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川、普野合後之歐洲--開欄文：英國首相強硬表態 - David Mercer
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英國首相強硬表態 -- David Mercer
(此為本文原標題，02/24改為現在的標題。「川、普」 者，「川普與普丁」之合稱也。)
我不熟悉歐洲政局，也很少關注。偶而讀到的評論，對史塔默並不看好。但從他這個正式發言，我認為他的國際觀相當靠譜。做為二流國家的領袖，真是「好樣的！」
下文中的 “Before attending an emergency summit with European leaders in Paris on Monday, …”，請見下一篇報導。也請參考《國際現勢：2025》，以及《歐洲各國領袖積極準備第三次世界大戰》一欄。
PM 'ready' to put troops on ground in Ukraine to protect peace
David Mercer - BBC News, 02/17/25
Sir Keir Starmer has said he is "ready and willing" to put UK troops on the ground in Ukraine to help guarantee its security as part of a peace deal.
Writing in the Daily Telegraph, the UK prime minister said securing a lasting peace in Ukraine was "essential if we are to deter Putin from further aggression in the future".
Before attending an emergency summit with European leaders in Paris on Monday, Sir Keir said the UK was prepared to contribute to security guarantees to Ukraine by "putting our own troops on the ground if necessary".
"I do not say that lightly," he wrote. "I feel very deeply the responsibility that comes with potentially putting British servicemen and women in harm's way."
The prime minister added: "But any role in helping to guarantee Ukraine's security is helping to guarantee the security of our continent, and the security of this country."
The end of Russia's war with Ukraine "when it comes, cannot merely become a temporary pause before Putin attacks again", Sir Keir said.
UK troops could be deployed alongside soldiers from other European nations alongside the border between Ukrainian-held and Russian-held territory.
Sir Keir's announcement comes after the former head of the Army, Lord Dannatt, told the BBC the UK military was "so run down" it could not lead any future peacekeeping mission in Ukraine.
The PM has previously only hinted that British troops could be involved in safeguarding Ukraine after a ceasefire.
He is due to visit President Donald Trump in Washington later this month and said a "US security guarantee is essential for a lasting peace, because only the US can deter Putin from attacking again".
Sir Keir is meeting with other European leaders in response to concerns the US is moving forward with Russia on peace talks that will lock out the continent.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio plans to meet Russian officials in Saudi Arabia in the coming days, US officials say.
On Saturday the US special envoy to Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, said European leaders would be consulted only and not take part in any talks between the US and Russia.
A senior Ukrainian government source told the BBC on Sunday that Kyiv has not been invited to talks between the US and Russia.
Trump earlier this week announced he had had a lengthy conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and that negotiations to stop the "ridiculous war" in Ukraine would begin "immediately".
Trump then "informed" Zelensky of his plan.
On Sunday, Trump said that he expected Zelensky to be involved in the talks. He also said he would allow European nations to buy US weapons for Ukraine.
Asked by the BBC about his timetable for an end to fighting, Trump said only that "we're working to get it done" and laid the blame for the war on the previous administration's Ukraine policies.
Writing in the Telegraph, Sir Keir said "peace cannot come at any cost" and "Ukraine must be at the table in these negotiations, because anything less would accept Putin's position that Ukraine is not a real nation".
He added: "We cannot have another situation like Afghanistan, where the US negotiated directly with the Taliban and cut out the Afghan government - in reference to a deal negotiated by Trump's first administration, which was later enacted by the Biden administration.
"I feel sure that President Trump will want to avoid this too," said Sir Keir
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Sir Keir said Ukraine's path to Nato membership was "irreversible" and European nations "must increase our defence spending and take on a greater role" in the alliance.
The UK currently spends around 2.3% of GDP on defence and has committed to increase defence spending to a 2.5% share of the economy, without giving a timeframe for this.
Trump has called for Nato members to spend 5% of GDP on defence, while Nato secretary general Mark Rutte has suggested allies should spend more than 3%.
Lord Dannatt - who was head of the Army from 2006 to 2009 - told the BBC up to 40,000 UK troops would be needed on rotation for a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine and "we just haven't got that number available".
He said, in total, a force to keep the peace would require about 100,000 troops on the ground and the UK would have to supply "quite a proportion of that and we really couldn't do it".
The meeting in Paris called by French President Emmanuel Macron will see Sir Keir joined by leaders from Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark along with the presidents of the European Council and European Commission, and Rutte.
相關訊息：
Ukraine end game: What each side wants from peace deal
Ukraine in maps: Tracking the war with Russia
Trump wants peace. Ukrainians fear what that might look like
Analysis: Vance's blast at Europe ignores Ukraine and defence agenda
本文於 修改第 13 次
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歐盟-南共市場貿易協定-Dora Meredith/John Clarke
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請參見本欄2026/01/31相關貼文。對歐洲事務熟悉的朋友，可以將下文與該貼文做個比較；看看「公」、「婆」之間，到底誰「說」的在「理」。
Europe must scramble to recover from its Mercosur blunder
If Brussels allows this moment to pass without course correction, others won’t wait. The deal might be imperfect, but irrelevance is far worse a fate.
"The deal might be imperfect, but irrelevance is far worse a fate," say our contributors. Pictured, screens reflect the EU Parliament's vote Jan. 21, 2026, to defer a decision on the freshly signed trade deal to the EU's top court. | Frederick Florin/AFP via Getty Images 圖片
Dora Meredith/John Clarke, 01/27/26
The EU rarely gets second chances in geopolitics. Yet last week, the European Parliament chose to throw one away. By voting to refer the long-awaited trade agreement with the Mercosur bloc to the Court of Justice of the EU for a legal opinion — a process that may take up two years — lawmakers dealt a serious blow to Europe’s credibility at a moment when speed and reliability matter more than ever.
After more than two decades of negotiations, this deal was meant to signal that Europe could still act decisively in a world of intensifying geopolitical competition. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen argued this month, it was the ultimate test of Europe’s continued relevance on the world stage. Oblivious to this, the Parliament’s decision reinforces the perception that the bloc is unable to follow through, even when an agreement is finally within reach.
It is, by any reasonable measure, a strategic own goal.
