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中東風雲錄 -- 開欄文：埃及的加薩重建方案 -- Al Jazeera
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下文為本欄開欄文。
埃及的加薩重建方案 -- Al Jazeera
What is Egypt’s plan for the reconstruction of Gaza?
Arab League endorses Egyptian proposal that provides alternative to US President Trump’s plan to take over Gaza.
Al Jazeera Staff, 03/04/25
Arab states have adopted Egypt’s Gaza reconstruction plan, providing a potential path forward after Israel’s devastating war on the Palestinian enclave.
Egypt unveiled its plan on Tuesday while hosting an Arab League Summit in its capital Cairo.
The plan offers an alternative to United States President Donald Trump’s suggestion that the Gaza Strip be depopulated to “develop” the enclave, under US control, in what critics have called ethnic cleansing. Under the Egyptian plan, Gaza’s Palestinian population would not be forced to leave the territory.
Trump had insisted that Egypt and Jordan take Palestinians forced out of Gaza by his plan, but that was quickly rejected, and the US has signalled that it is open to hearing what an Arab plan for Gaza’s post-war reconstruction would be.
Speaking at the start of the summit, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi said that Trump would be able to achieve peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Here’s everything you need to know about the plan, based on Al Jazeera’s own reporting, as well as drafts of the plan reported on by the Reuters news agency and the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram.
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What does the Egyptian plan call for?
The plan consists of three major stages: Interim measures, reconstruction and governance.
The first stage would last about six months, while the next two phases would take place over a combined four to five years.
The aim is to reconstruct Gaza – which Israel has almost completely destroyed – maintain peace and security and reassert the governance of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the territory, 17 years after it was kicked out following fighting between Fatah, which dominates the PA, and Hamas.
How does the plan aim to rebuild Gaza?
A six-month interim period would require a committee of Palestinian technocrats – operating under the management of the PA – to clear the rubble from Salah al-Din Street, which is the main north-south highway in the Gaza Strip.
Once the roads are clear, 200,000 temporary housing units would be built to accommodate 1.2 million people and about 60,000 damaged buildings restored.
According to the blueprint, longer-term reconstruction requires an additional four to five years after the interim measures are completed. Over that span, the plan aims to build at least 400,000 permanent homes, as well as rebuilding Gaza’s seaport and international airport.
Gradually, basic provisions such as water, a waste system, telecommunication services and electricity would also be restored.
The plan further calls for the establishment of a Steering and Management Council, which would be a financial fund supporting the interim governing body in Gaza.
In addition, conferences will be held for international donors to provide the necessary funding for reconstruction and long-term development in the Strip.
Who would be in charge of Gaza?
The plan calls for a group of “independent Palestinian technocrats” to manage affairs in Gaza, in effect replacing Hamas.
The technocratic government would be responsible for overseeing humanitarian aid and would pave the way for the PA to administer Gaza, according to el-Sisi.
Speaking at Tuesday’s summit, PA President Mahmoud Abbas said that an election could take place next year if circumstances allowed.
On the security front, Egypt and Jordan have both pledged to train Palestinian police officers and deploy them to Gaza. The two countries have also called on the United Nations Security Council to consider authorising a peacekeeping mission to oversee governance in Gaza until reconstruction is complete.
How much is this going to cost?
Egypt is calling for $53 bn to fund the reconstruction of Gaza, with the money distributed over three phases.
In the first six-month phase it would cost $3bn to clear rubble from Salah al-Din Street, construct temporary housing and restore partially damaged homes.
The second phase would take two years and cost $20bn. The work of rubble removal would continue in this phase, as well as the establishment of utility networks and the building of more housing units.
Phase three would cost $30bn and take two and a half years. It would include completing housing for Gaza’s whole population, establishing the first phase of an industrial zone, building fishing and commercial ports, and building an airport, among other services.
According to the plan, the money will be sourced from a variety of international sources including the UN and international financial organisations as well as foreign and private sector investments.
Is the plan going to work?
There are still a number of variables that could complicate the plan. Perhaps most importantly, it is unclear whether Hamas, Israel or the US will agree to it.
Hamas welcomed the reconstruction plan, and has previously agreed to a technocratic government. But it is less clear if it will accept the return of the PA, which itself would face the perception from its critics that it has returned to Gaza on the back of Israel’s tanks.
Hamas may be willing to discuss its removal from governance, but is adamantly against its disarmament – something the Egyptian plan adopted by the Arab League did not discuss.
Israel has made it clear that this is a red line, and that Hamas will not be allowed to keep its weapons. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also said that he will not allow the PA to return to Gaza.
There is also the question of whether Trump will abandon his idea of a US-controlled “Middle East Riviera” for the Egyptian plan. It is difficult to predict what Trump’s position will be, particularly if Israel signals its opposition to the Egyptian plan.
What has the response been so far?
In response to Egypt’s plan, Israel said that Arab states needed to “break free from past constraints and collaborate to create a future of stability and security in the region”.
Instead, Israel continues to back Trump’s Gaza displacement plan – which echoes a longstanding call from the Israeli far-right to depopulate Gaza.
Egypt called Israel’s response “unacceptable”, with Minister of Foreign Affairs Badr Abdelatty describing the Netanyahu government’s position as “stubborn and extremist”.
Abdelatty said it would be impossible to see peace in the region without an independent Palestinian state. “No single state should be allowed to impose its will on the international community,” he added.
The White House continues to stand by Trump’s plan for Gaza, but said it would welcome collaboration with regional partners – except Hamas.
“While the President stands by his bold vision for a post-war Gaza, he welcomes input from our Arab partners in the region. It’s clear his proposals have driven the region to come to the table rather than allow this issue to devolve into further crisis,” White House National Security Council spokesman Brian Hughes said.
“President Trump has been clear that Hamas cannot continue to govern Gaza,” he added.
相關閱讀：
Arab leaders endorse Egypt’s Gaza reconstruction plan
European leaders back 'realistic' Arab plan for Gaza
For Israel, ceasefire is a continuation of war by other means
The Egyptian Gaza plan: A deadly trap for Israel and the US
The Egyptian plan for postwar Gaza is a good starting point—but it needs changes
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美、伊戰爭開打 – A. Smith/F. Clayton
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U.S. and Israel launch strikes on Iran
Iran’s airspace was closed early on Saturday, Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim reported, as smoke was seen rising above buildings in the capital Tehran.
Alexander Smith/Freddie Clayton, 02/28/26
The U.S. and Israel were striking Iran on Saturday morning, with Iranian media reporting explosions across the capital Tehran.
President Donald Trump said U.S. forces have begun “major combat operations in Iran,” in an eight-minute video message shared on Truth Social.
“Our objective is to defend the American people by eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime,” he said.
A spokesperson for Israel’s defense minister had said earlier that Israel had "launched a preemptive strike against Iran to remove threats against the State of Israel.”
Retaliation is expected, the spokesperson said.
“As a result, a missile and UAV attack against the State of Israel and its civilian population is expected in the immediate time frame,” the Israeli spokesperson said.
The strikes in Iran are significant, and are not small strikes, two U.S. officials told NBC News.
Iran’s airspace was closed early on Saturday, Iran’s semi-official news agency Tasnim reported, as smoke was seen rising above buildings in Tehran.
The strikes come after Trump oversaw a massive military build up in the Middle East while holding talks with Tehran aimed at agreeing a new deal to curtail Iran's nuclear program.
