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「戰爭」與「反戰」 -- 開欄文
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瀏覽1,440 ｜回應8｜推薦1 |
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2023年我收到傅大為、盧倩儀、馮建三、和郭力昕等四位教授發起的《我們的反戰聲明》時，就想專闢一欄刊出該聲明，並收集網上以及我自己討論「戰爭」與「反戰」的文章。但是，由於這個題目很大，我一時三刻間寫不出一篇提綱挈領的「開欄文」；所以作罷。後來將該聲明和拙作《「我們的反戰聲明」爭議淺見》分別單獨刊出。
現在想想這其實不是個充分理由。最近讀到一篇介紹雷博教授著作的文章(本欄第三篇)，覺得有寫篇評論的必要(本欄第四篇)；寫作過程中，由於搜查相關資料，又看到史投克教授的大作(本欄下一篇)。我認為它值得介紹，就決定以這三篇文章為基礎而開此欄。
史投克教授的大作不但分析了「全面戰爭」這個「概念」，他借這個分析來強調：使用「明白清晰」的概念在建構理論和政策上非常重要。史投克教授在該文中並簡明的闡釋了韋伯「理想型」概念；軍事學之外，全文在「方法論」上也頗有參考價值。
我一向認為論述中所用詞彙和「概念」需要明白易懂，以及其「所指」應該確定而無岐義；我曾經說過和史投克教授同樣的話：
「如果一個詞彙或概念『無所不指』，則它實際上就會變得『無所指』」。
我不敢說和史投克教授「英雄所見略同」；或許，理性、務實的人在思考邏輯上都是同路人吧。
本文於 修改第 8 次
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《孫子》簡介 -- Thrive
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《孫子》是我讀的第一本中國典籍；那時大概14歲左右。高中畢業前重讀過一、兩次；所以，好些句子我現在還能琅琅上口。
在美工作期間偶而出差，在各地機場書店的陳列架上，通常都能看到兩、三本把「孫子兵法」應用到商場競爭/企業管理的教戰手冊。下文從日常生活切入，沒讀過《孫子》的朋友，不妨瀏覽一、二。
Sun Tzu — The Art of War The Book That Explain Teach Me How to Win People Without Fighting
Explained By A Psychologist.
THRIVE, 11/28/25
I hate war but I am a student of war let me explain.
About 5 years ago I read in a newspaper an interview with a professional boxer. Unfortunately I’ve forgotten the name of that athlete, but what he said about the act of fighting hit me like a ton of bricks. When he was asked how he prepared for a fight he quoted from an old Chinese book and that was the first time I heard about The Art of War. Most probably written by a Chinese gentleman called Sun Tzu who lived in the fifth century BC.
Ever since I have been fascinated by his work. I studied it and I tried to apply some of its principles when I was still fighting martial art competitions which is a very long, long time ago.
Why this book hooked me
As soon as you read his book you realize that next to the physical component of war and very far away from the horrible part where bodies clash and people get killed there is a psychological and a philosophical part to it. This part is all about reading your opponent, knowing yourself, and estimating the circumstances correctly.
One of the essential ideas in Sun Tzu is to overcome an army without fighting. According to him, that is the best of skills. This little booklet only 13 chapters provides a unique perspective on war, strategy, and leadership. Over the centuries it influenced military strategists, business leaders, world leaders, and athletes. I find it useful for almost every human being when we face an adversary or an opponent — in business, in sports, as leaders of our communities, or as private persons.
East vs West two different ways to think about winning
After I read The Art of War several times I started searching for a Western equivalent. There are several. Machiavelli wrote The Art of War, but it’s very technical and tied to his time and town. A true Western counterpart that matters is Carl von Clausewitz’s On War, published by his widow in 1832. Both authors are military strategists, but they wrote about war almost two thousand years apart and their thinking diverges in important ways.
Both start from a similar place. Sun Tzu opens with: “War is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death.” Clausewitz opens differently but with the same seriousness: “War is a serious means to a serious end.” Neither glorizes war. Thank God.
Still, they split on the fundamentals. Clausewitz compares war to a duel: war is physical force trying to compel the other to do your will. Confrontation. Direct force. Sun Tzu starts from a different idea: attack the enemy’s strategy, not the enemy. Don’t attack the man attack the plan. This is the essence of Chinese strategy, and it can be applied far beyond the battlefield.
How to attack strategy instead of people a simple example
Imagine a man in the fifth century BC. Let’s call him Mr. Korin. He had a great reputation and was widely respected. He lived in village A and learns that village A will be attacked by a king from city B.
Mr. Korin understands his village cannot defend itself. So he sends one of his students to the king of city C. The student tells the king of C that his master wants to warn him: city B is preparing to attack city C. The king of C is grateful and asks what to do. The student says, “My master advises you to attack city B first because they will not see that coming.”
The king of C attacks city B, takes them by surprise, and wins. Now the new situation: village A is safe, king of C is more powerful, and Mr. Korin has a powerful, grateful ally. Korin won without a fight. That’s deception used as strategy.
Clausewitz mentions stratagems but calls them almost inferior to be used only as a last resort. Sun Tzu places stratagems at the center. Huge difference.
Why I say I’m a student of war but I hate war
I started the story by saying I’m a student of war, but that doesn’t mean I like war. Actually, the opposite is true. Long story short: peace and stability don’t come by themselves. They’re hard work. War can often be avoided if we know how to do this work.
As a psychologist I see people who have limited skills to deal with conflict. Too often they go straight for direct confrontation. That usually leads to verbal and sometimes physical violence. Sun Tzu offers another way: learn to overcome opponents without a fight. That’s useful whether your neighbor is an asshole, your kid is bullied, or your business faces an aggressive competitor.
Two categories of books what I took from each
If I put the books on a shelf by function:
* Clausewitz — gems of insight. He gives specific theory on warfare and battle. It’s fundamental, heavy, theoretical. Difficult to read. Written in German over many interrupted years, full of long sentences and contradictions. Valuable if you want deep theory.
* Sun Tzu — hammer book. Short. Practical. Digestible. Not a one-two-three guide, but full of lines that trigger you. Underline them. Think with them.
I always advise: read The Art of War several times. Underline the sentences that trigger you. Why do they trigger you? Maybe you don’t like what he says. Maybe you get a new insight. Maybe you see why you can’t beat your current opponent. Use those lines to reflect on your situation.
A few practical notes on reading The Art of War
* It’s only about 60 pages and 13 chapters.
* Don’t pick a literal translation for your first read it can feel like abstract poetry.
* Pick a translation that includes an introduction on the time and context. That helps a lot.
Final thought this is about living better, not learning to fight
What I’ve learned from both books is that war and peace are two sides of the same coin. Learning how to maintain peace, avoid escalation, and handle conflict intelligently is worth the time. It’s not about becoming clever at hurting people it’s about preventing harm.
It’s funny how a boxer’s quote in a newspaper changed the way I think about conflict. I couldn’t agree more with the idea that the best victory is the one you get without fighting.
If you enjoyed this story, follow my channel and clap.
Written by THRIVE
Space for growth, wisdom, and wellness. Let’s explore self-improvement, inspiring books, and healthy living. Team Of different people sharing their knowledge
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人工智能科技對戰爭的影響 -- Nayef Al-Rodhan
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AI, War and Transdisciplinary Philosophy
Hacking the Human Soldier
Nayef Al-Rodhan, 11/30/23
Editor’s Notes：Human ego and emotionality play a bigger role in war than we often admit. Human pride, grief, contempt, hate and shame have all changed the course of history time and time again. As AI and human enhancement continue to evolve, they will be used to hack human ego and emotionality, leading to a step-change in the brutality and illegitimacy of war, writes Nayef Al-Rodhan.
The Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz saw uncertainty and fear as essential ingredients of war. But how does human fallibility, which is at the core of classic theories of war dating back to Sun Tzu, play out in a world where AI-powered military technologies remove human qualities from battle? Will emerging AI tools such as deepfakes, and other deceptive technologies, deepen the fog of war? Are these transformative technological developments changing the very nature of war? Will the extreme brutality enabled by highly destructive military technologies create multi-generational hate, vengeance, deep ethnic and cultural schisms and hinder reconciliation, reconstruction and coexistence? These questions have been made ever-more pressing by the current Russia-Ukraine and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. Will these developments change the very nature of war? These questions are fundamental to the sustainability of human civilisation, here on earth as well as increasingly in Outer Space. To answer them, we need to examine the benefits, dangers and limitations of the new methods of war - and examine how our human nature shapes, and is shaped by, the way we fight.
Contemporary research in neuroscience has provided valuable insights into human behaviour, with direct consequences for state behaviour, cooperation and conflict. Contrary to previous assumptions about the rationality of human behaviour, neuroscience has shown that emotions and emotionality play a central role in cognitive functions and in rational decision-making. Studies show that human beings are neither inherently moral, nor immoral. They are, rather, amoral, and influenced by personal and political circumstances, where their moral compass is governed primarily by “perceived emotional self-interest”.
Neuroscience shows that human beings are critically predisposed for survival. This means that we are fundamentally egoistic. It is this evolutionary desire to survive and thrive, with constant competition, mistrust and fear of the other, that inspires the aspiration to dominate others. In short, our appetite for primordial power is part of who we are. Neurochemically speaking, feelings of power are linked to the release of dopamine, amongst other chemicals, in the mesolimbic reward centre of the brain. Dopamine is the same neurochemical that is responsible for feelings of pleasure and rewards, as well as the “highs” of all forms of addiction, including drug addiction, social media and gambling. That is why power has an addictive effect on the brain, comparable to that of a drug. It leads human beings to do anything to seek it, enhance it – and prevent losing it.
Neuroscience has debunked the realist presumption that states are driven exclusively by rationality. Neuroscientific studies demonstrate the neuroanatomical and neurochemical links between emotions and decision-making, which have a profound influence on international relations and a peaceful global order. Emotionality infuses unpredictability into human affairs, and can be at the root of state and sub-state conflicts. Bertrand Russell noted this in his book ‘Has Man A Future?’ published on the eve of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Claiming that humanity was on the verge of annihilation, Russell described how “pride, arrogance and fear of loss of face have obscured the power of judgment” of Kennedy and Khrushchev, the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union. Much like humans, states are egoistic and survival-oriented and are heavily influenced by interests and perceptions.
The emotionality of states has played a determining factor in both inter- and intra-state conflict throughout history. Take, for example, Stalin’s fatal foray into Korea, which historian Tony Judt has described as a result of his growing paranoia and suspicions about Western plans. Or Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, which was arguably driven more by pride and hubris than by cold strategic calculation. More recently, the strategically unsound - and illegitimate - invasion and destruction of Iraq and dismantling of Libya had similar emotional undertones. Or the reheating of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with its deeply emotional undertones and the unprecedented humanitarian crisis.
These examples demonstrate that the human ego, sensibilities and our emotional repertoire consisting of emotions of policy makers such as pain, pride, grief, contempt, hate and shame play a more pervasive role in seemingly accountable state conduct and international relations than is often acknowledged. With an eye on the future, these attributes are a timely reminder how emotional attachment to exploitative hegemony, deceptive manipulations, arrogance of power and greed can lead to the illegal acquisition of land and resources. As a result, they can spark conflicts and infuse unpredictability and longstanding mistrust into international affairs, in all political systems. This is especially the case where there are few or no systems in place to keep policy-making in check.
As geopolitical tensions heat up, there is a growing danger of emotionally-tinged self-identity being weaponised through the means of strategic culture, the attempt to integrate cultural considerations, historical memory, applied history and their influences in the analysis of states’ security policies and international relations. History teaches us that states will weaponise everything they can in order to dominate others. That is why, going forward, we cannot ignore neuroscientific findings about the emotionality, amorality, and egoism of human nature and state behaviour when examining new technologies, norms and innovations. Together, they will play a crucial role in our efforts to end conflict by weeding out double standards in inter-state relations and increasing levels of respect for the sovereign choices and national interests of states. This will improve the chances of achieving equitable and sustainable peace, security and prosperity for all that is rooted in trust.
AI will play an increasingly important role in warfare in the coming years. There are those who argue that AI could make war less lethal and possibly strengthen deterrence, i.e. the lives of soldiers could be spared by expanding the role of AI-directed drones in the air force, navy and army. Russia is currently testing autonomous tank-like vehicles and the U.S. Defence Department is training AI bots to fly a modified F-16 fighter jet. However, the need for human intervention is likely to decrease, raising ethical and accountable governance questions. A fundamental question in this regard relates to the attribution of responsibility for transgressions by automatic or semi-automatic systems. Attribution is more complex in the case of autonomous weapons compared to that of human beings, since the programmer, manufacturer, and commander might all be held responsible. Although human beings themselves cannot be trained to respond to all possible scenarios, previous experiences help us react to unpredictable situations. The law of armed conflict is based on two fundamental principles, the principle of distinction, which requires combatants to distinguish between military and civilian objects, and the principle of proportionality in the use of force. Unlike a human being, any decision of this kind made by even a highly sophisticated autonomous weapon would be based solely on algorithms governed by probabilistic calculations and predetermined attribution of value. This combination of issues gives rise to a so-called “responsibility gap” for autonomous weapons which, at present, is far from being resolved.
Recent studies also show that AI-driven software could force military commanders to reduce their decision-making window from hours or days to minutes. There is a real danger that decision-makers become over-reliant on AI tools – which operate at much faster speeds than humans – as part of their command-and-control armoury. There is also a real danger that AI technology could equip rogue actors with the brainpower and tools to build dirty bombs or pinpoint nuclear arms sites as a lot of the data is held by private companies which could be susceptible to hacking and espionage. The current war between Russia and Ukraine and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also remind us how AI tools, such as deep fakes and other sophisticated technological tricks, are increasingly being used to amplify and bolster propaganda efforts. This is being made easier by the rapidly evolving sophistication of AI generators that can produce persuasive fake images and videos. As a result, we are also seeing a so-called liar’s dividend, i.e. a growing proportion of the public is dismissing genuine content from the frontlines as fake.
Their ultimate goal is to create “super soldiers” that are stronger, agile and cost-effective. The search for performance optimisation of soldiers through human enhancement is not entirely new and stimulant drugs have been used in the army for decades. During World War II, Japanese, American and British forces consumed large amounts of amphetamines to boost alertness and physical endurance. In the Vietnam War, which was later dubbed the first “pharmacological war” because of the high consumption of psychoactive substances by military personnel, the U.S. military supplied soldiers with speed and steroids. The reckless use of pharmaceuticals and stimulants in the Vietnam War resulted in a large number - estimates range from 400,000 to 1.5 million - of PTSD cases among veterans.
However, these days human enhancement technologies go even further. They can increase soldiers’ muscle strength and alertness while managing pain and stress levels. The quest to create ‘super soldiers’ creates a host of ethical and philosophical concerns linked to the development of authenticity, accountability, free will and fairness, amongst others. This begs the question: will these new techniques redefine what it means to be human? Will ‘super soldiers’ retain the aspects of their personality that make them human? How will the ability of enhanced soldiers to tolerate pain impact issues such as torture and the Geneva Convention? What is clear is that these innovations in the military space are bringing humanity to the brink of transhumanism. They are radically different from previous eras, as they are much more potent, invasive and potentially irreversible. We are now witnessing the rise of technologies that alter human biology by incorporating technology within the human body. Projects spearheaded by DARPA and others include computerised brain implants and biomedical tools that equip soldiers with increased stress resistance, “accelerated learning” capabilities as well as improved immunity from injury and the effects of sleep deprivation. These technologies mark a new phase in the mission to create ‘super soldiers’. These technologies mark a new phase in the mission to create super soldiers. Recent advances in neural integration bring about the real possibility that advanced technology could be plugged directly into the peripheral nervous system, for example via a remote-controlled micro-processing chip implanted beneath the skull. Neuro-stimulation of the brain through Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (TDCS), using a constant, low current delivered via electrodes on the head, has been found to accelerate learning and improve recall among Air Force pilots.
