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川普上台後，世局大戲一齣接一齣；國際高潮一波又一波。他並非原因或主角，只不過身間觸媒和插科打諢兩個角色而已。悲劇變鬧劇一再上演，根據「量變導致質變」法則，在川痞/川瘋/川丑三合一變形臭蟲下台前，我們怕不是要看好幾場慘劇。能不能渡過這個「川劫」，就要看我們大家的造化，和一眾善男信女「阿門」或「阿彌陀佛」的修為了。
由於節目繁多，劇情層出不窮：
1) 「親愛的，我把『規則』變沒了」
2) 「親愛的，我不裝了！自由主義的面具太沉重，還是帝國主義本尊帥氣」
3) 「親愛的，『大衛大戰歌利亞』的戲碼改成『卡尼勇嗆川瘋子』」
4) 「親愛的，『阿貓阿狗』們登場機會來了」
5)、6)、7)、8)、9)…，族繁不及備載。
故開此欄，一起欣賞當下各顯神通，讓人眼花繚爛的棋局和好戲。同喜還是同悲，且聽下回分解。本部落格原有個別地區或重大議題的專欄，仍然照常營業。
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西班牙總理素描及槓川普立場 - Aitor Hernández-Morales
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This World Leader Took on Trump Over Iran — and It’s Paying Off
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez may be embattled at home, but his opposition to the war in Iran has made him a “rockstar” who's defying the odds.
Aitor Hernández-Morales, 06/08/26
MADRID — When Europe's leaders hold their periodic gatherings in Brussels, Pedro Sánchez isn't often at the center of media attention.
As a rule, when Spain's 54-year-old prime minister strides down the red carpet below the giant glass oval structure in which the EU's heads of government meet, only Spanish reporters surge forward to shout out questions about domestic affairs. Correspondents from other countries tend to focus on their own leaders, or chase after French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz or Italian premier Giorgia Meloni — the heavyweights most consider to truly "run" the EU.
But at recent summits, Sánchez has been met by unusually swollen packs of journalists elbowing one another while waving microphones, eager to hear what he has to say.
Why the sudden surge of interest?
It's not because his government is doing well at home. The prime minister's fragile coalition has been abandoned by its parliamentary partners and is incapable of passing legislation. Moreover, a succession of corruption scandals involving members of Sánchez's inner circle are undermining his administration.
Instead, the attention on Spain's prime minister is driven by the fact that the head of a country better known for its beaches and nightlife has lately become the unlikely face of Europe's opposition to the war in Iran and, more broadly, to U.S. President Donald Trump.
When the U.S. and Israel began their attack on Iran in late February, Spain's prime minister stood out as the sole EU leader to openly condemn the military operation. In contrast to figures like Macron and Merz, who opted for a cautious, hedged reaction to the conflict, Sánchez's denunciation of the "illegitimate" aggression was unequivocally blunt.
So was Washington's reaction to the Spaniard's criticism. Sánchez's decision to bar U.S. warplanes from using jointly operated bases and the country's airspace infuriated Trump. Calling Spain "terrible" and "unfriendly," the president threatened to cut off all trade relations with Madrid, and later suggested the country should be booted from NATO.
By singling out Sánchez, the White House inadvertently helped turn Spain's isolated opposition to the war into a position embraced by nearly all of Europe. In response to the threats, EU leaders scrambled t express support for their colleague in Madrid — and, emboldened, joined him in condemning the attacks on Iran.
In the span of just a few months, Spain's prime minister went from being an outlier in Europe to the EU's moral leader.
"Spain was never alone," said Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares, a longtime Sánchez ally, in an interview. "We were simply first, leading so that others could follow behind."
The White House did not respond to a request for comment.
Sánchez's newfound prominence on the international stage is all the more striking because it comes at a moment of profound vulnerability at home. Although Spain's leader has not been implicated in the scandals that hound his government, political opponents have endeavored to link him to the criminal cases.
"Pedro Sánchez is synonymous with corruption," said Senator Alicia García, spokesperson for the center-right People's Party, during a recent session of the Spanish Senate.
Yet respect and admiration for the prime minister continues to grow in the rest of Europe. That's because his opposition to Trump reflects the majority view on the continent that the U.S. president poses a major threat to the bloc.
Overall, Europe's leaders have been reluctant to clash with Trump. The U.S. is one of the EU's largest trading partners, and maintaining stable ties is considered essential for countries like Germany. Additionally, despite Trump's efforts to undermine NATO, European defense continues to not only be U.S.-led, but U.S.-centered.
But Sánchez is an exception to that status quo.
Spain's limited trade relations with the U.S. means the country is shielded from Trump's tariff threats, and it is also geographically distant from potential military threats. The country is even comparatively immune from Iran-related energy shocks, thanks to a renewable energy boom spearheaded by Sánchez that has earned plaudits from the rest of Europe.
The prime minister's allies argue his consistently defiant stance toward Trump is driven less by pragmatism than conviction. At a moment when multilateralism and the postwar global order are seen as outdated concepts, the center-left moderate is described as a true believer, willing to defy the most powerful country in the world in defense of those ideals.
"He's always been committed to the respect for human rights, the dignity of all people," said Albares. "It's just what he truly believes in."
Sánchez — who declined to be interviewed for this article but allowed members of his administration to participate — has urged his European counterparts to follow Spain's example. During POLITICO's European Pulse Forum in Barcelona last April, he called for Europe to "rearm itself morally, so that it can contribute to stable and peaceful development throughout the world."
"Europe's citizens don't want their leaders to look the other way, to be self-absorbed," he said. "They want them to get involved in finding the solutions to the global challenges facing humanity."
The moral stance underpinning the Spanish prime minister's opposition to Trump can, paradoxically, be traced back to a link forged in the U.S. president's hometown.
Shortly after graduating with a degree in economics and business administration in Madrid in 1995, Sánchez moved to New York City to work at a consultancy. While there, Carlos Westendorp, the late Spanish ambassador to the United Nations — whose wife was an acquaintance of Sánchez's parents, two solidly middle class civil servants — began inviting him over for meals.
The inquisitive 24-year-old won the former foreign minister over by peppering him with questions about international affairs and eventually became a mentee of sorts. After Westendorp was named High Representative for Bosnia in 1997, he reached out to Sánchez — who by then was wrapping up a stint as an assistant in the European Parliament in Brussels — and offered him a spot on his team.
The Spaniard arrived in a city "in which every building was pockmarked by bullets" fired during nearly four years of siege. Journalist Victoria García, at the time the U.N. mission's spokesperson, recalled the women on the staff fawning over the handsome, 6-foot-3-inch Sánchez.
"But he was more than just a pretty face, [he was] a hell of a hard worker," she said in an interview. "That country had been reduced to rubble and we were charged with redesigning it from scratch, coming up with a constitution, a criminal system, even the flag and national anthem."
