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一般方法論 -- 開欄文
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子曰：「工欲善其事，必先利其器」(《論語•衛靈公10》)；「器」在這裏指的大概是工具。但是，要把一件事「做對」，「工具」之外，還得講究「方法」。「雖不中不遠矣」 (《大學章句10》)，講的應該是「態度」；這個道理用在「方法」上也可以說得通。這是「科學基礎論」中「科學方法」研究的對象。
大概在初中時，家父給了我一本討論「科學方法」的書；書名已經忘了。這是我第一次接觸到這個主題；自然印象深刻。後來成長過程中，我對它一直非常注意。「邏輯學」之外，我還讀過笛卡爾和波普的書。本部落格過去登過不少這方面的評論。
循此處各《開欄文》之意，另立此欄。
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關於「受理論制約」的說法 – Paul Austin Murphy
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請參考：
Feyerabend, Paul
Hacking, Ian
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
下文相當鬆散；與其說是一篇「文章」，不如說是作者把他的「讀書心得」或「讀書札記」拼湊在一起。不過，「受理論制約」這個議題值得討論；故轉載於此。
Observations of Feyerabend’s Theory-Laden Underpants
The idea of theory-ladenness became popular in the 1960s, and has remained popular in various sections of academia ever since. It’s often said to have begun with the work of Kuhn, Hanson and Feyerabend in the late 1950s. This idea impacts on science, and is said — by some — to lead to “anti-science”, “relativism” and “the attack on objectivity”. Whatever the case is, scientific theory is obviously distinguished from observation. So are all observations theory-laden? Just some? Or is it more a question of degree? The following essay relies on the work of the philosopher of science Ian Hacking, whose position is nuanced. Hacking sees the truth in much of what Kuhn, Hanson and Feyerabend argued. Yet at the same time he stated that “[t]here have been important observations in the history of science, which have included no theoretical assumptions at all”. Hacking also argued that the overuse of the term “theory-loaded” effectively made it “trifling”.
Paul Austin Murphy, 03/25/26
Philosophical positions on the distinction between observation and theory range from the old “naïve” view (i.e., that scientific observations must be pure) to rejecting the distinction altogether. Many philosophers take a position somewhere down the middle, but even that middle has various grey areas.
The philosopher Ian Hacking took a nuanced position that’s partially against some distinctions between theory and observation, but one which questions the complete rejection of the distinction too.
What is original to Hacking is his stress on experiment, which he believed had been largely ignored by philosophers. More relevantly, we had the distinction between observation and theory, but now we have Hacking’s idea that “[e]xperiment supersedes raw observation” too. It may be a surprise to some that Hacking simply inverts this particular binary opposition. Perhaps there’s little point in saying that observation supersedes experiment or that experiment supersedes observation.
N.R. Hanson and Paul Feyerabend
The fixation on theory-ladenness at least partly began with the philosopher N.R. Hanson. In his 1959 book Patterns of Discovery, he came up with the term “theory-loaded”, which in subsequent years became a bit of a cliché. Hanson argued that every sentence and term is theory-loaded.
Many of Hanson’s examples are convincing. However, is what is drawn from them legitimate too?
The American philosopher of science Dudley Shapere adds to Hanson. In his case, however, it’s the nature of scientific devices which concerns him. Hacking states that Shapere
“ makes the further point that physicists regularly talk about observing and even seeing using devices in which neither the eye nor any other sense organ could play any essential role at all”.
It can be said that there’s no serious problem with scientists using everyday terms in their own non-everyday work. Why shouldn’t they use the words “observing” and “seeing”? What’s more, it can be doubted that many scientists will be troubled with the quibbles philosophers have with their using these words.
Feyerabend went further than Hanson and Kuhn.
In his 1977 book Against Method, he argued that the observation-theory distinction is bogus. In other words, all scientific observations are always theory-laden.
Some readers may now be wondering what exactly Feyerabend meant by “theory”. (This is true about many other uses of that word too.) Hacking picked up on Feyerabend’s use of the word when he wrote the following:
“Unfortunately the Feyerabend of my quotation used the word ‘theory’ to denote all sorts of inchoate, implicit, or imputed beliefs.”
The word “theory” is often thrown around like confetti. Thus, on Hacking’s reading of Feyerabend’s position, one doesn’t need to express one’s theory explicitly, or even know that one has a theory in the first place. In addition, it’s often not the case that a person has a theory “behind” his words or statements: it’s that other people believe that he has. So a theory can be vague, unexpressed and projected onto others.
Despite all that, Feyerabend still believed that theoretical assumptions underlie
“the material which the scientist has at his disposal, his most sublime theories and his most sophisticated techniques included, is structured in exactly the same way”.
Now an everyday cliché can be used:
If everything is classed as a theory, and if theories can be found in every statement or term, then there are no theories at all. The word simply ceases to have any point.
Hacking agrees:
“Of course if you want to call every belief, proto-belief, and belief that could be invented, a theory, do so. But then the claim about theory-loaded is trifling.”
Hacking wrote the following too:
“Of course we have all sorts of expectations, prejudices, opinions, working hypotheses and habits when we say anything. Some are contextual implications. Some can be imputed to the speaker by a sensitive student of the human mind.”
Did Feyerabend really include expectations, prejudices, opinions and habits under the catchall term theory? Indeed, can’t we have expectations, prejudices, opinions and habits and it still not be the case that what we say (or everything we say) is theory-laden?
Hacking: No Theories At All
Oddly enough, although the theories-are-everywhere idea can easily be criticised, Hacking’s own position seems odd too, at least at first. He continues:
“There have been important observations in the history of science, which have included no theoretical assumptions at all.”
Following on the what was said a moment ago, it can be provisionally accepted that these important observations included no theoretical assumptions at all. Yet, at the very same time, the people who made them were (well) over-laden with expectations, prejudices, opinions and habits…
So what?
Hacking’s position may even strike a scientific realist as being extreme. Just for one. Why were such scientists making their important observations in the first place if they were completely free from theoretical assumptions? Of course, we’ll need to see examples here. Hacking, being an historian of science [see here] as well as a philosopher of science, cites plenty.
To ram the point home. Hacker argued that “[t]here are plenty of pre-theoretical observation statements, but they seldom occur in the annals of science”. Just to remind readers. Hacker took a fairly strict position on what a scientific theory is, whereas someone like Feyerabend was very loose with the term.
Logical Positivists and Quine on Observation
Feyerabend was largely reacting against logical positivism. [See here.] Hacking puts the positivist position at its most extreme when he tells his readers that the
“positivist, we recall, is against causes, against explanations, against theoretical entities and against metaphysics”.
More clearly, “The real is restricted to the observable.”
All this depends on what “the real” means. If it means observable, then that statement is true by definition. Of course, the core of the planet Earth can’t be observed, and neither can distant planets and quarks. What about numbers? Positivists had various answers to some of these examples, but not to all.
To run through Hacking’s list. Being against causes is a Humean position. Obviously, causes can’t be observed. Constant conjunctions can be observed, but not the nature of the cause itself. To be honest, I can only guess at what “against explanations” means. Is the argument that if you rely exclusively on observation, then you don’t need explanation too? The case against metaphysics is obvious from a positivist and observation-based point of view.
Now take Hacking’s criticisms of W.V.O. Quine’s position, which stresses not observations, but “observation sentences”. Quine, as quoted by Hacking, states that we should “drop the talk of observation and talk instead of observation sentences, the sentences that are said to report observations”. Hacking had a problem with Quine’s distinction (observations vs observation sentences) within another distinction (observation vs theory).
Hacking stated that Quine was “quite deliberately writing against the doctrine that all observations are theory-loaded”. Quine articulated this position in his 1974 book The Roots of Reference. That was long after Kuhn, Hansen and Feyerabend had first articulated their own controversial theories. As many readers will know, the critics of Kuhn and Feyerabend focussed on their “relativism”, rather than their stress on theory-ladenness. Of course, these two issues have been intimately tied together.
The first thing that can be said here is that Quine’s observation sentences simply seem to be proxies for… well, observations. And Hacking’s general point against Quine is that his theory of observation sentences is just as naïve as some talk about (mere) observations. So Hacking clarifies Quine’s position, which is essentially communal in nature.
Quine believed that “observations are what witnesses will agree about, on the spot”. That’s a non-scientific (or non-academic) three words to use: “on the spot”. Still, Quine provided details. He argued that
“a sentence is observational insofar as its truth value, on any occasion, would be agreed to by just about any member of the speech community witnessing the occasion”.
What’s more, “we can recognise membership in the speech community by mere fluency of dialogue”.
So we have these everyday utterances from Quine: “on the spot”, “just about any member of the speech community”, etc. But let’s remember here that Quine was a pragmatist of sorts. [See here.] So why shouldn’t he have been imprecise on these matters and simply focussed on his own self-referential observation sentences about how communities use words and sentences.
Hacking too has a problem with the above. He stated that “[i]t is hard to imagine a more wrong-headed approach to observation in natural science”. His main argument, at least at this point, was against Quine’s stress on the community. He cited the case of Caroline Herschel, the wife of William Herschel:
“No one in Caroline Herschel’s speech community would in general agree or disagree with her about a newly spotted comet, on the basis of one night’s observation. Only she, and to a lesser extent William, had the requisite skill.”
This seems to go against any notion of communal truth. Alternatively put, it shows that truth can be arrived at independently of any community.