“It has always been the policy of the United States, in particular my administration, that this terrorist regime can never have a nuclear weapon. I’ll say it again, they can never have a nuclear weapon,” Trump said in his video Saturday.
Iran vowed before the strikes that it would retaliate against any attack, threatening to target Israel as well as American bases across the region.
Other Middle Eastern nations have warned any attack could spiral into another major conflict for a region still reeling from the Israel-Hamas war in the Gaza Strip.
Trump raised the prospect of another attack on Iran after authorities cracked down on huge nationwide demonstrations, which erupted in December and January over the country’s ailing economy but morphed into demands for the overthrow of the clerical regime.
Trump wrote on Truth Social: “KEEP PROTESTING — TAKE OVER YOUR INSTITUTIONS!!! Save the names of the killers and abusers.” Then he added: “HELP IS ON ITS WAY.”
The regime ended up crushing the protests, killing thousands and arresting tens of thousands more in the weeks afterwards.
Trump then threatened a military attack if a deal could not be reached with Tehran over its nuclear program — which the president had said the U.S. “obliterated” with strikes in June. A later U.S. assessment found these only destroyed one of three sites targeted.
More recently, the administration said Iran was trying to rebuild its nuclear program, and that it could have enough fissile material for an atomic bomb within “a week” and that its ballistic missiles could “soon” be able to strike the U.S.
There is no publicly available evidence that Iran has made major progress in reviving its damaged nuclear program, including whether it has resumed significant uranium enrichment. The Trump administration has not specifically accused Iran of renewing uranium enrichment work.
Iran, which has always insisted that it has not pursued nuclear weapons, resists demands that it halt uranium enrichment or expand talks to include its ballistic missile program and support for proxy forces across the Middle East.
At the same time as holding talks with Iran, the U.S. amassed forces and built up its air defenses at bases across the region.
Trump sent the USS Gerald R. Ford, the world’s largest aircraft carrier, to join another at the head of what he dubbed an “armada.”
Iran has already signed a nuclear deal with the U.S. and other world powers. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, was seen by supporters as a landmark agreement that provided transparency and confidence internationally that Tehran was not building nuclear weapons.
Trump and other critics saw the deal as weak, however, and claimed it would only delay Iran from obtaining a bomb. In 2018, Trump unilaterally withdrew the U.S. from the agreement.
相關新聞
world Live updates: U.S. military begins 'major combat operations in Iran,' Trump says
Iran Tensions U.S. tells embassy staff in Israel to leave now if they want as Trump threatens to attack Iran
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川普忙著找伊朗危機的下台階 - Sean James
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請參考：Why Attacking Iran Could Be Riskier Than Capturing Maduro
川瘋總算還有幾分鐘的清醒時刻。肯因將軍就是我在本欄2026/02/18這篇報導「前言」中所說的「大人」。真沒想到凡斯副總統在這次危機中試著扮演「小大人」；好歹還是得給他按個「讚」。
US Mulling an ‘Off Ramp’ On Iran As Top General Advises Trump Iran Attack Would Be ‘Far More Difficult’ Than Venezuela: NYT
Sean James, 02/22/26
President Donald Trump is weighing options to avoid a major military conflict with Iran if the country does not ditch its nuclear program after General Dan “Raizin” Caine told him an attack would be “far more difficult” than the operation that captured Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, The New York Times reported on Sunday evening.
The report said Trump and key members of his administration are heading to Geneva on Thursday to meet with Iranian negotiators; the meeting appears to be a “last-ditch” effort to avoid a military conflict.
“President Trump has told advisers that if diplomacy or any initial targeted U.S. attack does not lead Iran to give in to his demands that it give up its nuclear program, he will consider a much bigger attack in coming months intended to drive that country’s leaders from power,” the report said, based on “people briefed on internal administration deliberations.”
The Times story has four reporters on the byline — Julian E. Barnes, David E. Sanger, Tyler Pager, and Eric Schmitt.
Members of Trump’s team and on the Iranian side are both considering an “off-ramp to military conflict,” which would include a “very limited nuclear enrichment program” that would only be used for medical research, the report said. That is because some members of the administration have expressed “doubts” a full dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program occur, if the U.S. only conducts airstrikes.
Here is a key section on Caine warning Trump that attacking Iran could be harder than first expected:
During the discussions of the operation last month to seize President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela, General Caine told Mr. Trump there was a high likelihood of success. But General Caine has not been able to deliver the same reassurances to Mr. Trump during the Iran discussions, in large measure because it is a far more difficult target.
[Vice President JD] Vance, who has long called for more restraint in overseas military action, did not oppose a strike, but he intensely questioned General Caine and Mr. Ratcliffe in the meeting. He pressed them to share their opinions of the options and wanted more of a discussion of the risks and complexity of carrying out a strike against Iran.
The report comes a few days after CBS senior White House reporter Jennifer Jacobs reported top military officials told Trump the military is ready for a potential strike as soon as this weekend. And Axios’s Barak Ravid reported on February 18 that “a U.S. military operation in Iran would likely be a massive, weeks-long campaign that would look more like full-fledged war than last month’s pinpoint operation in Venezuela, sources say.”
All of this comes amid months of protests against Iran’s theocratic regime inside the country.
The Times report added Trump is leaving open the possibility for a “military assault later this year intended to help topple Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It appears this could go a number of ways heading into the big summit this Thursday.
The post US Mulling an ‘Off Ramp’ On Iran As Top General Advises Trump Iran Attack Would Be ‘Far More Difficult’ Than Venezuela: NYT first appeared on Mediaite.
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攻擊伊朗將造成美國戰略窘境 - Andrew Latham
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請參考：
Britain blocking use of air bases Trump says would be needed for strikes on Iran, UK media reports
多個媒體報導：美軍已經完成02/21大舉攻擊伊朗的準備。下文指出：戰爭結果雖然能夠達到一時或短期的目標，但它將削弱美軍之後在全球地緣戰略的軍力佈署。這顯然跟剛公佈《2026國防戰略白皮書》的宗旨不符(該欄2026/02/20)。至少，中東在該「國防戰略」中屬於第四優先地區。不過，世人本來也不曾寄望川瘋及其團隊拿得出什麼考慮周詳，言行一致的全球策略。
參考本欄2026/02/07和2026/02/19兩篇貼文。
A War Against Iran Could Open Up a Pandora’s Box That Won’t Be Easy To Close
Andrew Latham, 02/17/26
War on Iran Would Solve the Wrong Problem: Summary and Key Points
-A major U.S. strike campaign could severely damage Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, missile networks, and IRGC command nodes.
-The deeper issue is what comes after. Physical destruction would likely buy time, not resolution, while strengthening Tehran’s incentive to sprint toward an overt nuclear deterrent.
-Retaliation would surge through Iran’s proxy ecosystem, widening the battlespace and forcing sustained U.S. presence across air defense, maritime security, and regional reassurance.
-Energy shocks from Hormuz risks would ripple globally. The net effect: a militarily feasible operation that drains strategic bandwidth and tightens force-allocation pressure in higher-priority theaters.
A War on Iran Would Solve the Wrong Problem for America
The dispatch of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group to the Middle East is an unmistakable sign that U.S. carrier-based signalling to Tehran is giving way to real carrier-based strike preparation. Debate over a potential U.S. or Israeli bombing campaign has intensified in parallel as Tehran’s nuclear breakout potential remains acute and regional proxy activity continues to widen.