Sánchez, who had just earned his masters degree in economics from the Free University of Brussels, was brought on board as an economic adviser and tasked with laying out Bosnia's future financial system in a series of complex position papers. In an early sign that he could be headstrong when defending matters he believed in, García said Sánchez clashed with a high-ranking American representative who offhandedly dismissed his policy proposals.
"He was just a kid, but he'd push back hard," she recalled. "He wouldn't hold back."
As U.N. peacekeepers attempted to keep violence between Croats, Serbs and Muslims from flaring up again, Sánchez travelled across Bosnia with Westendorp, attending meetings with regional leaders. According to García, it was impossible for anyone on the team to not emerge from their time in Bosnia "with a newfound understanding of the importance of multilateralism and the rule of law, and a profound respect for the work done by organizations like the U.N."
In his 2019 memoir, Manual de Resistencia — which translates to "Resistance Manual" — Sánchez said his experience in Sarajevo "inoculated him from the ravages of nationalism and identity politics."
"I saw unscrupulous politicians who don't consider the consequences of their hate speech — not the social, political, or economic ones," he wrote. "Or rather, it's not that they don't consider them, it's that they feed the worst in their people, because they thrive on that confrontation."
The prime minister recalled sleepless nights during which "U.S. jetfighters and bombers flew over the city, en route to Serbia and Kosovo," where Washington was attempting to stop ethnic cleansing. In his book, Sánchez praised then-U.S. President Bill Clinton's "brave decision" to bomb Yugoslavia — a measure "few of his countrymen supported."
"I saw a man deeply involved, who truly committed himself, his presidency, and his country to ending a deadly war," wrote Sánchez in 2019. Lamenting America's withdrawal from multilateralism under Trump, he noted the isolationist Republican president was "no Clinton."
Despite his deep admiration for the U.N.'s work, García said Sánchez was always clear-eyed about wanting a future in Spanish politics. When Westendorp would travel back to Spain to attend Socialist Party conferences, the young Spaniard would push to accompany him so as to make contacts within the political organization.
"Sánchez believed in what we were doing in Bosnia," she said. "But even then it was obvious that he was a political animal with aspirations that were bigger than Sarajevo."
The lessons Sánchez drew from Bosnia would remain largely invisible for years. But they would eventually become central to how he viewed conflicts abroad, the role of international institutions and the obligations of democratic governments in moments of crisis.
Sánchez's political convictions would soon collide with the realities of political survival.
When his time on Westendorp's staff concluded in 1999, the Spaniard returned to Madrid, entering local politics as a member of the Socialist Party. He remained a backbench figure for over a decade, but in 2014 he launched an unexpectedly successful dark horse bid to become party leader.
Albares, then a career diplomat, recalled first meeting Sánchez at that time and being entranced by the young and dynamic Socialist leader — the first frontline Spanish politician to speak English fluently and regularly read the international press. The future foreign minister was so taken by Sánchez that he eventually took a leave of absence from the diplomatic service to become his adviser on global affairs.
"I made that decision because I was impressed by his defense of the same principles he continues to uphold today," said Albares. "He had, and continues to have, a clear vision of the European project and its values, earnest concern about climate change, the defense of gender equality, a profound respect for the United Nations and multilateralism, and of the idea that the dignity and human rights of every human being must always be respected."
At a time when populist forces were steadily gaining traction among voters, Albares thought Sánchez was just the man to lead Spain. But the Socialists' old guard was unconvinced by their new leader, who questioned the decentralized party structure that gave disproportionate power to its regional leaders.
Sánchez had taken the reins of the center-left party amid a crippling economic crisis that hastened the collapse of Spain's bipartisan political system, and new far-left and economic-liberal political groups ate away at the Socialists' traditional voting base. Seizing on a series of electoral setbacks, the old guard painted Sánchez as an overwhelmed novice and forced him to step down in Oct. 2016.
For many politicians, that would have been the end. But for Sánchez, it was the beginning of an unlikely comeback. In a move that has since become Spanish political lore, he embarked on a grassroots campaign to win back support, traveling across the country in his Peugeot, meeting party members face-to-face and rebuilding his base from the ground up.
Accompanying him were several figures that have since become major liabilities for Sánchez. Among them were José Luis Ábalos, who would eventually be appointed transport and public works minister — but today is imprisoned on corruption charges — and Santos Cerdán, who would become one of the most powerful figures in the Socialist Party before being implicated in a kickback scandal.
Sánchez's odyssey coincided with Trump's surprise defeat of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election and the first months of his administration. Albares, who remained loyal to the ousted Socialist leader, said they followed the developments with fascination and discussed the impact of Trump's measures on the rest of the world.
"The conversations were not, and to this day are not, about what the U.S. president does, but rather about the context in which those actions place Spain," he said. "They were always about how we stay true to our principles, how we meet our objectives within that context."
Albares said Sánchez remained an indefatigable, cheerful figure on the cross-country tour. "Even at the lowest moments, he has this enthusiasm rooted in an unwavering belief in his project," he said. "And I think Spaniards perceived and rewarded that determination."
The retail politicking paid off. When elections were held to select the Socialist Party's new leader in May 2017, Sánchez handily defeated his rivals and was restored to the post from which he was ousted seven months before.
During his second turn in his party's top spot, Sánchez took pains to not repeat the mistakes that had led to his downfall. Moving swiftly to reshape the party in his own image, he sidelined internal opponents and transformed the Socialists into the hyper-centralized, leader-driven organization that it is today.
His next move was even more brazen. Capitalizing on a series of devastating corruption scandals, in 2018 Sánchez orchestrated a no-confidence vote to topple then-Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy — a maneuver unprecedented in modern Spanish politics. The bid succeeded, swiftly transforming the once ousted opposition leader into Spain's head of government.
At a summit of global mayors in Madrid last April, municipal leaders from around the world cheered after Sánchez gave a speech in defense of open cities that embrace migrants and diversity.
"He's a rockstar, he's exactly what the world needs: a progressive who isn't afraid of Trump," said an American municipal official who I agreed not to name because of his concerns that federal funding for his city could be jeopardized by a perceived criticism of the U.S. president.
Sánchez's popularity and perceived strength on the global stage contrasts with his divisive reputation and a weak domestic political position — one that isn't solely motivated by the corruption scandals involving members of his inner circle.
While the prime minister has managed to remain in power for the past eight years, he has always led fragile minority governments that required the support of smaller parties to get legislation through Spain's fractured parliament. The Socialist leader often says he operates by "making virtue of necessity" — in other words, by adapting his positions to align with strategic partners.
But that pragmatism has not gone down well among Spaniards. Prior to Sánchez, they had never experienced a coalition government at the national level or the flexibility required to make them work.
One of Sánchez's most controversial measures remains his 2023 move to amnesty separatist politicians who led an independence movement in the Spanish region of Catalonia. The decision — a complete reversal of his longstanding opposition to the clemency measure — was key to winning the support of the Catalan parties he needed to remain prime minister, but it alienated voters, many of whom have yet to forgive him for the U-turn.
