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中東風雲錄--開欄文：埃及的加薩重建方案 -- Al Jazeera
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下文為本欄開欄文。
埃及的加薩重建方案 -- Al Jazeera
What is Egypt’s plan for the reconstruction of Gaza?
Arab League endorses Egyptian proposal that provides alternative to US President Trump’s plan to take over Gaza.
Al Jazeera Staff, 03/04/25
Arab states have adopted Egypt’s Gaza reconstruction plan, providing a potential path forward after Israel’s devastating war on the Palestinian enclave.
Egypt unveiled its plan on Tuesday while hosting an Arab League Summit in its capital Cairo.
The plan offers an alternative to United States President Donald Trump’s suggestion that the Gaza Strip be depopulated to “develop” the enclave, under US control, in what critics have called ethnic cleansing. Under the Egyptian plan, Gaza’s Palestinian population would not be forced to leave the territory.
Trump had insisted that Egypt and Jordan take Palestinians forced out of Gaza by his plan, but that was quickly rejected, and the US has signalled that it is open to hearing what an Arab plan for Gaza’s post-war reconstruction would be.
Speaking at the start of the summit, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi said that Trump would be able to achieve peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Here’s everything you need to know about the plan, based on Al Jazeera’s own reporting, as well as drafts of the plan reported on by the Reuters news agency and the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram.
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What does the Egyptian plan call for?
The plan consists of three major stages: Interim measures, reconstruction and governance.
The first stage would last about six months, while the next two phases would take place over a combined four to five years.
The aim is to reconstruct Gaza – which Israel has almost completely destroyed – maintain peace and security and reassert the governance of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the territory, 17 years after it was kicked out following fighting between Fatah, which dominates the PA, and Hamas.
How does the plan aim to rebuild Gaza?
A six-month interim period would require a committee of Palestinian technocrats – operating under the management of the PA – to clear the rubble from Salah al-Din Street, which is the main north-south highway in the Gaza Strip.
Once the roads are clear, 200,000 temporary housing units would be built to accommodate 1.2 million people and about 60,000 damaged buildings restored.
According to the blueprint, longer-term reconstruction requires an additional four to five years after the interim measures are completed. Over that span, the plan aims to build at least 400,000 permanent homes, as well as rebuilding Gaza’s seaport and international airport.
Gradually, basic provisions such as water, a waste system, telecommunication services and electricity would also be restored.
The plan further calls for the establishment of a Steering and Management Council, which would be a financial fund supporting the interim governing body in Gaza.
In addition, conferences will be held for international donors to provide the necessary funding for reconstruction and long-term development in the Strip.
Who would be in charge of Gaza?
The plan calls for a group of “independent Palestinian technocrats” to manage affairs in Gaza, in effect replacing Hamas.
The technocratic government would be responsible for overseeing humanitarian aid and would pave the way for the PA to administer Gaza, according to el-Sisi.
Speaking at Tuesday’s summit, PA President Mahmoud Abbas said that an election could take place next year if circumstances allowed.
On the security front, Egypt and Jordan have both pledged to train Palestinian police officers and deploy them to Gaza. The two countries have also called on the United Nations Security Council to consider authorising a peacekeeping mission to oversee governance in Gaza until reconstruction is complete.
How much is this going to cost?
Egypt is calling for $53 bn to fund the reconstruction of Gaza, with the money distributed over three phases.
In the first six-month phase it would cost $3bn to clear rubble from Salah al-Din Street, construct temporary housing and restore partially damaged homes.
The second phase would take two years and cost $20bn. The work of rubble removal would continue in this phase, as well as the establishment of utility networks and the building of more housing units.
Phase three would cost $30bn and take two and a half years. It would include completing housing for Gaza’s whole population, establishing the first phase of an industrial zone, building fishing and commercial ports, and building an airport, among other services.
According to the plan, the money will be sourced from a variety of international sources including the UN and international financial organisations as well as foreign and private sector investments.
Is the plan going to work?
There are still a number of variables that could complicate the plan. Perhaps most importantly, it is unclear whether Hamas, Israel or the US will agree to it.
Hamas welcomed the reconstruction plan, and has previously agreed to a technocratic government. But it is less clear if it will accept the return of the PA, which itself would face the perception from its critics that it has returned to Gaza on the back of Israel’s tanks.
Hamas may be willing to discuss its removal from governance, but is adamantly against its disarmament – something the Egyptian plan adopted by the Arab League did not discuss.
Israel has made it clear that this is a red line, and that Hamas will not be allowed to keep its weapons. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also said that he will not allow the PA to return to Gaza.
There is also the question of whether Trump will abandon his idea of a US-controlled “Middle East Riviera” for the Egyptian plan. It is difficult to predict what Trump’s position will be, particularly if Israel signals its opposition to the Egyptian plan.
What has the response been so far?
In response to Egypt’s plan, Israel said that Arab states needed to “break free from past constraints and collaborate to create a future of stability and security in the region”.
Instead, Israel continues to back Trump’s Gaza displacement plan – which echoes a longstanding call from the Israeli far-right to depopulate Gaza.
Egypt called Israel’s response “unacceptable”, with Minister of Foreign Affairs Badr Abdelatty describing the Netanyahu government’s position as “stubborn and extremist”.
Abdelatty said it would be impossible to see peace in the region without an independent Palestinian state. “No single state should be allowed to impose its will on the international community,” he added.
The White House continues to stand by Trump’s plan for Gaza, but said it would welcome collaboration with regional partners – except Hamas.
“While the President stands by his bold vision for a post-war Gaza, he welcomes input from our Arab partners in the region. It’s clear his proposals have driven the region to come to the table rather than allow this issue to devolve into further crisis,” White House National Security Council spokesman Brian Hughes said.
“President Trump has been clear that Hamas cannot continue to govern Gaza,” he added.
相關閱讀：
Arab leaders endorse Egypt’s Gaza reconstruction plan
European leaders back 'realistic' Arab plan for Gaza
For Israel, ceasefire is a continuation of war by other means
The Egyptian Gaza plan: A deadly trap for Israel and the US
The Egyptian plan for postwar Gaza is a good starting point—but it needs changes
本文於 修改第 3 次
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伊朗啪啪打臉川普 ---- Parisa Hafezi/Steve Holland
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請參考：
Iran’s Supreme Leader Says It Won’t Give Up Nuclear Assets In Rare Public Statement (05/01)
Trump Calls Secret Meeting as His War Crisis Spirals
Trump unhappy with Iran's latest proposal to end the war
Parisa Hafezi/Steve Holland, 04/28/26
Summary
* Iranian plan would set aside nuclear issue until war ends
* Trump unhappy with delaying deal on nuclear programme
* Iran demands blockade be lifted before any negotiations begin
DUBAI/WASHINGTON, April 28 (Reuters) - U.S. President Donald Trump is unhappy with the latest Iranian proposal on resolving the two-month war, a U.S. official said, dampening hopes for resolution of a conflict that has disrupted energy supplies, fuelled inflation, and killed thousands.
Iran's latest proposal would set aside discussion of Iran's nuclear programme until the war, on hold following a ceasefire announced earlier this month, is ended and disputes over shipping from the Gulf are resolved.
Trump is unhappy with Iran's proposal as he wants nuclear issues dealt with from the outset, said a U.S. official briefed on the president's Monday meeting with his advisers, speaking on condition of anonymity.
White House spokeswoman Olivia Wales said the U.S. has "been clear about our red lines" as it seeks to end the war it began in February alongside Israel.
A previous agreement in 2015 between Iran and multiple other countries including the U.S. sharply curtailed Iran's nuclear programme, which it has long maintained is for peaceful, civilian purposes. But that deal fell apart when Trump unilaterally withdrew from it in his first term in office.
Hopes of reviving peace efforts have receded since the U.S. president scrapped a visit planned for last weekend by his special envoy Steve Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner to mediator Pakistan.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi shuttled in and out of Islamabad twice during the weekend. He also visited Oman and on Monday went to Russia, where he met President Vladimir Putin and received words of support from a longstanding ally.