The consequences of this go well beyond trade. Mercosur governments spent years negotiating this free trade agreement (FTA) in good faith, navigating Europe’s hesitation, shifting demands and inconsistent political signals. Understandably, they are now interpreting the referral to the court as a political move. For partners already hedging their bets in an increasingly contested global landscape, it reinforces doubts over whether Europe can be relied on.
Meanwhile, for Europe, the true damage is to a deeper truth it all too often obscures: That its real power comes from the ability to make such agreements and then implement them seriously, consistently and at scale.
The EU–Mercosur agreement isn’t just another trade deal. It was designed as a framework for long-term economic, political and strategic partnership with a region where Europe’s influence has been steadily eroding. It offers comprehensive market access in goods and services, clearer investment rules, access to critical materials, structured political dialogue and a cooperation-based approach to managing disputes.
Taken together, it is meant to anchor Europe more firmly in South America at a time when others, most notably China, have moved faster and with fewer constraints. And while that level of ambition hasn’t disappeared with the Parliament’s vote, it has been put at serious risk.
Over the years, much of the criticism surrounding the Mercosur deal has focused on sustainability. Indeed, if eventually passed, this will be the litmus test for whether the EU can translate its values into influence. And to that end, the deal makes a wide set of previously voluntary commitments legally binding, including the implementation of the Paris climate targets and adherence to international conventions on labor rights, human rights, biodiversity and environmental protection. However, it does so through dialogue-based enforcement rather than automatic withdrawal in the face of noncompliance — an approach that reflects the political realities in both Brussels and the Mercosur countries.
This has disappointed those calling for tougher regulation, but it highlights an uncomfortable truth: Europe’s leverage over sustainability outcomes doesn’t come from pretending it can coerce partners into compliance but from sustained engagement and cooperation. That was a red line for Mercosur governments, and without it there would be no agreement at all.
The deal’s novel “rebalancing mechanism” sits within this logic, as it allows Mercosur countries to suspend concessions if future unforeseen EU regulations effectively negate promised market access. Critics fear this provision could be used to challenge future EU sustainability measures, but Mercosur countries see it as a safeguard against possible unilateral EU action, as exemplified by the Deforestation Regulation. Moreover, in practice, such mechanisms are rarely used. Plus, its inclusion was the price of securing an additional sustainability protocol.
Most crucially, though, none of this will resolve itself through legal delay. On the contrary, postponement weakens Europe’s ability to shape outcomes on the ground. Research from Brazil’s leading climate institutes shows that ambitious international engagement strengthens domestic pro‑environment coalitions by increasing transparency, resources and political leverage. Absence, by contrast, creates space for actors with far lower standards.
The same logic applies to the deal’s economic dimension. The Commission rightly highlights the headline figures: Billions of euros in tariff savings, expanded market access, secure access to critical minerals and growing trade. According to a recent study by the European Centre for International Political Economy, each month of delay represents €3 billion in foregone exports.
But these numbers matter less than what lies beneath them: Europe will be gaining all this while offering limited concessions in sensitive agricultural sectors; and Mercosur countries will be gaining access to the world’s largest single market — but only if they can meet demanding regulatory and environmental standards that could strain domestic capacity.
Again, the real power lies in the deal’s implementation. If managed well, such pressures can drive investment, modernize standards and reduce dependence on raw commodity exports as Latin American think tanks have argued. This transition is precisely what the EU’s €1.8 billion Global Gateway investment package was designed to support. And delaying the agreement delays that as well.
The Parliament’s decision isn’t just a procedural setback — it damages Europe’s greatest strength at a time when hesitation carries real cost. It also creates an immediate institutional dilemma for the Commission. Despite the judicial stay, the Commission is legally free to apply the agreement provisionally, but this is a difficult call: Apply it and enter a firestorm of criticism about avoiding democratic controls that will backfire the day the Parliament finally gets to vote on the agreement; or accept a two-year delay and postpone the deal’s economic benefits possibly indefinitely — Mercosur countries aren’t going to hold out forever.
If it is going to recover, over the coming months Europe has to do everything possible to demonstrate both to its Mercosur partners and the wider world that this delay doesn’t amount to disengagement. This means sustained political dialogue, credible commitments on investment and cooperation — including the rollout of the Global Gateway — as well as a clear plan for the deal’s implementation the moment this legal process concludes.
Two years is an eternity in today’s geopolitical climate. If Europe allows this moment to pass without course correction, others won’t wait. The deal might be imperfect, but irrelevance is far worse a fate. Europe must be much bolder in communicating that reality — to the world and, perhaps more urgently, to its own public.
Dora Meredith is the director of ODI Europe.
John Clarke is a former senior trade negotiator for the European Commission and former head of the EU Delegation to the WTO and the U.N. He is a fellow at Maastricht University and the Royal Asiatic Society, and a trade adviser for FIPRA public affairs.
本文於 修改第 1 次
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《歐洲議會玩的政治障眼戲碼》讀後雜感
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1) 我對「南方共同市場」和「歐盟-南方共同市場貿易協定」一無所知；轉載該文與提供四個相關「超連結」，純屬「政普」性服務(請見本欄上一篇)。「政普」一詞沿襲「科普」而來，「政」治事務「普」及化也。
2) 從該文我們可以多多少少了解「歐盟」的運作方式或所謂的「布魯塞爾『文化』」。推而廣之或舉一反三，能幫助我們從「政治小學生」升級為「政治國中生」，聽懂一些「花言巧語」；以及學會「少看點熱鬧，多思索門道」。
3) 《歐洲政論》上一篇相關文章的觀點，跟該文作者圖歇爾先生表達的意見南轅北轍。如第1)段所說，我沒有能力決定：那一個意見更符合歐盟各會員國的利益。明、後天再行刊出前文，做為參考。
這兩篇政論再度佐證我常常提醒的：「凡論述必有前提；凡判斷必有立場」。
這句話和第2)段的意旨相當，都強調：慎思，明辨，盡信書不如無書。
4) 圖歇爾先生保守味的酸、辣文風也值得欣賞。他沒有巴克利的博學(和賣弄)，但刻薄和廢話多則過之。附帶說一句：道不同不相為謀；我拜讀的巴克利大作不多，但曾經是他「火線交鋒」的長期聽眾。相形之下，另一位保守派菁英威爾過去在《新聞周刊》的專欄，雖然學究氣也很濃，風格則平易多了。
談到此處不免懷念巴克沃的政治諷刺小品；目前《紐約客》上同一類型的專欄，就讓我有狗尾和小巫之感。
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歐洲議會玩的政治障眼戲碼 -- Tobias Teuscher
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請參考：
* cordon sanitaire：「反制陣線」(政治術語)
* Europe must scramble to recover from its Mercosur blunder
* EU-Mercosur agreements explained
* EU-Mercosur agreement：「歐盟-南方共同市場貿易協定」
* Mercosur：「南方共同市場」，名稱為該組織之西班牙語名稱縮寫
我在美國讀書、工作、成家凡26年；多少算個「親美派」吧。這大概是我以前沒什麼時間和興趣注意歐洲動態的原因之一。在川痞、川瘋、川盜、川匪、川建中、川利歐、和川老慫上台後，歐洲一下子成了抗普制川的一把手。既然舉足輕重，自然要多給些相應的關注。
Brussels, Mercosur, and the Theatre of Control
The word MERCOSUR is written on a wooden cross during a protest by European farmers following the signing of the free trade agreement between the European Union and the Mercosur countries and on the eve of a vote on a referral to the courts, in front of the European Parliament in Strasbourg on January 20, 2026.