According to the latest monthly survey conducted by Spain's state-run Center for Sociological Research while Sánchez ranks as the country's highest-rated political leader, 63 percent of Spaniards say they trust him "little, or not at all."
Meanwhile, the separatist politicians with whom Sánchez made the amnesty deal have since abandoned the prime minister, which is why his minority government currently lacks the backing required to pass laws, much less a fresh budget.
And then there are the scandals.
Sánchez came to power in 2018 promising clean government, but over the past years many of his closest allies — among them his cross-country campaign companions, Ábalos and Cerdán — have been prosecuted for alleged corruption.
That situation worsened last month, after Spain's National Court indicted former Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero — whom Sánchez had previously described as "an example to follow and a source of inspiration" — for money laundering, influence peddling and other criminal offenses. Just days later, agents of the Civil Guard's elite Central Operative Unit raided the ruling party's headquarters in an unrelated investigation into an elaborate scheme to discredit Sánchez's critics.
These latest developments appear to mark a breaking point for the prime minister's parliamentary allies. Regional groups like the Basque Nationalist Party, which Sánchez depends on to pass legislation, seem increasingly wary of being associated with the ruling party's scandals and are now calling for early elections.
But leaving office is ultimately up to the prime minister. Spain's opposition is too split to force him from power, and Sánchez has vowed to serve out the legislative term, which is due to end in August 2027.
The current deadlock could make Sánchez lean even harder into international affairs, said Pablo Simón, a political scientist at Madrid's Carlos III University. "The parliamentary paralysis impedes him from doing anything at home, but abroad he can make the most of personal political positions that happen to be quite aligned with that of most Spaniards."
The strategy has worked well for Sánchez in the past.
Following Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023 attacks, in which some 1,200 people were killed in Israel, Spain's prime minister made headlines by speaking out against the military operations in Gaza, describing them as "genocide." The stance led Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar to label him "a disgrace to Spain," but boosted Sánchez's standing domestically.
Opposition to Trump's policies have similarly benefitted Sánchez. Spaniards overwhelmingly backed the prime minister when he rebuffed the U.S. president's push to increase NATO's defense spending targets and refused to ramp up Madrid's military expenditures. However, it's Sánchez's stance against the war in Iran that really resonated with Spaniards, who are among the Europeans most opposed to the operation.
In recent POLITICO polling, 56 percent of Spanish respondents said they strongly disapprove of the offensive, and 43 percent said Madrid should publicly oppose the military operation and push for an end to the conflict. And a majority of Spanish respondents — 51 percent — also said Washington poses a "threat" to Europe, the largest proportion of the six EU countries polled.
It's unclear if the latest controversies will undo the domestic gains Sánchez has made on the back of global politics. But polling conducted before the most recent corruption cases were reported suggests that if elections were held today, Sánchez's scandal-ridden Socialist Party would still win the greatest share of the vote.
"By taking on Trump, he's managed to make Spaniards talk far less about domestic squabbles and corruption, and focus on international politics," said Simón. "Trump's nature is to fill the space and constantly draw attention to himself, and that makes the act of opposing him a constantly relevant action — and Sánchez's decision to oppose him an undeniable success."
Sánchez and Trump may be ideologically opposed, but they share one notable trait: Both molded established political parties around themselves after surviving political defeats that might have ended others' careers.
Diego Rubio, a 39-year-old Oxford-educated scholar who has served as the Spanish prime minister's chief of staff since 2024, described Sánchez as a born fighter.
"He's a self-made man who only ended up in this position by overcoming the status quo within his own party," he said. "He isn't like other prime ministers that were named by the party to be their candidate — he had to fight to remain in his own party."
"Given that spirit has worked out pretty well for him, why would he do anything differently now?" he asked.
Rubio said progressive politicians on both sides of the Atlantic had avoided direct confrontations with rising populist leaders, failing to challenge their talking points.
"Over here we had the advantage of seeing Hillary [Clinton] and others fail, of seeing that saying things like 'Trump is a liar' isn't enough to stop these people," he said. "You have to fight. Left-wing leaders are elected to fight — inequality, injustice, the big guys that make our society worse."
According to Rubio, the fundamental difference between Spain's prime minister and the U.S. president is that while neither backs down from a fight, "Sánchez never insults, never attacks people's families."
Since coming to power in 2018, the prime minister's outspoken defense of progressive ideas have made him an outlier in an EU that has drifted to the right.
Out of the bloc's 27 heads of government, Sánchez is one of the only three center-left prime ministers currently in power. The other two are Maltese leader Robert Abela, and Denmark's Mette Frederiksen, who has faced Trump's wrath over her refusal to give in to his annexationist designs on Greenland.
Arguably, Sánchez's clash with Trump has made him less isolated within the bloc.
At last March's summit of EU leaders in Brussels, heads of government from all political backgrounds sided with the Spaniard and adopted meeting conclusions rebuking Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's attacks on Iran. Coalescing around Sánchez, they pointedly called for "full respect of international law by all parties, including the principles of the United Nations Charter and international humanitarian law."
Still, the perception of being a lone progressive surrounded by an increasingly right-wing world could benefit Sánchez domestically ahead of Spain's next general election.
When voters last went to the polls, in the summer of 2023, the Socialist leader stoked fears of a coalition government made up of the center-right People's Party and the far-right Vox group. That scenario spooked electors into giving left-wing groups better than expected results, and Sánchez a path to remain in power.
This time around, he could repeat the strategy by focusing voters' attention on France, where the far-right National Rally party is projected to sweep next spring's elections. Many expect Sánchez to urge Spaniards to keep him in government by warning Madrid could go the way of Paris.
Political analyst Simón said betting domestic election results on international developments was an unorthodox move. "Developments in Syria rarely shape electoral outcomes in [the Spanish region of] Soria," he quipped.
But, he added, Sánchez is wise to continue making waves on the global stage. "Casting himself as the defender of multilateralism is working out for him personally, both in the outside world, and by consolidating him internally as the country's leading political progressive."
The political scientist said the prime minister's fight with Trump had also raised the country's profile across the globe, and reinforced its position as a player within Europe.
"Let's be honest," Simón said. "This is working out for Spain, too."
It's unclear if Sánchez's domestic troubles will eventually catch up with him, and his parliamentary position remains precarious. But for now, Spain's prime minister has turned a moment of political vulnerability into an opportunity for himself, his country — and perhaps the EU as a whole.
Sánchez, once a peripheral figure in continental affairs, has become one of Europe's most closely watched leaders. And as the jostling reporters at EU summits make clear, the world is now paying attention.
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烏克蘭：伊朗戰爭的意外贏家 - Katya Adler
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請參考此欄2026/05/05貼文。
The Iran war has strengthened Ukraine in surprising ways. Could a ceasefire with Russia be closer?