Various communal ideas about truth and knowledge can be dated back to Wittgenstein [see here], as well as before, and Quine was much influenced by him. [See here.] Hacking’s own stress was different. The last two words, “requisite skill”, are important here. In the community of the late 18th century there wouldn’t have been many — if any — people with same skills as Caroline Herschel. But did she or didn’t she discover eight new comets? Yes she did. [See here.] Yet she didn’t need — or rely on — any community to do so, except in less direct and rather obvious senses. In other words, Herschel needed the traditions of science, the devices of science, to share a natural language with various communities, etc. However, none of this is directly connected to Herschel discovering comets, and the knowledge she gained by doing so.
Written by Paul Austin Murphy
MY PHILOSOPHY: https://paulaustinmurphypam.blogspot.com/
My Flickr Account: https://www.flickr.com/photos/193304911@N06/
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「社會科學方法論」概論 ---- 呂曉波/江軍
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「社會科學方法論」概論
呂曉波主講/江軍整理，2018，6月
導論：方法論上的焦慮
在簡短感謝張佑宗主任的介紹後，呂曉波教授隨即點明了政治學界現存的「方法論焦慮」：「現在大家都存在一種焦慮的狀態…我是不是一定要做實驗？都不做實驗，我們是否就沒有辦法發表在頂級的期刊？」呂曉波教授認為，一方面，問題意識才是關鍵，而方法是為問題服務。另一方面，不見得唯有用因果推論的方法才能得出好的因果推論，而用其他方法得出的結論則無效。唯因所有的方法都是基於一系列假設，當假設都不成立的時候，得出的結論自然無效。換言之，因果推論的方法不是穩健結論的保證。另一種焦慮則是大數據、網路爬蟲等新方法不斷出現，學習的速度跟不上方法的演進。但呂曉波教授強調，這依然取決於你的方法對應到什麼問題。研究方法就如同學語言，要不斷積累和深入，並在學習的同時，思考方法的應用、背後的假設、與打破假設的可能。職是之故，今日演講也將順著因果推論方法的框架、假設、應用與限制等四個面向展開。
因果推論方法出現之前：如何解決實證問題？
在因果推論的方法出現之前，大家是用怎麼樣的方法來解決實證問題？呂曉波教授指出，社會科學家在沒有因果推論方法之前，仍在探討因果關係，亦即當某個條件發生時，會造成怎樣的後果。這些研究往往會碰到三個實證上的問題：
第一是理論的概念和測量方式不一致(measurement error)，例如「民主」和「非民主」編碼為二元變項0和1的轉錄標準往往不甚清楚。
第二是遺漏變數(omitted variable bias)，意思是有一些變數和自變數與依變數相關，但沒有被納入分析。如此一來，推論結果自然會出現偏差。
第三則是內生性問題(endogeneity)，亦即自變數與依變數互為因果。在因果推論方法出現之前，解決上述實證問題的方式，通常是做敏感性分析(sensitivity analysis)─如果要克服測量的不一致，那就選擇另一個變項重新測量一遍、把概念再衡量一遍、抑或是再跑一次模型。簡言之，就是用不同指標來衡量、抑或是用不同模型與數據來源測試。若該分析結果能支持研究論述，那理論就是正確的。
呂曉波教授認為，敏感性分析在選擇實驗組時即有偏誤可能，而模型的挑選與處理也不見得是客觀的。
什麼是因果推論？
因果推論的基本概念為反事實分析(counterfactual analysis)，也就是一件事發生和沒發生，在結果上的差異。因果推論方法有三個基本假設：首先，我們無法看到在個人層面上的因果效應，只能看到群體平均效果(average treatment effect)，這表示在群體層面上，實驗組和對照組作為兩個群體，在許多特徵上一致，唯一差別是一組接受處理(treatment)，而另外一組沒有接受。第二個假設則是一致性(consistency)，亦即同樣一組人接受相同處理，其結果會相同。最後，在做實驗時，我們是藉由抽取樣本並給予處理來證成因果關係，但我們會推論：對整個母體而言，處理的效用是和樣本一樣的。也就是說，「給一小部分人的處理」和「給全部人的處理」，兩者的效果相同。
接下來，呂曉波教授進一步分析因果推論方法的兩類實證問題。第一類是干擾變項(confounder)：當研究者想探討D對Y的影響，但有一個變數L同時對D和Y有真正影響。此時，若不考慮L，而僅收集D和Y的資料，兩者間會有統計上的顯著相關，但這卻不是真正的因果關係。例如當天氣熱時，我們衣服穿得少、冰吃得多，但不代表穿衣服和吃冰間有因果關係，唯因這是天氣熱造成的結果。第二類則是案例選擇(selection)問題：當我們推論Y是造成L的條件時，卻只選擇具備Y條件且出現L結果的案例作為佐證。例如對所謂發展型國家(developmental state)研究的批評之一，就是研究者只注意成功案例，而不注意那些未發展成功的案例，所以這個理論無法推廣。呂曉波教授特別提醒大家：研究者必須注意研究對象的選擇是否會導向特定研究結果。
因果推論的方法：主要研究方法與假設
一旦研究者試圖做出因果推論，就須考慮兩個策略：第一，因果證成策略(identification strategy)，意指有沒有一些假設讓你能宣稱你的研究具有因果關係。第二，統計估計策略(estimation strategy)則關乎統計估計方法的使用。如果一項研究無法滿足方法背後的假設，無論該研究使用的方法多花俏，其結果都不具因果效力，故研究的關鍵就在於研究設計如何滿足方法背後的因果證成策略。
那麼，因果證成策略有那些呢？呂曉波教授介紹了五種常見的因果證成方式：
1. 實驗法(Experiment)：研究者能人為的隨機操縱實驗組和對照組，並假設在平均效果上，隨機分配的實驗組和對照組，兩組間沒有特性差異。此種方法的侷限是外部效度(external validity)問題。另一方面，宥於環境和經費，實驗往往難以複製。
2. 自然實驗法(Natural Experiment)：現實情況的改變自然隨機分出實驗組和對照組。和實驗法相同，自然實驗法也假設在平均效果上，實驗組和對照組在特性上沒有差異。由於自然實驗法不是人為操縱，而是環境改變的結果，故有內部效度(internal validity)的問題─研究者必須要提出很多證據來證明隨機分配是成立的。
3. 工具變數(Instrumental Variable, IV)：若今天我們想探討D和Y之間的關係，但有一個干擾變數U會同時影響X和Y，以致於我們無法觀察D和Y間的關係。此時如有一個外生變數Z，可以透過影響一部分的D而對Y產生影響，那我們就可以藉由兩階段最小平方(two-stage least square, 2SLS)的迴歸分析來驗證D和Y間的關係，此時我們稱外生變數Z為工具變數。這個方法的關鍵假設是Z不能對Y有單獨的影響，限制在於很難找到一個符合關鍵假設的工具變數。
4. 斷點回歸(Regression Discontinuity, RD)：有些群體觀察值在特定的時間和地域範圍內會產生隨機差異。這個方法的假設是觀察值在短時間內有大幅度的變化，而這個變化的處理是隨機的。限制是在斷點邊界上確能找到很強的因果效應，但推廣到整個母體時結果卻不一定如此。故斷點回歸僅能滿足狹域的平均政策效果(local average treatment effect, LATE)。
5. 差異中的差異法(Differences in Differences)：此方法是在考慮處理前後的時間差異下，去檢視一個外生衝擊對不同群體的差異效果，關鍵假設則是平行趨勢(parallel trend assumption)，也就是在不加入處理的情況下，實驗和對照組的差異趨勢會是平行的。
結論與問答
在演講尾聲，呂曉波教授做出了四點結論。首先，現在的研究光提出因果效應還不夠，還必須提出對因果機制的檢驗。第二，方法是有其侷限的，若太注重因果推論，反而無法深入思考問題。第三，因果推論往往具有外部效度問題。最後，過度強調方法的結果，造成今日的研究多是檢驗現存理論，而非嘗試發展新的理論。呂曉波教授認為，理論上沒有突破，代表著政治科學無法繼續進步。
在提問時段，聽眾詢問該如何區分方法論、研究方法和研究工具？若一味追求工具而沒從方法打基礎，是否本末倒置？針對此問題，呂曉波教授指出，要有紮實的方法論基礎才能把握研究工具的假設和侷限。他的建議是，尋找對自己研究問題相對應的研究方法來鑽研，但也不要只看一種方法，因為「當你只有一支槌子，所有的東西對你來說都只是釘子」。
另一位提問人則詢問教授，什麼是正確的方法？後進學者又該如何挑戰現有理論，說服前輩學者？呂曉波教授認為，挑戰本身的動機是好的，但很多後進學者意欲挑戰舊說，卻無法確實掌握理論和實證，且故事說得不好。簡言之，若要挑戰，理論功課與實證必須做好，文章的布局(framing)也要把握，如此的論述才會有力。
後記：
上文是我在飆網時歐然看到的一篇文章；原載於《台大政治系系友聯誼會電子報》。原文並無標題，此處的「標題」是我根據「編者」權限加上的。轉載該文源起和講者介紹如下：
2018「胡定吾海外新銳學者講座」
整理：江軍(臺大政治學系研究所)
本系於2018年6月首次舉辦「胡定吾海外新銳學者講座」，邀請到德州大學奧斯汀分校政府系的呂曉波助理教授，由本系張佑宗擔任主持人，並於6/7、6/8、6/13、6/14、6/15進行5場與研究方法有關的演講。
講者簡介：呂曉波(Xiaobo Lü)教授
呂曉波，美國密西根大學碩士、美國耶魯大學博士，2012年榮獲美國政治學會Mancur Olson政治經濟學最佳博士論文獎，現為美國德州大學奧斯汀分校政府系助理教授。
呂曉波教授的研究專長包含發展的分配政治、中國政治、以及比較與國際政治經濟學。其中，社會支出與稅賦的政治及其相應的政治後果，為呂教授最感興趣的研究課題。
呂曉波教授的研究成果已見諸於美國各大頂尖期刊，包括American Political Science Review、American Journal of Political Science、Comparative Political Studies、以及Quarterly Journal of Political Science等。
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《量子力學與現實》讀後
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0. 前言
我不是哲學系科班出身；對量子力學的了解也止於物理系研究所第二年的程度。對阿洛唷和阿倫哈兩位教授的大作，自然沒有能力從純學術的角度評論(請參見本欄上一篇)。
以下從「方法論」角度，以對「科學基礎論」有興趣的人這個身份略表淺見；前者是我把這兩位教授大作置於此欄的原因。
1. 破彼論
1.1 論述策略
兩位教授在該文第3節第1段引用庫恩博士1973的論文，並甚為推崇。如果我對庫恩理論的了解還算得上六、七不離十，他本人並不接受兩位教授所描述的「科學現實論」；請參見以下第2、3兩節。
接受兩位教授所描述「科學現實論」的自然/社會科學家應該寥寥無幾。他們兩位大作的論述策略非常近於「稻草人」。
1.2 論述方式
兩位教授在第3節最後兩段使用「經驗論」和「實用論」兩個名詞來揶揄他們想像中的「科學現實論」者。兩位教授這篇大作的論述方式可稱之為「文字遊戲」；請參見以下第2、3兩節。
2. 立自義
1) 這兩位教授忽略了一個重要的「科學基礎論」原則或「假設」：
所有的「科學理論」都可能被「新發現」修正/推翻；或被「新理論」取代。
我雖然不盡同意庫恩的理論，以我對「典範移轉論」的了解，他顯然接受上述「原則」/「假設」。它也正是兩位教授看不上的「經驗論」觀點。
2) 換句話說：用「真」、「假」來形容一個「科學理論」是18世紀的思考邏輯；19世紀以降，形容或判斷「科學理論」的標準是：
它能不能幫助我們解決日常生活上的大、小問題；或者說，它能不能幫助我們解決自然界帶給我們的困難與災難。
這個立場正是兩位教授看不上的「實用論」觀點。
3. 結語
1) 沒有一位頭腦清楚的自然/社會科學家會排斥上述「經驗論」或「實用論」的「觀點」。
2) 自然科學能不能100%的「描述」外在「現實」是個「假議題」；或者說，它只是個提供某些哲學家寫論文(混飯吃？)的「議題」。對一個像我這樣也自稱「現實論」的人來說，一個「自然科學理論」能「描述」近於80%以上的「現實」；一個「社會科學理論」能「描述」近於30%以上的「現實」；我就偷著樂了。
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量子力學與現實 -- R. Arroyo/J. R. B. Arenhart
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請參見本欄下一篇。
Quantum mechanics works, but it doesn't describe reality
Predictive power is not a guide to reality
Raoni Arroyo/Jonas R. Becker Arenhart, 01/07/26
Editor’s Notes：Physicists like Sean Carroll argue not only that quantum mechanics is not only a valuable way of interpreting the world, but actually describes reality, and that the central equation of quantum mechanics – the wave function – describes a real object in the world. But philosophers Raoni Arroyo and Jonas R. Becker Arenhart warn that the arguments for wave-function realism are deeply confused. At best, they show only that the wave function is a useful element inside the theoretical framework of quantum mechanics. But this goes no way whatsoever to showing that this framework should be interpreted as true or that its elements are real. The wavefunction realists are confusing two different levels of debate and lack any justification for their realism. The real question is: does a theory need to be true to be useful?
1. Wavefunction realism