By optimising these technologies, the world’s leading militaries may soon be able to go a step further and pre-programme the reactions, responsiveness, and emotionality of their soldiers. Some of the most radical and profound changes for the human condition will take place through such interventions. These developments could give rise to a form of transhumanism that will challenge the very notion of the human condition as fixed, rooted and constant. Deeper integration of technology within the body, as well as the use of neuro-technological and neuropharmacological means of enhancing our bodies could affect how we feel and think – and therefore also how we act on the battlefield. While enhancement may boost cognitive and physical capabilities, they also diminish some deeply human features like compassion and empathy, that have been pivotal to us as a species, both for survival and cooperation. This could have dire consequences on ethical and humanitarian calculations during combat, including the use of torture. It could also have far-reaching implications on diplomacy and statecraft. Indeed, in the not-too-distant future, the existence of robots or sophisticated humanoids with advanced moral competencies could transform security dynamics, civil-military relations and how we regard ourselves as humans. To navigate this uncertain future, leading thinkers focused on the ethical implications of new types of warfare will need to add transdisciplinary tools to their intellectual armoury. They will need to engage directly with issues that lie on the cusp of AI, synthetic biology, neuroscience, and philosophy (an area I have termed Neuro-Techno-Philosophy). Transdisciplinary endeavours such as Neuro-Techno-Philosophy can teach us a lot about human frailty and malleability, both at the individual and group level. By understanding our neurochemical motivations, neurobehavioural needs, fears and predilections, and the neuropsychological foundations underpinning the behaviour of states, we are better placed to navigate the challenges posed by contemporary geopolitics and global security. These insights could also bolster conflict resolution efforts, which often incorporate behavioural models but, to date, rarely include neuroscientific insights.
On the battlefield, interventions to make soldiers feel less empathy and fear will effectively rewire the human condition and disrupt millennia of evolution. They will also have serious implications for how wars are fought. Given the potential effects of these technologies on emotions as well as physical capabilities, the level of brutality in warfare is likely to increase, severely impeding post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction efforts. Enhanced weapons, super-soldiers and new biological weapons will fall outside the existing ethical, customary, and legal norms of warfare that are defined by international law and the Geneva Conventions. This will raise important questions for lawyers and policy-makers, not least about questions of responsibility. For example, who will be held accountable if the “enhanced” soldier runs out of control: the soldier, the engineer or the medical teams that enhanced him?
More broadly, questions of law, international competition ethics and potentially uncontrollable cascading risks will become more prominent as states and societies respond to the challenges posed by new disruptive technologies. This is especially true with regard to the possibility of self-evolving run-away AI weapon systems, which are becoming increasingly tangible. These systems could potentially rewrite their own source code and become completely beyond human control and oversight. Unequal levels of access to new technologies will be reflected in international competition and shifts in balance of power, with countries with better integration capabilities possessing an advantage. Military history teaches us the importance of integrating technology. Going into World War II, France had the better tank – but the Germans gained the upper hand by successfully integrating their model with the radio and air cover. Looking to the future, the asymmetry of capabilities is likely to once again exacerbate the sense of extreme brutality and illegitimacy in war.
Professor Nayef Al-Rodhan is a philosopher, neuroscientist and geostrategist, Head of the Geopolitics & Global Futures Programme at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and an Honorary Fellow at St Antony’s College, Oxford University.
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戰術、戰略、和高科技之間的三角關係 -- Sinéad Baker
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請參看此文(該欄2025/10/28)和此文(該欄2025/10/27)。
New radar and missile tech have 'flattened the earth,' making even low-flying jets easy targets, Royal Air Force officer warns
Sinéad Baker, 10/25/25
* There has been a "flattening of the earth" by new radar and missile technology, a Royal Air Force official said.
* The long-running assumption that ultralow flying would prevent detection is "obsolete," he said.
* Conflicts like the Ukraine war show that deep strike is harder and more critical than ever.
New radar and missile technology have resulted in a "flattening of the earth" that puts even extremely low-flying aircraft at much higher risk, a Royal Air Force officer said this week.
Air Vice-Marshal James Beck, the RAF's director of capabilities and programs, said that when he was flying the Tornado multirole combat aircraft in the early 2000s, it was still an "underlying assumption that ultra low flying would allow a formation the ability to penetrate deep into enemy territory without being detected by their integrated air missile defense systems."
The assumption was that the hostile radars could not see through the ground, and this "underpinned our tactical thinking for many decades," he said, addressing the UK's Royal United Services Institute on Monday.
Terrain-masking was long a credible tactic, with fighters flying low and fast beneath the radar horizon and using the earth's curvature and ground clutter to evade line-of-sight radars. The approach made sense against legacy radars and surface-to-air missile systems. Advancements, however, are making low-level penetration insufficient on its own.
New radar and missile developments have made the classic approach "obsolete," Beck said, characterizing the shift in technology as tantamount to a "flattening of the earth."
He pointed to advances in radar technology, like the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, which has electronically steered beams to detect targets and allows crews to track multiple targets. Beck also highlighted the challenge of newer Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radars that can do just what the name implies and see beyond the curve of the earth. And then there are also the "all-pervasive abilities" of airborne surveillance aircraft.
Detection ranges have jumped from hundreds of nautical miles to thousands, he said, adding that the ranges of both surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles are also growing rapidly.
Gen. James Hecker, commander of US Air Forces in Europe, said previously that his "number one priority throughout NATO on the air side, is the counter-A2AD missions — so counter anti-access (A2), area-denial missions (AD)." The threats in this space are expanding.
Beck said these developments will soon make it far more difficult for air forces to enter an enemy's battlespace. Militaries use what's known as anti-access, area-denial strategies — layers of radars, missiles, and sensors — to keep adversaries out.
Those restricted zones are already vast — "measured in countries," Beck said — and could expand dramatically. Within the next decade, he predicted, "they will likely be measured in continents."
A big challenge
The flattening of the modern battlespace, Beck warned, will make it increasingly difficult for aircraft to penetrate deep into enemy territory without being detected or engaged.
That's a problem. Seizing control of the air and penetrating deep to knock out command nodes, logistics hubs, and missile sites far behind the front line are critical to victory.
The war in Ukraine, a grinding attritional fight chewing up equipment and troops, "continues to show us what happens if we fail to master control of the air from the outset," Beck said.
"Indeed, the longer the conflict reigns, this lesson becomes ever more compelling."
Neither Ukraine nor Russia has been able to seize control of the air as they are stymied by strong air defense networks that threaten anything flying. There have been numerous videos of Ukrainian combat aircraft flying low, hugging the earth and only popping up to launch munitions, but we're not seeing penetration flights into enemy-controlled airspace.
Both sides are, however, lobbing drones and missiles deep behind the lines, highlighting the importance of maintaining robust air and missile defense systems, especially given adversary capabilities have, as Beck said, "advanced dramatically."
"The pace of change continues to accelerate, with an increasing range of state and non-state actors posing new challenges," he said.
Demands of future war
Taking advantage of new technologies to keep ahead of the curve will be key as the battlespace shifts.
"As a first step," Beck shared, the UK "will prioritize upgrading our existing command and control capabilities to maximize the effectiveness of current systems and lay the foundation for future enhancements."
He added that the UK would also capitalize on advances in sensor technology, including surface, airborne, and space-based sensors, "to extend detection and tracking ranges, increasing opportunities to engage and defeat threats through a system of layered defenses." The aim is also to extend the range of both active and passive defensive systems, he said.
Particularly important work when it comes to being able to penetrate heavily defended airspace is the development of sixth-generation aircraft, like the US Air Force Next Generation Air Dominance program's F-47 or the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) that the UK, Italy, and Japan are working on.
Beck said that right now fifth-generation aircraft like the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter are the bare minimum for getting the edge in a modern air war. Sixth-gen fighters will need to bring advanced stealth, among other capabilities.
Without that full-spectrum stealth, aircraft "will be unable to enter an opponent's A2AD bubble to a level that it would be able to deliver meaningful effect," he said.