Katya Adler, Europe editor, 05/03/26
When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, serious-faced and clad in black, strolled down a lilac carpet in Saudi Arabia in March, it marked a moment in the US-Israeli war in Iran. A rather unexpected one.
In a post on X, he said his visit was to "strengthen the protection of lives".
Zelensky, who carries the weight of Ukraine's own war with Russia on his shoulders, has been seizing the moment, flying to the Gulf to publicly showcase the international value and marketability of Kyiv's learned-on-the-battlefield military nous in drone warfare.
Ukraine says it has now signed deals with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar - all hit by Iranian missiles and drones in recent weeks - to share drone expertise and technology, tightening alliances and benefitting from business - and it hopes defence deals - with wealthy US-allied countries.
"We want to help [Gulf states] defend themselves. And we will continue building such partnerships with other countries," Zelensky said.
Energy pressure
Initially, the impact of the Iran conflict seemed overwhelmingly negative for Ukraine. It threatened to divert Donald Trump's already wavering attention from orchestrating peace efforts between Moscow and Kyiv, while pouring money into Russia's fast-emptying war chest.
Moscow has been able to sell more of its oil to more countries, at higher prices as tankers carrying Middle Eastern oil are unable to reach global customers by crossing the Iran-bordering Strait of Hormuz. Trump has renewed a waiver allowing countries to buy sanctioned Russian oil because of spiralling costs worldwide.
The more money Russia has, the longer and in theory harder it can prosecute the war in Ukraine.
But Kyiv has consistently confounded international expectations since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.
And now it's done so again: playing a deft hand at trying to turn the impact of the Iran war to its advantage, as Ukraine tries to get itself in the strongest position possible before eventual, hoped-for peace negotiations with Russia.
Ukraine has been showcasing its battlefield nous to the Gulf countries
On Wednesday, Trump said he was confident a "solution" over Ukraine could be reached "relatively quickly" following a "very good" conversation with Vladimir Putin. "I think 'some people' (have) made it difficult for him to make a deal," he added.
It's not the first time Trump's made similar positive comments about Putin, while implicitly or explicitly criticising Ukraine's leader for not signing up to a ceasefire.
A "solution" has yet to materialise.
In the meantime, Zelensky has focused on bolstering Ukraine where he can. Opportunism is arguably one of his most potent weapons.
Saudi Arabia, which he visited again in April, has faced the same type of ballistic missile and drone attacks from Iran that Russia barrages Ukraine with, he said.
One of Moscow's most powerful weapons has been the Iranian-designed low-cost, long-range Shahed-136 attack drone, plus its own updated version, the Geran.
While a Shahed can cost between $80,000 and $130,000 (£59,500 and £95,500), Zelensky says it can be intercepted with systems costing as little as $10,000 (£7,400). That's far cheaper than traditional air defence missiles which cost millions of dollars.
Threatened by Russian drone sightings in a number of European cities, Nato countries have been paying attention.
As attacks on Ukraine continue, Donald Trump has said he thinks he can achieve a ceasefire "relatively quickly"
Ukraine signed two substantial defence cooperation agreements with European allies in April. One was with Norway, for $8.6bn, as part of a $28bn package of support until 2030. The other was with Germany, including "various types of drones, missiles, software and modern defence systems," valued at $4.7bn.
As for the Gulf States, Zelensky said he hoped for their help defending Ukraine against Russia.
Particularly because at the moment, the US has less military hardware available to sell to Europeans to help Ukraine, as Washington burns through supplies in the Middle East. Trump's response when asked about redirecting weapons has been: "We do that all the time. Sometimes we take from one, and we use for another."
"We would like Middle Eastern states to also give us an opportunity to strengthen ourselves," Zelensky recently told French newspaper Le Monde. "They have certain air defence missiles of which we don't have enough. That's what we'd like to reach a deal on.
Targeting infrastructure
Ukraine has also learned a key lesson from the Iran conflict to use back home: the big bang impact of attacking an adversary's oil export facilities. Russia's energy infrastructure is now a priority target, using Ukraine-manufactured long-range drones.
According to Zelensky, Russia is suffering "critical" losses running to billions of dollars in its energy sector despite the recent surge in global oil prices.
Crude oil export data suggests the rise in prices, plus the easing of American sanctions on countries buying Russian oil, boosted Russian revenues to 2.3 times their December-February levels in the third week of the Iran war.
But in the fourth week, Ukrainian drone strikes on energy-producing infrastructure reduced Russia's earnings by $1bn, eradicating around two-thirds of the previous week's gains.
Another plus for Ukraine from the Iran war fallout has been finally getting the green light last week on a €90bn (£78bn), EU-backed loan that Kyiv said it urgently needed to purchase and produce military equipment over the coming year. The loan had been blocked for months by EU member Hungary's then pro-Kremlin prime minister. But Hungary now has a new, determinedly less Russia-friendly leader, after Viktor Orbán's resounding defeat in Hungary's election last month.
Orbán is a close friend and admirer of Donald Trump. That didn't help him at election time. Voters said they were angry about the Iran war, which has pushed up their energy costs. That aided Orbán's demise, allowing the EU's Ukraine loan to finally be released.
With those "wins" under Kyiv's belt, plus Ukraine's boast that it is consistently killing more enemy soldiers each month than the 30,000 Russia has reportedly been recruiting in that time, Zelensky no longer feels on the back foot and may be in a better position to pursue a peace deal with Russia.
The sense of urgency in Ukraine is longstanding. People are tired and suffering. Conscripting new soldiers has been a serious challenge for a while now, and those on the battlefield are desperate to go home.
A lack of respect?
So what of negotiations aimed at establishing a sustainable ceasefire? They had been talked up so loudly by the Trump administration before Christmas.
Before being re-elected president, Trump repeatedly said he would end the violence in Ukraine in 24 hours. Now he's in office, the reality has not lived up to the promise.
A big clue is to follow the movements of Trump's designated peace envoys, his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and the former real estate magnate Steve Witkoff. A trip to Kyiv has been repeatedly postponed. Instead, they're preoccupied with the Middle East.
Zelensky has said he considers the pair's absence "disrespectful". He says peace discussions are ongoing at a "technical" level but fears no progress will really be made until the Iran conflict has ended. Who knows when that will be?
It's worth noting that Kushner and Witkoff have never visited Kyiv in an official capacity. They visited the Russian capital late last year as ceasefire talks aimed at ending the war in Ukraine gained pace, and again in January. Witkoff has been to Moscow eight times - he used to do a lot of business in Russia, in a private capacity. He's met Putin on a number of occasions.
The Trump administration has denied any bias towards Russia.
But Ukraine and other European countries were perturbed to read the US National Security Strategy (NSS), published towards the end of last year. It conspicuously does not label Russia a security threat. This is in direct contrast to how Moscow is viewed by Washington's European allies in Nato.