Quantum mechanics is probably our most successful scientific theory. So, if one wants to know what the world is made of, or how the world looks at the fundamental level, one is well-advised to search for the answers in this theory. What does it say about these problems? Well, that is a difficult question, with no single answer. Many interpretative options arise, and one quickly ends up in a dispute about the pros and cons of the different views. Wavefunction realists attempt to overcome those difficulties by looking directly at the formalism of the theory: the theory is a description of the behavior of a mathematical entity, the wavefunction, so why not think that quantum mechanics is, fundamentally, about wavefunctions? The view that emerges is, as Alyssa Ney puts it, that
Reality isn’t fundamentally a collection of objects—particles, atoms—spread out in three-dimensional space or even four-dimensional spacetime, but instead, reality is fundamentally a wave function, a field-like object that exists in some higher-dimensional quantum reality.
This view is quite appealing to those philosophers keen to have a closer connection between science and philosophy, the naturalists.
For naturalist philosophers, having our image of the world directly anchored to science is not just a preference, it is the whole game plan. Wavefunction realism promises to make that plan easier to achieve. The main advantage is the idea that we can “read off,” as it were, the ontology directly from our mature science—in this case, quantum mechanics. We can thereby furnish the inventory of the world in the most scientific way possible. That would seem to bypass the many messy interpretative difficulties that typically arise with quantum ontology, namely, when trying to say what quantum mechanics is really about.
But then, the natural question is: why wavefunctions? Here, the traditional indispensability argument becomes very attractive. The point is simple: commitment to wavefunctions is widespread and transversal across the most famous formulations of quantum mechanics; all of them rely, in one way or another, on this mathematical entity to function properly. So, just as philosophers of mathematics sometimes argue that we should be ontologically committed to whatever mathematical entities are indispensable to the success of empirical science, one could try to apply the same reasoning to quantum mechanics. If wavefunctions are indispensable to scientific practice, then—so the argument goes—we should accept an ontological commitment to them. In the case of wavefunction realism, this means granting full reality to the wavefunction itself. We reify the mathematical entity, the wavefunction, but for a good reason, it seems.
From this perspective, for a small price, the prize seems large: wavefunction realism would offer a direct path to closing the traditional epistemic gap in the metaphysics of science, that is, the gap between how theories say the world is and how reality actually is. Just look at the theory and you will find the answer in its indispensable ingredients.
2. Layers of realism
The difficulties, however, come from two sources: “wavefunction” and “realism.” The status of the wavefunction as a physical entity is a well-charted problem. Because the wavefunction lives in a very high-dimensional space, it does not fit smoothly into our ordinary, manifest picture of the world, and there is an entire ecosystem of proposals trying to make the two line up.
But the second component—the “realism” part—has not been discussed thoroughly in connection to wavefunction realism. Where, exactly, is the realism supposed to be in wavefunction realism? Roughly, to be a realist about something simply means to believe in its independent existence, where “independence” means “independent from our thoughts and language.” To be a realist about mathematics, for example, means believing that mathematical entities genuinely exist—not just as useful fictions, not just as a language. In the same spirit, to be a scientific realist means believing in the entities—observable or not—that our best science posits. When we say “wavefunctions exist,” or “black holes exist,” we are expressing this kind of ontological confidence.
Being a realist about our best scientific theories involves at least two distinct layers: an ontological thesis and a metaontological thesis.
The ontological thesis is straightforward: we should be realists (that is, believe in the existence of the entities postulated by our best scientific theories. Those theories often come with a catalogue of entities they commit us to. In quantum mechanics, wavefunctions may be part of that catalogue: wavefunction realists argue that the wavefunction is simply one more element in the theory’s inventory.
But there is also a metaontological thesis in play here: the claim that this theory, with this inventory, is the true theory—which is to say that the theory’s inventory is (or coincides with) the inventory of nature, so to speak. It is the metaontological thesis that enables one to go from within the theory to reality itself, and claim that the theory somehow mirrors reality.
To recall Rudolf Carnap’s famous distinction, the ontological thesis is internal to a framework. The relevant thesis here would be that within quantum mechanics, there are wavefunctions that behave in a certain way.
The metaontological thesis is external to the framework: it says about the description provided by quantum mechanics that it is true of external reality. The issue at stake here is not merely that of saying that such an entity exists within a theoretical model. The realist wants to know whether that entity exists in reality, i.e., whether the framework truly describes what is out there. Belief in the truth of our best theories is the distinguishing trait that separates scientific realists from their non-realist cousins.
So how does wavefunction realism behave under such a demand? At first glance, it looks promising: it seems we can appeal to indispensability and declare that the existence of the wavefunction is granted by quantum mechanics itself. But this does not automatically secure the metaontological level. In fact, the indispensability argument fails: there are formulations of quantum mechanics that don’t appeal to wavefunctions, Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics being one prominent example.
3. Wavefunction pragmatism
What now? Maybe there are some other reasons one can appeal to in order to ensure that a world with wavefunctions is nicer than a world without them. For instance, we could appeal to a kind of intuitive continuity—the idea that something like the wavefunction preserves precious aspects of the classical picture (for example, some sense of locality). However, if all one has in favor of wavefunction realism are pragmatic factors—such as simplicity, elegance, or intuitive appeal—then one should be reminded that these are not generally considered to be truth-conducive theoretical virtues since the seminal work of Thomas S. Kuhn. These virtues might count for theory choice in several ways to help us navigate whenever we face a plurality of theoretical options, but they do not, on their own, tip the balance toward the stronger claim that such-and-such a theory is literally true in the sense of interest for scientific realists. The world might not be simple after all. Simplicity is a theoretical virtue concerning us and how we evaluate theories, but has nothing to do, ipso facto, with truth—with how the world truly is. In other words: we prefer to choose simple theories, but that does not imply that simpler theories are closer to the truth—that link is still missing.