He said sixth-generation aircraft will need to carry out the deep strikes that are becoming increasingly difficult and “detect, select, and prosecute targets that are operating in or on the far side of an opponent's integrated air missile defense system.”
The UK's air staff chief, Beck said, "has made it very clear that control of the air is the thing that we must master above all else."
Read the original article on Business Insider
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《《動物農莊》與中情局冷戰期間宣傳手法》讀後
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0. 前言
《動物農莊》是文學作品，我本來應該把維克門先生這篇文章放在「文學和藝術版」(請見本欄上一篇，下稱「該文」)；轉載該文以及將它放在本欄的原因如下：
1) 紀念《動物農莊》一書對我的影響
我大概是初中時期讀的《動物農莊》；它對我的影響有三點。
1a) 早期此書的確強化了我的「反共意識」(1958-1967到美國唸研究所之前)；這個私人經驗可以說明：一般而言，中情局幹部是有兩把刷子的。
1b) 讀此書經驗，從年輕時就養成我：「質疑」政治話語的心態；例如，當年每次奉命參加慶典，在三軍球場內同學高喊「蔣總統萬歲」，我或者舉手張嘴如儀，或者舉手輕呼「胡卜凱萬歲」。這個經驗也讓我從小就對一切獨裁政權和烏托邦思想具有高度免疫力。或許它是我把「政治」想像為：「爭奪資源分配權的活動」靈感來源之一。
1c) 在金庸先生的武俠小說系列外，此書是幫助我對文學產生興趣眾多源頭中的一個；其它有：《西遊記》、《三國演義》、和《苦兒流浪記》(我小學時讀它的中譯本)等書。
2) 該文支持我對「戰爭」的理解
2a)《動物農莊》雖然是文學作品，該文的主旨在討論此書在上一世紀「冷戰」期間的角色，或它「被使用」為「意識型態」鬥爭工具的過程、手法、和效果；以及推廣來說，非傳統武器的「文化產品」在「非殺戮」戰爭形式中的使用和功能。因此，它可以視為支持本欄2025/07/13貼文所引述克勞塞維茲認為：「戰爭」是：「另一種延續政治對話方式」的個案。
2b) 幫助說明「全面戰爭」概念的個案(請參見本欄2025/07/05貼文)。也就是說，戰爭「地點」並不限於「戰場」；戰爭工具也不限於「武器」；戰爭方式更不限於「廝殺」。請參見此文(該欄2025/08/21)。
以下就第2)點略加申論。
1. 我對「戰爭」的理解
1.1 戰爭的本質
不論「戰爭是為了達到某種『政治目的』」(本欄2025/07/05貼文)，或「戰爭是另一種延續『政治對話』方式」(本欄2025/07/13貼文)；如果同意：「政治是爭奪資源分配權的活動」這個觀點，則雷博教授對「戰爭肇因」的研究結果顯然站不住腳(本欄2025/07/06貼文)。同理，「正義戰爭論」之類的「論述」，不是思路有盲點，就是遮羞布式的意識型態。
1.2 戰爭的形態
「戰爭」既然是「全面性」/「整體性」(或推廣言之，所有「衝突」)，而其目的在「爭奪資源」；同時，「資源」不但是生存的必要條件，它更更能給擁有者帶來諸多優勢，則「無所不用其極」成為進行「戰爭」的手段是邏輯推理的結論。從夫差到普丁的斑斑史實，都在替這個「邏輯」做註腳。
《動物農莊》在「冷戰」期間被使用和達到一定程度的成效(根據維克門先生的判斷)，也就理所當然了。
2. 論述的本質
維克門先生對就中情局官員使用《動物農莊》經過的報導和分析，除了支持我對「戰爭」的看法外，它也可視為支持我「理論」/「政治論述」觀點的案例，旁證了我對兩者的理解(該欄2025/05/27貼文第1節)：一切社會科學理論以及相關論述都有幾分「意識型態」的性質、作用、和/或功能；換句話說，「學者的筆，唬人的理」。
3. 結論
1) 「盡信書不如無書」；
2) 讀書務必時時記住：「審問」、「慎思」、與「明辨」這三個動作。「博學」和「篤行」當然重要，但對初入學宮之門者，我就不陳義過高了。
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《動物農莊》與中情局冷戰期間宣傳手法-Gregory Wakeman
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在我寫的下文《讀後》中，將說明把它放在本欄的理由。
How the CIA Used ‘Animal Farm’ As Cold War Propaganda
Orwell’s allegory didn’t make it to the screen exactly as he wrote it.
Gregory Wakeman, 08/15//25
One of the most celebrated books of the 20th century, George Orwell’s Animal Farm is a biting critique of totalitarianism.
Published shortly after the end of World War II, the novella tells the story of farm animals who revolt against their human owner—only to see their rebellion corrupted from within. Beneath its barnyard setting, the fable is a pointed allegory for how the promise of the 1917 Russian Revolution descended into the tyrannical reign of Joseph Stalin. In his essay, Why I Write, Orwell admitted, “Animal Farm was the first book in which I tried, with full consciousness of what I was doing, to fuse political purpose and artistic purpose into one whole.”
Upon its release on August 17, 1945, in England, the satirical novel quickly sold out its initial print run of 4,500 copies. When it hit American shelves in August 1946, it sold over half a million editions in its first year alone, according to Mark Satta, associate professor of philosophy and law at Wayne State University. Though reception to the story's satire was mixed, the book got the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
As Cold War tensions gripped the United States, the American government was searching for anti-Soviet propaganda to spread across the world. Animal Farm’s effective plot and messaging made it the perfect material to aid their battle against Stalin and his regime. The CIA wanted to bring Animal Farm to a much wider audience, reported The New York Times, by covertly backing a movie adaptation that downplayed the source material’s attacks on capitalism and amplified its opposition to communism.
“It was perceived as having a simple story that would be accessible to families, children and people of all educational levels,” says Tony Shaw, the author of Hollywood's Cold War. “They wanted to make it clear to ordinary people that communism is a danger to you.”
Behind the Scenes
The CIA likely began to think about adapting Animal Farm shortly following Orwell’s death on January 21, 1950. After undercover agents bought the film rights from his widow Sonia Orwell, Louis de Rochemont—the filmmaker behind the monthly theatrical newsreels The March Of Time—was hired as an intermediary between the production and intelligence agency.
Rather than using an American animation company, the CIA hired Halas and Batchelor, run by a U.K.-based husband-and-wife team. “They didn’t use Hollywood because they wanted some distance. Using a British company made it look less like American propaganda,” explains Shaw.
During this era of Joseph McCarthy's infamous communist accusations in Hollywood, the CIA also harbored suspicion towards American film companies. There was a belief that some individuals in Hollywood could not be trusted to keep the CIA's involvement a secret, says Shaw. Meanwhile, Halas and Batchelor had produced around 70 war information and propaganda films for the UK’s Ministry of Information and War Office during World War II.
Animator Eddie Radage sketches pigs on a farm in Hertfordshire, in preparation for his work on an animated film of George Orwell's "Animal Farm" to be made by cartoon studio Halas and Batchelor, 1953. Getty Images 請至原網頁觀看卡通圖片
Changing the Story
Under orders from the CIA, de Rochemont told screenwriters Philip Stapp and Lothar Wolff to change various elements of Orwell’s plot to make its anti-Communist message clear. “They simplified the book and got rid of characters and elements that were very critical of capitalism,” says Shaw. This included making the character of Snowball the pig, who represented Leon Trotsky, much less sympathetic and more fanatical.
The biggest alteration was the conclusion. While the book ends in a pessimistic fashion, the movie finishes with the animals rallying together and triumphantly storming the farm against their new oppressors—the pigs who became indistinguishable from the humans they replaced. “They revolt and smash it down,” says Shaw. “This, to my reading, is a clear case of the CIA telling the people living under communism to revolt.”
Despite its government-backing, when the movie finally hit cinemas in the US and UK in January of 1955, it underperformed. Unlike Orwell’s book, which was snuck behind the Iron Curtain, the film wasn’t distributed or spread around the Soviet Union.
