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「戰爭」與「反戰」 -- 開欄文
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2023年我收到傅大為、盧倩儀、馮建三、和郭力昕等四位教授發起的《我們的反戰聲明》時，就想專闢一欄刊出該聲明，並收集網上以及我自己討論「戰爭」與「反戰」的文章。但是，由於這個題目很大，我一時三刻間寫不出一篇提綱挈領的「開欄文」；所以作罷。後來將該聲明和拙作《「我們的反戰聲明」爭議淺見》分別單獨刊出。
現在想想這其實不是個充分理由。最近讀到一篇介紹雷博教授著作的文章(本欄第三篇)，覺得有寫篇評論的必要(本欄第四篇)；寫作過程中，由於搜查相關資料，又看到史投克教授的大作(本欄下一篇)。我認為它值得介紹，就決定以這三篇文章為基礎而開此欄。
史投克教授的大作不但分析了「全面戰爭」這個「概念」，他借這個分析來強調：使用「明白清晰」的概念在建構理論和政策上非常重要。史投克教授在該文中並簡明的闡釋了韋伯「理想型」概念；軍事學之外，全文在「方法論」上也頗有參考價值。
我一向認為論述中所用詞彙和「概念」需要明白易懂，以及其「所指」應該確定而無岐義；我曾經說過和史投克教授同樣的話：
「如果一個詞彙或概念『無所不指』，則它實際上就會變得『無所指』」。
我不敢說和史投克教授「英雄所見略同」；或許，理性、務實的人在思考邏輯上都是同路人吧。
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誰知道：伊朗戰爭實況？ ---- Harlan Ullman
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下文可以歸類為「訊息大雜燴」；或者說：由於「文不對題」，作者讓人搞不清楚他的「主旨」到底是什麼。
不過，從他的分析我們再度了解到：制空權和制海權並非「勝利」或「達到軍事/政治目標」的「充分條件」。「軍靴踏上敵國土地」才能畢「戰爭」之功；也就是曹松說的：「一將功成萬骨枯」。
How the war with Iran is actually going
Harlan Ullman, 03/23/26
While President Donald Trump has told Americans that Operation Epic Fury is “way ahead of schedule,” how well are the U.S. and Israel doing in compelling Iran to submit to our demands, no matter how confusing they may be in declaring the outcomes we seek?
According to press reports, U.S. officials confirmed five KC-135 tankers crucial to refueling striking aircraft were damaged at an airbase in Saudi Arabia. One had a mid-air collision and crashed killing its aircrew. And an F-35 was reportedly damaged but made it safely to base. In addition to three F-15’s downed by friendly Kuwaiti fire, over 200 American service personnel have been wounded or killed by Iranian missiles and drones.
So, despite Trump’s reports of destroying Iran’s Navy and Air Force, Tehran is still conducting missile and drone strikes against U.S. and local allies in the Gulf. The question must be what Iran’s strategy is and is it working or failing? At this stage, there are no answers to that or to whether the U.S. and Israel will achieve their political objectives based on the use of military force. Trump has already reprimanded Israel for attacking Iranian gas production facilities. But here is a classic irony.
Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz. As the administration considers lifting sanctions on Iranian oil, Trump has signaled that the flow of energy from the Gulf must be kept open, as U.S. gas prices surge near $4 per barrel. His policy is contradictory. The only leverage Trump has is to threaten Iranian energy production facilities. But to do so, he is merely increasing energy costs that could redound against him in the November elections.
From the U.S. and Israeli side, after conducting over 7,000 strikes, finding appropriate targets must be an issue. Since the energy infrastructure seems to be off limits and much of Iran’s military capability was destroyed or is unreachable because it is buried so deeply underground, where are all the bombs and missiles headed? Further, since rearming U.S. warships at sea with Tomahawk and other missiles is not possible, how are the surface escorts going to be replenished? And after fire sent the USS Ford back to Crete for repairs, it will take time for USS Nimitz to replace it.
The U.S. is sending a Marine Expeditionary Unit to the Gulf. While a Marine Expeditionary Unit consists of at least three ships — in this case an LHA “lightning carrier” and two dock landing ships of some 2,500 sailors and Marines — only 800 Marines are in the infantry battalion.
To think that such a small force, despite the air power that could be mounted from the Gulf to support it, could seize control of the Strait of Hormuz or capture Iran’s uranium at Natanz brings back memories of “Blackhawk Down” and the fiasco in Mogadishu to capture a Somali warlord in 1993 that led to 19 U.S. deaths and 79 wounded.
While it can be argued that Iran has mounted a brilliant campaign to win by not losing, using a combination of missiles and drones to punish Gulf states while blocking the Strait to impose huge economic pressure on the U.S., why was it unable to prevent the U.S. and Israel from devastating its conventional forces?
Surely Iran had months to react to the Midnight Hammer bombing that “obliterated” its nuclear ambitions, if Trump is correct. But it made no attempts to use decoys and cover to protect its air force and navy. It had three capable Kilo class Russian built submarines. Apparently, none was operational. Why not? And knowing that USS Ford had to transit Suez and the Red Sea, why did Iran not mobilize its Houthi allies to disrupt that passage?
Over time, all these questions may be answered. If one recalls, the initial assaults into Afghanistan by NATO forces and Iraq in 2003 were hugely successful. However, do those operations have any consequences for Iran? While the Taliban and Saddam’s army were routed, who has all the time and not the watches in Kabul? And who is running Iraq?
Going to war sometimes is too easy, especially with a compliant Congress. Ending wars, as the U.S. learned in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq after 2003, did not go well. The question is whether President Trump is being told the realities of this war. Or are his advisors merely reinforcing his decisions, as Lyndon Johnson’s and George W. Bush’s team led the march of folly into failure and defeat?
Harlan Ullman, Ph.D., is UPI’s Arnaud deBorchgrave Distinguished Columnist, a senior adviser at the Atlantic Council, the chairman of two private companies and the principal author of the doctrine of shock and awe. He and former United Kingdom Defense Chief David Richards are the authors of a forthcoming book on preventing strategic catastrophe.
Copyright 2026 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
For the latest news, weather, sports, and streaming video, head to The Hill.
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戰爭成本之「日費千金」 --- Jason Ma
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請參考：
Trump’s War Is Burning Through Years’ Worth of Multibillion Dollar Stockpiles
這是除了「決勝於千里之外」，現代戰爭或「高科技戰爭」的另一個特質。不過，老祖宗早有先見之明：
「… 則內外之費，賓客之用，膠漆之材，車甲之奉，『日費千金』，然後十萬之師舉矣。」(《孫子》•作戰第二)
The U.S. has the world’s most advanced military, but the unforgiving economics of wars in Iran and Ukraine show quantity has a quality all its own
Jason Ma, 03/22/26
The U.S. war on Iran has laid bare a dichotomy in the world’s most advanced military: high-tech weapons and AI have delivered stunning blows at unprecedented speed, while defending against the swarm of missiles and drones launched in retaliation have come at unsustainably lopsided costs.
Led by a massive air campaign, the U.S. has claimed more than 7,000 strikes on key sites, with Israel conducting a comparable number of sorties, as AI tools like Anthropic’s Claude recommend targets “much quicker in some ways than the speed of thought.” The relentless bombardment has decimated Iran’s military and leadership.
But helped by the mass production of cheap drones, the forces that are left still retain enough combat power to attack Gulf neighbors and scare away commercial tankers from the Strait of Hormuz, keeping 20% of the world’s oil bottled up.
Iran’s retaliatory barrage has also forced the U.S. and its allies to draw down expensive stockpiles of interceptors. The tactic highlights the brutal economics of the current war: missiles that cost millions of dollars each are shooting down drones that cost tens of thousands of dollars. In other words, it’s like the U.S. is using a Formula 1 racer to fight off a used car.
U.S.-style warfare doesn’t come cheap. The first six days of the Iran conflict have cost the U.S. more than $11 billion, though a switch to less expensive bombs has since slowed the daily bill.
Pentagon leaders insist the U.S. has enough munitions, though the exact size of the inventory is classified. Still, the heavy usage has raised concerns about the remaining supply, especially as allies consider what’s needed in the event of war with Russia or China.
But lawmakers got sticker shock on reports the Defense Department was seeking an additional $200 billion for the Iran war. Part of the Pentagon’s calculus, however, was to address the shortage of precision munitions and spur the defense industry to quickly restock supplies, sources told the Washington Post.
President Donald Trump summoned top contractors to the White House earlier this month to push them along. But ramping up to high levels of output could take years. For example, Lockheed Martin made 620 PAC-3 interceptors for the Patriot air-defense system last year and plans to make 650 this year. But its goal of producing over 2,000 annually won’t be reached until 2030, according to Bloomberg.
The current dilemma brings to mind a quote attributed to Joseph Stalin during World War II as he weighed the Red Army’s numerical advantage against Nazi Germany’s superior weapons: “quantity has a quality all its own.”
