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國際現勢 -- 開欄文
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川普上台後,世局大戲一齣接一齣;國際高潮一波又一波。他並非原因或主角,只不過身間觸媒和插科打諢兩個角色而已。悲劇變鬧劇一再上演,根據「量變導致質變」法則,在川痞/川瘋/川丑三合一變形臭蟲下台前,我們怕不是要看好幾場慘劇。能不能渡過這個「川劫」,就要看我們大家的造化,和一眾善男信女「阿門」或「阿彌陀佛」的修為了。 由於節目繁多,劇情層出不窮: 1) 「親愛的,我把『規則』變沒了」 2) 「親愛的,我不裝了!自由主義的面具太沉重,還是帝國主義本尊帥氣」 3) 「親愛的,『大衛大戰歌利亞』的戲碼改成『卡尼勇嗆川瘋子』」 4) 「親愛的,『阿貓阿狗』們登場機會來了」 5)、6)、7)、8)、9)…,族繁不及備載。 故開此欄,一起欣賞當下各顯神通,讓人眼花繚爛的棋局和好戲。同喜還是同悲,且聽下回分解。本部落格原有個別地區或重大議題的專欄,仍然照常營業。
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「南方諸國」還有意義嗎? -- Noah Smith
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下文標題雖然講的是「(全球)南方諸國」這個概念或「指號」,其內容除追溯此詞沿革外,重點在討論國家發展政策、相關經濟理論、和意識型態之虛妄。雖然發表已近三年,頗值得一讀;下文附有多幅統計圖,請至原網頁參考。 Does the notion of a "Global South" still make any sense? There are really four Global Souths. NOAH SMITH, 10/29/23 Map by Specialgst 全球地圖(以紅、藍兩色表示) The Israel-Gaza war has caused a lot of heated rhetoric to be thrown around. One of the big talking points is that the U.S.’ support of Israel will cause it to lose support among the nations of the “Global South”. I don’t know if that’s true or not — Muslim countries seem likely to be at least annoyed with the U.S., but India seems more on the pro-Israel side. But regardless, this has drawn my attention to the highly questionable way in which the categories “Global North” and “Global South” are used — not just in online discussions, but by official organizations like the United Nations. A lot of people use “Global South” interchangeably with “developing countries”, since countries in the north of the globe tend to generally be richer than countries in the south. In fact, I used it myself, in a post about global development, back in 2021: But as soon as you try to actually categorize all the countries of the world into two groups, you run into difficulties. For example, in 1980 the Brandt Report, issued by an independent international commission, drew a nice clean line: By Jovan.gec - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0 全球「已發展 VS 發展中」國家 The red and blue map at the top of this post, which is from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), is clearly based on the Brandt Line, with just two changes: It moves South Korea and Israel into the “developed” category. South Korea and Israel…but not Singapore??? Singapore, which UNCTAD still classifies as a “developing” country, is among the very richest countries on the planet. It’s far richer than the U.S., Canada, Australia, Switzerland, or the countries of North Europe: GDP/總人口數 統計圖 1 2000 -- 2021 Nor does this wealth come from oil money, like Qatar or the UAE. Singapore’s economy is a highly diversified high-tech economy. It has the highest number of industrial robots per capita of any country except South Korea. It has the #1 ranking in the World Bank’s Human Capital Index. It’s Human Development Index is higher than almost any country’s on the planet — considerably higher than the UN’s own “very high human development” benchmark: 人力資源發展指數圖 In other words, if Singapore isn’t a developed country, then the term “developed country” is utterly and completely meaningless. But while Singapore is the most glaring omission here, it’s not the only one. Turkey and Malaysia have grown robustly in recent decades, such that their per capita GDP is now comfortably ahead of a number of the countries that UNCTAD includes in its “developed” roster: GDP/總人口數 統計圖 2 2000 -- 2021 (The gap is narrower if you use the Human Development Index, but it’s still there.) So what’s going on here? UNCTAD’s website basically says that their present categorization is based on the categories that people used in the past: This categorization is based on a distinction between developing and developed regions that was commonly used in the past (see Hoffmeister, 2020) and is maintained by UNSD with the understanding that being part of either developed or developing region is through sovereign decision of a state (see the M49 website). But that makes no sense. The whole idea of a “developing” country is that it’s developing, which means at some point it can become developed. So freezing in the categories of the past makes no sense. Anyway, Hoffmeister’s 2020 paper doesn’t provide much enlightenment here, making some hand-wavey justifications based on which countries have colonial pasts and which don’t (though again, South Korea breaks this mold, and Thailand and Iran never colonized, etc.). It’s only once we go to the UN’s “M49” website that we find some plausible answers: There is no definition of developing and developed countries (or areas) within the UN system. However, in 1996 the distinction between “Developed regions” and “Developing regions” was introduced to the Standard country or area codes for statistical use (known as M49). These groupings were intended solely for statistical convenience at the time and did not express a judgement about any country’ or area’s stage of development. Over time the use of the distinction between "Developed regions" and "Developing regions", including in the flagship publications of the United Nations, has diminished. Since 2017, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) report and the statistical annex to the Secretary General’s annual report on SDGs progress uses only geographic regions without referring to the two groupings of developed and developing regions. Therefore, following consultation with other international and supranational organizations active in official statistics, the “Developed regions” and “Developing regions” were removed from the "Other groupings" of the M49 in December 2021. Following its removal from M49, several users expressed the need to maintain the distinction of developed and developing regions based on the understanding that being part of either developed or developing region is through sovereign decision of a state. Therefore, a file was created that contains an updated classification of developed and developing regions as of May 2022, in addition to the historical classification of December 2021…The updated classification reflects a recent action by the Republic of Korea to be considered part of developed regions. (emphasis mine 此段中斜體字部分) So now I think we have an answer. The UN didn’t actually want to draw a distinction between developing and developed countries, and they’ve tried to remove the classification entirely. But certain countries keep insisting that the distinction be maintained. And whether a country gets included in the “developed” or “developing” blocs is basically at the request of that country’s government. South Korea wants the UN to call it a “developed” country, while Singapore, for all its fabulous wealth and high technology, wishes to be called a “developing” country. One presumes these desires are political in nature. Singapore, a tiny city-state, has to maintain good relationships with the poorer countries of Southeast Asia that surround it, and so would rather not be singled out from them. Turkey and Malaysia probably have similar imperatives. But South Korea would prefer to advertise its successful development on the world stage. Anyway, this whole investigation might seem excessively punctilious, but the key point is that the notion of the Global South and Global North is inherently a geopolitical one. Much of it has to do with the politics of decolonization, which played out well before I was born. The notion of former European colonies as a geopolitical bloc — embodied by the Non-Aligned Movement, “Third Worldism”, etc. — left its mark on a lot of these economic categories. But I think it is possible to classify the world’s economies in a more useful way. The World Bank’s four-tier classification system works pretty well, I think: 世界銀行平均收入金額分級圖 Income, meanwhile, is closely correlated with other indicators of development like education and health. But categorizing countries by their income today doesn’t tell the whole story here, because it doesn’t show the picture over time. For instance, if you look at the five major World Bank regions that comprise the “Global South” — East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa — you’ll see that they have four very different trajectories: GDP/總人口數 統計圖 3 1990 -- 2021 East Asia — which includes Southeast Asia — is on a strongly upward trajectory; almost all of the countries in this region have either grown rapidly in recent years or are already high-income. The Middle East and Latin America look basically identical on this graph — they’re both comfortably upper-middle income regions, but they’ve grown more slowly and have stagnated in recent years (though the Middle East has more heterogeneity than Latin America, and obviously has very different governance). South Asia is still poor, but is making solid gains, and looks like it might be on an upward path like East Asia (though it’s too early to tell). And Sub-Saharan Africa is mostly poor and stagnant, with a few exceptions at the southern tip and the west coast. It’s not hard to tell what separates the fast-growing countries from the stagnant ones — it’s manufacturing. If you look at which goods these countries export — which is a good proxy for what they specialize in — you’ll see that the fast-growing countries almost all export manufactured goods, while the stagnant ones mostly export natural resources like fossil fuels, minerals, and agricultural products. Economic research shows this correlation clearly. And economic theory gives us a clear reason why manufacturing-based economies should grow faster than resource-based ones: productivity. There’s lots of scope to improve the productivity of manufacturing, especially if you’re not near the frontier yet. But there’s just not much scope to improve the productivity of resource extraction (especially because the extraction is often done by foreign companies whose technology is already cutting-edge). Resource exporters can do lots of things to improve their GDP — stable governance, a good business climate for local services, etc. — but ultimately their space for growth is more limited. And even the most well-governed resource-based economies will be limited by their population sizes — if your country has hundreds of millions of people like Nigeria does, resource rents will be stretched thin, while if you have only a few million people like Norway, there will be more to go around. In other words, there are basically four Global Souths. I think I’ll give them names: 1. The mostly-developed countries: Industrialized countries that are on the cusp of developed status, and are only thought of as “developing” for historical or political reasons. These include Turkey, Malaysia, and arguably China, Thailand and Mexico. 2. The industrializing countries: Rapidly industrializing countries that are still poor or middle-income but are growing fast. There include India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and potentially the Philippines and Indonesia. 3. The resource exporters: Upper-middle-income countries that specialize in resource extraction. These include Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, Iran, Botswana, Namibia, Kazakhstan, and so on. 4. The poor countries: These countries mostly export natural resources but either don’t have enough of them to afford decent standards of living, or are plagued by war and/or poor governance. These include countries like Nigeria, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan, Sudan, and so on. Every time a country moves from the “industrializing” category to the “mostly-developed” category, the old dividing lines between Global South and Global North become a bit less relevant. Already, this process has turned the two-peaked global income distribution of the old colonialist world into something that looks much more natural: 全球收入(個人每日)分布圖 1800, 1975, 2015 Continuing this process should be the goal of development policy — for poor countries, but also for rich countries and international economic organizations that have an interest in a richer, more equal world. This means helping the industrializing countries escape whatever “middle-income traps” they find themselves in, and propelling as many of the poor countries as possible onto the escalator of industrialization. Industrialization is the means by which the shackles of the colonial age are thrown off; by this means we can build a world where nations respect each other as equals. I fear that many on the political Left don’t understand this. When I read accounts of global economic development by thinkers who lean to the socialist side, I often encounter nostalgia for the “trente glorieuses” — the three postwar decades. In those decades, most of the industrial growth happened in rich countries — the old “Global North” — and poor countries mostly exported resources to them. To people on the left, this relationship represents at least a partial rectification of the exploitation of colonialism — finally, the Global South was getting a fair price for their resources! And sure, it was an improvement. But fundamentally, it still represented an unequal relationship — the Global North controlled all the high-value-added and high-tech parts of the supply chain, while the Global South mainly dug up rocks for them. Ultimately, that pattern of development was a trap for the resource exporters of the Global South, because it meant they could only rise as high as their resource endowments would allow them to. The stagnation of countries like Brazil and South Africa demonstrates that there’s an inherent ceiling to resource-based development. (Many saw this trap and tried to break out of it, but only a few like South Korea and Taiwan succeeded.) The decades since 1990, however, have been a much different story. Manufacturing has finally spread beyond the boundaries of the Global North. It’s not just a few countries like Turkey and Malaysia joining the party, either — China now manufactures more than the U.S. and Europe combined, and the countries of South and Southeast Asia are rising fast. I believe that despite the geopolitical disruptions caused by the industrialization of much of the Global South, ultimately this will lead to a world that’s both richer and more equal. And we’ll know it’s working because the categories of Global North and Global South will start to make less and less sense; the more ridiculous and out-of-date the old Brandt Line starts to look, the brighter the future will be. 相關閱讀 * Checking in on the Global South (2021)