Iran's Deputy Defence Minister Reza Talaei-Nik said on Tuesday that Tehran was ready to share defensive weapons capabilities and experiences gained from "America's defeat" with "independent" nations including those of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. That bloc includes Iran, Russia, China, India, Pakistan and Central Asian states.
OIL PRICES RISE AGAIN
With the warring sides still seemingly far apart, oil prices resumed their upward march, rising nearly 3% on Tuesday and extending gains from the previous session.
"For oil traders, it's not the rhetoric that matters any more, but the actual physical flow of crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz, and right now, that flow remains constrained," Fawad Razaqzada, market analyst at City Index and FOREX.com, said in a note.
At least six tankers loaded with Iranian oil have been forced back to Iran by the U.S. blockade in recent days, ship-tracking data showed, underscoring the war's impact on traffic.
Iran's foreign ministry condemned U.S. action against Iran-linked tankers as "outright legalization of piracy and armed robbery on the high seas", in a social media post.
However, government spokesperson Fatemeh Mohajerani told state media on Tuesday that Iran had prepared for maritime blockade scenarios as early as the U.S. 2024 presidential election and made necessary arrangements so that "there is nothing to worry about".
She added Tehran was using northern, eastern and western trade corridors that do not rely on Gulf ports to neutralise the blockade's effects.
Between 125 and 140 ships usually crossed in and out of the strait daily before the war, but only seven have done so in the past day, according to Kpler ship-tracking data and satellite analysis from SynMax, and none of them were carrying oil bound for the global market.
With his approval ratings falling, Trump faces domestic pressure to end a war for which he has given the U.S. public shifting rationales.
Senior Iranian officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Reuters the proposal carried by Araqchi to Islamabad over the weekend envisioned talks in stages, with the nuclear issue to be set aside at the start.
A first step would require ending the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran and providing guarantees that the U.S. cannot start it up again. Then negotiators would resolve the U.S. Navy's blockade of Iran's trade by sea and the fate of the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran aims to reopen under its control.
Only then would talks look at other issues, including the longstanding dispute over Iran's nuclear programme, with Iran still seeking some kind of U.S. acknowledgment of its right to enrich uranium.
Reporting by Reuters bureaus; Writing by Jonathan Allen, Alexandra Hudson; Editing by Lincoln Feast.
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
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伊朗戰爭和談陷入僵局 -- CNN
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請參考：
* Iran offers to reopen Strait of Hormuz if US lifts its blockade and the war ends, officials say (2026/04/28)
* Germany's Merz says Iran is humiliating US as talks stall (2026/04/27)
* NBC News Drops Bombshell Report on Trump War Battle Damage: ‘Far Worse’ Than Trump Team Said
壞消息是：雙方坐地起價，和談陷入僵局。
好消息是：各自養精蓄銳，戰場硝煙未起。
Trump says US team won’t visit Pakistan as uncertainty surrounds Iran peace talks
Tehran had ruled out a direct meeting with American negotiators in Islamabad.
CNN, 04/25/26
Trump scraps Witkoff-Kushner trip to Pakistan for peace talks
Where things stand
* Trip canceled: President Donald Trump scrapped plans for a US delegation to visit Pakistan, saying talks will continue by phone after Iran declined to meet directly with American negotiators. Trump said he’s since received a new proposal from Tehran, offering “a lot but not enough.” He did not provide details.
* Stalled peace effort: Negotiations have hit repeated roadblocks, with Trump blaming “infighting” in Tehran for complicating the effort. Iran’s top diplomat, who met with Pakistani mediators Saturday, said it’s not clear if Washington is “truly serious about diplomacy.”
* Economic standoff: In the absence of a deal, a US naval blockade is causing rising food prices and unemployment for everyday Iranians, while Tehran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz has economic ripple effects around the world.
* In Lebanon: Meanwhile, Israel has launched more deadly strikes on southern Lebanon, despite a ceasefire agreement recently extended by three weeks. Iran-backed Hezbollah has fired rockets into Israel.
本文於 修改第 3 次
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川瘋「瘋」性不改全球被玩死 - Alayna Treene/Kevin Liptak
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請參考：
* US and Iran warn they are ready for war as talks in limbo
* The world's biggest airlines are canceling flights as they face jet fuel shortages and rising prices
A deal to end the Iran war seemed close. Then Trump started posting on social media
Alayna Treene/Kevin Liptak, CNN, 04/21/26
As the weekend approached, the US and Iran appeared to be closing in on a deal to end the seven-week war.
Then President Donald Trump did exactly what his staffers have repeatedly said they wouldn’t do: He seemed to try negotiating via the press, posting about ongoing talks on social media and speaking to several reporters by phone Friday morning as Pakistani intermediaries updated him on ongoing talks with Iranian officials in Tehran.
He claimed Iran had agreed to a host of provisions that sources familiar with the talks said have not yet been finalized. He also asserted that Tehran had agreed to many of the most contentious US demands — including handing over the enriched uranium — and declared an imminent end to the war.
Iranian officials outwardly rejected many of those assertions and denied they were preparing for another round of talks, rapidly tanking the rising optimism for a deal. Now, it’s unclear where the peace talks go from here.
Some Trump officials privately acknowledged to CNN that the president’s public commentary has been detrimental to talks, noting the sensitivity of the negotiations and the Iranians’ deep mistrust of the US. Compounding matters: American officials suspect there is a divide between Iran’s negotiating team, led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, leading to questions about who can ultimately sign off on a deal.
“The Iranians didn’t appreciate POTUS negotiating through social media and making it appear as if they had signed off on issues they hadn’t yet agreed to, and ones that aren’t popular with their people back home,” one person familiar with the talks told CNN, adding that the Iranians are particularly concerned about appearing to look weak.
Among the president’s claims: Trump told Bloomberg that Iran had agreed to an “unlimited” suspension of its nuclear program. He told CBS News Tehran “agreed to everything,” and would work with the US to remove its enriched uranium. And he told Axios a meeting would “probably take place over the weekend,” adding, “I think we will get a deal in the next day or two.”
The fragile ceasefire between Washington and Tehran was tested once again on Sunday when a US guided-missile destroyer fired on and seized an Iranian cargo ship after it tried to get past the US naval blockade in the Gulf of Oman, further angering the Iranians.
Now, as the expiration date of a two-week ceasefire looms, Trump is again facing a decision: whether to accept a deal, even an imperfect one, or to escalate a conflict he once said would be over by now.
By Monday, officials in Iran sounded less resistant to more negotiations. But the contours of any pending agreement remained unclear.
“The United States has never been closer to a good deal with Iran, unlike the horrible deal made by the Obama Administration, thanks to President Trump’s negotiating ability,” said White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt. “Anyone who cannot see President Trump’s tactics to play the long game are either stupid or willfully ignorant.”
Trump has set several red lines for the negotiations, including that Iran freeze its uranium enrichment and surrender its stockpile of near-bomb-grade material. Tehran, meanwhile, insists it be allowed to maintain control over the Strait of Hormuz while also demanding the US lift sanctions.
During the first round of talks, American negotiators proposed a 20-year pause on Iran enriching uranium, a source familiar with the discussions said. Iran responded with a proposal for a five-year suspension, which the US has rejected, according to a US official.
One recent proposal from the Iranian side would involve a 10-year pause on enrichment, followed by another decade where Iran would agree to only enrich to levels well below weapons grade, according to a person familiar with the discussions. Meanwhile, Trump has told reporters that he wants no enrichment indefinitely and is against even the 20-year pause.
The Trump administration is also considering unfreezing $20 billion in Iranian assets as part of ongoing negotiations with Tehran, CNN previously reported. The step would come in exchange for Iran turning over its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.
How flexible each side is on their terms will ultimately dictate whether a deal can be reached. For Trump, one imperative is not agreeing to a deal that could be likened to the Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, an Iran nuclear deal he withdrew from in 2018 and has continuously derided as weak.
