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中東風雲錄--開欄文：埃及的加薩重建方案 -- Al Jazeera
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下文為本欄開欄文。
埃及的加薩重建方案 -- Al Jazeera
What is Egypt’s plan for the reconstruction of Gaza?
Arab League endorses Egyptian proposal that provides alternative to US President Trump’s plan to take over Gaza.
Al Jazeera Staff, 03/04/25
Arab states have adopted Egypt’s Gaza reconstruction plan, providing a potential path forward after Israel’s devastating war on the Palestinian enclave.
Egypt unveiled its plan on Tuesday while hosting an Arab League Summit in its capital Cairo.
The plan offers an alternative to United States President Donald Trump’s suggestion that the Gaza Strip be depopulated to “develop” the enclave, under US control, in what critics have called ethnic cleansing. Under the Egyptian plan, Gaza’s Palestinian population would not be forced to leave the territory.
Trump had insisted that Egypt and Jordan take Palestinians forced out of Gaza by his plan, but that was quickly rejected, and the US has signalled that it is open to hearing what an Arab plan for Gaza’s post-war reconstruction would be.
Speaking at the start of the summit, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi said that Trump would be able to achieve peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Here’s everything you need to know about the plan, based on Al Jazeera’s own reporting, as well as drafts of the plan reported on by the Reuters news agency and the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram.
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What does the Egyptian plan call for?
The plan consists of three major stages: Interim measures, reconstruction and governance.
The first stage would last about six months, while the next two phases would take place over a combined four to five years.
The aim is to reconstruct Gaza – which Israel has almost completely destroyed – maintain peace and security and reassert the governance of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the territory, 17 years after it was kicked out following fighting between Fatah, which dominates the PA, and Hamas.
How does the plan aim to rebuild Gaza?
A six-month interim period would require a committee of Palestinian technocrats – operating under the management of the PA – to clear the rubble from Salah al-Din Street, which is the main north-south highway in the Gaza Strip.
Once the roads are clear, 200,000 temporary housing units would be built to accommodate 1.2 million people and about 60,000 damaged buildings restored.
According to the blueprint, longer-term reconstruction requires an additional four to five years after the interim measures are completed. Over that span, the plan aims to build at least 400,000 permanent homes, as well as rebuilding Gaza’s seaport and international airport.
Gradually, basic provisions such as water, a waste system, telecommunication services and electricity would also be restored.
The plan further calls for the establishment of a Steering and Management Council, which would be a financial fund supporting the interim governing body in Gaza.
In addition, conferences will be held for international donors to provide the necessary funding for reconstruction and long-term development in the Strip.
Who would be in charge of Gaza?
The plan calls for a group of “independent Palestinian technocrats” to manage affairs in Gaza, in effect replacing Hamas.
The technocratic government would be responsible for overseeing humanitarian aid and would pave the way for the PA to administer Gaza, according to el-Sisi.
Speaking at Tuesday’s summit, PA President Mahmoud Abbas said that an election could take place next year if circumstances allowed.
On the security front, Egypt and Jordan have both pledged to train Palestinian police officers and deploy them to Gaza. The two countries have also called on the United Nations Security Council to consider authorising a peacekeeping mission to oversee governance in Gaza until reconstruction is complete.
How much is this going to cost?
Egypt is calling for $53 bn to fund the reconstruction of Gaza, with the money distributed over three phases.
In the first six-month phase it would cost $3bn to clear rubble from Salah al-Din Street, construct temporary housing and restore partially damaged homes.
The second phase would take two years and cost $20bn. The work of rubble removal would continue in this phase, as well as the establishment of utility networks and the building of more housing units.
Phase three would cost $30bn and take two and a half years. It would include completing housing for Gaza’s whole population, establishing the first phase of an industrial zone, building fishing and commercial ports, and building an airport, among other services.
According to the plan, the money will be sourced from a variety of international sources including the UN and international financial organisations as well as foreign and private sector investments.
Is the plan going to work?
There are still a number of variables that could complicate the plan. Perhaps most importantly, it is unclear whether Hamas, Israel or the US will agree to it.
Hamas welcomed the reconstruction plan, and has previously agreed to a technocratic government. But it is less clear if it will accept the return of the PA, which itself would face the perception from its critics that it has returned to Gaza on the back of Israel’s tanks.
Hamas may be willing to discuss its removal from governance, but is adamantly against its disarmament – something the Egyptian plan adopted by the Arab League did not discuss.
Israel has made it clear that this is a red line, and that Hamas will not be allowed to keep its weapons. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also said that he will not allow the PA to return to Gaza.
There is also the question of whether Trump will abandon his idea of a US-controlled “Middle East Riviera” for the Egyptian plan. It is difficult to predict what Trump’s position will be, particularly if Israel signals its opposition to the Egyptian plan.
What has the response been so far?
In response to Egypt’s plan, Israel said that Arab states needed to “break free from past constraints and collaborate to create a future of stability and security in the region”.
Instead, Israel continues to back Trump’s Gaza displacement plan – which echoes a longstanding call from the Israeli far-right to depopulate Gaza.
Egypt called Israel’s response “unacceptable”, with Minister of Foreign Affairs Badr Abdelatty describing the Netanyahu government’s position as “stubborn and extremist”.
Abdelatty said it would be impossible to see peace in the region without an independent Palestinian state. “No single state should be allowed to impose its will on the international community,” he added.
The White House continues to stand by Trump’s plan for Gaza, but said it would welcome collaboration with regional partners – except Hamas.
“While the President stands by his bold vision for a post-war Gaza, he welcomes input from our Arab partners in the region. It’s clear his proposals have driven the region to come to the table rather than allow this issue to devolve into further crisis,” White House National Security Council spokesman Brian Hughes said.
“President Trump has been clear that Hamas cannot continue to govern Gaza,” he added.
相關閱讀：
Arab leaders endorse Egypt’s Gaza reconstruction plan
European leaders back 'realistic' Arab plan for Gaza
For Israel, ceasefire is a continuation of war by other means
The Egyptian Gaza plan: A deadly trap for Israel and the US
The Egyptian plan for postwar Gaza is a good starting point—but it needs changes
本文於 修改第 3 次
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伊朗戰爭的真正得利者-Oleh Cheslavskyi
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請參考
* China Is Having a Good War—So Far
* Why China, not Russia, could be the real winner of the Iran war
* How Russia and China are winning the war in Iran
* The Iran Strike Is All About China
The Hormuz Trap: How Beijing Won a War Without Firing a Single Missile
Oleh Cheslavskyi, 03/10/26
On June 15, 1900, Major General Stessell sent a dispatch to Vice Admiral Alexeyev reporting the successful storming of the Eastern Arsenal at Tianjin during the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China. It contained a sentence that military historians have cited as a curiosity ever since — but which in fact describes an entire doctrine:
“Only because I had no plan in my hands (Colonel Vogak said he had none either) did I decide to attack; had I had a plan, I probably would not have gone.”
These words should stand as the motto of the war — or, if you prefer, the “military operation” — against Iran that Trump unleashed. The general won precisely because he did not know that winning was impossible. Washington in February 2026 marched on Hormuz with the same logic — only with a map in hand on which every Iranian missile position was marked. And that is precisely why it failed to notice what the map did not show.
Three Hypotheses, Nine Days, Zero Survivors
On the morning of March 8, Brent crude traded at $118. On the chart now circulating across trading desks and Telegram channels, the spike looks like a cardiac arrest on an ECG — weeks of flat line, then a vertical cliff upward, then a sharp drop. By the time you read this, the number has already fallen below $90 and is gravitating toward $85. The market is pricing in the TACO pattern — Trump Always Chickens Out — and in this case the market is probably right. But the market is wrong about what it is measuring. The $118 was never the story. The story is what broke at $67 and will not simply return on its own.
To understand how the United States walked into the most foreseeable strategic trap in recent memory, you have to start not with the missiles but with the assumptions — three hypotheses, specifically, whose validity Washington’s planners had convinced themselves to believe.
