|
兩岸關係 – 開欄文
|
瀏覽6,873 ｜回應41｜推薦2 |
|
|
|
俄烏戰爭在一年半以後，俄國憑藉其龐大的國力和人員，似乎拖垮了烏國的戰力、士氣、和民心。以巴戰爭又平地一聲雷的爆發，不但以國周邊的阿拉伯諸國虎視眈眈、蓄勢待發；也讓美國軍力和軍援左支右絀。這些發展勢必影響美國當下和未來在台海的軍事部署和決策。
我曾預估：2027年前台海無戰事。但俗話說，世事難料；我們升斗小民只能期望政治領袖們不以老百姓為芻狗，盡量發揮理性和睿智以和平方式解決利益衝突。
兩岸關係從過去的和平對峙隨著中、美國力的長消，逐漸進入外弛內張的狀況。雖然還說不上戰雲密布或圖窮匕見；但讓關切時局者緊張兮兮應該是有的。這個部落格過去也常有報導和評論；現在開一個專欄，今後將把相關議題集中討論。
本文於 修改第 3 次
|
|
武統快來了? -- The Week UK
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
Is China about to invade Taiwan?
Conflict in East Asia ‘would be one of the most dangerous and consequential events of the 21st century’
The Week UK, 11/28/25
When you buy through links on our articles, Future and its syndication partners may earn a commission.
Taiwan split from the People's Republic of China during a civil war in the 1940s| Credit: Illustrated / Getty Images 請至原網頁觀看示意圖
Taiwan’s president has announced a $40 billion security package to strengthen the island’s defences against a possible invasion by China.
Warning that Beijing’s threats are “intensifying” and its preparations to invade are speeding up, Lai Ching-te said: “This is not an ideological struggle, nor a ‘unification vs independence’ debate, but a struggle to defend ‘democratic Taiwan’ and refuse to submit to being ‘China’s Taiwan’”.
The new eight-year plan includes the development of a “T-dome” air defence system, modelled on Israel’s Iron Dome,“ accompanied by a focus on the use of artificial intelligence, drones and other high-tech defence methodologies to boost Taiwan’s ‘asymmetric’ response to a Chinese attack”, said The Times.
Beijing views Taiwan as a rogue breakaway territory that needs to be brought back under control, by force if necessary. This makes it arguably “the most dangerous place on Earth”, said The Economist.
How likely is an invasion?
US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth warned in May that China’s attempt to conquer Taiwan by force “could be imminent”.
Yet experts “disagree about the likelihood and timing of a Chinese invasion”, said the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) think tank.
China has been engaging in “unprecedented aggression and military modernisation”, Admiral Samuel Paparo, the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, told the US Congressional Armed Services Committee earlier this year. Underscoring the seriousness of this escalation, he said China’s drills around Taiwan are “not just exercises – they are rehearsals”.
While “alarming”, said the Atlantic Council, this “unfortunately reflects a broader, consistent trend” of escalating activities by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), including persistent crossings of the Taiwan Strait’s median line.
Data from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence found that sorties across the Taiwanese-declared dividing line between Taiwan and China have increased from 953 incidents in 2021 to 3,070 in 2024.
There are other indications that Beijing is preparing to move on Taiwan. China has been stockpiling record amounts of gold, which could be part of a strategy to defend itself from Western sanctions in the event of an attack on Taiwan. It has also been building a solid legal ground for a potential invasion, aiming to frame the attack as a legitimate internal matter.
“This will help the country to delay a collective security and economic response from the West,” said The Sun.
When could an invasion happen?
Paparo told members of Congress that the PLA are “stretching their legs” to meet President Xi Jinping’s military readiness goal of being capable of taking Taiwan by force by 2027. That year is seen as “magical” because it marks the centenary of what was to become the PLA, said Robert Fox in London’s The Standard.
Despite living under the constant shadow of Chinese invasion, most people in Taiwan – 65%, according to a survey released in May by the military-affiliated Institute for National Defense and Strategic Research – believe it is unlikely that China will attack in the next five years.
Lai and his government have adopted a mantra: “by preparing for war, we are avoiding war”. They have initiated “major military reforms”, expanded the mandatory conscription programme, “increased pay and benefits for the military, and introduced more rigorous training”, said the BBC. The extra $40 billion announced this week is part of a “long-term plan” to raise defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2030, “a response to demands from the Trump administration not to rely solely on the United States coming to its aid”, said The Times.
“Others believe 2049 is a critical date,” said the CFR, as Xi Jinping has “emphasised that unification with Taiwan is essential to achieving what he calls the Chinese Dream, which sees China's great-power status restored by 2049”.
How could an invasion start?