Ukraine tranforms warfare
The U.S. has long prioritized cutting-edge equipment to maintain superiority against any military rivals. But as the pace of technological improvements accelerated in recent decades, costs ballooned and the Pentagon struggled to keep up. During the Iraq war, acquisition officials looked to “off the shelf” commercial options that could be integrated into the military quickly.
The advent of cheap commercial drone technology changed equation dramatically, as demonstrated by the Ukrainian military’s adoption of new tactics to fight off the Russian invasion.
The four-year-old conflict has transformed warfare. Unmanned weapons are now responsible for most battlefield casualties as small first-person view drones hunt down individual troops or vehicles. Ukraine’s defense industry has also evolved to mass produce inexpensive drones that can take down Russia-launched Shaheds from Iran.
Once such drone, the P1-Sun, costs a little more than $1,000 and can fly above 30,000 feet as 3-D printers crank them out in Ukrainian factories.
“The future of warfare is Ukraine producing 7 million drones per year right now,” former CIA director and retired Gen. David Patraeus said earlier this month. “This past year, they produced 3.5 million. That enabled them basically to use 9 to 10,000 drones per day.”
And when combined with AI that makes drones more autonomous, the result will be swarms that are “really, really hard” to counter, he added.
Defending against an onslaught like that may require energy weapons, like high-powered microwaves, that can take down large swathes of drones at once.
“We are not actually where we should be relative to that, based on what we should have been learning from Ukraine for a very long time,” Patraeus warned. “And they’re learning back and forth. They make software changes every week or two, hardware changes every two to three weeks.”
Gulf countries facing Iranian attacks have sought Ukraine’s help in combating the Shahed drone. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said his country can produce at least 2,000 “effective and combat-proven” interceptors a day.
The Pentagon also understands the new economics of warfare and has even incorporated a copycat version of the Shahed in the U.S. military, using the American version against Iran during the war.
Emil Michael, the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, said at an industry conference on Tuesday that the Pentagon plans to go big with the new LUCAS drone.
“After only a few years, we continue to refine that and make that something that we can mass produce at scale,” he said. “They’ve worked very well so far and it’s proven out to be a useful tool in the arsenal.”
This story was originally featured on Fortune.com
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星鏈技術決定戰場上的勝敗 -- T. Pultarov/H. Cheshire
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請參考：本欄2026/03/16貼文。
The Race to Replace Starlink on the Battlefield
Starlink,SpaceX,Ukraine
Tereza Pultarov/Hannah Cheshire, 03/18/26
With Starlink no longer available to unauthorized foreign actors in Ukraine, Russia is racing to find a replacement to keep troops and drones connected. It’s an uphill battle.
For months, Ukrainians had been quietly campaigning for SpaceX to allow the government of the embattled country to control who can use Starlink terminals in Ukraine’s territory. It was a matter of life and death as evidence kept mounting that Russia was buying Starlink terminals on the black market, using them to guide deep strike drones to hit civilian targets and infrastructure in Ukraine.
In early February, the deal was finally reached, a few days after reports had emerged that a Russian Geran drone fitted with a Starlink terminal hit a passenger train near Kharkiv, killing five people on board.
Ukraine’s Minister of Defence Mykhailo Fedorov publicly thanked Elon Musk and SpaceX CEO Gwynne Shotwell for “their swift response” in a LinkedIn post, announcing the new registration initiative that requires all Starlink users in Ukraine to whitelist their devices with the government.
Within weeks, it became clear how important that agreement was.
Without Starlink, Russian forces began to fumble, the momentum appearing to swing toward Ukraine.
"I think they lost 50% of their capacity for offence," a Ukrainian drone operator said. "That's what the numbers show. Fewer assaults, fewer enemy drones, fewer everything."
Starlink has played a key role in Ukraine’s ability to ward off the Russian invasion since the early months of the war. Shortly after the invasion on February 24th, 2022, SpaceX famously turned on Starlink services in Ukraine, dispatching thousands of satellite terminals to the post-Soviet republic to keep its troops and civilians online after the Russian army began destroying terrestrial internet infrastructure. Since then, access to Starlink has become a cornerstone of Ukraine’s defence and counter-offensive. At the same time, the reliance on an asset controlled by a single person — whimsical billionaire Elon Musk — is raising concerns not only in Ukraine, but also in Europe, which, according to analysts, may need to brace itself for a possible Russian attack in the coming years.
The conflict has ignited a race, with Ukraine and Russia in the lead, to develop alternatives to the SpaceX-owned megaconstellation.
Starlink Advantage
Within weeks of the arrival of the first Starlink terminals in 2022, Ukrainians realized that the nimble devices, weighing around one kilogram each, could be mounted onto reconnaissance and kamikaze drones to extend their range.
Commercial drones, previously used by filmmakers and hobbyists, redefined war-fighting doctrines in Ukraine within months of the invasion. Those devices are by default controlled by radio-frequency links that have a range of only a few miles and are easily jammed. With Starlink, drones could cover distances of hundreds or thousands of kilometers. Since Starlink satellite links cannot be easily jammed, these drones are also hard to stop, providing a significant advantage to those who have access to the constellation’s connectivity.
Today, Ukraine is by far the largest user of Starlink terminals in the world. According to Ukrainian satcom expert Volodymyr Stepanets, some 250,000 terminals are active in the country. Out of that number, 100,000 are in the hands of the military. They are used to keep troops connected and to guide drones and ground robots across the grey zone, the ravaged no-man’s strip of land along the frontline.
Hundreds of devices are connecting to the constellation every day along the frontline, with the high demand creating bandwidth bottlenecks, diluting the constellation’s peak bandwidth of 200 Mbps to a mere 10 Mbps per terminal, affecting drone and robot mission execution.
Still, the useof Starlink forcombat operationshas been a game-changer.
No other system currently exists that could replace Starlink on drones. The Eutelsat-owned One Web low-Earth-orbit constellation lacks in capacity, featuring a mere 690 satellites compared to Starlink’s 10,000. On top of that, the most compact One Web terminals weigh in excess of 10 kilograms, way too much to be placed on a maneuverable drone, and cost in excess of $7,000 compared to the $300-$500 for a Starlink mini terminal, which makes them a no-go for single-use attack missions. Prices vary depending on where and when the Starlink device was purchased.
Old-school geostationary communication satellites, suspended above a fixed spot above the equator some 22,000 miles away from the planet, can offer connectivity to troops, but they suffer from signal delays that make it difficult to use them for drone control. The terminals designed to receive their signal, too, are way too clunky for lightweight UAVs.
Russia Catches On
Although Starlink services have never been enabled in Russia, the Russian military could, until early February, use the terminals along the frontline in Eastern Ukraine in the same way that Ukrainians do. Those terminals could be registered in other countries with the roaming setting switched on.
First reports of Russia attaching Starlink terminals to long-range attack Shahed drones date back to late 2024. Stepanets told Supercluster the situation had become increasingly serious by mid-2025, forcing Ukraine to campaign for a registration scheme that would allow only whitelisted terminals to operate in the country.
Anecdotal evidence that has emerged since the registration requirement shows how critical Starlink access is on the frontline. Unable to use their unregistered terminals, Russian soldiers were falling prey to a brazen Ukrainian phishing scheme. Pretending to offer Russian users the opportunity to register their terminals with the Ukrainian government via Ukrainian proxies, a group of Ukrainian cyber warriors extracted payments from the desperate Russian troops as well as locations, which were later used to guide drone and missile strikes.
Scrambling to restore frontline connectivity, Russia has deployed stratospheric balloons fitted with 5G communication terminals to connect troops and drones via relays in the stratosphere 12 miles above Earth’s surface. The project, called Barrazh-1, is, however, bound to face literal headwinds as the predominant atmospheric flow above Eastern Europe moves from west to east, meaning the balloons are likely to quickly drift deeper into Russian aerospace.
Iurii Vysoven, CEO of Ukrainian company Aerobabovna, which is producing tethered aerostats that serve as communication relays along the frontline, said in a blog post on the company’s website that such high-altitude platforms would be restricted “to short-duration operations” and would have a significantly limited “usefulness for military applications, particularly as a replacement for satellite communications.”
Russia’s Own Starlink
Russia is making up for the loss of Starlink for basic frontline connectivity and communications among troops with the use of its own geostationary satellite systems.
But the services can hardly compete with Starlink.
Russia’s Yamal satellite constellation currently consists of five satellites stationed above Russia and surrounding regions. Another satellite is expected to launch this year. The five satellites already in orbit have been purchased by Russia from the European manufacturer Thales Alenia Space years before the invasion of Ukraine.
According to available reports, the roll-out of Yamal terminals to replace Starlink on the battlefield has earned criticism from Russian troops. The antennas have been described as too large and hard to set up, and the data speeds are too slow to meet the needs.
Stepanets told Supercluster that Russia is believed to be conducting experiments with controlling drones through the newest satellite of the Yamal constellation, Yamal 601, launched in 2014.
“This is a very modern satellite with a good coverage that covers Europe too,” Stepanets said. “It has a good capacity and a good technological level.”