Much of that debate centers on feasibility — whether American airpower could significantly degrade Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, disrupt missile production and storage networks, and fracture IRGC command coordination long enough to alter regional deterrence dynamics. On those questions, the answer is almost certainly yes. The United States retains the capacity to impose severe physical damage on Iranian military and nuclear assets within a compressed operational window.
But military feasibility and strategic alignment are not the same thing. Even a highly successful bombing campaign, one that addressed the most visible manifestations of the Iran problem, would ultimately deepen the structural pressures already weighing on U.S. grand strategy.
Tactical Success Is Not in Doubt
A large-scale strike campaign would not resemble the episodic shadow-war exchanges that defined much of the U.S.–Iran confrontation over the past decade. Nor would it mirror the scale or duration of the 2025 12-Day War.
It would move immediately toward sustained degradation — nuclear infrastructure, missile forces, regime security networks — executed through repeated strike cycles rather than mere symbolic demonstration attacks.
The operational effects would be significant. Enrichment capacity could be pushed backward on the timeline. Missile regeneration would require time and industrial recovery. Personnel losses inside the IRGC would disrupt planning tempo and weaken coordination across partner organizations. In narrow military terms, the United States could inflict significant setbacks on Iran’s coercive reach.
Those gains, however, would be fleeting. Industrial recovery begins quickly in systems built with redundancy in mind. Nuclear knowledge survives bunker penetration. Facilities can be reconstituted deeper underground, dispersed across new sites, or hardened further. A strike campaign purchases time. It does not resolve the underlying challenge.
The Nuclear Acceleration Risk
The more consequential question is how Tehran would internalize such an attack. Modern regime survival lessons are not lost on Iranian planners. Iraq disarmed and fell. Libya abandoned its nuclear program and collapsed under external intervention.
A bombing campaign might therefore delay Iran’s technical progress while intensifying its political resolve. What had been calibrated nuclear latency could shift toward open weaponization. Survival logic would harden under direct assault. The pursuit of a deliverable deterrent would gain urgency rather than diminish.
In that sense, physical destruction and strategic radicalization could unfold simultaneously. Delay in infrastructure might coexist with acceleration in intent.
Proxy Retaliation and Regional Expansion
Strikes on Iranian territory would not remain geographically bounded. Tehran’s deterrent architecture is deliberately externalized across aligned militias and partner organizations. Retaliatory pressure would emerge quickly through those channels, not sequentially.
U.S. facilities throughout the region would be at risk of renewed attack. Hezbollah would activate whatever assets it had left and escalate along Israel’s northern border. The Houthis might resume their disruptions at sea if the war expands. The battlespace would extend well beyond Iranian territory rather than remain confined to it.
Managing that escalation would require a sustained American presence. Naval patrol zones would expand. Air defense assets would require reinforcement. Intelligence coverage would thicken across multiple theaters. A strike campaign would evolve into an enduring regional security management burden.
Energy Market Shockwaves
Iran’s geography ensures that conflict reverberates beyond military channels. Even limited disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would likely produce price volatility. More serious interference would transmit economic shock outward at speed.
Energy dislocation does not remain regional. It moves through inflation, allied fiscal strain, and the redistribution of revenue flows. Russia would benefit from sustained price elevation. Other hydrocarbon producers would capture windfall gains.
The economic externalities of war would shift balance sheets in ways misaligned with U.S. competitive positioning.
Military action would carry geoeconomic consequences independent of battlefield outcomes.
Strategic Bandwidth and Force Allocation
The most enduring effects would appear at the level of global posture. A major conflict with Iran would require sustained allocation of high-end U.S. assets. Carrier groups, bombers, ISR platforms, and missile defense architecture would be drawn into the theater over time.
Those deployments are not costless. Assets concentrated in the Gulf are unavailable elsewhere. Indo-Pacific balancing requirements would feel compression. European reassurance rotations could tighten. Readiness cycles would absorb operational strain.
Strategic competition does not pause for regional wars. China’s military trajectory would continue uninterrupted. Russian opportunism would remain opportunistic. A war with Iran would consume bandwidth for force allocation needed in higher-priority theaters.
The Overstretch Mechanism
This is the structural paradox at the heart of the bombing debate. A strike campaign might weaken Iran’s immediate capacity to threaten regional partners. Yet the act of waging that campaign would expand the perimeter that the United States must defend.
Retaliation risks would require a prolonged presence. Maritime security commitments would deepen. Partner reassurance demands would grow heavier. Each layer would add weight to an already extended strategic architecture.
Overstretch emerges when commitments accumulate faster than force structure can absorb. A new major theater of conflict would intensify that imbalance rather than relieve it.
Tactical Victory, Strategic Ambiguity
None of this negates battlefield effectiveness. On operational metrics, the campaign could register as a clear success.
But success measured in terms of physical damage obscures broader strategic effects. Iran would remain adversarial. Nuclear incentives might intensify. Proxy warfare would broaden. U.S. posture requirements would thicken rather than contract.
The United States would exit the conflict not into strategic relief, but into a more combustible regional system layered atop an already demanding global competition environment.
Solving the Immediate, Compounding the Enduring
The central question is not whether the United States can execute an effective bombing campaign. It can. The question is whether doing so resolves the dominant strategic pressures shaping American power in this period.
Here, the alignment frays. A war with Iran would address urgent operational concerns tied to nuclear latency and proxy coercion. At the same time, it would deepen the strain on force allocation, widen the demands on escalation management, and divert attention from pacing threats in other theaters.
In strategic terms, it would solve the most immediate problem while aggravating the most consequential one.
Andrew Latham is a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham.
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美國、伊朗戰爭後的中東政局 - Hamza Farooq
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下文分析的可信度頗高。在阿拉伯國家沒有能力和以色列正面交鋒時，隨之而來的必然是：「對象」和「手段」兩者都毫無禁忌的攻擊模式；或「西方媒體」所謂的「恐怖攻擊」；也就是下文作者警告的「血腥戰爭」(1)。
附註：
1. 原文的 “bloody war”。
The Iran War Isn’t the Problem. The Real Destruction Will Come Later.
I’m not talking about an Iranian civil war or a massive retaliation.
Hamza Farooq, 01/16//26
Suppose America finally launches a massive attack on Iran and now the Ayatollah regime is a part of history.
Now, there is either a pro-American leader in power in Iran, or the Iranians cannot agree on a government, and all major ethnic groups like the Kurds and Baloch have established their own separate governments.
But regardless of the outcome, America will achieve multiple victories beyond just the Middle Eastern front:
* First, China could no longer purchase Iranian oil. Just a few weeks ago, it lost access to Venezuelan oil as well. All of this will ultimately create long-term challenges for the Chinese economy.
* Second, the calculus of the Strait of Hormuz will entirely change. Under the Ayatollah’s regime, if it were blocked, the West and its allies would bear the loss. But now, if a pro-American regime blocks it, the loss will be borne by China, Russia, and their allies.
* Third, the supply of Iranian drones to Russia will now be cut off. This means that a reduction in Russian aggression in Ukraine could be expected to some extent.
* Fourth, America will now be positioned just seventy kilometers from the Pakistani port of Gwadar. This means the flagship structures of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative will now be easily within its reach.
