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「戰爭」、「反戰」、與「和平」 -- 開欄文
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瀏覽2,695 ｜回應24｜推薦1 |
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2023年我收到傅大為、盧倩儀、馮建三、和郭力昕等四位教授發起的《我們的反戰聲明》時，就想專闢一欄刊出該聲明，並收集網上以及我自己討論「戰爭」與「反戰」的文章。但是，由於這個題目很大，我一時三刻間寫不出一篇提綱挈領的「開欄文」；所以作罷。後來將該聲明和拙作《「我們的反戰聲明」爭議淺見》分別單獨刊出。
現在想想這其實不是個充分理由。最近讀到一篇介紹雷博教授著作的文章(本欄第三篇)，覺得有寫篇評論的必要(本欄第四篇)；寫作過程中，由於搜查相關資料，又看到史投克教授的大作(本欄下一篇)。我認為它值得介紹，就決定以這三篇文章為基礎而開此欄。
史投克教授的大作不但分析了「全面戰爭」這個「概念」，他借這個分析來強調：使用「明白清晰」的概念在建構理論和政策上非常重要。史投克教授在該文中並簡明的闡釋了韋伯「理想型」概念；軍事學之外，全文在「方法論」上也頗有參考價值。
我一向認為論述中所用詞彙和「概念」需要明白易懂，以及其「所指」應該確定而無岐義；我曾經說過和史投克教授同樣的話：
「如果一個詞彙或概念『無所不指』，則它實際上就會變得『無所指』」。
我不敢說和史投克教授「英雄所見略同」；或許，理性、務實的人在思考邏輯上都是同路人吧。
本文於 修改第 10 次
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「當代戰爭」形同經濟黑洞 -- Jason Ma
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請參考：
A $300,000 Ukrainian Drone Just Crippled a $200 Million Russian Tanker — It's Now a Drifting Time Bomb Headed Toward Libya's Coast
請參照本欄2026/03/31和2026/03/29兩篇貼文。
The ‘obscene economics’ of modern warfare show how the race to military supremacy is transforming, while U.S. rearmament relies on China
Jason Ma, 04/27/26
The Iran conflict has confirmed a transformation in the economics of warfare toward cheap, mass-produced weapons, forcing a wholesale rethinking of military procurement, according to a recent report.
While the U.S. and Israel have decimated Iran’s military, the Islamic republic still has enough combat power to inflict meaningful economic and physical damage, said Noah Ramos, chief innovation strategist at Alpine Macro, in a note earlier this month.
In particular, the regime has leveraged its Shahed drones, which cost only $20,000-50,000, forcing the U.S. and its allies to shoot them down with $4 million PAC-3 missiles or THAAD interceptors that cost $12 million-$15 million.
“Even with interception rates above 90%, the value of asset protection is diminished given the obscene economics,” Ramos wrote. “This imbalance has haunted Western military planners since the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.”
He explained that such lopsided attrition is the opposite of the West’s model of precision lethality and is a deliberate part of Iran’s strategy: mass losses are a feature not a flaw, because even the most advanced defenses can be overwhelmed with sufficient volume.
The cost asymmetry is worsened by severe production and supply-chain constraints. For example, no new THAAD interceptors have been delivered since August 2023, and the next batch is due in April 2027.
At the same time, the U.S. has rapidly drawn down stockpiles of its most expensive munitions during the Iran war. The Center for Strategic and International Studies put the tally at 45% of its Precision Strike Missiles, 50% of its THAAD interceptors, and almost half of its of PAC-3 missiles. CSIS estimated it would take one to four years to restock seven major munitions to prewar levels.
“The diminished munitions stockpiles have created a near-term risk,” the report said. “A war against a capable peer competitor like China will consume munitions at greater rates than in this war. Prewar inventories were already insufficient; the levels today will constrain U.S. operations should a future conflict arise.”
In fact, Alpine Macro’s Ramos pointed out that many critical components for a variety of U.S. munitions are deeply exposed to Chinese supply chains.
That includes the stealthy Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, the Tomahawk cruise missile, the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, and the Joint Direct Attack Munition guidance kit.
The U.S. military’s reliance on Chinese suppliers “poses a grave threat given geopolitical fragmentation or a conflict over Taiwan,” Ramos warned.
Despite the emergence of mass-produced munitions, Ramos still expects legacy platforms like fighter jets, strategic bombers, precision missiles, and warships to continue enabling force projection.
Rather than displacing so-called “exquisite” weapons, the more expendable systems will sit along side them and even amplify them, he predicted.
Cheaper weapons can exploit specific vulnerabilities, prevent expensive assets from being depleted, and carry out riskier missions unsuitable for traditional platforms, Ramos suggested.
“Going forward, supremacy will belong to the force that deploys the right tool for the right task at the right cost, not the one that defaults to multi-billion dollar platforms for every engagement,” he added. “The Iran conflict is proving this in real time.”
The Pentagon also understands the new economics of warfare that bring to mind a quote attributed to Joseph Stalin during World War II as he weighed the Red Army’s numerical advantage against Nazi Germany’s superior weapons: “quantity has a quality all its own.”
Efforts at cheaper, mass-produced platforms are underway while upstart defense contractors like Anduril are developing manufacturing innovations to enable hyperscale production.
The U.S. has even incorporated a copycat version of the Shahed drone, using the American version against Iran during the war. Emil Michael, the undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, said at an industry conference last month that the Pentagon plans to go big with the LUCAS drone.
“After only a few years, we continue to refine that and make that something that we can mass produce at scale,” he said. “They’ve worked very well so far and it’s proven out to be a useful tool in the arsenal.”
This story was originally featured on Fortune.com
相關閱讀
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* Hormuz crisis spurs $24B Iraq trade corridor as Gulf routes shift
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改變戰爭方式的10項科學突破 —TIMES OF INDIA
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請至原網頁觀看相關照片或示意圖。「無人機」和「人工智能」也是時候上榜了。
10 scientific breakthroughs that rewrote the rules of war
TOI Science Desk, TIMESOFINDIA.COM, 04/15/26
The history of warfare has typically been depicted as the result of the combined efforts of accomplished generals and well-thought-out strategies, however it is often science that has provided the ‘force multiplier’ that could turn a (previously) successful general into a (newly) unsuccessful one and will change the rules of engagement, so that in an instant, what was once the effective means of war become outdated. Through a series of ten major advancements, ranging from the incredible weaponry powered by the ‘alchemy’ or ‘magical fire’ of Greek Fire to the new ability to navigate precisely via satellites. These technological leaps fundamentally redefine the battlefield, ensuring that tactical superiority remains inextricably linked to the relentless, often volatile progression of human scientific and engineering ingenuity.
the invention of gunpowder
Gunpowder was the result of an accidental discovery by Chinese alchemists working with Taoist principles. Gunpowder switched the basis for warfare from mechanical, on the use of bows and catapults to chemical, on the use of propulsion; when it was introduced into Europe, it made castles and plate armour used by knights no longer a viable means for holding or controlling land, thus concentrating power into the hands of those states that could afford to buy cannons and artillery.