At the least, negotiators hope to produce a framework understanding between the US and Iran that would then lead to more detailed talks over the coming weeks on the finer points of a deal. That approach has its detractors, however, who warn that Iran could be drawing out the discussions as a play for time as it unearths some of its missile systems that have been buried over the course of the war.
Trump insisted Monday he wasn’t feeling pressure to reach a deal, despite the war’s rising unpopularity among the American public and the role it’s played in higher gas prices.
“I am under no pressure whatsoever, although, it will all happen, relatively quickly!” he wrote on Truth Social.
It was unclear as of Monday afternoon whether any advisers had shared concerns with the president that his penchant for posting could be damaging to the talks. By midday, he had posted multiple times on Truth Social about the war, totaling more than 900 words.
His public comments have only continued to add to the uncertainty surrounding negotiations.
At one point Sunday morning, Trump told a series of callers that Vice President JD Vance would not participate in this round of talks, citing unspecified security concerns. Simultaneously, two senior officials in his government — United Nations Ambassador Mike Waltz and Energy Secretary Chris Wright — appeared on television to say Vance would, in fact, be leading the delegation in Islamabad, as he had for the first round.
It turned out they were right and Trump was wrong. “Things changed,” a White House official told CNN when asked what had happened.
A day later, Trump offered another confusing update, this time about the whereabouts of his No. 2. He told a reporter calling from the New York Post that Vance was in the air and preparing to touch down in Pakistan within hours for the talks. Moments later, Vance’s motorcade — with the vice president inside — arrived at the West Wing.
“We expect the delegation to be on the road soon,” a White House official explained.
People familiar with the plans said Vance is now planning to depart Washington on Tuesday for the talks, which Trump claimed on Sunday would occur Monday evening.
But negotiations are now on track to commence Wednesday morning in Islamabad. In something of an understatement, the sources cautioned the situation remains “fluid.”
So, too, is the fate of the two-week ceasefire, which is set to expire soon. When, exactly, its deadline falls has also seemingly changed, based on a phone conversation Trump had with a reporter on Monday. He originally announced the ceasefire at 6:32 p.m. ET on April 7, putting the two-week mark on Tuesday evening in Washington.
But Trump told Bloomberg the truce ends “Wednesday evening Washington time,” allowing for an extra 24 hours of talks before he must choose whether make good on his threat to blow up Iranian bridges and power plants, a possible war crime. He added that it was “highly unlikely” that he would extend it further.
But he previously went back and forth on whether he would agree to extend the ceasefire. During one question-and-answer session with reporters last week, he was asked five separate times whether he would extend the ceasefire, and offered three different answers:
“If there’s no deal, fighting resumes,” he said definitively at one point. Later, he offered that he would offer an extension if necessary: “If we need to, I would do that.” In another answer, he suggested the question was moot, given the state of negotiations: “We’ll see. I don’t know that we’ll have to. Ideally, we won’t.”
本文於 修改第 1 次
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川普的軟肋：美國國內經濟 -- M. Spetalnick/D. Brunnstrom
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The Iran war has revealed Trump's pressure point: the economy
Matt Spetalnick/David Brunnstrom, 04/18/26
Summary
* Iran's control of Strait of Hormuz exposed US economic vulnerability, raising domestic pressure on Trump
* Allies and rivals question US reliability, analysts warn of long-term economic, geopolitical fallout
* Russia and China could draw lessons about US pressure points
WASHINGTON, April 18 (Reuters) - Seven weeks of war have failed to topple Iran’s theocratic rulers or force them to meet all of President Donald Trump's demands, but for U.S. adversaries and allies it has cast a spotlight on one of his central vulnerabilities: economic pressure.
Even with Iran’s announcement on Friday that it was reopening the Strait of Hormuz to shipping, the Middle East crisis has revealed the limits of Trump's willingness to tolerate domestic economic pain.
Trump joined Israel in attacking Iran on February 28 based on what he said were imminent security threats, especially over its nuclear program. But now, with U.S. gasoline prices high, inflation rising and his approval ratings down, Trump is racing to secure a diplomatic deal that could stem the fallout at home.
Iran has taken a beating militarily, but demonstrated it can exact economic costs that Trump and his aides underestimated, unleashing the worst-ever global energy shock, analysts say.
RISING ENERGY COSTS, RECESSION RISK
Trump has often publicly shrugged off domestic economic concerns driven by the war.
But he can hardly ignore that though the U.S. does not depend on the one-fifth of global oil shipments that were effectively blocked by Iran’s chokehold on the strait, surging energy costs have hit U.S. consumers. The International Monetary Fund’s warning of a risk of global recession adds to the gloom.
Pressure for a way out of the unpopular war has mounted as Trump’s fellow Republicans defend narrow majorities in Congress in the November midterm elections.
None of this has been lost on Iran's leaders, who have used their grip on the strait to push Trump's team to the negotiating table.
Analysts say U.S. rivals China and Russia may draw their own lesson: while Trump has shown an appetite for military force in his second term, he looks for a diplomatic off-ramp as soon as the economic heat becomes uncomfortable at home.
“Trump is feeling the economic pinch, which is his Achilles heel in this war of choice,” said Brett Bruen, a former foreign policy adviser in the Obama administration who heads the Global Situation Room strategic consultancy.
White House spokesman Kush Desai said that while working toward a deal with Iran to resolve "temporary" energy market problems, the administration "has never lost focus on implementing the president’s affordability and growth agenda."
"President Trump can walk and chew gum at the same time," he said.
FEELING THE PRESSURE
Trump’s abrupt shift on April 8 from airstrikes to diplomacy followed pressure from financial markets and parts of his MAGA base.
Some of the economic pain is borne by U.S. farmers, a key Trump constituency, due to disrupted fertilizer shipments, and is also reflected in higher airfares from increased jet fuel prices.
With the clock ticking on a two-week ceasefire, it remains to be seen whether a president who embraces unpredictability will reach a deal that meets his war goals, extend the truce beyond April 21, or relaunch the bombing campaign.
But global oil prices fell sharply and financial markets, which Trump often sees as a barometer of his success, flourished on Friday after Iran said the strait would be open for the remainder of a separate U.S.-brokered 10-day truce between Israel and Lebanon.
Trump was quick to declare the strait safe as he touted a deal-in-the-making with Iran that he said would be completed soon and mostly on his terms. But Iranian sources told Reuters gaps remained to be resolved.
Experts have warned that even if the war ends soon, the economic damage could take months if not years to fix.
A key question is whether any deal achieves the objectives Trump has laid out, including closing Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon, which Tehran has long denied it is seeking.
Iran has a stockpile of highly enriched uranium believed buried by U.S.-Israeli strikes in June. Trump told Reuters on Friday the emerging deal calls for the U.S. to work with Iran to recover the material and bring it to the U.S. Iran denied agreeing to a transfer anywhere outside its territory.
A senior Trump administration official said the U.S. was maintaining "several redlines" in negotiations with Iran.
At the same time, Trump’s call at the war’s outset for Iranians to overthrow their government has gone unheeded.
Allies from Europe to Asia were initially stunned by Trump’s decision to go to war without consulting them or seeming to take into account the risk to them of Iran closing the strait.
“The alarm bell ringing for allies right now is how the war has highlighted that the administration can act erratically, without much regard for consequences,” said Gregory Poling, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, former Democratic President Joe Biden was cautious about imposing sanctions on Moscow’s energy sector out of concern for reducing oil supplies and inflating U.S. gas prices.
But Trump, who ran for a second term on promises of cheap gas and low inflation, has shown himself sensitive to accusations that his policies raise prices. An example was when he reduced tariffs on China last year after it retaliated.
MISCALCULATIONS
Just as Trump misjudged Beijing’s response in a trade war, he seems to have miscalculated how Iran might strike back economically in a shooting war - by attacking energy infrastructure in Gulf states and blocking the strategic waterway between them.
Trump mistakenly believed the war would be a limited operation like the January 3 lightning raid in Venezuela and June’s strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites, U.S. officials have said privately.
