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0. 前言
「哲學」不是我閱讀的重點領域；但在指示「思」、「辨」活動之外，它同時有「(學問)基礎論」之意(該欄2023/11/21貼文)，我有時也就不免涉獵一、二。
對我影響最大的兩位哲學家是笛卡爾和尼切(1)；我深受兩位的「啟示」。前者在「方法論」層面，他的：「方法論」是我求知、思考、和寫作的基本指導原則。
尼切思想則是我形成「道德」和倫理學兩方面觀點的基礎；此外，他也是近代最有影響力的思想家。由於近一年來在《媒介》網誌看到許多討論尼切學說的評論，有了為他建立一個專欄的想法。一時三刻間我整理不出什麼系統性的文章；借用2010/11/17我寫給向台大一位黃教授請教的信，來權充本欄開欄文(2)。
1. 關於尼切思想的幾則討論
1.0 本節前言
我從台哲會論文集拜讀到大作 -- 《論尼切「未來的人性」》。我相信妳掌握到尼切「人性觀」的要點，但是整個論述似乎可以更充分和更明確。我有三個意見，請參考。
1.1 「權力意志」
妳沒有對「權力意志」做一個清楚明確的詮釋。因此，雖然妳就它和「人性觀」兩者之間的關係做了一些認定，但是我(相信其他讀者亦然)看不出尼切的「人性觀」和「權力意志」這個概念兩者間的相關性和思路上的邏輯或推論關係。或者說，你需要為妳的「認定」提出一些說明或論證。
如果用我對尼切 ”will to power” 的翻譯或詮釋 -- 「發揮潛能的意志」，則(我相信)妳的論述可能更具有一致性。妳對尼切「人性觀」的詮釋也就能夠更充分和更相容。(妳第二節中的「而其關係也會一再地重新確定。」、「而是人對於自我解釋與確定的問題，」、和「流變」一詞等，以及第三節中1、2兩小節的闡釋，和「發揮潛能的意志」這個觀點相容。)
1.2 「存在先於本質」
沙特在《存在主義也是人本主義》這篇演講中，簡要的說明了存在主義「存在先於本質。」這個口號或命題的意涵。如果我沒有記錯，他的大意是：
「人的本質(不斷的)由一個人的選擇、決定、和行動來創造(塑造、定義、… 等等)。」
我不敢說這個觀點繼承尼切的思想體系而來，但如果妳的「生成著」指一個「進行式」過程，則它和妳對尼切思想的詮釋 -- 「人『存在』的意義或人禽之別不是任何被賦予之物，而是在某種生成著的東西。」相通。它也和「發揮潛能的意志」(以及上述妳第二節和第三節的闡釋)相通。
如果妳對「生成著」這個概念以及「如何生成著」的過程做進一步的闡述，我相信大作會更有力道。
1.3 行文的嚴謹度
以下摘錄7段我認為大作中可以略加修正的說法。
1) 「我們在尼切的文本中看不到其對於人之本質的規定與研究；」v「尼切清楚地以『未來的人性』為題，處理了其對『人性』與『神聖性』概念的發展與理解。」
「人之本質」和「人性」在概念上應該沒有多少差異。「神聖性」一詞可能有更適當的表達方式。(「神聖」一詞在尼切思想中可能沒有什麼地位；他用holy一字時，通常有諷刺意味。)
2) 「權力意志的鬥爭過程是所有有機體的『真實』」(Wirklichkeit)。
「所有有機體」是全稱名詞。「有機體」包含所有生物。
3) 「一方面代表著，權力意志被視為人作為有機體的根本性質，」vs「人無法經由權力意志或任何事物而與其他存有者本質地區分開來，因為不再有任何所謂的『本質』(Wesen)存在。」
「根本性質」和「本質」在概念上應該沒有多少差異。
4) 「藉著它，『不是一個主體、而是一個戰鬥在自我維持。』」
「戰鬥」指什麼而言？在中文裏「戰鬥」是一個動詞，當名詞用的時候，通常它不指一個有意識的物體。
5) 「他在大地上的存在(Dasein)沒有目標；『人為了什麼(wozu Mensch überhaupt)？』-- 曾經是一個沒有答案的問題。」
我不懂德文。但根據英譯：
His existence on earth contained no end; “What is the purpose of man at all?” was a question without answer; …
或許這樣的中譯比較達意：
人存在於世界上其實沒有目的；「人為什麼活著？(或，地球上為什麼有人？)」這個問題也從來沒有一個答案。(「曾經是」蘊含「現在已不是」。)
6) 「這個『有效』(es gilt)才是真正的『這是』(das ist)，唯一的『這是』」。
很抱歉，我看不懂這句話。也看不出它和上一句話的邏輯或推論關係。或許es gilt有比「有效」更適當的中譯？此外，以「這是」當「補詞」用不合中文語法；我不知道「存在性」在這裏是否比較適當。
7) 「人性有效作為什麼？」
很抱歉，我看不懂這句話，我相信它也不合中文語法。
2. 結語
我是一個退休工程師，對哲學和尼切思想可說是門外漢。偶而翻翻書而已。以上意見完全出於「獻曝」之意。請指正。如果有胡說八道之處，希望海涵。