Greek Fire in Byzantine Defense
Greek Fire was an advanced form of chemical warfare, which was most likely made from a mixture of petroleum and other materials that continued to burn on water. Developed in the seventh century, Greek Fire provided the Byzantine Empire with a significant naval advantage, enabling it to defend against the massive siege by the Arabs during the sieges of Constantinople and maintain its control of the Mediterranean for centuries.
The Development of Bronze Weapons
The transition from the Stone Age to the Bronze Age brought about advancements in weaponry with the introduction of weapons made of bronze (copper and tin) being stronger, longer-lasting, and more easily sharpened than weapons made of stone. The creation of swords and armour through the advancements in metallurgy led to the emergence of the organised professional infantry of Mesopotamia and Egypt.
Printing Press and Military Communication
Gutenberg press changed the way armies operated, through the production of large quantities of standardized maps, manuals for drill procedures and, various tactical doctrine; this enabled armies with multiple division commanders in a country to all function under one set of command and operate in a way that mirrored the methods used by other divisions in the field, which was the basis for the Military Revolution.
Satellites and GPS Technology
The GPS (Global Positioning System) uses multiple satellites to determine a location, along with atomic clocks that give very precise measurements of time. This system was originally designed for military use. Precision-guided munitions will allow for surgical strikes with little chance of collateral damage and will provide ground troops with superior situational awareness.
The Atomic Bomb
Applying theoretical nuclear physics to build a bomb, the Manhattan Project made use of fission or splitting the atom, to create a weapon that would create an incredible amount of destruction when dropped on Japan. Because of the scale of the destruction at both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ‘Total War,’ a concept that resulted from this type of destruction, was introduced. Because of this new concept of 'Total War,' military doctrine shifted from ‘active combat’ to ‘nuclear deterrence' and 'Mutually Assured Destruction.'
Radar Technology in World War II
Radar, or radio detection and ranging, is a system that uses electromagnetic energy to provide visibility to the user in situations where visibility would otherwise not be possible (such as in darkness or in a rainstorm). During World War II, the Chain Home radar network allowed the Royal Air Force (RAF) to conserve scarce resources by providing the RAF with the ability to detect German bombers before they reached Great Britain. This enabled the RAF to significantly alter its air defence strategies.
Chemical Warfare in World War I
The industrial development of chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gas was the first time that the periodic table was used as a weapon of mass destruction. Chemical warfare killed many men, but, due to the psychological terror created by chemical weapons and the rapid scientific innovation required to protect soldiers from chemical weapons (gas masks) as well as the possibility of being exposed to chemical weapons in the future, history will reflect that the introduction of chemical warfare had a profound impact on the manner in which warfare occurred after World War I.
Machine Guns in World War I
Another major invention that changed warfare was the recoil-operated machine gun created by Hiram Maxim. This weapon allowed soldiers to shoot bullets and fire bullets with energy, causing the cartridge to be fired and thus allowing for the firing of another round into the weapon. The development of this weapon created a zone of death that supported defensive positions and helped perpetuate the horrible stalemate of trench warfare and the decline of cavalry as a viable offensive fighting force.
The Development of Rifled Barrels
Rifles work by spinning a projectile and providing a greater range of accuracy. Rifles also altered military tactics in the 19th century, whereby soldiers stopped fighting using bayonets and instead began shooting at each other from hundreds of feet away.
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教宗李奧重申反戰與呼籲和平 - Tom McArthur
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給他按個「讚」！另請參考：此欄2026/04/16貼文。
Pope criticises 'tyrants' who spend billions on wars after Trump spat
Tom McArthur, 04/16/26
What Trump and Pope Leo have said about each other 請至原網頁觀看視頻
Pope Leo has criticised leaders who spend billions on wars and said the world was "being ravaged by a handful of tyrants" in unusually forceful comments during a visit to Cameroon.
The pontiff blasted those he said had manipulated "the very name of God" for their own gain, while touring a region ravaged by a deadly insurgency.
The remarks come just days after a high-profile spat with US President Donald Trump, who posted a lengthy attack on the Pope, a vocal critic of the US-Israeli military operation in Iran.
The Pope had voiced his concern about Trump's threat that "a whole civilisation will die" if Iran did not agree to US demands to end the war and open the Strait of Hormuz.
Leo, who last year became the first US-born Pope, has previously also questioned the Trump administration's approach to immigration.
"Leo should get his act together as Pope," Trump wrote in a Truth Social post at the time.
The Pope told reporters at the start of his Africa tour that he did not want to get into a debate with Trump but would continue to promote peace.
Speaking in Cameroon, the Pope criticised leaders who "turn a blind eye to the fact that billions of dollars are spent on killing and devastation, yet the resources needed for healing, education and restoration are nowhere to be found".
"The masters of war pretend not to know that it takes only a moment to destroy, yet often a lifetime is not enough to rebuild," he said on Thursday.
The Pope also condemned "an endless cycle of destabilisation and death" in a "bloodstained" region of Cameroon that has been gripped by insurgency for nearly a decade.
"Those who rob your land of its resources generally invest much of the profit in weapons, thus perpetuating an endless cycle of destabilisation and death," he told those gathered at a cathedral in the north-western city of Bamenda - the centre of the violence that has left at least 6,000 people dead and displaced many more.
"Peace is not something we must invent: it is something we must embrace by accepting our neighbour as a brother and as our sister," the Pope said.
Separatist insurgents in Cameroon's two Anglophone regions have been fighting the predominantly Francophone government since 2017.
Following Leo's address, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Sarah Mullally, said that she stood with the Pope in his "courageous call for a kingdom of peace".
The war in Iran has increasingly placed the Pope and the Trump administration at odds.
Soon after the first US and Israeli attacks on Iran, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth recited a highly controversial prayer at a Pentagon worship service that talked of "overwhelming violence" and "justice executed swiftly and without remorse".
Then, during a Palm Sunday Mass in St Peter's Square, the Pope said the conflict between Iran, Israel and the US was "atrocious" and that Jesus could not be used to justify war.
"This is our God: Jesus, king of peace, who rejects war, whom no one can use to justify war," he told tens of thousands of worshippers gathered in Vatican City.
"He does not listen to the prayers of those who wage war, but rejects them."
The pontiff also quoted the Bible passage Isaiah 1:15: "Even though you make many prayers, I will not listen: your hands are full of blood."