The first hypothesis held that Hormuz would never close, because the economic cost to everyone is too great for any rational actor to pay. This is the logic of deterrence theory applied to straits, and it works for rational actors. The IRGC is not a monolith with a single phone number. When Ali Khamenei was killed in the first wave of Operation Epic Fury, the Revolutionary Guard activated a decentralized mosaic defense doctrine — 31 autonomous provincial commands, no single point of failure, no single authority to call and offer a deal. The very strike that was supposed to decapitate the system produced a system incapable of being decapitated. The rational actor assumption died not because Iran is irrational, but because the United States created the conditions in which centralized rationality became impossible.
The second hypothesis held that American military power could quickly restore any disruption to maritime flow. Three carrier strike groups in theater, 80 percent of Iranian air defenses destroyed, 43 warships sunk, missile launches down 86 percent from day-one peaks. By every traditional metric of military dominance, the campaign succeeded. And yet the commercial potential of the strait remained paralyzed — not because the guns were still firing, but because the guns had already fired. At midnight Greenwich time on March 5, seven of the twelve international P&I clubs that collectively insure roughly 90 percent of global ocean tonnage withdrew their war risk policies from the Persian Gulf. They did not do this because a government ordered them to. Not because a blockade was declared. They withdrew because their London reinsurers, facing unlimited loss exposure in an active combat zone, could no longer meet the Solvency II capital requirement of 99.5 percent coverage of risk value. By March 7, tanker traffic had fallen to zero. Three hundred oil tankers lay at anchor in the Gulf of Oman. A thousand commercial vessels worth $25 billion sat trapped inside the Persian Gulf with nowhere to unload. The United States Navy had not escorted a single commercial tanker through the strait. The $20 billion Emergency Reinsurance Fund announced on March 6 had not produced one confirmed large-scale VLCC transit. The war was not lost at Bandar Abbas. It was lost at Lloyd’s of London, and the loss was structural, not tactical.
The third hypothesis held that bypass routes and strategic reserves would absorb a temporary disruption. This certainty survived longest — until March 8, when Brent cracked $100 despite the existence of overland pipelines, despite Saudi announcements of spare capacity, despite IEA emergency reserve releases. The bypass map died because the insurance architecture governs those routes too, and because the scale of the closure — 20 million barrels per day — simply exceeds what alternative infrastructure was designed to absorb.
Three hypotheses. Nine days of testing. All three proved wrong.
The Failure That Was Already Public Knowledge
But there is a second failure embedded inside the first — and it is more embarrassing because it was already common knowledge.
The United States was not ready for this war.
Secretary of State Rubio publicly acknowledged the structural mismatch before the operation began: Iran produces more than 100 ballistic missiles per month, against six or seven interceptors that the United States can manufacture in the same period. The Shahed-136 drone costs between twenty and fifty thousand dollars to produce. The PAC-3 interceptor that destroys it costs four million. The THAAD interceptor costs twelve point seven million.
The twelve-day war in June 2025 had already consumed approximately 150 THAAD interceptors — roughly a quarter of the entire global supply. The first nine days of Epic Fury burned through an additional 40 THAAD, 90 Patriot, and over 180 carrier-based interceptors. Current THAAD production runs at approximately eight missiles per month. The January 2026 contract with Lockheed Martin to quadruple production to 400 per year requires seven years to reach full capacity. New interceptors will not arrive in meaningful volumes before 2028.
The Stimson Center’s analysts put the timeline to critical arsenal depletion at four to five weeks. At that point, the United States faces a choice that no American strategic planner has been willing to articulate publicly — who to defend: Israel, Taiwan, or tankers in the Gulf. Because defending all three simultaneously has proven beyond American capacity.
The general without a map attacked because ignorance of obstacles is sometimes strategically useful. Washington attacked with a map that showed every Iranian missile position — and on which the London insurance market, the Solvency II directive, and the trajectory of its own interceptor reserves were entirely absent.
Two Moves That Appeared Unrelated
To understand why the United States walked into this particular trap at this particular moment, you have to unwind the chronology — back to two moves that looked unrelated until they stopped being so.
The first move was Caracas. On January 3, 2026, Nicolás Maduro was detained by American forces. Venezuela — the country with the world’s largest proven oil reserves, approximately 300 billion barrels — passed under operational American control. By March 2026, Chevron and a consortium of American firms had restored operations at the José terminal. Venezuelan heavy crude — technologically the closest substitute for Iranian grades at complex refineries — began flowing into Gulf Coast processing facilities. This was not a coincidence of timing. This was the closing of the first precondition.
The second move was Beijing’s — but Washington was reading it in real time. After Russia’s reserves were frozen in February 2022, China drew a cold arithmetical conclusion: sovereign financial assets can be frozen within days; physical stockpiles of raw materials cannot. Throughout 2023 and 2024, an anomaly accumulated in the data: oil imports rising against sluggish domestic demand, refinery throughput failing to grow proportionally to purchases. The gap between what China was buying and what it was actually consuming was the pace of reserve accumulation. By end of 2024, combined strategic and commercial reserves approached 1.1 billion barrels — more than 100 days of import coverage against the IEA standard of 90. Washington saw this number. And chose to treat it as a green light rather than a warning.
The sequence that emerged is elegant in its cold logic: wait for China’s tanks to fill, secure Venezuela as the alternative heavy crude source, then strike. The pause between Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025 and Operation Epic Fury in February 2026 — eight months during which the world asked why Washington had stopped — was not hesitation. It was the closing of conditions. The kinetic clock started only when the economic prerequisites were met.
What Washington failed to account for adequately was the distance between “China can absorb the shock” and “global markets can absorb the shock.” China’s hundred-day reserves made Beijing immune to the Iranian disruption. But they did not make Rotterdam immune. Did not make Lloyd’s of London immune. Did not make the Solvency II capital table immune. The distinction between Chinese preparedness and global system resilience turned out to be the size of the entire problem.
What Happens to Oil Next
What comes next for oil is not a question of when Hormuz opens. It is a question of what “open” means in the new insurance environment.
Even if a ceasefire holds — and the signals from Trump’s rhetoric and Iran’s stated conditions suggest the contours of an exit are visible — the commercial transit problem does not resolve automatically. P&I clubs do not reopen coverage the day guns fall silent. They reopen coverage after vessels demonstrate safe passage — which requires naval escort, which the Navy has not committed to provide at commercial scale. The market consensus of two to four weeks for normalization is wrong by a factor of three. The actual timeline for meaningful commercial recovery in Hormuz transit is six to twelve weeks at minimum, conditional on sustained naval escort and a sufficient number of demonstrated safe transits to satisfy the reinsurance capital models.
Brent’s current level around $89–90 reflects not peace but the market’s bet on the TACO pattern — that Trump will find an exit before the arsenal problem becomes acute. The bet is probably correct on the political timeline. It is almost certainly wrong on the economic timeline. The gap between “Trump announces victory” and “tankers are actually moving at pre-war volumes” will be measured in months, not the days the futures curve implies. The backwardation structure of Brent assumes a return to something like normal by Q3. It does not price the possibility that “normal” for Hormuz in a world of mosaic defense doctrine and Solvency II capital requirements is structurally different from what it was on February 27.
Meanwhile, the thirty-day window of General License 133 — authorizing Indian refineries to purchase Russian oil loaded before March 5, expiring April 4 — presents Washington with a choice it cannot avoid. Extend it, and the three-year architecture built to isolate Russia from oil revenues is formally converted from a pause into a structural reversal. Close it, and India, which cannot currently source adequate Gulf crude, faces an unbridgeable supply gap in the middle of a global price spike. For three years, the American Treasury built the most sophisticated sanctions architecture in the history of oil markets. The decision to strike Iran dismantled it in seventy-two hours — not by enemy action, but by creating conditions in which Russian oil, loading in the Baltic and Black Seas and routed entirely around the closed strait, became the only large-scale crude already at sea, already paid for, and available for delivery. Moscow did not pay a ruble for this rehabilitation. Washington provided it free of charge.