But this time the repercussions are more far-reaching.
The message to Asian allies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan may be that Trump, who is looking for warmer ties with China, can be expected to pursue his regional goals with less regard for their geopolitical and economic security.
Analysts believe those governments will adjust for any contingency, such as a Chinese bid to seize Taiwan, out of concern over Trump’s reliability.
European countries, annoyed they are bearing so much of the economic brunt of a war that they never asked for, are likely to be even more nervous about Trump’s commitment to continued aid to Ukraine in its war with Russia, analysts say.
Gulf Arab states want the war to end soon, but will be unhappy if Trump cuts a deal without security guarantees for them.
"An end to this conflict should not also create a continuous instability in the region,” said Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the president of the United Arab Emirates.
Most MAGA supporters have stuck with Trump despite some prominent dissenting voices. But there are growing doubts whether he can help his party recover lost ground, especially with independent voters, in time for the midterms.
“He’s aware that a significant portion of the country outside his MAGA base, and even some within the MAGA base, are vehemently opposed to what he’s done,” said Chuck Coughlin, an Arizona-based political strategist. “And I think the price is going to come due.”
Reporting by Matt Spetalnick and David Brunnstrom; additional reporting by Nathan Layne, Maha El Dahan, Patricia Zengerle and Dan Burns; writing by Matt Spetalnick; editing by Don Durfee and Rod Nickel
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
The Reuters Iran Briefing newsletter keeps you informed with the latest developments and analysis of the Iran war. Sign up here.
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以、黎達成停火協議 -- Yang Tian/Helen Sullivan
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What we know about the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire
Yang Tian/Helen Sullivan, 04/17/26
US President Donald Trump announced on Thursday that the leaders of Israel and Lebanon have agreed to a 10-day ceasefire, which took effect from 17:00 EST (21:00 GMT; midnight local time) on 16 April.
Trump urged Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militant group in Lebanon which has been exchanging fire with Israel for the past six weeks, to abide by the ceasefire, saying he hoped it "acts nicely and well during this important period of time".
Iran's foreign minister said on Friday that "in line with the ceasefire in Lebanon" the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's busiest oil shipping channel, had been "declared completely open".
Here is what we know about the truce.
What does the agreement say?
The terms of the deal specify that the ceasefire will last for 10 days, with the possibility of it being "extended by mutual agreement" if negotiations show signs of progress.
According to further details provided by the US State Department:
* Israel retains its "right to take all necessary measures in self-defence, at any time, against planned, imminent, or ongoing attacks"
* Lebanon must take "meaningful steps" to prevent Hezbollah and all other "rogue non-state armed groups" from carrying out attacks against Israeli targets
* Those involved recognise that Lebanon's security forces have exclusive responsibility for Lebanon's security
* Israel and Lebanon requested that the US continues to facilitate further direct talks with the objective of "resolving all remaining issues"
The statement added that the truce was a "gesture of goodwill" by Israel intended to enable "good-faith negotiations towards a permanent security and peace agreement" between the two parties.
What has the reaction been?
Israel and Lebanon's leaders have both welcomed the truce, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu calling it an "opportunity to make a historic peace agreement".
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said: "We all stand before a new phase: the transition from working towards a ceasefire to working towards permanent agreements that preserve the rights of our people, the unity of our land, and the sovereignty of our nation."
Hezbollah also signalled a willingness to participate in the ceasefire but said it must include "a comprehensive halt to attacks" across Lebanon and "no freedom of movement for Israeli forces".
When asked about disarmament, senior Hezbollah leader Wafiq Safa told the BBC: "Not until a proper ceasefire, a real one. Not until Israeli withdrawal."
The Iran-backed group, while deeply embedded in Lebanon, is not part of the Lebanese government's security apparatus.
On Tuesday, Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced on X: "In line with the ceasefire in Lebanon, the passage for all commercial vessels through [the] Strait of Hormuz is declared completely open for the remaining period of ceasefire." This is due to expire on 22 April.
Iran's Tasnim News Agency, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), later called the post "bad and incomplete", saying such passage would be considered "void" should the US naval blockade continue.
UN Secretary General António Guterres commended the role of the US in facilitating the deal and urged all parties to "fully respect" and "comply with international law at all times".
European Commission chief, Ursula von der Leyen, called the deal a "relief", saying Europe would continue to "call for the full respect of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity".
Why is Israel remaining in southern Lebanon?
Despite the agreement, Benjamin Netanyahu said Israeli troops would remain stationed 10km-deep (6.2 miles) into southern Lebanon.
UN figures show that across Lebanon, more than 1.2 million people have been displaced, the majority of these from the south.
Israel re-entered southern Lebanon after strikes by Hezbollah in early March, describing the area it is occupying as a "security zone".
"We are there, and we are not leaving," Netanyahu said this week.
Israel's defence minister previously said the occupied area would go up to the Litani River in southern Lebanon - about 30km from the border with Israel.
He also said all houses in Lebanese villages near the Israeli border would be demolished.
In the weeks since the war began, research by BBC Verify has found that more than 1,400 buildings have been destroyed by Israel in southern Lebanon.
Lebanon's defence minister said Katz's remarks reflected "a clear intention to impose a new occupation of Lebanese territory". European nations, Canada and the UN have also criticised Israel's announcement.
A previous ceasefire deal between Israel and Hezbollah - ending 13 months of conflict - still saw near-daily cross-border strikes.
How was the ceasefire negotiated?
Israel and Lebanon held rare direct talks in Washington earlier this week aimed at easing the war, which has seen deadly air strikes on part of the Lebanese capital of Beirut and fighting in the country's south.
Trump said the ceasefire came about after "excellent conversations" with Aoun and Netanyahu, but did not mention whether Hezbollah was directly involved in the talks.
He also invited the two leaders to the White House for further talks.
The Israeli leader, while welcoming the truce, also made clear that he was making few concessions on the ground.
Netanyahu said Hezbollah had insisted on two conditions - the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, and a principle of "quiet for quiet".
However, it appears the ceasefire announcement has taken senior figures in Israel by surprise - reportedly even within the government's own security cabinet.
A widely respected Israeli news outlet described Netanyahu convening a security cabinet meeting with just five minutes notice, shortly before the ceasefire announcement was made.
Leaks from that meeting say ministers were not given a vote on the ceasefire.
What does this have to do with the war in Iran?
Israel launched strikes on Lebanon on 2 March in response to those by Hezbollah. This was after the US and Israel attacked Iran – prompting retaliation from Tehran against US allies in the Gulf, and from Iran's proxies, including Hezbollah.
Iran's response included effectively blocking the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20% of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) usually passes. This sent global fuel prices soaring.
When a ceasefire with Iran was announced earlier this month, it was unclear whether Lebanon was involved. Pakistani officials, who helped negotiate the deal, and Iranian officials said it was, but Israel and the US said it was not.
While Iran on Friday announced the re-opening of the Strait of Hormuz, Trump said a US blockade of maritime traffic entering and leaving Iranian ports would continue "until such a time as our transaction with Iran is 100% complete".
Regarding the negotiation of a peace deal with Iran, Trump told reporters on Thursday that a deal was "very close", despite Pakistan-brokered talks last weekend ending without an agreement being reached.
More than 2,100 people have been killed and 7,000 others wounded in Israel's attacks on Lebanon since 2 March, according to the Lebanese health ministry, which does not distinguish between combatants and civilians. The number includes at least 260 women and 172 children.
Hezbollah attacks have killed two civilians in Israel over the same period, while 13 Israeli soldiers have been killed in combat in Lebanon, Israeli authorities say.
On Thursday, the Israeli military destroyed the last bridge linking the south to the rest of the country, further isolating the region and renewing fears among many Lebanese that this could lead to a long-term occupation of some areas.