On top of that, Russia is already working on its own low-Earth-orbit communications constellation that could enable the control of drones in the absence of Starlink.
“They have managed to put into low Earth orbit an experimental formation of small satellites, which they are actually already testing,” Eugen Rokytsky, the CEO of the Ukrainian Innovation Spacetech Clusters Alliance, told Supercluster. “The sole purpose of this constellation is to control drones.”
The constellation, dubbed Rassvet, currently has three satellites in orbit, according to Gunter’s Space Page, all launched in 2023. However, according to available information, an are expected to be launched in the coming months. By 2027, the constellation could grow to over 300 spacecraft.
With these developments, Rokytsky remarked, Russia is leaping ahead of Europe in its ability to control battlefield assets without reliance on Starlink.
Europe Lags Behind
Ukraine is already taking its own steps to reduce its dependence on Starlink, having learned from the unpredictable mood changes of the Trump administration not to take access to U.S. technology for granted.
“We understand that our dependency on Starlink is a big vulnerability for us,” Stepanets said.
In collaboration with western partners, Ukraine has developed a dedicated geostationary satellite terminal, UASAT GEO, which, according to Stepanets, “provides an alternative for many use cases” on the battlefield and has already been tested on the front line.
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烏軍無人機戰術的小兵立大功 - Verity Bowman
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Ukraine’s plan to cut off Russia’s front-line troops is working
Kyiv’s drone campaign base has expanded the ‘kill zone’ without sending soldiers to battle
Verity Bowman, 03/14/26
Ukraine knows it cannot match Russia’s relentless waves of manpower.
Refusing to throw troops into the grinder, Kyiv has taken a different path to victory – one defined by precision, patience and technology. Now, that strategy is starting to pay off.
A relentless and meticulously planned drone campaign is choking Russia’s front-line forces, expanding the so-called “kill zone” threefold in some areas.
It has turned areas once considered safe behind the front line into deadly no-go zones.
The aim is simple: make it impossible for Russian forces to move men and equipment forward fast enough to sustain offensive operations.
A soldier from one of Ukraine’s unmanned systems battalions, who remained anonymous for security reasons, told The Telegraph: “The drones are constantly watching, constantly striking. It slows them down, it breaks their rhythm and it gives us the space to control the battlefield without sending men to die.”
Ukraine stepped up its precision drone campaign earlier this year, focusing on destroying Russian drone defences to allow its own drones to operate deeper behind enemy lines.
Ukrainian drones are now able to strike targets from up to 93 miles away from the front line, compared to around 31 miles a few weeks ago, expanding the kill zone to unprecedented depths, according to experts.
The kill zone is the area behind the front line where Ukrainian drones can strike Russian troops, vehicles and logistics, making movement hazardous or impossible.
Its boundaries are fluid, shifting along a zigzag pattern depending on the positions of Ukraine’s elite drone units.
Kateryna Stepanenko, a Russia team lead at the Institute for the Study of War, said: “This takes time and a tremendous amount of planning,” adding that the campaign was a turning point in the conduct of drone warfare on the battlefield.
“It is becoming much more systematic. Based on geo-located footage we are observing and frequent reports from Ukrainian officials about successful strikes – not just precision strikes against vehicles travelling along roads, but also attacks on Russian drone positions, assembly areas, storage facilities and other key targets.”
At the heart of Ukraine’s new drone war is its Deep Strike Command Centre, a unit created in early 2026 by the Unmanned Systems Forces to co-ordinate and improve the management of drone strikes on targets behind Russian troops.
Experts say its founding represents Ukraine’s transition to a network-centric model of warfare, where planning and the sharing of real-time information allow forces to strike effectively across the battlefield without relying on massed troop movements.
Anton Zemlianyi, senior analyst of the Ukrainian Security and Co-operation Centre, said: “Precision, co-ordination and technological superiority play a key role.”
This year’s campaign began with the deployment of heavy bomber drones, such as Nemesis, a Ukrainian-developed heavy attack system that has become one of the most feared assets in Kyiv’s drone arsenal.
Russian forces refer to it as “Baba Yaga”, in reference to the figure in Slavic folklore, because of its ability to strike silently and effectively at night.
These heavy bombers have been deployed to target key Russian systems, including electronic warfare units, air defence installations and equipment that allows Russia to strike or intercept drones.
Ms Stepanenko said: “Heavy bomber drones give an advantage because they are able to pursue specialised targets.
“By undermining and suppressing these Russian assets, Ukrainian forces create conditions in which more drones can fly at greater distances without being intercepted or jammed.”
The destruction of Russian air defence systems, including Buk, Tor, and Pantsir‑S1 models, has weakened Russian defences in the occupied territories, opening up the skies to unprecedented numbers of lighter drones, which are most affected by jammers.
The shortages of air defence capabilities have also pushed the Russians to rely on antiquated equipment, soldiers on the front line told The Telegraph.
Dimko Zhluktenko, a soldier and analyst at Ukraine’s 413th Unmanned Systems Regiment, said: “In some cases, Russian units have reportedly removed multi-barrel machine-gun mounts from old Soviet attack helicopters ... and installed them on improvised gun trucks to fight drones.”
The 413th Unmanned Systems Regiment is one of Ukraine’s cutting-edge drone warfare units, serving as the tip of the spear for many tactical and technological developments.
Russian war bloggers have claimed that Ukraine’s efforts are paying off.
“The enemy has once again taken control of the ‘lower sky’,” one said on the app Telegram, adding: “The situation is difficult.”
Experts have said that infractions have been made across the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk front lines, with successful campaigns in Dobropillia, Huliaipole, Kupiansk, Petrovske, Kostiantynopil, among others.
So far, Russian attempts to push back Ukraine’s dominance in the skies have been largely unsuccessful.
Outages from Starlink, SpaceX’s satellite internet service in Ukraine, are making it harder for Russian forces to operate their own drones, sometimes forcing operators to move into the open to rig communications equipment to lamp posts or trees to maintain control.
Ukraine has been able to secure an advantage over Russia as analysis of its drone operations is paving the way for technological advancements.
Mr Zemlianyi said: “Ukraine continuously analyses battlefield data, including operational reports and signals intelligence, to determine which technologies and tactics work effectively and which are vulnerable.
“Based on this feedback loop, Ukrainian engineers and operators adapt drone systems, communication links and control frequencies to make them more resilient to electronic warfare.”
He said as a result, drones were evolving not only tactically but also operationally, and that in many cases they were beginning to perform roles traditionally associated with long-range precision weapons systems.
Many of the heavy bomber drones also have machine learning or artificial intelligence capabilities, according to Ms Stepanenko, while the range of lighter drones has steadily increased.
Ukrainian forces are not only expanding the kill zone with large numbers of drones, but are using the opportunity to conduct a targeted campaign against Russian vehicles and logistical hubs to make it harder for Moscow to move equipment closer to the front line.
The goal, according to Ms Stepanenko, is to force Russian troops to travel long distances on foot to reach their positions, eventually weakening their ability to hold defensive lines.
By extending the reach of its drones and systematically targeting the systems that protect Russian logistics, Ukraine is attempting to reshape the battlefield without matching Moscow’s manpower, according to Mr Zhluktenko.
“I think the results speak for themselves,” he said. “Russia is losing crazy amounts of rare air defence systems, radars, and there is no way to quickly replenish them.”
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現代空防戰略及戰術 – Adam Gramegna
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FAFO："Fuck Around and Find Out" 的縮寫；中文通常翻譯為：「不作死就不會死」。
下文重點在以當下的美、伊戰爭為實例，說明：
戰爭不但要比誰的武器精良，還要比誰的武器便宜(當然也得比誰的武器製造周期短)。
故將其置於此欄；請見：‘Paranoid’ Pentagon Officials Are Secretly Panicking。
Lessons Learned: How Iran was able to bruise the US Navy’s 5th Fleet
The battle of cheap, slow drones has begun.
Adam Gramegna, 03/01/26
Welcome to 2026. The sky over the Juffair district in Bahrain isn’t so blue; instead, it was a mosaic of gray-black plumes and the white-hot streaks of interception. For years, the armchair generals on social media have been salivating over Operation Truthful Promise 4, the supposed doomsday scenario where Iran’s missile rain finally drowns the U.S. 5th Fleet in its own home.
They told us the Persian Gulf was a kill box. They told us the headquarters at Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain was a sitting duck. As the first Shahed-136 moped drones plodded over the Mina Salman port area over the weekend, it looked like they might finally be right.
However, while the world watched the smoke rise from the service center, our 5th Fleet was fine; the base that houses it took a black eye in the fracas, though.
Here is the after-action report on how we turned a potential Pearl Harbor moment into a dramatic piece of Iranian theater, and why the future of modern defense is about to become a bloodletting for our budgets.
Peaced Out
Before you start mourning the 5th Fleet, check the pier. In a stroke of intelligence foresight, or a well-timed leak perhaps, the U.S. Navy pulled its most valuable cards off the table well before the first siren wailed.
The USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike groups vanished into the “blue water” like Homer Simpson into a wall of shrubbery, out into the Arabian Sea and Mediterranean, safely outside the immediate “kill zone” of Iran’s coastal batteries.
What Iran hit this weekend was, for all intents and purposes, a g-g-g-Ghost Port (If you know, you know). Millions of dollars’ worth of ordnance were spent splashing into static infrastructure, fuel depots, radar domes, and logistics hubs. No sugarcoating it, this was no bueno for our military in future conflicts.
On the other hand, it’s like blowing up an empty garage after the owner drove the Rolls-Royce to a different county. Don’t let the pirrhic victory of the carrier withdrawal fool you; the infrastructure left behind is a technical marvel, and it was being used for target practice.
Mopeds vs. Million-Dollar Missiles
When 71% of the planet is covered in high-quality H2O, the country that can rule it can rule the world. So when our Navy, a walking “FAFO” sign, isn’t a threat anymore, things need to change quickly. The Shahed-136 loitering munition is the one to cause an evolutionary change in American naval power… or else.
This little nugget is a $35,000 lawnmower engine with a warhead attached. It’s slow, it’s loud, and it’s arguably the most annoying weapon in modern history. But in a dense urban neighborhood like Juffair, annoying becomes lethal.
The problem isn’t that we can’t hit them, spoiler alert: we can, it just costs so much money. The Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD batteries protecting the base were screaming today, swatting at dozens of incoming threats in the air.
Unfortunately, here is the power of attrition: we are firing $4 million death sticks at $35,000 drones. Iran is counting on us to “win” every engagement until we run out of ammo or money. They want to deplete our magazine depth with junk drones before they send in the real hardware.
The Hypersonic “Fattah” and the Radar Horizon
Once the Shahed swarms softened the electronic bubble, the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard) sent in the heavy hitters: the Fattah-1 hypersonic missile. Iran calls it “The Conqueror,” and while Western analysts like to dismiss their Mach 13–15 speed claims as dubious at best, the picture on the ground today tells a different story.
Unlike traditional ballistic missiles, which are more predictable in their high-arcing paths (making them fairly easy targets for systems like THAAD), the Fattah-1 is designed for maneuverability within the atmosphere.
Today, that math resulted in at least one confirmed hit on a service center near the base’s command-and-control hub. We didn’t lose a ship, but we lost the untouchable aura our static bases once oozed.
Playing Defense in a Crowded Room
NSA Bahrain isn’t out in the desert like Al Udeid; it’s shoved into the middle of Manama’s Juffair district, surrounded by 20-story luxury apartments. This is a tactical nightmare. Every time a C-RAM (the land-based Phalanx) opens up with its signature wall of lead, thousands of 20mm high-explosive rounds are flying into the sky.
Reports are already filtering in of civilian high-rises shattered by “friendly” shrapnel and falling interceptor debris, thus introducing a major dilemma: the enemy doesn’t have to hit the base to win; they just have to force us to defend it so aggressively that we cause a diplomatic crisis with our Bahraini hosts. This one is simple: if too much damage is done to the civilian infrastructure from American weapons debris, the people will blame America.
A fire broke out in a building targeted by Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles as Iran attacked several buildings in Manama, the capital of Bahrain, on February 28, 2026. (Stringer/Anadolu via Getty Images) 照片
“LUCAS” Joins the Fray
Perhaps the grimmest part of today’s after-action report is the irony of Operation Epic Fury. While Iran was hitting us with Shaheds, the U.S. military was simultaneously debuting our new bestie, LUCAS (Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System).
What is the LUCAS? It’s a $35,000, American-made clone of the Iranian Shahed-136. We reverse-engineered their “moped” and started mass-producing it through Arizona-based SpektreWorks. Today, we saw a classic “Spider-Man pointing at Spider-Man” moment of 21st-century warfare: two powers using the exact same cheap tech to try and bankrupt each other’s air defenses.
We bought the airspace over the Persian Gulf for a trillion dollars, but today, Iran showed they could rent it for an afternoon with loose change. Operation Truthful Promise 4 never even sniffed the 5th Fleet because we were smart enough to move the ships, but it did leave the “Iron Dome” of the Gulf looking more like a well-worn pair of sweatpants.
Russia’s S-300s in Venezuela were nothing but paperweights because of corruption; the U.S. shield in Bahrain is under pressure because of attrition. We can win the sniper duel, but what happens when the enemy stops bringing a rifle and starts bringing ten thousand rocks?
The smoke is still clearing over Manama, and America’s naval dominance around the globe could be a lot less dominant unless serious attention is paid to defending against kids with toy choppers taking out our bases. Welcome to the era where small supplies of $4 million missiles are the only thing standing between a $30,000 drone and your mates.
相關閱讀
Operation Eagle Claw: The story behind the failed hostage rescue in Iran
The Swedish sledgehammer: A salute to the Carl Gustaf, long may the ‘Goose’ reign
Veterans suffering from Gulf War Illness won a 30-year war for recognition
Iran
The God-Switch: What Elon Musk’s Starlink can actually be used for
What goes up must, and will, come down.
本文於 修改第 3 次
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台海戰爭對美國人民的影響 -- Michael D. Purzycki
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下文從日常生活的角度分析「台海戰爭」對美國老百姓的影響，及其對戰爭結果的間接負面作用。該文分析的重點當然也值得中國領導人思考。畢竟，東、西兩大兵聖(孫子和克勞塞維茲)都強調：戰爭的「全面性」和「整體性」。
No One Wants a War with China over Taiwan
But the U.S. still needs to prepare for one.
Michael D. Purzycki, 01/21/26
The capture of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro was an impressive feat by the American military but could prove to be a distraction from more pressing geopolitical concerns. President Trump’s decision to seize Maduro, and the attention he must now pay to Venezuela and the Western Hemisphere in the aftermath, makes it likely that the administration could take its eye off a far more powerful adversary: China. Confronting the military of a rival superpower is a much more daunting task than swooping in and arresting one dictator, even with the superb execution of that mission.
On March 9, 2021, Admiral Philip Davidson, then commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, addressed the Senate Armed Services Committee. Pointing to Chinese military preparations as evidence of the People’s Republic’s ambitions, he warned that China would likely be ready to invade and conquer Taiwan by 2027. The long-anticipated confrontation between the U.S. and China over the island was looming on the horizon, he warned.
Since then, the “Davidson window” has been used in national security circles as the timeframe the U.S. has to prepare to fight China for the freedom of Taiwan. It has informed debates over how the American military (especially but not exclusively the Navy) should be structured, what equipment it should purchase, and where its assets should be based. American service members are preparing to give their all to defend a fellow democracy.
Less attention has been paid, however, to preparing Americans outside the military for the effects of war. If the U.S. should come to blows with the PRC, the effects will be felt in many areas of American life, including the economy. With the Davidson window closing a year from now, America’s leaders need to level with the people they serve about what it will cost to keep Taiwan free, should that decision be made.
Preparing for War
Wargames carried out by American experts provide a mixture of hope and worry about the outcome of such a war over Taiwan. While there is a good chance the U.S. would prevail over China, it would do so at a significant cost of its military assets: America is estimated to lose hundreds of aircraft and dozens of warships, including one or more aircraft carriers. If a carrier were to be sunk (something that has not happened to an American carrier since World War II), it would be a severe blow to American prestige even if Taiwan remained free.
The good news is that the last few years have seen an encouraging renewal of awareness of how important maritime strength is for the United States. In a possible war with China to keep Taiwan from totalitarian tyranny, the U.S. Navy will play a leading role; keeping it strong and ready is clearly a bipartisan priority. Under both the Biden and Trump administrations, the Navy has developed plans for dramatically expanding the size of its fleet, which has shrunk drastically since the 1990s.
Such a conflict would have enormous repercussions within the U.S., though, effects that would ripple throughout many sectors of the civilian economy as well as American national security institutions. A war may well be a long one, and the American people may not have the stomach for a long conflict. The sooner American officials begin preparing the domestic economy for the shock of a war over Taiwan, the better. While it will take time, any wiggle room achieved this year can help.
Of the many economic areas that would be hit by a U.S.-China war, three in particular stand out as areas in which the government should begin increasing resiliency:
* Replacing vital manufactured goods that the U.S. would lose access to during a war;
* Ensuring the military has enough oil to fight China without disrupting domestic supplies; and
* Preparing for Chinese cyberattacks in an attempt by Beijing to weaken American resolve.
Manufacturing
Much of the debate surrounding trade with China concerns blue-collar American jobs lost during the last quarter century, rightly so. In reaction, many of America’s major imports from China have plummeted in volume since 2018 due to tariffs under both the Trump and Biden administrations and to an increasing American desire to decouple economically from a rival great power. But it is not only Chinese goods whose flow would be disrupted by a major war.