There are three possible avenues that could lead to conflict, said Joel Wuthnow in Foreign Affairs.
A “so-called war of choice” would see Beijing “try to capture Taiwan by force after careful consideration of the economic, military, and political risks”.
Alternatively, a “war of necessity” might be launched if it felt Taiwan “had crossed a political red line that permanently threatened China’s control of the island”; for example, with a formal declaration of independence.
The third possibility, that “has received much less attention – yet may be even more likely”, is a war resulting “from an accident or miscalculation that spirals out of control”.
Given recent events it is easy to see how such a miscalculation could spiral into full-blown conflict.
Chinese military drills last year surrounded Taiwan’s main island with joint exercises by all branches of the PLA and, unusually, an increasingly militarised coast guard. Then, in January, Naval News first reported the construction of new amphibious barges at Guangzhou Shipyard, in southern China.
These new barge-like Shuiqiao ships (水橋型兩棲登陸艇) are potentially a game-changer for Beijing and provide “insight into China's integration of its military, paramilitary and civilian operations – and its plans for a potential invasion”, said The Guardian.
The barges feature bridges that could be used to transport tanks and supplies over previously uncrossable land, said The Telegraph, giving them multiple fronts for an invasion and “thinning out” Taiwan’s line of defence.
The likely strategy is to overwhelm Taiwan with a massive attack with little warning.
That would mean in the early hours of a Chinese invasion, the narrow strait separating the island from the mainland would likely be “transformed into a ferocious battlefield”, said Business Insider. Aside from deploying more traditional weapons such as missiles or warships, “vast fleets of unmanned aerial and naval drones will likely darken the skies and hide beneath waves, bringing with them a deadly threat that Taiwan and its allies are ill-prepared to counter”. During Joe Biden’s presidency, the US strategy to counter this – dubbed “Hellscape” – hinged on deploying thousands of new drones that would swarm the Taiwan Strait and keep China's military busy until more help could arrive.
How would it play out?
Chinese action against Taiwan would be an “act of war that sparks a global crisis”, said The Wall Street Journal. “It would provoke a military response by Taiwan, force President Trump to decide whether the US military should help defend the island, disrupt global trade and impel European nations to impose punishing sanctions on Beijing.”
China has warned it will “crush” any foreign attempts to interfere on behalf of Taiwan, after Japan announced plans to deploy missiles near the independent island. It comes less than a week after Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, said her country would regard an attack on Taiwan as an “existential threat” to security in the region and would likely intervene.
If a conflict were to break out it would be “a catastrophe”, said The Economist. This is first because of “the bloodshed in Taiwan”, but also because of the risk of “escalation between two nuclear powers”, namely the US and China.
Beijing massively outguns Taiwan, with estimates from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute showing that China spent about 23 times more on its military in 2021. The PLA also boasts more than two million active soldiers. The US is bound by the Taiwan Relations Act to “provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character” and discourage China from using force or coercion to achieve its goals regarding the island. This could see Washington drawn into any conflict – although there is growing scepticism in Taipei that Trump would intervene militarily in the event of a full-blown Chinese attack.
That means any invasion “would be one of the most dangerous and consequential events of the 21st century”, said The Times, and “would make the Russian attack on Ukraine look like a sideshow by comparison”.
本文於 修改第 5 次
|
|
防止台海發生戰事的最佳戰略 - Zack Cooper
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
How War in Taiwan Ends
If Deterrence Fails, Could America Thwart China?
Zack Cooper, 11/06/25
In recent years, many in Washington have focused on deterring China from invading Taiwan. Before taking office earlier this year, Elbridge Colby, the U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy, asserted that Taiwan should be “laser focusing on implementing a denial defense against invasion.” Indeed, an array of small, inexpensive weapon systems holds great promise for repelling a Chinese amphibious landing. The Trump administration’s new National Defense Strategy is therefore correct to embrace a strategy of denial for stopping an invasion of Taiwan.
But rebuffing an invasion might not end the war. Joel Wuthnow, an expert on the Chinese military, has warned, “There is no scenario in which China, following an unsuccessful invasion, accepts responsibility, acknowledges that military solutions are impractical, or pivots to a fundamentally different set of political objectives toward Taiwan.” In the wake of a failed invasion, Chinese leader Xi Jinping (or his successor) would be unlikely to simply pack up and go home. Instead, Chinese leaders might reason that they have less to lose by continuing the fight.