NICOLAS TUCAT / AFP 照片
In Strasbourg, the European Parliament committed an almost subversive act: it did its job.
Tobias Teuscher, 01/30/26
Members of the European Parliament voted on January 21, 2026, to refer the EU–Mercosur file to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), asking the judges to test the agreement’s compatibility with the Treaties and, crucially, the strength of its legal basis. In the Brussels bubble, nerves immediately frayed. Trade policy remains one of the few areas where the single market still carries real weight globally and where the union of 27 can still credibly claim an unmistakable ‘European added value.’ Touch that lever, and the technocratic machine starts to wheeze.
The EU–Mercosur package is a ‘new generation’ mixed agreement. Its commercial chapters sit at the core of the EU’s exclusive competence, exercised by the Commission; its broader political provisions are shared and therefore also fall within member state competence. The architecture is convenient in a very Eurocratic Brussels culture: accelerate where you can, bypass where you want, and then promise provisional application so as not to ‘lose momentum.’ One is entitled to wonder whether this complexity blinded MEPs who wanted to bite but settled for barking.
And this is where Brussels has found its neat workaround and where the Luxembourg court provided the logic that makes it possible. Think of trade deals as a long train. Some carriages are ‘pure trade’: selling cars, machines, chemicals to third countries. Other carriages are ‘politics’: who decides disputes, how far rules reach, what powers member states keep, and how much of the ‘motherhood-and-apple-pie’ language of corporate responsibility is meant to be binding rather than decorative. The Court’s message in Opinion 2/15 (May 16, 2017) was, in essence, that the EU can drive the trade carriage alone, but if a deal begins to touch national competences in a meaningful way, the member states must be on board too.
So the Commission increasingly splits one big agreement into two papers: a fast ‘trade-only’ part it can roll out quickly, and a slower ‘mixed’ part that needs national ratifications across roughly forty parliamentary bodies once you count national and certain regional parliaments, including Wallonia. Legally, it looks tidy. Politically, it feels like sleight of hand. The fast train leaves the station while citizens and forty parliamentary entities are still looking for their tickets, and the sensitive questions are parked on a siding with a sign that reads: ‘we’ll deal with this later.’ Brussels’ Eurocratic bureaucracy learned how to move the deal forward even when the 27 member states have not truly agreed on the whole thing.
To be clear, a referral to the Court for an opinion is not a coup; it is a parliamentary act foreseen by the Treaties. Yet it was carried by an alliance contrary to nature—one that, for once, loosened the cordon sanitaire—under the pressure of mostly French farmers’ protests, sometimes violent, right up to the EU parliament’s doors. The referral was sold, with theatrical certainty, as a heroic rescue of French agriculture. It is nothing of the sort. Farmers targeted the wrong building and the wrong door, and, more importantly, they were betrayed by the very elected officials who claim to shield them.
Here is the inconvenient truth behind the triumphal messaging: the CJEU referral does not prevent the immediate provisional application of the commercial elements bundled into the interim trade agreement. So why the loud celebration of a ‘setback for Ursula von der Leyen’? Because the story is emotionally satisfying. The EU parliament ‘stands up’ to the Commission; democracy ‘pushes back’ against Brussels. But the institutional reality is colder; remember the train. The Commission remains the central actor for external trade. It receives a negotiating mandate from the member states, in Council, and implements it with substantial autonomy. The division of the Mercosur deal into two parts—one purely commercial free-trade pillar and one broader political pillar—was a tactical Commission choice, shaped by the Court’s jurisprudence and doctrine 2/2015 since 2017, accepted by Latin American partners, and approved by the member states. Parliament does not negotiate. That is not a scandal; that is the system.
This is where the supposed ‘parliamentary victory’ dissolves into procedure. If MEPs genuinely wished to stop conditions they claim are harmful to European agriculture, they would have had to follow the political logic to its end: vote for the motion of no confidence against the Commission tabled by Rassemblement National MEPs and their allies. Yet, the cordon sanitaire constrains those who invoke it. It freezes the common base of the von der Leyen ‘grand coalition,’ a majority willing to dramatise oversight but unwilling to impose sanctions. And because the Court referral does not block provisional application of the trade pillar, reserved to the Commission alone, only a no-confidence vote would have stopped the implementation of the contested trade rules. The betrayal, from the farmers’ perspective, lies precisely there: the vote of no confidence did not happen.
This episode exposes a familiar Eurocratic contradiction. Brussels speaks the language of accountability, yet prefers accountability in slow motion: after the text is stabilised, after the package is signed, after political costs are already sunk. Oversight becomes a ceremonial moment: high on symbolism, low on consequences. Parliament, lacking the steering wheel, reaches for the emergency brake. But an emergency brake is not a strategy; it is a last resort. Used too late, it slows the train without changing its destination.
The EU Commission, for its part, is not acting in a vacuum. It operates within a system that treats trade as an exclusive EU competence precisely to prevent 27 national vetoes from paralysing external economic policy. The problem is political: when citizens feel exposed, when sectors feel abandoned, and when protests erupt, the Union’s reflex is to substitute mechanics for politics. It offers monitoring, safeguard language, procedural reassurance. It gives the impression of control, while the underlying choice remains intact.