* Fifth, by gaining control over Iran and Venezuela, America will now become the country with the world’s largest oil reserves. It can now easily lower oil prices. This, in turn, will dismantle the primary source of income for Russia and the Gulf nations at any time.
* Sixth, the Ayatollah’s regional proxy groups, which had been a persistent headache for Israel, will now be permanently gone.
* And seventh, and the most important one, is that if there is to be a hegemon in the region, it will be Israel alone.
And it is precisely from here that the real game will begin.
The fall of the Iranian government will undoubtedly bring an end to this ‘axis of resistance’ that the West feared. But it will ultimately give birth to a new ‘axis of resistance’ that will haunt the East, particularly the Arab nations.
And the most terrifying aspect of this will be that, unlike the previous ‘Axis of Resistance,’ this one will be completely unbridled and several times more powerful.
The reality is that, no matter how rogue Iran under the Ayatollahs may have been, it at least kept another rogue force in check. Because of this, a balance of power was maintained in the Middle East. But now, all power will tilt decisively in Israel’s favor.
In reality, Israel is also a type of Iran. Extremists are in power there as well. They just appear slightly more presentable.
And this new ‘Resistance’, Israel, may or may not carry out occasional small, non-kinetic attacks through proxies, but it will definitely conduct direct military bombings to reduce the region to rubble. There will be no one to stop it, nor will it itself have any regard for international law.
The reason for this is that this new ‘Resistance’ has repeatedly spoken of expanding its territory several times over. In fact, there are clear indications of support for these ambitions from the current American president.
And since new land cannot be created, achieving this goal will demand the sacrifice of at least seven neighboring Arab nations.
Before today, there was the fear of a second power, Iran under the Ayatollahs. That will no longer exist.
Why would the Arab nations, whose majority population considers Israel a colonial project, allow this new ‘Resistance’ to seize their land as well?
It’ll bring a bloody war.
The truth is that Israel’s past reveals many instances where it was simply waiting for an opportunity, and as soon as it arose, it achieved its ambitions. Our ancestors may remember the opportunity it seized in 1967, and our own generation has witnessed such an opportunity live in 2023.
Why would it then be difficult for Israel to find an opportunity to seize Arab land after the Iranian issue is resolved? The truth is, it will indeed find that opportunity. It is only a matter of sooner or later.
It is a geographic vulnerability and misfortune for the Arab nations that they are caught between Iran on one side and Israel on the other. Both are eager to dominate them. Whichever one is ‘subtracted,’ the one that does the subtracting will establish dominance over the Arabs. And now it is certain that the one doing the subtracting will be Israel.
Perhaps the Arab nations had clearly perceived this during the Israel-Iran war in June. That is why they now consider Israel, not Iran, their primary security threat. Saudi Arabia even took steps to acquire Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella in an attempt to deter Israel.
The September Israeli airstrikes in Qatar made it abundantly clear to the Arab nations that a situation akin to Gaza is inevitably around the corner for them as well.
That is why, after Iran’s departure, they now want to restore the balance of power. In this context, according to the latest news, it is entirely possible that after Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Turkey might also throw its weight against Israel.
Take any major war from history. When an entity is left unbridled, destruction becomes inevitable. There is no need here to detail or cite historical events.
And I think that it’s worth mentioning here that, whenever I alluded to Israeli warmongering in my previous articles, I was ridiculed. But everyone has quieted down dramatically since the attacks on Qatar.
Anyways.
Whatever happens, in the coming days, you will surely witness the funeral procession of whatever international laws remain.
Written by Hamza Farooq
I envisage a world governed by rules and moral values. But I analyze everything through a realistic lens. Freelance Work: hamzafcontent@gmail.com
I’m available for freelance work. If you need SEO-optimized, high-ranking content on geopolitics, international affairs, or political analysis, connect with me via email or Upwork.
Email: hamzafcontent@gmail.com
Upwork: View my profile & portfolio
Published in The Geopolitical Economist
In The Global geopolitics, truth is one, but the wise interpret it differently.— Here, we interpret these diversions
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美國伊朗核武談判審慎樂觀 -- Olivia Le Poidevin
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美、伊雙方領導人打打最砲，甚或短時間、局部性的舞機弄艦都無傷大雅。希望兩家有大人出來說幾句話，不要假戲真做或擦槍走火搞成全面戰爭；那就不僅僅是區域性的禍害了。請參見本欄2026/02/07貼文。
Iran foreign minister says progress made in nuclear talks with U.S. in Geneva
Olivia Le Poidevin, 02/17/26
GENEVA, Feb 17 (Reuters) - Iran and the United States reached an understanding on the main "guiding principles" in a second round of nuclear talks in Geneva on Tuesday but work still needs to be done, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said.
The progress does not mean an agreement will be reached soon but the path has started, he told Iranian media after the talks concluded.
Iranian state media reported earlier that Iran would temporarily shut part of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital global oil supply route, as it held talks over its nuclear programme with the United States, which has sent a battle force to the Gulf region to press Tehran to make concessions.
U.S. President Donald Trump has said "regime change" in Tehran may be the best thing that can happen, while Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Tuesday that any U.S. attempts to depose his government would fail.
Just as the talks got under way in Geneva, Iranian state media reported that parts of the strategic strait would close for a few hours due to "security precautions" while Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards conducted military drills there.
Tehran has in the past threatened to shut down the strait to commercial shipping if it is attacked, a move that would choke off a fifth of global oil flows and drive up crude prices.
Alongside Araqchi, U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner took part in the Geneva talks, which were being mediated by Oman, a source briefed on the matter told Reuters.
Reporting by Olivia Le Poidevin; Additional reporting by Parisa Hafezi and Elwely Elwelly in Dubai, Humeyra Pamuk in Budapest, Rishabh Jaiswal in Bengaluru, Steve Holland in Washington, Writing by Michael Georgy; Editing by Kevin Liffey, Lincoln Feast, Sharon Singleton and Gareth Jones
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
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美軍規劃攻擊伊朗長期方案 -- Phil Stewart/Idrees Ali
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這類消息也有可能只不過在：「虛聲恫嚇」。總之，我們平頭老百姓只能希望：五角大廈資深中級官員能夠做全面、深入、詳盡的「廟算」；請參考本欄上一篇。
巴拉維者可謂「伊奸」。
Exclusive: US military preparing for potentially weeks-long Iran operations
Phil Stewart/Idrees Ali, 02/14/26
Summary
* Trump says it has been difficult to make a deal with Iran
* US fully expects Iran to retaliate, official says
* A sustained campaign carries more risk to US forces, broader Middle East
WASHINGTON, Feb 14 (Reuters) - The U.S. military is preparing for the possibility of sustained, weeks-long operations against Iran if President Donald Trump orders an attack, two U.S. officials told Reuters, in what could become a far more serious conflict than previously seen between the countries.
The disclosure by the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the planning, raises the stakes for the diplomacy underway between the United States and Iran.
The Reuters Gulf Currents newsletter brings you the latest on geopolitics, energy and finance in the region. Sign up here.
U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner will hold negotiations with Iran on Tuesday in Geneva, with representatives from Oman acting as mediators. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio cautioned on Saturday that while Trump's preference was to reach a deal with Tehran, "that’s very hard to do."
Meanwhile, Trump has amassed military forces in the region, raising fears of new military action. U.S. officials said on Friday the Pentagon was sending an additional aircraft carrier to the Middle East, adding thousands more troops along with fighter aircraft, guided-missile destroyers and other firepower capable of waging attacks and defending against them.