Earlier this week, Trump launched a scathing attack on the Pope on social media, in which he described the leader of the Catholic Church as "WEAK on Crime and terrible for Foreign Policy" while portraying himself as a Jesus-like figure.
He later doubled-down on his criticism and refused to apologise – but deleted the AI-generated image of himself.
Asked about the US president's remarks as he arrived in Algiers, the Pope said he had "no fear" of the Trump administration and that he would continue to speak out against war.
The Catholic leader's wide-ranging Africa tour will include stops in 11 cities across four countries. It is his second major foreign visit since being elected to the papacy last year, and reflects the importance of Catholicism in Africa.
More than a fifth of the world's Catholics - some 288 million people - live in Africa, according to figures from 2024.
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停火協議：伊朗戰略上的勝利 - Shlomo Ben-Ami
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請參考：US inadvertently handed Iran’s leadership a safe place to regroup
Iran’s Strategic Victory
Shlomo Ben-Ami, 04/09/26
The US-Israeli war will be remembered as yet another episode of powerful countries falling into the trap of asymmetric warfare, with the ceasefire ratifying what any competent military planner should have anticipated. But while the US might be able to absorb the shock of another defeat, Israel is no superpower.
TEL AVIV—When the news that the United States has agreed to a two-week ceasefire with Iran broke, I was immediately reminded of an exchange described by the American Colonel Harry Summers in 1982. “You never defeated us on the battlefield,” Summers said to a former North Vietnamese colonel. “Yes, but we won the war,” was the categorical response.
Make no mistake: the ceasefire deal seals the strategic defeat of the US-Israel alliance in Iran. This war will be remembered as yet another episode of powerful countries falling into the trap of asymmetric warfare, in which the mightiest militaries invariably fail to translate tactical gains into strategic victories.
The US and Israel—especially Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is better versed in history than US President Donald Trump—should have known this. The principles of war, laid out by Carl von Clausewitz in 1812, make clear that the destruction of enemy forces should have a terminal impact on their will to resist. Asymmetric wars defy this norm of “decisive battle.” And there was no reason to think that Iran would be an exception.
A civilization animated by ideological fervor, which has endured centuries of wars of survival, was never going to surrender easily. A country that sacrificed some 750,000 of its people’s lives, including thousands of children, in its eight-year war against Iraq in the 1980s always had a tremendous advantage over enemies that crumble under the emotional impact of a few dozen body bags. A regime that in January murdered tens of thousands of its own citizens in a mere 48 hours was not going to be fazed two months later by threats against civilians.
Even as the US and Israel have killed much of the Islamic Republic’s political and military leadership, and demolished much of its military capacity, the regime has waged a war of attrition against the global economy. As any competent military planner would have predicted, Iran has blocked transit through the vital Strait of Hormuz, and ensured that its Houthi allies are poised to close the only alternative, Bab al-Mandeb. Add to that strategic drone and missile attacks, and Iran has managed largely to offset its enemies’ military advantage.
In the process, Iran has managed to replenish its budget: it is now earning nearly twice as much from oil sales as before the war, while raking in profits from taxing ships for passage through the Strait. Russia has also profited, thanks to the easing of US sanctions on its oil. Meanwhile, the earnings of America’s allies in the Gulf have plunged, raising questions about whether they will be able to fulfill their pledges to invest billions of dollars in the US and in their own economic diversification.
To top it all off, the US and Israel have failed to achieve any of their war aims. Even the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz cannot be considered a victory, since it was open before the war. Iran’s ballistic-missile capabilities and its enriched uranium supplies remain a problem that will be addressed through diplomacy, just as they were before the war. And the upcoming negotiations in Islamabad are not going to produce an American diktat: the Iranians can still teach US negotiators a lesson, especially since Trump is eager to cut his losses and shift his attention to the politically vital domestic front and to the neglected East Asia theater.
As for regime change, though different individuals now lead Iran, they are no more moderate than their predecessors. Quite the contrary: the Islamic Republic has been transformed into an outright military dictatorship, with the Ayatollahs providing religious legitimacy to the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
The broader regional implications are no more favorable to the US and Israel. The war is bound to lead to a redrawing of the geopolitical map of the Middle East. Ties among the countries most overtly challenging the Western-led global order—China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea—might be strengthened, and their resolve hardened.
At the same time, the Gulf states, which have borne the brunt of Iran’s retaliatory strikes, might start viewing US military bases as more of a liability than an effective deterrent and move to diversify their alliances. They may consider aligning with a regional power like Turkey, which already has ties to the Gulf Cooperation Council, or Pakistan, which has a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia and has shown a willingness to share its nuclear know-how with Islamic states.
In fact, the likelihood of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East has now grown, as leaders in Iran and elsewhere come to view nuclear weapons as the ultimate insurance policy. Iran will also continue to build up its proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, capitalizing on state failure—and the West’s reduced appetite for nation-building—to strengthen its regional buffers.
As for Israel, unless it holds Netanyahu accountable for leading the country into the abyss, its democracy is doomed. With his violent and poorly conceived policies, he has torn apart a once-cohesive society and undermined Israel’s standing in the US to the point that Americans’ alienation poses a strategic threat. His attempt to use Iran to distract from Israel’s escalating brutality toward the Palestinians—which has been essential to Netanyahu’s political survival—only compounds the catastrophe.
During the Cold War, the late US diplomat and strategist George Kennan recognized that internal dysfunction and external overreach would cause the Soviet Union to collapse on its own. So, he devised a strategy of containment, focused on preventing Soviet expansion while avoiding an unnecessary military showdown.
The same strategy could have worked against the Islamic Republic, which sooner or later would have collapsed under the weight of its internal contradictions. Instead, the US and Israel initiated a confrontation that was never going to go their way. And whereas the US might be able to absorb the shock of yet another defeat in an asymmetrical war, Israel is no superpower, no matter what Netanyahu claims.
Shlomo Ben-Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister, is the author of Prophets without Honor: The 2000 Camp David Summit and the End of the Two-State Solution (Oxford University Press, 2022). He’s been writing for PS since 2006
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戰爭以及和談過程的基本原理 - George Friedman
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請參看此欄2026/04/04貼文的「編者前言」。
War and the Principles of the Negotiation Process
George Friedman, 04/13/26
All wars end. Sometimes, the end is reached when one side achieves its goals, which can range from a limited victory to the conquest of the enemy nation. When neither nation is able to reach its goals, the war ends in negotiations. The evolution and outcome of those negotiations depend on two things.
The first is resources: Which nation is most able to continue the war?
The second is popular support: whether an agreement can be reached that is acceptable to the public.
The leaders on both sides must know what they need to achieve in order to survive, a question that at times competes with the national interest.
Each side must consider the willingness of its citizens to fight on or to demand an end to the war. This is not unlike the world of business, where the interests of shareholders and the management can at times diverge.