Taiwan manufactures 60 percent of the world’s semiconductors, including more than 40 percent of the most sophisticated logic chips the U.S. imports. When the price of these chips goes up—say, in response to constricted supply during a war in which a vital exporter of this technology is cut off from the world economy—the prices of multitudes of other goods will go up including computers, tablets, phones, cars, and TVs. In preparation for such an event, the more chips the U.S. can manufacture on its own soil, the better able it will be to withstand such shocks.
In 2022, President Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act, which authorized $39 billion in federal aid for semiconductor development on American soil. Companies have responded positively to these incentives: they have made large investments in U.S. manufacturing and related research and development, and a boost in production has created at least 15,000 jobs. While Trump initially derided the CHIPS Act upon returning to the White House, he later signed an expansion of tax credits under the act. There are additional measures the government can take to increase production, such as scaling back environmental permitting rules around manufacturing facilities.
There is also an ongoing push for a revival of the shipbuilding industry along similar lines. The bipartisan Shipbuilding and Harbor Infrastructure for Prosperity and Security (SHIPS) for America Act would encourage major investments in American shipbuilding to reverse the sector’s decline that dates back to Ronald Reagan’s ending of federal subsidies for the industry in 1981. Congress should pass this law, and Trump should sign it.
China’s current dominance of global shipbuilding currently gives it enormous leverage. As Jerry Hendrix, a former Navy captain and longtime defense expert who now heads the Shipbuilding Office at the Office of Management and Budget, wrote in The Atlantic in 2023:
The lack of civilian ships under our own flag makes us vulnerable. Today we remember the recent backlog of container ships in the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, but tomorrow we could face the shock of no container ships arriving at all should China prohibit its large fleet from visiting U.S. ports.
Government incentives to increase semiconductor manufacturing and shipbuilding will both take time to reach their full effect. But the mere fact of Washington taking both these industries seriously would be a signal, both to American consumers and to America’s trading partners, that if the U.S. suffered economic blows from a conflict with China, the pains it suffered would be temporary. The world would have good reason to believe that America would bounce back.
Oil
There is a common saying in military circles: amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics. In an era replete with ever-advancing technology, including videos and games that might give civilians some sense of being in a battle without facing any physical danger, it is easy to think of warfare only in terms of shooting. But the far less glamorous role of logistics—getting personnel, platforms, ammunition, equipment, and supplies from point A to point B—is equally important to a war’s outcome. And when it comes to military logistics, energy supplies are critical.
In 2021, Andrea K. Orlowski, deputy director of engineering at the Navy’s Military Sealift Command, wrote an article assessing the Navy’s inadequate oil supplies for its ships and aircraft. She warned that in a U.S.-China naval war over Taiwan, the U.S. would most likely run out of oil first, partly due to a shortage of refining capacity on the U.S. West Coast. The imbalance seems even more striking considering that Russia, whose oil has been sanctioned by the West for the last four years while it militarily batters Ukraine, exports much of its oil to China, giving the PRC a reliable supply from America’s other great power rival. The U.S. could try to shift the balance in its favor by interdicting Chinese oil imports from the Middle East, but sustaining this operation could take too many military units away from either the fight with China or the deterrence of Russia.
The U.S. military’s need for oil is already vast. The Department of Defense is the largest consumer of energy in the U.S. and the top bulk purchaser of fuel among federal agencies. Military oil consumption will increase even further during a full-scale war, such that it may be necessary to take oil out of the civilian economy, potentially raising its price.
Established in the wake of the surge in fuel prices that followed the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is America’s stockpile to guard against spikes in oil prices. The government purchases oil when prices are low, and presidents can sell it back into the civilian economy when prices are high. The SPR came to public attention in 2022, when President Biden tapped into it in response to high oil prices caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Filling the SPR is consistent with Trump’s desire to boost American oil production. He recently ordered the purchase of one million barrels for it, but this is a truly tiny amount. The SPR is authorized to hold up to 714 million barrels, and as of November 26, 2025, it held 411 million. The administration should go much further than a mere one million barrels.
Cyber
On May 7, 2021, Colonial Pipeline, the largest provider of refined petroleum products in the Eastern U.S., was hit with a ransomware attack. Long lines formed at gas stations in the Southeast, and Colonial was forced to temporarily shut down all its operations. This was the largest-ever cyberattack on American oil infrastructure.
This attack was carried out by criminals looking to make money. Imagine if another attack, doing even worse damage to critical American infrastructure, was perpetrated by China in the middle of a war over Taiwan. How long would Americans put up with disruption—to commerce, to the supply of critical goods, to their own peace of mind—before public opinion would turn against defending Taiwan and in favor of cutting a deal with Beijing?
Chinese cyberespionage against the U.S. has increased in frequency throughout the early 21st century. Victims have included government agencies, major corporations, and millions upon millions of ordinary users and consumers. In all likelihood, China would launch every cyber weapon at its disposal at the U.S. during a full-fledged war.
There is worthwhile legislation before Congress that would bolster America’s cyber defenses against China and other hostile actors. Trump should also reverse his confusing decision from last December not to sanction China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), Beijing’s spy agency and the perpetrator of a major cyber breach of U.S. telecom companies in 2024. As noted by Morgan Peirce in Just Security, letting China off the hook for its cyber aggression undermines Trump’s attempts to get America’s allies to bear more of the burden of their own defenses: “If the world’s largest economy will not confront China’s cyber operations, how can it credibly ask Indo-Pacific allies—who have far less leverage over Beijing—to step up?”
It is not completely guaranteed that China will invade Taiwan in 2027. It is always possible that American deterrence will be so strong that Beijing will conclude that the cost of war is not worth the benefit of conquering the island. It is also possible that China will opt for means other than conventional war to bring Taiwan under its thumb, such as attempting a complete air and sea blockade to isolate the island from the world. Likewise, Russia’s quagmire in Ukraine during the past four years may give Chinese admirals and generals pause about waging a normal war.
Conditions within the United States, however, give Xi Jinping hope that he can subdue Taiwan with enough patience. Americans are so polarized politically and culturally that consensus on anything is difficult for them to achieve. Even war may not be enough to bring our people together. Xi may well bank on Americans’ unwillingness to fight for long as the factor that will give China the ultimate edge in an all-out conflict, especially if America’s leaders don’t prepare citizens to withstand it even as they take steps to prevent it.
Michael D. Purzycki is an analyst, writer, and editor based in Arlington, Virginia. He writes The Non-Progressive Democrat on Substack. Follow him on Twitter at @MDPurzycki.
Michael D. Purzycki
I'm a liberal who's been a Democrat since 2003. Some forms of progress are compatible with liberty and democracy, some are not. Opinions I express here are mine alone, in my capacity as a U.S. citizen. Support Ukraine: https://u24.gov.ua/
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分析普丁騎虎難下的七大原因 - Dennis Berziakov
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我在這篇拙作中說：
「戰爭開始的原因有兩個：1a) 一方誤判。1b) 雙方誤判。」(該欄2025/08/25貼文第2-2)小節)
這段話和下文所做分析並沒有推翻：「沙盤推演」的重要性；更沒有表示它只不過是浪費時間。反之，兩者在強調「『沙盤推演』非常重要」之外，同時顯現了：「廢材只能衍生出廢料」這句俗話的深入觀察。
這也讓我們了解到：「一廂情援」、「心存僥倖」、和「心想事成」等的虛妄。
You Think You Know Why Putin Lost in Ukraine? These Hidden Failures Will Shock You
Dennis Berziakov, 01/06/26
What If Putin Had Listened? 7 Fatal Mistakes That Doomed His Ukraine Invasion From Day One.
In February 2022, Vladimir Putin unleashed the largest war in Europe since 1945, launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin confidently expected to seize Kyiv in days — perhaps as few as three — and topple President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government with minimal resistance. Russian forces were poised for a lightning advance, betting on a quick collapse. Instead, the “special military operation” bogged down immediately, evolving into a brutal war of attrition that has drained lives, resources, and Russia’s global standing. As we enter 2026, nearly four years later, the conflict grinds on with ongoing peace talks showing little progress, Russian advances coming at staggering costs, and Ukraine holding firm. Russia’s initial blitzkrieg dream has turned into a nightmare of fatal miscalculations. Let’s break down the key reasons for this spectacular failure.
Strategic Miscalculations and Imperial Delusions
At its core, Putin’s plan was built on a dangerously naive worldview. He saw Ukraine not as a sovereign nation but as an artificial construct, inseparable from Russia — a “brotherly people” misled by Western influences and a supposed “Nazi” regime. In a 2021 essay, Putin denied Ukraine’s distinct history, claiming Russians and Ukrainians were “one people.” He genuinely believed many Ukrainians would welcome Russian troops as liberators.
The easy 2014 annexation of Crimea fueled this overconfidence. Planners split forces across multiple fronts: a northern push to capture Kyiv, while eastern and southern axes attacked simultaneously, expecting Ukraine’s military to crumble quickly. But by 2022, Ukraine had forged a strong national identity, reformed its armed forces with Western support, and turned firmly toward Europe. Spreading combat power too thin across a massive battlefield made a rapid victory impossible.