In the end, we are watching procedures being marketed as courage. A referral to the Court is presented as a blow struck when it is merely a question asked. The trade pillar can still move; the Commission still holds the pen; the ‘protective’ coalition avoided the one sanction that would have mattered. Oversight, yes. Bravery, no. And that is how Eurocracy ‘discovers’ control: not as a democratic safeguard, but as a disruption to something to endure, contain, and reframe.
Tobias Teuscher is a writer for europeanconservative.com with extensive professional experience in the European Parliament.
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歐洲何去何從？-M. Leonard
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世局將進入「後『西方』時代」或「後『歐、美哥倆好』時代」；請參見本欄前一篇。
Where Does Europe Go From Here?
Mark Leonard, 01/26/26
Beyond showcasing Donald Trump's "neo-royalist" style of politics, this year's annual gathering of the global elite in Davos revealed deeper, structural changes that will shape political and business leaders’ decision-making for years to come. Europeans, in particular, must absorb the right lessons.
DAVOS – At the World Economic Forum’s annual gathering in Davos this month, the global elite witnessed firsthand what some have called US President Donald Trump’s “neo-royalist” style of government. But the week offered more than an over-the-top spectacle (more Game of Thrones than Versailles). It also revealed deeper, structural changes that will shape political and business leaders’ decision-making for a long time to come.
Although the crisis over Trump’s demand that Denmark hand over Greenland to the United States appears to have been defused for now, the idea of a united West has been dealt a fatal blow. Even if Trump keeps his promise to refrain from using force against a NATO ally, his (and all his advisers’) boorish behavior in the run-up to Davos and at the conference has raised lasting doubts about America’s reliability, even in the minds of some of the most committed Atlanticists.
These doubts formed the essence of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s now-famous speech, in which he spoke of a “rupture in the world order.” The same sentiment also showed up in my own organization’s latest poll, which finds that a mere 16% of Europeans see America as an ally, whereas almost twice as many in countries such as France, Germany, and Spain see it as a rival or even an enemy.
Equally important, as one European leader put it to me in private, the lurching unpredictability of US foreign policy under Trump reflects American weakness rather than strength. Again, our polling bears this out. One year into his second term, Trump’s greatest achievement has been to make China great again. Around the world, respondents expect China to become the world’s biggest power, and they predict that their own countries will develop closer links with it rather than with the United States.
What lessons should Europeans draw from this moment?
The first takeaway concerns the exercise of power. The Greenland resolution that Trump announced on Truth Social on January 21 appears to have been the product of tireless diplomacy by NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, Finnish President Alexander Stubb, and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre. But more importantly, these “Trump whisperers” succeeded because Europe had shown unusual resolve in drawing red lines and signaling its willingness to defend them.
To be sure, European leaders had to manage the usual divisions within their own ranks (for example, Poland’s right-wing nationalist president, Karol Nawrocki, dismissed the Greenland crisis as a bilateral problem between Denmark and the US). But unlike Europe’s feeble and ultimately unsuccessful response to Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs, the assertion of European sovereignty in recent weeks has been forceful and credible. It included troop deployments to the Arctic and a threat to introduce €93 billion ($110 billion) worth of retaliatory tariffs and to use the EU’s so-called “trade bazooka” (the Anti-Coercion Instrument).
This response was enough to spook US markets, Congress, and the American public. Trump was forced to change course, just as he did when China called his bluff on tariffs last year. Europeans showed not only that they had “cards” and were willing to play them, but also that they are prepared to engage in Trumpian power politics on their own terms. The question now is whether Europeans will accelerate efforts to insulate themselves from America’s volatile politics and identify the cards they can play in the next transatlantic contretemps.
That brings us to a second lesson: now is the time to prepare for a post-Western world by building wider relationships beyond the Atlantic. Carney prepared the ground for this by conceding that much of the world has always seen the liberal international order as hypocritical. And in their speeches, French President Emmanuel Macron, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz all made a point of reaching out to the rest of the world.
Such overtures are prudent. Davos attendees from India, Africa, and South America told me that they are eager to find cooperative ways of resisting lawlessness and unfettered power politics. But, again, there are questions about whether Europeans will rise to the occasion. After all, messy intra-European politics remain a persistent obstacle. While European leaders were offering paeans to multilateralism in Davos, the European Parliament was busy trying to block implementation of a landmark EU-Mercosur trade deal that had been signed to much fanfare just the previous week. Equally, European leaders have long struggled to find the right tone when engaging with countries outside the West, as evidenced by their failure to create a global alliance in support of Ukraine.
Finally, Europeans should remember that although this moment may feel unprecedented, it really is not. One of the most interesting discussions I attended in Davos focused on the lessons from the 1920s. That decade, too, was characterized by a discrepancy between technological optimism (following the advent of electrification and mass production) and geopolitical crises. And it was a prelude to world war, owing partly to America’s embrace of tariffs, protectionism, and isolationism.
In the face of similar dynamics, the question for Europeans is whether they can rise to the challenge and prevent history from repeating itself. The big difference this time is that they will be operating as just one global player among many. The post-Western world is here.
Mark Leonard is the Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations,the author of The Age of Unpeace: How Connectivity Causes Conflict (Bantam Press, 2021). He has been writing for PS since 2004.