附註：
1. 笛卡爾思想對我的幫助，請見：拙作《敬覆SCFtw2兄賜教》第2.2小節(該欄開欄文，2022/11/24)。
2. 見以下第1節(文字略有修改，意旨無更動)；我在網上搜尋不到黃教授大作原文；只找到這則相關訊息。
本文於 修改第 1 次
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《以「主奴關係」詮釋道德本質》讀後
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拿斯臘拉先生的文章相當精簡(請見本欄2026/08/30貼文)；他的評論雖然沒有高深理論，但他對尼切觀點的解讀說得上中肯，可以參考。
我大概初三時，就隱隱約約感到「道德」具有高度的「人際關係」性質。30歲前後先讀了《尼切選集》，又讀了幾本他的書；因此，當我讀到史特勞斯：「在社會脈絡之外，討論道德並無意義」時，完全能夠認同這個認為「道德」基於「社會結構」的「定性」(1)。
拿斯臘拉先生詮釋尼切「發揮潛能的意志」這段文字，跟我對此概念的理解相通(2)。
此外，「心態」和「社會環境」並非獨立的參數。許多「心態」由一個人的「社會存在」衍生而來；另一方面，許多「心態」 -- 如野心、好勝心、不服氣、賭口氣等等 – 往往是「社會條件/環境」被改變的原動力(3)。
附註：
1. 我在40多歲才讀到這句話；它出於《政治哲學研究那些課題及其它議題》這本書。
2. 這個概念在中文書裏被通譯為「權力意志」；拿斯臘拉先生原文是：”In this sense, master morality is closely connected to Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power, the fundamental drive to grow, overcome obstacles, create, and express one’s capacities.”；此處請參見開欄文第1.1小節的討論。
3. 這段評論請參考拿斯臘拉先生所說：”In his analysis, moral values are connected to different psychological types and social conditions.”，以及該文中其它相關論述。
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以「主奴關係」詮釋道德本質 - Irfan Nasrullah
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** 本文原刊載於「倫理學」一欄(2026/08/20)；因現另闢「尼切」專欄，故移置於此處。造成不便，尚請見諒。
原文某些段落字數冗長，讀起來吃力；我根據「一段一個主題」原則，把它們分為幾個小段。
Master-Slave Morality
Irfan Nasrullah, 08/15/26
The origin of bad conscience
‘if you kill a cockroach you are a hero, if you kill a butterfly, you are evil. morals have aesthetic criteria.’
Nietzsche’s theory of master–slave morality challenges the idea that morality is simply a universal system of objective right and wrong. In his analysis, moral values are connected to different psychological types and social conditions.
He distinguishes between master morality, associated with strength, power, ambition, courage, creativity, and self-assertion, and slave morality, associated with humility, obedience, patience, forgiveness, and equality.
Rather than accepting moral values as fixed truths, Nietzsche asks where these values came from and whose interests they serve.