In fact, some versions of wavefunction realism recognize the limits of their naturalistic project of extracting (or reading off) the ontology from science, along with the troubles it causes for the corresponding metaontological argument. They even explicitly adopt a (Carnapian) stance of tolerance toward other interpretations of quantum mechanics that do not involve wavefunctions at all. These versions of wavefunction “realism” are not compatible with scientific realism in the strong sense. They do not commit to the idea that there is a single true ontology provided by the theory. Instead, they look much more like versions of empiricism or pragmatism: the view that the task of science is not to tell us how the world actually is, but only how it might possibly be, among other plausible options. For these versions of wavefunction realism, it would be more accurate—and certainly more honest—to use names like “wavefunction empiricism” or “wavefunction pragmatism.”
Nobody seems to want those labels, of course, but—as is often said—“the shoe fits.”
For more details, see Arroyo, R., Arenhart, J. R. B. “Antirealism in Sheep’s Clothing.” Found Phys 55, 70 (2025).
Raoni Arroyo, Faculty Member, Graduate Program in Philosophy, Federal University of Santa Catarina
Jonas R. Becker Arenhart, Professor of Philosophy, Federal University of Santa Catarina
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Quantum realism is impossible
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Everything in the universe is a quantum wave
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當物理學家扮演哲學家 -- Paul Austin Murphy
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物理學家有傾向「超理性想法」的傳統。大概40多年前我讀威爾伯的《量子問題》；該書對我們熟知的大物理學家，如海森堡、希瑞丁格、和愛因斯坦等人在這方面的觀點有相當詳細的陳述。
我能了解此傾向的原因：這些物理學家窮畢生之力，追尋「真理」和宇宙的究竟；不過，我不敢妄論他/她們是否也追求「意義」；到了晚年，他/她們發現自己沒有捕捉到「真理」的影子，更別說裙角了；從而，另闢蹊徑，甚至劍走偏鋒，倒也是個理性行為。
請參見Paul Davies。
Physicist Paul Davies’s Mysticism[卜胡1]
The English physicist Paul Davies deems himself to be so rational that he’s realised that rational thought itself has its limitations. (At least this is how Davies’s views can be interpreted.) That critical position relates to Davies’s fixation on “the meaning of the universe. He doesn’t believe that “the universe is absurd or meaningless”. Nor does he want to live in an “absurd” universe. However, Davies also believes that science and rational thought cannot show us the meaning of the universe. What can show us its meaning is what “lies outside the usual categories of rational human thought”.
Paul Austin Murphy, 12/03/25
Paul Davies states that the belief that “the universe exists, and exists in the form it does, reasonlessly” is no better than “many metaphysical and theistic theories”. Of course, readers will need to know exactly what Davies means by the word “reasonlessly”. (Davies does go into detail elsewhere.)
What Davies desires is for someone (perhaps himself!?) “to construct a metaphysical theory that reduces some of the arbitrariness of the world”. It seems that such a metaphysical theory must include some kind of mysticism. However, if we don’t construct this theory, then
“[w]e are barred from ultimate knowledge, from ultimate explanation, by the very rules of reasoning that prompt us to seek such an explanation in the first place”.
Davies believes that we are barred partly or even primarily because of the findings of such people as Cantor and Gödel. However, we are not barred if we embrace a different concept of ‘understanding’ from that of rational explanation”.That different concept is supplied by some kind of mysticism.
All that said, Davies often stresses that he has “never had a mystical experience myself, but I keep an open mind about the value of such experiences”.
In various of Davies’s books, the statement that “I have never had a mystical experience myself” has been used a few times. Readers may get the impression that it’s important to Davies that he tells his readers that he hasn’t had a mystical experience himself. Why is that? Sceptically, if Davies had mystical experiences, then he’d be one of the mystics he praises so often in his books. That would muddy the water somewhat.
For one, Davies wouldn’t be treated seriously by many of his fellow scientists, at least scientists as they’re portrayed by Davies himself. So Davies settles for simply keeping an open mind about the value of such experiences.
To be sceptical again, this may remind some readers of the believers in UFOs, astral travelling, etc. who claim that they have an “open mind”, and that their critics have closed minds. The logic of this type of stance is that the person with the most open mind is the person who believes almost everything. Of course, this is partially unfair to Davies in that he’s a physicist who also provides technical — and sometimes convincing — arguments to back up his metaphysical and mystical positions… unlike most people with open minds.
In any case, Davies believes that mystical experiences may
“provide the only route beyond the limits to which science and philosophy can take us, the only possible path to the Ultimate”.
We can ask questions about the nature of “the Ultimate”, how anyone knows that mystics have discovered it, and many more questions.
The Quick Fixes of Self-Important Mystics
Despite the self-image of many mystics (as well as the devotion they receive from their followers), there’s something self-important about them — or at least about their claims. Davies himself says that “mystics claim that they can grasp ultimate reality in a single experience”. (聽起來有點近於「禪宗」) Can they? Who says so? Well, they do. Yet even if they could grasp ultimate reality, how would anyone else know that they have done so?
Davies finished that sentence by saying
“in contrast to the long and tortuous deductive sequence (petering out in turtle trouble) of the logical-scientific method of inquiry”.
Perhaps that gets to the heart of the matter. Mystics (or at least some mystics) don’t want to do the hard work. They don’t want to spend any time on a “long and tortuous deductive sequence”. Instead, Ultimate Reality (whatever that is) is grasped in a single experience.
Of course, not all mystics claim to find Ultimate Reality. According to Davies, some simply find “an inner passionate, joyful stillness that lies beyond the activity of busy minds”.
Mystical Experience and Culture
Here’s something very interesting. Davies happily admits that
“[t]he language used to describe these experiences usually reflects the culture of the individual concerned”.
What Davies doesn’t admit is that the language of the culture may determine the actual content of these experiences too, not only the later descriptions. In other words, Davies might have assumed a languageless and concept-free experience which was only later described in the language of a specific culture. But what if the words, terms, concepts, ideas, etc. of this natural language permeated the actual experience itsel ? (Add to that the memories of the subject who has the experiences, which were themselves determined by the language of a specific culture.)
Davies tells his readers that “Einstein spoke of a ‘cosmic religious feeling’ that inspired his reflections on the order and harmony of nature”. He then quotes science writer David Peat. The passage goes as follows:
“‘[A] remarkable feeling of intensity that seems to flood the whole world around us with meaning. . . . We sense that we are touching something universal and perhaps eternal, so that the particular moment in time takes on a numinous character and seems to expand in time without limit. We sense that all boundaries between ourselves and the outer world vanish, for what we experiencing lies beyond all are and all attempts to be captured in logical thought.”
Note Peat’s uses of the words “seems” and “we sense”. This is an acknowledgement that Peat may not have touched something universal, and that even though he sensed that all boundaries between himself and the outer world vanished, they may not have actually done so.
The influence of language was mentioned earlier. Carrying on from that, perhaps the passage above simply reflects all the books and pieces on mysticism which Peat has read. It certainly comes across as almost cliched.
Peat’s description also reads like one under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs. Yet even here it can be argued that psychedelic experiences are at least partially determined by what the tripper has previously read about other trips, mystical experiences, what “hippies” in the 1960s have said, etc. (Personally, I once noted that those trippers who had no interest in mysticism, hippy culture, Carlos Castaneda, Ken Wilber, Timothy Leary, Aldous Huxley, Rudy Rucker, etc. didn’t have experiences like the one described above.)
More specifically, take Peat’s statement that “[w]e sense that all boundaries between ourselves and the outer world vanish”. Did Peat have this precise experience because he’d previously read about other people who had experienced all boundaries between themselves and the outer world vanish?
Again, it can be conceded that experiences like this do occur when people trip. Yet that may be because they’ve read about such things. That said, there’s a chicken and egg situation here. In other words, people have read about such things because people have experienced such things. So surely there must have been a time when people experienced these things even before they could have read about such things.
This leads to the possibility that such experiences may occur in cultures without books. Yet they still have an oral culture. So pretty much the same arguments will apply in these cases too.
Davies also quotes Ken Wilber on mystical “Eastern” experiences. The passage goes as follows:
“In the mystical consciousness, Reality is apprehended directly and immediately, meaning without any mediation, any symbolic elaboration, any conceptualization, or any abstractions; subject and object become one in a timeless and spaceless act that is beyond any and all forms of mediation. Mystics universally speak of contacting reality in its ‘suchness’, its ‘isness’, its ‘thatness’, without any intermediaries; beyond words, symbols, names, thoughts, images.”
How did Wilber know all this? More specifically, how did he know that such experiences didn’t involve any symbolic elaboration, any conceptualization, or any abstractions? How did he know that the mystic moved beyond words, symbols, names, thoughts, images?
More strongly, how did Wilber know that Reality is apprehended directly and immediately?
Paul Davies vs Other Scientists
Throughout his many books, Davies often tells his readers what other scientists believe about religion, mysticism and certain metaphysical beliefs. He’s not too happy with what they believe. That said, the following passage isn’t judgemental:
“Most scientists have a deep mistrust of mysticism. This is not surprising, as mystical thought lies at the opposite extreme to rational thought, which is the basis of the scientific method.”