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《川普給歐洲帶來大「利多」》讀後
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請參考：
Getting to 'no': Europe's leaders find a way to speak with one voice against Trump (2016/01/25增訂)
看來川某又多了一個外號：「川利歐」；忽發奇想：
「川建中」 + 「川利歐」 = 「川敗家」？
我對歐洲的政治、經濟、和社會情況了解不多；也就不敢對下文作者米爾班克先生所提出的分析和對策置喙。
米爾班克先生還說得上客觀和腦筋清楚。不過，我猜想：
1) 他是位「歐洲中心主義」者；
2) 邏輯訓練有些不足；
3) 他完全不了解「文化」跟「社會現實」與「社會建構」兩者間的動態關係。或者說，他言必稱「文化」，但缺乏社會學和文化研究兩個領域的基本概念。
最後，米爾班克先生的大作讓我想起：
清末民初以降，中國許多「遺老派」、「復古派」、「傳統派」、「中體西用派」、和「文化復興派」的調調兒。真的是三十年河東，三十年河西；此之謂「歷史的諷刺」？
要是在三、五年前，我一定會興沖沖的寫一篇討論/批評「文化決定論」的文章。我現在對絞腦汁、花腦筋的事兒避之唯恐不及；不過，這倒也不是我第一次有「力不從心」的老驥感和挫折感。
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川普給歐洲帶來大「利多」 -- Sebastian Milbank
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請參考此欄2026/01/16和01/17兩篇貼文。
Why Trump is good for Europe
He will force our leaders to be more realistic
Sebastian Milbank, 01/17/2
Is America still a friend to Europe? Or even a potential foe? That’s a question being asked across Europe as Trump threatens to annex Greenland, and shrugs off international law. Tensions between America and Europe have only increased in the past few years. The Munich Security Conference has become a bully pulpit for JD Vance to push around the soft Europeans, whilst Trump has openly speculated about withdrawing US defence support from the continent. Likewise, in the case of the Ukraine conflict, America has shown itself willing to trade away European territory to Russia if it thinks it can profit thereby.
But what if all of this, from the tough love to the ruthless power politics, was fundamentally good for Europe?
To frame these as positives is not to exonerate Trump, or hail him as any sort of strategic genius. Denmark is not only a close NATO ally, but one that committed substantial manpower to some of the darkest and bloodiest chapters of the War on Terror, with Danish special forces joining the British in brutal fights against the Taliban in Helmand province. Much of what Trump wants in Greenland, from greater security to more economic opportunities for US business in the Arctic, he could readily get through diplomatic channels. Resorting to threats and bullying at the first juncture against an ally is not just wrong, it is also stupid and pointless.
All this aside, the effect on Europe, as with the invasion of Ukraine, may yet be salutary. Trump’s clear message that the continent cannot count on America, or assume that its interests will be eternally aligned with Europe’s, is one we desperately need to hear.
Trump cannot be defended as a man of virtue, wisdom or even machiavellian genius. Yet he should be seen as a man of history — someone who catalyses the shift to a new paradigm and a new era. His iconoclasm and irreverence have forced any number of issues that should have been confronted long ago, and he is presently shocking the sleepy, complacent continent of Europe back into wakefulness and forcing us to tentatively paddle back into the lively currents of history. (iconoclasm：無視於規範；逆天悖理)
Europe is finally rearming, and taking up the mantle of its own defence. Trump’s ambivalence in Ukraine has ensured that European countries have upped their commitments, and taken a more independent line in foreign policy. The provocations in Greenland have prompted not only Danish, but British and German troops to deploy to the Arctic Circle. Though couched in the language of answering US security concerns, the deployments are a welcome sign of unlooked for steeliness and defiance, as these are soldiers standing directly in the way of any attempted American annexation.
The response to home-grown populism and Trumpian provocations is still far too complacent, however. Much of Europe’s elite simply wants populism and the forces of history to go away and leave them alone thankyouverymuch. Attacks on American free speech norms and the power of its tech firms to shape the informational space tend to miss the point. There’s a strong element of cope here — they blame the big bad Other (whether Russia or America) for the anger of their own populations at uncontrolled mass migration and civilisational vandalism and self-hatred. But just as pertinent for a Europe that claims to want to control its own destiny, they are failing to influence and direct the informational and narrative realm on their own terms.
Thanks to the bullishness of Trump, Vance and Elon, we’re starting to wake up to these questions, if oh-so-slowly. I don’t like the thuggishness of US language or the adolescent sewer of Musk’s “X”, sure, but why is it left to Americans to point out the threat of uncontrolled migration or the horrors of grooming gangs?
There will be a lot of denials, many tantrums thrown, and endless hand-wringing to be endured before we start entering the territory of serious thought and action. Higher defence spending and expanding arms industry are the first, but in a sense easiest step. What we will need to confront next is just what it is we are defending, and how we will defend it culturally, demographically, intellectually and spiritually.
An alternative European model
What does this look like? Painting in broad strokes, it means reclaiming the idea of Europe as a unique civilisational space, one that we shamelessly and “Eurocentrically” promote, both at home and abroad.
Ironically, if we now moan about populism being pushed by Americans, the original poison of civilisational self-hatred owes much to our cultural submission to American culture and ideas. The settler-colonial issues of race in the US republic have been projected onto the European post-imperial context, and along with this framework we have adopted America’s legalistic wrangling over rights and individual identity.
The EU itself is reaching a point of crisis. For years, despite its motto of “united in diversity”, the EU has relentlessly pushed for an unnatural model of the single currency, legal homogeneity and neoliberal economic alignment. In so doing it has kept Europe subordinate to America, uncompetitive with the state capitalism of China, and has squander our greatest advantage — the agility and variety of ideas and practices in small, highly advanced states. Instead of relentlessly locking us into the same regulation and economic practices, we should diversify our economic models, whilst aligning instead on foreign policy, culture and defence, increasingly acting autonomously of NATO and the US.
Mass migration is an issue that we finally need to manage and confront. Migration, when it is skilled, in managed numbers, and involves individuals committed to joining a common culture and civilisation, can be a strength and a boon. But the scale and type we have seen, as with the madness of Merkel’s commitment to massive Arab migration from an active warzone, has been actively destructive, not least of ethnic harmony and an open, tolerant culture.
The combination of an academy hostile to Western, European and Christian identity, with a massive importation of non Western, non European and non Christian immigrants has created a feeling of existential threat, and a deep feeling of abandonment and alienation. What is needed in its place is a clear civilisational narrative, and a new and strengthened model of citizenship. Migration must become clearly conditioned on national loyalty and civilisational belonging. These messages must pervade culture as well as policy. The dominance of Hollywood and US culture, along with American legal, intellectual and moral norms, must be challenged and alternatives constructed.
Rather than creating a European superstate on American lines, a new European civilisational order could focus on defending regional and national cultures against globalisation, defend rootedness and tradition, and challenge virtual capitalism with an economics centred on manufacturing, craft, aesthetics and social goods. We talk, and with good cause, about the weakness of the European economy relative to American dynamism, but there are weaknesses in the US model. America’s vast wealth doesn’t translate into high quality public infrastructure and services, and it is often paralysed by partisan politics and administrative confusion.