Russia’s position in this configuration is the inverse of what the Kremlin had hoped and a better outcome than it deserved. The shadow fleet is fully deployed — every available tanker loaded. The sanctions architecture is broken at its load-bearing joint. Oil prices, even after falling from the $118 peak, remain well above the February baseline of $67–68. What Russia lost is the windfall it briefly glimpsed: Brent above $100 for long enough to meaningfully replenish a war chest bled dry by Ukrainian attrition. Trump’s exit ramp, if taken quickly, will return prices toward $80–85 before Moscow’s treasury has meaningfully benefited from the spike. Kremlin planners reportedly convened to discuss how to maximize gains from the current market structure. Then Trump said the word “demilitarization” — and the spike began to deflate. The timing was, from Moscow’s perspective, almost personal in its cruelty.
The Winner Who Fired Nothing
The only actor whose strategic position has unambiguously improved as a result of Operation Epic Fury is Beijing.
China entered the conflict with reserves sufficient to withstand a complete cessation of Iranian exports through the decisive months of any hypothetical conflict. It is receiving bilateral safe passage guarantees from the IRGC — vessels transmitting “OWNER — CHINA” on their AIS transponders have been transiting the strait. Its hundred-day reserve buffer insulates it from the price shock hitting every other major importer. And the depletion of American interceptor stocks over Hormuz directly reduces Washington’s capacity to defend Taiwan — the only military theater that matters to Beijing’s long-term calculus.
China did not fire a single missile. It filled its tanks and waited. This is what preparation looks like when it is done correctly.
History records this pattern with the precision of a chronograph. France legislated a three-month oil reserve in 1928. Britain launched emergency stockpiling for its navy and air force in 1934. Parliament passed the Essential Commodities Reserves Act in 1938. Then came the war those reserves were built for. China in 2025 outpaced every one of those players combined. The question that Beijing’s planners have not yet answered — and that the rest of the world is not yet asking loudly enough — is what the reserves were built for. The difference between an insurance policy and preparation for a first strike is not determined by the volume of barrels. It is determined by what happens next.
To return to where we began: the Russian general without a map attacked because ignorance of obstacles is sometimes strategically useful. Donald Trump attacked with a map on which every Iranian missile was marked — and on which the London insurance market was entirely absent. Both won their battle. The general’s fort fell. Trump’s kinetic phase is succeeding by every traditional metric. But the fort of the global oil order — the belief that American military power is the ultimate guarantor of energy flow — has taken damage that no ceasefire announcement will repair. Global maritime trade does not rest on naval protection. It rests on insurance capital tables, reinsurance capacity, and the Solvency II directive of the European Union. None of those foundations will be fixed by a statement from Mar-a-Lago.
Brent is trading at $89.89. The chart looks like a recovery. It is not a recovery. It is a market that has not yet understood what broke.
Written by Oleh Cheslavskyi
I'm a Ukrainian journalist, a committed advocate for citizen-driven reporting free from editorial constraints, and a passionate supporter of digital democracy.
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以色列政府的陰招 -- Gökçen Kunukcu
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請參考本欄2026/02/07貼文。
下文即使不是「一廂情願」，也說得上「無甚新意」。伊朗老百姓大概早就受夠了；但單靠「民怨」就推翻「國家機器」的先例，三、四千來歷史上應該是屈指可數。
「強弱」是相對而言的；戰爭結束後伊朗的神權政府領袖固然不好過，川普、尼坦雅胡兩位恐怕也得開始數饅頭。平心而論，灣區國家統治者和老百姓們嘴上不說，心裏對川普和尼坦雅胡的恨意，遠遠高於對伊朗領導群的怒氣。下文作者對此隻字不提，想來是因為其偏頗立場蒙蔽了她的思路。
This War Might Not End on the Battlefield
Israel may be preparing for something else and it’s not a victory on the ground. The real fight may be moving inside Iran itself.
Gökçen Kunukcu, 03/26/26
Israel’s targeting of infrastructure and critical facilities in southern Lebanon has long suggested that the war would not remain just on the border. The Lebanese President’s statement that this could be a harbinger of a land operation clearly confirmed the trend that has already been seen for a while.
In the same period, Lebanon expelled the ambassador from Iran, Saudi Arabia declared Iranian diplomatic and military personnel persona non grata, and Iran nevertheless gave a message of “brotherhood” to its neighbors. These developments may seem like diplomatic reactions when viewed individually, but when read together, they point to something else.
Israel’s goal is to achieve a greater strategic outcome beyond weakening the armed structures around Iran.
Lebanon and the Gulf: Why Do They Act This Way?
On the Lebanese side, the picture is actually quite clear. The fragile state structure is disturbed that Hezbollah is drawing the country into a large-scale conflict again.
Therefore, the expulsion of the Iranian ambassador and the adoption of a tougher line against Hezbollah cannot be explained only by external pressure. The Lebanese state is trying to open its own space of action. But there is a problem here: Moving away from the Iranian and Hezbollah line to avoid conflict with Israe does not automatically make Lebanon safe.
Lebanon does not have a very comfortable option. On the one hand, there is Israel, which systematically attacks and constantly puts the country under pressure. On the other hand, the Hezbollah-Iran line narrows the area of domestic sovereignty, weakens the state and makes Lebanon a part of regional wars. In such a situation, it is not surprising that Lebanon seizes every opportunity it deems appropriate to get rid of Hezbollah.
On the Gulf side, the issue is even more pragmatic. If Iran says “our neighbors are our brothers” and simultaneously launches attacks against countries with a US military presence in the Gulf, it is already difficult for this discourse to be convincing in the region. The old Arab solidarity, Islamic world unity or common doctrines are no longer decisive. The benefit-cost calculation is decisive.
This seems clearer, especially from the perspective of Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has been following a new economic-centered path for a long time. Projects like Vision 2030 require stability. It is also understandable that Saudi Arabia, which is in constant tension with Iran and seeks regional leadership, stays closer to the US-Israel line. The weakening of Iran also means strategic gain for Saudi Arabia.
We should not forget the Yemen dimension here. Because even though Saudi Arabia and the UAE seem to be on the same line, they do not look at the issue of regional stability from the same perspective.
Therefore, it is not right to paint the picture of distance from Iran in the Gulf with a single color. But the general trend is clear: The cost of appearing side by side with Iran is increasing.
Where Is The War Going?
The real important part starts here. Because Lebanon’s or the Gulf’s attitude alone is not the heart of the story. These are rather signs that show where we are going in the big picture.
Israel has been directly targeting Iran’s regional capacity along with the actors surrounding Iran for a long time.
I can explain it in its simplest form as follows: To reach the big fish, he first cleans the small fish.
That is why it is important to target Hezbollah, narrow down the area in Lebanon, and put pressure on Iran-linked structures one by one. These are not tactical developments alone; They appear to be intermediate stages leading to a more central goal.
The fact that Iran’s attacks near Dimona have once again created a debate about Israel’s nuclear infrastructure and security perception shows that this war is not an ordinary war of attrition. Iran shows that it still has serious trump cards. In other words, it was already difficult for this war to reach an easy, quick and one-sided conclusion from the very beginning.
I think the critical issue here is whether Israel and the United States are on the same page regarding the duration and ultimate goal of the war. The United States was probably considering a war that would be shorter, more controllable, and could be stopped once certain objectives were achieved. Since Israel sees that this cannot be solved in a short time, it is trying to read how much Iran will be weakened at the end of the war, rather than the duration of the war.
The most important advantage that Iran has here is its capacity to prolong the war. This is not just a matter of missiles and UAVs. Iran’s industrial capacity, geographical depth, ability to create asymmetry at sea and widespread pressure tools buy it time. So, as the war drags on, Israel does not automatically win. On the contrary, a protracted war poses serious political and social costs for Israel and the United States.
Could The Target Have Changed?