The NSS does underline the importance of ending the war in Ukraine, but the focus is not on establishing a durable peace for Kyiv. Instead, the stated aim is to ensure "strategic stability" and potential partnership with Russia to free up resources for other US priorities.
These attitudes of the Trump administration delight the Kremlin. Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov crowed at the time of publication that the NSS was "largely consistent" with Moscow's vision.
Under Trump, there's been a failure to introduce or maintain hard-hitting economic sanctions against Russia that could truly move the dial and force the Kremlin to approach the negotiating table without a list of demands impossible for Kyiv (or its European backers) to accept.
On top of this, US military and economic assistance for Ukraine has all but dried up. Europeans have instead been buying military hardware from the US to send to Kyiv. But even that supply is now in danger, thanks to the Iran conflict.
Peace prospects
When it comes to persuading Russia to talk peace, conventional wisdom says the US is the only power able to make Moscow budge.
Putin shows no sign of ending hostilities of his own volition any time soon.
Quite the opposite. With the world distracted by the war on Iran, Moscow has been stepping up attacks on Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure. Opinion is divided over whether this is a last lashing out before Russia's president comes to the negotiating table or an indication of ongoing grim determination. At EU HQ in Brussels, most suspect the latter.
Russia's economy may be struggling under international sanctions but it's not decimated and is now firmly on a war footing. Winding that down won't be easy, leading European countries to fret that even if peace is secured in Ukraine, Russia will swiftly seek to destabilise somewhere else in Europe, including targeting a Nato nation. The Netherlands, Germany and Nato itself have described that as possible, even likely.
And then there's Putin's pride and ambition. Will he - can he - really hold up his hands and admit defeat in Ukraine?
"If Russia had a rational government, it would end the war," said Luke Cooper, an Associate Professorial Research Fellow in International Relations at the London School of Economics. He is also the Director of the Ukraine programme at PeaceRep, a pro-peace consortium of organisations.
"The economy is stagnant or in recession. Russia is sending enormous numbers of men to die who could be in work, the private commercial civilian economy is suffering by the imposition of the war economy… and what has Russia achieved? A sliver of Ukrainian territory. Surely, a ceasefire would be advantageous, if it included sanctions relief? But Putin isn't thinking in those terms. This is all about the decisions of one person, with imperial ambitions, running an autocratic system."
Ukraine's scepticism
While Kyiv still waits for US engagement, privately many Ukrainian officials are sceptical the US under Donald Trump will ever take the action they want to ensure peace, or, even in the case of a ceasefire, would stump up the desired cast-iron security guarantees, ensuring that Russia doesn't just come back again another day.
Mark Cancian, senior adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told me: "It's hard to envisage a set of security guarantees the Ukrainians will find reliable enough to sign a peace deal, and that Russia, the US and Europeans will all agree to."
But "there is no time to lose" for Europe's leaders who largely believe it would be dangerous for wider continental security if Russia ultimately felt it won a victory in Ukraine, according to Tom Keatinge, Director of the Finance & Security Centre at the Royal United Services Institute.
Despite the war in the Middle East, Keatinge says Trump, with his reputation for impatience, might pivot away at any moment from focusing on Iran if finding a deal with Tehran remains complicated.
He could then swiftly turn back to the Russia-Ukraine question. That, insists Keatinge, is why Europeans must take far more decisive action in Ukraine now than they have to date.
With their repeated use of the phrase "as long as it takes" when it comes to helping Ukraine, critics have long accused European leaders of "managing" the war, rather than aggressively pursuing peace for Ukraine.
Despite all the speeches, all the visits to Kyiv and the money spent on weapons for Ukraine, when it comes to getting really, really tough in terms of what could be truly biting economic sanctions "Europeans stand around waiting for the Americans, says Keatinge. "They act so timid yet the EU is a massive trading bloc."
Brussels is now working on its twenty-first sanctions package against Russia. But what of the €210bn frozen Russian central bank assets the EU has sitting in its jurisdiction, mainly in Belgium? Balking at using that money to help Ukraine (citing legal and reputational considerations), EU leaders came up with the €90bn loan, underwritten by European taxpayers. Europe's leaders could act against Russia with a lot more impact, argues Keatinge. "They're just not willing - or united enough to go vollgas (foot on the gas pedal) on ending the war."
Europe's leaders are sincere in wanting the suffering to end in Ukraine and for there to be a just and durable peace on their borders, but it is also true that a ceasefire in Ukraine would push uncomfortable decisions to the fore. Fewer countries are in favour of fast-tracking Ukraine's membership to the EU than they would like to admit. As for the so-called "Coalition of the Willing", headed by France and the UK, that has pledged to act as a "reassurance force" in Ukraine if and when hostilities end - which countries would really stump up boots on the ground and for how long? Especially if forces weren't supported by the US from the air.
Last week, Trump blasted what he called the hatred between Putin and Zelensky as "ridiculous". Washington has seemed dismissive of Ukraine's selling of drone tech in the Gulf. It hasn't taken up Zelensky on his public offer to share Kyiv's drone know-how with the US administration either. At least not publicly.
But Ukraine's black-clad leader seemed unfazed by those details. As long as he's making headlines, he hopes Ukraine isn't forgotten and that Washington might turn its attention back to his part of the world that much sooner.
Top image credit: AFP via Getty Images / Reuters
BBC InDepth is the home on the website and app for the best analysis, with fresh perspectives that challenge assumptions and deep reporting on the biggest issues of the day. Emma Barnett and John Simpson bring their pick of the most thought-provoking deep reads and analysis, every Saturday. Sign up for the newsletter here
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德國防長：美國撤兵在意料中 - Jaroslav Lukiv
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US to cut troop levels in Germany by 5,000 amid Trump spat with Merz
Germany says US troop withdrawal 'foreseeable' as Nato seeks clarification
Jaroslav Lukiv, 05/02/26
German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has said the US decision to withdraw 5,000 troops from his country was "foreseeable", as the Nato military alliance says it is seeking clarification from Washington.
Speaking to the DPA news agency, Pistorius also stressed that "the presence of American soldiers in Europe, and particularly in Germany, is in our interest and in the interest of the US".
Meanwhile Nato spokeswoman Allison Hart said the alliance was "working with the US to understand the details of their decision".
Washington's move comes after President Donald Trump criticised German Chancellor Friedrich Merz for saying the US had been "humiliated" by Iranian negotiators in the ongoing war.
The US military deployment in Germany - currently at more than 36,000 active duty troops - is by far its biggest in Europe, compared with about 12,000 in Italy and 10,000 in the UK.
Trump has also suggested pulling US troops from Italy and Spain.
Last year, Washington decided to reduce its troop presence in Romania, as part of Trump's plan to shift the focus of US military commitment from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region.
There are now growing concerns within the 32-member Nato alliance that the US latest decision could weaken the organisation.
"The greatest threat to the transatlantic community are not its external enemies, but the ongoing disintegration of our alliance," Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned on Saturday.
