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美、烏稀土元素礦產交易並不划算 -- William Walldorf
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2025/03/12 21:02 瀏覽186 ｜回應2｜推薦1 |
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本欄前兩篇文章討論「美、烏稀土元素礦產交易」。此議題涵蓋外交、經濟、和國際外交等領域的政策、運作、以及評估等活動；不限於美國或川普政府，故另成一欄。我會對前兩篇的分析做一個綜合評論。
A Ukraine Minerals Deal Is Not the Win Trump Thinks It Is
William Walldorf, 03/07/25
One good thing that came from the spat between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky last week at the White House was that it seemed to put a minerals deal between the U.S. and Ukraine in jeopardy.
Now, unfortunately, cooler heads seem to be prevailing.
Zelensky said on Tuesday that he is “ready to sign” the deal and Trump has expressed his appreciation for Ukraine's willingness to do so. Officials from both countries have indicated that they will meet in Saudi Arabia next week to discuss the war in Ukraine and the minerals deal.
From what we know, the deal would create a fund from sales of Ukrainian minerals for post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, repay the U.S. for aid to Ukraine in its war against Russia, and create opportunities for U.S. mining companies that will purportedly reduce U.S. mineral dependence on China. American officials have hailed the agreement as a “co-investment” that’s a “win-win” for both the U.S. and Ukraine.
Finding ways for Ukraine to rebuild using its own resources is a good thing, as is creating opportunities for U.S. businesses abroad. But Trump needs to beware of the minerals trap—the costly, no-holds-barred pursuit of rare-earth minerals that sometimes gets great powers into trouble strategically.
The allure of resources was one reason U.S. troops continued to fight and die in Afghanistan long after it stopped making strategic sense. It may also be why U.S. troops are still in Syria under dicey conditions despite completing the mission to defeat the Islamic State in 2019; Trump said that year that American forces would stay behind “only for the oil.”
Russia, too, has fallen victim to the minerals trap of late in Africa. It faces the dangers of overstretch as its soldiers die in low-grade nation-building missions to maintain access to African minerals. In the last six months alone, close to 100 Russian soldiers have died in Mali, all to protect mines. Minerals are also an under-appreciated reason for Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has come of course with a staggeringly high toll for Moscow.
Instead of obsessing over getting repaid by Ukraine, Trump needs to keep U.S. security interests in view and carefully weigh the costs and benefits of pursuing Ukrainian minerals.
On the benefits side, the gains may not be that great. There are a lot of unknowns about Ukrainian minerals.
The U.N. says Ukraine holds 5% of the world’s rare earth minerals, including 22 of the 34 most critical for national security. But assessments of Ukrainian minerals are based on outdated Soviet-era data and models that may not be accurate.
Additionally, the investment and ramp-up time to get mines running (on average 18 years) are enormous. Location is a big problem too. Some 40% of the mineral deposits are estimated to be in eastern Ukraine. That’s been ground zero for the war since 2022 and armed conflict between Ukrainian forces and Russia-backed separatists since 2014. U.S. mining companies should be leery about making costly, long-term investments in the eastern Donbas region.
On top of the questionable economic benefits, the costs of securing Ukrainian minerals could be exorbitant. If U.S. companies invest, they’ll need protection from attacks by Russia and its local proxies. Trump officials say that the mere presence of U.S. workers on Ukrainian soil will deter Russia and its proxies because of the fear of killing Americans. As Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said recently, “The more assets that U.S. companies have on the ground, the more security it creates for the Ukrainian people.”
This is wishful thinking. Aside from ethical questions about using U.S. miners and engineers as a security measure, deterrence doesn’t really work this way. History shows that autocratic states like Russia are only deterred by a strong counterforce from a rival that balances it and threatens its survival.
While offering no such counterforce, U.S. miners and engineers would offer juicy targets for Russian special forces or pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine who are disgruntled with Kyiv or U.S. mining efforts. If attacks come, Washington will feel pressure to respond—out of anger, to maintain credibility, or both. The U.S. might then give Ukraine the security guarantee Zelensky has been asking for—or worse, put U.S. troops on the ground to protect the mines. Both are things Trump is currently (and rightly) saying the U.S. should stay away from.
In the end, U.S. leaders need a big dose of pragmatism when it comes to Ukraine’s minerals. There are plenty of other friendly states and territories—Canada, Greenland, Australia, Norway, Japan, and Finland, for instance—with an abunda nce of rare-earth minerals that could strike partnerships with Washington. As for Ukraine, its minerals are not worth the risk to U.S. security.
Trump, ever the deal-maker, should spot a bad one for what it is.