The claim that I consider important is this: As Israel saw that the war could not get the kind of rapid and definitive result it wanted on the field, it turned its aim directly to paralyzing the supports of the Iranian regime.
It’s not just about military victory here. The issue may be to leave Iran alone with its own internal crises after the war. Weakening Hezbollah, targeting the Revolutionary Guard and pruning Iran’s regional connections become more meaningful when read this way.
It was already discussed how central the Revolutionary Guard issue had become in the pre-war negotiation discussions. If the goal is really to liquidate these structures, the question we need to ask here is: What will happen next? What will replace it?
The end of this will not automatically be a “liberated Iran” as is often told from the outside — and this is the American side. Such a scenario would create a huge power vacuum. The sudden paralysis of the regime apparatus, especially the collapse of security and influence networks such as the Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah, creates a much harsher risk of instability and even civil war within the country.
Israel’s calculation may be this: If it cannot achieve the exact result it wants in the war, it will at least leave a ground for Iran to exhaust itself after withdrawing. This may sound speculative, but we have seen enough similar examples in the history of the Middle East. (Again, it was carried out by USA. Isn’t it strange how history keeps repeating itself?) Dismantle the state’s security apparatus, create a power vacuum, and then domestic fractures will do the rest. This dynamic is not new.
Finishing Touch
The steps taken by Lebanon today, the distance the Gulf has taken towards Iran, or Iran’s discourse-action contradiction are not the center of the story alone. These are signs that the war is changing direction.
In my opinion, Israel is not only looking for superiority on the front. If quick victory is not possible, it seems to want to escalate the war to a point that will cripple Iran’s regime capacity. This means that a war that never ends militarily will move into a second phase that is much more destructive politically and socially.
So perhaps the question we should be asking now is not whether Iran will lose the war. The question I want to address is this: If Iran is weakened, what kind of region will emerge?
Written by Gökçen Kunukcu
Observing chaos. Calling it analysis.
Published in The Geopolitical Economist
In The Global geopolitics, truth is one, but the wise interpret it differently.— Here, we interpret these diversions
相關閱讀
What Is Happening in Lebanon?
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停火協議生效後伊朗戰爭現況 – Jon Gambrell
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請參考：
* Iran closes Strait of Hormuz in response to Israeli strikes on Lebanon, state media say
Here's where things stand after a tentative, 2-week Iran ceasefire took effect
JON GAMBRELL, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 04/08/26
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — The ceasefire reached Wednesday has raised hopes of halting hostilities between Iran, Israel and the United States, but many issues remain unresolved.
Reaching a permanent deal will be key to ending a war that's shaken the Middle East and global energy markets. But there are vast differences between U.S. President Donald Trump and Iran's surviving leaders, and America's ally Israel has its own interests.
Here's where things stand.
Iran's government
Trump has suggested there has been “regime change” in Iran after U.S. and Israeli strikes killed the 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the first day of the war and a slew of other top officials and military leaders thereafter.
But Khamenei was succeeded by his son, Mojtaba, who is close to the country's Revolutionary Guard and seen as even more hostile toward the U.S. He is believed to have been wounded in the strike that killed his father and has not been seen or spoken in public since the start of the war.
The political class devoted to maintaining Iran's Shiite theocracy remains intact. Many Iranians are angry at their leaders, but there has been no sign of an uprising since authorities crushed mass protests in January, before the war.
Iran's nuclear program
All of Iran's highly enriched uranium remains in the country, likely entombed at enrichment sites bombed by the U.S. during a 12-day war last June. Iran hasn't enriched since then but maintains it has the right to do so for peaceful purposes and denies seeking nuclear weapons.
Trump said Wednesday that the U.S. would work with Iran to “dig up and remove” the uranium — though Iran did not confirm that.
Trump, along with Israel, has called for Iran to completely dismantle its nuclear program. Iran rejected that in its 10-point proposal for ending the war.
Iran's missile program
Since the war began Feb. 28, Iran has launched more than 5,000 drones, over 2,100 ballistic missiles and over 50 cruise missiles, according to statistics from the Washington-based Jewish Institute for National Security of America, which has close ties to the Israeli military.
Before the war, JINSA estimated Iran's arsenal to be between 8,000 to 10,000 ballistic missiles of various ranges. No public estimate exists of Iran's drone stockpile.
The U.S. and Israel say they destroyed or buried many of Iran's missile launchers. Israel says it also greatly reduced Iran's ability to produce and launch missiles but did not eliminate the threat — and Iran continued launching attacks.
Iran's military
The U.S. military's Central Command said it destroyed over 150 ships — effectively sinking the Iranian navy. Multiple Iranian warplanes, helicopters and other equipment were destroyed, along with military installations and missile factories.
That didn’t stop Iran from effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz, the waterway through which around a fifth of the world’s traded oil passes, and erecting a virtual toll booth to charge countries for using it.
Iran's ‘Axis of Resistance’
Israel mauled Iran's allied militant groups across the region in wars sparked by Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023, attack out of the Gaza Strip.
Lebanon's Hezbollah, the strongest such group, is still battling Israel, fighting that Israel says will continue despite the ceasefire. Yemen's Houthi rebels, targeted by Israeli and U.S. airstrikes in recent years, only fired on Israel a few times during the war and left Red Sea shipping alone. Hamas still controls around half of Gaza and has yet to disarm under a U.S.-brokered ceasefire.
Israel wants Iran to end its support for such groups, something Tehran has refused to do and did not mention in its peace proposal.
The Strait of Hormuz
Before the war, ships freely passed through the Strait of Hormuz, in the territorial waters of Iran and Oman. Since the war, Iran reportedly has been charging as much as $2 million a vessel to allow them to pass.
Iran and Oman are working on a proposal to split fees in the waterway, and Tehran insists it will maintain military control there, potentially granting itself a new source of revenue in the face of international sanctions.
Trump says America will be “hangin' around” to ensure traffic passes. The U.S. and other countries are likely to oppose the new system, setting up a potential flashpoint.
Gulf Arab countries
Gulf Arab nations can't be happy about how the war has turned out.
Iranian attacks caused widespread damage to oil and gas facilities, airports and other sites, piercing their carefully cultivated image as stable business and tourism hubs. Qatar, one of the world's top natural gas producers, has said it will take years to restore its output.
Gulf countries' distrust of Iran has never been deeper and their faith that the U.S. will defend them has been shaken. U.S. bases across the region suffered direct strikes, but there’s no indication of any American withdrawal, as Iran has demanded.
More tactical gains for Israel, but no knockout blow
Israel was repeatedly targeted by Iranian fire but its advanced air defenses and extensive network of bomb shelters provided significant protection.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says Israel inflicted major losses on Iran, but the U.S. and Israel fell short of eliminating its nuclear or missile programs. His hoped-for uprising that would topple the Islamic Republic has yet to materialize.
Israel says it has assurances the U.S. will address Iran's nuclear and missile programs in negotiations. But many Israelis are likely to be disappointed by yet another inconclusive war, which could weigh on Netanyahu ahead of elections later this year.
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伊朗戰爭：雙方同意停火兩週 – BBC
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請參考：
* US and Iran agree to 2-week ceasefire as Trump pulls back on threats
* Iran ceasefire deal a partial win for Trump - but at a high cost
* Political analyst reacts to Trump's Iran threat: 'This is the way the monsters of history speak'
Iran and US agree to conditional two-week ceasefire and opening of Hormuz strait
BBC, 04/08/26
Summary
* Donald Trump says he agrees to a proposed two-week ceasefire between the US and Iran if shipping traffic is allowed to move through the Strait of Hormuz
* Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says Tehran will agree to the end in fighting "if attacks against Iran are halted"
* Israel says it supports Trump's decision to suspend strikes on Iran, but the two-week ceasefire "does not include Lebanon"
* The US president had set a deadline of 20:00 EDT (01:00 BST) for a deal or else "a whole civilisation will die tonight"
* Pakistan, which has been acting as a mediator, called on Trump to extend his deadline for two weeks, and has invited both sides for talks in Islamabad on Friday
* A deficit in trust between the US and Iran will make these negotiations very difficult, BBC Persian's correspondent in Washington writes
* Oil prices have fallen sharply since the announcement of the ceasefire, now trading well under $100 a barrel
* 1:13 Americans on Trump's 'a whole civilisation will die tonight' warning. 00:01:13, play video Americans on Trump's 'a whole civilisation will die tonight' warning
* 0:40Iranians form human chains at bridges and power plants. 00:00:40, play video Iranians form human chains at bridges and power plants
Edited by Toby Mann and James Chater, with reporting from BBC Persian and teams across the Middle East
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川瘋「最後通牒」的攤牌時刻 - Anthony Zurcher
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請參考：
* Iran threatens Bab al-Mandeb closure: How would that affect world trade?
