which seeks to magnify and interpret individual, personal experiences into universal judgments, indeed into condemnations of the world.”
這個觀點當然也和曾子的：「士不可以不弘毅，任重而道遠」，以及馬克思的：「哲學家用種種觀點詮釋世界，但重點在改變它」這兩個「積極進取」或「勇於面對」的思想相通。
進一步分析：
如果 “Leidender” 的所指是「承擔者」，則：
「承擔者(肩負重任者)沒有悲觀的權利」這句話在當前的社會並沒有什麼出色或出眾。在意思上它幾乎就等於：
「士不可以不弘毅，任重而道遠」。
以尼切的風格或才氣，他大概不會浪費時間來說它。我不是說曾子沒有才氣，而是以曾子的性格、教育、所處時代，以及當時和兩千年來的中國社會等等因素，這句話有它傳頌兩千年的價值。也是我對它念茲在茲的原因。
但是：
「痛苦的人沒有悲觀的權利」或「正在承受苦難的人沒有悲觀的權利」。
則是另一個語境的意味，以及另一個層次的格局。這是它到今天傳頌了一百多年的原因；也是我在兩個不同場合引用它的原因。
3. 結論
不論把 “Leidender” 一字「詮釋」成：「承擔者」或「正在承受苦難的人」那一個意思，在尼切：「… 沒有悲觀的權利」這句話中，它們都說得通。問題的重點應該是︰
兩者中那一個「詮釋」，更符合尼切的風格、意旨、和思想體系。
還請Wenson和眾網友不吝賜教。
附註：
1. 很可惜【新聞對談】這個網頁已經不復存在。
2. 該文為：《紅衫軍，辛苦了！》留言260。
3. 時隔多年，Wenson先生/女士所附「網頁連接」已經不適用；不過，目前在網上還能找到他/她的文章和一些跟他/她網誌相關的訊息。正文中將略去「先生/女士」的稱呼，只用Wenson。
4. 我當年算是中度投入「紅衫軍運動」；本部落格保留了幾篇跟「紅衫軍」議題相關的文章：請見談紅衫軍和給紅衫兄弟姐妹兩欄。
5. 英文的 “bearer” 在「承擔者」之外，「肩負重任者」也是一個信、達的中文翻譯。
6. 該網址現在須付費；摘錄原文的英譯如下：
“Human, All too human, Assorted Opinions and Maxims
PREFACE
5.
…
… for it was then that I hit upon the proposition: “a sufferer has no right to pessimism because he suffers!", and that I engaged in a tedious, patient campaign against the unscientific basic tendency of all romantic pessimism, which seeks to magnify and interpret individual, personal experiences into universal judgments, indeed into condemnations of the world.”
7. 語出《查拉圖拉如是說》，紐約，1906, p. 166。我沒有讀過尼切這本名著；此資訊來自杜蘭《西洋哲學史話》17頁，註 11。
本文於 修改第 4 次
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武士哲學：被扭曲的尼切思想 - A Daily Dose of History
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就原標題而言，此處中文翻譯完全不符合「信」、「達」的要求；它是我對下文作者「日進一史」先生/女士原文意旨的批評。本欄2026/08/30貼文對尼切思想的分析應屬當前主流意見。我會用「進取哲學」來總結尼切思想；請參見開欄文和本欄2026/08/31貼文對他「發揮潛能的意志」所做詮釋。
關於尼切思想和納粹「意識型態」間的關係，請參考： ”Nietzsche and the Nazis” 和 ”How the nazis hijacked Nietzsche, and how it can happen to anybody” 的正、反兩方意見。
The Warrior Philosopher: Friedrich Nietzsche and the Twisted Legacy of Power
A Daily Dose of History, 08/27/26
Friedrich Nietzsche died on this date in 1900. Fifty-five years old when he died, he had been insane for the last eleven years of his life.
But before his breakdown Nietzsche published over two dozen books — a body of writing that would profoundly influence the development of philosophy and intellectual history generally. While his work has always been controversial, Nietzsche continues to be widely read today and he is generally regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of the modern era.