Trump, speaking on Friday after a military event at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, openly floated the possibility of changing the government in Iran, saying it "seems like that would be the best thing that could happen." He declined to share who he wanted to take over Iran, but said, "there are people."
"For 47 years, they've been talking and talking and talking," Trump said.
Trump has long voiced skepticism about sending ground troops into Iran, saying last year, "the last thing you want to do is ground forces," and the kinds of U.S. firepower arrayed in the Middle East so far suggest options for strikes primarily by air and naval forces. In Venezuela, Trump demonstrated a willingness to rely also on special operations forces to seize that country's president, Nicolas Maduro, in a raid last month.
Asked for comment on the preparations for a potentially sustained U.S. military operation, White House spokesperson Anna Kelly said: "President Trump has all options on the table with regard to Iran."
"He listens to a variety of perspectives on any given issue, but makes the final decision based on what is best for our country and national security," Kelly said.
The Pentagon declined to comment.
The United States sent two aircraft carriers to the region last year, when it carried out strikes against Iranian nuclear sites.
However, June's "Midnight Hammer" operation was essentially a one-off U.S. attack, with stealth bombers flying from the United States to strike Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran staged a very limited retaliatory strike on a U.S. base in Qatar.
RISKS INCREASING
The planning under way this time is more complex, the officials said.
In a sustained campaign, the U.S. military could hit Iranian state and security facilities, not just nuclear infrastructure, one of the officials said. The official declined to provide specific details.
Experts say the risks to U.S. forces would be far greater in such an operation against Iran, which boasts a formidable arsenal of missiles. Retaliatory Iranian strikes also increase the risk of a regional conflict.
The same official said the United States fully expected Iran to retaliate, leading to back-and-forth strikes and reprisals over time.
The White House and Pentagon did not respond to questions about the risks of retaliation or regional conflict.
Trump has repeatedly threatened to bomb Iran over its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and crushing of internal dissent. On Thursday, he warned the alternative to a diplomatic solution would "be very traumatic, very traumatic."
Iran's Revolutionary Guard has warned that in case of strikes on Iranian territory, it could retaliate against any U.S. military base.
The U.S. maintains bases throughout the Middle East, including in Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met Trump for talks in Washington on Wednesday, saying that if an agreement with Iran were reached, "it must include the elements that are vital to Israel."
Iran has said it is prepared to discuss curbs on its nuclear program in exchange for lifting sanctions, but has ruled out linking the issue to missiles.
On Saturday, Iranian opposition figure Reza Pahlavi said U.S. military intervention in Iran could save lives and urged Washington not to spend too long negotiating with Tehran's clerical rulers on a nuclear deal.
The exiled son of Iran's toppled shah told Reuters in an interview there were signs that the Iranian government was on the brink of collapse and that an attack could weaken it or accelerate its fall.
"We are hoping that this attack will expedite the process and the people can be finally back in the streets and take it all the way to the ultimate regime's downfall," said Pahlavi, who is based in the United States and has lived outside Iran since before his father was toppled in the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Reporting by Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali; Editing by Don Durfee, Rosalba O'Brien, Rod Nickel
Phil Stewart has reported from more than 60 countries, including Afghanistan, Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, China and South Sudan. An award-winning Washington-based national security reporter, Phil has appeared on NPR, PBS NewsHour, Fox News and other programs and moderated national security events, including at the Reagan National Defense Forum and the German Marshall Fund. He is a recipient of the Edwin M. Hood Award for Diplomatic Correspondence and the Joe Galloway Award.
Idrees Ali is a National security correspondent focusing on the Pentagon in Washington D.C. Reports on U.S. military activity and operations throughout the world and the impact that they have. Has reported from over two dozen countries to include Iraq, Afghanistan, and much of the Middle East, Asia and Europe. From Karachi, Pakistan.
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
本文於 修改第 1 次
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伊、以各自的同歸於盡殺手鐧 - Hamza Farooq
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從他大名來看，作者應該是中東裔；從而，請各位自行判斷：下文內容是否「危言聳聽」。
Iran’s Retaliation Blueprint Is Ready. And It Should Worry Everyone.
It’s not about the Strait of Hormuz or contaminating the Gulf’s waters with nuclear waste…
Hamza Farooq, 02/02/26
In response to recent threats of attack and military buildup by the US, Iran responded by saying that “it will retaliate like never before.”
Now, receiving such a response isn’t surprising. Even the weakest armies say such things when threatened. And Iran is, among the armies the US has clashed with in this century, the strongest foe.
But if we carefully analyze Iran’s message within the context of the 12-day war last June, we can get the potential severity of this threat. It is one that might eventually bring the whole world down.
Here’s how. Take a look at the picture circulating on X nowadays.
Image link. 地圖照片
It marks five Israeli targets which, if attacked successfully, can bring the whole Israeli economy to its knees and eventually “deport” everyone living there. And with no population and economy, Israel could collapse in days if not hours.
These targets are the water desalination plants.
Like other Middle Eastern nations, Israel doesn’t have sufficient flowing water for household use and to sustain its industries. So, it has built five major desalination plants on the Mediterranean coast to make seawater usable for its population.
Estimates say that at least 65% of Israel’s water comes from these plants. The rest comes from natural lakes, rivers, and groundwater.
Can you run a country without water? Absolutely not. And if Iran successfully destroys these water desalination plants, the game could be over for Israel in no time. With no water to sustain the economy and for domestic consumption, the hustling-bustling country of Israel will come to a halt.
Iran’s use of water as a weapon is now highly likely. Here’s why:
1. Iran knows that it can’t sustain a long war, as its regime would surely collapse. So naturally, there’s no point in not hitting the enemy where it hurts the most when you yourself are not going to survive.
2. During the 12-day war, the attacks were limited. Both sides showed restraint, and attacks were more symbolic than decisive. Iran didn’t go all out because it preferred a ceasefire. That’s why it attacked a target in Qatar only after warning the Qatari government. This time, however, it’s clear that no holds will be barred. All gloves are off. And that goes for both sides.
3. Iran has unequivocally declared that it will attack Israel if the US attacks Iran, even if Israel doesn’t play any role in the war. Iran has also declared that even a small, limited attack by the US will be considered the start of an all-out war.
4. Water wars are real. There are recent examples in the international community of similar tactics. Look at South Asia. After a terrorist attack in India in April 2025, which India blamed on Pakistan, India suspended the Indus Water Treaty. This treaty guaranteed that Pakistan would keep receiving water from the rivers that flow from India. Pakistan’s entire economy depends on this water, and without this treaty, India could stop the water, eventually desertifying Pakistan without firing a single shot. Iran might very well be taking this move out of the Indian playbook to justify its attack on Israel’s water plants. After all, everything is fair in love and war.
5. Furthermore, the recent history of using water as a weapon also exists within the Iran-Israel conflict. Recently, Israeli PM Netanyahu openly tried to exploit Iran’s water shortage issues in Israel’s favor. This means that Iran might want to exploit Israel’s water issues in a tit-for-tat response.
Having said that, on the surface, if such a situation arises, this would seem to be only Israel’s problem. However, it has the catastrophic potential to become a global problem almost immediately.
Here’s why I say this.