相關報導
Satellite images reveal scale of Israeli demolitions as Lebanese villages destroyed
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伊朗戰爭之打打談談談談打打 - MUNIR AHMED等
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‘This is the last warning.’ Iran threatens U.S. warships after they throw down the gauntlet for winner-take-all Strait of Hormuz
US and Iran end ceasefire talks without agreement and blaming each other
MUNIR AHMED/SAM METZ/SAMY MAGDY, 04/12/26
ISLAMABAD (AP) — The United States and Iran ended face-to-face talks on Sunday without an agreement to end the war, leaving a fragile two-week ceasefire in doubt.
U.S. officials said the negotiations collapsed over what they described as Iran’s refusal to commit to abandoning its nuclear program, while Iranian officials blamed the U.S. for talks breaking down without specifying the sticking points.
Neither side indicated what will happen after the 14-day ceasefire expires on April 22. Pakistani mediators urged all parties to maintain it. Both said their positions were clear and put the onus on the other side, underscoring how little the gap had narrowed throughout the talks.
“We need to see an affirmative commitment that they will not seek a nuclear weapon, and they will not seek the tools that would enable them to quickly achieve a nuclear weapon,” Vice President JD Vance said after the 21-hour-long talks.
Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, who led Iran in the negotiations, said it was time for the United States “to decide whether it can gain our trust or not.”
He did not mention the core disputes in a series of social media posts, though Iranian officials earlier said the talks fell apart over two or three key issues, blaming what they called U.S. overreach.
Iran has long denied seeking nuclear weapons but has insisted on its right to a civilian nuclear program. Experts say its stockpile of enriched uranium, though not weapons-grade, is only a short technical step away.
Since the U.S. and Israel launched the war on Feb. 28, it has killed at least 3,000 people in Iran, 2,020 in Lebanon, 23 in Israel and more than a dozen in Gulf Arab states, and caused lasting damage to infrastructure in half a dozen Middle Eastern countries. Iran’s grip on the Strait of Hormuz has largely cut off the Persian Gulf and its oil and gas exports from the global economy, sending energy prices soaring.
Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said his country will try to facilitate a new dialogue between Iran and the U.S. in the coming days.
“It is imperative that the parties continue to uphold their commitment to cease fire,” Dar said.
The deadlock — and Vance’s take-it-or-leave-it proposal that Iran end its nuclear program — mirrored February’s nuclear talks in Switzerland. Though President Donald Trump has said the subsequent war was meant to compel Iran’s leaders to abandon nuclear ambitions, each side’s positions appeared unchanged in negotiations following six weeks of fighting.
There was no word on whether they would resume, though Iran said it was open to continuing the dialogue, Iran’s state-run IRNA news agency reported.
“We have never sought war. But if they try to win what they failed to win on the battlefield through talks, that’s absolutely unacceptable,” 60-year-old Mohammad Bagher Karami said in downtown Tehran.
US moves to shift status quo in Strait of Hormuz
The United States and Iran entered talks with sharply different proposals and contrasting assumptions about their leverage to end the war. Before negotiations began, the ceasefire was already threatened by deep disagreements and Israel’s continued attacks against the Iranian-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Iran’s 10-point proposal ahead of the talks called for a guaranteed end to the war and sought control over the Strait of Hormuz. It included ending fighting against Iran’s “regional allies,” explicitly calling for a halt to Israeli strikes on Hezbollah.
Pakistani officials told The Associated Press in March that the U.S. 15-point proposal included monitoring mechanisms and a rollback of Iran’s nuclear program. Speaking on condition of anonymity as they weren’t authorized to discuss details, they said it also covered reopening the Strait of Hormuz.
Indeed, Iran’s closure of the strait has proved its biggest strategic advantage in the war. Around a fifth of the world’s traded oil had typically passed through on over 100 ships a day.
During the talks, the U.S. military said two destroyers transited the critical waterway ahead of mine-clearing work, a first since the war began. Iran’s state media, however, reported the country’s joint military command denied that.
“We’re sweeping the strait. Whether we make a deal or not makes no difference to me,” Trump said as talks extended into early Sunday morning.
Israel presses ahead in Lebanon
The impasse raises new questions about fighting in Lebanon. Israel pressed ahead with strikes after the ceasefire was announced, saying the agreement did not apply there. Iran and Pakistan claimed otherwise.
Lebanon’s state-run National News Agency reported six people were killed Sunday morning in an Israeli strike in Maaroub, a village near the southern coastal city of Tyre. Though Israel’s strikes over Beirut have calmed in recent days, its attacks on southern Lebanon have intensified alongside a ground invasion it renewed after Hezbollah launched rockets toward Israel in the opening days of the Iran war.
Negotiations between Israel and Lebanon are expected to begin Tuesday in Washington, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s office has said, after Israel’s surprise announcement authorizing talks despite the lack of official relations between the countries. Protests erupted in Beirut on Saturday over the planned negotiations.
Israel wants Lebanon’s government to assume responsibility for disarming Hezbollah, much like was envisaged in a November 2024 ceasefire. But the militant group has survived efforts to curb its strength for decades.
The day the Iran ceasefire deal was announced, Israel pounded Beirut with airstrikes, killing more than 300 people in the deadliest day in Lebanon since the war began, according to the country’s Health Ministry.
Metz reported from Ramallah, West Bank, and Magdy from Cairo. E. Eduardo Castillo in Beijing, Collin Binkley and Ben Finley in Washington and Kareem Chehayeb in Beirut contributed.
SAM METZ covers Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and points beyond for The Associated Press.
SAMY MAGDY is a Middle East reporter for The Associated Press, based in Cairo. He focuses on conflict, migration and human rights abuses.
相關報導
* US and Iran end 21-hour ceasefire talks without agreement before Vance departs Pakistan
* US and Iran prepare for high-level talks as Israel and Hezbollah trade more fire
* Netanyahu authorizes direct talks with Lebanon in potential boost to ceasefire efforts
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伊朗戰爭的真正得利者-Oleh Cheslavskyi
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請參考
* China Is Having a Good War—So Far
* Why China, not Russia, could be the real winner of the Iran war
* How Russia and China are winning the war in Iran
* The Iran Strike Is All About China
The Hormuz Trap: How Beijing Won a War Without Firing a Single Missile
Oleh Cheslavskyi, 03/10/26
On June 15, 1900, Major General Stessell sent a dispatch to Vice Admiral Alexeyev reporting the successful storming of the Eastern Arsenal at Tianjin during the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China. It contained a sentence that military historians have cited as a curiosity ever since — but which in fact describes an entire doctrine:
“Only because I had no plan in my hands (Colonel Vogak said he had none either) did I decide to attack; had I had a plan, I probably would not have gone.”
These words should stand as the motto of the war — or, if you prefer, the “military operation” — against Iran that Trump unleashed. The general won precisely because he did not know that winning was impossible. Washington in February 2026 marched on Hormuz with the same logic — only with a map in hand on which every Iranian missile position was marked. And that is precisely why it failed to notice what the map did not show.
Three Hypotheses, Nine Days, Zero Survivors
On the morning of March 8, Brent crude traded at $118. On the chart now circulating across trading desks and Telegram channels, the spike looks like a cardiac arrest on an ECG — weeks of flat line, then a vertical cliff upward, then a sharp drop. By the time you read this, the number has already fallen below $90 and is gravitating toward $85. The market is pricing in the TACO pattern — Trump Always Chickens Out — and in this case the market is probably right. But the market is wrong about what it is measuring. The $118 was never the story. The story is what broke at $67 and will not simply return on its own.
To understand how the United States walked into the most foreseeable strategic trap in recent memory, you have to start not with the missiles but with the assumptions — three hypotheses, specifically, whose validity Washington’s planners had convinced themselves to believe.
The first hypothesis held that Hormuz would never close, because the economic cost to everyone is too great for any rational actor to pay. This is the logic of deterrence theory applied to straits, and it works for rational actors. The IRGC is not a monolith with a single phone number. When Ali Khamenei was killed in the first wave of Operation Epic Fury, the Revolutionary Guard activated a decentralized mosaic defense doctrine — 31 autonomous provincial commands, no single point of failure, no single authority to call and offer a deal. The very strike that was supposed to decapitate the system produced a system incapable of being decapitated. The rational actor assumption died not because Iran is irrational, but because the United States created the conditions in which centralized rationality became impossible.