Europe is still developing highly innovative science and technology, but it is failing to capitalise on this economically. The success of American tech-led growth, and Chinese state coordination of large scale manufacturing and infrastructure, are both vital lessons, but need not be swallowed whole. The distinctive advantage of Europe is the good life — we produce food and manufactured goods of a uniquely high quality, haloed by carefully protected cultural legacies that have grown into global reputations. We could unlock some American innovation and employ some Chinese state intervention without importing their dystopian libertarianism or statism, and instead adapt elements of both at the level of small European states and regions, and direct them towards building up our traditional strengths.
We’ve some way to go till we get to such a happy place. Populism will need to run riot before Europe wakes up from its dogmatic liberal slumber. European elites will need to stand up for their cultures, or be torn down. Both sides of the culture war will need to drop dead end ideas and reach a greater intellectual maturity. But we have set our feet upon the path, and we should spare some grudging thanks for our friendly rival and helpful antagonist — Donald J. Trump.
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歐洲各國軍事領袖要民眾備戰-M Colchester/B. Benoit
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After a generation of peace, Europe tells its people to prepare for war
As Trump tries to negotiate Ukraine peace deal, European leaders sound alarm that Russia could target their countries next
Max Colchester/Bertrand Benoit, 12/15/25
European security officials now regularly broadcast a message nearly unimaginable a decade ago: get ready for conflict with Russia.
Rarely a week goes by now without a European government, military or security chief making a grim speech warning the public that they are headed toward a potential war with Russia. It is a profound psychological shift for a continent that has rebuilt itself after two world wars by trumpeting a message of harmony and joint economic prosperity.
Over the weekend, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz compared Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategy in Ukraine to that of Hitler in 1938, when he seized the German-speaking Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia before pressing on to conquer a large chunk of the continent. “If Ukraine falls, he won’t stop. Just like the Sudetenland wasn’t enough in 1938,” Merz told a party conference on Saturday.
That came days after NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte made a speech warning that “conflict is at our door” and that “we must be prepared for the scale of war our grandparents or great-grandparents endured.” Rutte said that Russia could be ready to use military force against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization within five years. The head of the French military recently said that France was at risk “because it is not prepared to accept the loss of its children.”
This sense of urgency has been amped-up as the Trump administration looks to broker an end to the war in Ukraine. There is concern in European capitals that Ukraine will be pushed by Trump into accepting a lopsided peace-deal that leaves Putin emboldened and Ukraine vulnerable to future Russian attack. Crucially, a cease-fire would free Russian military resources to focus on Europe, too, potentially paving the way for a future attack on its eastern flank.
The warnings are accompanied by fear that a more isolationist Trump administration won’t come to Europe’s aid if an attack does materialize. The U.S. National Security Strategy, which was published this month, says that the U.S. government will aim to stop war spreading in Europe and “re-establish strategic stability with Russia.” For the first time in recent years, it makes no mention of Russia as an enemy.
The U.K.’s annual threat assessment by the head of its Secret Intelligence Service, delivered on Monday, sounded a very different note. MI6 chief Blaise Metreweli warned that Russia will continue to try to destabilize Europe “until Putin is forced to change his calculus.”
The head of the U.K.’s armed forces, Richard Knighton, meanwhile on Monday said that the situation “is more dangerous than I have known in my career” and that the British public had to be prepared. “More families will know what sacrifice for our nation means,” he said.
For Europe, the sobering messaging marks a deep shift. The European Union was expressly designed, with the encouragement of the U.S., to prevent the kind of total war that ravaged the continent during the 20th Century. Its population has reaped the benefits of the so-called peace dividend—when military spending was cut back after the Cold War and the extra funds plowed into social spending.
Politicians across the region have warned that re-instilling a martial mindset into the public, accompanied by an explanation of the difficult spending trade-offs ahead, is a challenge. A Gallup poll last year found that only a third of Europeans would be willing to fight to defend their country, compared with 41% in the U.S.
Retired Dutch admiral Rob Bauer, who recently completed a term as NATO’s most senior military official, says that if Europe is to maintain peace, it must prepare for war to deter Putin.
In recent months that message “has gotten stronger,” he says, adding that officials are alarmed by data showing the Russian military industrial complex is producing more than it needs for the war in Ukraine, raising fears that it could regenerate to attack Europe faster than previously envisaged.
In private, European officials say voters will only support the sacrifices necessary—from higher military spending to the reintroduction of conscription—if they think an attack will happen.
Already, European security chiefs say that Russia has begun a covert “gray zone” assault on Europe, to try to damage its economy and sow confusion. Russia is suspected of being behind a string of sabotage on critical European infrastructure and military facilities, cyberattacks on businesses, as well as arson attacks on warehouses and shopping centers. Russian drones have disrupted Polish airspace and jet fighters zipped over Estonia.
“We are now operating in a space between peace and war,” said Metreweli.
The Kremlin has denied involvement in acts of sabotage or drone incursions in Europe, and Putin last month said the idea that Russia would invade another country was a “lie.”
Last week, Germany accused Russia of being behind a cyberattack on its air-traffic control in 2024 and trying to interfere with a federal election by spreading disinformation online. Suspected Russian drones have also interrupted flights in several European airports in recent months.
German officials suspect Moscow’s campaign of sabotage and espionage is partly aimed at preparing an attack on NATO’s logistical routes that would delay the deployment of troops in Eastern Europe in case of an armed conflict targeting Poland or the Baltic States.
Governments are taking steps to prepare. France has said that it would reinstate a voluntary military service for young people, following similar moves by Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. Germany is actively war-gaming how it would rush troops to the front in the event of a Russian attack. The U.K. is scaling back military training outside Europe, to focus on Russia.
Military spending across the continent is rising. This year, NATO’s European members agreed to increase traditional defense spending to 3.5% of their economies by 2035, compared with 2% currently. They have also agreed to spend another 1.5% on security-adjacent measures, such as hardening their infrastructure, which could help counter Russia’s hybrid attack. Germany has pledged to spend more than a trillion dollars on its military and its infrastructure over the next decade, with the goal of creating Europe’s largest conventional force.
However, in many of the big western European economies, the trade-offs haven’t yet been felt by the public. Britain, for instance, is funding a rise in military spending by cutting foreign aid to developing nations. Several military chiefs have publicly stated that spending will have to be increased much more if Russia is to be deterred from further aggression.