Just as I argued that Iran will try to escalate this war because it will be sure its regime won’t survive, Israel would also escalate far more drastically if its collapse seems imminent.
For those who don’t know, Israel is widely believed to have a “Samson Option.” This is a purported last-resort strategy to be employed if it ever feels the threat of annihilation. In simple words, this doctrine says that Israel will nuke the whole region if its own survival is at stake.
After all, no water means no population and no economy. And without these two pillars, a state can’t survive.
The name of this doctrine is a reference to the biblical Israelite judge Samson, who pushed apart the pillars of a Philistine temple, bringing down the roof and killing himself and thousands of Philistines who had captured him.
And if Israel ever employs the Samson Option, I don’t need to explain what will happen next to the whole world…
Even if we never see Iranian attacks on Israeli water desalination plants, there are plenty of other options Iran would definitely pursue.
I wish things never escalate. But if the US really wants to attack Iran, any action would need to be super-calculated. Unless it boosts defenses in the Middle East so much that no Iranian missile can penetrate them, I don’t think it’s wise to start a war.
The US needs to make sure that the Iranian missile barrage that overwhelmed Israeli air defenses in June can be stopped from hitting any critical target this time. Or ultimately the onus of the losses in the whole world will be on the US alone.
The situation reminds me of a famous Urdu couplet (烏都語金句) :
(烏都文；無法複製。)
Take even a breath gently, for very delicate is the work
Of this glassblower’s workshop of the cosmos.
I’m available for freelance work. If you need SEO-optimized, high-ranking content on geopolitics, international affairs, or political analysis, connect with me via email or Upwork.
Email: hamzafcontent@gmail.com
Upwork: View my profile & portfolio
If you found this geopolitical analysis intriguing, I explore similar high-stakes economic strategies in short-form videos on my YouTube channel, It’s the Economy. Please check it out and subscribe if you like the content!
Written by Hamza Farooq
I envisage a world governed by rules and moral values. But I analyze everything through a realistic lens. Freelance Work: hamzafcontent@gmail.com
Published in The Geopolitical Economist
In The Global geopolitics, truth is one, but the wise interpret it differently.— Here, we interpret these diversions
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本文於 修改第 1 次
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面對伊朗危機川普6個可行方案 -- Adrian Blomfield
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根據川瘋個人「人格」和他僚屬的素質兩者看(1)，他鋌而走險執行「伊拉克方案」(大規模入侵)，或步步調入這個泥淖的機會，大概在50%以上。這應該是「把美國搞垮」的最後一根稻草、木棍、或鐵釘。
附註：
1. 「人格」一詞在此脈絡為心理學術語。
Trump has six options that will define the future of Iran
Massive force, swiftly delivered has brought wins – but White House recognises risk of ‘forever war’
Adrian Blomfield, 01/30/26
For someone so instinctively non-interventionist, Donald Trump has developed a taste for military action – particularly when the battle is short and decisive.
The snatch-and-run operation to spirit Nicolás Maduro out of Venezuela this month and last year’s bunker-busting raids on Iran’s nuclear facilities allowed the United States president to savour emphatic victories without entanglement. Both reinforced his belief that force, swiftly applied, can deliver results.
Emboldened by those successes, determined to reassert Washington’s global primacy and sensing what he sees as a historic opportunity to remove a regime that has menaced the Middle East for nearly half a century, Mr Trump is again contemplating the military option.
This time, however, the gamble is far greater. If the US president decides to use force, it is conceivable that he could indeed topple the ayatollahs who have suffocated and subjugated Iran for decades.
But if things go wrong, he could also ignite a regional conflagration, spark a civil war and drag the US into the very kind of forever conflict he has long railed against.
“The risks are immense, but so are the rewards,” said Yossi Kuperwasser, a former head of research for Israeli military intelligence. “It is a very difficult decision to make.”
A fortnight ago, as Mr Trump promised protesters on Iran’s streets that help was “on the way”, Israel lobbied against US military strikes. Officials feared that the interceptor air defence stockpile Israel burnt through during last year’s war had left the country dangerously exposed to an Iranian ballistic-missile counter-attack.
Those concerns have been partly allayed by the build-up of US offensive and defensive assets in the region. Israel is now believed to be keen for Mr Trump to take action, even as anxious Gulf powers urge restraint.
中東地區美國軍力佈署圖
Much depends on what, precisely, the US is trying to achieve – something that has grown less clear now that the protests have been crushed.
Is he seeking to punish Iran for slaughtering thousands – and possibly tens of thousands – of its own people? Is the aim to force Iran into a deal in which it formally abandons its nuclear programme? Or is he pursuing regime change – and if so, what would that actually look like?
Diplomats and analysts say there are essentially six scenarios under consideration.
Military pressure alone
The Iranian regime has rarely looked weaker. The three pillars of its regional power – its network of proxy militias, its nuclear programme and its ballistic-missile arsenal – have all been significantly degraded over the past two years. The brutal suppression of protests has shorn it of what little domestic legitimacy it retained. Fear alone sustains the system.
A show of might, rather than force, may therefore be sufficient to extract major concessions. With their survival at stake, Iran’s rulers might countenance steps they have long rejected: formally abandoning nuclear ambitions, dismantling proxy networks and surrendering remaining ballistic missiles – perhaps even sacrificing the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Such an outcome would hand Mr Trump a major foreign-policy triumph without a shot being fired. Nothing would burnish his credentials more.
Yet diplomats regard it as unlikely. The regime appears determined to “resist rather than retreat”, says one. If Tehran digs in and Washington then backs away, Mr Trump risks looking weak.
The symbolic strike
Having set a red line – threatening military action if the regime continued killing protesters – Mr Trump has placed himself under pressure to act. The last thing he wants is to be likened to Barack Obama, who failed to enforce his own red lines in Syria.
If credibility is his overriding concern, the president could opt for a limited, largely symbolic strike, echoing his 2017 and 2018 missile attacks on Syrian regime targets.
Under such a scenario, US forces might hit one or two high-profile sites, such as the Thar-Allah headquarters in Tehran, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command centre widely seen as the nerve hub of internal repression. The destruction of such a building would be celebrated by many Iranians.
This would be a “low-cost, low-reward” option, one diplomat says. Mr Trump could claim to have kept his word while minimising the risk of retaliation. But so limited a response would leave his administration open to charges of having betrayed the protesters and reduced mass killings to a performative gesture.
Limited substantive action
Mr Trump could choose broader strikes designed to encourage renewed unrest, placing the regime under simultaneous external and internal pressure.
Such a campaign would probably last several days, targeting air defences, ballistic-missile launchers, communications infrastructure, energy facilities and IRGC installations, including facilities linked to the Basij militia responsible for much of the protest violence.
The objective would be to create conditions in which Iranians might seize the initiative themselves, allowing the US to facilitate rather than directly engineer regime change.
The risks are considerable.
Protesters, exhausted, traumatised and suspicious, may not respond. Strikes could instead rally the population around the regime, as they did during June’s 12-day war. Many IRGC and Basij facilities sit in densely populated areas, raising the likelihood of civilian casualties.
And Iran, which still retains a substantial missile arsenal despite the losses suffered in June, could retaliate against Israel or the Gulf states.
The Maduro option
Should Israel or the US acquire actionable intelligence, Mr Trump might authorize an operation to capture or kill Khamenei – something he was reluctant to contemplate last year.