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歐洲北約聯盟國家東邊最前線 - Laura Kayali等
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請參考: * Russia planning attack on Poland to test Nato resolve, US warns 如果有人到現在還搞不清楚:在老鷹搏兔的態勢下,俄、烏戰爭為什麼還能打到現在?下文把「唇亡齒寒」的道理,講得活神活現。 我搞不懂的是:據說俄國已經被打得焦頭爛額,為什麼俄國還有能力另起戰端? NATO's eastern flank prepares to fend off Russia — with or without America Laura Kayali, Marcin Wyrwał, Philipp Fritz and Carolina Drüten, Business Insider Inc., 07/05/26 NORTH KARELIA, Finland — Bears, wolves and moose still cross the frontier freely, but for the border guards patrolling this stretch of fields and forest, this is where NATO ends. A line of wooden poles and painted markers cuts through the light green grass, separating Finland from Russia along the alliance's longest border with Moscow — 1,343 kilometers (835 miles) of increasingly militarized territory. The crossing has been closed since 2023, the year after the Kremlin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. On the other side lies land Finland lost to the Soviet Union when it was left to fight largely on its own in the early months of World War II. Reporters from Axel Springer's Global Reporters Network traveled to three exposed stretches of Europe's eastern frontier — Finland's forested border with Russia, Poland's fortified line with Kaliningrad and Belarus and Lithuania's vulnerable edge near the Suwałki Gap — to see how ready NATO's frontline states are for the possibility that Moscow will attack the alliance. What we observed was a continent racing to harden its eastern edge against a threat it can no longer assume Washington will handle. As US President Donald Trump questions old security guarantees and looks to reduce America's military footprint in Europe, the countries closest to Russia are building fortifications, expanding reserves, buying tanks and drones and preparing for the possibility that the first days of any conflict may be theirs to fight largely alone. Since his reelection in 2024, Trump has repeatedly called into question Washington's commitment to NATO's Article 5, the foundational clause under which an attack on one member is treated as an attack on all. The uncertainty only deepened after the war in Iran, when the president and his team threatened to reassess US membership in NATO in response to European allies' refusal to join the conflict. Meanwhile, satellite imagery shows that Russia has built up its armed presence along its border with Finland and other EU countries, building barracks and staging military vehicles in what the head of Swedish military intelligence has described as preparation for a possible confrontation with NATO. "Russia is a superpower, and we're a small country," said Col. Matti Pitkäniitty, commander of Finland's North Karelia Border Guard District, while driving to the border. "You have to be careful when you sleep next to a bear." Finland never forgot the lessons of what it calls its Winter War, when it halted an unprovoked attack in 1939 by the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin but lost roughly a tenth of its territory. While much of the rest of Europe spent the decades after the Cold War cutting armies and cashing in the peace dividend, Helsinki kept conscription, maintained vast reserves and built its defenses around the assumption that Russia might one day come back. "In the Winter War, Finland felt very alone, with very little help from other countries," said Pitkäniitty. A dozen Finnish defense officials, military officers, lawmakers and analysts interviewed for this article described their nation as unsurprised by Russia's 2022 assault on Ukraine. And even after Finland joined NATO in 2023, Helsinki has continued to view the alliance as a reinforcement of its own defense, rather than a substitute for it. "We're happy to be in an alliance, but we still understand that we will take the first blow alone, before NATO's Article 5 is activated," said Jukka Kopra, a Finnish lawmaker who chaired the parliament's defense committee, referring to the mutual defense clause that underpins the alliance. "We trust the US as our ally, a member of NATO, but we realize they have crucial interests elsewhere," Kopra said. Finland: 'Total defense' Over decades, Finland built its preparedness around the concept of "total defense" — a mobilizable population, civil resilience, shelters and a military designed to keep fighting with or without allies. The country can mobilize nearly 870,000 reservists out of a population of 5.6 million, a figure set to reach one million by 2031. "It's fair to say Finland is more ready to fight alone than other frontline countries. The US wind-down doesn't impact its readiness," said Eoin Micheál McNamara, a postdoctoral fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Finland spends nearly 3 percent of its GDP on defense and, in line with its commitments to NATO, it intends to raise that figure to 5 percent by 2035. Its air force expects to receive US-made F-35 fighter jets in the coming months. Like most European militaries, the Finnish armed forces are still catching up on drone warfare, but on land they have one of Europe's largest artillery arsenals. "Stalin called artillery the god of war," said McNamara. "Unlike a lot of Western countries, Russia never forgot about artillery. Finns never forgot either." One of Finland's greatest military assets is the land itself. An army invading from the east would have to move through a country of few roads, dense forests, deep snow and freezing temperatures, with little light in winter and almost none of the darkness that conceals movement in summer. In the woods, long, slender gray-white trunks stand so close together that it is impossible to see more than 50 meters ahead. In spring, when the leaves turn bright green, visibility drops even further. Even without the US, it's unlikely Finland would have to fight entirely on its own. Several European countries have an interest in keeping Russia off NATO's northern flank, according to Charly Salonius-Pasternak of the Helsinki-based Nordic West Office think tank, referring specifically to Norway, Sweden and the UK. Still, Finland would face a Russian army with more manpower and a willingness to use sheer numbers in ways the alliance cannot easily match. "Since the Winter War, the very basics haven't changed," said Pitkäniitty, the border guard commander. "We have to be able to use the terrain, operate the environment better than anyone else — then, we have leverage," he added. "Is the forest a typical Russian battle environment? I would say no. Their lessons are learned in more open environments." Finland is now trying to teach its NATO allies how to fight on that ground. In May, two multinational exercises in southeastern Finland — Northern Star 26 and Karelian Sword 26 — were designed in part to show troops from countries including France and the United Kingdom how to operate in Northern Europe's forests, lakes and swamps. US soldiers from the Virginia National Guard also took part. Karelian Sword — conducted in Finland's Vekaranjärvi region — involved some 10,000 soldiers in a simulated invasion of the country. One main takeaway from days of drilling in the woods was that armored vehicles and drones are ill-adapted for Finland's forests. "It's also very hard for commercial drones to find Finnish troops in the forest because of the leaves, unless you have a thermal camera," according to Col. Ari Määttä, the Karelian brigade's deputy commander who commanded the exercise. The Nordic country is also preparing to add another obstacle. Alongside Poland and the three Baltic states, Helsinki withdrew last year from the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines, arguing that Russia never joined the treaty and is already using the weapons in Ukraine. Several Finnish military officers confirmed to the Global Reporters Network that the country's defense forces plan to purchase anti-personnel landmines in the coming months. The mines would not be deployed in peacetime, they said, but would be available if the threat of a Russian invasion became more imminent. "We have quite a long border with Russia," said First Lt. Terra Tevajärvi, a 33-year-old reservist and trained mechanized infantry officer who works as a filmmaker. Standing in a clearing, with the sounds of gunshots in the distance, he added: "Landmines would help slow [an attacker] down and make our lives easier." Nuclear gap There is one domain where geography, conscription and military readiness offer little protection: nuclear weapons. While Finland has practiced for a conventional defense for decades, it is only since it joined NATO three years ago that it has had to incorporate nuclear deterrence into its calculations. Since joining the alliance, Helsinki has participated in its Nuclear Planning Group, taken part in nuclear exercises and begun rewriting laws that still reflected its long history outside the alliance. In June, Finnish lawmakers lifted restrictions on the transport and storage of nuclear weapons on Finnish territory, a legacy of its non-nuclear posture before NATO membership. Changing that framework had proven more contentious than the discussion about joining NATO itself. Opposition parties resisted lifting the restrictions, while officials and analysts argued that Finland could not be a full participant in NATO defense planning without understanding how nuclear deterrence works. "Readiness in that regard is being learned," said McNamara. "You hear the phrase: 'Finland needs to upgrade its nuclear IQ as a society.'" Finland's nuclear debate highlighted an uncomfortable truth. While the country is better positioned than most frontline countries to defend its territory without American ground forces, it's no more able than the rest of Europe to replace Washington's nuclear umbrella. While the US has not publicly questioned that guarantee, the Trump administration's unpredictability has pushed Helsinki and other European capitals to examine whether Europe can build a stronger deterrent of its own. After meeting with France's top general in the Finnish capital in June, the country's Defense Minister Antti Häkkänen acknowledged talks with Paris about French President Emmanuel Macron's proposal to broaden his country's nuclear deterrent to include other European countries. The French president, who officially proposed the idea in March, has left what he means by it purposefully ambiguous. Paris has floated joint exercises and temporary deployments of nuclear-capable French fighter jets, but not a formal European nuclear guarantee. For Finland, it is still unclear what participation in the scheme would mean. In the meantime, Helsinki is hoping that hosting troops from two nuclear-armed allies — France and the UK — will add another layer of deterrence, even if the force itself is conventional. Paris and London have expressed interest in participating in a NATO battalion that will be based in Sweden but operate in northern Finland. Designed to strengthen the alliance's presence in the high north, the force will be led by Stockholm, another formerly neutral government that joined the military alliance after Moscow's invasion of Ukraine. "We'll be on high alert, with high readiness to act," said Col. Daniel Rydberg, who leads Sweden's NATO mission in northern Finland. Along with Finnish border guards, NATO troops would be among the first responders if Russia decided to test Finland, he said in a phone interview the day before the force's inauguration in June. "The message to Russia is deterrence," he said. Just what that would mean in the case of an attack by the Kremlin will depend on people like Nuutti Kurikka, a 20-year-old conscript whose great-grandfather fought in the Winter War. Deep in the Finnish forest, Kurikka, a platoon leader, stood in front of a tank. The lesson of that war, he said, is "a mentality that we can overcome very hard things." Unlike officials in many European capitals, he is not anxious about the Trump administration's ambiguity regarding NATO. "It's not good that the relationship is a bit shaky, but Finland is prepared to defend itself alone if needed," he said. "We did it before in the past." Poland: 'Eastern Shield' In November 2024, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk visited the small village of Dąbrówka, near his country's border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, to inspect the first stretch of a new fortification system known as the Eastern Shield. Standing before reinforced concrete anti-tank barriers known as hedgehogs, Tusk delivered a message aimed at both Poles and Moscow. "I don't have to explain to anyone that this border must be guarded exceptionally carefully," he told reporters. At the time, Polish television reported that the first section had been completed ahead of schedule. And yet, a year and a half later, with the project roughly halfway to its 2028 deadline, the hedgehogs still stand behind Dąbrówka — but only a few hundred meters farther on, the visible fortifications end abruptly. A local resident said the activity around the border surged before Tusk's visit, then disappeared. "Before the prime minister's visit, dozens of trucks, cranes and troops passed through here day after day, week after week," the resident said. "After the visit, complete silence. The operations simply stopped." If Finland's answer to uncertainty is national readiness, Poland's is concrete barriers, sensors, drones and one of Europe's fastest-growing armies. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Warsaw has recast itself as NATO's frontline state: buying weapons at a pace few allies can match, expanding its army, and pouring billions into new defenses along its borders with Belarus and Kaliningrad. The message is meant to be unmistakable — to Moscow, to Washington and to Europe — that Poland is preparing not for a distant theoretical threat, but for the possibility that war could come sooner than many Western capitals assume. Yet along parts of the very frontier where that deterrent is supposed to take shape, the gap between Poland's military ambition and the physical reality on the ground remains visible: fortifications appear, then stop; materials sit in warehouses; and local residents say the building frenzy has given way to quiet. Poland is the largest country on NATO's eastern flank and the alliance's biggest defense spender by share of GDP. Warsaw had already exceeded NATO's 2% target before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine; this year, it is set to spend 4.8% of GDP on defense even as its economy continues to grow. At the start of Russia's full-scale invasion, Poland sent more than 300 tanks from its own stocks to Ukraine, then moved to replace and expand its arsenal with off-the-shelf tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, support vehicles and rocket artillery from the United States and South Korea. Its army is NATO's third largest, behind the US and Turkey. The sheer mass of the Polish military, combined with Warsaw's role as one of the world's largest buyers of US weapons, has earned Warsaw a reputation in Washington as a model ally. Even US President Donald Trump, while berating other European countries over defense, has regularly praised Poland. The US keeps thousands of troops in Poland, the vast majority on a rotational basis, an arrangement the Polish government is keen to keep as a deterrent to any Russian attack. The country's importance to NATO is not just a matter of spending. Its size and location make it the alliance's central frontline state in any potential confrontation with the Kremlin. During the Cold War, West Germany was NATO's conventional bulwark against the Warsaw Pact. Today, Poland plays a similar role on NATO's eastern edge. "While Germany has long focused on quality, Poland stands for mass and speed," said Carlo Masala, a professor at the University of the German Federal Armed Forces in Munich and one of Germany's most renowned security experts. "Because Warsaw does not rule out having to fight tomorrow. It is what is called 'fight tonight.'" Tusk's Eastern Shield project is Warsaw's attempt to reinforce its defenses along its 800-kilometer (500-mile) frontier with Belarus, a close ally of Moscow's, and Kaliningrad, the heavily militarized Russian territory wedged between Poland, Lithuania and the Baltic Sea. Designed as a network of obstacles meant to slow an attack, channel Russian forces and buy time for NATO to respond, the system includes anti-tank and infantry trenches, concrete barriers, bunkers, drones, thermal cameras, mines and nearby military units, while also using natural obstacles such as swampy terrain. When completed, it is expected to cost about €10 billion ($11 billion) according to Poland's defense ministry. Poland's military buildup is part of a large-scale, multi-billion-dollar new deterrence and defense system along NATO's eastern border. Known as the Eastern Flank Deterrence Line, it is planned to stretch from Finland to Romania. Brig. Gen. Thomas Lowin, deputy chief of staff for operations at NATO Land Command in Izmir, says the alliance will build up much larger stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and equipment in border states, while establishing an "automated zone" of sensors and robotized weapons to help halt Russian forces early in any attack. Cezary Tomczyk, Poland's deputy defense minister and the official overseeing the project, called his country's part of the effort the largest fortification effort in Europe since World War II. "We are building a border that sees further, reacts faster and makes it harder for the enemy to act at every stage," he said. "Russia must know one thing: Every kilometer of potential aggression will cost more time, more equipment and more resources. The Eastern Shield is intended to raise the price of aggression to an unacceptable level." At the end of the world So far, however, along parts of the border, the Eastern Shield is still more promise than reality. Polish officials are reluctant to discuss delays, and not every element of the system is meant to be visible. But large sections of the border are not visibly fortified. A military facility near Dąbrówka warehouses large numbers of hedgehog anti-tank barriers, but since Tusk's visit to the village, none have been placed along the border. Poland's defense ministry told the Global Reporters Network that engineering troops, using pre-positioned material from warehouses, would be able to erect fortifications along the entire border within seven to 14 days. But a logistics expert who has held senior military positions said some elements cannot be moved into place so quickly. "Laying one kilometer of reinforced concrete hedgehogs takes anywhere from several weeks to several months, depending on terrain conditions," said the logistics expert, who was granted anonymity to discuss sensitive defense matters. "It took the army three weeks to fortify a relatively short section." A short distance from Dąbrówka, an agritourism farm named "At the End of the World" welcomes visitors looking for a rural retreat. At the Russian border, less than 100 meters away, the only obvious protection is a simple concertina-wire fence and a scattering of warning signs. The owner, Wioletta Bornejko, does not want the new fortifications to reach her meadow. "I hope they don't put up those concrete hedgehogs here," she said. "Even barbed wire scares away tourists. A neighbor recently closed down a similar business." Others in the area say the constant talk of war has already hurt local businesses. The quiet is deceptive. Travel east from Dąbrówka and you'll reach the so-called Suwałki Gap. Ben Hodges, a retired general who served as the commander of US Army Europe, has described this short stretch of Polish and Lithuanian territory separating Kaliningrad from Belarus as NATO's Achilles' heel. The fear is that a Russian attack could try to close the corridor from both sides, cutting Poland and the rest of NATO from the Baltic states to the north. Farther east, Poland's border with Belarus stretches some 420 kilometers (260 miles). There, the limits of the current defenses are even more evident. "I don't see any other fortifications here," said one soldier from a brigade serving on the border.
Much of the border is protected only by a 4-meter-high (13-feet-high) fence built in 2022. Erected to stop migrants from crossing into Poland, it would offer little protection against tanks. Poland's defense ministry told the Global Reporters Network that it currently "has material resources that allow it to secure border sections with a total length of over 140 kilometres" — less than a third of the length of the frontier. Drone wall Tanks and other traditional forces aren't the only thing Poland would have to worry about in case of a Russian attack. Anti-tank measures are of limited use when the weapons of choice fly far overhead and are cheap enough to exhaust conventional air defenses. And so the country is busy developing an anti-drone system it calls SAN. Its development gained urgency after 19 Russian drones entered Polish airspace last year, forcing NATO aircraft to shoot them down with missiles from F-16 and F-35 jets — a response that cost millions of euros against drones worth a fraction of that. SAN is meant to allow Poland to defend against drones without relying on fighter jets. The system, sometimes described as a "drone wall," could cost up to €4 billion — accounting for about 40% of the entire Eastern Shield. "Russia is watching Ukraine," said Tomczyk, Poland's deputy defense minister. "So are we. We draw our conclusions faster." Tomczyk said SAN would be Europe's largest and most advanced anti-drone effort. Within 24 months, he said, the Polish army is expected to receive 18 battery modules, including about 700 combat vehicles, radars, sensors and effectors, and roughly 350 systems to detect and counter aerial threats. "It is not a single system," he said. "It is an entire architecture for drone defense." Construction of SAN began at the start of the year and is scheduled for completion by the end of 2027, after which it will be permanently deployed on Poland's eastern border. For Masala, the security expert, the drone wall and the Eastern Shield are part of the same strategy: to slow a Russian attack long enough for NATO to react. "It is clear that the USA is withdrawing from Europe and that the Europeans currently lack deep-strike capabilities," he said. "So we have to ask ourselves which strategies make sense in the event of conflict." "One is to aim at delaying the Russians. This is possible with the installations that Poland is building," he added. "The lesson from Ukraine is that not everything always has to be at 150 percent, but that 80% is sometimes enough." Lithuania: 'The Baltic Defense Line' In the office of Raimundas Vaikšnoras, Lithuania's chief of defense, a map of the country lies spread across a table. Marked on it are the positions of German and American troops near the Belarusian border — a reminder that, for Lithuania and its Baltic neighbors, national defense depends on allies being close enough to quickly join the fight. Vaikšnoras, who has led Lithuania's armed forces since 2024, does not think a Russian surprise attack is likely. NATO warning systems, he said, make large troop movements difficult to hide. Lithuania watches rail hubs, logistics sites and when Russia and Belarus hold military exercises across the border, its armed forces respond in kind. "We organize exercises with equally strong or even stronger forces," Vaikšnoras said. "We mirror the movements of the other side." But if Finland is preparing to fight alone if it has to and Poland is building an army capable of doing the same, the Baltic countries do not have that luxury. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are too small, too exposed and too close to Russia and Belarus to trade territory for time. Connected to the rest of NATO by the roughly 65-kilometer-wide (40-mile-wide) Suwałki Gap, they are vulnerable to being cut off by a lightning assault. Their defense rests on a narrower calculation: make sure that NATO comes to their rescue. That makes them the most vulnerable to the Trump administration's unpredictability. And so the Baltic states have set out to bind their security as tightly as possible to the rest of the continent — through border fortifications, pre-positioned obstacles, allied troops on their soil and, above all, a German brigade meant to ensure that any Russian attack would immediately become a European war. In any conflict in the region, the Kremlin would enjoy a clear advantage. Russian troops would be fighting virtually on their own doorstep, while NATO reinforcements would have to move across Europe — and in some cases across the Atlantic — before reaching the front. Kaliningrad compounds the problem. One of Europe's most militarized areas, the Russian territory is packed with air-defense systems, missiles and surveillance technology. In wartime, Russian military units based there could threaten NATO supply routes in the Baltic Sea and along the Polish-Lithuanian border. Lithuania's vulnerability is on display near the village of Lavoriškės, where a red sign warns Lithuanian citizens not to travel across the frontier: "Do not risk your safety — do not travel to Belarus. You may fail to come back." The government closed the crossing in early 2024 on national security grounds. The border is lined with dense coils of razor wire, and rows of triangular concrete blocks — known as dragon's teeth — stand ready to stop enemy tanks. The fortifications are part of the Baltic Defense Line, a joint defense project by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Along NATO's eastern frontier, the three countries are preparing anti-tank ditches, bunkers, defensive obstacles and — more controversially — minefields. Like Finland, the Baltic countries have moved to leave the Ottawa Convention, which prohibits such weapons. "These obstacles make it harder for an attacker to simply roll through," said Ralph Thiele, a retired colonel and chairman of the Political-Military Society in Berlin. "They have to stop, bring in combat engineers and clear a path." If Russian forces break through, they would have "open terrain," Thiele added. Forward defense Vaikšnoras, Lithuania's chief of defense, does not pretend his country can defend itself alone. The border fortifications are intended to slow Russians down, channel enemy forces onto predictable axes of advance and buy time for a response.