Apart from the first sentence (which would need a survey of some kind to be demonstrated), I couldn’t have put it better myself. In this chapter, Davies is very keen to show us the limitations of rational thought when it comes to both physics and mathematics. He writes:
“My own feeling is that the scientific method should be pursued as far as it possibly can. Mysticism is no substitute for scientific inquiry and logical reasoning so long as this approach can be consistently applied.”
Yet Davies clearly believes that it can’t be consistently applied in such cases. And that’s where he takes a dive into mysticism. Or, it should be said, he takes a dive into “espousing mysticism”.
According to Davies, scientific inquiry and logical reasoning hit a brick wall when it comes to “ultimate questions”. Then “science and logic may fail us”. (At least here Davies isn’t saying that science and logic will fail us.)
Davies relies on the work of Cantor and Gödel to show his readers that there can’t be a literal theory of everything. Gödel’s theorem “is nevertheless full of paradox and uncertainty”. In short,
“[t]here will always be truth that lies beyond, that cannot be reached from a finite collection of axioms”.
This may be a classic example of a person stretching the meaning of Gödel’s theorems beyond their proper boundaries.
Davies then put the cream on the cake when he stated the following:
“And here we encounter once more the Gödelian limits to rational thought — the mystery at the end of the universe. We cannot know Cantor’s Absolute, or any other Absolute, by rational means, for any Absolute, being a Unity and hence complete within itself, must include itself.”
… But we can experience (if not know) the Absolute through mystical means… at least according to Davies.
In terms of Davies himself, he seems to be saying that it isn’t doomed to failure if one takes the mystical route. The mystical route even trumps Stephen Hawking’s “theory of everything”, which isn’t about everything at all. It’s about all the fundamental forces and particles in the universe. The mystical experience of everything, on the other hand, really does include everything. (There are indeed broader theories of everything, and even Hawking himself went further.)
The question is whether these limitations have the consequences Davies believes they have. In addition, it doesn’t follow that even if there are a multitude of limitations to rational thought that this should lead us to mysticism. Indeed, mystics — as well as Davies himself — have it that there actually are no limits to what human persons can achieve. It’s just rational thought that has various limits. Thus, the mystic realises that rational thought has its limits, and then goes beyond it to grasp Ultimate Reality.
Yet most mystics, both today and historically, have “stretched thought to its limits” without practicing science, mathematics or even philosophy. Instead, they taken what Davies himself calls a “short cut”. That’s why Davies is keen to point out those physicists who didn’t take a short cut. He tells his readers that
“many of the world’s finest thinkers, including notable scientists such as Einstein, Pauli, Schrodinger, Heisenberg, Eddington, and Jeans, have also espoused mysticism”.
These scientists were human beings. So it’s not much of surprise that some scientists embraced mysticism, just as many have embraced religion. There’s also a difference between espousing mysticism and actually indulging in mysticism. It’s not clear that all the named scientists above actually experienced any mystical states (unless those two words are interpreted very loosely). Yet they did espouse mysticism in various ways and to various degrees.
Davies Makes the How-Why Distinction
In Davies’s nutshell, science and logic can address the “how questions”, but not the “why questions”. [See note.]
This how-why binary opposition has become a bit of cliché when it comes to the critics of science, so it’s worth unpacking.
Firstly, we have Google AI mode on this subject:
“The criticism of the rigid ‘how-why’ binary opposition in the philosophy of science centers on the argument that it is a false dichotomy and an oversimplification of scientific explanation. Critics contend that ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions are deeply intertwined, with the answers to ‘how’ questions often providing the substance of ‘why’ explanations.
“[ ] Many ‘why’ questions in a scientific context (e.g., ‘Why is the sky blue?’) can be answered by providing a detailed ‘how’ explanation (e.g., how light scatters in the atmosphere). The distinction often depends on the level of analysis or the specific context of the inquiry, rather than an inherent difference in the nature of the questions themselves.”
Now let’s specifically tackle why-questions.
As the American-English philosopher Gordon Park Baker (1938–2002) put it:
“The unexamined question is not worth answering.”
Baker added:
“To accept a question as making good sense and embark on building a philosophical theory to answer it is already to make the decisive step in the whole investigation.”
Another problem is summed up by Gordon Baker:
“Questions, just as much as assertions, carry presuppositions.”
Baker’s questions about questions are partly Wittgensteinian in nature. Thus, readers can certainly note his Wittgensteinian points in the following:
“[T]o suppose that the answers to philosophical questions await discovery is to presuppose that the questions themselves make sense and stand in need of answers (not already available). Why should this not be a fit subject for philosophical scrutiny?”
Indeed, Wittgenstein did have things to say on the nature of many philosophical questions (both in his “early” and “late” periods). His position is partly summed up in this passage from Robert W. Angelo. (This ends with a quote from Wittgenstein himself.) Thus:
“[N]onsense in the form of a question is still nonsense. Which is to say that the question-sign [] can only be rejected, not answered: ‘What is undefined is without meaning; this is a grammatical remark.’ [].”
Another good way of summing up the problem with these philosophical why-questions is also cited by Gordon Baker. He wrote:
“To pose a particular question is to take things for granted, to put some things beyond question or doubt, to treat some things as matters of course.”
One obvious “presupposition” to a question is that there’s an answer to it — or at least a possible answer. (這句話顯然有問題)
To sum up. Aren’t the askers of these types of philosophical why-questions “taking certain things for granted”? That is, aren’t they taking for granted that their questions are legitimate and that there are answers? Moreover, aren’t these questioners also “put[ting] some things beyond question or doubt”, as well as “treat[ing] some things as matters of course”?
Note:
I’ve commented on why-questions many times throughout the years. The last section, admittedly, is almost a copy-and-paste of previous uses.
Written by Paul Austin Murphy
MY PHILOSOPHY: https://paulaustinmurphypam.blogspot.com/
My Flickr Account: https://www.flickr.com/photos/193304911@N06/
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「大眾做科學」理論 -- Steve Fuller
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我雖然拿了一個物理學碩士學位，但並非物理學家，更不是科學基礎論領域的學者。根據我對後者的一知半解，以及對自然/社會科學的粗淺常識，我不認為庫恩的「典範移轉論」說得通。
基於「集思廣益」和「眾志成城」兩個原則，下文作者夫勒教授的看法應該有幾分道理。另一方面，「科學」畢竟是專業領域，「理論」的產生在大量「觀察」和「實驗」外，更有它一套嚴謹的步驟和嚴格的標準需要遵循。「大眾做科學」可以鼓勵，它也會提供一些有幫助的資料和啟發性「點子」；如果寄望它產生「突破性理論」則不免天真；或許夫勒教授把「量變引起質變」的想法用錯場合。
The next scientific revolution won’t come from scientists
80% of scientific studies are ignored, but that's about to change
Steve Fuller, 12/19/25
Editor’s Notes：Thomas Kuhn taught us that scientific revolutions arrive only in moments of a crisis of the paradigm. Now, as philosopher Steve Fuller argues, we may be able to intervene without having to wait for a Kuhnian paradigm shift. In a scientific world dominated by computer simulations and unread research, generative AI offers a radical solution. By mining the entirety of scientific knowledge and placing it in the hands of non-experts, AI could trigger a metascientific revolution -- one that finally delivers on science’s promise of collective empowerment.
The most influential work on the nature of science for at least the past fifty years has been The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, first published in 1962 by a young physicist-turned-historian, Thomas Kuhn. Although influential, the book has also been widely misunderstood. It is quite common to think -- certainly based on the title -- that Kuhn was providing a formula for producing scientific revolutions. On the contrary, he was arguing that revolutions only happen once scientists confront insurmountable obstacles in attempting to solve their own research problems. In the Kuhnian jargon, the “paradigm” is then in “crisis.”
Such crises typically involve the presence of phenomena that cannot be explained within the terms set by the paradigm, even after much research has been devoted for many decades -- if not centuries -- to the matter. Kuhn’s own case in point was the persistent difficulties that physicists working in the Newtonian paradigm faced with accounting for the nature of light, which eventuated in the relativity and quantum revolutions in the early twentieth century. The paradigm that was formed after those revolutions continues to dominate physics research today.
Nowadays, many authors -- including accredited scientists -- believe that physics is once again in crisis and that a revolution is required to establish a new paradigm. Interestingly, the first call came in 1996 from an editor at Scientific American magazine, John Horgan, whose book The End of Science predicted -- accurately, I believe -- that the increasing use of computer simulations in cutting edge research across the sciences would shift the site of validation from hard empirical fact to more aesthetic criteria, such as beauty and elegance, which are normally associated with pure mathematics.
Horgan had interviewed Kuhn himself but went beyond him to suggest that scientific research was becoming the collective realization of an artistic vision that might then be imposed as the lens through which everyone sees the world. This reading of Kuhn makes sense if you think about “paradigm” as meaning “worldview” or “world-picture.” Imagine Newton as being like Rembrandt, both master artists who first sketch a vision and fill in much of the detail but then leave it to others to follow their example and complete the final work.
Horgan was vehemently opposed by the scientific establishment. Nevertheless, he had history on his side. What we now regard as the first ‘scientific revolution’ in seventeenth century Europe started a shift in the source of privileged evidence from the field to the lab. It was ultimately about not trusting your senses until they were systematically mediated, starting with telescopic observation but quickly incorporating all the other instruments that are commonly found in scientific laboratories today – not least computers. In this respect, physics was the vanguard science, followed by chemistry and then biology and the social sciences.