"We must all do what it takes to reverse this disastrous trend," he added.
And two senior US lawmakers from Trump's Republican party said that they were "very concerned by the decision to withdraw a US brigade from Germany".
"Rather than withdrawing forces from the continent altogether, it is in the US interest to maintain a strong deterrent in Europe," said Senator Roger Wicker and Representative Mike Rogers, who chair the Senate and House armed services committees respectively.
In Saturday's interview with DPA, Pistorius also said Europe must take greater responsibility for its security, and that Berlin would now be working more closely with allies on the continent.
"Germany is on the right track," he said, pointing out that his country has significantly boosted its military spending in recent years.
Trump had previously accused Germany of being "delinquent" because its military spending was well below Nato's target of 2% of economic output (GDP).
But that has changed radically under the Merz government, with Germany now projected to spend €105.8bn (£91bn) on defence in 2027.
Overall, Germany's defence expenditure is set to reach 3.1% of GDP, taking into account other defence funds, including Berlin's continuing aid to Ukraine as its continues to fight against invading Russian troops.
In her post on X on Saturday, Nato's Allison Hart said the US decision to pull troops out of Germany "underscores the need for Europe to continue to invest more in defence and take on a greater share of the responsibility for our shared security.
"We're already seeing progress since allies agreed to invest 5% of GDP at the Nato summit in The Hague last year."
The latest spat between Trump and Merz was triggered by comments by the German chancellor on Monday.
Merz told university students that "the Americans clearly have no strategy".
"The Iranians are obviously very skilled at negotiating, or rather, very skilful at not negotiating, letting the Americans travel to Islamabad and then leave again without any result," he said.
He added that the "entire nation" was being "humiliated" by Iran.
In response, Trump took to his platform Truth Social, saying Merz thought it was "OK for Iran to have a Nuclear Weapon" and "doesn't know what he's talking about".
This was soon followed by the US troop withdrawal announcement.
Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said the order had come from Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth.
"We expect the withdrawal to be completed over the next six to twelve months," the spokesman added.
Trump, a longtime critic of the Nato alliance, has been lashing out at allies over their refusal to participate in operations to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a key oil shipping route.
Iran has severely limited traffic through the waterway, responding to US and Israeli strikes that began on 28 February.
The US has also enforced a naval blockade on Iranian ports in the Gulf.
相關閱讀
What is Nato and which countries are in it?
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歐洲「洲防」基於核武聯防 -- Andreas Rinke等
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就「外交辭令」尺度而言，德國總理梅茲不是打臉，而是飽以老拳；他不但打了川痞/川瘋/川丑，還順帶狠狠的踢了凡斯一腳。給他按個「讚」！
Europe looks to boost its security, urges U.S. to ‘repair and revive trust’
Andreas Rinke/James Mackenzie/John Irish, Reuters, 02/13/26
At the Munich Security Conference Friday different European leaders stressed the necessity for NATO members within the continent to do more for their own conventional defence. With the war in Ukraine approaching its fourth year, and an increasingly isolationist United States, many countries are taking action and encouraging others to do the same.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on Friday that Berlin had begun talks with France about a European nuclear deterrent, while President Emmanuel Macron said Europe had to become a geopolitical power given the Russian threat would not disappear.
Merz, who said the region had to become stronger in order to reset its relationship with the United States, called in a speech to open the Munich Security Conference, on Washington to “repair and revive trust” in a dangerous new era of great power politics, warning the U.S. could not go it alone as the old global order crumbles.
He was later followed by Macron, who pushed back on criticism of the continent, but said it was time that Europe was more assertive and prepared itself with a stronger security architecture.
The speeches underscored how European leaders are increasingly looking to carve an independent path after a year of unprecedented upheaval in transatlantic ties, while also striving to maintain their alliance with Washington.
Europe faces myriad threats from Russia’s war in Ukraine to massive ruptures in global trade.
“I have begun confidential talks with the French President on European nuclear deterrence,” Merz said. “We Germans are adhering to our legal obligations. We see this as strictly embedded within our nuclear sharing in NATO. And we will not allow zones of differing security to emerge in Europe.”
FRANCE IS EU'S ONLY NUCLEAR POWER
Macron is due to make a speech on the nuclear deterrent later this month.
He said the consultations with Germany and other leaders were part of a broader discussion that included conventional deep strikes capabilities, which Europe does not possess unlike Russia, and the role of France’s nuclear deterrent.
“This is the right time for audacity. This is the right time for a strong Europe,” Macron said. “Europe has to learn to become a geopolitical power. It was not part of our DNA.”
“We have to reshuffle and reorganise our architecture of security in Europe. Because the past architecture of security was totally designed and framed during Cold War times. So it’s no longer adapted,” he said.
European nations have long relied heavily on the United States, including its large nuclear arsenal, for their defence but have been increasing military spending, partly in response to sharp criticism from the Trump administration.
While Germany is currently banned from developing a nuclear weapon under international agreements, France is the European Union’s only nuclear power following Britain’s departure from the bloc and has the world’s fourth-largest stockpile.
Taking his cue from those warning that the international rules-based order was about to be destroyed, Merz said: “I fear we must put it even more bluntly: This order, however imperfect it was even at its best, no longer exists in that form.”
Switching to English at the end, Merz said: “In the era of great power rivalry, even the United States will not be powerful enough to go it alone. Dear friends, being a part of NATO is not only Europe’s competitive advantage. It is also the United States’ competitive advantage.”
“So let’s repair and revive transatlantic trust together,” he added.
Defence Minister David McGuinty told a panel on defence industrial cooperation at the conference that Canada was strengthening its ties with Europe on defence procurement and security. He did not mention the U.S. but affirmed Canada was stepping up its defence spending and capabilities with help from diverse partners.
U.S. Sen. Chris Coons of Delaware, a top Democrat on multiple foreign relations and defence committees, told the same panel that America needs to adopt the same approach of cooperation in order to counter China and Russia.
When asked if he believes the Trump administration is following that advice, however, Coons acknowledged he did not.
“That is a core concern,” he said, citing the recent push to acquire Greenland from fellow NATO member Denmark.
“Our core attitude must be, we only get through this with our allies.”
A YEAR AFTER VANCE BLAST, RUBIO STRIKES WARMER TONE
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had also said transatlantic ties faced a “defining moment” in a rapidly changing world but struck a more conciliatory tone that contrasted with remarks by Vice President JD Vance in 2025.
At the same gathering of top security officials last year, Vance had attacked European allies in a speech that marked the start of a series of confrontations.
“I think it’s at a defining moment … the world is changing very fast right in front of us,” Rubio said before departing for Munich.
“(The U.S. is) deeply tied to Europe, and our futures have always been linked and will continue to be,” said Rubio, who is a potential rival to Vance for the 2028 U.S. presidential race. “So we’ve just got to talk about what that future looks like.”