The defense of the Baltics relies on how long they can hold out — and, crucially, how quickly NATO can reinforce them. There are already about 3,000 soldiers from other NATO countries in Lithuania, he said in February, including German, Norwegian, Dutch and American troops. Since then, however, the rotational deployment of more than 1,000 US soldiers has ended. Unlike previous rotations, no follow-on force has yet arrived, as Washington reviews its military posture in Europe. This, again, underscores the role European allies are playing on NATO's eastern flank. The most important addition is the German brigade, due to be permanently stationed in Lithuania by the end of 2027, when it is expected to consist of around 5,000 personnel. For years, NATO's presence in the Baltic states was largely based on so-called tripwire forces — that is, multinational units whose purpose was to ensure that any attack on the region would automatically draw the entire Alliance into the conflict. Today, NATO relies on forward defence. The aim is to defend every inch of Alliance territory from the outset. Still, the strategy continues to rely on reinforcements. It is unlikely that the troops stationed in Lithuania at present will be able to fight on their own indefinitely. How long they could hold out depends on how quickly additional NATO troops arrive, as well as on the scale and nature of a possible Russian attack. The German presence is important because the old NATO assumption — that the US would automatically lead any response to a Russian attack — is no longer one Europe can take for granted. "I very clearly feel that we have strong allies by our side," Vaikšnoras said. "The fact that Germany has assumed a leadership role in NATO here is an important signal, including to our own population." What such a leadership role could mean in practice was revealed by the outcome of a wargame conducted late last year by WELT, part of Axel Springer Global Reporters Network, together with the German Wargaming Center at the Bundeswehr University in Hamburg. The exercise tested how Germany would respond if Russia used a post-Ukraine ceasefire to threaten Lithuania — and if Washington declined to play its traditional role as NATO's leader. For one day, former senior politicians, military officers, intelligence officials and security experts took on the roles of the German government, its allies and the Kremlin. The scenario began with Russian troops remaining in Belarus after an exercise instead of withdrawing as announced, then concentrating near Lithuania's border. The result was sobering. While Team Russia moved quickly toward a limited invasion, the German side held crisis meetings and focused on recruiting allies and building political support — rather than preventing Moscow from achieving its military objectives. The new NATO In the old NATO, German hesitation would have mattered less. The US would have been expected to take command politically and militarily, moving troops, aircraft and ships while European governments aligned behind it. But as the US reduces its role in Europe, the defense of the eastern flank increasingly depends on a question the alliance has not yet fully answered: Is Europe ready to fight on its own? Hodges, the former US Army Europe commander, has warned that, in a worst case — if NATO is caught by surprise and Polish troops are unable to provide support — the Baltic countries could have to fight for up to two weeks without additional reinforcements from more distant allies. That is the window of time in which their allies would have to react. German and Lithuanian officials reject the notion that such a scenario would come as a surprise. A Russian attack, they say, would be preceded by visible military preparations, allowing NATO reinforcements early on. Which indicators would trigger such a response is classified. According to that logic, however, reinforcement would require political leaders to act before an attack has actually started. "What we are witnessing is the dissolution of NATO," Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a former NATO secretary-general, has argued. Europe must rethink its defense plans and build the capabilities to act without waiting for Washington. Europe needs "new defense plans and new military capabilities," he said. That calculation is already shaping defense planning across NATO's eastern flank. Finland is making itself more difficult to invade. Poland is building up its military forces, fortifications and drone defense. And the Baltics are working to ensure they won't be left to fight on their own. Europe may not yet be ready to defend itself alone. But on its eastern frontier, it is already preparing for the day when it may have to start. In Finland, Col. Ari Määttä, the Karelian brigade's deputy commander, was asked whether, with America's disengagement, NATO needs to become more European. "That's not a concern I have for my brigade," he said. "I focus on military preparedness. Ask the politicians." Laura Kayali, Senior Defense Correspondent at POLITICO's Paris office, reported from Finland. Marcin Wyrwał, a journalist with Onet, and Philipp Fritz, Warsaw Correspondent for WELT, reported from Poland. Carolina Drüten, International Security Correspondent at WELT, reported from Lithuania. The Axel Springer Global Reporters Network harnesses the resources of the company's newsrooms to publish ambitious scoops, investigations, interviews, opinion pieces and analysis. It allows journalists — including those from POLITICO, Business Insider, WELT, BILD, Onet and Fakt — to collaborate on major stories for an international audience of hundreds of millions across platforms: online, print, TV and audio. If you enjoyed this story, be sure to follow Business Insider on Yahoo.
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太平洋西北海岸與島鏈圍堵 -- Paula Allen
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請參見「中、俄關係」一欄相關貼文。此處不排除「陰謀論」 -- 這些分析/評論旨在挑撥中、俄兩國間「兄弟之邦」的友好關係。
If China recovers Russian Far East coast, it will suddenly outflank island chain Paula Allen, 06/30/26 The West’s strategy to contain China behind island chains risks being bypassed – China could gain free access to the Pacific by recovering territory lost to Russia in the 19th century. This may not be imminent, but it’s increasingly plausible as Russia weakens and becomes ever more dependent on China, and it could happen with little or no warning. If China held the Pacific coast north of North Korea, including the port of Vladivostok (海參崴), its naval forces could reach the Pacific free of current chokepoints and monitoring. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan would face simultaneous strategic exposure across their defences, undersea cables and sea routes. Repossession of the lost Russian Far East would also give China maritime access to the Arctic, as well as control over critical mineral deposits central to the global technology supply chain. China lost more than 1 million square km of Pacific coastline to Russia under the Treaty of Aigun (《璦琿條約》) in 1858 and the Convention of Peking (《北京條約》) in 1860. The territory runs north of North Korea to the Sea of Okhotsk. Its crown is Vladivostok, Russia’s only Pacific naval base east of Sakhalin (庫頁島). The lands were home to Tungusic peoples (通古斯族) before a weakened Qing China was forced to cede the territory through what it calls the unequal treaties. The Soviet Union promised to return it but didn’t. A border clash in 1969 and a friendship treaty in 2001 were meant to settle the matter, but they didn’t. Chinese maps published as recently as 2023 labelled Vladivostok and nearby cities by their Chinese names, prompting sharp protests from Moscow. A leaked 2025 Russian Federal Security Service report, cited by The New York Times, suggests the Kremlin is acutely aware of the risk. Beijing has never renounced the claim. It is simply waiting for the moment the cost of recovery falls below the cost of restraint.
太平洋西北海岸線地圖 The West has monitored China’s naval movements for decades, seeking to constrain its access to the open ocean. Since 2005, American and Japanese surveillance have used the Fish Hook system – a network of hydrophone arrays, patrol aircraft and ship-based sensors – to track submarines and surface vessels through the East and South China seas. Its key chokepoints are in the south: the Miyako (宮古島), Osumi (大隅半島) and Tsushima straits (對馬海峽). The Russian Far East coast sits north of this architecture. Once vessels exit through the La Perouse (澳洲,拉佩魯茲) or Tsugaru straits (津輕海峽) into the North Pacific, persistent tracking depends on mobile assets rather than fixed infrastructure. Those assets are finite. The northern route that Chinese forces have been probing in exercises with Russia threads through waters where allied coverage is weakest. China fears encirclement. In April it ordered companies and research institutions to find ways to protect the trade corridors it depends on. The Northern Sea Route, navigable by surface vessel for roughly five months a year, has become central to that thinking. It is largely free of the chokepoints that constrain Chinese trade elsewhere, save for the Bering Strait and ice. Control of the Russian Far East coast would give China an anchor for that route and remove the last layer of dependence on Russian goodwill to use it. The Russian Far East holds the world’s largest concentration of coal-hosted rare-metal ore deposits. Germanium, critical to semiconductor manufacturing, is found there alongside rare earth elements used in smartphones, radar systems and electric vehicles. The region also holds Russia’s largest gold reserves and significant deposits of silver, titanium, molybdenum, tungsten, copper, tin and iron. China is already the dominant foreign investor in the area, under a bilateral cooperation framework that expired in 2024. Xi Jinping has spoken of both the century of humiliation and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Hong Kong and Macau have been returned. Taiwan remains the unfinished business that draws Western attention. But the Russian Far East represents a different kind of opportunity – one that could arrive not through confrontation but through the slow transfer of leverage as Russia’s position deteriorates. Beijing would not need to seize the territory as a first step, though sovereignty must ultimately be understood as the aim. Preferential access to Vladivostok, long-term lease arrangements, or a boundary revision negotiated from strength could each move the pieces into place. Russia, needing Chinese support to survive Western pressure, may have little room to refuse. For Xi, the stakes are personal as well as strategic. No Chinese ruler since the Qing emperors has governed a China of this size. Recovering the Russian Far East would cement his place in history as the leader who presided over a greater, resurgent China, the world’s new power. That is not a footnote to his ambition. It may be the point of it. The West has built its containment architecture around a set of geographic assumptions. Those assumptions should be revisited. Paula Allen is an investment strategist specialising in the intersection of geopolitics, megatrends and capital flows. * Image (top) of Vladivostok: Natalia Kolesnikova/AFP via Getty Images. * Image (middle) of a map of Eurasia with overlays indicating island chains and cessions: pop_jop/Getty Images/Claude. AI contributed no ideas to this article – Paula Allen.