We can regard what began four hundred years ago as a kind of technical solution to the profoundly fallen nature of humanity, a common belief shared by these early scientists, due to an exceptionally strong reading of the Christian doctrine of “Original Sin.” The secular upshot was that they felt they had to “steelman” (to make the strongest possible argument for a claim) everything they proposed about the world because their compromised minds made any naked observations and intuitions fundamentally unreliable. Whereas Descartes proposed that a strict adherence to deductive reasoning as a mental discipline could perform that corrective function, most scientists adopted a version of Francis Bacon’s “experimental method,” whereby technology is taken to provide an independent arbiter of human judgment. This is the trajectory that leads us from Galileo’s original telescope to science’s omnipresent reliance on computers today.
Moreover, the fallen state of humanity extended to natural languages. Over the subsequent centuries, it has inspired various projects of linguistic renewal, most of which devolved into the jargons that have rendered scientific writing impenetrable even to educated non-experts. Nevertheless, for Kuhn, the combination of specialized discourse and instrumentation served to ringfence scientific inquiry from those who might want to exploit prematurely its novel and powerful insights. He invoked the 1660 Charter of the Royal Society of London as the institutional origin of modern science for its official insulation of scientific from non-scientific concerns.
From that moment, Kuhnian paradigms could flourish, initially by a self-selecting group of correspondents but eventually by academically trained professionals. It is perhaps no accident that the person who coined “scientist” in the 1830s to mean a scientific professional, William Whewell, was himself a theologian. He understood science as a “vocation,” a kind of secular priesthood. This helps to explain why even today “lay people” may refer to either those who have not taken Holy Orders or those who have not received advanced formal training in science. In both cases, the laity participates through involvement in public demonstrations of the faith. Thus, Whewell was also a founder of the British Association for the Advancement of Science.
However, there is a downside to thinking about science as this autonomous and somewhat exalted form of inquiry, which has in turn motivated the periodic calls for revolution. In a famous 1965 debate in London, Kuhn’s only serious contender as a twentieth-century science influencer, Karl Popper, declared that science should be subject to “permanent revolution,” a phrase he provocatively adapted from the Trotskyites of the time. He worried that science’s institutional autonomy undermines the sort of cognitive autonomy that inquirers need to advance the frontiers of knowledge. In short, paradigms are potential incubators of groupthink.
But is permanent revolution the solution? Not even Popper’s admirers, who were generally more sensitive to political matters than Kuhn, could follow him on this point. Calls for permanent revolution have tended to result in repeated purges of the sort all too familiar from the French and Russian Revolutions. Epistemologically speaking, Popper’s signature critical stance to taken-for-granted assumptions in science would quickly dissolve into a self-devouring skepticism, which eventually would call into question the very legitimacy of scientific inquiry.
Many who fear that we inhabit a “post-truth condition” believe that we have already landed in Popper’s nightmare scenario. Be that as it may, does it follow that Kuhn is correct that scientific revolutions should be postponed as long as possible? The latest development in computer-based technology -- generative artificial intelligence -- sheds an interesting light on this question.
Sociologists from Robert Merton onward have long observed that the collective attention span of the scientific community is highly skewed. The referencing habits of scientists suggest that up to 80% of the published scientific literature is effectively ignored, notwithstanding the exponential growth in the number of scientists and their publications over the past half-century. Indeed, nowadays most scientists publish not to be read by their colleagues, but to be promoted in their universities.
Nevertheless, it does not follow that these unread publications are not worth reading. On the contrary, they are a repository for what the information scientist Don Swanson forty years ago called “undiscovered public knowledge.” After all, the main reason such publications go unread is their failure to directly address the research frontier of the scientific paradigm in which they are presumed to be located. However, the history of science teaches that the whole of reality always exceeds the grasp of the sum of current paradigms.
While it may be difficult to alter the reading habits of scientists whose careers depend on surfing the latest research wave, a computer programmed with all the published scientific literature is, in principle, only burdened by the interests of its users. In the case of generative AI, whose cardinal virtue is the ability to match and combine texts in very large databases, one can pose to it novel questions that cross disciplinary boundaries and reveal the bases for answers that require relatively little additional original research. Thus, Swanson -- an educated person with no medical background -- could discover a treatment for a mysterious disease, namely that fish oil could reduce blood viscosity and improve circulation in Raynaud’s disease, using the relatively primitive search and retrieval technologies available the 1980s.
Generative artificial intelligence has the potential to kill several epistemic birds with one stone. Equipped with all the published scientific literature, it can provide equal access to users who are educated but not necessarily expert. In this way, the “laity” can redress the biases of the professionals in science, resulting in alternative scientific cultures that hybridize the default academic trajectories of paradigms and contemporary interests in knowledge. Yes, it would break the monopoly that academics have in knowledge production, but it would also allow all the available knowledge to be accessible to the widest range of people. This “metascientific revolution” would finally deliver the promise of science to be a vehicle of mass empowerment.
Steve Fuller is the Professor of Social Epistemology at the University of Warwick. Among his many books are Kuhn vs Popper: The Struggle for the Soul of Science (Icon and Columbia) and Reforming the Governance of Science (Springer).
Related Posts:
Science must move from materialism to mystery
The divide between art and science is a mistake
Materialism is holding science back
There will never be a theory of everything
Experimenting with the truth With Claudia de Rham, John Ioannidis, Harry Collins, Daniel Glaser
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Why most published research findings are false
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The Limits of Logic
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福音派教眾為什麼拒絕演化論 - Tanner on Truth & Myths
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Why Evangelicals Still Don’t Understand Evolution
The stubborn refusal to accept basic science — and the absurdity of the arguments Evangelicals still throw at evolution.
Tanner on Truth & Myths, 08/09/25
The misunderstanding of evolution is widespread, but Evangelicals in the United States take it to a new level. From willful ignorance of dinosaurs to outright denial of science, it seems they’re determined to settle back into the Stone Age. Modern science and evolutionary theory make it clear: the Earth is not 6,000 years old. Evolution is not — and has never been — a conspiracy to take down Christianity. It’s simply the scientifically backed answer to the question of why and how there is so much life on Earth.
Yet the tireless resistance from Evangelicals is mind-boggling. For the sake of sanity, let’s slice it all up.
1. The Adam and Eve Obsession
The figure of Adam and Eve captivates many Evangelicals. For them, their existence is a cornerstone of the doctrine of original sin. If evolution is true, then Adam and Eve weren’t historical figures — which renders Christianity, in their view, fundamentally flawed. Without a literal Fall of Man, salvation becomes unnecessary. So then, what is Jesus there for?
Historians and scholars — like Peter Enns in The Evolution of Adam — argue that the story is symbolic, not literal. Genesis is best understood as part of Ancient Near Eastern literature, not a factual account. When analyzed using historical and critical biblical methods, the narrative does not support a literal interpretation of Adam, Eve, or original sin.
Evangelicals are right to sense that evolution conflicts with a literal reading of Genesis. But Genesis is not a scientific textbook. It’s an ancient creation myth. There’s no need for science and religion to be at war here. Yet for Evangelicals, accepting evolution feels like pulling the first thread in a theological unraveling. They cannot fathom a faith that doesn’t begin with Adam and Eve in a literal garden. That’s a problem — but it’s not one evolution caused.
2. The Literal Interpretation of the Bible
It’s not just Adam and Eve — it’s the entire Bible. Evangelicals cling to a literal interpretation of scripture, and that’s where they stumble. Evolution directly contradicts this approach. But the Bible was never meant to be read as a scientific manual. The ancient authors didn’t know about DNA, fossils, or the Earth’s age. They were writing in a different time, with different tools and intentions.
Researchers like Bart Ehrman have shown how biblical authors used cultural narratives and mythological language to convey meaning — not scientific truths. The literalism imposed by modern readers stems from theological frameworks developed long after the texts were written.
Ironically, Evangelicals refuse to consider that the Bible might contain symbolic depth. For them, abandoning literalism means their entire worldview collapses. That’s how they end up disregarding scientific discoveries that don’t fit their simplistic lens.
3. Evolution Is “Just” a Theory
This classic argument — “it’s just a theory” — offers Evangelicals an easy exit. But in science, a theory is not a guess. It’s a well-supported explanation based on evidence and experimentation. Evolution is backed by overwhelming data: fossil records, genetic studies, observable natural selection.
Philosophers like Karl Popper have emphasized that a theory is science’s highest form of knowledge. Evolution, rigorously tested and refined, is a robust framework for understanding life. Calling it “just a theory” reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of how science works.
Evangelicals often misuse the term, showing a lack of grasp on critical scientific concepts. A theory is not weak — it’s strong. Dismissing evolution as “just a theory” is not skepticism; it’s ignorance.
4. The “Missing Link” Myth
Evangelicals often argue that because the “missing link” hasn’t been found, evolution must be false. This is a flawed notion. Evolution is not a linear process — it’s a branching tree. There is no single fossil that connects everything. Instead, we have a cumulative body of evidence from countless species and populations.
In The Greatest Show on Earth, Richard Dawkins explains that the “missing link” concept doesn’t make sense in evolutionary biology. Evolution is a branching process, not a straight line. The so-called “missing link” is not one fossil — it’s a mosaic of transitional forms that show gradual development over millions of years.
Despite thousands of fossils and genetic evidence, Evangelicals cling to this outdated argument. It’s baffling — and it reflects a refusal to engage with the actual science.
5. Denying the Evidence
Evangelicals actively deny the evidence. We’re not just talking about centuries of fossil records — we’re talking about mountains of genetic data and observable examples of natural selection. Yet to them, it’s all a lie. Some even claim it’s the Devil’s work.