The range and nature of Nietzsche’s work make it impossible to summarize fairly in a concise post. Much of the controversy surrounding his legacy derives from Nietzsche’s praise of power as a virtue and his claim that the greatest human goals are striving and accomplishment, not happiness. To that end he admired militarism and was contemptuous of democracy and “weakness.” Consider this passage from his 1888 book Twilight of the Idols:
“Freedom means that the manly instincts which delight in war and victory dominate over other instincts, for example, over those of ‘pleasure.’ The human being who has become free — and how much more the spirit who has become free — spits on the contemptible type of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, females, Englishmen, and other democrats. The free man is a warrior.”
Nietzsche’s estate was administered by his sister Therese Förster-Nietzsche, and she has been charged with having edited her brother’s work to make it more appealing to the Nazis and German ultra-nationalists. Other scholars contend that it was the Nazis themselves who molded Nietzsche’s philosophy to their ideology. (“charge” 此字在這裏是：「控告」、「歸咎」之意。)
Regardless, although most scholars today deny that Nietzsche himself was a fascist or that he would have supported the Nazis, quotes like the one above (and there are many of them) make it easy to see why he became one of their intellectual heroes.
Friedrich Nietzsche died one hundred twenty-six years ago today.
The photo is of Nietzsche in 1872, at age 28. (請至原網頁觀看照片)
Written by A Daily Dose of History
"Exploring the legendary stories of cinema and history, bringing you daily insights into the icons who shaped our world."
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《以「主奴關係」詮釋道德本質》讀後
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拿斯臘拉先生的文章相當精簡(請見本欄2026/08/30貼文)；他的評論雖然沒有高深理論，但他對尼切觀點的解讀說得上中肯，可以參考。
我大概初三時，就隱隱約約感到「道德」具有高度的「人際關係」性質。30歲前後先讀了《尼切選集》，又讀了幾本他的書；因此，當我讀到史特勞斯：「在社會脈絡之外，討論道德並無意義」時，完全能夠認同這個認為「道德」基於「社會結構」的「定性」(1)。
拿斯臘拉先生詮釋尼切「發揮潛能的意志」這段文字，跟我對此概念的理解相通(2)。
此外，「心態」和「社會環境」並非獨立的參數。許多「心態」由一個人的「社會存在」衍生而來；另一方面，許多「心態」 -- 如野心、好勝心、不服氣、賭口氣等等 – 往往是「社會條件/環境」被改變的原動力(3)。
附註：
1. 我在40多歲才讀到這句話；它出於《政治哲學研究那些課題及其它議題》這本書。
2. 這個概念在中文書裏被通譯為「權力意志」；拿斯臘拉先生原文是：”In this sense, master morality is closely connected to Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power, the fundamental drive to grow, overcome obstacles, create, and express one’s capacities.”；此處請參見開欄文第1.1小節的討論。
3. 這段評論請參考拿斯臘拉先生所說：”In his analysis, moral values are connected to different psychological types and social conditions.”，以及該文中其它相關論述。
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以「主奴關係」詮釋道德本質 - Irfan Nasrullah
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** 本文原刊載於「倫理學」一欄(2026/08/20)；因現另闢「尼切」專欄，故移置於此處。造成不便，尚請見諒。
原文某些段落字數冗長，讀起來吃力；我根據「一段一個主題」原則，把它們分為幾個小段。
Master-Slave Morality
Irfan Nasrullah, 08/15/26
The origin of bad conscience
‘if you kill a cockroach you are a hero, if you kill a butterfly, you are evil. morals have aesthetic criteria.’
Nietzsche’s theory of master–slave morality challenges the idea that morality is simply a universal system of objective right and wrong. In his analysis, moral values are connected to different psychological types and social conditions.
He distinguishes between master morality, associated with strength, power, ambition, courage, creativity, and self-assertion, and slave morality, associated with humility, obedience, patience, forgiveness, and equality.
Rather than accepting moral values as fixed truths, Nietzsche asks where these values came from and whose interests they serve.