Master morality develops from the perspective of those who possess strength, power, wealth, or social status. For the master type, something is considered “good” when it expresses strength, vitality, excellence, courage, or the ability to pursue one’s goals. “Bad,” in contrast, refers to what is weak, passive, or incapable of achieving its potential.
The master does not necessarily need to define himself in opposition to others; instead, he begins with an affirmation of his own strength and values. In this sense, master morality is closely connected to Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power, the fundamental drive to grow, overcome obstacles, create, and express one’s capacities.
Slave morality develops from a very different psychological and social position. Nietzsche argues that people who are powerless or oppressed cannot easily express their natural impulses directly. Instead, they gradually reinterpret the qualities they cannot possess as moral vices.
Wealth may become “greed,” strength may become “violence,” ambition may become “pride,” while poverty becomes “humility,” weakness becomes “gentleness,” and obedience becomes “virtue.”
This process allows the oppressed to transform their disadvantages into sources of moral superiority. The result is a reversal of values: what the powerful consider good becomes evil, while the characteristics of the weak become morally good.
Nietzsche connects this transformation particularly strongly to the Judeo-Christian tradition. According to his historical interpretation, groups that experienced oppression developed moral systems that emphasized survival, obedience, patience, humility, forgiveness, and equality.
Christianity then became, in his interpretation, a powerful expression of slave morality because it elevated the poor, weak, suffering, and oppressed while criticizing pride, domination, and worldly power.
The promise of divine justice also offered psychological compensation: even if the weak suffered in this life, they could believe that the powerful would ultimately be judged and that the suffering would receive a higher reward.
This leads Nietzsche to his important concept of ressentiment. When people are unable to act against those who dominate them, their anger and desire for revenge cannot easily be expressed outwardly. Instead, these impulses can turn inward and become psychological resentment. The person begins to condemn the qualities that he secretly desires but cannot possess.
Nietzsche sees this as one of the foundations of slave morality: instead of overcoming weakness, the individual gives weakness a positive moral meaning and condemns strength as evil. Morality therefore becomes not only a system of values but also a psychological response to powerlessness.
This process is closely related to Nietzsche’s discussion of the origin of bad conscience. Imagine a person who naturally possesses aggression, cruelty, ambition, and the desire to act freely but lives in a society where these impulses must constantly be restrained. If the individual cannot release these instincts outwardly, they may be redirected inward.
Nietzsche famously suggests that instincts that cannot be discharged externally turn back against the individual. In this sense, bad conscience is born from the internalization of impulses that society prevents us from expressing. The person becomes divided against himself, experiencing guilt and self-condemnation because his natural drives conflict with social expectations.
The image of killing a cockroach can help illustrate the psychological complexity behind moral judgment. If you kill a cockroach, many people immediately regard the action as acceptable because the insect is considered dirty, dangerous, or undesirable. But if you kill a harmless animal such as a butterfly, the same action may be judged as cruel.
Nietzsche would encourage us to question where these judgments come from. Is the act itself objectively “good” or “evil,” or do our cultural values determine what kind of creature deserves sympathy? The example shows how moral responses can depend on interpretations, instincts, social conventions, and inherited values rather than on an unquestionable universal standard.
However, Nietzsche’s distinction between master and slave morality can also be criticized for being too binary.
Human beings rarely fit perfectly into one category. A person may be ambitious and powerful while also valuing humility and compassion. Someone who possesses wealth may give generously to others, while someone who is powerless may still demonstrate courage and self-assertion. Forgiveness does not necessarily mean weakness, and ambition does not necessarily mean selfishness.
Therefore, reducing morality to two opposing systems risks overlooking the complexity of human character and the possibility that apparently contradictory virtues can exist together.
His central challenge is to ask whether morality expresses genuine human flourishing or whether it sometimes functions as a mechanism of social control, survival, resentment, and power. The strongest response may not be to choose completely between master and slave morality, but to critically examine both. A mature individual might combine ambition with humility, strength with compassion, and the pursuit of personal excellence with concern for others.
Written by Irfan Nasrullah
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