Why? Because their belief in the literal truth of the Bible overrides everything. Science becomes impossible to accept. There’s no reasoning with that.
Scholars like Jerry Coyne, in Why Evolution Is True, insist the evidence is overwhelming. From fossils to genetics, the conclusion is clear: all life shares common ancestry. Ignoring this evidence isn’t just anti-science — it’s intellectually dishonest.
But science doesn’t care what you believe. It’s not out to destroy religion. It’s out to understand reality. Thanks to fossil archaeologists and geneticists, the facts are in. When Evangelicals refuse to accept evolution, they’re not just rejecting science — they’re choosing to live in a world where evidence doesn’t matter.
6. The Wrong Choice: Faith and Science
Evangelicals and evolutionists have a problem which boils down to a false choice: It is either faith or science. This is a wholly ungrounded position. Each of these approaches approaches something different. Science takes the task of explaining the physical world and all life within it. Faith handles the unseen- dealing purpose and ethics. They do not stand at odds with each other.
This ungrounded position is addressed by some, such as Francis Collins. The American physician, geneticist and a devout Christian, published The Language of God: A Geneticist’s Quest for Truth where he argues faith and science can coexist. Collins, who led the Human Genome Project, states that scientific breakthroughs only enrich his love for God, not lessen it. The idea that one has to pick between the two is primarily a byproduct of fear, not reason.
Creationists assume this choice is real because believing in evolution would force them to part away from faith all together. This is false. The evidence for evolution can coexist with God. Many Christians, including some Evangelicals, have figured out that the two do not one has to forfeit the other. Science has not destroyed belief in God.
7. Reason for Denial of Evolution
To be frank, there is a lack of acceptance of evolution, not because people genuinely believe in it, rather, it is denial that is driven by political ideology. Evangelists, for example, have a strong interest in preserving the ignorance of their followers about evolution, because it helps them manage the narrative. The idea that science poses a threat to faith is a narrative that helps them push their agenda without any questions. Evolution is simply the convenient scapegoat that helps them further their narrative.
Evangelists have adopted evolution as a symbol in the culture war. The battle is no longer about science. Rather it is about the ideology that maintains their control. The culture war is a political tool, thus, they have to cling to outdated arguments even when the evidence is right in front of them.
The Verdict
We can firmly conclude that for Evangelicals, the understanding of evolution remains out of reach, not because of lack of information, but rather the willingness to access it. Denial of reality is far more convenient than confronting one’s deeply rooted belief system. Evolution does not endanger Christianity, but it certainly challenges the unconditional, fear-peddling interpretation of the holy text. Rather than finding peace in reality, they choose to oppose it, which is truly tragic. Any discussion surrounding evolution should not include options or personal preference, because it is, and always will be a fact. It is high time Evangelicals come to terms with that.
And now, feel free to follow for more insights and leave a comment to join the conversation. See you next time!
Sources and Further Reading
* Why Evolution Is True (Jerry Coyne, 2009)
* The Greatest Show on Earth (Richard Dawkins, 2009)
* The Evolution of Adam (Peter Enns, 2012)
* The Bible: A Historical and Literary Introduction (Bart D. Ehrman, 2014)
* The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Karl Popper, 1959)
* The Language of God (Francis Collins, 2006)
* The Republican War on Science (Chris Mooney, 2005)
* Why People Believe Weird Things (Michael Shermer, 1997)
Written by Tanner on Truth & Myths
I write about the myths that shape society, culture, and politics. Blunt takes, sharp history, no sacred cows. Read with curiosity. Leave with better questions.
If you enjoyed this post, subscribe here to get notified whenever a new one comes out.
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「反向思考」的決策過程模式 - Tom Addison
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雖然墨菲定律說：「凡是會出錯的事，一定會出錯」(1)，但事先周詳的考慮，如使用「風險評估」和「立於不敗之地」等思考方式，應該能降低出錯/失敗的機率。
下文作者艾迪生先生對他所引用芒格博士雋語的詮釋，可以用俗話說的「負負得正」來理解。
附註：
1. “Anything that can go wrong will go wrong.”
The Incredible Decision-Making Mental Model You’ve Never Heard Of
Practical wisdom from a personal hero of mine
Tom Addison, 06/22/25
Charlie Munger famously said:
“All I want to know is where I’m going to die so that I don’t go there.”
On the surface, this seems like a typical quick-witted, funny Charlie Munger thing to say.
However, Munger isn’t being literal when he talks about dying.
What he’s doing is using it as a metaphor for avoiding things that almost certainly guarantee personal disaster, failure, and ruin.
It’s only once we delve a bit deeper that these 17 words deeply reflect one of the key mental models Munger lived by throughout his long life.
He’s using the model of inversion.
He’s trying to solve problems in reverse by looking at them backwards.
Instead of asking “how can this go right?”, he’s asking “how can this go terribly?”
For example, using a real-world example, before asking “how do I make sure I become financially stable in the future?”
Start by asking, “How can I guarantee I stay poor?”
Here’s a list of things you might come up with:
* Carry on gambling my money away.
* Buying things I don’t need and can’t afford
* Investing in things I don’t understand.
* Taking financial advice from people who are already poor.
* Marrying someone who doesn’t share the same values as me.
* Taking on unnecessary debt.
* Having no financial plan or goal to aim for.
Asking how things can go wrong first, rather than last, makes problems significantly easier to solve.
Asking questions in reverse allows us to jump straight to the heart of the problem and immediately pinpoint the worst-case scenario, rather than encountering it later on.
And ultimately (hopefully) avoid total disaster.
Munger argues that by consciously avoiding terrible things, we’re way more likely to succeed in the long term.
It makes a lot of sense, and at the end of the day, who are we to argue otherwise?
It worked phenomenally well for Munger throughout his long life and career, so why shouldn’t it work for us?
What do you think? Will you be using the power of inversion in the future?
Thank you for reading this article and spending your most precious asset on me — your time.
I appreciate it, and I hope to see you again soon!
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Also, become part of a growing community and subscribe to my Substack for absolutely free!
Written by Tom Addison
I write about personal development, books, and key life lessons I learn. Please, feel free to subscribe. Email me on addisontom2@gmail.com to connect with me.
Published in ILLUMINATION
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非文學類的7個寫作小心得 -- Mental Garden
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7 Harsh Writing Lessons I Learned After 300 Articles — So You Don’t Waste Years
How to dramatically accelerate your growth
Mental Garden, 11/21/25
I want you to know this: I wish I had read this when I first started.
If you want to start writing and you feel like your words could go further — that they lack impact or fail to resonate with anyone… I’ll share with you 7 keys I’ve learned and applied during more than 500 days of writing and over 300 published articles.
Here are the 7 keys you can use right now to strengthen your writing.
1. Ignore the word count
A text isn’t better because it has 800, 1,000, or 2,000 words.
The only thing that matters is: Did you answer what the reader came looking for?
A title is nothing more than a promise. It tells the reader what they’ll find once they begin reading. Your only real job is to deliver that valuable information as clearly as possible.
* A Twitter thread won’t have 20,000 words, but it might have 200.
* A newsletter won’t have 200 words, but it might have 1,200.
* A book won’t have 1,200, but it might have 50,000.
The medium you write for defines what’s acceptable — nothing more.
Just write within that range; it doesn’t matter if today’s newsletter is 700 or 1,500 words. When I started writing on Substack, I’d think: “Too short, it should have at least 800 words.” Now I tell myself: “If the idea is resolved in 700, then it’s 700; if it needs 1,500, then it’s 1,500.”
The metric is not the word count.
The metric is: Did the reader leave with what they came for?
If yes, they’ll come back.
2. Make an “anti-list”
People are tired of hearing the same things.
* The perfect diet.
* The perfect study routine.
* The 10 secrets of productivity.
They’re always the same clichés: sleep 8 hours, drink water, plan, meditate. Everyone repeats them. And when everyone repeats the same thing, you add nothing.
Imagine your writing is a fruit shop.
Apples are the typical advice: easy to sell, everyone likes them. But here’s the problem: there are fifty fruit shops on the same street selling the exact same apples. No one will remember yours.
The solution is simple: offer something different.
Yes, sell apples — every fruit shop needs some clichés — but add the specialized fruit that makes you unique: passion fruit, dragon fruit, lychee, papaya. Those unexpected fruits make customers say: “I haven’t seen this anywhere else — I’ll try it!”
Want to stand out as a writer? Do the opposite of what everyone else is doing.
Example: If you want to write “The perfect productivity routine,” you think of waking up early, organizing schedules, taking breaks, drinking coffee, sleeping 8 hours. Sound cliché? Good. Now the interesting part: you can’t use any of that.
That’s your anti-list.
What else can you offer? When you eliminate the obvious, the unexpected emerges. This technique comes from option suppression — look it up if you want to go deeper. For example, you could start your real productivity list like this:
* Batch errands into a single day: groceries, pharmacy, paperwork.
* Decide your weekly menu on Sunday: no more “What do we eat today?”
* Write your tasks on paper, not your phone: avoid digital distractions.
These productivity tips are far less common.
That’s the power of the anti-list.
Want an example from me? Please See：How aerodynamic drag in Formula 1 applies to productivity.
3. Start strong and end strong
The first and last lines are the two pillars of the text — if they’re weak, everything collapses.