* Iran's Revolutionary Guards say they targeted petrochemical facilities in the Gulf
Clock ticks on Trump's Iran ultimatum with little sign of breakthrough
Anthony Zurcher, North America correspondent, 04/07/26
President Donald Trump has set deadlines, made demands and issued threats over the course of the five-week joint US-Israeli war against Iran. But seldom have they been this explicit.
The new round of strikes against Iran will be devastating. They will begin at 20:00, Washington DC time on Tuesday (00:00 GMT on Wednesday). Within four hours, every bridge and power plant in the nation will be "decimated".
"Very little is off-limits," Trump said on Monday.
To avoid this fate, according to the president, Iran has to make a deal "that's acceptable to me". A component of the agreement should include "free traffic of oil" through the Strait of Hormuz.
As the final hours tick down, there has been little indication that Iran is ready to agree to Trump's ultimatum. They've rejected a temporary ceasefire and issued their own list of demands, which a US official described as "maximalist".
This places the American president in a delicate position. If there is no agreement, Trump could extend his deadline – for the fourth time in the past three weeks.
But backing away after such detailed threats, punctuated with expletives and dire warnings, could undercut his credibility as the war grinds on.
It's possible Iran, and the rest of the world, could conclude that despite America's military might and tactical skill – readily displayed in this weekend's intricate operation to rescue two downed airmen deep in Iran – it is not negotiating from a clear position of strength.
"We won," Trump insisted during his press conference on Monday afternoon. "They are militarily defeated. The only thing they have is the psychology of: 'Oh, we're going to drop a couple of mines in the water'."
That "psychology" – the ability to deter oil tankers from transiting the Strait of Hormuz with drones, missiles and mines – may be a more potent Iranian asset than the US has been willing to acknowledge.
During Monday's press conference, Trump marveled at American military precision on display in last year's "Midnight Hammer" bombing raid on Iran's nuclear sites, the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in January and this weekend's rescue mission.
He and his national security team celebrated that most recent effort – which included coordinating hundreds of aircraft and elite military personnel and employing misdirection and technological wizardy. But the effort, while remarkable, was to avoid what Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth acknowledged was a "potential tragedy".
Even if that tragedy was averted, the triumphant rescue underlined the risk American forces still face in Iran. And the president may be learning that American military power has its limits.
"We can bomb the hell out of them," he said. "We can knock them for a loop. But to close the Strait, all you need is one terrorist."
The other option is for Trump to follow through with his threats. On multiple occasions on Monday, he said that was a course he did not want to pursue.
While Trump said that the Iranian people were willing to endure the ongoing US military campaign – and, in fact, welcomed the bombs falling on their cities – he also acknowledged that anything the US destroys now would eventually have to be rebuilt and that the US might ultimately contribute to that rebuilding effort.
"Do I want to destroy their infrastructure? No," he said. "Right now, if we leave today, it will take them 20 years to rebuild their country."
He added that if he followed through with his bombing threats, the rebuilding effort would take a century.
It's not exactly the "stone age" that he has warned Iran would be reduced to, but an ensuing humanitarian crisis – including the regional impact of the "crushing" retaliation that Iran has promised – could be devastating.
Even in this late hour, however, Trump continues to hold out hope of a breakthrough.
"We have an active, willing participant on the other side," he said. "They would like to be able to make a deal. I can't say any more than that."
With the stakes as high as they are, the president's opacity is notable. He has a plan – "every single thing has been thought out by all of us", he said on Monday - but he won't divulge it.
It could be an indication that, behind the scenes, negotiations are farther along than have been publicly acknowledged. Or it could be some combination of bluff and wishful thinking.
"They have till tomorrow," Trump said. "We'll see what happens. I believe they're negotiating in good faith. I guess we'll find out."
相關報導
* Trump threatens to take out Iran in 'one night' if no deal before deadline
* Trump issues expletive-laden threat to Iran over Hormuz Strait blockage
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川瘋的狂怒和咆哮適得其反 -- Catherine Bouris
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果不其然，川瘋/川痞再次食言而肥(請見以下第一個「超連結」。
請參考：
* Trump backs away from seizing Iran's oil: 'Unfortunately, the American people would like to see us come home'
* Trump threatens to take out Iran in 'one night' if no deal before deadline (deadline is set at：01：00 GMT on Tuesday；GMT Greenwich Mean Time；格林威治標準時間；台北時間04/08，08：00)
* Iran rejects latest ceasefire proposal as Trump deadline approaches
* US, Iran study ceasefire plan as Trump's 'hell' warning nears deadline
* Hormuz Traffic Rises to Highest in Weeks
Trump’s Profanity-Filled Easter Post Blows Up in His Face
Catherine Bouris, 04/06/26
President Donald Trump’s early morning Easter Sunday Truth Social tirade has backfired spectacularly.
At 8 a.m. on Sunday, the president posted an expletive-laden rant featuring a warning for Iran that the country would be “living in hell” if it did not open the Strait of Hormuz.
“Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!!!” Trump, 79, wrote.
“Open the F—n’ Strait, you crazy b-----ds, or you’ll be living in Hell - JUST WATCH!” he continued, before ending with, “Praise be to Allah.”
Trump's Truth Social post from Sunday morning. / Truth Social 川瘋貼文
If the president intended for his incendiary post to calm the markets, it has had the opposite effect, instead sending oil prices even higher on Sunday, CNN reported.
The cost of Brent crude rose 1.4 percent to $110.60 while U.S. crude rose 1.8 percent to $113.60, their highest in over three years.
Gas prices are at their highest since June 2022, having risen by over 38 percent since the war began to a national average of $4.11 on Sunday.
Meanwhile, stocks fell on Sunday after markets were closed Friday, with Dow futures down 0.69 percent, S&P 500 futures down 0.76 percent, and Nasdaq futures down 0.91 percent.
The Daily Beast has contacted the White House for comment.
An Iranian official responded to Trump’s Truth Social post by asserting that the strait will remain closed until the country is “fully compensated” for the damage it has suffered during Trump’s war.
He also dismissed Trump’s threats as a sign that the U.S. has “resorted to obscenities and nonsense out of sheer desperation and anger.”
The renewed threats came less than a week after the president claimed that the U.S. did not need the Strait of Hormuz in his Wednesday address to the nation.
“The United States imports almost no oil through the Hormuz Strait and won’t be taking any in the future. We don’t need it,” Trump said.
The president has repeatedly leveled threats at Iran in an attempt to force it to reopen the strait, including threatening to strike vital infrastructure, despite warnings that such acts could constitute war crimes.
“Once again, the US president openly threatens to destroy infrastructure essential to civilian survival in Iran,” Iran’s mission to the United Nations said on Sunday.
“The international community and all states have legal obligations to prevent such atrocious acts of war crimes. They must act now. Tomorrow is too late.”
On Thursday, dozens of international law experts signed an open letter expressing “profound concern” about violations of international law made by the U.S., Israel, and Iran during the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.
“International law protects from attack objects indispensable to the survival of civilians, and the attacks threatened by Trump, if implemented, could entail war crimes‚” the experts wrote in response to the president’s initial threats against Iran’s power plants.