The second hypothesis held that American military power could quickly restore any disruption to maritime flow. Three carrier strike groups in theater, 80 percent of Iranian air defenses destroyed, 43 warships sunk, missile launches down 86 percent from day-one peaks. By every traditional metric of military dominance, the campaign succeeded. And yet the commercial potential of the strait remained paralyzed — not because the guns were still firing, but because the guns had already fired. At midnight Greenwich time on March 5, seven of the twelve international P&I clubs that collectively insure roughly 90 percent of global ocean tonnage withdrew their war risk policies from the Persian Gulf. They did not do this because a government ordered them to. Not because a blockade was declared. They withdrew because their London reinsurers, facing unlimited loss exposure in an active combat zone, could no longer meet the Solvency II capital requirement of 99.5 percent coverage of risk value. By March 7, tanker traffic had fallen to zero. Three hundred oil tankers lay at anchor in the Gulf of Oman. A thousand commercial vessels worth $25 billion sat trapped inside the Persian Gulf with nowhere to unload. The United States Navy had not escorted a single commercial tanker through the strait. The $20 billion Emergency Reinsurance Fund announced on March 6 had not produced one confirmed large-scale VLCC transit. The war was not lost at Bandar Abbas. It was lost at Lloyd’s of London, and the loss was structural, not tactical.
The third hypothesis held that bypass routes and strategic reserves would absorb a temporary disruption. This certainty survived longest — until March 8, when Brent cracked $100 despite the existence of overland pipelines, despite Saudi announcements of spare capacity, despite IEA emergency reserve releases. The bypass map died because the insurance architecture governs those routes too, and because the scale of the closure — 20 million barrels per day — simply exceeds what alternative infrastructure was designed to absorb.
Three hypotheses. Nine days of testing. All three proved wrong.
The Failure That Was Already Public Knowledge
But there is a second failure embedded inside the first — and it is more embarrassing because it was already common knowledge.
The United States was not ready for this war.
Secretary of State Rubio publicly acknowledged the structural mismatch before the operation began: Iran produces more than 100 ballistic missiles per month, against six or seven interceptors that the United States can manufacture in the same period. The Shahed-136 drone costs between twenty and fifty thousand dollars to produce. The PAC-3 interceptor that destroys it costs four million. The THAAD interceptor costs twelve point seven million.
The twelve-day war in June 2025 had already consumed approximately 150 THAAD interceptors — roughly a quarter of the entire global supply. The first nine days of Epic Fury burned through an additional 40 THAAD, 90 Patriot, and over 180 carrier-based interceptors. Current THAAD production runs at approximately eight missiles per month. The January 2026 contract with Lockheed Martin to quadruple production to 400 per year requires seven years to reach full capacity. New interceptors will not arrive in meaningful volumes before 2028.
The Stimson Center’s analysts put the timeline to critical arsenal depletion at four to five weeks. At that point, the United States faces a choice that no American strategic planner has been willing to articulate publicly — who to defend: Israel, Taiwan, or tankers in the Gulf. Because defending all three simultaneously has proven beyond American capacity.
The general without a map attacked because ignorance of obstacles is sometimes strategically useful. Washington attacked with a map that showed every Iranian missile position — and on which the London insurance market, the Solvency II directive, and the trajectory of its own interceptor reserves were entirely absent.
Two Moves That Appeared Unrelated
To understand why the United States walked into this particular trap at this particular moment, you have to unwind the chronology — back to two moves that looked unrelated until they stopped being so.
The first move was Caracas. On January 3, 2026, Nicolás Maduro was detained by American forces. Venezuela — the country with the world’s largest proven oil reserves, approximately 300 billion barrels — passed under operational American control. By March 2026, Chevron and a consortium of American firms had restored operations at the José terminal. Venezuelan heavy crude — technologically the closest substitute for Iranian grades at complex refineries — began flowing into Gulf Coast processing facilities. This was not a coincidence of timing. This was the closing of the first precondition.
The second move was Beijing’s — but Washington was reading it in real time. After Russia’s reserves were frozen in February 2022, China drew a cold arithmetical conclusion: sovereign financial assets can be frozen within days; physical stockpiles of raw materials cannot. Throughout 2023 and 2024, an anomaly accumulated in the data: oil imports rising against sluggish domestic demand, refinery throughput failing to grow proportionally to purchases. The gap between what China was buying and what it was actually consuming was the pace of reserve accumulation. By end of 2024, combined strategic and commercial reserves approached 1.1 billion barrels — more than 100 days of import coverage against the IEA standard of 90. Washington saw this number. And chose to treat it as a green light rather than a warning.
The sequence that emerged is elegant in its cold logic: wait for China’s tanks to fill, secure Venezuela as the alternative heavy crude source, then strike. The pause between Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025 and Operation Epic Fury in February 2026 — eight months during which the world asked why Washington had stopped — was not hesitation. It was the closing of conditions. The kinetic clock started only when the economic prerequisites were met.
What Washington failed to account for adequately was the distance between “China can absorb the shock” and “global markets can absorb the shock.” China’s hundred-day reserves made Beijing immune to the Iranian disruption. But they did not make Rotterdam immune. Did not make Lloyd’s of London immune. Did not make the Solvency II capital table immune. The distinction between Chinese preparedness and global system resilience turned out to be the size of the entire problem.
What Happens to Oil Next
What comes next for oil is not a question of when Hormuz opens. It is a question of what “open” means in the new insurance environment.
Even if a ceasefire holds — and the signals from Trump’s rhetoric and Iran’s stated conditions suggest the contours of an exit are visible — the commercial transit problem does not resolve automatically. P&I clubs do not reopen coverage the day guns fall silent. They reopen coverage after vessels demonstrate safe passage — which requires naval escort, which the Navy has not committed to provide at commercial scale. The market consensus of two to four weeks for normalization is wrong by a factor of three. The actual timeline for meaningful commercial recovery in Hormuz transit is six to twelve weeks at minimum, conditional on sustained naval escort and a sufficient number of demonstrated safe transits to satisfy the reinsurance capital models.
Brent’s current level around $89–90 reflects not peace but the market’s bet on the TACO pattern — that Trump will find an exit before the arsenal problem becomes acute. The bet is probably correct on the political timeline. It is almost certainly wrong on the economic timeline. The gap between “Trump announces victory” and “tankers are actually moving at pre-war volumes” will be measured in months, not the days the futures curve implies. The backwardation structure of Brent assumes a return to something like normal by Q3. It does not price the possibility that “normal” for Hormuz in a world of mosaic defense doctrine and Solvency II capital requirements is structurally different from what it was on February 27.
Meanwhile, the thirty-day window of General License 133 — authorizing Indian refineries to purchase Russian oil loaded before March 5, expiring April 4 — presents Washington with a choice it cannot avoid. Extend it, and the three-year architecture built to isolate Russia from oil revenues is formally converted from a pause into a structural reversal. Close it, and India, which cannot currently source adequate Gulf crude, faces an unbridgeable supply gap in the middle of a global price spike. For three years, the American Treasury built the most sophisticated sanctions architecture in the history of oil markets. The decision to strike Iran dismantled it in seventy-two hours — not by enemy action, but by creating conditions in which Russian oil, loading in the Baltic and Black Seas and routed entirely around the closed strait, became the only large-scale crude already at sea, already paid for, and available for delivery. Moscow did not pay a ruble for this rehabilitation. Washington provided it free of charge.
Russia’s position in this configuration is the inverse of what the Kremlin had hoped and a better outcome than it deserved. The shadow fleet is fully deployed — every available tanker loaded. The sanctions architecture is broken at its load-bearing joint. Oil prices, even after falling from the $118 peak, remain well above the February baseline of $67–68. What Russia lost is the windfall it briefly glimpsed: Brent above $100 for long enough to meaningfully replenish a war chest bled dry by Ukrainian attrition. Trump’s exit ramp, if taken quickly, will return prices toward $80–85 before Moscow’s treasury has meaningfully benefited from the spike. Kremlin planners reportedly convened to discuss how to maximize gains from the current market structure. Then Trump said the word “demilitarization” — and the spike began to deflate. The timing was, from Moscow’s perspective, almost personal in its cruelty.