The goal of the United States in initiating the war against Iran was stated as preventing a nuclear Iran. One fear was that a nuclear Iran might threaten the United States. The other was that a nuclear Iran would come to dominate the region, which, given the region’s oil wealth and economic importance, would make Iran a superpower. Armed with a nuclear weapon, Iran could coerce its neighbors, build its economic power and translate it into greater military power. So there was a great deal at stake during this war.
At this point, neither side has been able to defeat the other militarily, and both sides must reach a conclusion in which the price of peace is not so great as to threaten the survival of their nations, or of their regimes. This, then, is a moment when geopolitical considerations encounter domestic political considerations. And as in all negotiations, there is a psychological dimension. The nation that appears to need a settlement based on both its military and domestic political reality is the weaker party. Therefore, each nation and its regime must appear fully prepared to continue the war and capable of doing so. The side that seems both more capable and even desirous to wage the war has a huge advantage. Internal threats to the regime’s survival undermine this strategy.
Iran’s weakness is that in the long run, the United States is inherently more powerful in terms of weapons production and weapons capability. The United States’ weakness is the vulnerability of the political leadership and Americans’ substantial opposition to continuing the war. Recent polls show a majority of Americans oppose the war, and a higher percentage oppose sending ground troops into Iran. By contrast, Iran’s posture is that it is prepared to carry on the war indefinitely, given the strength of its regime internally. Thus, while Iran is much more vulnerable to the United States in an extended war, the United States is weaker because of its political reality: It is a nation that is not prepared to engage in an extended war. Given the nature of Iran’s regime, it seems not to fear or consider the internal mood of the nation. As the war began, President Donald Trump called for an uprising of the Iranian people, based on the recent demonstrations that had taken place against the regime. That this has not happened indicates that the regime has subdued its internal enemies, giving it a somewhat more powerful hand in the negotiations than it would have otherwise had, while the political reality inside the United States makes extended warfare more difficult to wage.
Iranian strategy is to prolong the war, even as the United States degrades Iran’s military. The Iranian view is that the longer it can constrain the global oil supply, the more likely resistance to the war will weaken the American government at home. In addition, the longer the war lasts and oil is disrupted, the more other nations will pressure the United States to end the fighting. Iran’s view is that a longer war will weaken the United States in several ways, even as the U.S. military advantage over Iran widens. It does not expect the United States to capitulate, but the longer it can drag out the war, the more urgently the American leadership will want to end it, and the more concessions the U.S. will make.
Iran’s strength is that it has far more to lose in this war than the United States does, yet paradoxically, the longer the war lasts, the more favorable the end will be for Iran. From the United States’ point of view, the longer the war goes on and the higher the military and economic costs, the less leverage it has in negotiations. It is essential that the U.S. be able to increase military pressure on Iran to increase the costs of war on the Iranian public and regime. But an escalation runs counter to Washington’s ability to wage the war due to domestic political forces.
The American dilemma in this war is in principle similar to the logic of the Vietnam War. The United States entered that conflict on the assumption that its military force would cripple North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. The communists, however, had a far greater interest in winning the war than the United States had. By not losing the war, they defeated the United States by generating over time opposition to the conflict in the United States. The time frame for that was more than a decade, but the communists had interests so profound that they endured, while the U.S. interest was far more limited, leading to American failure to achieve its ends in the war over a very extended time.
To some extent, the U.S. stakes in this war are greater than they were in Vietnam. Certainly, the economic stakes are higher, given the negative short-term economic impact on the United States, American allies and other nations such as China, whose economy is somewhat dependent on oil imports at prewar prices and which is in the process of negotiating mutual accommodation with the United States. The question is whether other nations harmed economically by the war will place pressure on Iran, or on the United States, to end the conflict. Given that the Iranian regime has everything to lose in this war, and that the United States has far less to lose, pressure on the U.S. (domestically and from other nations) will have a much greater effect than pressure on Iran.
The fundamental question is whether internal pressure on the Iranian regime will increase and be more effective in the coming weeks of war. And that is in turn based on whether the U.S. will escalate the war and help create such a result. That depends on whether the Vietnam model of escalation will be more effective in this war – which is at least a very uncertain assumption.
George Friedman is an internationally recognized geopolitical forecaster and strategist on international affairs and the founder and chairman of Geopolitical Futures. Dr. Friedman is also a New York Times bestselling author. His most recent book, THE STORM BEFORE THE CALM: America’s Discord, the Coming Crisis of the 2020s, and the Triumph Beyond, published February 25, 2020 describes how “the United States periodically reaches a point of crisis in which it appears to be at war with itself, yet after an extended period it reinvents itself, in a form both faithful to its founding and radically different from what it had been.” The decade 2020-2030 is such a period which will bring dramatic upheaval and reshaping of American government, foreign policy, economics, and culture. His most popular book, The Next 100 Years, is kept alive by the prescience of its predictions. Other best-selling books include Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, The Next Decade, America’s Secret War, The Future of War and The Intelligence Edge. His books have been translated into more than 20 languages. Dr. Friedman has briefed numerous military and government organizations in the United States and overseas and appears regularly as an expert on international affairs, foreign policy and intelligence in major media. For almost 20 years before resigning in May 2015, Dr. Friedman was CEO and then chairman of Stratfor, a company he founded in 1996. Friedman received his bachelor’s degree from the City College of the City University of New York and holds a doctorate in government from Cornell University.
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/author/gfriedman/
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歷史上導致戰爭的12種原因 -- Mark Cartwright
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下文作者歸納出歷史上導致戰爭的12種原因；附錄1則列舉對史上7個重要戰爭的分析。請自行參考；並可與本欄2025/07/06和2025/07/13兩篇貼文對照。
Causes of War in History
Mark Cartwright, 05/16/25
This collection of resources examines the causes of various conflicts in the last millennium, from religious and civil wars to revolutions and global wars. The origins of conflict through history are often many and varied; they often, too, include simmering causes of discontent between the parties involved, which have existed long before any fighting ever took place. Common causes of wars throughout history include:
1. the desire for land and resources
2. disputes over borders
3. the disputed succession of a ruler
4. differences in religion
5. nationalism
6. a desire for independence (e.g. from a colonial power)
7. a desire to remove a tyrannical or incompetent ruler
8. self-defence against a perceived aggressor
9. the personal ambitions of leaders
10. the need to distract from domestic problems
11. revenge for a previous act (e. g. an assassination), exploitation, or lost conflict
12. treaty obligations
Mark Cartwright is WHE’s Publishing Director and has an MA in Political Philosophy (University of York). He is a full-time researcher, writer, historian and editor. Special interests include art, architecture and discovering the ideas that all civilizations share.