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川瘋又開始口吐白沫起乩了 -- Hatem Maher/Phil Stewart
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請參考：
* 'Be serious... don't speak every day': Macron criticises Trump approach to Iran war
傻瓜，「轟炸」在把敵人徹底打趴上有個屁用！
我敢打賭：到了美國時間04/06，12:00 pm，川普還是得換上「川『痞』」的面具，再次「賣慫」。
Trump gives Iran 48 hours to make a deal, as hunt goes on for missing US pilot
Hatem Maher/Phil Stewart, 04/04/26
CAIRO/WASHINGTON, April 4 (Reuters) - Iranian and U.S. forces were searching for a missing American pilot on Saturday from one of two warplanes downed over Iran and the Gulf, while President Donald Trump warned Tehran time was running out on his latest deadline for a deal to end the war.
The prospect of a U.S. service member alive and on the run in Iran raised the stakes for Washington as the conflict entered its sixth week with scant prospect of peace talks in sight and polls showing low public support.
With Iran's leadership defiant since the start of the war, its foreign minister left the door open in principle for peace talks with the U.S. via mediation from Pakistan, but gave no sign of Tehran's willingness to bow to Trump's demands.
Officials prioritize rescue efforts for the missing crew member, with both countries focusing on recovery. The U.S. says the search remains dangerous, and military analysts point out the risks involved with operations in contested areas.
"We are deeply grateful to Pakistan for its efforts and have never refused to go to Islamabad. What we care about are the terms of a conclusive and lasting END to the illegal war that is imposed on us," Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said on X.
MIXED SIGNALS
Trump has sent mixed messages since the conflict began with a U.S.-Israeli bombardment of Iran on February 28, switching between hinting at diplomatic progress to making threats to bomb the Islamic Republic "back to the Stone Ages".
On Saturday, he repeated his threats to intensify attacks on Iran if it failed to reach a deal or open the key Strait of Hormuz waterway.
"Remember when I gave Iran ten days to MAKE A DEAL or OPEN UP THE HORMUZ STRAIT. Time is running out - 48 hours before all Hell will reign (sic) down on them. Glory be to GOD!" he said in a post on Truth Social.
The war has killed thousands, sparked an energy crisis and threatened lasting damage to the world economy. Iran has virtually shut the Strait of Hormuz, which normally carries about a fifth of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas.
Iran attacked an Israel-affiliated vessel with a drone in the strait, setting the ship on fire, Iran's state media said on Saturday, citing the commander of the Revolutionary Guards' navy.
IRAN TOUTS NEW AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS
The downing of two U.S. warplanes shows the risks still facing U.S. and Israeli aircraft, despite assertions by Trump and his Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth that U.S. forces had total control of the skies over Iran.
Iranian fire brought down a two-seat U.S. F-15E jet, officials in both countries said on Friday, and a U.S. official said search-and-rescue efforts had recovered one of the crew.
Two Black Hawk helicopters engaged in the search for the missing crew member were hit by Iranian fire but made it out of Iranian airspace, the two U.S. officials told Reuters.
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said it was combing a southwestern area near where the pilot's plane came down, while the regional governor promised a commendation for anyone who captured or killed "forces of the hostile enemy."
In a separate incident, an A-10 Warthog fighter aircraft was hit and crashed over Kuwait, with the pilot ejecting, the U.S. officials said.
Iranians, pummelled by air power since the U.S. and Israel began their attacks, celebrated their success.
The Khatam al-Anbiya joint military command said it used a new air-defence system on Friday, which targeted a U.S. fighter jet, three drones and two cruise missiles.
"The enemy should know that we rely on new air-defence systems built by the young, knowledgeable, and proud people of this country, unveiling them one after another in the field," a Khatam al-Anbiya spokesperson said, according to Iran's state media.
The Revolutionary Guards said they had targeted various areas in Israel in a wave of missiles and drones. Israeli media reported that two warheads from an Iranian cluster missile landed near Israel’s Kirya military headquarters in Tel Aviv.
Later on Saturday, the Israel Defence Forces said they had detected more missiles launched from Iran towards Israel.
The Revolutionary Guards also targeted U.S. HIMARS rocket launcher batteries in Kuwait and Patriot missile batteries in Bahrain, according to a statement read on Iranian state TV.
PETROCHEMICAL ZONE STRUCK IN IRAN
Iranian state media reported air strikes at a petrochemical zone in southwestern Iran, with five people reported injured. They later said a fire there had been extinguished.
A projectile also hit an auxiliary building near the perimeter of Iran's Bushehr nuclear plant, the Tasnim news agency said, killing one person. The operations of the plant were unaffected.
Russia's state nuclear company Rosatom evacuated a further 198 of its staff from the site on Saturday, Russian news agencies reported, in evacuations already planned before the latest incident.
The Israeli military meanwhile said it had carried out "a wave of strikes" on Tehran.
Israel has been waging a parallel campaign against Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon after the militant group fired at Israel in support of Iran. Early on Saturday, Israel's military said it was striking the militants' infrastructure sites in Beirut.
(Reporting by Phil Stewart in Washington, Reuters bureaux; Writing by Clarence Fernandez, Matthias Williams and Alex Richardson; Editing by William Mallard and Sharon Singleton)
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伊朗仍持有戰前半數攻擊武器 - Haley Britzky等
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請參考：
* US fighter jet shot down over Iran, search underway for crew, US officials say
* How to take down a US F-35 over Iran? Chinese engineer’s prophetic tutorial goes viral
* Inside Trump's Search for a Way Out of the Iran War
伊朗降低攻擊次數是明智決定 – 畢竟，「細水長流」嘛。伊朗政府領導人不是傻瓜；戰場上伊朗當然不是財大氣粗美國的對手，只能用「持久戰」拖一天是一天。冀望民意支持度和國際/市場忍耐度來屈山姆大叔之兵。
這篇報導可以說明此文(本欄2026/03/18)和此文的虛妄(該欄2026/04/02)。
US intelligence assesses Iran maintains significant missile launching capability, sources say
Haley Britzky/Natasha Bertrand/Jim Sciutto/al Shalev, CNN, 04/03/26
Roughly half of Iran’s missile launchers are still intact and thousands of one-way attack drones remain in Iran’s arsenal despite the daily pounding by US and Israeli strikes against military targets over the past five weeks, according to recent US intelligence assessments, three sources familiar with the intel told CNN.
“They are still very much poised to wreak absolute havoc throughout the entire region,” one of the sources said of Iran.
The US intelligence assessment total may include launchers that are currently inaccessible, such as those buried underground by strikes but not destroyed.
Thousands of Iranian drones still exist — roughly 50% of the country’s drone capabilities — two of the sources said the intelligence indicated. The intelligence, compiled in recent days, also showed a large percentage of Iran’s coastal defense cruise missiles were intact, the sources said, consistent with the US not focusing its air campaign on coastal military assets though they have been hitting ships. Those missiles serve as a key capability allowing Iran to threaten shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz.
Pentagon and CNN sources say Iran’s arsenal survived weeks of coordinated strikes, leaving the region on alert for further escalation. Officials continue to warn that Iran’s military capabilities remain a serious threat and tensions are high.
The intelligence offers a more nuanced picture of Iran’s continuing capabilities compared to sweeping assessments of military victory offered publicly by President Donald Trump and administration officials.
In remarks to the nation on Wednesday evening, Trump said Iran’s “ability to launch missiles and drones is dramatically curtailed, and their weapons factories and rocket launchers are being blown to pieces, very few of them left.”
As of Wednesday, the US has struck more than 12,300 targets inside Iran, according to US Central Command. The sources said the intelligence showed the US military has degraded Iran’s military capabilities, and key senior leaders have been killed in US and Israeli strikes, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Ali Larijani, the head of Iran’s National Security Council.
In addition to the country’s missile launchers, Iran maintains a large number of missiles, according to the intelligence.
In public comments, the Pentagon has pointed to a reduction in the total number of missiles launched by Iran, rather than what has been destroyed. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said during a press briefing on March 19 that “ballistic missile attacks against our forces, down 90 percent since the start of the conflict, same with one way attack UAVs, think kamikaze drones, down 90 percent.”