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歐洲走上獨立於美國之外的路 - Marina Henke等
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Europe Goes Its Own Way Drifting From America, the Continent Is Rearming and Reordering Itself Marina Henke, Iren Marinova, and Till Knobloch, 06/29/26 Europeans have been humiliated, disparaged, and sidelined since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to office in 2025. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that Europe has become the president’s favorite punching bag. The continent is, his administration believes, militarily emaciated, economically irrelevant, politically unfit, and culturally doomed to civilizational erasure. Trump’s attempt to coerce Denmark into relinquishing Greenland in 2025 was symbolic of the administration’s dismissive attitude. So set is Washington in its beliefs about Europe, however, that it has overlooked the profound changes that are taking place. For the first time in decades, Europeans recognize the dangers that surround them. They are, accordingly, willing to invest in military resources and serve in their countries’ armed forces. From these shifts a new grand strategy is slowly being forged, which signals a new European geopolitical and strategic trajectory. Europe has come to recognize that its old paradigm—wealth without military strength, influence without sacrifice, and protection without obligation—is no longer sustainable. To dismiss Europe as permanently irrelevant is to ignore the scale and depth of the changes that are now underway. For decades, European countries reflexively aligned themselves with Washington’s priorities. They were even willing to send their soldiers to fight in U.S.-led wars that many of their publics—and at times their governments—regarded as misguided, peripheral, or strategically costly. A Europe that invests seriously in its own defense will no longer do that—and Washington had better get ready. EUROPE AWAKENS After decades of complacency, Europeans have awakened to the reality that they live in a dangerous world. According to polling conducted for the European Commission, 77 percent of Europeans think that Russia’s war in Ukraine represents a direct threat to Europe’s survival. Concern is strongest in eastern and northern Europe, but 59 percent of respondents in Germany, 50 percent in France, and 49 percent in the United Kingdom also consider Russia the greatest threat to their country’s national security. These are Europe’s largest and most powerful states. The Russian threat is thus no longer a concern confined to Europe’s periphery. It has moved to the heart of the continent. This sense of insecurity is increased by the fact that many Europeans now realize that they can no longer rely on the United States. According to a YouGov poll commissioned by the European Council on Foreign Relations in May, only 11 percent of Europeans across the 15 surveyed countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) viewed the United States as an ally—down sharply from 16 percent six months earlier and 22 percent in November 2024. While confidence in the United States has been steadily declining in most surveyed countries, it is a more recent development in Hungary and Poland. Majorities in every country surveyed expressed doubt that the United States would come to their defense in the event of an attack, while 25 percent of respondents now see the United States as either a rival or an adversary. Given the Russian threat and U.S. unreliability, many Europeans now support military buildups. Majorities in Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Poland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom favor increasing national defense expenditures. Italy is the only country where a clear majority remains opposed. Remarkably, across the 15 countries surveyed, 47 percent of respondents now support collective EU borrowing to finance defense initiatives, with 59 percent in favor in Portugal, 56 percent in Denmark, and 55 percent in the Netherlands. Until very recently, this idea was politically unthinkable. Equally striking, majorities now also favor cutting Europe’s dependence on U.S. military hardware and turning instead to European alternatives. Support for buying European is especially pronounced in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Finally, majorities in France, Germany, and Poland now support reinstating mandatory military service, which is already in place in countries such as Denmark, Estonia, and Switzerland. Poland and Germany ended compulsory conscription in 2010 and 2011, respectively, whereas France phased out mandatory military service in the late 1990s. Over the past 30 years, support for conscription in many European countries had become a minority position. Today, it is becoming increasingly mainstream. GOING IT ALONE European defense spending is going through the roof. In 2024, the 27 EU member states spent approximately $402 billion on defense, far surpassing Russia’s military outlays of $160 billion. Germany has taken a leading role, and Berlin now accounts for roughly a quarter of total EU defense spending, making it the world’s fourth-largest military spender. It is on track to spend $172 billion (or roughly 3.6 percent of its GDP) by 2029—an increase of almost 200 percent from 2022. In most European states, this increase has been welcomed as a necessary measure to deter Russia. As Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski put it in April: “As long as Germany is a member of the EU and NATO, I am more afraid of a German aversion to armament than I am of the German army.” France, meanwhile, worries that German rearmament threatens a long-standing division of labor: Germany as Europe’s economic power, France as its military-strategic power. Paris is adjusting to this new reality by trying to bind Germany to a system of French-German defense industrial cooperation—so far with mixed success. To reduce its dependence on U.S. equipment, Europe is also ramping up its military-industrial capacity. In Berlin, startups such as Helsing and Stark Defense are competing for multibillion-euro drone contracts. Meanwhile, Quantum Frontline Industries, a German-Ukrainian defense venture, started industrial-scale drone production near Munich earlier this year. Although Berlin is still at the beginning of its endeavors to develop autonomous capabilities, it can draw on decades of experience in heavy equipment manufacturing. Rheinmetall, Germany’s largest defense contractor, is partnering with the Italian defense company Leonardo on the production of more than 1,000 new infantry fighting vehicles and up to 350 Panther KF51 main battle tanks for the Italian army. Such developments are not confined to equipment. Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Sweden have reintroduced compulsory military service in response to Russian aggression. Germany, which suspended conscription in 2011, has decided to reactivate military service. Since it is initially relying on voluntary enlistment, policymakers including German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier questioned whether sufficient numbers of young men would sign up for the armed forces, or Bundeswehr. But their fears have proved unfounded. By the end of March 2026, 12,700 people were completing voluntary military service in the Bundeswehr, up 13.5 percent from the previous year, while around 22,700 had applied for a military career, a gain of 20 percent. This development puts the German armed forces on track to approach the country’s medium-term target of 260,000 active soldiers and 200,000 reservists by the mid-2030s, advancing Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s stated goal of making the Bundeswehr once again “the strongest conventional army in Europe.” In Sweden, the shift is even more astounding: it has more qualified and motivated applicants to serve in its armed forces than it can absorb and accepts less than ten percent of the eligible young people who apply. THE ROAD AHEAD After the Cold War, most European countries made economic prosperity rather than national security the organizing principle of their grand strategy. At the heart of this vision lay a deep faith in global trade. Economic interdependence, their policymakers believed, would moderate political conflict and make war less likely. Where states remained unruly, Europe sought to discipline and transform them through aid, trade, law, regulation, and standards. This was the grand strategy: to govern geopolitics through markets, rules, and integration. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shattered this notion, and the search for a grand new design began. Merz has provided the most coherent account of it so far, articulating the concept of “principled realism” in an essay in Foreign Affairs. At its core, his grand strategic framework features a cold-eyed analysis. The international order, which was based on rights and rules, no longer exists, and we have entered an era that is instead governed by the naked exercise of power. Germany must adapt and reenter the realm of hard power—undertaking large-scale military rearmament, overhauling its armed forces and intelligence services, and sustaining support for Ukraine for as long as necessary. Yet in this transformation, Germany must not lose sight of the principles of democracy, the rule of law, and international cooperation that have guided it since 1945. Although it cannot uphold the global rules-based order single-handedly, it can help shape a regional order—and perhaps even an order among like-minded states outside Europe—that preserves a minimum of stability and predictability. In this context, relations with the United States will be adjusted, not abandoned. A sentimental friendship will become a pragmatic partnership. A renewed tendency toward European cooperation can be seen across the continent. Brexit has shown the economic costs of leaving the European single market, with a study by the National Bureau of Economic Research estimating that British GDP in 2025 was six to eight percent lower than it would have been had the United Kingdom not left the European Union. Meanwhile, Switzerland, which never joined the EU, has been engaged in difficult and costly negotiations with the United States over tariffs, underscoring the vulnerabilities of small states in bilateral power-based bargaining. The opposite approach was demonstrated when Trump pressured Denmark over Greenland. That clash proved that even a small state can withstand great-power coercion when backed by European partners—an outcome Copenhagen would have struggled to achieve alone. As a consequence, even Iceland is reconsidering its long-standing opposition to EU membership, and a majority of British citizens now favor rejoining the EU. European states recognize that collective action and alliances are essential, as few can effectively defend their interests in isolation. WHAT COULD GO WRONG? This strategic alignment can be put in jeopardy. Differences in national preferences persist, and Euroskeptic parties threaten the continent’s cohesion. Polls currently show France’s National Rally winning next year’s presidential election. Although the party has softened its earlier calls for the country to leave NATO and the EU, it remains committed to an agenda that would weaken French support for deeper European integration, constrain cooperation with Brussels, and complicate efforts to strengthen European security cooperation. Meanwhile, the Euroskeptic party Alternative for Germany (AfD) has emerged as a major force, polling at around 28 percent nationally. Although institutional barriers and coalition politics make it unlikely that the AfD will capture the German chancellorship in the near term, the party’s increasing power at the state level will limit the country’s dedication to European rearmament initiatives. It is therefore unlikely that the EU, with its 27 often unruly members, will be able to jointly adopt any new grand strategic framework—let alone the institutional adaptations required to implement it. For the bloc to truly turn into a defense institution, it would need to move toward a majority voting mechanism, which would require each member state to transfer sovereignty to Brussels. Even in the most pro-EU states, there is little appetite for such a profound overhaul. The likeliest development, then, is the emergence of overlapping European security institutions. NATO will remain fundamental, but Europeans will likely begin to slowly take over responsibility for the organization’s planning, leadership, and manpower. Alongside NATO will be clusters of European states that seek deeper strategic integration. A successful recent example of this development is the Joint Expeditionary Force. This British-led military framework of ten northern European states is designed for rapid, flexible crisis response—especially in the Arctic, North Atlantic, and Baltic Sea regions. Another example is a French-led “advanced deterrence” initiative for which nine other European countries have signed up. Under this arrangement, the ten countries’ militaries will participate in exercises involving France’s air-launched nuclear forces and host air bases capable of accommodating French nuclear-capable aircraft. Participating countries will also contribute to the development of supporting capabilities, including space-based early warning systems, air defense to intercept drones and missiles, and long-range strike systems. The initiative is focused on the integration of nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as on finding a European response to Russian nuclear blackmail—the most plausible and immediate nuclear scenario Europe may face in the years ahead—and for which U.S. forces might not stand ready to help. ACROSS THE WATER Transatlantic tensions are nothing new. European relations with Washington suffered over the botched British, French, and Israeli attempt to seize the Suez Canal in 1956, over U.S. actions in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and over the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Yet the current level of conflict between Washington and European capitals is unprecedented. So, too, is the action that Europe is taking to ensure its own security. Russia may be a formidable nuclear power, but it lacks the economic and technological foundations of a superpower. As a result, Europe’s ambition to achieve its security goals is realistic in the medium term. A Europe responsible for its own security has not been seen for almost a century. During the Cold War, Europe depended on the United States; those days are gone. It would be a mistake for Europe to simply wait out Trump and hope for a more sympathetic U.S. president. The war in Ukraine may be decided before the Trump presidency ends, and with it the future balance of power on the European continent. Europe, therefore, cannot defer the hard choices about its own defense in the hope that Washington will eventually return to form. Nor would Trump’s departure necessarily restore the old order. Many Europeans now suspect that even a future Democratic administration would be pulled inexorably toward the Indo-Pacific, where the United States increasingly sees China as its central strategic competitor. Finally, Trump’s assault on democratic institutions, combined with the broader erosion of governing capacity in Washington, has raised doubts about whether the United States will remain able—or be seen as able—to honor its commitments in a moment of crisis. If Moscow, Beijing, or any other adversary comes to believe that the United States is too fractured, distracted, or depleted to respond with force and speed, Europe cannot afford to be left improvising. It must have its own answer ready. Although the Trump administration might applaud the changes in Europe, their downsides have already become apparent. As the United States initiated Operation Epic Fury in February, Spain would not allow U.S. warplanes access to its airspace, and the United Kingdom would not allow U.S. forces to use the Diego Garcia base. Later, Merz publicly criticized the ongoing war—much to Trump’s fury. New economic, political and social constituencies are emerging that will block any full restoration of the transatlantic bond. Future relations may be friendly and they may be close. But they will be different. MARINA HENKE is Professor of International Relations at the Hertie School and Director of its Centre for International Security. IREN MARINOVA is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. TILL KNOBLOCH is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
