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洽普門教授這篇評論除了文風可以用「歇斯底里」形容外,它還犯了作文課老師一個大忌:「文不對題」。全文內容只跟原文標題的前半部相當;在1,300字中,涉及原文標題後半部的論述大概不到50個字(1);而且沒有片語隻字涉及他做此判斷的「依據」。其實也難怪,這位冬烘先生不過是圖書館學的「教授」,他畢竟不是政治學、軍事學、或太空科技等領域的「專家」。撈過界的結果,往往就只能應了「不知所云」這句俗話。 算他運氣,這篇分析正好可以支持洽普門教授原文標題中:「西方國家可能輸掉」這個論斷(該欄2025/10/12)。 附註: 1. 標題中: “… and the West is losing” 這個陳述。 “Space is a critical battlefield, and the West is losing The next war will be won and lost in space Bert Chapman, 10/10/25 Editor’s Notes: As wars wage around the world our attention is rightfully directed to these theatres, but perhaps our attention should really be towards the stars. Professor Albert Chapman argues that the Outer Space Treaty and the lofty ideas it was founded upon are dead, and space is better thought of as a battlefield. The nature of space conflict blurs the line between overt and covert activity, and therefore the US needs strong alliances and a strong military presence in order to dominate the area between Earth and Mars, even if that comes to the cost of day-to-day spending and short term priorities. If the West loses space, it may well lose the world. We think of space as a place of wonder—Neil Armstrong’s inspirational Moon landing, or the serene blue marble of Earth suspended in the sky—rather than warfare. But, whether we pay attention or not, the geopolitics of space threatens to become a key part of our everyday lives. The following scenario may occur now or in the near future. A large solar flare or an attack on the satellite infrastructures of democratic countries by hostile actors such as China and Russia could hobble our modern technologies. It could ground planes; stall ambulances, police and courts; freeze financial transactions; stop food getting into stores, with ensuing panic-buying; and take out our ability to communicate by phone and social media. Life as we know it could be devastated overnight. The TV series COBRA dramatically illustrated the potential disruption a solar flare incident could cause in the UK, affecting everyone from ordinary citizens to the highest circles of government policymaking. COBRA might have been fictional, but situations like it are entirely plausible. Beyond solar flares, space is a potential target of warfare—one that we should be more worried about, and that we should be seeking to defend. The strategy underpinning this new frontier of war may, however, turn out to be very familiar. There are a number of ways in which counterspace weapons could be deployed. Kinetic physical weapons, such as missiles, attempting to strike directly or detonate a warhead near a satellite or ground station, could cause irrevocable damage to affected systems and potentially kill people. Non-kinetic physical weapons, such as lasers, may physically impact satellite or ground systems without making contact, and can temporarily dazzle or permanently blind satellite sensors, potentially damaging components by making them overheat, too. A nuclear device detonated in space could create a high-radiation environment and electromagnetic pulse that could damage or destroy the electrical components inside orbital satellites. Electronic counterspace weapons can target the electromagnetic systems that allow satellite networks to transmit and receive data. This can involve jamming devices interfering with communications to and from satellites by generating noise in the same radio frequency. Such attacks may be difficult to distinguish from accidental interference, making attribution and awareness harder. Cyber counterspace weapons target specific data and the systems using, transmitting, and controlling data flow, while also targeting ground stations, end-user equipment, or the satellite. The space age started as a utopian project of exploration and international scientific cooperation. But, nearly seven decades on, space is an arena of acute commercial activity and global strategic competition between multiple powers. It is no longer a place of sanctuary beyond the fought-over terrain of Earth, but its own arena of war. Numerous countries, from Russia and China to the Western world, have begun addressing this reality by placing different governmental and military agencies in charge of civilian and military space policy, seeking to develop national and international legal architectures to regulate such competition, enhancing the role of universities and companies in producing civilian and military space-related applications and research, and beginning to prepare space as a potential venue for future military conflict. They are also starting to develop an intellectual doctrine for fighting and winning wars in space out to the Moon and Mars. Many of these resources are publicly accessible and produced by civilian and military scholars and research institutions such as the US Air Force’s Centre for Chinese Aerospace Studies and the United Kingdom’s Defense Futures. Some space warfare and defense scholars advocate that the U.S. and its allies develop robust systems to protect their space assets from hostile acts. These individuals also note that space warfare will primarily occur in a grey zone, involving serious attacks and disruptions