This is why the political scientist Michael Beckley has argued that “war over Taiwan likely would become protracted, as nearly all great power wars have since the Industrial Revolution.” World War II ended only when Allied forces captured Germany’s capital and the United States dropped nuclear weapons on Japan. Neither option seems advisable in the context of a U.S.-Chinese war; Washington needs to find other ways to end it. And so, in the years to come, the United States must prepare two forces: one to stop a Chinese invasion and another to end the conflict. Preventing a war from starting in the first place will rely to some extent on the innovative forms of deterrence by denial on which the Trump administration and others have focused. But denial capabilities on their own will not be enough. Ending a war that churns on even after a failed invasion will also require old-fashioned power projection.
IN DENIAL
In the twentieth century, the United States perfected the art of projecting power around the globe. A combination of forward bases and aircraft carriers allowed U.S. forces to operate worldwide. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. military’s dominance also meant that one set of forces could employ two distinct forms of deterrence simultaneously: denial and punishment.
表單的頂端
表單的底部
Consider the role of U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. At the time, China was staging military exercises and testing missiles in the waters around Taiwan. As tensions rose, Washington maneuvered two carriers near the island. Those strike groups practiced deterrence by denial by threatening to physically repel an attack. But they also performed deterrence through punishment by threatening severe consequences if Beijing went through with it, since carrier-based aircraft could strike ships heading toward China and even targets on the Chinese mainland.
In the last few years, however, the United States has begun tailoring its forces—and those of its allies and partners—for more specific missions. Forward bases and aircraft carriers are expensive to build and maintain, yet still vulnerable to ballistic missiles and other asymmetric systems. Pentagon officials are therefore pushing to acquire more “attritable” systems, which are relatively cheap to produce and designed to be expendable, for use by small units operating within the expanding area that China threatens. As David Berger, the former commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, explained at a defense industry conference in 2021, the United States must “get comfortable with throwaway things.”
Ending a war over Taiwan will require old-fashioned power projection.
But attritable systems are of limited use against China’s day-to-day coercive operations in the air and sea around Taiwan. Last year, Taiwan detected 5,105 Chinese sorties into its airspace. Defending against these aircraft requires expensive jets rather than low-flying drones. In the maritime context, responding to Chinese naval incursions in the waters around Taiwan will require vessels that can monitor those activities and challenge Chinese forces if necessary.
Even after open conflict begins, denial is still only a partial answer. U.S. mines and missiles can sink Chinese vessels, killing thousands of troops in the process, but Chinese leaders might still seek at least a partial victory. The People’s Liberation Army could attempt to seize Taiwan’s outlying islands or conduct a maritime blockade while its military arsenal makes the waters around Taiwan a no man’s land. “There is no path to U.S. victory that does not include the long blockade,” the former intelligence officer Lonnie Henley has argued.
That is why the United States must be able to convince China that it will face unacceptable costs if it continues fighting in the wake of an unsuccessful invasion. A strategy of denial is only step one; the threat of punishment will be the United States’ ultimate trump card.
CAN’T STOP, WON’T STOP
The war in Ukraine illustrates the difficulty of terminating a conflict even after an initial invasion has bogged down. With small and cheap systems such as drones and mines, Ukraine was able to deny Russia a swift victory but has failed to impose costs high enough to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to stop fighting. Russia has suffered terrible losses in the war, but Putin appears to have calculated that the costs of continuing are lower than the costs of admitting defeat.
Russia’s example serves as a warning about China’s likely behavior. Ideally, the prospect of a failed invasion of Taiwan would deter China, but Chinese leaders might perceive several incentives for protracting a war following an initial loss.
First, China’s industrial capacity far outstrips that of the United States, so it could recapitalize its forces more rapidly. Over the last three decades, China has undergone a massive military buildup. The Office of Naval Intelligence has assessed that China has over 230 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States. Meanwhile, U.S. armed forces face significant munitions shortages, with some experts predicting that American stockpiles would be expended after just weeks, or even days, of a conflict with China.
Beijing might believe it can outlast Washington and Taipei in terms of other supplies, as well. Getting provisions across land into Ukraine has proved challenging; delivering even basic necessities over water to Taiwan amid a conflict with China would be an order of magnitude more difficult. Taiwan is a relatively small island with limited food and energy stockpiles. Conversely, Beijing’s rapid expansion of wind, solar, and nuclear power would help insulate it against a U.S. energy blockade.
Beijing believes it could win a contest of wills over Taiwan.
A conflict over Taiwan could eventually become a contest of wills—which Beijing believes it could win. Chinese officials have described Taiwan as “the very core of China’s core interests.” U.S. President Donald Trump’s take is decidedly different: “Taiwan is 9,500 miles away,” he said in an interview with Bloomberg Businessweek. “It’s 68 miles away from China. I just think we have to be smart . . . it’s a very, very difficult thing.” The American people support Taiwan, but many do not want a direct conflict with China: when asked in 2024 by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs about their commitment to defending Taiwan from a Chinese invasion, the majority of Americans surveyed either opposed such a policy or were unsure.