However, the adaptation did eventually find an audience in South America, where over the next few decades the U.S. government would aid coups in Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic and Ecuador to prevent the rise of communism. “Its other target would have been these developing countries, where power was up for grabs by the mid-'50s into the 1960s. That’s where the Cold War could have been won or lost," says Shaw.
The movie was also used as an educational tool in both Great Britain and the United States. Until the conclusion of the Cold War in 1991, it was regularly shown in schools to teenagers as a cautionary tale about the dangers of communism.
A still from "Animal Farm" (1954). FilmPublicityArchive/United Arch 請至原網頁觀看影片截圖
Culture the CIA Propagated
Animal Farm wasn’t the only piece of culture the CIA used in its covert fight against the Soviet Union. After learning that Stalin highlighted how racially divided the United States was to undermine its image of freedom, the CIA encouraged film studios to “insert a number of Black characters into films,” says Shaw. From the 1970s onwards, the CIA also helped to promote rock music in the Soviet Union and East Germany, all with the intention of destabilizing the Eastern bloc.
While it’s impossible to quantify the impact culture had on the ultimate downfall of the Soviet Union, historians over the last two decades have analyzed what people bought, listened to and watched in the lead-up to the fall of the Berlin Wall. “I don't think it's any doubt that American propaganda played a critical role in helping the West win the Cold War,” says Shaw. “The amount of effort the American government put into film and culture tells us that they thought they were getting some reward and that it worked.”
About the author
Gregory Wakeman has been a journalist for over a decade, he was raised in England but is now based in the United States. He has written for the BBC, The New York Times, National Geographic, and Smithsonian.
Related Post：
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* How ‘Back to the Future’ Turned a Failed Sports Car Into a Pop Culture IconThe DeLorean became a time machine with a 'flux capacitor.'
* The CIA Recruited ‘Mind Readers’ to Spy on the Soviets in the 1970s
Project Star Gate operated between 1972 and 1995 and attempted to offer, in the words of one congressman, "a hell of a cheap radar system."
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《真正導致戰爭發生最多的原因》簡評
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0. 前言
該文報導雷博教授就引爆戰爭「原因」的結論(請見本欄2025/07/06貼文)。雷博教授是知名的政治學家，主要研究領域是國際關系；據說他是一位「現實論」者。不過，我對畢希雅女士文章中所介紹他得到的「結論」甚不以為然，在此略做批評。
我沒有讀過雷博教授這本書，自然沒有資格評論該書中：引述的史實、分析的步驟、和推理的依據等等。本文只從我對「戰爭」和「方法論」的了解，就畢希雅女士文章的介紹提出一些拙見。還請網友們指正。Trump is already lowering the bar on China tariffs blasting President Xi as ‘hard to make a deal with’
1. 我的「戰爭觀」
我認為政治是：「爭奪資源分配權的活動」。這是帶學究氣的說法；用口語來說，政治是：「爭權奪利的活動」，或類似我們常常在鄉下街頭巷尾看到的狗搶骨頭動作。
克勞塞維茲對「戰爭」的定義是：「另一種延續政治對話的方式」(我的意譯)；史投克教授則認為：「『戰爭』應該以它企圖達到的『政治目的』來了解和規劃」(本欄2025/07/05貼文；我的解讀)。
如果綜合這三個對「政治」和「戰爭」的理解，在我看來，戰爭的目的在於：解決「資源」(包括土地、水源等)的歸屬；簡單的說：絕大多數戰爭是為了「爭奪利益」。
2. 戰爭論述可能遇到的陷阱
2.1 抽樣偏差
此小節指出：在非自然科學領域，一般討論任何特定事務或議題「性質」的學者，在選擇相關「樣本」的過程中，經常有：「挑支持自己『預設』想法『案例』」的傾向。
2.2 表面理由和實質理由
由於在任何一個社會中，「資源」或「利益」只掌握在少數人手中。也就是說，戰爭勝利的果實只有少數人能享受；但戰爭的艱苦和戰敗的惡果卻由大多數人民承擔。因此，主政者或掌握國家機器的集團經常使用「宰制論述」或天花亂墜的「宣傳」來替戰爭真正「目的」擦脂抹粉，來騙取廣大民眾的支持。
一位歷史學家或政治學家需要目光如炬、思路清楚才能辨別「原因」和「文宣」或「戰鬥口號」。簡言之，孔夫子說的「審問」、「慎思」、和「明辨」是也(《中庸》第22)。
2.3 「戰爭」本質
孫子說：「兵者，國之大事，死生之地，存亡之道，不可不察也」(《孫子•始計》第1)。
任何對軍事略有所知的人都知道：
1) 戰爭往往必須盡舉國之力來進行才能取得勝利(此處可參考本欄2025/07/05貼文)。其決策過程必然包含類似「集思廣益」的動作。
2) 戰爭不是過家家。開戰之前的準備工作包括：情報、兵員、武備、後勤、規劃、和外交等等。它們不是國家領袖能夠「一個命令，一個動作」就能完成；這些工作需要多方面的協調配合，也就需要聽取多方面的意見和評估。
3) 不論戰勝或戰敗，其結果不但嚴重而且深遠，同時它會危及方方面面的利益。
因此，即使在獨裁或專制國家，「要不要打仗」不是少數人，更不是一個人能拍板定案。
至於學術界充斥著一些「修正派」學者或「援嘴」型學者(該欄2025/03/06貼文「附註」1)，他/她們拿錢著書，大家就心照不宣了。
不了解戰爭的複雜性而侃侃談論戰爭的起因，充其量不過是紙上談兵、霧裏看花、隔靴搔癢之類的行為。
3. 雷博教授的「結論」
畢希雅女士的文章介紹雷博教授對「戰爭起因」所做的研究，自1648後發生94個國際戰爭中，雷博教授歸納出「起因」的類型如下(請見本欄2025/07/06貼文)：
1) 維護國際地位 -- 58%。
2) 維護國家安全 -- 18%。
3) 復仇 -- 10%。
4) 爭奪物質資源 -- 7%。
根據我上一節的觀察，以下針對雷博教授「戰爭起因」結論提出我的看法。
1) 如上所述，我沒有讀過雷博教授大作，不能對他在「抽樣」過程中是否「精挑細選」做評論。這裏只是指出：雷博教授得到的結論，可能跟他選擇的「樣本」有關。
2) 同上，這裏只是指出：雷博教授得到的結論，可能跟他輕信：發起「戰爭」者自吹自擂或自說自話的「原因」；沒有深入探索引爆該「戰爭」的實際「原因」有關。
例如：「國際地位」和「國家安全」很可能都只是表面理由或片面理由。換句話說，維持「國際地位」只是便於放言「維持」者保持巧取豪奪的實力；「國家安全」問題之所以會產生，往往是鄰國企圖染指感到受威脅國家的「土地」或「天然資源」等等。
3) 如我指出：是否進行「戰爭」是執政階層中許多個別集團的共同「決策」，不是一個人或一個集團能夠單獨決定。從而，屬於個人層次的「虛驕」(「國際地位」)或「情緒反應」(「仇恨」或「過節」)，很少進入集體決策過程的考量。
綜合以上討論，它們是我在「前言」中做了：「『據說』他是一位『現實論』者」這個略帶揶揄評論的原因。
由於我沒有讀雷博教授的大作；對歷史和戰爭史也毫無研究；此處只能做一般性的討論，畢希雅女士文章中所列舉的個案就略而不論了。
3. 結論
Trump is already lowering the bar on China tariffs blasting President Xi as ‘hard to make a deal with’
1) 社會/人文科學的研究，最忌研究主有先入為主的成見或預設。這會導致研究者墜入第2節中所提及的前兩個「陷阱」或「認知偏差」。
2) 畢希雅女士顯然犯了「盡信書」的毛病。
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真正導致戰爭發生最多的原因 - Carlyn Beccia
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Why Nations Go to War? A Researcher Analyzed 94 Wars and Found One Common Reason
No, it’s not resources or land.