Articles & Definitions
1. The Crusades: Causes & Goals
2. Causes of the Hundred Years' War
3. Causes of the Wars of the Roses
4. Causes of the English Civil Wars
5. Causes of the American Revolution
6. The Causes of WWI
7. The Causes of WWII
External Links
* Timeline Of 20th And 21st Century Wars - IWM
* The Five Reasons Wars Happen - Modern War Institute
* War - National Geographic
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人工智能與未來戰爭進行模式 - Katrin Bennhold
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請參考：
* Anthropic
* Judge rejects Pentagon's attempt to 'cripple' Anthropic
* The Cost of Conscience: What the Anthropic-Pentagon Feud Means for AI Governance
A Fight About the Future of War
A.I. is already reshaping warfare, but there are big disagreements over what guardrails are needed.
Katrin Bennhold, 03/04/26
If there’s a war unfolding somewhere in 2026 — and there are currently several — there’s a good chance that artificial intelligence is playing a part in it.
A.I. is being used in fighting in Iran and Ukraine. The U.S. used it when it captured the leader of Venezuela. Israel used it during its war in Gaza.
And the use of A.I. on the battlefield is only just getting started. That’s why another battle that unfolded last week between the Trump administration and Anthropic, an American A.I. company, is so important. I asked my colleague Julian E. Barnes what the fight means for the future of warfare, for Americans and for the world.
A fight about the future of war
Anthropic is one of the world’s leading A.I. companies. Its Claude model has been widely used by the Pentagon to collect intelligence, identify targets, map out operations and more. But the fight last week wasn’t about how A.I. is currently being used. It was about how it could be used.
Anthropic’s contract set out two restrictions: The government could not use its technology for surveillance of U.S. citizens. And it could not use Claude with autonomous weapons that kill without human involvement.
The Pentagon balked. It said it didn’t want to use A.I. for domestic surveillance or autonomous killer robots. But it refused to let a private company put restrictions on how the military uses its product.
The standoff has been a messy mix of contract dispute and culture war, a focal point for fears about A.I. and worries about U.S. competitiveness in the global race for A.I. pre-eminence.
On Friday, after negotiations failed, President Trump ordered all federal agencies to stop using Anthropic. The Pentagon also labeled it a “supply-chain risk to national security,” potentially barring any military contractor from doing business with the firm.
Julian, who writes about intelligence and national security, was covering the fight between Anthropic and the Pentagon before he started covering the war in Iran. (He’s been busy.)
Julian, how much is A.I. already integrated into warfare and national security?
It’s totally integrated. The use of A.I. in warfare is no longer theoretical. A.I. is on the battlefield. We do not believe that large language models are being used to command drones or fire weapons yet. But A.I. is deeply embedded in the process of collecting intelligence and using it to shape strategic decisions.
And what exactly is Anthropic worried about?
One of their concerns was that the government could use A.I. to analyze commercially available data on U.S. citizens. Our web browsing data, our telephone metadata — commercial firms can scoop that up and use A.I. to figure out where you’ve been, what you’ve visited, what you purchased.
Anthropic is also worried about this idea of killer drones.
And why is the government objecting to these red lines?
The U.S. says it will always have a human in the loop when artificial intelligence is making decisions around whether or not to kill someone. But there are problems that go along with that, because whoever can observe, think and decide faster is going to win in a battle, and humans can slow that process down.
The central question here is the role of humans in future warfare. And that will probably look very different than today. We still need them, but we haven’t decided what their role is going to be. And that makes it hard to write A.I. rules in advance.
What does the law have to say about A.I. and warfare?
The Pentagon says that the existing laws that govern the conduct of war should be enough. Because the principles of ethical warfare are the same if I’m dropping a bomb or using software to improve my targeting.
But Anthropic says A.I. is not like other weapons. Other weapons are confined by their hardware. This plane flies to this spot, and drops a bomb. This plane flies to this spot, and shoots another plane.
Large language models are different. You can have them analyze data for insights. You can have them suggest places to bomb. You could have them design a cyberattack. Their use constantly evolves.
Anthropic’s line is that this is special technology and we need to have special guardrails on it.
So if we boil it down, what is this fight really about?
It’s about politics and about principle — on both sides.
Anthropic wants to show that it’s a responsible, safety-minded company. That’s their brand. And the Pentagon is saying: This is the woke A.I. company! We’re cracking down on woke! That’s the MAGA brand.
As for principles, the Pentagon is saying there is one standard for all companies who do business with us: We are constrained by the lawful use of this technology, not by any conditions dictated by private companies.
And Anthropic is saying that existing laws are not fit to regulate A.I.
How does this fit into the bigger A.I. race between the U.S. and China? I assume Chinese companies don’t ask the government to put in place guardrails.
Definitely not. Chinese law commands Chinese companies to give up their technology to the state. That’s also why the threat of China hangs over what just happened in Washington. Because the U.S. believes that if there is a war with China over Taiwan, the opening battle will be a battle of drones over the Taiwanese Strait. The drones that can move and decide faster are going to win.
No guardrails also means the Chinese government has asked A.I. companies to develop mass disinformation tools. It has used A.I. for mass surveillance. It has used large language models to identify dissidents. So how China has used A.I. is the actual nightmare scenario that Anthropic is warning about.
Related: OpenAI, Anthropic’s primary rival, signed a deal with the Pentagon immediately after Trump’s order. On Monday, OpenAI said it was amending the contract to say its A.I. systems “shall not be intentionally used for domestic surveillance of U.S. persons and nationals.”
You’re reading The World newsletter. Your daily guide to understanding what’s happening — and why it matters. Hosted by Katrin Bennhold, for readers around the world.
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無人機滿天飛之制空權新生態 - Ibrahim Naber
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請參考：本欄2026/03/02、2026/03/16、和2026/03/21等三篇貼文。
Iran's drone war is exposing deep cracks in US and allied air defenses
Ibrahim Naber, 03/29/26
There is a sound — a low, persistent buzzing — that links Iran's asymmetric warfare against US and Israeli targets in the Middle East to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
It is the sound of a terrifying weapon that symbolizes a new economy of war — cheap, expendable, and mass-produced — and makes its presence known long before it strikes.
In Ukraine, they call them "flying mopeds."
The engines on the Iranian-designed Shahed drones — cheap weapons which cost as little as $20,000 to $50,000, have a wingspan of nearly 10 feet, have a range of up to 1,000 miles, and carry up to 90 kilograms of explosives — whine as they blast and incinerate their targets, from apartment blocks to industrial plants.
That same buzzing now rumbles across the Middle East.
In the opening weeks of the war, Iran launched more than 3,600 of these exploding drones across the region — a campaign that not only reshaped the battlefield but exposed its vulnerabilities.
A Shahed slammed into a radar dome near the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain.
A blast ripped through a luxury district in Dubai.
A Saudi refinery burned; Kuwait reported similar strikes on its energy infrastructure.