Intelligence Failures and Confirmation Bias
Russian intelligence fed Putin exactly what he wanted to hear — optimistic assessments that ignored harsh realities. Agencies like the FSB predicted mass defections in Ukraine’s ranks, a swift government surrender, and popular uprisings against Zelenskyy.
In truth, infiltration efforts backfired as intelligence was twisted to fit ideological blind spots. Tactical intel was abysmal: troops relied on outdated maps and underestimated defenses. Russia also misjudged the West’s response, failing to anticipate unified military aid. After the invasion, purges in security services exposed a culture of blame-shifting, where corruption and loyalty trumped competence.
Logistical Nightmares and Supply Chain Collapse
Despite numerical superiority, Russia’s military wasn’t prepared for prolonged fighting. The infamous 40-mile convoy stalled north of Kyiv became a symbol of chaos: vehicles ran out of fuel, broke down, and fell to Ukrainian ambushes.
Planners assumed a three-day war needed little logistics, a fatal error. Rampant corruption meant poor equipment maintenance, shortages of spares, fuel, and ammo. Advances toward Kyiv collapsed utterly under these self-inflicted wounds.
Tactical and Operational Flaws
Russian forces bungled even basic combined arms coordination. Opening air strikes failed to neutralize Ukrainian defenses, wasting precision munitions on decoys. The airborne assault on Hostomel Airport near Kyiv — a key bridgehead for rapid reinforcements — ended in disaster. Elite VDV paratroopers briefly held it but were crushed by Ukrainian artillery and counterattacks, losing helicopters and troops in droves.
Rigid, top-down command stifled initiative. Units advanced in predictable columns without proper scouting, making them easy prey for drones and anti-tank weapons. Electronic warfare jammed their own comms, leading to friendly fire and chaos. Wrecked vehicles lined roadsides, testament to poor mobility and protection.
Fierce Ukrainian Resistance and National Unity
Kremlin propaganda painted Ukraine as fractured and feeble, but the invasion unified the nation like never before. Zelenskyy’s heroic defiance — staying in Kyiv and declaring, “I need ammunition, not a ride” — shattered expectations of flight or surrender.
Military reforms since 2014, plus Western weapons like Javelin missiles that shredded armored columns and Bayraktar drones targeting logistics, turned the tide. Territorial defense units and civilians joined the fray, transforming Ukraine into an impenetrable quagmire. Russian advances on Kyiv stalled amid ambushes and flooded terrain, forcing a humiliating retreat by April 2022.
Unexpected International Unity and Sanctions
Putin banked on a divided West, reliant on Russian energy and weary from Afghanistan. Instead, allies rallied, pouring in advanced weapons and billions in aid. Sanctions hammered Russia’s economy, isolating it from technology and finance.
This global backlash sustained Ukraine far longer than Moscow predicted, turning a presumed quick win into a prolonged slugfest.
Endemic Corruption and Internal Rot
Corruption gutted Russia’s military from within. Embezzled budgets created “ghost” units, fake reports, and junk equipment. Troops suffered low morale from brutal leadership, poor pay, and hazing, sparking desertions.
Autocratic oversight crushed honest feedback, echoing Soviet-era blunders. Paper strengths melted into real-world weaknesses.
Long-Term Consequences
What was billed as a “three-day war” has become a grinding, multi-year attrition battle. Russia has suffered over 1.2 million casualties (per Ukrainian estimates), vast equipment losses, and economic hemorrhage — all for modest territorial gains (around 20% of Ukraine occupied).
Ukraine’s national identity has solidified, NATO expanded with Finland and Sweden joining, and global alliances shifted. Peace talks flicker in early 2026, but deep divides over territory persist. Putin’s gamble exposed the hollow core of autocratic overreach: Russia’s feared military proved more “paper tiger” than powerhouse, unable to subdue a determined neighbor despite superior numbers.
The invasion’s failure stands as a stark lesson — underestimating resolve and overestimating one’s might invites disaster. As the war drags on, the human and strategic costs mount, with no swift end in sight.
Written by Dennis Berziakov
International affairs analyst | Decoding global power shifts, conflicts, and diplomacy | Writing at the intersection of geopolitics, strategy & history
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《孫子》簡介 -- Thrive
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《孫子》是我讀的第一本中國典籍；那時大概14歲左右。高中畢業前重讀過一、兩次；所以，好些句子我現在還能琅琅上口。
在美工作期間偶而出差，在各地機場書店的陳列架上，通常都能看到兩、三本把「孫子兵法」應用到商場競爭/企業管理的教戰手冊。下文從日常生活切入，沒讀過《孫子》的朋友，不妨瀏覽一、二。
Sun Tzu — The Art of War The Book That Explain Teach Me How to Win People Without Fighting
Explained By A Psychologist.
THRIVE, 11/28/25
I hate war but I am a student of war let me explain.
About 5 years ago I read in a newspaper an interview with a professional boxer. Unfortunately I’ve forgotten the name of that athlete, but what he said about the act of fighting hit me like a ton of bricks. When he was asked how he prepared for a fight he quoted from an old Chinese book and that was the first time I heard about The Art of War. Most probably written by a Chinese gentleman called Sun Tzu who lived in the fifth century BC.
Ever since I have been fascinated by his work. I studied it and I tried to apply some of its principles when I was still fighting martial art competitions which is a very long, long time ago.
Why this book hooked me
As soon as you read his book you realize that next to the physical component of war and very far away from the horrible part where bodies clash and people get killed there is a psychological and a philosophical part to it. This part is all about reading your opponent, knowing yourself, and estimating the circumstances correctly.
One of the essential ideas in Sun Tzu is to overcome an army without fighting. According to him, that is the best of skills. This little booklet only 13 chapters provides a unique perspective on war, strategy, and leadership. Over the centuries it influenced military strategists, business leaders, world leaders, and athletes. I find it useful for almost every human being when we face an adversary or an opponent — in business, in sports, as leaders of our communities, or as private persons.
East vs West two different ways to think about winning
After I read The Art of War several times I started searching for a Western equivalent. There are several. Machiavelli wrote The Art of War, but it’s very technical and tied to his time and town. A true Western counterpart that matters is Carl von Clausewitz’s On War, published by his widow in 1832. Both authors are military strategists, but they wrote about war almost two thousand years apart and their thinking diverges in important ways.
Both start from a similar place. Sun Tzu opens with: “War is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death.” Clausewitz opens differently but with the same seriousness: “War is a serious means to a serious end.” Neither glorizes war. Thank God.
Still, they split on the fundamentals. Clausewitz compares war to a duel: war is physical force trying to compel the other to do your will. Confrontation. Direct force. Sun Tzu starts from a different idea: attack the enemy’s strategy, not the enemy. Don’t attack the man attack the plan. This is the essence of Chinese strategy, and it can be applied far beyond the battlefield.
How to attack strategy instead of people a simple example
Imagine a man in the fifth century BC. Let’s call him Mr. Korin. He had a great reputation and was widely respected. He lived in village A and learns that village A will be attacked by a king from city B.
Mr. Korin understands his village cannot defend itself. So he sends one of his students to the king of city C. The student tells the king of C that his master wants to warn him: city B is preparing to attack city C. The king of C is grateful and asks what to do. The student says, “My master advises you to attack city B first because they will not see that coming.”
The king of C attacks city B, takes them by surprise, and wins. Now the new situation: village A is safe, king of C is more powerful, and Mr. Korin has a powerful, grateful ally. Korin won without a fight. That’s deception used as strategy.
Clausewitz mentions stratagems but calls them almost inferior to be used only as a last resort. Sun Tzu places stratagems at the center. Huge difference.
Why I say I’m a student of war but I hate war
I started the story by saying I’m a student of war, but that doesn’t mean I like war. Actually, the opposite is true. Long story short: peace and stability don’t come by themselves. They’re hard work. War can often be avoided if we know how to do this work.
As a psychologist I see people who have limited skills to deal with conflict. Too often they go straight for direct confrontation. That usually leads to verbal and sometimes physical violence. Sun Tzu offers another way: learn to overcome opponents without a fight. That’s useful whether your neighbor is an asshole, your kid is bullied, or your business faces an aggressive competitor.
Two categories of books what I took from each
If I put the books on a shelf by function:
* Clausewitz — gems of insight. He gives specific theory on warfare and battle. It’s fundamental, heavy, theoretical. Difficult to read. Written in German over many interrupted years, full of long sentences and contradictions. Valuable if you want deep theory.
* Sun Tzu — hammer book. Short. Practical. Digestible. Not a one-two-three guide, but full of lines that trigger you. Underline them. Think with them.
I always advise: read The Art of War several times. Underline the sentences that trigger you. Why do they trigger you? Maybe you don’t like what he says. Maybe you get a new insight. Maybe you see why you can’t beat your current opponent. Use those lines to reflect on your situation.