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本文於 2025/03/14 02:06 修改第 5 次
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美、烏稀土元素礦產交易《評論》之小評
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2025/03/13 19:10 推薦1 |
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1. 兩篇《評論》內容概述
本欄第一、二兩篇文章的主旨都是：反對簽訂「美、烏稀土元素礦產交易」。我在此對兩位作者的論述略表拙見。
開欄文作者指出：即使烏克蘭的稀土金屬具有開採價值，礦產交易所帶來的經濟「效益」，遠遠不及它對美國安全所導致危險這個「成本」。
此外，該文作者同時指出：
1) 國際政治的本質是：「爭奪資源」(該欄開欄文第0-1)小節)。
2) 只有「實力」才能遏止強權。
本欄第二篇文章和開欄文異曲同工(請見以上兩篇貼文)。只是哈瑞斯教授的論點在深入和周全兩個層面頗勝一籌。值得細讀。
該文和開欄文的兩位作者都強調：烏克蘭的存亡在目前並非美國「核心利益」，所以美國政府的援助點到為止即可；不應該出兵或擴大戰火。反之，一旦訂定稀土元素礦產協議，美國就難免再度陷入類似伊拉克戰爭或阿富汗戰爭的風險。
如果簡單的讀哈瑞斯教授大作，得到的印象很可能是：作者「前言不對後語」。不過，由於在美國高等學府粥少僧多的情況下，他能熬到教授位置，邏輯訓練須是有的。因此，引起我從他文章字裏行間進一步思考美國「外交政策」門道的興趣。
2. 美國外交政策的「門道」
從2022到2024年底，美國國會撥款1千8百3十億美元援助烏克蘭抵抗俄國侵略。我不清楚美國聯邦預算各個子項目的金額；但是，每年600億美元終歸不是雞毛蒜皮；例如，它大約相當於加州州政府2024-2025年度預算的1/5；美國最小的羅德•艾倫州州政府2025會計年度預算則只有56億美元；不到上述援烏金額的1/10(1)。
因此，烏克蘭存亡即使不是美國「核心利益」，拜登政府支持烏國也絕對不是在大手筆的做慈善活動。
哈瑞斯教授在該文中推崇和支持拜登政府援烏措施，但他反對美、烏稀土元素礦產交易。哈瑞斯教授的理由是：此交易很有可能把美國捲入俄、烏戰火。他以「甜頭」和「利益」的對比來說明「軍援烏國」和「礦產交易」的差別(2)。
現在回到此節子標題：美國外交政策的「門道」。
對美國這個有錢的大爺來說，一年花個600億美元軍援烏國，不過是買個「甜頭」。但是，如果為了烏國礦產把身家性命搭進去，那就傷害到美國「利益」；鐵定「不划算」、真正「虧大了」。
什麼樣的「甜頭」值得拜登政府三年來平均每年花600億美元去買呢？！
我想它應該是：
把俄國陷入當年阿富汗這個泥淖，讓普丁進退不得，狼狽不堪，脫身不能；最後搞到棄甲曳兵，落荒而逃。
在這個情況下，美國避免了腹背受敵，可以全力對付中國。
可惜千算萬算，沒算到川普這隻呆頭鵝不但上了台，還一上台就把好好的一盤棋給下臭了。
3. 結論
以上的分析也適用於此地、此情、此景：
對美國來說，裝腔做勢的「協防台灣」，只是她把中國大軍和國力拖在亞太地區的「甜頭」。一旦圖窮匕見，兵臨海灘，站在美國「利益」的立場，第七艦隊不船底抹油才怪。
賴總其慎之乎！
我看，你全家還是找時間去挑幾個堅固耐用的皮箱吧(該欄開欄文第1節)！
附註：
1. 為了讓以上數字的脈絡更清楚，做個簡單對比：以面積論，加州是羅德•艾倫州的106倍；以人口論，加州是羅德•艾倫州的35.5倍。另一方面，烏克蘭面積是加州的1.4倍，人口是加州的96%。本文引用數字均為2024統計，根據Google提供的數值計算。如果有誤，責任在我。
2. 在「決策理論」中，區分眾多問題的「重要性」和「緊急性」；釐清各個行動的「不妨做」和「必須做」；是「如何下決定」過程中最簡單的思考邏輯。
本文於 2025/03/14 02:21 修改第 5 次
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美、烏稀土元素礦產交易讓美國虧大了 -- Peter Harris
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2025/03/13 14:43 推薦0 |
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這篇文章的基調跟開欄文異曲同工；兩位作者都站在「國家安全」和「國家利益」兩個角度認為：「美、烏稀土元素礦產交易」對美國造成的風險太大。只是下文的論點比開欄文的深入周全。它也讓我想到美國「外交政策」的所以然。拙見請見本攔下一篇。
A minerals agreement with Ukraine would be a bad deal for America
Peter Harris, opinion contributor, 03/11/25
The much-hyped minerals agreement between the U.S. and Ukraine is a bad idea and should be dropped. But although critics have tended to focus on the deal’s unseemliness and impracticalities, the real problem has to do with America’s own national security interests.