Carlyn Beccia, 05/ 27/25
To all our veterans, thank you for your service. And to my dad, who served his country for all the right reasons. (請至原網頁觀看美軍公墓照片)
On March 20, 2003, the United States launched “Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).” We all know the official narrative — Saddam Hussein had “weapons of mass destruction.” Apparently, Hussein was cooking up nuclear warheads in his basement like some kind of James Bond villain. We had no choice. We had to invade. The world was at stake.
Except none of that was true.
What there was, however, was George W. Bush with a vendetta. Saddam had once tried to assassinate his daddy, and like any good son of Texas, Bush responded the way anyone would — with a multi-trillion-dollar war and a few hundred thousand body bags. Freud would have had a field day.
The Iraq War isn’t an isolated case. Most people assume wars are about oil, strategy, protecting borders, acquiring land and resources, or simply keeping the bad guys at bay. You know, practical things. Sure, reasons often overlap. When nations go to war, it is never straight-line thinking.
So, Historian Richard Ned Lebow decided to examine those reasons. He found one common thread.
Why Nations Really Go to War?
Historian Richard Ned Lebow analyzed 94 interstate wars since 1648. Surprisingly, he found most wars aren’t about material gain or land.
Lebow found that the most common reasons nations go to war are status, security, and revenge.
Lebow’s research, compiled in Why Nations Fight, found that 58% of wars were primarily motivated by standing or status, 18% were motivated by security, and 10% were fought for revenge. Only 7% of wars were fought over material interests. That means the most common cause of war isn’t oil, land, or fear — it’s ego with a flag.
There’s a fancy Greek word for this: thumos. It’s the part of human nature that craves recognition. It’s what makes a guy buy a Ferrari when he’s going bald or leads a woman to get breast implants when bits start to sag. And sometimes, thumos causes an entire country to say, “Oh, you think we’re weak? We’ll show you weak.”
Now, to be fair, Lebow acknowledges that nations often wrap their wars in logic. They say they’re protecting borders, securing trade routes, or rescuing kittens from tyranny. And sometimes they are. Resources matter. Strategy matters.
However, often these rationales are camouflage.
Take Vladimir Putin. On the surface, his invasion of Ukraine looks like a cold geopolitical calculation. Ukraine is a major energy transit route. Gaining control (or instability) would increase Russia’s leverage over Europe’s gas supplies. Cha-ching.
And sure, that is the wrapping paper. But underneath it all is wounded pride. Ukraine kept flirting with the West, and Putin didn’t like that. It was like watching your ex post pictures with someone taller, richer, and better at democracy.
Now, Putin’s not just playing Risk on a Soviet nostalgia board. He’s trying to be the man who brings Russia back to its “rightful” place. He wants statues, songs, and possibly a cologne named after him. This is what happens when you give a KGB agent with a giant ego a nuclear arsenal and too many shirtless photo ops. You get a man who wants to redraw borders to match the bruises on his wounded pride.
Putin’s ambitions run deep. He wants to be remembered not as the bureaucrat who managed a declining petrostate, but as the man who “restored” Russian greatness. In other words, the ego isn’t just part of the plan — it is the plan.
So yes, war can be about geography. But it’s also about geography’s sexier, more unstable cousin: identity.
Examples of Wars Fueled by Pride and Payback
Institutions and states don’t have emotions. But the people who run them can often be petty, insecure, and ego-driven. And when those people have control of armies, bad things happen. Here are a few examples.
The Peloponnesian War — Athens vs. Sparta, Ego Edition
The Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) wasn’t about security. It was about Athens acting like the prom queen and Sparta saying, “Not on my watch, sweetheart.” Athens had turned the Delian League into its personal slush fund and cultural fan club. Sparta, the laconic muscle bro of ancient Greece, got sick of Athens bragging about its democracy and pottery.
When Athens got too big for its britches, Sparta wasn’t having it. This hurt ego led to a 27-year-long war that reduced the Greek world to rubble. Security concerns? Maybe. But mostly, it was a brutal contest for dominance.
What followed was a heck of a lot of backstabbing, sieges, and general nonsense. Thucydides, who literally wrote the book on it, said the real cause was fear — Sparta’s fear of losing status to a rising Athens.
The Spanish Succession: Who Gets to Wear the Fancy Hat?
In 1701, Europe collectively lost its mind over who would inherit the Spanish throne after Charles II died without an heir. The main contenders? The French Bourbons and the Austrian Habsburgs. Both sides feared that if the other won, the balance of power would tilt, leading to a European superpower.
But underneath the diplomatic hand-wringing was the simple question of royal honor. No one wanted their dynasty to be the one that “lost Spain.” So, rather than accept a compromise, they dragged most of Europe into the War of the Spanish Succession — 13 years of battles, burned cities, and baffled peasants.
It ended in 1714 with the Treaty of Utrecht, which settled some territorial disputes but didn’t do much for the real issue: inflated dynastic egos in powdered wigs.
The War of Jenkins’ Ear — Yes, His Ear
Ever heard of this one? Its official name was the War of the Austrian Succession, but that’s a mouthful, so let’s just call it the dumbest war ever.
In 1731, British captain Robert Jenkins claimed Spanish coast guards cut off his ear while searching his ship in the Caribbean. Eight years later, in 1739, Britain declared war on Spain. Why the delay? Because Parliament suddenly needed a good excuse to assert naval dominance and distract from domestic issues.
The ear, which Jenkins allegedly preserved in a jar and showed to Parliament, became the mascot for a conflict that was less about cartilage and more about colonial bragging rights. It was a war about trade, tariffs, and who got to boss around the West Indies. But it was packaged as righteous revenge for one man’s ear.
The Franco-Prussian War — Bismarck’s PR Campaign
In 1870, Otto von Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor of Prussia, wanted to unify the German states under Prussian rule. France, under Napoleon III, was seen as the final obstacle. So Bismarck edited a diplomatic telegram — the Ems Dispatch — to make it sound like the French ambassador had been insulted.
France’s Napoleon III took the bait and declared war because, well, he couldn’t be seen backing down. The result? A humiliating French defeat, the capture of Napoleon himself, and the birth of a unified German Empire in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. All because two leaders needed to look tough.
The American Civil War
(Note: Lebow didn’t include civil wars in his analysis of why nations go to war.)
The American Civil War wasn’t just a hissy fit over cotton and human bondage (though, yes, slavery was the economic engine and moral sinkhole at the center of it all). No, beneath the musket smoke and mint julep breath, there was a piping-hot dish of revenge served cold, or, in this case, re-heated over four years of national carnage.
After Lincoln won the 1860 election without carrying a single Southern state, the Southern elite viewed the rise of abolitionism not only as a threat to their plantations but as a personal insult to their manhood, honor, and God-given right to sip lemonade while someone else did the sweating. Sure, the end of slavery posed a real economic panic for plantation owners. (Losing free labor does tend to ruin a business model.) But it was the cultural slap across the face that really lit the cannon fuse. In the South’s eyes, the North had snatched away their social supremacy and paraded it around like a prize hog at a county fair.
So, what did the South do? Like any jilted aristocrat with access to cannonballs, they tried to take it all back. Not just their property, but their pride, place, and peculiar institution.
World War I — A Global Bar Fight
In 1914, a teenager named Gavrilo Princip shot an archduke. That should’ve been a minor diplomatic headache. Instead, it kicked off a global war.
The archduke’s murder cascaded into a standoff. Austria-Hungary couldn’t let Serbia get away with it. Germany wanted to prove it was a big deal. Britain and France wanted to keep Germany in check. It was less about safety and more about, “Oh, you think you can push us around?”
By 1918, over 16 million people were dead, including 9.7 million military personnel and 6.8 million civilians. And what did it solve? Basically nothing. The war ended with a treaty so bitter it created the sequel.
World War II: Versailles, Vengeance, and Very Bad Decisions
World War II is often portrayed as a fight against fascism. True. But not the whole story.
Let’s rewind to 1919. The Treaty of Versailles essentially handed Germany a humiliation sandwich with a side of debt. It forced Germany to accept full blame for World War I, pay reparations equivalent to hundreds of billions today, and surrender territory.