Write to Max Colchester at Max.Colchester@wsj.com and Bertrand Benoit at bertrand.benoit@wsj.com
Related video：
Europeans vow to assist Ukraine against future Russian attack after Berlin talks (Dailymotion)
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歐洲領袖試圖表達：各國已決心完成戰後維和任務–C. Porter/S. Erlanger
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Europe Aims to Show It Is Ready to Secure Postwar Ukraine
President Emmanuel Macron of France hosted a meeting of leaders to review options for protecting any peace with Russia.
Catherine Porter/Steven Erlanger, 09/04/25
Emerging from a summit in Paris, President Emmanuel Macron of France said on Thursday that 26 countries had formally committed to securing any future peace in Ukraine, including by putting international troops on the ground, in the sea or in the air to deter Russian aggression.
If Russia refuses to meet to hash out some sort of peace deal, Mr. Macron said, it will face increased international sanctions, including from the United States, he asserted, although President Trump has regularly threatened to do so without following through.
“I can tell you today that we are ready,” Mr. Macron said at a news conference at the end of the summit, which was attended by more than 30 heads of state and government, most of them by video link. Ready for what, however, remains unclear, since there is little sign that a peace settlement or even a cease-fire is in the offing anytime soon.
The meeting was the latest European diplomatic attempt through a group called the “coalition of the willing” to bring the United States on board in forcing Russia to end more than three years of war, while also reassuring the Ukrainians that any peace deal would be secure.
Though it offered a show of unity, the meeting yielded few concrete details about the security guarantees. And while Mr. Macron assured reporters that there was “no doubt” that the United States was committed to the broader plan, what role it might play was still to be determined.
“The questions we had before remain the same,” said Martin Quencez, the director of the Paris office of the German Marshall Fund. “We still don’t know whether the United States is ready to provide a backstop that many of the contributors expect.”
“The spin was positive,” he added. “But we are still wondering what it really means.”
Mr. Macron said 26 countries had committed to deploying troops to Ukraine or to being “present on the ground, in the sea or in the air” to bring assurance to Ukraine “the day after a cease-fire or peace.” Later, he said that some of those countries could support the Ukrainian Army while “remaining in NATO member countries, or making their bases available.”
Major countries like Poland, Germany and Italy, along with the United States, have already declared that they would not put troops on the ground in Ukraine, even after any settlement.
When pushed for details about the deployment and individual country commitments, Mr. Macron said that the group did not plan to “reveal the details of our organization to Russia.”
“We have no desire to show our hand,” he said.
Much of the point of the summit was to convince President Trump to throw the full weight of the United States behind the plan.
Most Europeans believe American support is essential to put enough pressure on Russia to agree to negotiate peace first, and then for any effective plan to ensure Russia does not invade again. Many have repeatedly stressed that they are working continually with the United States and took the presence of Steve Witkoff, Mr. Trump’s envoy for peace missions, at Thursday’s meeting as a positive sign.
“It is important that the United States is on our side,” President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine said on Thursday after the summit. He added, “Many things depend on them.”
But President Trump has proved himself an unpredictable and fickle ally, at times blaming Ukraine for the war. After meeting with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia in Alaska last month, Mr. Trump echoed a Russian blueprint for a large-scale peace agreement that would require Kyiv to cede territory it controls to Moscow.
A White House official confirmed that Mr. Trump was called into Thursday’s meeting, but offered no further details about the American role in future security guarantees for Ukraine.
Instead, the official said President Trump had urged the European leaders to stop purchasing Russian oil that is helping to fund the war in Ukraine and pushed them to put more economic pressure on China for funding Russia’s war efforts.
Mr. Trump has grown increasingly frustrated with Mr. Putin over his delay tactics in brokering a cease-fire deal with Ukraine, and has become increasingly hostile to China as the two countries have become engaged in a trade war.
This week, he accused the leaders of both countries of joining with North Korea to “conspire against” the United States.
Mr. Trump has repeatedly threatened to impose sanctions on Russia, but has so far not yet followed through, choosing instead to impose secondary sanctions on countries that do business with Russia, particularly those that buy its oil.
Mr. Macron accused Russia of using “false pretenses, false openings and delaying tactics” to avoid negotiating for peace. He threatened additional sanctions “in coordination with the United States of America.”
Mr. Zelensky said economic pressure was critical to compelling Russia to the negotiating table. “The key to peace is to deprive the Russian war machine of its finances and its resources,” he said.
While a reassurance force has been a topic of discussion among Europeans for many months, to date only France, Britain and tiny Estonia have publicly indicated they could deploy troops in a postwar Ukraine.
For most European countries, the prospect of opening themselves up to conflict with Russia is terribly sensitive and raises questions of whether Washington would really have their backs militarily if NATO-country troops were attacked.
After Thursday’s meeting, Italy reiterated that it would not send troops to Ukraine but said that it could support a cease-fire through surveillance and training operations “outside of Ukrainian borders,” according to a statement from the office of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.
And while Germany said it remained committed to providing Ukraine’s military with weapons and training, it stopped short of promising that German troops would help keep the peace, saying that matter would need to be decided in by country’s Parliament.
Ukraine’s first and main condition for any potential cease-fire is the coalition’s first prong of its security plan — a large investment in the Ukrainian military, nearly a million soldiers strong. Mr. Zelensky told reporters on Friday that Ukraine would seek an arsenal of long-range missiles that could bombard Russian targets if a cease-fire was violated. He also would seek binding commitments of military assistance from allies that were ratified by parliaments or the U.S. Congress, to protect against changes in policy as governments change through elections.
The Ukrainians see little defensive advantage in a small European contingent, and do not trust the idea of a “tripwire force” that would set off a larger European response should Russia invade again.
“I don’t remember any discussion here where anyone would believe the Europeans would send their armies to fight for Ukraine,” said Maksym Skrypchenko, the president of the Transatlantic Dialogue Center, a research group in Kyiv.
Military analysts have said that Ukraine would welcome a European role in peacekeeping, but would not rely on it. That might include air policing missions over western Ukraine flown by European pilots.
Ukrainian analysts have also pointed out that European soldiers could prove useful if deployed in western Ukraine as a justification for allies to protect the airspace above them.