In response to questions for this story, White House spokesperson Anna Kelly said that, “anonymous sources desperately want to attack President Trump and demean the incredible work of our United States Military in achieving the goals of Operation Epic Fury.”
“Here are the facts: Iranian ballistic missile and drone attacks are down 90 percent, their navy is wiped out, two-thirds of their production facilities are damaged or destroyed, and the United States and Israel have overwhelming air dominance over Iran,” she said. “The terrorist regime is being decimated militarily and their dismal situation grows bleaker by the day – their only hope is to make a deal with President Trump’s administration and leave behind their nuclear ambitions for good. Otherwise, they will be hit harder than they’ve ever been hit before.”
An administration official added that Iran’s ballistic missiles are being destroyed rapidly.
Israel, countries in the Gulf, and US military personnel have continued to face regular barrages of missile and drone strikes.
Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell disputed CNN’s reporting, calling it “completely wrong.”
“The United States military has delivered a crippling series of blows to the Iranian regime,” Parnell said. “We are far ahead of schedule on accomplishing our military objectives: destroy Iran’s missile arsenal, annihilate their Navy, destroy their terrorist proxies, and ensure Iran can never obtain a nuclear weapon.”
Israeli military officials put the total number of operational Iranian launchers at a lower number, roughly 20-25%. Israel does not include launchers that have been buried or made inaccessible in caves and tunnels in their count of surviving launchers, said one of the sources familiar with the US’ intelligence assessment and an Israeli source.
On Wednesday, Trump put the timeline for finishing US operations at two to three weeks.
The first source who has reviewed the US intelligence assessment said such a goal was unrealistic, given how much remains on the playing field for Iran to use.
“We can keep f**king them up, I don’t doubt it, but you’re out of your mind if you think this will be done in two weeks,” the source said.
Hegseth said this week in a press briefing that Iran’s firepower is continuing to decrease.
“Yes, they will still shoot some missiles, but we will shoot them down,” he said. “Of note, the last 24 hours saw the lowest number of enemy missiles and drones fired by Iran. They will go underground, but we will find them.”
The ability to go underground is a primary reason why launchers have not been further degraded, two of the sources familiar with the recent assessment told CNN. Iran has long hid its launchers in extensive networks of tunnels and caves — preparing for conflict like this for decades — making them particularly difficult to target. Two of the sources said Iran has had success in shooting and moving the mobile platforms, making it difficult to track the launchers, similar to the challenges the US has had with the Houthis in Yemen, one of Iran’s primary proxy forces.
The US and Israel have increasingly targeted tunnel entrances to those underground facilities and equipment used to try to regain access to them, like bulldozers and other heavy equipment, Annika Ganzeveld, the Middle East Portfolio Manager for the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute said.
The recent intelligence assessment also comes as the US has struggled to re-open the Strait of Hormuz, acknowledging privately that it cannot promise to reopen the crucial waterway before ending the war. The coastal cruise missile capabilities could be largely still intact because it hasn’t been the focus of the US military’s campaign, the first source said, instead narrowing its firepower on what can be fired at allies in the region. But those capabilities have also likely retreated underground, making them difficult to find.
And while Iran’s Navy has largely been destroyed, the first source said, the separate naval forces belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps still retain roughly half of its capabilities. The second source said the IRGC still has “hundreds, if not thousands, of small boats and unmanned surface vessels left.”
As of Wednesday, CENTCOM said in a public release that more than 155 Iranian vessels have been damaged or destroyed. But Ganzeveld said it has been unclear when the US says it has destroyed Iranian vessels which Navy they’re referring to.
The IRGC Navy, she said, is largely the force responsible for harassing shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
“There are certainly things that remain — the proxies, as well as the drones, and Iran recently demonstrated in the past couple of days that it still retains the ability to target shipping in the strait,” Ganzeveld said. “So there are definitely things that remain to be targeted if we want to completely destroy these capabilities.”
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川瘋伊朗戰情匯報之惡習未改 – Will Weissert等
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請參考：
* Oil plunges, stocks soar after Iranian president offers first signs of willingness to end war with US
川瘋的大嘴巴嚇不到人，只會讓跟他一樣瘋狂的伊朗領袖層，堅定「玉石俱焚」意志。
Trump says US forces will 'finish the job' soon in first prime-time speech since starting Iran war
WILL WEISSERT/JON GAMBRELL/ DAVID RISING, 04/01/26
WASHINGTON (AP) — President Donald Trump said U.S. forces will “finish the job” in Iran soon as “core strategic objectives are nearing completion,” offering a full-throated defense of the war Wednesday night in his first national address since the conflict began more than a month ago.
Trump used his platform before a wide audience to tout the success of the U.S. operations in Iran and argue that all of Washington’s objectives have so far been met or exceeded. He ticked through a timeline of past American involvement in conflicts and noted that the ongoing war in Iran had lasted 32 days in comparison, seeming to appeal to the public for more time to achieve the mission.
“In these past four weeks our armed forces have delivered swift, decisive, overwhelming victories on the battlefield,” Trump said, saying the U.S. military action had been “so powerful, so brilliant” that “one of the most powerful countries” is “really no longer a threat” — even as Iran kept up its attacks on Israel and Persian Gulf neighbors early Thursday.
Trump spent much of an address that lasted just under 20 minutes repeating many of the same things he said in recent weeks and providing few new details. The speech appeared unlikely to move the needle of public sentiment at a time when polling shows many Americans feel the U.S. military has gone too far in Iran and as gas and oil prices remain high.
“Tonight, I’m pleased to say that these core strategic objectives are nearing completion,” Trump said. He also acknowledged American service members who had been killed and added, “We are going to finish the job, and we’re going to finish it very fast. We’re getting very close.”
He didn’t mention the possibility of sending U.S. ground troops into Iran, nor did he mention NATO, the trans-Atlantic alliance he has railed against for not helping the U.S. secure the critical Strait of Hormuz. He didn’t mention negotiation talks with Iran or bring up his April 6 deadline for Iran to reopen the waterway or face severe retaliation from the U.S.
Trump encourages other countries to go take the Strait
In his speech, Trump seemed to suggest he had ruled out going into Iran to get the enriched uranium, though he has been clear that the country could never have a nuclear weapon.”
“The nuclear sites that we obliterated with the B-2 bombers have been hit so hard that it would take months to get near the nuclear dust,” Trump said Wednesday. "And we have it under intense satellite surveillance and control. If we see them make a move, even a move for it, we’ll hit them with missiles very hard again.”
Trump encouraged countries reliant on oil through the Strait of Hormuz to “build some delayed courage” and go “take it.”
He also said that the fighting would continue for at least a few more weeks.
“We are going to hit them extremely hard over the next two to three weeks. We’re going to bring them back to the Stone Ages, where they belong," Trump said.
Oil rose more than 4% and Asian stocks fell after Trump said in his address that the U.S. will continue to hit Iran very hard.
Trump says ‘we could just take their oil’ before speech
Trump's comments in his address were more measured than some of his previous remarks, including earlier Wednesday at a White House Easter lunch.
Of Iran, he told his assembled guests: “We could just take their oil. But you know, I’m not sure that the people in our country have the patience to do that, which is unfortunate.”
“Yeah, they want to see it end. If we stayed there, I prefer just to take the oil,” Trump said. “We could do it so easily. I would prefer that. But people in the country sort of say: ‘Just win. You’re winning so big. Just win. Come home.’ And I’m OK with that, too, because we have a lot of oil between Venezuela and our oil.”
The media was not permitted to watch the president’s remarks at the lunch, but the White House uploaded video of the speech online before taking it down. The White House did not return requests for comment from The Associated Press on the video and why it was taken down.
In the lunch, the president reiterated some of his complaints about NATO allies for their reluctance to get involved in securing the Strait of Hormuz while suggesting that China, Japan and South Korea could also step up to reopen the waterway.