“We know exactly where the so-called supreme leader is hiding,” he said during the 12-day war. “He is an easy target, but… we are not going to take him out, at least not for now.”
Such a strike would allow Mr Trump a Maduro moment, though on a vastly greater scale. But locating Khamenei may now be far harder.
After the war, the regime launched an extensive counter-espionage purge, arresting thousands and executing an unknown number. Security around senior officials has tightened, safe houses have multiplied and Khamenei rarely appears in public.
Even if successful, there is no guarantee his successor would prove pliant – or stabilising.
The Gaddafi option
Should limited action fail, Mr Trump could escalate, sustaining air strikes until the regime collapses, while providing support to re-emerging protests.
“If the Iranian regime is going to be removed, the reward for the safety and security of the world, and of the Middle East in particular, would be immense,” said Gen Kuperwasser. “It justifies the risks.”
Those risks are formidable. It took seven months to topple Gaddafi, and Iran – unlike Libya – has no organised rebel force advancing on the capital. A prolonged campaign would risk a rupture between Mr Trump and the anti-interventionist wing of his base.
Facing a threat to its existence, Iran could attempt to ignite the region, striking Israel, US bases and even naval assets. It could target Gulf oil facilities or attempt to seal the Strait of Hormuz, sending oil prices soaring and undermining Mr Trump’s domestic priorities.
This helps explain why Gulf allies, despite warm ties with the White House, oppose strikes so resolutely and have refused to allow the US to use their territory, airspace or waters for an attack on Iran.
They fear, too, what might follow regime collapse. “The risk of chaos, even of civil war, is unacceptably high,” said one former Arab diplomat. “Containment may be safer than confrontation.”
The Saddam option
One path Mr Trump is almost certainly not considering is an Iraq-style ground invasion.
Boots on the ground would be the most effective way to topple the regime, but managing a transition in Iran – a country nearly four times the size of Iraq, with twice the population and a far more complex social fabric – would be vastly harder.
Mr Trump has been accused of bombast, but not even his foes consider him gung-ho. The last thing he wants is another Iraq – though he may find that, having ordered military action, he has stumbled into the kind of Middle Eastern entanglement he long swore to avoid.
Mr Trump has shown that he believes wars can be won quickly, cleanly and on his own terms. A new intervention may yet prove him right – but Iran could just as easily be the place where his foreign policy starts to unravel.
Try full access to The Telegraph free today. Unlock their award-winning website and essential news app, plus useful tools and expert guides for your money, health and holidays.
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伊朗將如何回應川普步步進逼 - Amir Azimi
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狗急了都要跳牆；那些吃香喝辣，養尊處優慣了的「革命衛隊」大爺們，一想到沒酒、沒肉、沒女人的苦日子，怎麼可能會不惡向膽邊生 -- 橫豎都是個死字；老子跟你拚了！
倒霉的只會是伊朗老百姓和航空母艦上的美國子弟。
到目前為止，川瘋的表現用「人如其名」來形容可說維妙維肖。大家等著看：「兩敗俱傷，各掘墳墓」的大戲吧！
Why Iran's response to a US attack could be different this time
Amir Azimi - BBC News Persian, 01/30/26
The arrival of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group into the US Central Command area of responsibility, close to Iranian waters, has sharpened the sense that a broader confrontation may be taking shape.
Coming amid the most extensive and violent crackdown on protests in Iran in recent memory, the deployment underscores how close Washington and Tehran may now be to a direct showdown, closer than at any point in recent years.
Iranian leaders find themselves squeezed between a protest movement increasingly demanding the removal of the regime itself and a US president who has kept his intentions deliberately opaque, fuelling anxiety not only in Tehran but across an already volatile region.
Iran's response to a potential US military strike may not follow the familiar, carefully calibrated pattern seen in earlier confrontations with Washington.
President Donald Trump's recent threats, made in the context of Iran's violent suppression of domestic unrest, come at a moment of exceptional internal strain for the Islamic Republic. As a result, any US attack now carries a significantly higher risk of rapid escalation, both regionally and inside Iran.
In recent years, Tehran has shown a preference for delayed and limited retaliation.
After US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on 21-22 June 2025, Iran responded with a missile attack on the US-operated Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar the following day.
According to President Trump, Iran had given advance warning of the strike, allowing air defences to intercept most of the missiles. No casualties were reported. The exchange was widely interpreted as a deliberate attempt by Iran to signal resolve while avoiding a wider war.
A similar pattern emerged in January 2020, during Trump's first presidency. Following the US assassination of Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani near Baghdad airport on 3 January, Iran retaliated five days later by firing missiles at the US Ain al-Asad airbase in Iraq.
Again, advance warning was provided. While no US personnel were killed, dozens later reported traumatic brain injuries. The episode reinforced the perception that Tehran sought to manage escalation rather than provoke it.
The present moment, however, is markedly different.
Iran is emerging from one of the most serious waves of domestic unrest since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979.
Protests that erupted in late December and early January were met with a severe violent crackdown. Human rights organisations and medical workers inside the country report that several thousand people have been killed, with many more injured or detained.
The exact numbers cannot be verified due to a lack of access and an internet blackout which has continued for more than two weeks. Iranian authorities have not accepted responsibility for the deaths, instead blaming what they describe as "terrorist groups" and accusing Israel of fomenting the unrest.
That narrative has been echoed at the highest levels of the state. Iran's secretary of the Supreme National Security Council said recently that the protests should be seen as a continuation of last summer's 12-day war with Israel, a framing that offers insight into the authorities' security-first response and that might have been used as an excuse to justify the scale and intensity of the crackdown.
Although the scale of street protests has since diminished, they have not ended. The grievances remain unresolved, and the divide between large parts of society and the ruling system has rarely appeared so wide.
On 8 and 9 January, security forces reportedly lost control of parts of several towns and neighbourhoods in major cities before reasserting authority through overwhelming force.
That brief loss of control appears to have deeply unsettled the authorities. The calm that followed has been imposed rather than negotiated, leaving the situation highly combustible.
Uncompromising rhetoric
Against this backdrop, the nature of any US strike becomes critical.
A limited attack may allow Washington to claim military success while avoiding immediate regional war, but it could also provide Iranian authorities with a pretext for another round of internal repression.
Such a scenario risks fresh crackdowns, mass arrests and a new wave of harsh sentences, including death penalties, for protesters already in detention.
At the other extreme, a broader US campaign that significantly weakens or cripples the Iranian state could push the country towards the brink of chaos.
The sudden collapse of central authority in a country of more than 90 million people would be unlikely to produce a clean or rapid transition. Instead, it could trigger prolonged instability, factional violence, and spillover effects across the region, with consequences that may take years to contain.
These risks help explain the increasingly uncompromising rhetoric from Tehran.
Senior commanders in both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the regular armed forces, along with senior political officials, have warned that any US attack-regardless of scale-would be treated as an act of war.
Such declarations have unsettled Iran's neighbours, particularly Gulf states hosting US forces. A rapid Iranian response would place those countries - and Israel - at immediate risk, regardless of their direct involvement, and raises the prospect of a conflict spreading far beyond Iran and the United States.
Washington, too, faces constraints. Trump has repeatedly warned Iranian authorities against using violence against protesters and, at the height of the unrest, told Iranians that "help is coming". Those remarks were widely circulated inside Iran and raised expectations among protesters.
Both sides are aware of the broader strategic picture.