All the meetings and plans are predicated on the condition of an end to the war, which at this point remains illusory.
“The question is now whether the Americans are willing or able to force Russia to accept any cease-fire guarantees,” Mr. Skrypchenko said. “Otherwise, it’s just a waste of time.”
Reporting was contributed by Andrew E. Kramer and Marichka Varenikova in Kyiv, Erica L. Green in Washington, Aurelien Breeden in Paris and Jim Tankersley in Berlin.
Catherine Porter is an international reporter for The Times, covering France. She is based in Paris.
Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe and is based in Berlin. He has reported from over 120 countries, including Thailand, France, Israel, Germany and the former Soviet Union.
Catherine Porter reported from Paris, and Steven Erlanger from Berlin
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歐盟主席宣示：歐洲國家需要獨立行事 – Lorne Cook
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馮•德•萊恩女士不愧於世界領袖的格局和風範；川痞連她一根腳指頭都比不上。
EU chief says it's time for Europe's 'independence moment' faced with war and major power tensions
Lorne Cook, 09/10/25
BRUSSELS (AP) — The European Union’s most powerful official warned Wednesday that Europe is battling against a series of threats posed by Russia, new global trade challenges and even other major world powers and must stake claim to its independence.
In a State of the Union speech, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced new measures to help Ukraine fight off Russia's full-scale invasion, and she called for trade restrictions and sanctions on Israel over the war in Gaza.
She also defended the deal she reached with U.S. President Donald Trump to limit the impact of his global tariff war, despite agreeing to a 15% duty rate for most European exports to the United States.
Fight for values
“Europe is in a fight,” von der Leyen told EU lawmakers in Strasbourg, France. “A fight for our values and our democracies. A fight for our liberty and our ability to determine our destiny for ourselves. Make no mistake — this is a fight for our future.”
“Battle lines for a new world order based on power are being drawn right now,” she said, adding that the EU “must fight for its place in a world in which many major powers are either ambivalent or openly hostile to Europe.”
“This must be Europe’s independence moment,” said the 66-year-old former German defense minister, who has become a prominent figure at summits with leaders around the world, despite her role as a political appointee who hasn't been elected to office.
The commission is the EU’s executive arm. It proposes laws that impact the lives of around 450 million people across 27 countries, and monitors whether those rules are respected.
In recent years, it has helped Europe to survive fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic, break its dependency on Russian energy supplies and cope with a trade war launched by a traditional ally like the U.S.
Russian aggression
Turning to Russia’s war on Ukraine, now in its fourth year, von der Leyen said that Russian President Vladimir Putin shows no sign of ending the war, and that “our response must be clear too.”
“We need more pressure on Russia to come to the negotiation table. We need more sanctions,” she said. The commission and EU member countries are working on a new raft of sanctions targeting Russia’s energy revenues.
Poland said Wednesday that multiple Russian drones entered its territory over the course of several hours and were shot down with help from NATO allies.
Von der Leyen condemned the “reckless and unprecedented violation of Poland and Europe’s airspace."
“Europe stands in full solidarity with Poland,” she said. “Putin’s message is clear, and our response must be clear, too. We need more pressure on Russia to come to the negotiation table. We need more sanctions.”
Ukraine's economy
Von der Leyen also said that new ways to address Ukraine’s financial challenges must also come through the use of frozen Russian assets in Europe. Almost 200 billion euros ($235 billion) worth of those assets are being held in a Belgian clearing house.
Interest earned on the assets – around 3.5 billion euros ($4.1 billion) were generated last year – are already being used to help prop up Ukraine’s war-ravaged economy. Von der Leyen said that a “reparations loan” for damage inflicted by Russia is being weighed.
She also announced the creation of a “drone alliance” with Ukraine – drones have become a decisive factor in the war – with 6 billion euros ($7 billion) in funds for the effort.
Freezing support to Israel
To applause in the parliament, the commission chief said that she wants to freeze some financial support to Israel, and to impose trade restrictions and sanctions on the government over the war in Gaza.
Breaking with her traditionally very strong pro-Israeli government stance, von der Leyen said that the events in Gaza and the suffering of children and families “has shaken the conscience of the world.”
“Man-made famine can never be a weapon of war. For the sake of the children, for the sake of humanity. This must stop,” she said. She added that the commission will set up a new Palestinian donor group, with a focus on Gaza’s future reconstruction.
U.S. tariff deal
Addressing criticism of the tariff deal with Trump, von der Leyen underlined that Europe depends on the United States as a major trading partner, and that the position of European businesses was improved compared to other countries that got a worse deal.
“Millions of jobs depend on” that relationship, she said. “And as president of the commission, I will never gamble with people’s jobs and livelihoods.”
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歐洲盟國規劃烏克蘭戰後維和部隊 – 路透社
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請參考：
Germany criticizes EU remarks on plans to deploy to Ukraine (09/02更新)
EU chief tours Poland border with Belarus to show support
我在此欄及本部落格其它各欄評論多次強調(該欄2028/08/25)：歐洲各國領袖對普丁俄國持有高度戒心；不論川普政府最終的政策是什麼，歐洲各國政府絕不會容許俄國吞併烏克蘭。川普這個暴發戶那是歐洲這些老油條的對手。
Von der Leyen says Europe is drawing up 'precise' plans to send troops to Ukraine, FT reports
Reuters, 09/01/25
(Reuters) -Europe is drawing up "pretty precise plans" for a multinational troop deployment to Ukraine as part of post-conflict security guarantees that will have the backing of U.S. capabilities, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told the Financial Times in an interview published Sunday.
“President Trump reassured us that there will be (an) American presence as part of the backstop,” von der Leyen told the FT, adding that “That was very clear and repeatedly affirmed.”
The deployment is set to include potentially tens of thousands of European-led troops, backed by assistance from the U.S., including control and command systems and intelligence and surveillance assets, the report said, adding that this arrangement was agreed at a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and senior European leaders last month.
European leaders, including German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte and von der Leyen are expected to gather in Paris on Thursday, at the invitation of French President Emmanuel Macron, to continue the high-level discussions on Ukraine, the FT reported, citing three diplomats briefed on the plans.
(Reporting by Rhea Rose Abraham in Bengaluru, Editing by Louise Heavens and Ros Russell)
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