“Let South Korea, you know, we only have 45,000 soldiers in harm’s way over there, right next to a nuclear force -- let South Korea do it,” Trump said of efforts to reopen the strait. “Let Japan do it. They get 90% of their oil from the strait. Let China do it.”
In a social media post Wednesday morning, Trump wrote that “Iran’s New Regime President” wanted a ceasefire. It wasn’t clear to whom the U.S. president was referring since Iran still has the same president. Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, Esmail Baghaei, called Trump’s claim “false and baseless,” according to a report on Iranian state television.
Hours before Trump’s address, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian posted a lengthy letter in English on his X account appealing to U.S. citizens and stressing that his country had pursued negotiations before the U.S. withdrew from that path. “Exactly which of the American people’s interests are truly being served by this war?” he wrote.
No signs of Iran relinquishing its grip on the Strait of Hormuz
Since the war began on Feb. 28, Trump has offered shifting objectives and repeatedly has said it could be over soon while also threatening to widen the conflict. Thousands of additional U.S. troops are currently heading to the Middle East, and speculation abounds about why. Trump has also threatened to attack Iran’s Kharg Island oil export hub.
Adding to the confusion is what role Israel — which has been bombing Iran alongside the U.S. — might play in any of these scenarios.
Trump has been under growing pressure to end the war that has been pushing up the cost of gasoline, food and other goods. The price of Brent crude, the international standard, is up more than 40% since the start of the war.
Gambrell reported from Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Rising reported from Bangkok. Associated Press writers Seung Min Kim in Washington, Giovanna Dell’Orto in Miami, Farnoush Amiri in New York and Samy Magdy in Cairo contributed to this report.
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葉門乎舍軍投入美以伊戰爭 -- Tim Lister/Nadeen Ebrahim
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* Trump's April 6 deadline looms as Iran vows to 'set fire' to U.S. troops. Here's what's happening on day 30 of the war.
The Iran war has a new front in Yemen. Here’s how it could escalate
Tim Lister/Nadeen Ebrahim, 03/29/26
After a month of threats, Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels finally entered the Middle East conflict on Saturday, firing two missiles towards Israel. And in recent days they have also warned they could close a key waterway at the southern entrance of the Red Sea – raising the prospect of even greater disruption to global shipping and oil supplies.
Whether the Houthis will extend their attacks to Saudi Arabia or Red Sea shipping remains unclear, but doing so would mark a dramatic escalation of the month-long war.
Who are the Houthis?
The Houthis represent Yemen’s Shia Muslim minority, the Zaidis, and are formally known as Ansar Allah – “Partisans of God.”
They emerged as an armed group in the 1990s and fought a series of rebellions against Yemen’s central government over two decades. After the Arab Spring in 2011, they seized a northern province and later the capital Sanaa, which they still hold, along with most of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline.
Israel directly addressed the Houthi group's move into the Iran conflict and signaled military consequences. The potential threat to the Red Sea could disrupt a key global trade route, which worries the business and shipping world.
In the process they became part of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” across the region, receiving weapons and missile technology. After Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza began in October 2023, the Houthis launched missiles against Israel and began targeting shipping in the Red Sea.
The Israelis responded with air-strikes against Houthi infrastructure and killed a number of senior Houthi officials – but not the top leadership.
Why have they joined the war now?
Their initial attempted strikes on Saturday were very limited, and some analysts see them as a symbolic move rather than a full-throated effort to support Iran.
“The truth is, (Israel is) at war with us and in a state of continuous aggression against us,” according to Nasr al-Din Amer, a member of the Houthis’ politburo.
“They have not stopped, nor have they concealed their pursuit of what they call ‘Greater Israel’ and ‘changing the Middle East,’” Amer said in a statement to CNN on Saturday.
The Houthis’ leader, Abdel-Malik Houthi, said on Thursday that Yemenis “repay loyalty with loyalty, and Iran was the only state, officially, that stood with us against the aggression on our country.”
Much of his speech was directed at Saudi Arabia, demanding compensation for the blockade and the long-term damage to Yemen as a result of Riyadh’s military campaign against the Houthis between 2015 and 2022.
Essentially, the Houthis are putting Saudi Arabia on notice while not inviting Saudi retaliation.
“It lets them restart military action without getting pulled into a wider fight with the U.S. or Saudi Arabia,” according to Yemeni analyst Mohammad Basha.
“Their main focus is still the Palestinian cause. By striking Israel, they are telling people in Yemen, their partners in the Iran-backed network, and supporters abroad that their priority has not changed,” Basha wrote on X.
What is Israel saying?
The Israeli military says it is prepared for a multi-front war but has not detailed any plans for retaliation.
“We have to be ready for this becoming a part of this war, and that’s how we’re preparing for it,” Israel Defense Forces spokesman Nadav Shoshani said Sunday.
“We’re taking their word and preparing to defend ourselves for as long as needed from that front as well.”
Is this a boost for Iran?
Not yet. The Houthis’ ability to inflict damage on Israel is marginal. Between 2023 and 2025 they fired nearly 100 missiles and more than 300 drones at Israel. Only one person was killed.
However, were the Houthis to expand their campaign to target Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, it would further expand the conflict. They have previously used missiles and drones against both countries, which are already fending off daily attacks from Iran.
The real boost for Iran would come if the Houthis resume targeting shipping in the Red Sea. They hit more than 100 ships in response to Israel’s military action in Gaza, driving up insurance rates and persuading many major operators to avoid the sea-lane, normally one of the busiest in the world.
With Tehran blocking most shipping from using the Strait of Hormuz, the Iranians and their chief regional ally would control or at least have a massive impact on regional shipping routes – and the flow of oil.
How can they block the Red Sea?
The Houthis control most of Yemen’s Red Sea coast, including the major port of Hodeidah. They have a range of weapons – including drones and anti-ship missiles – that can cause severe damage and even sink merchant ships.
Shipping has to pass through the Bab al-Mandab Strait – which translates as the Gate of Tears – at the southern end of the Red Sea. Just 29 kilometers (18 miles) across at its narrowest point, the navigational challenges would make huge container vessels particularly vulnerable to attack.
On Friday, Mohammed Mansour, deputy Information Minister in the Houthi government, told CNN that closing the Bab al-Mandab Strait “is a viable option, and the consequences will be borne by the American and Israeli aggressors.”
Just how much damage to the global economy would such disruption cause?
With shipping through the Strait of Hormuz severely curtailed over the past month, blocking another maritime chokepoint would cause further economic dislocation.
“Disrupting traffic in the Red Sea, the Bab al Mandab Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea creates pressure without crossing a line that could trigger a direct U.S. response,” says Basha.
Nearly 15% of global maritime trade passes the Bab al-Mandab. The previous disruptions to shipping between 2023 and 2025 probably cost some $20 billion a year, according to industry estimates, as ships were re-routed around southern Africa (often extending a voyage by two weeks) or paid higher insurance to use the Red Sea.
Those attacks also caused brief but noticeable spikes in crude prices because of the higher risk premiums.
But during that period there were large global stocks of oil and alternative routes. That’s not the case now.
And there’s an additional hazard. With the Strait of Hormuz blocked to most traffic, Saudi Arabia is routing oil exports through its east-west pipeline to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, and tanker traffic there has surged.
The port of Jeddah is also handling far greater volumes of container traffic.
Both would be vulnerable to Houthi drones and missiles.
Even the prospect of renewed Houthi attacks worries large shipping companies such as Maersk, which is currently avoiding the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
“The primary risk that one could see is that the actual conflict itself spreads to a wider geography,” Charles van der Steene, regional managing director of Maersk told CNN earlier this month.
While Jeddah “continues to be a safe option, (but) we need to consider what the alternatives would be,” he added.
While the Houthis may delay any broader escalation, says Basha, “they may be overlooking the longer-term risk. Israel has a pattern of delayed responses that focus on leadership. A decapitation campaign could come sooner or later.”
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Israel warns Houthis will ‘pay the price’ for entering war
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