Enter Hitler, who didn’t rise to power by offering economic spreadsheets. He promised revenge, honor, and the restoration of national pride. Nazi propaganda leaned heavily on the theme of verlorene Ehre — lost honor. In 1933, polls showed that Germans supported Hitler’s foreign policy objectives, including rearming the military and defying Versailles.
By the time Germany invaded Poland in 1939, Hitler was playing a high-stakes game of historical payback. Honor wasn’t just a side dish; it was the main course.
Can We Stop Fighting for Stupid Reasons?
Wars aren’t started by rational people thinking through the best way to keep their citizens safe. According to the United Nations, 90% of war casualties are civilians. (Other studies put the average civilian casualties closer to 60%.) Either way, war is bad for the little people.
Can we predict the next war? Probably not. Unfortunately, wars rarely come with a single motivation. But we can at least recognize the warning signs. When a leader starts puffing up his chest, demanding respect and gratitude, or making vague threats about national pride, “retribution” and “poisoning the blood of our nation,” maybe…just maybe, it’s time to sit up and pay attention.
Because here’s the truth: Wars don’t start when tanks roll. They start when one man in power feels small and decides the only cure is to make someone else bleed for it.
So the next time a puffed-up politician demands respect, maybe don’t give him your sons, your daughters, or your taxes. Give him therapy. Or better yet, a very long nap and maybe a shot of that impulse-controlling “fat drug.”
Or, as Steinbeck put it, “All war is a symptom of man’s failure as a thinking animal.”
And yet, we keep building smarter bombs for dumber men.
Written by Carlyn Beccia
Carlyn Beccia is an award-winning author and illustrator of 13 books. Love grim history? Subscribe to A Grim Historian for a weekly dose of the darkest and most depressing history. Her latest: 10 AT 10: The Surprising Childhoods of 10 Remarkable People, MONSTROUS: The Lore, Gore, & Science. CarlynBeccia.com
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以「全面戰爭」為例說明「清晰概念」的重要--D. Stoker
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What’s in a Name II: “Total War” and Other Terms that Mean Nothing
Donald Stoker, US Naval War College, 2016
To cite this article:Stoker, Donald, “What’s in a Name II: “Total War” and Other Terms that Mean Nothing,” Infinity Journal, Volume 5, Issue No. 3, fall 2016, pages 21-23.
The historian Peter Paret pointed out in 1960 that “any discussion of war is bedeviled by a confusion of terms… the definitions have undergone repeated modification—and in different countries not always to the same effect.”[i] “Total war” perfectly illustrates this problem. The term is commonly used in discussions of warfare, but usually as an undefined catchall that fails to provide a firm foundation for discussion and analysis. Modern writing on warfare too often lacks this needed basis. Much of it uses theoretical approaches to the study of war, but these have generally failed to help generate policies and strategies that lead to victory. Poorly reasoned, poorly constructed theory—which includes poorly defined terms and concepts—can detrimentally influence how wars are fought, as well as whether or not one wins them.
Carl von Clausewitz told us why good theory is necessary: “The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become…confused and entangled.”[ii] Theory, as Sir Julian Corbett tells us, can help “a capable man to acquire a broad outlook.” Theory should teach us to think, to analyze, to bring a critical but informed eye to the problem at hand and consider both its depth and breadth. It also serves to ground us by defining our terms and providing us a firm foundation for analysis while teaching us to distinguish between what is important and what isn’t.[iii] Theory, Clausewitz reminds us—particularly any theory addressing warfare—“is meant to educate the mind of the future commander.”[iv]
Clausewitz and Corbett also gave us the intellectual basis for building a solid theoretical approach to war: defining wars based upon the political objective sought. Clausewitz made clear his intention to rewrite his unfinished opus based upon his epiphany that all wars are fought for regime change or something less, but did not live to do so.[v] Corbett built upon Clausewitz’s work to construct a theory of maritime warfare and gave us the terms “unlimited war” to describe a conflict waged to overthrow the enemy government (an unlimited political objective), and “limited war” for a war fought for something less (a limited political objective).[vi] Rational discussion and analysis of all wars fits within this framework by beginning with the starting point of both Clausewitz and Corbett: all wars are fought either for the political objective of regime change or something less than this.
Critically, there is no room in this clear, simple, ironclad typology for so-called “total war”. The most significant problem with the term “total war” is that it is used to mean everything and thus it means nothing. Historian Brian Bond goes so far as to call “total war” a “myth.”[vii] Historian Eugenia Kiesling compares discussions of “total war” to medieval “ruminations about angels cavorting on pinheads.”[viii] Even when “total war” is defined (and often it is not), the definitions are valueless. For example, one author writing in 1957 defines a “total war” as one where “the survival of the U.S. or U.S.S.R. as sovereign nations is the issue of the war.” He goes on to insist that there was no satisfactory definition of limited war and that no one could explain when a conflict stopped being this and moved to being “total.”[ix] He makes his point by comparing one badly defined thing (“total war”) with something else that is equally badly defined (“limited war”) by almost every author who writes on the subject.[x]
Generally, “total war” is used to mean a “big” war, particularly the twentieth century world wars. Explications of “total war” also usually include wars fought for the overthrow or complete conquest of the enemy regime. Discussions of potential nuclear wars are often described as “total wars,” particularly in limited war theory, and sometimes include other elements such as genocide or the extermination of an enemy. Some similar terms that are often used interchangeably can be thrown in the same bowl: general war, major war, big war, national war, all-out-war, central war, and any others in this vein. These provide further examples of the definitional catastrophe that is too much of today’s military and political theorizing and writing. A related (though valueless) definition commonly accepted in certain academic circles is: “Major war means an operation where the United States deployed over fifty thousand troops and there were at least one thousand battle deaths.”[xi]
Critically, all of these definitions are dependent upon a variable that is consistently fluid: the means used to wage the war. So, do we define a war as “total” because it involves extensive mobilization, the overthrow of the enemy, the harnessing of society, and even genocide? Rationally, we cannot because this does not provide a firm foundation for critical analysis. These definitions are subject to debate and thus lack explanatory clarity.
The modern use of the term “total war” can be dated to the French push in the last year of the First World War for guerre totale, which meant renewing the nation’s ideological and political dedication to the struggle. German Field Marshal Erich Ludendorff used the term in his 1918-19 memoirs and his 1935 book Totale Krieg. In these examples whether or not a war is “total” generally boils down to an issue of means.[xii] Discussions of “total war” very often pick World War I as its first example, though sometimes the French Revolutionary Wars and the US Civil War are branded the first “total wars.” These efforts focus generally—if not exclusively—on the means utilized or mobilized for the struggle in their efforts to define it, and are often tied to discussions of escalation based upon nations increasing the means they dedicate to the war.[xiii]
Political scientist Robert Osgood offers us one of the better definitions of “total war”, but it also characterizes the analytical and critical failure exhibited by use of this term as part of a coherent theoretical approach: “that distinct twentieth-century species of unlimited war in which all the human and material resources of the belligerents are mobilized and employed against the total national life of the enemy.”[xiv] This definition has several problems.
First, it is limited to the twentieth century, and thus not consistently applicable as an analytical tool.
Second, it insists upon the mobilization of all of a state’s “human and material resources.”
This is impossible. A state cannot harness “all” of its resources for war or anything else. During the Second World War the Soviet Union’s leaders mobilized more of their nation’s human and physical resources than any state in history, but even Stalinism could not mobilize “all” of the nation’s means. During the US Civil War, nearly 80 percent of the Confederacy’s white male population aged 15-40 served in uniform.[xv] But even this extreme number is not “all.” Nation states have a difficult time putting more than 10 percent of their people in the military. Going beyond this often begins to cause the economy to breakdown.
Osgood’s definition also mixes ends and means, which is also not unusual. Indeed, one could argue that the defining element of definitions of “total war” is the emphasis on means. Wars cannot be defined by the means used because this is a nebulous, subjective factor and thus does not pass the defining test of building a theory upon solid ground. The means nations dedicate to pursuing political objects are a manifestation of the value they place upon that object. The means used to fight the war are also one of the contributing factors helping to create the nature of the struggle. But the means used do not and indeed cannot define the war itself. The political objective sought defines the war, not the means or methods used in pursuit of this.