What is unfolding goes far beyond regional escalation. Iran's ability to sustain near-daily drone barrages — often combined with missiles — has prolonged the conflict while increasing pressure on critical infrastructure and global energy markets. Leading military analysts and Ukrainian operators say it exposed a structural vulnerability: advanced Western militaries accustomed to defeating enemy fighter jets and missiles are struggling against a threat that outnumbers their defenses. Even as the United States, according to US Central Command, targets Iran's "one-way attack drone capabilities," it has so far failed to decisively shut down its Shahed attacks.
"I don't think that any military in the world has learned sufficiently from Ukraine about what is required to deal with the kind of drone threat posed by Russia — or, frankly, the drone threat posed by Ukraine to Russia, which is also extraordinary," said David Petraeus, a retired general and former CIA director, in an interview with Business Insider.
Only weeks ago, Petraeus returned from a trip to Ukraine, where he accompanied an air defense unit outside Kyiv defending against Shahed drones. What he saw, he argued, points to the beginning of a broader military transformation that will require fundamental changes to how armed forces are organized, trained, and equipped.
The United States, despite its technological edge, has not adapted fast enough. What is now playing out in the Middle East is not a surprise — it is a warning.
The economics of air defense reveal the imbalance. Even the high-end systems face hard limits: an IRIS-T launcher carries eight missiles, a Patriot launcher up to sixteen — meaning a single drone wave can quickly exhaust ready interceptors. Iran's drones are cheap and easy to produce at scale, allowing Tehran — and Russia — to sustain high volumes of attacks. Countering low-cost Shaheds with $3-4 million Patriot (PAC-3) interceptor missiles is economically unsustainable — a reality that defies easy solutions.
Recent operations have exposed how quickly stockpiles can be depleted. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the US-led campaign against Iran is consuming large numbers of scarce interceptor missiles, forcing Washington to shift air defense assets across regions to keep pace. The implications extend beyond the Middle East: Europe, too, remains heavily reliant on US interceptors to counter ballistic missiles. Lockheed Martin is on track this year to produce more than 600 PAC-3 missiles for the first time and plans to increase annual capacity to 2,000 in the coming years, according to a January announcement.
As governments across the Middle East scramble for solutions, Kyiv has become a hub of expertise. More than 200 Ukrainian drone specialists have been deployed abroad in recent weeks, advising partners across the Middle East, including on the protection of US installations. According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine has sent drone experts to help protect US military bases in Jordan.
Even as President Donald Trump has suggested the United States does not need Ukraine's help in drone defense, the battlefield is telling a different story.
"Ukraine has built what is arguably the world's most combat-tested, multi-layered drone defense architecture," said the influential military analyst Franz-Stefan Gady, who regularly visits Ukrainian front-line units and advises European governments. "Its uniqueness lies in the acceptance that no single system — no silver bullet — can defeat a mass drone threat, and that the answer must be a diverse, layered and economically sustainable ecosystem of capabilities."
The war with Iran is making that impossible to ignore— and pressing.
How Ukraine Takes on Shaheds
To understand how Ukraine counters Iran-designed Shahed drones, it helps to travel to eastern Ukraine — the main theater of Russia's war.
On a remote field outside Dnipro, less than a 50-minute drive from the front line, Ukrainian pilots are testing what has become the most cost-effective weapon in Ukraine's arsenal: interceptor drones. A unit of the elite drone brigade "Magyar's Birds" operates here, using aircraft that cost as little as $5,000 to hunt down Russian systems worth many times more. These rapidly evolving systems are reshaping air defense. They now down roughly one in three Russian aerial targets — and, over Kyiv, more than 70% of Shahed drones.
"It has 200 grams of explosives," said a soldier with the call sign "Kusto" in an interview with Business Insider, holding up the interceptor. He and his comrades wore balaclavas to avoid identification by Russian forces. "This warhead is capable of destroying the enemy's main reconnaissance drones, as well as Shahed-type drones. If the strike is carried out correctly, it can take them down."
Operators adjust the payload depending on the target. One option is a heavier charge — the equivalent of 500 grams of TNT. Another combines a smaller explosive load with fragmentation, designed to burst metal fragments outward to maximize damage against reconnaissance or strike drones such as Zala, Lancet, Molniya, Orlan or Supercam.
In some cases, a single interceptor armed with a fragmenting warhead can take out multiple targets. "If we launch a drone to destroy an Orlan or a Supercam and a Shahed is flying nearby, we can destroy the Shahed as well," Kusto says. "That's enough — there are fuel tanks inside. The fragments pierce them, it starts to burn, and the drone is destroyed."
The principle is simple: intercept the threat midair — and destroy it before it reaches its target. The process is more complex, requiring radar operators to locate incoming drones early and relay them to dispersed interceptor crews.
Every movement is drilled. At the training site, the soldiers rehearsed each step up to launch — typically using a catapult system with a tensioned elastic cord, though the drones can also be launched by hand. At the front, seconds can mean survival. Their rule is strict: the drone must be airborne within three to five minutes.
"They fly at speeds of 150 to 200, even 220 kilometers per hour," said Kusto. "That means they can catch up with standard Shaheds."
The sheer scale of Russia's campaign is unprecedented, with attacks reaching up to 900 drones a day across Ukraine — far exceeding anything seen in the Middle East. Flight paths show swarms approaching from multiple directions, designed to stretch and overwhelm air defenses. According to assessments by Ukrainian and European intelligence agencies, Russia is capable of producing between 3,000 and 5,000 Shahed-style long-range attack drones per month. The Russian-made systems are called Geran drones.
In response, Ukraine has been forced to build a multi-layered system, combining interceptor drones, helicopters, fighter jets with guns and missiles, ground-based air defenses, heavy machine guns, and electronic warfare. In March, President Zelenskyy said Ukraine can produce at least 2,000 combat-proven interceptor drones per day — roughly double the military's needs, leaving up to 1,000 daily units available for allies.
"What is required is a comprehensive concept — a comprehensive plan — that uses all types of systems," said Petraeus, co-author of the book, "Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine" and someone regarded as one of America's foremost military strategists. He pointed to Ukraine's extensive network of radars, acoustic sensors, and other tools feeding into a shared sensory map of aerial threats.
This means the decisive factor is not any single weapon, argues military analyst Gady. "Without an integrated architecture — one that fuses radar feeds, early warning systems, and command-and-control into a single real-time platform — effective employment of interceptors at scale is nearly impossible," he said.
This is why exporting Ukrainian interceptor drones alone is not enough. What's decisive is the combat experience and operational know-how behind them — the expertise of elite Ukrainian units like Magyar's Birds — and the ability to translate it into a fully integrated drone defense system night after night.