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俄國財政崩盤是普丁垮台前兆 - Jason Ma
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請參考: * Putin: Russia is facing problems in Ukraine war (06/29) * In Viral Post, Russian Veteran Warns Putin Of Mutiny, Then Walks Back Threat The end of Putin’s regime will spring from war spending chaos, former central bank advisor says, amid military mutiny threat and fuel-shortage brawls Jason Ma, 06/28/26 Vladimir Putin's grip on power has remained resilient despite the economic woes caused by his invasion of Ukraine, but the seeds of an eventual decline may have already been planted, according to a former Russian central bank advisor. A telltale sign is the Kremlin's abandonment of any fiscal discipline as the costs of fighting the Ukraine war, which is now in its fifth year, strain existing resources. Alexandra Prokopenko, who is now a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, pointed out in a recent Financial Times op-ed that the war has forced Russia to unwind its long-touted fiscal restraint. In a striking example of the turnaround, Russia's parliament recently gave the finance ministry a blank check to spend more and borrow past its debt ceiling without a formal budget or explicit legislative approval. That's as the budget deficit through May is already double 2025's full-year level, hitting 2.6% of GDP, or about $83 billion. At the same time, Russia's sovereign wealth fund, which has been tapped to cover budget shortfalls, is being rapidly depleted and just a fraction of prewar levels. "A cornered autocracy is rewriting the fiscal rules as it goes, cutting parliament out of the loop, and will not admit to dangers it cannot control," Prokopenko wrote. "It's less dramatic than a palace coup, but this is what decline looks like." The precipitous deterioration in Russia's finances coincides with Ukraine's stunning military successes this year. Advanced drones and new tactics have allowed Kyiv to not hold off the Russian military's attacks but push them back and regain territory. Long-range drones are also reaching deep into Russia, including St. Petersburg and Moscow, targeting refineries and the defense industrial base. The result has been devastating battlefield casualties that now outpace the ability to raise fresh recruits as well as soaring death-benefit payouts and widespread fuel shortages across the country. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has been unable to defend against all of Ukraine's drone attacks, forcing companies to spend more than $1 billion of their own money on makeshift protection. But Moscow also refuses to reimburse them. Putin's "juggling act" has now come to an end as he can no longer fund his war, keep a lid on inflation, and continue growing the economy all at once, Prokopenko said. "The war is increasingly paid for by quietly invoicing the population and suspending the state's own rules," she added. "A regime sustained this way is heading for a poorer, angrier country, a financial system out of control, and war funding it cannot count on. The end, when it comes, will spring from this kind of decline, the sort that begins long before anyone names it." For now, Putin's grip on power is secure, but public discontent is growing as average citizens buckle under the pressure of high inflation and onerous interest rates. Russia's fuel shortage has added to the misery, creating long lines at gas stations with motorists waiting for hours to fill up. Frustration is boiling over, and fights are breaking out between people struggling to buy rationed supplies of gasoline. In addition, the Russian military's "meat-grinder" tactics in Ukraine, where troops suffer ruinous losses for barely any gain, are creating a backlash. In fact, the average life expectancy of a new recruit is about 10 days to three weeks, and once on the battlefield, their survival averages just 20-35 minutes, according to Russian military bloggers. One Russian blogger, who is a veteran the Ukraine war going by the name Aleksandr Lunin, posted a video on Thursday that went viral. In it, he described regular torture of soldiers by their own commanders, according to Radio Free Europe. Lunin also demanded a live, on-air meeting with Putin and warned that if it did not take place soon, "the army will turn its weapons against the Kremlin." He added that he was relaying the sentiment of active-duty military and security officials who met with him earlier. But he walked back the mutiny threat on Friday, explaining that if soldiers wanted to rebel, they would do it quietly and not ask him to issue a warning for them. Still, the original video was so widespread that Putin's spokesman was asked to comment on it, and said the Kremlin was aware "that such an appeal exists." Peter Frankopan, a professor of global history at the University of Oxford, cautioned in a Foreign Policy article that a revolution in Russia is not likely. Instead, continued economic pain and disenchantment over the war will convince certain factions in the regime "that it is time for a new start," he said, adding that "today's cracks can become tomorrow's fissures." But that could also make Putin more dangerous as fights to cling to power, raising the risk of escalation in Ukraine or other parts of Europe. "Beware the drowning man: The coming months will likely be dangerous outside and inside Russia as Putin tries desperately to stay afloat," Frankopan warned. This story was originally featured on Fortune.com
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美國不再具有全球一哥實力 -- Nick Lichtenberg
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Ray Dalio just finished a 10-day trip to China. He says global leaders know America ‘doesn’t have what it takes to fight to maintain its empire’ Nick Lichtenberg, 06/24/26 Ray Dalio has spent 42 years visiting China, building relationships with senior officials and studying its political history back to 221 BCE. But after a recent 10-day trip to Beijing—part of a monthlong tour of Asia—the Bridgewater Associates founder says something has changed, and changed fast. "Over the past few months there has been a big shift in the world order," Dalio wrote in a sweeping essay published June 18 on LinkedIn, where his newsletter has 750,000 subscribers. (A truncated version of the piece also previously appeared in the Financial Times.) The catalyst, in Dalio's telling, was the United States' handling of Iran's seizure of the Strait of Hormuz. The episode convinced leaders across Asia—including those who host American military bases—of something they had long suspected but never quite said aloud: that the American public "does not have the willingness to endure the discomforts of war," and that Washington "doesn't have what it takes to fight to maintain its empire." The historical parallel Dalio reaches for is pointed. "This situation looks a lot like the British handling of Egypt's taking of the Suez Canal," he wrote, "which signaled the end of the British Empire." It is a comparison that Dalio has been building toward for months: In March, he wrote in Fortune that the 2020s feel like "the rise of a new type of world order" resembling "pre-1945 world orders with great powers conflicts and gunboat diplomacy"—a view he illustrated with a Bank of America chart tracing 2,000 years of GDP dominance that showed China's current ascent as a return to historical norms, not a disruption of them. A new hierarchy takes shape and the righting of a 100-year wound What Dalio observed in Beijing was not an adversarial standoff but rather a diplomatic migration. World leaders, he says, are now traveling to meet President Xi Jinping to "build tribute-type relationships"—a phrase that is the essay's central thesis. We are, he argued, witnessing the early emergence of a modern version of China's ancient tribute system (朝貢制度): a hierarchical but nonmilitary order in which smaller powers acknowledge Chinese primacy in exchange for economic access and stability. The diplomatic traffic has been visible: President Trump made a state visit to Beijing in May, a trip that McKinsey's China practice leaders believe reflects a U.S.-China relationship that is no longer "in free fall"—though Dalio would argue the direction of that stabilization matters as much as the fact of it. The tribute system governed Chinese foreign relations for roughly 2,000 years, from about 200 BCE until the late 19th century. It was not an empire in the Western sense, as China did not occupy or control subordinate states. Instead, it expected deference and received it—with rewards for good relationships and punishments, typically economic, for bad ones. "In the tribute system, relations are not between equals," Dalio wrote, "but between superiors and subordinates that recognize their relative positions in the hierarchy." The last tribute system, historians know, crumbled under what the Chinese call the "100 Years of Humiliation"—a century of foreign invasion, unequal treaties, and national trauma that began with Britain's defeat of China in the Opium War of 1839 and ended only with the founding of the People's Republic in 1949. Dalio's lens on the dramatic events that saw the British take control of Hong Kong and open Chinese ports to foreign trade, among other things, focuses on the terms of trade that China was forced to accept and its diminishing influence over Taiwan, Korea, and the South China Sea. These are all situations that, he argues, China will seek to reverse now that the U.S. has played its hand—but China will do so in a very un-American way. "The full story of the 100 Years of Humiliation remains vivid in Chinese leaders' and most Chinese people's minds," Dalio wrote, arguing that it is not history to them, but a wound that reunification with Taiwan would help close. Xi has been saying as much publicly. In April, as the Iran crisis was roiling global markets and the IMF was cutting its global growth forecast to 3.1%, Xi told Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez that the international order was "crumbling into disarray"—using a Chinese phrase that connotes not just chaos but moral decay. Fortune reported at the time that the comment reflected Beijing's view that the current moment of U.S. retrenchment represented not a crisis to be weathered, but an opportunity to be seized. Dalio said he suspects that Xi wants that reunification achieved during a potential new term beginning in 2028. Taiwan's own presidential election is scheduled for January of that year, and the island's KMT opposition party—which favors closer ties with Beijing—has been quietly meeting with both Xi and members of the U.S. Congress. A KMT victory could open the door to a Hong Kong–style arrangement, Dalio suggests, without requiring American military intervention or Chinese military force. Dalio believes that the model is returning and that Xi is actively engineering it through a new version of the 19th-century tribute system. Fighting without fighting Dalio's framework for understanding Chinese strategy draws heavily on Sun Tzu's The Art of War, which he recommended that readers study. Its central insight, as Dalio applies it: "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." In practice, that means China will pursue reunification with Taiwan and the dismantling of U.S. containment policies not through direct military confrontation but through relentless indirect pressure—economic, diplomatic, financial. The analogy Dalio offers is the difference between chess and Go. Chess is about annihilating your opponent. Go is about limiting their area of influence. "China can gain ground by simply making the threats and not facing resistance," he wrote. "There is a good chance that the war will be so subtly fought that we won't see it being fought." The most significant sign of this shift, Dalio says, was a private exchange between Xi and President Trump: Xi made clear, "in the form of a veiled threat," that planned U.S. arms sales to Taiwan "would not be appreciated." Dalio expects Trump to ultimately cancel those sales. If he doesn't, Dalio predicted China will respond with a dramatic demonstration of force—something far more severe than the military exercises that followed Nancy Pelosi's 2022 visit to Taipei. The leverage China holds over Taiwan is not merely military. It is technological. Taiwan produces the overwhelming majority of the world's most advanced semiconductors—the chips that power AI. Dalio puts it bluntly: "AI is everything, and AI without Taiwan is nothing." A Chinese blockade of chip exports, he noted, would not need to happen. The threat alone would be enough to crater global stock markets, particularly AI-related equities. And China is racing toward the moment when such leverage becomes even more one-sided—Dalio said Beijing plans to achieve chip self-sufficiency by late 2027, while the U.S. and its allies remain dependent on Taiwanese production. What this means for markets For investors, Dalio's message is structurally bearish on U.S. primacy. China's external economy—what he calls "China, Inc."—is generating massive export surpluses and accumulating financial assets at speed. The renminbi's role in global trade is growing. Chinese companies are "understandably reluctant to accumulate American assets that can be sanctioned." Capital is flowing away from the dollar-denominated system that has underpinned global finance for 80 years. "The world order is now in the process of changing from a U.S.-led, multilateral, rules-based order to a bipolar, power-based, hierarchical order," Dalio wrote.