The problem with having a poor analytical foundation for any discussion—or none at all—particularly one examining the development of an idea or concept is clearly demonstrated in Cambridge University Press’s five volume study of “total war”.[xvi] In a series drawing upon a staggering array of the era’s best writers on military affairs, the editors missed the chance to create a supremely groundbreaking work because they failed from the outset to define “total war” and thereby provide a solid foundation for analysis. What makes this especially remarkable is that the editors identified the answer to their problem but then didn’t grasp it. They linked the concept of limited war to the manner in which Max Weber used an “ideal type,” as well as Clausewitz’s discussion of “absolute war” and “total war” (terms he used interchangeably to denote an “ideal type”).[xvii] Simply put, when using the “ideal type” methodology the writer sets up a theoretical ideal that cannot be reached. Various factors intervene to produce a reality that is acted upon by these factors that keep the resulting creature from ascending to the ideal. This is the method of analysis used by Clausewitz in On War. To him “absolute war” and “total war” (again, terms he uses interchangeably) represent the unreachable “ideal type.” War—if the state could utilize all of its resources and never stop moving toward its goal—would be “total” or “absolute”, but reality intervenes. Politics, friction, the actions of the enemy, and other things unite to produce the reality of war.[xviii] By using “total war” as an ideal type in the manner of Weber and Clausewitz, combined with the insistence by both Clausewitz and Corbett of the tendency of wars to escalate and consume more of the state’s resources in a climb toward the unreachable theoretical ideal, the editors could have placed their contributors on a firm and coherent path. The articles could have been strengthened further by the addition of Clausewitz’s concept of whether or not the warring states were pursuing regime change or more limited political goals. This would then force a needed and clearer delineation between the political aim or aims sought and the means and methods used to try and achieve them—which again shows why wars can’t be defined by the means used because the means derive from the value of the political objective sought. All of this goes to again prove that if the analytical foundation lacks clarity and strength the building falls.
Other discussions of “total war” center on the use of technology, particularly technology that intensifies the bloodshed and destruction delivered at the tactical level. But this is only an example of war’s natural tendency to escalate and is merely the offering of yet another argument for defining “total war” by the means used. Technology and the increasing power of the modern centralized state simply feed war’s inherent escalatory nature and allow more intense escalation. All wars—civil wars, guerrilla wars, limited wars, religious wars, and every other kind of war—fit within the Clausewitz/Corbett typology because all wars are fought for political objects, even if these are sometimes masked by religious terms or propaganda.
Interestingly, the editors of these volumes raise the question of whether the term “total war” should be killed because it creates more confusion than clarity—something about which they are completely correct—but then make the mistake of refusing to kill the enemy when the opportunity arrives. Instead, they argue for the term’s retention and ask “that historians henceforth should attend more to its manifold hazards and limitations.”[xix] Editing a five-volume historical work should have decisively convinced the editors of the impossibility of this. Unfortunately, the current writer and his fellow historians are only part of the problem. Journalists, political scientists, pundits, students of international relations, and military officers are just as dangerous when they embark upon discussions of so-called “total war,” possibly even more so because they often lack the historical knowledge necessary to provide solid analysis and critical nuance.
Why does all of this matter? One of the great failings of discussions and analysis of military affairs and strategic issues is the lack of definitional clarity. These fields are infested with buzzwords and jargon that cloud issues and thereby weaken our ability to understand and explain past—and more importantly—current conflicts. For example, much ink has been spilled of late over “Gray Zone Wars.” But there is nothing new here. Authors in the 1950s were discussing “war in the gray zone”—and in relation to conflicts on the periphery of Russia (though it was still called the Soviet Union).[xx]
Unless someone is discussing war in a theoretical sense the term “total war” should never appear in historical or policy writing. Why? Because it has no analytical solidity, fails to clearly illuminate the nature of conflict, and adds needless linguistic opacity. It creates confusion instead of producing clarity, and it is clarity that we need.
References
[i] Peter Paret, “A Total Weapon of Limited War,” Royal United Services Institution, Vol. 105, No. 617 (1960), 34.
[ii] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. and eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 132.
[iii] Sir Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Eric Grove, intro. and notes (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988 [1911]), 3-7.
[iv] Clausewitz, On War, 141.
[v] Clausewitz, On War, 69.
[vi] Clausewitz, On War, 69; Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 44-46. Clausewitz discusses wars fought for “limited aims” in Book 8 of On War.
[vii] Brian Bond, War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1998), 168.
[viii] Eugenia C. Kiesling, ‘”Total War, Total Nonsense” or “The Military Historian’s Fetish,” in Michael S. Neiberg, ed., Arms and the Man: Military History Essays in Honor of Dennis Showalter (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 220.
[ix] Ephraim M Hampton, “Unlimited Confusion Over Limited War,” Air University Quarterly Review, Vol. IX (Spring 1957), 31-32.
[x] For two examples of bad definitions of limited war see the following: John Garnett, “Limited War,” in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett, and Phil Williams, Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982), 123; Robert McClintock, The Meaning of Limited War (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1967), 5.
[xi] Dominic Tierney, The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts (New York: Little Brown, 2015), 7. In footnote 12 on page 317, the author notes that the term “major war” is problematic because it could be major for one side and not the other. But the real reason is that “major war,” like “total war,” has no concrete meaning.
[xii] John Horne, “Introduction: Mobilizing for ‘Total War’, 1914-1918,” in John Horne, ed., State, Society, and Mobilization in Europe During the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4.
[xiii] See Horne, “Introduction: Mobilizing for ‘Total War’, 1914-1918,” 3-5, and I. F. Beckett, “Total War,” in C. Emsley, A. Marwick, and F. Simpson, eds., War, Peace, and Social Change in Twentieth Century Europe (Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press, 1989), especially 28, 31-32.
[xiv] Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1957), 3.
[xv] Donald Stoker, The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 24.
[xvi] Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler, On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861-1871, German Historical Institute (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 15; Manfred F. Boemke, Roger Chickering, and Stig Förster. Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871-1914, German Historical Institute (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 15-16, 16 fn.3, 23-24, 24 fn. 47; Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, eds., Great War, Total War. Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000); Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, eds, The Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919-1939, German Historical Institute (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3-10; Roger Chickering, Stig Förster, and Bernd Greinder, eds., A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937–1945, German Historical Institute (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2010). See also this review: Talbot Imlay, “Total War,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2007), 547-570.
[xvii] Clausewitz, On War, especially 580 and 582, but also 488-489, 501, 581, 606.
[xviii] Clausewitz, On War, 80-89 (especially 85), 579-581. The editors also bind Clausewitz’s teachings—incorrectly—to his experience in the Napoleonic era. This is a misreading of the text because Clausewitz’s larger ideas are not limited by the Napoleonic era. They do note his passage on “absolute war” where he says that it was reached under Napoleon, but they miss the contradiction in Clausewitz’s discussion of “absolute war” because they do not examine the fullness of the text on this point.
[xix] Boemke, et al, eds., Anticipating Total War, 16.
[xx] See Thomas K. Finletter, Power and Policy: US Foreign and Military Policy in the Hydrogen Age (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1954), 81-192, especially 84-85; Osgood, Limited War, 267-274, 307; Henry Kissinger, “Military Policy and the Defense of the ‘Grey Areas’,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Apr. 1958), 416-428; E. Biöklund, “Can War Be Limited? (In General or Local Wars),” Air Power, Vol. 6 (Summer 1959), 287-293. Finletter seems to have been first to print with the concept.
Donald Stoker is Professor of Strategy and Policy for the US Naval War College’s Monterey Program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The author or editor of seven previous books, his most recent work is Carl von Clausewitz: His Life and Work (Oxford University Press, 2014). His The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War, 1861-1865 (Oxford University Press, 2010), won the prestigious Fletcher Pratt award for best non-fiction Civil War book of 2010. In 2016 he was a Fellow of the Changing Character of War Programme at the University of Oxford’s Pembroke College. He is currently co-editing three books on advising and writing a book on limited war.
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