The Winner Who Fired Nothing
The only actor whose strategic position has unambiguously improved as a result of Operation Epic Fury is Beijing.
China entered the conflict with reserves sufficient to withstand a complete cessation of Iranian exports through the decisive months of any hypothetical conflict. It is receiving bilateral safe passage guarantees from the IRGC — vessels transmitting “OWNER — CHINA” on their AIS transponders have been transiting the strait. Its hundred-day reserve buffer insulates it from the price shock hitting every other major importer. And the depletion of American interceptor stocks over Hormuz directly reduces Washington’s capacity to defend Taiwan — the only military theater that matters to Beijing’s long-term calculus.
China did not fire a single missile. It filled its tanks and waited. This is what preparation looks like when it is done correctly.
History records this pattern with the precision of a chronograph. France legislated a three-month oil reserve in 1928. Britain launched emergency stockpiling for its navy and air force in 1934. Parliament passed the Essential Commodities Reserves Act in 1938. Then came the war those reserves were built for. China in 2025 outpaced every one of those players combined. The question that Beijing’s planners have not yet answered — and that the rest of the world is not yet asking loudly enough — is what the reserves were built for. The difference between an insurance policy and preparation for a first strike is not determined by the volume of barrels. It is determined by what happens next.
To return to where we began: the Russian general without a map attacked because ignorance of obstacles is sometimes strategically useful. Donald Trump attacked with a map on which every Iranian missile was marked — and on which the London insurance market was entirely absent. Both won their battle. The general’s fort fell. Trump’s kinetic phase is succeeding by every traditional metric. But the fort of the global oil order — the belief that American military power is the ultimate guarantor of energy flow — has taken damage that no ceasefire announcement will repair. Global maritime trade does not rest on naval protection. It rests on insurance capital tables, reinsurance capacity, and the Solvency II directive of the European Union. None of those foundations will be fixed by a statement from Mar-a-Lago.
Brent is trading at $89.89. The chart looks like a recovery. It is not a recovery. It is a market that has not yet understood what broke.
Written by Oleh Cheslavskyi
I'm a Ukrainian journalist, a committed advocate for citizen-driven reporting free from editorial constraints, and a passionate supporter of digital democracy.
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以色列政府的陰招 -- Gökçen Kunukcu
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請參考本欄2026/02/07貼文。
下文即使不是「一廂情願」，也說得上「無甚新意」。伊朗老百姓大概早就受夠了；但單靠「民怨」就推翻「國家機器」的先例，三、四千來歷史上應該是屈指可數。
「強弱」是相對而言的；戰爭結束後伊朗的神權政府領袖固然不好過，川普、尼坦雅胡兩位恐怕也得開始數饅頭。平心而論，灣區國家統治者和老百姓們嘴上不說，心裏對川普和尼坦雅胡的恨意，遠遠高於對伊朗領導群的怒氣。下文作者對此隻字不提，想來是因為其偏頗立場蒙蔽了她的思路。
This War Might Not End on the Battlefield
Israel may be preparing for something else and it’s not a victory on the ground. The real fight may be moving inside Iran itself.
Gökçen Kunukcu, 03/26/26
Israel’s targeting of infrastructure and critical facilities in southern Lebanon has long suggested that the war would not remain just on the border. The Lebanese President’s statement that this could be a harbinger of a land operation clearly confirmed the trend that has already been seen for a while.
In the same period, Lebanon expelled the ambassador from Iran, Saudi Arabia declared Iranian diplomatic and military personnel persona non grata, and Iran nevertheless gave a message of “brotherhood” to its neighbors. These developments may seem like diplomatic reactions when viewed individually, but when read together, they point to something else.
Israel’s goal is to achieve a greater strategic outcome beyond weakening the armed structures around Iran.
Lebanon and the Gulf: Why Do They Act This Way?
On the Lebanese side, the picture is actually quite clear. The fragile state structure is disturbed that Hezbollah is drawing the country into a large-scale conflict again.
Therefore, the expulsion of the Iranian ambassador and the adoption of a tougher line against Hezbollah cannot be explained only by external pressure. The Lebanese state is trying to open its own space of action. But there is a problem here: Moving away from the Iranian and Hezbollah line to avoid conflict with Israe does not automatically make Lebanon safe.
Lebanon does not have a very comfortable option. On the one hand, there is Israel, which systematically attacks and constantly puts the country under pressure. On the other hand, the Hezbollah-Iran line narrows the area of domestic sovereignty, weakens the state and makes Lebanon a part of regional wars. In such a situation, it is not surprising that Lebanon seizes every opportunity it deems appropriate to get rid of Hezbollah.
On the Gulf side, the issue is even more pragmatic. If Iran says “our neighbors are our brothers” and simultaneously launches attacks against countries with a US military presence in the Gulf, it is already difficult for this discourse to be convincing in the region. The old Arab solidarity, Islamic world unity or common doctrines are no longer decisive. The benefit-cost calculation is decisive.
This seems clearer, especially from the perspective of Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has been following a new economic-centered path for a long time. Projects like Vision 2030 require stability. It is also understandable that Saudi Arabia, which is in constant tension with Iran and seeks regional leadership, stays closer to the US-Israel line. The weakening of Iran also means strategic gain for Saudi Arabia.
We should not forget the Yemen dimension here. Because even though Saudi Arabia and the UAE seem to be on the same line, they do not look at the issue of regional stability from the same perspective.
Therefore, it is not right to paint the picture of distance from Iran in the Gulf with a single color. But the general trend is clear: The cost of appearing side by side with Iran is increasing.
Where Is The War Going?
The real important part starts here. Because Lebanon’s or the Gulf’s attitude alone is not the heart of the story. These are rather signs that show where we are going in the big picture.
Israel has been directly targeting Iran’s regional capacity along with the actors surrounding Iran for a long time.
I can explain it in its simplest form as follows: To reach the big fish, he first cleans the small fish.
That is why it is important to target Hezbollah, narrow down the area in Lebanon, and put pressure on Iran-linked structures one by one. These are not tactical developments alone; They appear to be intermediate stages leading to a more central goal.
The fact that Iran’s attacks near Dimona have once again created a debate about Israel’s nuclear infrastructure and security perception shows that this war is not an ordinary war of attrition. Iran shows that it still has serious trump cards. In other words, it was already difficult for this war to reach an easy, quick and one-sided conclusion from the very beginning.
I think the critical issue here is whether Israel and the United States are on the same page regarding the duration and ultimate goal of the war. The United States was probably considering a war that would be shorter, more controllable, and could be stopped once certain objectives were achieved. Since Israel sees that this cannot be solved in a short time, it is trying to read how much Iran will be weakened at the end of the war, rather than the duration of the war.
The most important advantage that Iran has here is its capacity to prolong the war. This is not just a matter of missiles and UAVs. Iran’s industrial capacity, geographical depth, ability to create asymmetry at sea and widespread pressure tools buy it time. So, as the war drags on, Israel does not automatically win. On the contrary, a protracted war poses serious political and social costs for Israel and the United States.
Could The Target Have Changed?
The claim that I consider important is this: As Israel saw that the war could not get the kind of rapid and definitive result it wanted on the field, it turned its aim directly to paralyzing the supports of the Iranian regime.
It’s not just about military victory here. The issue may be to leave Iran alone with its own internal crises after the war. Weakening Hezbollah, targeting the Revolutionary Guard and pruning Iran’s regional connections become more meaningful when read this way.
It was already discussed how central the Revolutionary Guard issue had become in the pre-war negotiation discussions. If the goal is really to liquidate these structures, the question we need to ask here is: What will happen next? What will replace it?