Fortune senior contributing columnist Steve Hanke made a similar case ahead of Trump's May state visit to Beijing, arguing that China had spent six years methodically building leverage the U.S. no longer has—dominating rare earths, critical minerals, and materials supply chains that underpin both defense and AI hardware. "China has intellectual firepower and technical firepower," Hanke said in May. "The real strategic winner has been China." Where Dalio frames that leverage in historical and cultural terms, Hanke frames it in the blunter language of commodity markets: The U.S. simply doesn't control what it needs to control. Dalio, who has been wrong about a third of his market calls by his own accounting, was careful to hedge, but not on the big picture. The tribute system, he believes, is not a metaphor for what is coming. It is the operating manual. "Just having power, showing it, and not having to use it is very effective," he concludes, "and in keeping with the Chinese approach." For this story, Fortune journalists used generative AI as a research tool. An editor verified the accuracy of the information before publishing. This story was originally featured on Fortune.com
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五角大廈釐清美「中國戰略」 - Ken Moriyasu
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下文最大的問題,在於作者森保先生的「論述前提」不能成立;至少,有相當大的爭議。如果:川普和赫格塞斯兩人,頭腦都清楚、都有戰略素養、都能一邊走路一邊嚼口香糖而不摔跤,則這篇文章的觀點也許還有個立足點。可惜,美、伊「和議草案」曝光後,很清楚的顯示: 主導伊朗戰爭的川普和赫格塞斯,恐怕連把腳踏車直直停的本事都沒有;我甚至懷疑他們兩人能把「戰略」這個英文字正確的寫出來。 至於森保先生的三個申論是:自說自話,自由聯想,還是「取證偏執」(或者說他在「發台灣燒」),就有待網友們自行判斷了。 Why dropping ‘Indo-Pacific’ clarifies the Pentagon’s China strategy By removing ‘Indo’ from the name of its largest command, US has told India, China, its allies and Pakistan exactly where they stand Ken Moriyasu, 06/18/26 On June 16, the US Department of Defense announced that the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will officially revert to its previous name, the US Pacific Command (PACOM). The move reverses a decision made during President Donald Trump’s first term to include “Indo” in the name of its largest combatant command. This publication reported in June 2018 that the original change “highlights the increasing significance of India in Washington’s strategic thinking and also marks India’s re-entry into the American government’s ‘Asia Nexus.’” As much as New Delhi may protest, this change signals the opposite: the decreasing significance of India in Washington’s strategic thinking – and its exit from the American government’s “Asia Nexus.” There were already hints of this in US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in late May. “India was mentioned last,” an Asian diplomat in attendance recalled. Hegseth praised the efforts of South Korea, the Philippines, Japan, Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam before finally turning to India. A strong India, “acting in its own self-interest,” advances a shared goal of maintaining a regional balance of power, he said – hardly a description of a core ally in a coordinated strategy. This name change, however, does not represent a toning down of competition with Beijing. On the contrary, it clarifies where competition with China will actually be fought — and where it will not. The decision moves the strategy in the right direction. There are three key takeaways. First, the fact that the Pentagon made this significant move absent any immediate trigger suggests it is sending a deliberate message: the Indian Ocean is not central to dealing with China. That message is aimed at both allies and Beijing itself. To its allies, it signals that in a potential conflict with China, the United States will concentrate on the Taiwan Strait, operating primarily from Japan and the Philippines. In all other regions, allies and partners will be expected to take primary responsibility for conventional defense. South Korea will deter North Korea, Europe will confront Russia and the Indian Ocean will largely fall to India to monitor and control. Symbolically, Hegseth made no mention of “Indo-Pacific” in his Shangri-La speech, nor did he reference Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s efforts to “update” the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept championed by her mentor, the late Shinzo Abe. Japan’s region-wide strategic framing may soon require a rethink. To China, the message is equally clear: in a crisis, the US will prioritize the Taiwan Strait above all other theaters. Second, the shift signals that India is being written out of the core contingency that matters most: Taiwan. Washington believes Chinese President Xi Jinping has instructed the People’s Liberation Army to be ready to take Taiwan by force, if necessary, by 2027. The Trump administration has little patience for fence-sitters. It is prioritizing allies such as South Korea and the Philippines – who act like they “live on the front lines,” as Hegseth said. India is not aligned, and Washington is no longer hoping that one day it will be. Third – and most intriguingly – by treating India as a normal partner rather than a strategic centerpiece, Washington gains greater flexibility in dealing with Pakistan, India’s archrival. Trump has turned to Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir as a key backchannel to Tehran, relied on him in defusing the 2025 India-Pakistan crisis and invited him to discussions on expanding the Abraham Accords. Pakistan matters not because of India, but because of China’s westward pivot. Over the past 15 years, China has steadily reduced its reliance on maritime energy routes through Indian Ocean chokepoints, such as the Malacca and Hormuz straits, shifting instead toward overland pipelines across Central Asia. In responding to this Chinese pivot to Eurasia, Pakistan – not India – emerges as the more relevant partner. The return to PACOM reflects these strategic realities. It is a recognition that clarity, not geographic sprawl or vague values-based alignments, will define how the US competes with China. And it is the right move. Ken Moriyasu, a former correspondent for the Japanese newspaper Nikkei, is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. Sign up for one of our free newsletters 請至原網頁登錄 * The Daily ReportStart your day right with Asia Times' top stories * AT Weekly ReportA weekly roundup of Asia Times' most-read stories
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中東停戰中國偷笑 -- Simone McCarthy
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China is counting its wins from the Iran war Analysis by Simone McCarthy, CNN, 06/20/26 When US and Israeli bombs first began falling on Iran at the end of February, China's leaders were staring at the very real possibility of another friendly regime being decapitated, much like had happened with Venezuela only weeks before. The view is quite different nearly four months later: the United States and Iran have reached an interim agreement after weeks of peace talks, but the regime in Tehran remains in place and the war is widely seen to have exposed the limits of American power. Meanwhile, Beijing's own diplomatic clout has appeared to rise – as it's hosted a parade of foreign leaders and cast itself as a proponent of peace, even earning repeated praise from US President Donald Trump for its response to the war. The world's second largest economy has also weathered the historic energy crunch triggered by the conflict better than many of its neighbors – in particular due to its copious strategic oil reserves and embrace of green tech and electric vehicles. China's Foreign Ministry welcomed the announcement of a US-Iran deal in comments this week, with a spokesperson saying Beijing "stands ready" to play an active role in "restoring peace and tranquility" to the Middle East. When asked whether Beijing had a hand in the agreement, the spokesperson, Lin Jian, didn't confirm any specific role. But he also didn't hesitate to point to China's "tireless" efforts to end the war, including through leader Xi Jinping's release of a four-point peace proposal in April. And that praise wasn't only emanating from Beijing. "I want to thank China, President Xi … he stayed neutral, totally neutral, and I appreciate it," Trump said at a G7 press conference in France on Wednesday, noting how the Chinese leader didn't use his country's naval might to defy the US blockade on Iranian ports. "They didn't do that. President Xi helped me. He tried to help, and I think he probably helped get it solved," Trump added. China walked a careful diplomatic line during the conflict. It condemned the US and Israeli attack on Iran and continued to buy Iranian oil, in defiance of US sanctions. But it also kept communications open with players on both sides. Numerous foreign leaders have made their way to Beijing as the conflict has worn on – including Trump last month, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi days earlier, and leaders of Pakistan, the conflict's main mediator. Early in negotiations, Tehran had been eager to secure China's backing as a guarantor in a peace deal, but Beijing has shown little interest in playing such a formal - and potentially vexed - role. On Wednesday, China's top diplomat Wang Yi spoke with Araghchi over the phone and called for navigation in the Strait of Hormuz to be "properly handled." "The dawn of peace has emerged. The key to the next step is for all parties to truly implement their commitments and eliminate interference from all sides," Wang said. It's not clear whether or to what degree Beijing used its diplomatic weight to backchannel toward the latest agreement, a memorandum of understanding formally signed Wednesday, triggering a 60-day period to negotiate the final terms of a deal. But for Beijing, these very public visits amplified its message that while others are waging war, it is a responsible global power – and power broker. Debating the 'Suez moment' As the two sides enter into the next phase of negotiation, observers are watching closely for what exactly the US gained from a conflict that took a heavy global economic toll. In China – where opposition to a US-dominated world order is a tenet of foreign policy – political thinkers have also been debating how the conflict has impacted the US' place on the global stage. Some pundits are asking whether the conflict is a so-called "Suez moment" for the US, a reference to Britain's loss of control over the Suez Canal in the 1950s, widely seen as a bellwether for Britain's international decline and its eclipse by the US as a global power. "Is the scene that cast a shadow over the British Empire during the Suez crisis now being replayed for the United States in the Strait of Hormuz?" asked Sun Degang, director of Fudan University's Center for Middle Eastern Studies in Shanghai, in an opinion piece published Tuesday in China's state-run Global Times. "Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has become the world's 'sole superpower,'" Sun said. This time, however, "US military power did not prove as overwhelmingly powerful as Washington had imagined," while the absence of key allies backing its war is a sign that "the US-led global alliance system has shown increasing signs of division," he wrote. It's a question that's also been debated in the West, but in China, some voices have also spelled out a view that Beijing has gained from Washington's war. "China has no interest in wearing the 'victor's halo' of a distant Middle Eastern war," political commentator Hu Xijin wrote on the social media platform Weibo earlier this week. But the conflict has influenced the world's perception of China – showing the success of its "strategic planning" to weather energy shocks and the appeal of its peaceful "development path," he said. The war has also "significantly diminished" the US' overall deterrent power when it comes to Taiwan, Hu wrote, pointing to how it showed limits in US munitions stockpiles and its inability to form a Western coalition even against an isolated enemy like Iran. China claims the self-ruling Taiwan as its own and has not ruled out using force to take control of the democratic island. "What leverage does the US have to convince its allies in Europe to go head-to-head with China for American interests?" Hu wrote. China's balancing act How China responds to what it sees as a diminished US is an open question. Beijing has long positioned itself as the champion of a "multipolar world" and it's likely to use the conflict to push for another change it wants to see in the world: the end of security environment dominated by the US and its alliances. Throughout the war, however, Beijing looked to carefully navigate its interests, rather than taking a front seat in conflict resolution or overtly picking sides. While backing its longtime partner Iran rhetorically, China has been measured in its criticism of the US for sparking the conflict and held multiple calls and meetings with Gulf states that came under Iran's attack. Beijing is widely seen to have pushed Tehran toward talks with Washington earlier this spring, even as Chinese companies – according to the US government – have supported Tehran's weapons procurement. Beijing broadly denies providing weapons to countries in conflict. That Xi was able to host Trump for a friendly meeting last month, despite these assessments and while China held its longstanding place as the largest buyer of Iranian oil, may be testament to Beijing's clout – and its carefully calibrated balancing act. But observers in China also say that a potential "Suez moment" for the US wouldn't mean China automatically takes its place at the top of the world order. And Chinese officials and analysts have long said that Beijing doesn't want to be a superpower in the mold of the US. "The US remains the most powerful external actor in the Middle East. What has changed is that its dominance now requires far greater political, military, economic and reputational costs," Sun Chenghao, a fellow at Tsinghua University's Center for International Security and Strategy in Beijing, told CNN. The conflict may make China's worldview – emphasizing sovereignty, non-interference, political settlement and development-oriented security – more attractive to many countries, he said. "But credibility is built not only through criticism of US actions; it also depends on whether China can provide practical diplomatic solutions, protect energy stability, and help create conditions for de-escalation." For more CNN news and newsletters create an account at CNN.com
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美、伊議和之幾家歡樂幾家愁 - Ben Farmer
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請參考: * Trump says deal to end war with Iran already signed and details to be released 'pretty soon'