When Petraeus was out one night recently with a drone unit near Kyiv, he saw how that works in practice. On Ukraine's integrated air picture, every incoming threat was visible. "We could even see glide bombs — that were launched over Russian airspace — and then track the bombs themselves coming in, in that case toward somewhere around Kharkiv," he said.
The rapid evolution has exposed a gap Western militaries have yet to close. In Ukraine, electronic warfare systems designed to scramble frequencies used to control Shahed drones often have to be updated every few weeks — sometimes even days — or risk becoming obsolete.
Russia has adapted. Many Shaheds now cruise at higher altitudes, sometimes reaching up to 13,000 feet, to evade interceptors and penetrate deeper into Ukrainian territory.
But Ukraine has adapted, too.
"These interceptor drones can climb to four or even five kilometers," said Kusto, the latter the equivalent of 16,000 feet. "And destroy them there."
Operators monitor the sky through screens, scanning for incoming threats while guiding their interceptors in real time; higher altitudes put a premium on more advanced notice of an incoming threat. Increasingly, they rely on artificial intelligence to support targeting.
"Artificial intelligence helps identify and highlight the target," said Vitaliy, another soldier in the unit. Once the system locks on, he explained, the operator initiates the attack — and the rest is automated.
The technology is developed in close cooperation with Western partners and constantly refined using combat data. Ukrainian teams run test flights, collecting footage from every possible angle, which is then used to train neural networks abroad. "We send the data to Germany," Vitaliy said. "There, they teach the system what is a Shahed and what is not — building a model of the target from all perspectives."
Beyond Shaheds
How deeply Ukraine has embedded drone defense across every level of its military was clear at a secret training ground in northeastern Ukraine.
New recruits from an infantry unit of the 47th Brigade spread out across an open field, rifles raised — waiting for the sound. Suddenly, a drone rushed toward them, a yellow balloon attached in place of an explosive charge. "Fire, fire!" a Ukrainian instructor shouted as the drone zigzagged.
Shooting down these small aircraft — often costing only a few hundred dollars — can mean the difference between life and death. Online, countless videos show Ukrainian and Russian soldiers staring at incoming one-way attack drones, pleading for mercy in their final moments.
"To reach a position today, you need the ability to take down enemy drones," said a Ukrainian unit commander, call sign "Musician." "You have to stay concealed, remain undetected, move quickly — and ideally make it to your position alive."
For soldiers on both sides, survival increasingly depends on those skills. Thousands of First-Person-View (FPV) drones laden with warheads have turned the battlefield into a place where there is almost nowhere left to hide. The immediate kill zone — the area under constant high drone threat — now extends roughly 15 to 20 kilometers, or about 12 miles, from the front line on both sides.
Even electronic warfare is no longer a guarantee of safety. Traditional jamming systems are bypassed by a new generation of fiber-optic drones — tethered systems guided via cables that can stretch for miles across the battlefield. Immune to electronic interference, they can only be stopped by being shot down.
The threat is no longer confined to Ukraine. Videos posted by Iranian-backed militias in March appear to show FPV drones striking hangars and a helicopter near a base in Iraq. It is another reminder that distance and high-end defenses no longer guarantee protection — as creative tactics and mass-production bypass even well-defended positions.
Militaries that want to compete at the cutting edge will need deep reforms. In summer 2024, Ukraine became the first country worldwide to establish an Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) as an independent branch of its armed forces. The USF is tasked with the development, integration, and deployment of unmanned platforms in the air, on land, and at sea, while also serving as a direct bridge to domestic manufacturers.
The United States — and especially Europe — are lagging behind, according to experts.
"You have to adapt your organizational structures to modern drone warfare and to the way you train and operate," said Petraeus, the former CIA director. "You also need to revise all of your leader development courses — for commissioned, warrant and non-commissioned officers. You obviously have to dramatically change your material requirements and what you buy. Yet none of these changes are happening remotely fast enough in countries outside Ukraine."
For now, the skill of drone pilots still shapes the outcome of combat. But that advantage is fading as the battlefield shifts toward increasingly autonomous systems.
"The next major development in the war in Ukraine will feature far more autonomous systems — not just individual autonomous drones, but systems of autonomous systems that can think for themselves and carry out the orders they've been programmed to follow," said Petraeus. Such systems, he warns, will pose a fundamental challenge to existing defenses.
"You cannot defeat a drone swarm with current counter-drone capabilities."
Militaries are racing to respond. Directed-energy weapons — especially lasers — are often seen as a potential breakthrough: fast, precise, and far cheaper per shot than interceptor missiles. Even more promising are high-powered microwave systems capable of disabling multiple drones at once.
"The only element that is just now emerging is high-powered microwave systems," Petraeus said. "If you look at one of the leading new systems, it's called Epirus. It's relatively short-range, and thus point-defense rather than area defense, but it is incredibly effective, and it can deal with what is coming next — autonomous systems, drones that can operate in swarms."
For the United States, the lesson is clear: the drone defense playbook exists — but it is being written by Ukraine.
Ibrahim Naber is a foreign correspondent who has reported from Ukraine since 2022. In October 2025, he and his team were injured in a Russian Lancet drone strike in Dnipro. In 2025, he received the George Weidenfeld Prize for his coverage of global conflicts and crisis zones. He wrote his dissertation at King's College London on the psychology of modern drone warfare.
Read the original article on Business Insider
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飛彈有時而盡蠢夫無處不有 -- Rhian Lubin
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「有時而盡」出處。
US has fired 850 Tomahawk missiles into Iran - leaving some officials concerned about dwindling supply
The rate at which the U.S. military has used the Tomahawk missiles in the Iran war has reportedly prompted internal talks about increasing supplies
Rhian Lubin, 03/27/026
US has fired 850 Tomahawk missiles into Iran - leaving some officials concerned about dwindling supply.
Key takeaways Powered by Yahoo Scout. Yahoo is using AI to generate key points from this article. This means the info may not always match what’s in the article. Reporting mistakes helps us improve the experience.
Pentagon officials are concerned about the low supply of Tomahawk missiles in the U.S. military after firing 850 into Iran.
Some Pentagon officials are concerned about the “alarmingly low” supply of Tomahawk missiles remaining in the U.S. military’s arsenal after firing 850 of the weapons into Iran, according to a report.
The rate at which the U.S. military has used the Tomahawk missiles in President Donald Trump’s war in Iran, now in its fourth week, has prompted internal talks about increasing supplies, according to The Washington Post.
U.S. officials told the newspaper that the number of Tomahawks left in the Middle East was “alarmingly low.” Another official told the outlet that the U.S. supply of Tomahawks was closing in on “Winchester,” military slang that means almost out of ammunition.
Many of the Tomahawks, which can be launched from submarines and Navy warships, were used during the first days of the war, which began on February 28, people familiar with the matter told the Post. Each missile is estimated to cost more than $2 million.