The end of this will not automatically be a “liberated Iran” as is often told from the outside — and this is the American side. Such a scenario would create a huge power vacuum. The sudden paralysis of the regime apparatus, especially the collapse of security and influence networks such as the Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah, creates a much harsher risk of instability and even civil war within the country.
Israel’s calculation may be this: If it cannot achieve the exact result it wants in the war, it will at least leave a ground for Iran to exhaust itself after withdrawing. This may sound speculative, but we have seen enough similar examples in the history of the Middle East. (Again, it was carried out by USA. Isn’t it strange how history keeps repeating itself?) Dismantle the state’s security apparatus, create a power vacuum, and then domestic fractures will do the rest. This dynamic is not new.
Finishing Touch
The steps taken by Lebanon today, the distance the Gulf has taken towards Iran, or Iran’s discourse-action contradiction are not the center of the story alone. These are signs that the war is changing direction.
In my opinion, Israel is not only looking for superiority on the front. If quick victory is not possible, it seems to want to escalate the war to a point that will cripple Iran’s regime capacity. This means that a war that never ends militarily will move into a second phase that is much more destructive politically and socially.
So perhaps the question we should be asking now is not whether Iran will lose the war. The question I want to address is this: If Iran is weakened, what kind of region will emerge?
Written by Gökçen Kunukcu
Observing chaos. Calling it analysis.
Published in The Geopolitical Economist
In The Global geopolitics, truth is one, but the wise interpret it differently.— Here, we interpret these diversions
相關閱讀
What Is Happening in Lebanon?
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停火協議生效後伊朗戰爭現況 – Jon Gambrell
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請參考：
* Iran closes Strait of Hormuz in response to Israeli strikes on Lebanon, state media say
Here's where things stand after a tentative, 2-week Iran ceasefire took effect
JON GAMBRELL, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 04/08/26
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — The ceasefire reached Wednesday has raised hopes of halting hostilities between Iran, Israel and the United States, but many issues remain unresolved.
Reaching a permanent deal will be key to ending a war that's shaken the Middle East and global energy markets. But there are vast differences between U.S. President Donald Trump and Iran's surviving leaders, and America's ally Israel has its own interests.
Here's where things stand.
Iran's government
Trump has suggested there has been “regime change” in Iran after U.S. and Israeli strikes killed the 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the first day of the war and a slew of other top officials and military leaders thereafter.
But Khamenei was succeeded by his son, Mojtaba, who is close to the country's Revolutionary Guard and seen as even more hostile toward the U.S. He is believed to have been wounded in the strike that killed his father and has not been seen or spoken in public since the start of the war.
The political class devoted to maintaining Iran's Shiite theocracy remains intact. Many Iranians are angry at their leaders, but there has been no sign of an uprising since authorities crushed mass protests in January, before the war.
Iran's nuclear program
All of Iran's highly enriched uranium remains in the country, likely entombed at enrichment sites bombed by the U.S. during a 12-day war last June. Iran hasn't enriched since then but maintains it has the right to do so for peaceful purposes and denies seeking nuclear weapons.
Trump said Wednesday that the U.S. would work with Iran to “dig up and remove” the uranium — though Iran did not confirm that.
Trump, along with Israel, has called for Iran to completely dismantle its nuclear program. Iran rejected that in its 10-point proposal for ending the war.
Iran's missile program
Since the war began Feb. 28, Iran has launched more than 5,000 drones, over 2,100 ballistic missiles and over 50 cruise missiles, according to statistics from the Washington-based Jewish Institute for National Security of America, which has close ties to the Israeli military.
Before the war, JINSA estimated Iran's arsenal to be between 8,000 to 10,000 ballistic missiles of various ranges. No public estimate exists of Iran's drone stockpile.
The U.S. and Israel say they destroyed or buried many of Iran's missile launchers. Israel says it also greatly reduced Iran's ability to produce and launch missiles but did not eliminate the threat — and Iran continued launching attacks.
Iran's military
The U.S. military's Central Command said it destroyed over 150 ships — effectively sinking the Iranian navy. Multiple Iranian warplanes, helicopters and other equipment were destroyed, along with military installations and missile factories.
That didn’t stop Iran from effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway through which around a fifth of the world’s traded oil passes, and erecting a virtual toll booth to charge countries for using it.
Iran's ‘Axis of Resistance’
Israel mauled Iran's allied militant groups across the region in wars sparked by Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023, attack out of the Gaza Strip.
Lebanon's Hezbollah, the strongest such group, is still battling Israel, fighting that Israel says will continue despite the ceasefire. Yemen's Houthi rebels, targeted by Israeli and U.S. airstrikes in recent years, only fired on Israel a few times during the war and left Red Sea shipping alone. Hamas still controls around half of Gaza and has yet to disarm under a U.S.-brokered ceasefire.
Israel wants Iran to end its support for such groups, something Tehran has refused to do and did not mention in its peace proposal.
The Strait of Hormuz
Before the war, ships freely passed through the Strait of Hormuz, in the territorial waters of Iran and Oman. Since the war, Iran reportedly has been charging as much as $2 million a vessel to allow them to pass.
Iran and Oman are working on a proposal to split fees in the waterway, and Tehran insists it will maintain military control there, potentially granting itself a new source of revenue in the face of international sanctions.
Trump says America will be “hangin' around” to ensure traffic passes. The U.S. and other countries are likely to oppose the new system, setting up a potential flashpoint.
Gulf Arab countries
Gulf Arab nations can't be happy about how the war has turned out.
Iranian attacks caused widespread damage to oil and gas facilities, airports and other sites, piercing their carefully cultivated image as stable business and tourism hubs. Qatar, one of the world's top natural gas producers, has said it will take years to restore its output.
Gulf countries' distrust of Iran has never been deeper and their faith that the U.S. will defend them has been shaken. U.S. bases across the region suffered direct strikes, but there’s no indication of any American withdrawal, as Iran has demanded.
More tactical gains for Israel, but no knockout blow
Israel was repeatedly targeted by Iranian fire but its advanced air defenses and extensive network of bomb shelters provided significant protection.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says Israel inflicted major losses on Iran, but the U.S. and Israel fell short of eliminating its nuclear or missile programs. His hoped-for uprising that would topple the Islamic Republic has yet to materialize.
Israel says it has assurances the U.S. will address Iran's nuclear and missile programs in negotiations. But many Israelis are likely to be disappointed by yet another inconclusive war, which could weigh on Netanyahu ahead of elections later this year.
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伊朗戰爭：雙方同意停火兩週 – BBC
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請參考：
* US and Iran agree to 2-week ceasefire as Trump pulls back on threats
* Iran ceasefire deal a partial win for Trump - but at a high cost
* Political analyst reacts to Trump's Iran threat: 'This is the way the monsters of history speak'
Iran and US agree to conditional two-week ceasefire and opening of Hormuz strait
BBC, 04/08/26
Summary
* Donald Trump says he agrees to a proposed two-week ceasefire between the US and Iran if shipping traffic is allowed to move through the Strait of Hormuz
* Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says Tehran will agree to the end in fighting "if attacks against Iran are halted"
* Israel says it supports Trump's decision to suspend strikes on Iran, but the two-week ceasefire "does not include Lebanon"
* The US president had set a deadline of 20:00 EDT (01:00 BST) for a deal or else "a whole civilisation will die tonight"
* Pakistan, which has been acting as a mediator, called on Trump to extend his deadline for two weeks, and has invited both sides for talks in Islamabad on Friday
* A deficit in trust between the US and Iran will make these negotiations very difficult, BBC Persian's correspondent in Washington writes
* Oil prices have fallen sharply since the announcement of the ceasefire, now trading well under $100 a barrel
* 1:13 Americans on Trump's 'a whole civilisation will die tonight' warning. 00:01:13, play video Americans on Trump's 'a whole civilisation will die tonight' warning
* 0:40Iranians form human chains at bridges and power plants. 00:00:40, play video Iranians form human chains at bridges and power plants
Edited by Toby Mann and James Chater, with reporting from BBC Persian and teams across the Middle East
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