A few practical notes on reading The Art of War
* It’s only about 60 pages and 13 chapters.
* Don’t pick a literal translation for your first read it can feel like abstract poetry.
* Pick a translation that includes an introduction on the time and context. That helps a lot.
Final thought this is about living better, not learning to fight
What I’ve learned from both books is that war and peace are two sides of the same coin. Learning how to maintain peace, avoid escalation, and handle conflict intelligently is worth the time. It’s not about becoming clever at hurting people it’s about preventing harm.
It’s funny how a boxer’s quote in a newspaper changed the way I think about conflict. I couldn’t agree more with the idea that the best victory is the one you get without fighting.
If you enjoyed this story, follow my channel and clap.
Written by THRIVE
Space for growth, wisdom, and wellness. Let’s explore self-improvement, inspiring books, and healthy living. Team Of different people sharing their knowledge
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人工智能科技對戰爭的影響 -- Nayef Al-Rodhan
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AI, War and Transdisciplinary Philosophy
Hacking the Human Soldier
Nayef Al-Rodhan, 11/30/23
Editor’s Notes：Human ego and emotionality play a bigger role in war than we often admit. Human pride, grief, contempt, hate and shame have all changed the course of history time and time again. As AI and human enhancement continue to evolve, they will be used to hack human ego and emotionality, leading to a step-change in the brutality and illegitimacy of war, writes Nayef Al-Rodhan.
The Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz saw uncertainty and fear as essential ingredients of war. But how does human fallibility, which is at the core of classic theories of war dating back to Sun Tzu, play out in a world where AI-powered military technologies remove human qualities from battle? Will emerging AI tools such as deepfakes, and other deceptive technologies, deepen the fog of war? Are these transformative technological developments changing the very nature of war? Will the extreme brutality enabled by highly destructive military technologies create multi-generational hate, vengeance, deep ethnic and cultural schisms and hinder reconciliation, reconstruction and coexistence? These questions have been made ever-more pressing by the current Russia-Ukraine and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. Will these developments change the very nature of war? These questions are fundamental to the sustainability of human civilisation, here on earth as well as increasingly in Outer Space. To answer them, we need to examine the benefits, dangers and limitations of the new methods of war - and examine how our human nature shapes, and is shaped by, the way we fight.
Contemporary research in neuroscience has provided valuable insights into human behaviour, with direct consequences for state behaviour, cooperation and conflict. Contrary to previous assumptions about the rationality of human behaviour, neuroscience has shown that emotions and emotionality play a central role in cognitive functions and in rational decision-making. Studies show that human beings are neither inherently moral, nor immoral. They are, rather, amoral, and influenced by personal and political circumstances, where their moral compass is governed primarily by “perceived emotional self-interest”.
Neuroscience shows that human beings are critically predisposed for survival. This means that we are fundamentally egoistic. It is this evolutionary desire to survive and thrive, with constant competition, mistrust and fear of the other, that inspires the aspiration to dominate others. In short, our appetite for primordial power is part of who we are. Neurochemically speaking, feelings of power are linked to the release of dopamine, amongst other chemicals, in the mesolimbic reward centre of the brain. Dopamine is the same neurochemical that is responsible for feelings of pleasure and rewards, as well as the “highs” of all forms of addiction, including drug addiction, social media and gambling. That is why power has an addictive effect on the brain, comparable to that of a drug. It leads human beings to do anything to seek it, enhance it – and prevent losing it.
Neuroscience has debunked the realist presumption that states are driven exclusively by rationality. Neuroscientific studies demonstrate the neuroanatomical and neurochemical links between emotions and decision-making, which have a profound influence on international relations and a peaceful global order. Emotionality infuses unpredictability into human affairs, and can be at the root of state and sub-state conflicts. Bertrand Russell noted this in his book ‘Has Man A Future?’ published on the eve of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Claiming that humanity was on the verge of annihilation, Russell described how “pride, arrogance and fear of loss of face have obscured the power of judgment” of Kennedy and Khrushchev, the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union. Much like humans, states are egoistic and survival-oriented and are heavily influenced by interests and perceptions.
The emotionality of states has played a determining factor in both inter- and intra-state conflict throughout history. Take, for example, Stalin’s fatal foray into Korea, which historian Tony Judt has described as a result of his growing paranoia and suspicions about Western plans. Or Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, which was arguably driven more by pride and hubris than by cold strategic calculation. More recently, the strategically unsound - and illegitimate - invasion and destruction of Iraq and dismantling of Libya had similar emotional undertones. Or the reheating of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with its deeply emotional undertones and the unprecedented humanitarian crisis.
These examples demonstrate that the human ego, sensibilities and our emotional repertoire consisting of emotions of policy makers such as pain, pride, grief, contempt, hate and shame play a more pervasive role in seemingly accountable state conduct and international relations than is often acknowledged. With an eye on the future, these attributes are a timely reminder how emotional attachment to exploitative hegemony, deceptive manipulations, arrogance of power and greed can lead to the illegal acquisition of land and resources. As a result, they can spark conflicts and infuse unpredictability and longstanding mistrust into international affairs, in all political systems. This is especially the case where there are few or no systems in place to keep policy-making in check.
As geopolitical tensions heat up, there is a growing danger of emotionally-tinged self-identity being weaponised through the means of strategic culture, the attempt to integrate cultural considerations, historical memory, applied history and their influences in the analysis of states’ security policies and international relations. History teaches us that states will weaponise everything they can in order to dominate others. That is why, going forward, we cannot ignore neuroscientific findings about the emotionality, amorality, and egoism of human nature and state behaviour when examining new technologies, norms and innovations. Together, they will play a crucial role in our efforts to end conflict by weeding out double standards in inter-state relations and increasing levels of respect for the sovereign choices and national interests of states. This will improve the chances of achieving equitable and sustainable peace, security and prosperity for all that is rooted in trust.
AI will play an increasingly important role in warfare in the coming years. There are those who argue that AI could make war less lethal and possibly strengthen deterrence, i.e. the lives of soldiers could be spared by expanding the role of AI-directed drones in the air force, navy and army. Russia is currently testing autonomous tank-like vehicles and the U.S. Defence Department is training AI bots to fly a modified F-16 fighter jet. However, the need for human intervention is likely to decrease, raising ethical and accountable governance questions. A fundamental question in this regard relates to the attribution of responsibility for transgressions by automatic or semi-automatic systems. Attribution is more complex in the case of autonomous weapons compared to that of human beings, since the programmer, manufacturer, and commander might all be held responsible. Although human beings themselves cannot be trained to respond to all possible scenarios, previous experiences help us react to unpredictable situations. The law of armed conflict is based on two fundamental principles, the principle of distinction, which requires combatants to distinguish between military and civilian objects, and the principle of proportionality in the use of force. Unlike a human being, any decision of this kind made by even a highly sophisticated autonomous weapon would be based solely on algorithms governed by probabilistic calculations and predetermined attribution of value. This combination of issues gives rise to a so-called “responsibility gap” for autonomous weapons which, at present, is far from being resolved.
Recent studies also show that AI-driven software could force military commanders to reduce their decision-making window from hours or days to minutes. There is a real danger that decision-makers become over-reliant on AI tools – which operate at much faster speeds than humans – as part of their command-and-control armoury. There is also a real danger that AI technology could equip rogue actors with the brainpower and tools to build dirty bombs or pinpoint nuclear arms sites as a lot of the data is held by private companies which could be susceptible to hacking and espionage. The current war between Russia and Ukraine and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also remind us how AI tools, such as deep fakes and other sophisticated technological tricks, are increasingly being used to amplify and bolster propaganda efforts. This is being made easier by the rapidly evolving sophistication of AI generators that can produce persuasive fake images and videos. As a result, we are also seeing a so-called liar’s dividend, i.e. a growing proportion of the public is dismissing genuine content from the frontlines as fake.
Their ultimate goal is to create “super soldiers” that are stronger, agile and cost-effective. The search for performance optimisation of soldiers through human enhancement is not entirely new and stimulant drugs have been used in the army for decades. During World War II, Japanese, American and British forces consumed large amounts of amphetamines to boost alertness and physical endurance. In the Vietnam War, which was later dubbed the first “pharmacological war” because of the high consumption of psychoactive substances by military personnel, the U.S. military supplied soldiers with speed and steroids. The reckless use of pharmaceuticals and stimulants in the Vietnam War resulted in a large number - estimates range from 400,000 to 1.5 million - of PTSD cases among veterans.