As it stands, the U.S. has only a limited interest in Ukraine’s long-term security. This is a basic function of geography and economics. The U.S. is more than 4,000 miles away from Ukraine, and in 2021 — the last full year before Russia’s invasion — its firms held investments there totaling just $98 million.
To be sure, most Americans strongly prefer that Kyiv triumph over Russia. They abhor the war and blame Vladimir Putin for it. But the bottom line is that U.S. national security will probably not be jeopardized one way or the other by what happens in Ukraine.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it bluntly: “It’s not that we don’t care about Ukraine, but Ukraine is on another continent. It doesn’t directly impact the daily lives of Americans.”
For three years, supporters of Ukraine have bitterly lamented this reality, trying hard to contrive reasons for why the U.S. should regard the former Soviet state’s fate as a core national security issue. But from an American perspective, it is actually a good thing to have only a weak interest in Ukraine: relative disinterest affords Washington the luxury of selective engagement.
Under former President Biden, the U.S. sent vast amounts of military, economic and humanitarian aid to Kyiv. Biden also authorized the sharing of valuable intelligence, which allowed Ukraine to inflict punishing blows upon Russian forces. Without U.S. help, it is highly likely that Ukraine would have capitulated to Russia by now.
This assistance was appropriate given America’s intense preference that Ukraine win its war of self-defense. But preferences are different from interests — there are limits to how far states are willing to go in pursuit of mere preferences. Interests, on the other hand, can be things that states are willing to fight for.
If there is any U.S. interest at play in Ukraine, it is the overriding interest to avoid a devastating war between NATO and Russia. This is why Biden put sensible limits on his support for Ukraine, from rejecting irresponsible calls to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine to ruling out the deployment of U.S. ground forces. Biden was emphatic that the U.S. must not risk a shooting war with Russia.
This was the right policy. But Biden’s restraint was only possible because he recognized that core U.S. interests would not be imperiled even if Ukraine were to lose. If he had believed that Ukraine’s collapse would compromise vital U.S. interests, Biden would have been forced to consider a direct intervention to prevent such an outcome — which he never did, not even in February 2022 when U.S. intelligence officials assessed that Kyiv could be overrun “within days.”
Signing a substantial minerals deal with Ukraine (potentially worth billions of dollars) would change this political calculus in the wrong direction. Overnight, Washington would acquire a compelling interest — not just a preference — in ensuring that the government in Kyiv remains free, independent and committed to upholding U.S. firms’ lucrative mineral rights.
The U.S. government would also come under heavy pressure to bankroll the physical reconstruction of Ukraine, which will be essential before companies can extract untapped natural resources and sell them for profit at market. In other words, any minerals deal would realistically be a public-private partnership, requiring indefinite investments by the U.S. taxpayer.
If a minerals deal is agreed to, then, what would happen if Russia were to reinvade Ukraine? Would future U.S. leaders feel obliged to protect their country’s commercial interests with military force? It is impossible to say for sure. But having a large economic stake in Ukraine would certainly increase the odds of America choosing to join a war in defense of Kyiv.
Of course, this is exactly how Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz (and French President Emmanuel Macron) have sold the minerals deal in public: as a “security guarantee” for Ukraine. This should appeal to those who want to fold Kyiv into the Western alliance. But analysts who view it as imprudent to risk World War III over Ukraine (now or in the future) should be aghast.
If President Trump is serious about reducing America’s exposure in Ukraine, he should rethink the minerals deal as a matter of urgency. Even if an agreement once had some superficial appeal — a way to recoup the money that Washington has spent in defense of Ukraine, and then some — the long-term security risks far outweigh any economic benefits that U.S. firms might one day hope to realize.
In the final analysis, giving Americans an “economic upside in the future of Ukraine” will never be worth the security downsides. Locking the United States into an enduring relationship with Ukraine — a country currently at war with a nuclear-armed adversary — is simply unwise and unnecessary. On this critical issue, the Trump administration should think again.
Peter Harris is an associate professor of political science at Colorado State University and a non-resident fellow with Defense Priorities.
本文於 2025/03/14 02:07 修改第 2 次
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