Trump knows Iran is militarily weaker than it was before last summer's 12-day war, and Tehran is aware that he has little appetite for a full-scale, open-ended conflict.
That mutual awareness may provide some reassurance, but it could also create dangerous misperceptions, with each side potentially overestimating its leverage or misreading the opponent's intentions.
For Trump, finding a balance, whatever that might be, is crucial. He needs an outcome he can present as a victory, without tipping Iran into either a renewed cycle of repression or a descent into chaos.
For Iranian leaders, the danger lies in timing and perception. Iran's previous model of delayed, symbolic retaliation may no longer be sufficient if leaders believe speed is essential to reassert deterrence on the outside and control inside of the country that was shaken by the scale of the recent unrests.
Yet, a rapid response would sharply increase the risk of miscalculation, drawing regional actors into a conflict few can afford.
With both sides under intense pressure and little room to manoeuvre, a long-running game of brinkmanship may be approaching its most dangerous moment, one in which the cost of getting the balance wrong would be borne not only by governments, but by millions of ordinary Iranians and the wider region beyond.
相關新聞
Is the US preparing to strike Iran again?
What could happen if the US strikes Iran? Here are seven scenarios
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好人難做：以色列軍方爆醜聞 – M. Lidman/J. Frankel
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「道德」的重要性不在於它能導出「禮教」或「道學」；而在於：「四維不張，國乃滅亡」(《管子•牧民》第1；「四維」之意請見該篇第2)。其「所以然」者，蓋因：「道德」的功能在維繫社會穩定發展；「道德」淪喪則社會秩序動盪，社會秩序動盪則國將不國。
美國的衰敗驗證了管子的睿智，以色列其能遠乎？
Israel rocked by scandal as top military lawyer resigns, goes missing, is found and thrown into jail
MELANIE LIDMAN/JULIA FRANKEL, 11/04/25
JERUSALEM (AP) — Until last week, Maj. Gen. Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi was the Israeli army's top lawyer. Now she is behind bars and at the center of a scandal rocking the country after a bizarre sequence of events that included her abrupt resignation, a brief disappearance and a frantic search that led authorities to find her on a Tel Aviv beach.
The soap opera-worthy saga was touched off last week by Tomer-Yerushalmi’s explosive admission that she approved the leak of a surveillance video at the center of a politically divisive investigation into allegations of severe abuse against a Palestinian at a notorious Israeli military prison.
The video shows part of an assault in which Israeli soldiers are accused of sexually abusing a Palestinian detainee.
By leaking the video last year, Tomer-Yerushalmi aimed to expose the seriousness of the allegations her office was investigating. Instead, it triggered fierce criticism from Israel's hard-line political leaders. After Tomer-Yerushalmi resigned under pressure last week, her critics continued to heave personal insults.
She left a cryptic note for her family and abandoned her car near a beach. That led to fears she may have taken her own life and prompted an intensive search that included the use of military drones.
She was found alive at the beach Sunday night, at which point more vitriol against her was unleashed.
“We can resume the lynch,” right-wing TV personality Yinon Magal, an ally of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, posted on X with a winking-face emoji.
After it was revealed that one of Tomer-Yerushalmi's phones had disappeared, right-wing politicians and commentators began to accuse her of staging a suicide attempt as a way to destroy potential evidence.
The extraordinary episode shows two years of devastating war have done little to heal a country that was deeply divided even before Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023, attack. It also makes Tomer-Yerushalmi the latest in a long line of top security officials who have either left office or been forced out, most of them to be replaced by people considered loyal to Netanyahu and his hardline government.
Anger over leak distracts from severe abuse at heart of case
At a court hearing Monday, the judge said Tomer-Yerushalmi's detention would be extended until Wednesday on suspicion of committing fraud, breach of trust and obstruction of justice. While the investigation into her actions continues, she is being held at a women’s prison in central Israel.
Israeli media reported that former chief military prosecutor Col. Matan Solomesh was also arrested in connection with the leak investigation. The prime minister's office has refused to comment on Solomesh’s arrest.
The fury over the leaked video reveals the depth of polarization in Israel — and at least for the moment, keeps the media and the public focused on the leak and not the allegations of abuse.
The assault occurred on July 5, 2024, at the Sde Teiman military prison, according to the indictment against the accused soldiers. The AP has investigated allegations of inhumane treatment and abuse at Sde Teiman that predate those in the surveillance video.
That video, which has been aired by Israeli news, shows soldiers taking a detainee into an area they cordoned off with shields in an apparent attempt to hide their actions. The indictment said the soldiers assaulted the Palestinian prisoner and sodomized him with a knife, causing multiple injuries.
A medical staffer familiar with the case who spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear for his safety said the detainee arrived at a civilian hospital in life-threatening condition with blunt trauma to the abdomen and the chest and fractured ribs.
He said the detainee underwent surgery for a perforated rectum and was released back to Sde Teiman days later. The staffer said it was the most extreme abuse case he was familiar with from Sde Teiman.
When military police came to Sde Teiman in July to detain the soldiers suspected of abuse, they scuffled with protesters opposed to the arrests. Later, hundreds of violent protesters broke into the detention center.
In her resignation letter, Tomer-Yerushalmi wrote that she had exposed evidence of the abuse to counter the idea that the military was unfairly targeting its own soldiers. That idea was creating a danger to the military’s law enforcement, she said, citing the break-in.
She wrote that the military had a “duty to investigate when there is reasonable suspicion of violence against a detainee.
“Unfortunately, this basic understanding — that there are actions which must never be taken even against the vilest of detainees — no longer convinces everyone,” she wrote.
The Palestinian detainee who was the subject of the alleged abuse in the video was released back to Gaza last month as part of an exchange between living hostages and Palestinian prisoners, according to documents from the military prosecutor’s office obtained by the AP.
The case is still pending before the military court.
A web of legal issues
Three separate legal issues must be sorted out as part of Israel’s investigation into what happened at Sde Teiman, said Yohanan Plesner, the president of the Jerusalem-based think tank Israel Democracy Institute.
The first is the allegation that Israeli soldiers tortured Hamas militants while they were in detention. The second is whether Israeli civilians, including members of parliament, tried to disrupt the investigation by breaking into the military base where the soldiers accused of the actions were being held. The third is whether the military attorney general allegedly committed a host of offenses, including fraud, to undermine the investigation into how a video purporting to show the abuse was leaked to the media.
The intense rhetoric over the past few days is reminiscent of what it was like in Israel immediately before the Oct. 7 attack that launched the war in Gaza, Plesner said. At the time, the public was deeply divided over Netanyahu’s push to overhaul the judiciary.
The concern for a few hours Sunday night about Tomer-Yerushalmi’s fate should serve as a “stop sign” to the Israeli public — and especially to commentators who derided her personally, Plesner said.
“It was very sad to see how the internal discourse can bring about such potentially tragic outcome on a personal level,” Plesner said.
It felt especially symbolic, he said, that Tomer-Yerushalmi was in court while the Israeli government held its official memorial ceremony marking the 30th anniversary of the assassination of then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.
Many regard the assassination as Israel's lowest point in terms of divisions and incitement among the Israeli public, and worry that the dramatic events of the weekend foreshadow Israel's return to a similar period of internal strife.
“It was very sad to see how the internal discourse can bring about such potentially tragic outcome on a personal level,” Plesner said. “There's a way how to debate our differences in a democratic society."
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