However, these days human enhancement technologies go even further. They can increase soldiers’ muscle strength and alertness while managing pain and stress levels. The quest to create ‘super soldiers’ creates a host of ethical and philosophical concerns linked to the development of authenticity, accountability, free will and fairness, amongst others. This begs the question: will these new techniques redefine what it means to be human? Will ‘super soldiers’ retain the aspects of their personality that make them human? How will the ability of enhanced soldiers to tolerate pain impact issues such as torture and the Geneva Convention? What is clear is that these innovations in the military space are bringing humanity to the brink of transhumanism. They are radically different from previous eras, as they are much more potent, invasive and potentially irreversible. We are now witnessing the rise of technologies that alter human biology by incorporating technology within the human body. Projects spearheaded by DARPA and others include computerised brain implants and biomedical tools that equip soldiers with increased stress resistance, “accelerated learning” capabilities as well as improved immunity from injury and the effects of sleep deprivation. These technologies mark a new phase in the mission to create ‘super soldiers’. These technologies mark a new phase in the mission to create super soldiers. Recent advances in neural integration bring about the real possibility that advanced technology could be plugged directly into the peripheral nervous system, for example via a remote-controlled micro-processing chip implanted beneath the skull. Neuro-stimulation of the brain through Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (TDCS), using a constant, low current delivered via electrodes on the head, has been found to accelerate learning and improve recall among Air Force pilots.
By optimising these technologies, the world’s leading militaries may soon be able to go a step further and pre-programme the reactions, responsiveness, and emotionality of their soldiers. Some of the most radical and profound changes for the human condition will take place through such interventions. These developments could give rise to a form of transhumanism that will challenge the very notion of the human condition as fixed, rooted and constant. Deeper integration of technology within the body, as well as the use of neuro-technological and neuropharmacological means of enhancing our bodies could affect how we feel and think – and therefore also how we act on the battlefield. While enhancement may boost cognitive and physical capabilities, they also diminish some deeply human features like compassion and empathy, that have been pivotal to us as a species, both for survival and cooperation. This could have dire consequences on ethical and humanitarian calculations during combat, including the use of torture. It could also have far-reaching implications on diplomacy and statecraft. Indeed, in the not-too-distant future, the existence of robots or sophisticated humanoids with advanced moral competencies could transform security dynamics, civil-military relations and how we regard ourselves as humans. To navigate this uncertain future, leading thinkers focused on the ethical implications of new types of warfare will need to add transdisciplinary tools to their intellectual armoury. They will need to engage directly with issues that lie on the cusp of AI, synthetic biology, neuroscience, and philosophy (an area I have termed Neuro-Techno-Philosophy). Transdisciplinary endeavours such as Neuro-Techno-Philosophy can teach us a lot about human frailty and malleability, both at the individual and group level. By understanding our neurochemical motivations, neurobehavioural needs, fears and predilections, and the neuropsychological foundations underpinning the behaviour of states, we are better placed to navigate the challenges posed by contemporary geopolitics and global security. These insights could also bolster conflict resolution efforts, which often incorporate behavioural models but, to date, rarely include neuroscientific insights.
On the battlefield, interventions to make soldiers feel less empathy and fear will effectively rewire the human condition and disrupt millennia of evolution. They will also have serious implications for how wars are fought. Given the potential effects of these technologies on emotions as well as physical capabilities, the level of brutality in warfare is likely to increase, severely impeding post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction efforts. Enhanced weapons, super-soldiers and new biological weapons will fall outside the existing ethical, customary, and legal norms of warfare that are defined by international law and the Geneva Conventions. This will raise important questions for lawyers and policy-makers, not least about questions of responsibility. For example, who will be held accountable if the “enhanced” soldier runs out of control: the soldier, the engineer or the medical teams that enhanced him?
More broadly, questions of law, international competition ethics and potentially uncontrollable cascading risks will become more prominent as states and societies respond to the challenges posed by new disruptive technologies. This is especially true with regard to the possibility of self-evolving run-away AI weapon systems, which are becoming increasingly tangible. These systems could potentially rewrite their own source code and become completely beyond human control and oversight. Unequal levels of access to new technologies will be reflected in international competition and shifts in balance of power, with countries with better integration capabilities possessing an advantage. Military history teaches us the importance of integrating technology. Going into World War II, France had the better tank – but the Germans gained the upper hand by successfully integrating their model with the radio and air cover. Looking to the future, the asymmetry of capabilities is likely to once again exacerbate the sense of extreme brutality and illegitimacy in war.
Professor Nayef Al-Rodhan is a philosopher, neuroscientist and geostrategist, Head of the Geopolitics & Global Futures Programme at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and an Honorary Fellow at St Antony’s College, Oxford University.
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New radar and missile tech have 'flattened the earth,' making even low-flying jets easy targets, Royal Air Force officer warns
Sinéad Baker, 10/25/25
* There has been a "flattening of the earth" by new radar and missile technology, a Royal Air Force official said.
* The long-running assumption that ultralow flying would prevent detection is "obsolete," he said.
* Conflicts like the Ukraine war show that deep strike is harder and more critical than ever.
New radar and missile technology have resulted in a "flattening of the earth" that puts even extremely low-flying aircraft at much higher risk, a Royal Air Force officer said this week.
Air Vice-Marshal James Beck, the RAF's director of capabilities and programs, said that when he was flying the Tornado multirole combat aircraft in the early 2000s, it was still an "underlying assumption that ultra low flying would allow a formation the ability to penetrate deep into enemy territory without being detected by their integrated air missile defense systems."
The assumption was that the hostile radars could not see through the ground, and this "underpinned our tactical thinking for many decades," he said, addressing the UK's Royal United Services Institute on Monday.
Terrain-masking was long a credible tactic, with fighters flying low and fast beneath the radar horizon and using the earth's curvature and ground clutter to evade line-of-sight radars. The approach made sense against legacy radars and surface-to-air missile systems. Advancements, however, are making low-level penetration insufficient on its own.
New radar and missile developments have made the classic approach "obsolete," Beck said, characterizing the shift in technology as tantamount to a "flattening of the earth."
He pointed to advances in radar technology, like the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, which has electronically steered beams to detect targets and allows crews to track multiple targets. Beck also highlighted the challenge of newer Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radars that can do just what the name implies and see beyond the curve of the earth. And then there are also the "all-pervasive abilities" of airborne surveillance aircraft.
Detection ranges have jumped from hundreds of nautical miles to thousands, he said, adding that the ranges of both surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles are also growing rapidly.
Gen. James Hecker, commander of US Air Forces in Europe, said previously that his "number one priority throughout NATO on the air side, is the counter-A2AD missions — so counter anti-access (A2), area-denial missions (AD)." The threats in this space are expanding.
Beck said these developments will soon make it far more difficult for air forces to enter an enemy's battlespace. Militaries use what's known as anti-access, area-denial strategies — layers of radars, missiles, and sensors — to keep adversaries out.
Those restricted zones are already vast — "measured in countries," Beck said — and could expand dramatically. Within the next decade, he predicted, "they will likely be measured in continents."
A big challenge
The flattening of the modern battlespace, Beck warned, will make it increasingly difficult for aircraft to penetrate deep into enemy territory without being detected or engaged.
That's a problem. Seizing control of the air and penetrating deep to knock out command nodes, logistics hubs, and missile sites far behind the front line are critical to victory.
The war in Ukraine, a grinding attritional fight chewing up equipment and troops, "continues to show us what happens if we fail to master control of the air from the outset," Beck said.
"Indeed, the longer the conflict reigns, this lesson becomes ever more compelling."
Neither Ukraine nor Russia has been able to seize control of the air as they are stymied by strong air defense networks that threaten anything flying. There have been numerous videos of Ukrainian combat aircraft flying low, hugging the earth and only popping up to launch munitions, but we're not seeing penetration flights into enemy-controlled airspace.
Both sides are, however, lobbing drones and missiles deep behind the lines, highlighting the importance of maintaining robust air and missile defense systems, especially given adversary capabilities have, as Beck said, "advanced dramatically."
"The pace of change continues to accelerate, with an increasing range of state and non-state actors posing new challenges," he said.
Demands of future war
Taking advantage of new technologies to keep ahead of the curve will be key as the battlespace shifts.
"As a first step," Beck shared, the UK "will prioritize upgrading our existing command and control capabilities to maximize the effectiveness of current systems and lay the foundation for future enhancements."
He added that the UK would also capitalize on advances in sensor technology, including surface, airborne, and space-based sensors, "to extend detection and tracking ranges, increasing opportunities to engage and defeat threats through a system of layered defenses." The aim is also to extend the range of both active and passive defensive systems, he said.
Particularly important work when it comes to being able to penetrate heavily defended airspace is the development of sixth-generation aircraft, like the US Air Force Next Generation Air Dominance program's F-47 or the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) that the UK, Italy, and Japan are working on.
Beck said that right now fifth-generation aircraft like the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter are the bare minimum for getting the edge in a modern air war. Sixth-gen fighters will need to bring advanced stealth, among other capabilities.
Without that full-spectrum stealth, aircraft "will be unable to enter an opponent's A2AD bubble to a level that it would be able to deliver meaningful effect," he said.
He said sixth-generation aircraft will need to carry out the deep strikes that are becoming increasingly difficult and “detect, select, and prosecute targets that are operating in or on the far side of an opponent's integrated air missile defense system.”
The UK's air staff chief, Beck said, "has made it very clear that control of the air is the thing that we must master above all else."
Read the original article on Business Insider
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