A Tomahawk missile was likely responsible for the strike on the elementary school in the southern Iranian city of Minab during the first weekend of the conflict that killed 175 people, including children, according to preliminary findings from an investigation.
Some Pentagon officials are concerned about the ‘alarmingly low’ supply of Tomahawk missiles remaining in the U.S. military’s arsenal after firing 850 of the weapons into Iran, according to a report (US Navy) Tomahawk飛彈照片
Inventory numbers for the Tomahawk missiles are classified, but analysts told the Post they estimate 850 or so was approximately “a quarter” of the U.S. military’s stockpile.
Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell said the U.S. military “has everything it needs to execute any mission at the time and place of the President’s choosing and on any timeline” in a statement to the outlet, and said the media was “obsessed with portraying the world’s strongest military as weak.”
Parnell added that the media’s scrutiny over weapon supplies in the Iran war inaccurately suggests that the Pentagon has failed to provide its service members “every advantage to be successful” while attempting to “frighten and sow doubt in the minds of the American people.”
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth previously said the U.S. military has “no shortage of munitions” and supplies would “sustain this campaign as long as we need to.”
White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt also asserted that there was “more than enough munitions, ammo and weapons stockpiles to achieve the goals of Operation Epic Fury laid out by President Trump — and beyond.”
US officials reportedly said that the number of Tomahawks left was ‘alarmingly low.’ Preliminary findings from an investigation appear to show that a Tomahawk missile struck an elementary school in Iran during the first weekend of the conflict (pictured) (ISNA/AFP via Getty Images) 小學被炸後慘狀
The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that the Navy may have had around 3,000 Tomahawk missiles on hand at the beginning of the war last month.
Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the think tank, told the Post that if more than 800 Tomahawks were used in Iran, it “would leave a large gap for a conflict in the Western Pacific” and would “take several years to replenish.”
Trump announced on March 6 that his administration held a “very good meeting” with U.S. defense manufacturing companies that included the contractor of the Tomahawk missiles, Raytheon.
The president said the companies agreed to “quadruple production of “exquisite class weaponry…as rapidly as possible.”
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誰知道：伊朗戰爭實況？ ---- Harlan Ullman
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下文可以歸類為「訊息大雜燴」；或者說：由於「文不對題」，作者讓人搞不清楚他的「主旨」到底是什麼。
不過，從他的分析我們再度了解到：制空權和制海權並非「勝利」或「達到軍事/政治目標」的「充分條件」。「軍靴踏上敵國土地」才能畢「戰爭」之功；也就是曹松說的：「一將功成萬骨枯」。
How the war with Iran is actually going
Harlan Ullman, 03/23/26
While President Donald Trump has told Americans that Operation Epic Fury is “way ahead of schedule,” how well are the U.S. and Israel doing in compelling Iran to submit to our demands, no matter how confusing they may be in declaring the outcomes we seek?
According to press reports, U.S. officials confirmed five KC-135 tankers crucial to refueling striking aircraft were damaged at an airbase in Saudi Arabia. One had a mid-air collision and crashed killing its aircrew. And an F-35 was reportedly damaged but made it safely to base. In addition to three F-15’s downed by friendly Kuwaiti fire, over 200 American service personnel have been wounded or killed by Iranian missiles and drones.
So, despite Trump’s reports of destroying Iran’s Navy and Air Force, Tehran is still conducting missile and drone strikes against U.S. and local allies in the Gulf. The question must be what Iran’s strategy is and is it working or failing? At this stage, there are no answers to that or to whether the U.S. and Israel will achieve their political objectives based on the use of military force. Trump has already reprimanded Israel for attacking Iranian gas production facilities. But here is a classic irony.
Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz. As the administration considers lifting sanctions on Iranian oil, Trump has signaled that the flow of energy from the Gulf must be kept open, as U.S. gas prices surge near $4 per barrel. His policy is contradictory. The only leverage Trump has is to threaten Iranian energy production facilities. But to do so, he is merely increasing energy costs that could redound against him in the November elections.
From the U.S. and Israeli side, after conducting over 7,000 strikes, finding appropriate targets must be an issue. Since the energy infrastructure seems to be off limits and much of Iran’s military capability was destroyed or is unreachable because it is buried so deeply underground, where are all the bombs and missiles headed? Further, since rearming U.S. warships at sea with Tomahawk and other missiles is not possible, how are the surface escorts going to be replenished? And after fire sent the USS Ford back to Crete for repairs, it will take time for USS Nimitz to replace it.
The U.S. is sending a Marine Expeditionary Unit to the Gulf. While a Marine Expeditionary Unit consists of at least three ships — in this case an LHA “lightning carrier” and two dock landing ships of some 2,500 sailors and Marines — only 800 Marines are in the infantry battalion.
To think that such a small force, despite the air power that could be mounted from the Gulf to support it, could seize control of the Strait of Hormuz or capture Iran’s uranium at Natanz brings back memories of “Blackhawk Down” and the fiasco in Mogadishu to capture a Somali warlord in 1993 that led to 19 U.S. deaths and 79 wounded.
While it can be argued that Iran has mounted a brilliant campaign to win by not losing, using a combination of missiles and drones to punish Gulf states while blocking the Strait to impose huge economic pressure on the U.S., why was it unable to prevent the U.S. and Israel from devastating its conventional forces?
Surely Iran had months to react to the Midnight Hammer bombing that “obliterated” its nuclear ambitions, if Trump is correct. But it made no attempts to use decoys and cover to protect its air force and navy. It had three capable Kilo class Russian built submarines. Apparently, none was operational. Why not? And knowing that USS Ford had to transit Suez and the Red Sea, why did Iran not mobilize its Houthi allies to disrupt that passage?
Over time, all these questions may be answered. If one recalls, the initial assaults into Afghanistan by NATO forces and Iraq in 2003 were hugely successful. However, do those operations have any consequences for Iran? While the Taliban and Saddam’s army were routed, who has all the time and not the watches in Kabul? And who is running Iraq?
Going to war sometimes is too easy, especially with a compliant Congress. Ending wars, as the U.S. learned in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq after 2003, did not go well. The question is whether President Trump is being told the realities of this war. Or are his advisors merely reinforcing his decisions, as Lyndon Johnson’s and George W. Bush’s team led the march of folly into failure and defeat?
Harlan Ullman, Ph.D., is UPI’s Arnaud deBorchgrave Distinguished Columnist, a senior adviser at the Atlantic Council, the chairman of two private companies and the principal author of the doctrine of shock and awe. He and former United Kingdom Defense Chief David Richards are the authors of a forthcoming book on preventing strategic catastrophe.
Copyright 2026 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
For the latest news, weather, sports, and streaming video, head to The Hill.
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