to important infrastructure, but that fall below the threshold of conventional warfare that would lead to a full-blown military response. This could be marked by spacecraft movement, placement, and proximity, like a game of satellite chess in which key positions are occupied to block enemy pieces or be exploited for competitive advantage by powers such as China and Russia; it may see nations use commercial space companies as proxies for security and peacekeeping; or it may feature lawfare including the distortion and misuse of international legal regimes. Powers could use privates, privateers, and space militias to potentially circumvent legal restrictions. Countries such as China could strive to make extensive use of innovative space technologies and dual-use technologies to create and exploit power imbalances among competitors and foster international instability. Durham University Astropolitics Professor Bleddyn Bowen contends that space dominance has imperial traditions. He stresses that commanding space has its foundations in blue water naval supremacy and includes similar strategic insights to continental power theories. The problems of spacepower exist within an Earth-centred strategic framework, but that power is dispersed across multiple locations both on Earth and in space. Classical geopolitical thinkers such as Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman would see their theories applying to space as opposed to the Panglossian idealism of the Outer Space Treaty, signed by the US, UK and Russia in 1967, which delusionally believed space could be kept competition- and conflict-free: “free for exploration and use by all States” and “exclusively for peaceful purposes.” Today, historic military theorists such as Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Clausewitz, Mahan, Corbett, Gorshkov, and Huaquing would find their land and seapower theories exceptionally relevant to space. The military theories of space will come from the proven strategies of the land and the sea. These theories would include concentrating forces at critical points between cislunar space (between the Earth and the Moon) and beyond. They would focus on defeating enemy forces while achieving control of important positions in space. They would achieve political objectives by creating balanced space capabilities that offer practical uses too. They would also intentionally blur the lines between different types of conflict, mixing covert and overt warfare, and use a mixture of guerrilla operations, such as cyber attacks and lawfare, to achieve operational and propaganda success. The US and its democratic allies should work with other relatively democratic maritime countries including Indonesia, Israel, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, to keep China and Russia and their de facto allies from dominating cislunar space out to the Moon and through the asteroid belt to Mars. These countries must also work to ensure that their likely attempts to mine natural resources in these areas are not disrupted by hostile powers. Such policymaking must include whether to use crewed or autonomous vehicles and weapons, developing new areas of space economic development, new military space and strategic thought and doctrine, including national and international chains of command, lines of communication, kill chains, and conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations. Democratic countries must accept the inescapable reality that they must rise to meet the protracted challenge of authoritarian powers in space. The commercial, academic, and governments of these countries should have the innovative assets to effectively meet the acute challenges posed by China and Russia while demonstrating the long-term political will to be successful and triumphant in the emerging space competition. This may require them to tell public opinion in their countries that social spending will have to be reduced to devote resources to ensuring unrestricted access to space. With the stakes being this high, we cannot allow short-term political thinking to constrain the future in this epochal moment. Public opinion in democratic countries must be made to understand that political reality has made the Outer Space Treaty defunct. Space is now a battlefield. In an arena of acute economic, informational, and military competition, we need to commit resources to defending assets that have become imperative for our personal convenience, societal prosperity, and national security. Failing to take these steps could result in hostile powers like China and Russia restricting or permanently ending access to space by the US and its allies, and the consequences for our daily lives could be the stuff of the bleakest science fiction dystopia. Professor Albert Chapman is Government Information and Political Science Librarian and Professor of Library Science at Purdue University, USA. He is the author of Space Strategy and Military Doctrine: Policy Documents of NATO Allies published by Bloomsbury. SUGGESTED VIEWING Adventures in space With Matt O'Dowd, Avi Loeb, Alison Flood, Carol Cleland
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