The winners and losers of the Iran war Ben Farmer, 06/15/26 A deal to end the Iran war has finally been agreed, Donald Trump has said, almost four months after the US and Israel launched their attacks on Tehran. The conflict has torn apart the Middle East, choked the global economy and tested some of the world's greatest powers. This is how the war has affected some of the key players. Iran Iran has been hammered by air strikes by the US and Israel, which enjoyed nearly complete air dominance during their campaign. Its conventional navy has been sunk, and many senior leaders, including Ayatollah Khomeini, have been killed. An economy which was suffering badly before Feb 28 is now in even worse shape. However, the regime remains in control and analysts say that, if anything, it is more hard line than before. Tehran still has substantial missile and drone stocks, even though its defence industry appears to have been badly damaged. While much of Iran's uranium enrichment infrastructure was destroyed or badly damaged by Israel and the US's earlier bombing campaign in June 2025, a large part of the highly enriched uranium it amassed is thought to have survived in Iranian hands. Perhaps most importantly, Iran has shown its control over the Strait of Hormuz. The strait has been reopened through negotiation with Iranian permission, not through US force of arms. Meanwhile, there appears to be no credible alternative to the Iranian regime, which killed thousands of its own people in January. United States The US has faced less economic disruption from the war than some countries, but it has not been pain-free. Petrol prices at the pump have risen by half, and Americans have spent nearly $450 extra per household on rising energy costs. Polling shows they blame the war for their cost of living increase, and they are not happy with the way Washington has handled it. The US military colossus was able to strike at will, but the war showed limits to its might. Air strikes did not remove the regime, or break its grip. Tehran has for decades readied for such a one-sided war by hiding away missiles and nuclear material and building cheap drones to strike back. Iran damaged 20 US military sites across the region. Diplomatically, trust in the US has been further eroded, allies complain. Mr Trump plunged the Middle East into crisis with little consultation and has left allies to pick up the pieces. Donald Trump The US president has forged a war that has been increasingly unpopular with his Maga base and which most Americans were sceptical about. A Fox News poll in late May reported that 60 per cent of Americans opposed the war. Such unease has fed into a slide in Mr Trump's approval ratings. And his deal to end the war has also not delivered on his main goals, at least not yet. The White House in April said his "clear and unchanging" objectives were to wipe out Iran's missile stocks and production, annihilate its navy, sever its support for terrorist proxies, and ensure it never acquired a nuclear weapon. He has come closest with regards to Iran's navy, though Tehran retains a "mosquito fleet" of speedboats to harass shipping in the strait. Missile stocks have been cut by as much as half, according to some estimates, and manufacturing has been degraded, but not knocked out. Iran still has enriched uranium, the wider nuclear issue has been kicked down the road, and Tehran continues to sponsor proxies across the Middle East, though these have been significantly weakened since 2023. The largest initial result of the agreement appears to be the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which was open and unimpeded before the war. Sagging poll numbers and the hangover from an unpopular and inconclusive campaign risk following Mr Trump to the November midterms. Israel Israel and the US began the war shoulder-to-shoulder, but it is Mr Trump who is ending it after sidelining Benjamin Netanyahu. At the start, the prime minister of Israel told his nation that the campaign offered a chance to "put an end to the threat from the ayatollah regime in Iran". After more than three months, Israeli officials are worried that a deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz will not sufficiently address their core concerns. As a recent analysis in the Times of Israel put it: "The Iranian regime still exists. It still possesses much of its ballistic missile arsenal and its stockpile of enriched uranium. And it also controls the Strait of Hormuz." Faced with a lack of progress in the Gulf, Mr Trump has appeared frustrated with Mr Netanyahu, and he has reportedly frozen the Israeli leader out of negotiations. A deal that may be critical to Israel's security has been taken out of its hands. Gulf states The decision by the US and Israel to attack Iran despite their advice shocked Gulf states. They have gone on to bear the brunt of Iran's retaliation, though each has been affected in different ways over the past three months. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) suffered the worst barrages of drones and missiles, though its air defences prevented large damage or loss of life. The onslaught widened existing gaps between Gulf monarchies, with the UAE complaining of a lack of solidarity from neighbours. In its hour of need, the UAE is thought to have grown closer to Israel and the US. Other Gulf states are expected to reduce their military dependence on what they see as an unpredictable Washington. Their reliance on the Strait of Hormuz has been laid painfully bare. The Arab Gulf states are expected to rapidly invest in alternative export routes and pipelines to ensure they are never held hostage again. China Iran is a Chinese ally and oil supplier, but Beijing has not been a major player in the conflict, despite an estimated 35 per cent of all the oil it consumes passing through the strait. China has seemingly withstood the short-term economic impact better than many and even cut oil purchases. It already had large strategic reserves and a quickly growing renewables sector and has been receiving Iranian oil via a shadow tanker fleet, the US alleges. Beijing has meanwhile enjoyed the sight of Washington caught in a costly bind over Iran and has been trying to learn whether the war's lessons could be transferred to the Indo-Pacific, analysts believe. That could include copying Iran's use of economic attrition in any stand-off over Taiwan. Russia Sky-high oil prices boosted Russia's finances, temporarily at least. Yet the extra revenue has not profoundly changed Vladimir Putin's worsening economic predicament, analysts say. Labour shortages caused by mounting casualties in Ukraine and limited production capacity mean Russian industry is struggling to keep up with military demand. Meanwhile, Kyiv's drone attacks on Russia's oil industry have helped prevent Moscow from taking advantage of the higher prices, while Ukrainian forces are causing terrible battlefield losses and may even be starting to regain slivers of territory. Diplomatically, the Iran war has also shown, as the fall of Bashar al-Assad did in Syria two years ago, that an alliance with Moscow is no guarantee of significant Russian protection or intervention when the chips are down. Ukraine When the Iran war erupted, it seemed to be bad for Ukraine in many ways. There were predictions that Western attention, funding and military support would be diverted to leave Kyiv exposed. An oil bonanza would supercharge Putin's military machine. Instead, as the world watched Iranian drones strike Dubai's skyscrapers, Kyiv's military experience and expertise in stopping them became highly valued. Volodymyr Zelensky acted swiftly to take advantage of his country's newfound status as a drone superpower and made new alliances with Gulf kingdoms seeking Ukrainian savvy. Kyiv in April announced new security pacts with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The war has earned Ukraine rich new allies and military respect. World economy The oil price's roughly 40 per cent jump has upended outlooks for inflation and interest rates. A massive release of reserve stocks cushioned the blow, but the price surge has still hit countries that rely on imported energy and fertilisers. The effect has been harder to dodge as the war has gone on and has particularly hit some of the world's poorest countries. Yet global stocks have weathered the storm on the back of AI optimism and persistent hopes that the war will only be short term. That resilience may not have lasted through the summer, economists had warned as reserves were used up. Britain Higher costs from the war have only just started to feed through to a country already tortured by a cost of living crisis. Household energy bills are expected to rise by an average of £200 in July and inflation is expected to rise to around 4 per cent by the end of the year. The war is expected to trim growth, too. Sir Keir Starmer's refusal to provide military help to Mr Trump has damaged transatlantic relations. The King's barnstorming state visit to Washington cooled some of Mr Trump's ire, but relations have been strained. The days of the unlikely Starmer-Trump friendship are long over. The war also highlighted UK military vulnerability when a drone hit an RAF air base on Cyprus on the second night of the war, with no major Royal Navy warship in the Mediterranean at the time. Try full access to The Telegraph free today. 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亞美尼亞親歐政府贏得選舉 – K. Armstrongand/R. Demytrie
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Armenia's pro-West government wins election despite Russian pressure Kathryn Armstrongand/Rayhan Demytrie,Caucasus correspondent, 06/08/26 Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's party has won a crucial election billed as being key in deciding whether the country continues to move closer to the West. Pashinyan's centrist Civil Contract Party secured 49.8% of the vote, with the Strong Armenia Alliance coming in second with 23.2%. The Armenia Alliance was third with 9.9%. Sunday's vote was the first general election since Armenia, a small South Caucasus country of three million people, suffered a crushing military defeat by Azerbaijan in 2023. It was viewed as a test of the prime minister's push to deepen ties with the West while facing mounting economic pressure from Russia, its largest trading partner and traditional ally. Pashinyan, who has been in power since 2018, declared victory on Monday after early results showed his party had secured more than 50% of the vote. "Armenian people voted for peace, regional prosperity and cooperation," he said. The election drew significant international attention to the country. On Monday, France and the EU were among European powers that congratulated Pashinyan, praising Armenia's closer ties with the West. Russia's foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova was quoted by the Tass news agency as saying "unprecedented pressure" had been put on opposition parties and alleged there had been "interference" from the West. Zakharova also said the election had demonstrated that Armenian society was "extremely polarised". Civil Contract's success came despite Pashinyan's domestic support falling from 54% in 2021 to around 30% today, according to polls. A total of 19 parties and alliances took part in the election but few of these earned enough votes to gain a seat in the national assembly. Turnout was 59%, the electoral commission said. The conservative Prosperous Armenia party, led by businessman Gagik Tsarukyan, came fourth with 4% of the vote. It, like the Strong Armenia Alliance - led by Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, and the Armenia Alliance - led by former President Robert Kocharyan, are pro-Russian. "We will continue the course of rapprochement with the West, but we will also continue our participation and membership in the Eurasian Economic Union," Pashinyan also said on Monday. In late May, the Russian president called on Armenia to hold a referendum "as soon as possible" on whether to join the EU or remain in the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a customs bloc from which Armenia benefits. Last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin listed the economic benefits Armenia stood to lose if it pursued closer ties with the West - pointedly noting that "the crisis in Ukraine began with efforts to move toward EU accession". Russia supplies Armenia with gas at $177.50 (£132.90) per 1,000 cubic metres, while European market prices, as Putin pointed out to Pashinyan in April, exceed $600. In the two weeks preceding the election, Moscow banned the export of Armenian flowers, mineral water, cognac, fresh vegetables and fruit. Pashinyan efforts to try and steer his country away from Moscow include passing a law to launch the process of joining the EU, and accelerating the peace process with neighbouring Azerbaijan via a US-brokered agreement. The latter has won him US President Donald Trump's endorsement. He also hosted a large summit of EU leaders and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the capital, Yerevan, earlier this year. Despite Pashinyan developing, good-natured relationship with European leaders, Armenia doesn't even have EU candidate status yet, and membership of the bloc is still a long way off. His loss of popularity is mainly due to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous enclave inside Azerbaijan that was home to 100,000 ethnic Armenians until Azerbaijan took it by force in 2023. Pashinyan's critics have never forgiven him for making concessions in favour of peace with Azerbaijan, like refusing to campaign for the release of former leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh who are in jail in the neighbouring country. The peace deal with Azerbaijan, too, remains deeply divisive, with one recent poll showing 44% of public opinion in support and 41% opposed. In the Armenian capital, Yerevan, the election results were not met with much excitement and people were going about their days as usual. Lala, 70, is a gardener who looks after the roses in the city's central Republic Square. She told the BBC that she voted for Pashinyan. "I am excited. He is the one who is taking us to peace, he raised pensions and we have free healthcare, we can see what he is doing, we are not voting for him blindly." Gohar, 40, said she was sceptical about a possible future for Armenia in the EU. "I don't have any evidence that the European Union is waiting for Armenia. We know that Georgia is waiting for a long time, Turkey is waiting for a long time." When asked about Pashinyan's peace agenda, she said: "Yes, of course, in Nagorno-Karabakh there is also peace now, but there are no Armenians left, I don't want the same thing to happen here." For Arshak, 25, the number one issue in the election is the displaced people from Nagorno-Karabakh. "It is their right to live in peace like we are living," he said, adding: "Before we talk about our external relations with the EU or Russia, we should first focus on the topic of displaced Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh." Anahit and Kimma, both 16, are still too young to vote but said their thoughts have been formed by what their family members have been saying. Anahit is a student at a medical college and said she hopes the government will reduce the cost of education. Kimma, meanwhile, said: "I did not think any of the candidates was good, but now that Pashinyan is elected, I hope he will be better than he was before."
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