Transatlantic ties have long been central to the Munich Security Conference, which began as a Cold War forum for Western defence debate. But the unquestioned assumption of cooperation that underpinned it has been upended.
Underscoring the damage, a YouGov poll on Friday of the six largest European countries showed favourability towards the U.S. in Europe hitting its lowest since tracking began in 2016.
The latest figures are broadly comparable to – and in some cases higher than – the perceived threat from China, Iran or North Korea, although behind Russia, YouGov said.
U.S. President Donald Trump has toppled Venezuela’s leader, threatened other Latin American countries with similar military action, imposed tariffs on friends and foes alike and talked openly about annexing Greenland – a move that could effectively end the NATO alliance.
Last year’s speech by Vance accused European leaders of censoring free speech and failing to control immigration, which Merz explicitly rejected.
“A rift has opened up between Europe and the United States. Vice President JD Vance said this very openly here in Munich a year ago,” Merz said.
“He was right. The culture war of the MAGA movement is not ours. Freedom of speech ends here with us when that speech goes against human dignity and the constitution. We do not believe in tariffs and protectionism, but in free trade,” he said, drawing applause.
—With additional files from Global News
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《2026年國際舞台上的八大金剛》讀後
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0. 前言
法爾黎教授大作全文不到2,000字；可謂簡明扼要，略嫌深度不足(請見本欄上一篇)。以下就該文對中、美兩國所做分析，略加補充；敬請指教。
1. 中國
關於中國「隱藏危機」的部份，法爾黎教授點出「整肅軍頭」和「人口老化」兩個議題。評論它們的文章很多；我就不在此湊熱鬧。
長遠的看，我更擔憂以下兩個議題：
1) 內需不見起色
貿易戰明白顯示：「外銷型經濟成長模式」的限制和罩門。從而，提升「內需」更加成為刻不容緩的當務之急。中國政府至今拿不出一套有效的政策；我討論過導致此困境的部份因素；請參考此欄2025/12/17貼文。
2) 統治正當性
只要政府能夠把中國維持在「小康社會」的狀態，「統治正當性」不成個問題。
但是，當中國進入「開發中」社會，或早期「已開發」社會之後，大多數老百姓的「價值觀」就轉變為「向錢看」。這時，「黨國觀念」或「民族主義」等價值就相對成了口頭禪，不再具有實際意義。換言之，大多數老百姓都成了「可共富貴」但「不可共患難」的小人。
2. 美國
法爾黎教授指出：「巨額國債」和「政治制度崩塌」導致美國國情的混亂和動盪。實際上，美國真正的問題在於：
1) 政客中「三客流」的比率至少高於30%(1)；
2) 選民中「戇大呆」的比率不會低於30%。
前者根本原因來自所謂的「社會風氣」或「文化傳統」；後者則源於「社會風氣」和「教育方式」。一言以蔽之，美國社會的特色是：急功近利掛帥；禮義廉恥闕如。至於跟「新教倫理」有沒有關係，就得看我三、五年後是否有幸能找到韋大師，向他當面討教了。
從而，川痞/川瘋/川丑型人物進入白宮，將是美國政治的「新常態」。
3. 結論
我完全同意法爾黎教授大作中最後一句話：
「根據過去一、兩百年來國際關係學者所觀察到的真理：
國際間做一個強權遠勝於做一個看強權臉色的附庸。」
附註：
1. 這是我十多年前在網上論政時常用的詞彙。由於有一段時間，在說明一次：
「三客流」者，「擦客」、「舔客」、「吹客」三種人物之合稱也；社會上觸目皆是，集三種技藝於一身者也所在多有。各「客」的拿手絕技如下：
「擦客」：擦屁股
「舔客」：舔屁股(ass-kissing)
「吹客」：吹喇叭(cock-sucking)；《素女經》中稱此動作為「吹簫」。
2. 原文：“Still, as generations of international relations theorists have argued, it is better to wield power than to be the subject of power.”
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2026年國際舞台上的八大金剛 -- Robert Farley
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The Eight Great Powers of 2026
“Sphere of influence” (勢力範圍) has returned as a defining idea, but the real story is bigger than a U.S.-China-Russia triangle. Eight powers—India, Japan, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, China, the United States, Russia, and the European Union—will shape international politics for years to come.
Robert Farley, 02/07/26
A U.S. Sailor signals the launch of an E/A-18G Growler aircraft, attached to Electronic Attack Squadron 142, from the flight deck of the world’s largest aircraft carrier, Ford-class aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), while underway in the Caribbean Sea, Jan. 31, 2026. U.S. military forces are deployed to the Caribbean in support of the U.S. Southern Command mission, Department of War-directed operations, and the president’s priorities to disrupt illicit drug trafficking and protect the homeland. (U.S. Navy photo) 照片說明
The 8 Great Powers That Will Shape Global Politics for Decades
The phrase of the year in international relations has been “sphere of influence.”
Driven by a purported desire to redirect American energy and attention to the Western Hemisphere, the US national security strategy emphasized that the United States should be dominant within its own neighborhood, implying that other great powers, such as Russia and China, are due a degree of deference within theirs.
However, Russia, China, and the United States are not the only players, nor are they the most important.
As we enter the second quarter of the 21st century, here is a list of eight great powers that will determine the course of international politics for the foreseeable future.
For context, see our 2025 list (a video version is above as well) to see what may or may not changed.
India
India has walked a long and uneven road to global prominence. The very size of the Indian population made it an important player in the immediate wake of independence, although a sclerotic economic system and a troublesome neighborhood created hard limitations on New Delhi’s power.
Nonetheless, India spearheaded anti-colonial sentiment and launched institutional alternatives to both the Soviet and Western principles of global order.
India also maintained a robust democratic culture, even amid periodic authoritarian backsliding during and after the Cold War.
Now, the moment feels like it belongs to India.
India’s nuclear weapons program is one of the world’s most advanced.
India finally passed China in total population in 2023, and does not suffer from the kinds of demographic problems that plague many of the other countries on this list.
New Delhi has carefully played the diplomatic game during the Russia-Ukraine War and has maintained good-enough relations with both Russia and the United States.
Careful diplomacy has also reduced tensions with China. India’s technological future appears promising, with a large cadre of well-educated and entrepreneurially minded workers.
Landmines remain; Trump’s ascension has strained relations with the US even with the conclusion of a new trade agreement. Nevertheless, India is in a strong position as we pass the quarter mark of the 21st century.
Japan
For decades, Japan’s position among the world’s great powers has been controversial, largely because of Tokyo’s relatively small defense posture in the wake of the Second World War.
The Cold War witnessed the substantial expansion of Japan’s economic and financial power under the aegis of Tokyo’s alliance with the United States. Japanese firms reached the very edges of the technological frontier and transformed patterns of trade across the Global North.