Master morality develops from the perspective of those who possess strength, power, wealth, or social status. For the master type, something is considered “good” when it expresses strength, vitality, excellence, courage, or the ability to pursue one’s goals. “Bad,” in contrast, refers to what is weak, passive, or incapable of achieving its potential.
The master does not necessarily need to define himself in opposition to others; instead, he begins with an affirmation of his own strength and values. In this sense, master morality is closely connected to Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power, the fundamental drive to grow, overcome obstacles, create, and express one’s capacities.
Slave morality develops from a very different psychological and social position. Nietzsche argues that people who are powerless or oppressed cannot easily express their natural impulses directly. Instead, they gradually reinterpret the qualities they cannot possess as moral vices.
Wealth may become “greed,” strength may become “violence,” ambition may become “pride,” while poverty becomes “humility,” weakness becomes “gentleness,” and obedience becomes “virtue.”
This process allows the oppressed to transform their disadvantages into sources of moral superiority. The result is a reversal of values: what the powerful consider good becomes evil, while the characteristics of the weak become morally good.
Nietzsche connects this transformation particularly strongly to the Judeo-Christian tradition. According to his historical interpretation, groups that experienced oppression developed moral systems that emphasized survival, obedience, patience, humility, forgiveness, and equality.
Christianity then became, in his interpretation, a powerful expression of slave morality because it elevated the poor, weak, suffering, and oppressed while criticizing pride, domination, and worldly power.
The promise of divine justice also offered psychological compensation: even if the weak suffered in this life, they could believe that the powerful would ultimately be judged and that the suffering would receive a higher reward.
This leads Nietzsche to his important concept of ressentiment. When people are unable to act against those who dominate them, their anger and desire for revenge cannot easily be expressed outwardly. Instead, these impulses can turn inward and become psychological resentment. The person begins to condemn the qualities that he secretly desires but cannot possess.
Nietzsche sees this as one of the foundations of slave morality: instead of overcoming weakness, the individual gives weakness a positive moral meaning and condemns strength as evil. Morality therefore becomes not only a system of values but also a psychological response to powerlessness.
This process is closely related to Nietzsche’s discussion of the origin of bad conscience. Imagine a person who naturally possesses aggression, cruelty, ambition, and the desire to act freely but lives in a society where these impulses must constantly be restrained. If the individual cannot release these instincts outwardly, they may be redirected inward.
Nietzsche famously suggests that instincts that cannot be discharged externally turn back against the individual. In this sense, bad conscience is born from the internalization of impulses that society prevents us from expressing. The person becomes divided against himself, experiencing guilt and self-condemnation because his natural drives conflict with social expectations.
The image of killing a cockroach can help illustrate the psychological complexity behind moral judgment. If you kill a cockroach, many people immediately regard the action as acceptable because the insect is considered dirty, dangerous, or undesirable. But if you kill a harmless animal such as a butterfly, the same action may be judged as cruel.
Nietzsche would encourage us to question where these judgments come from. Is the act itself objectively “good” or “evil,” or do our cultural values determine what kind of creature deserves sympathy? The example shows how moral responses can depend on interpretations, instincts, social conventions, and inherited values rather than on an unquestionable universal standard.
However, Nietzsche’s distinction between master and slave morality can also be criticized for being too binary.
Human beings rarely fit perfectly into one category. A person may be ambitious and powerful while also valuing humility and compassion. Someone who possesses wealth may give generously to others, while someone who is powerless may still demonstrate courage and self-assertion. Forgiveness does not necessarily mean weakness, and ambition does not necessarily mean selfishness.
Therefore, reducing morality to two opposing systems risks overlooking the complexity of human character and the possibility that apparently contradictory virtues can exist together.
His central challenge is to ask whether morality expresses genuine human flourishing or whether it sometimes functions as a mechanism of social control, survival, resentment, and power. The strongest response may not be to choose completely between master and slave morality, but to critically examine both. A mature individual might combine ambition with humility, strength with compassion, and the pursuit of personal excellence with concern for others.
Written by Irfan Nasrullah
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