Readers mostly remember what grabbed them at the beginning and what you concluded at the end. What’s in the middle matters, of course, but the introduction and the ending carry the maximum tension; the middle is just the development. This applies both at the article level and within each block.
That’s what makes the text effortless to read and brings key ideas to the foreground.
If you look back at what you just read, you’ll see the structure: first a striking statement — “The first and last lines are the two pillars of the text” — then the development that expands it, and finally an unforgettable closing: “That’s what makes the text effortless to read and brings key ideas to the foreground.”
You’ve just seen how effective this structure is.
When you write online — where attention is fragile and readers can close your article in a second — writing this way ensures they stay. This is due to the “F-pattern effect.” Look it up to understand how we read on the internet and how to adapt your text to that reading pattern.
Then you’ll understand why this “strong start and strong finish” is so effective.
4. Don’t write only long paragraphs
Not everything has to be dense text blocks.
Newsletters are read on small screens, amid distractions, sometimes standing on the subway or bus. Readers need breathing room and text that’s effortlessly legible.
Give them exactly that.
* Use lists when you enumerate ideas, descriptions, or steps.
* Don’t hesitate to include visuals, images, or supporting elements.
* Insert short sentences when you want to emphasize something — like in tip #3.
This makes your writing more readable and aligned with how people read online.
5. Delete the “I…”
“I think…”, “I believe…”. These openings are redundant.
You’re the author — obviously the ideas are yours, you don’t need to clarify it constantly. I realized this after re-reading my articles many times: those filler phrases became stones in the path. They tired the reader and added nothing.
Deleting “I…” makes the sentence stronger.
Instead of “I think writing is a muscle,” write: “Writing is a muscle.” The second hits harder, more directly.
The exception? When quoting others.
If I mention Hemingway, García Márquez, or a scientific study, I clarify. That’s where attribution matters. In all other cases, readers already know the voice is yours. Anything not attributed to someone else is yours.
Clear the stones and weeds from the reader’s path.
6. Warm up before you start
No one walks into the gym and lifts 100 kilos without warming up.
Why do we do that when we write?
Julia Cameron recommended what she called “morning pages,” meaning writing pages about anything that comes to mind to wander, generate ideas, and prepare the mind for focused writing. Spend 10 minutes writing freely. Write about what you dreamed, what you think of the day, what you ate for breakfast. It doesn’t matter.
The result doesn’t matter; the goal is to clear mental noise and enter flow.
Press enter or click to view image in full size
7. Use few adverbs — avoid the ones ending in -ly
Hemingway knew it and García Márquez said it clearly:
“Adverbs ending in -mente are an impoverishing vice. I haven’t used any in my books for a long time. I force myself to find richer, more expressive ways of writing.” — Gabriel García Márquez, Living to Tell the Tale
Every time you write quickly, subtly, delicately, the text loses strength.
A good verb does the job better than any adverb. Don’t say “walked slowly,” say “ambled.” Don’t say “spoke passionately,” say “exclaimed.”
The message becomes clearer — therefore more memorable.
When revising your text, do this exercise: look for adverbs and delete them.
You’ll be surprised how little you needed them.
Writing better is having the right tools for each situation:
* Ignore the word count
* Make an anti-list
* Start and end strong
* Don’t rely only on long paragraphs
* Delete the “I…”
* Warm up before writing
* Use few adverbs — avoid the -ly ones
Small practices that, together, make your writing resonate and leave an impression.
Nothing more to add.
Your turn: What other writing key has worked for you and deserves to be on this list?
Quote of the day: “Writing as a poet is one thing; writing as a historian, another.” — Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quixote.
Here I plant ideas. In the newsletter, I make them grow.
Daily insights on self-development, writing, and psychology — straight to your inbox. If you liked this, you’ll love the newsletter. Join 43.000+ readers: Mental Garden
See you in the next letter, take care!
References
Márquez, G. G. (2002). Vivir para contarla.
Written by Mental Garden
Productivity and psychology inisghts in useful life lessons +3M monthly views and +300 articles
Published in Change Your Mind Change Your Life
Read short and uplifting articles here to help you shift your thought, so you can see real change in your life and health.
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讀書務必使用「根基法」 ---- Mental Garden
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請參見拙作《淺談「讀書方法」》(本欄2025/03/18)，以及此文(該欄2025/03/17)。
The Root Method: How to Absorb Books Like a Genius (Without Highlighting a Single Page)
Stop collecting information — start crafting your own knowledge
Mental Garden, 04/30/25
We immerse ourselves in books because we seek to understand the world, to develop new skills, to change the way we think. But if you’re like me — or like so many voracious readers — have you ever finished a book that inspired you, that you even talked about with a friend, but a few weeks later…
You can barely remember anything.
Maybe you feel like you could get more out of your reading — all those hours and all that wisdom that end up going nowhere, unorganized, not put into practice… Today, I want to share with you the most effective minimalist method I know to fix this.
The Root Method.
You’ll retain more, understand better, and most importantly: you’ll start connecting ideas across books, authors, and disciplines. Same readings, deeper learning.
What is the Root Method?
It’s based on a fundamental principle: shifting from passive reading to active learning.
1. Before starting a book, take a blank sheet of paper and write down everything you already know about the topic you’re about to read about. Even if you think you know very little.
2. During your reading session, add what you learn in a different color.
3. Before your next session, review your sheet. During the session, return to step 2.
4. Store the sheets in a binder and study them periodically.
That’s it.
But what happens inside you while you do this… that’s where the magic lies.
Let’s break down each of the 4 steps:
Step 1: Before starting a book
Take a blank sheet of paper and write down everything you know (or think you know) about the topic. It doesn’t matter if it’s just three words or half a page. The important thing is to force your brain to recall and organize your ideas before consuming new ones.
Don’t know anything? Perfect.
Write down the questions you have. Or create a mind map with scattered words. The key here is to establish your starting point. It’s a quality filter to see what beliefs you hold, what preconceptions you carry, and it opens you up to the possibility of correcting them later.
Step 2: During your reading session
After reading a section of the book (a chapter, a block of ideas, or even just a dense page), return to your sheet and add what you learned — using a different color.
This detail is crucial.
Each color represents a different reading session. Visually, you can see how your knowledge evolves. It’s not just “read and turn the page.” It’s about extracting the best from each session. Documenting your growth. Building a structure of ideas you didn’t have before.
Never copy a paragraph or idea word for word.
You must explain it in your own words, in a summarized form.
This forces you to process the information, not just store it. And while doing so, you’ll likely notice errors in what you wrote at the beginning or in previous sessions.
Awesome, right?
Correct them, cross things out, jot down the updated version. This comparison makes you think critically about what you wrote, sharpening your learning more and more.
Step 3: Before your next session
Before starting your next reading session, review your blank sheet.
It’ll only take a few minutes, but this simple act refreshes your memory about what you’ve already learned and prepares you to connect the new ideas with what you already know. It transforms every learning into building blocks, session after session, allowing you to see connections that previously seemed invisible.
* Recurrent keywords or technical terms.
* Core ideas that structure the whole topic.
* Cause-effect patterns or parallels.
In other words: you read more deeply.
Step 4: After finishing the book
You’ve finished the book and now have several sheets filled with colors, ideas, corrections, and notes.
Store them in a folder. That sheet is a map of your learning. A valuable resource you can review later. I recommend rewriting it neatly. Doing so forces you to synthesize again, organize your ideas definitively, and filter out the essential now that you have the full perspective.
Then, every few months, review it. Spend a few minutes.
This simple, repeated act embeds the information into your long-term memory — it’s called spaced repetition, and it’s the most effective technique for retaining knowledge for years.
Why does it work so well?
Because it combines 3 powerful learning principles in one simple action: writing.
1. It naturally applies the Feynman Technique
When you write and structure what you learn in your own words, you force yourself to explain it clearly. You don’t just repeat — you truly understand what you read.
And that’s harder than regular note-taking… but also far more effective.
Every connection between concepts, every outline, every review is an opportunity to detect mistakes or gaps. Rewriting is learning because it pushes you to make sense of what’s inside you, just as Feynman recommended.
2. It leverages spaced repetition
Spaced repetition is the most effective way to memorize long-term.
Every time you review your sheet before a new session, you’re refreshing your memory right when you need it. You fight the forgetting curve with small doses of active recall. And when you rewrite the sheet cleanly at the end, you create a distilled version of the essentials — a synthesis your mind can retain.
That’s knowledge you’ve worked for, connected, and internalized.
3. It avoids the collector’s fallacy
The collector’s fallacy is the idea that hoarding PDFs, highlighting everything, and taking endless notes equals learning.
No.
That just fills your folders with unprocessed data. With the blank sheet method, you can’t hide. You only write down what you truly understand, and you only keep what makes sense to you. You store less information, but you learn more. You don’t just collect ideas: you craft them. And that extra effort makes each sheet packed with real knowledge.
That’s why it works. Because it simplifies, repeats, and refines.
It’s not enough to know: you have to understand.
The Root Method isn’t just for books; it works for any learning process: courses, conferences, YouTube videos, podcasts. You don’t need complicated apps or anything fancy — just paper and colored pens.
Don’t stay at the surface of knowledge — dig down to the root of every topic.
You’ll notice the change instantly.
Your turn: What methods do you use to learn from your reading?
Quote of the day: “The skill I was learning was crucial: the patience to read things I could not yet understand.” — Tara Westover, Educated: A Memoir.
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Written by Mental Garden
Productivity and psychology inisghts in useful life lessons +3M monthly views and +300 articles
Published in Change Your Mind Change Your Life
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