Soryu-Class Japan Submarines. Image Credit: Creative Commons. 照片
But Japan’s military restrictions have limited its strategic influence. Over the past several years, this has changed, even as Japan has begun to face serious demographic challenges and an outmoded financial system.
And yet Japan remains immensely wealthy and at the forefront of many critical global technologies. The world’s fourth-largest economy is more than capable of building and maintaining a world-class military establishment, and Tokyo seems to be moving in that direction.
Brazil
Brazil is the country of the future and always shall be, or so many have said across the country’s long history.
With a large population, a favorable resource endowment, and a strong territorial position in South America, Brazil should enjoy substantial influence in its neighborhood and globally.
And yet Brazil continues to face major impediments, including a volatile industrial economy, immense income inequality, and profound regional disparities. Brazil has also stood in the shadow of the United States, which has exercised regional hegemony longer than Brazil has existed as an independent entity.
A-29 Super Tucano from Brazil. 照片
Still, Brazil has major advantages. Its aerospace industry is internationally competitive, and Brasilia’s military profile has been steadily growing. The political system is relatively stable, having weathered some internal challenges over the past several years.
Brazil is well respected both regionally and globally, to the extent that respect remains a meaningful currency in international affairs. Brazil’s greatest future challenge will be the uncertainty surrounding U.S. foreign policy, itself generated by American political dysfunction.
With strong leadership, however, Brazil is well positioned to secure a stable position for the rest of the 21st century.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia’s position among the great powers has historically depended upon two things: the ability to control global oil prices, and the related capacity to maintain good relations with the United States and Europe.
Both remain important today, as the House of Saud exerts substantial influence over the price and availability of oil, the world’s most important commodity. This gives Riyadh leverage over politics, both local and global, and has historically enabled Saudi Arabia’s rulers to pursue political projects at home and abroad.
Vladimir Putin met with Crown Prince and Defence Minister of Saudi Arabia Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud. 照片
To be sure, this financial power has not always resulted in military advantage. However, Riyadh has paid increasing attention to establishing and maintaining a modern, effective, and technologically advanced military.
As the experience in Yemen demonstrates, the road has been bumpy. Yet Riyadh now enjoys decent enough relations with its neighbors and continues to wield influence in Washington.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia has experienced rapid population growth and does not appear likely to face the demographic challenges that afflict other members of this list. Modernization of the economy and (perhaps) the pursuit of a nuclear weapon remain key to the future of Riyadh’s global and regional influence.
China
China has resumed its place among the first rank of world powers. Chinese economic growth continues to pace the industrialized world. China has also closed qualitative and quantitative military gaps with its neighbors and with the United States.
China’s nuclear arsenal is growing at a breakneck pace, putting it in a position to compete with both Russia and the United States.
J-36 or JH-XX from China. Screenshot for Chinese Social Media. 照片
To be sure, not all is well. President Xi Jinping has spent much of the last year purging the senior ranks of the PLA, a campaign that may or may not yield a more efficient and professional military. China’s demographic problems also loom large.
The overall impact of the One-Child Policy remains difficult to ascertain, but China now faces an aging population and a shrinking youth cohort.
Remedying this will require substantial reforms to the existing Chinese welfare state, which may precipitate additional political upheavals.
United States
The United States remains the world’s pre-eminent power. American economic, military, and administrative power continues to bestride the globe, notwithstanding constant whingeing about America’s terminal decline.
The United States continues to support Ukraine’s resistance to Russia while also threatening war against Iran and Venezuela, enjoying a global reach without really breaking a sweat. In the face of American threats to seize Greenland, Europe found itself with few options beyond threatening to pull the pin on the grenade of the transatlantic relationship, although Trump ultimately backed down.
A U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor performs an aerial demonstration during Aviation Nation 2025 at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, April 6, 2025. Aviation Nation is an airshow held at Nellis Air Force Base, showcasing the pride, precision and capabilities of the U.S. Air Force through aerial demonstrations and static displays. The F-22 Raptor performed there to highlight its unmatched agility and air dominance as part of the Air Force’s efforts to inspire, recruit and connect with the public. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Lauren Cobin) 照片說明
This is not to say that the United States is without problems.
A growing debt and a dysfunctional political system have created an unusual degree of uncertainty and instability. The US no longer enjoys the tremendous technological advantages it held throughout the Cold War.
Perhaps most troubling in the long run, the Trump administration has undermined one of America’s enduring strengths, its capacity to attract and assimilate immigrants from around the world.
Russia
Russia has had a rough four years. The decision to invade Ukraine was predicated on the idea of a quick war that would leave Europe and the United States no choice but to accept a fait accompli. Instead, Moscow has found itself in a dreadfully destructive war that distanced allies, damaged the financial and economic system, created enduring dependence upon China, India, and North Korea, and inflicted a demographic disaster on an already ailing country.
For this, Russia has captured about 20% of Ukraine’s territory, inhabited by perhaps three million people.
Tu-22M Bomber from Russia 照片
And yet… Moscow continues to control a continent-spanning territory rich in natural resources. Moscow has mobilized its economy for war and (despite long-term damage) seems unlikely to be forced out of the conflict by economic and financial factors.
Russia also continues to operate the world’s second most lethal arsenal of nuclear weapons. Russia’s natural resources (especially energy) remain too important to the world to be without, and the Russian population is sufficiently well educated to manage an industrial mobilization. The trend arrows all point in the wrong direction for Russia, yet it continues to rank among the world’s foremost powers.
European Union
Were we to exclude the European Union due to its supranational nature, each of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom would deserve some degree of attention, the former by virtue of its robust economy and the latter two because of their global reach and nuclear arsenals.
The governing institutions of the European Union remain a project under construction, and gaps between national preferences and supranational institutional demands continue to plague the continent’s long-term political future.
AIP Submarine from Germany. Image Credit: Creative Commons. 照片
But given that the three great powers in Europe seem to be aligned on major questions of international influence, including resistance to the demands of the Trump administration and support for Ukraine. Along with Italy, these constitute four of the world’s ten largest economies.
Technologically, Europe is competitive with the foremost economies of Asia and North America, although it no longer enjoys the advantages it once had. Russia, and perhaps even the United States, may regret the geopolitical awakening that Europe has undergone over the past four years.
The Honest Truth About Spheres of Influence
The honest truth about “spheres of influence” is that they represent an observation about the current state of the world, not a normative judgment or a source of policy guidance. The most brutal conflicts in world history (between Russia and Germany and between China and Japan) have involved contests for supremacy within a regional order, not unwanted interference from external powers. Large countries are necessarily influential in their neighborhoods because they occupy positions at the top of vast social, financial, and economic networks.
This does not mean that they enjoy special rights in those neighborhoods or that they can simply do as they wish; as Russia has discovered and the United States may find out, it is far more advantageous to have Canada as a neighbor than Ukraine. Still, as generations of international relations theorists have argued, it is better to wield power than to be the subject of power. (“subject” 在此指「附庸」或「子民」。)
Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.
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