A Chinese failure in a conflict over Taiwan could also threaten Xi or his successor’s hold on power and undermine the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi would want to avoid an admission of failure and thus might order the Chinese military to keep waging an unsuccessful war. Without the prospect of punishment, the CCP might decide that failure poses a greater risk than continuing the conflict.
For all these reasons, Chinese leaders might prefer to keep fighting even after an initial defeat. To bring the conflict to a close, the United States would need to credibly threaten punishment. Colby and other Trump administration officials clearly recognize this; he co-authored a 2022 report advocating “selective punishment operations” and “cost-imposition to favorably manage escalation and seek to terminate a war with China.” These operations could include an embargo or the seizure of Chinese assets held abroad. But Beijing has been insulating itself against political and economic pressure, so military escalation might well be required, including strikes on critical infrastructure and parts of China’s defense-industrial base. These moves would raise the costs for China of continuing a conflict, but they also present a strategic dilemma.
THE GOLDILOCKS PARADOX
A number of factors would complicate any threat of punishment.
First is what researchers at the RAND Corporation have termed the “Goldilocks challenge”: threats of punishment must be high enough to persuade Beijing to end a conflict in which it is deeply invested but low enough to avoid provoking unacceptable escalation, such as nuclear use. Finding this middle ground would not be an easy task.
It will therefore be important to try to keep an initial fight over Taiwan limited in order to provide Chinese leaders a pathway for deescalation. Chinese leaders might back down after claiming to have taught Taiwan a lesson or taken some contested territory. Yet China’s own messaging before a conflict could set a higher bar: Chinese leaders might demonize Taiwan and the United States to rally public support, while trumpeting the PLA’s military superiority and China’s great rejuvenation. An invasion of Taiwan might start with Beijing metaphorically burning its ships so there would be no turning back.
In the aftermath of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, politicians in Washington, Taipei, and elsewhere might themselves raise the stakes. They could seek to use Beijing’s moment of weakness to constrain China’s ambitions, formalize Taiwan’s independence, or undermine the CCP’s hold on power. There would be a fine line between “too hot” and “too cold” policies, and the tradeoffs would become more difficult as the war grew longer, bloodier, and more destructive.
A second challenge is that U.S. “horizontal escalation”—widening the scope of the conflict—may not be as effective today as it once might have been. Devoting more funding to denial capabilities risks cannibalizing resources for military platforms more capable of threatening punishment, such as stealthy bombers and submarines armed with cruise missiles. And although American strategists have discussed the possibility of a blockade to prevent China from importing energy supplies, the country’s nuclear power plants and renewable energy sources now account for a third of its energy production, so that Beijing is less vulnerable to an energy blockade. Cutting China’s fossil fuel imports would hurt over time, but Taiwan would be in a far more dire position.
Therefore, the biggest challenge for the Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy is not whether it allocates resources to a strategy of denial but how it integrates denial and punishment into a holistic deterrence framework. Rebuffing an initial attack on Taiwan is necessary but not sufficient. Without a plan for terminating a war, Washington would risk repeating the pattern of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan that many Trump officials critiqued: winning the first battle but losing the war. If the United States is to deter China, it will have to persuade Chinese leaders that Washington has a strategy not only for the early stages of a conflict but also for the end stage of a war.
ZACK COOPER is a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a lecturer at Princeton University. He is the author of Tides of Fortune: The Rise and Decline of Great Militaries.
* More by Zack Cooper
Related
* Taiwan
* Security
* Defense & Mil
Subscribe to Foreign Affairs This Week
Our editors’ top picks, delivered free to your inbox every Friday.
Sign Up
* Note that when you provide your email address, the Foreign Affairs Privacy Policy and Terms of Use will apply to your newsletter subscription.
本文於 修改第 2 次
|
|
中國對台新策略–Arran Hope
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
雖然我只讀了下文的「前言」部份(「摘要」和第1、2兩段)，不客氣的說，作者的分析難逃「霧裏看花」或「隔靴搔癢」之譏。各位要是沒啥事好幹，倒也不妨姑妄讀之。
Beijing’s New Approach to Taiwan
Arran Hope, China Brief Volume: 25 Issue: 20, 10/31/25
Executive Summary:
* In 2025, Beijing has intensified its approach to Taiwan across legal, military, discourse, and political dimensions.
* In October, a local public security bureau opened investigation into a sitting Taiwanese lawmaker for the first time, enhancing its legal warfare tactics against the democratic state.
* Purges at the top of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may have precipitated a tactical switch away from He Weidong’s approach, which emphasized persistent gray-zone activities, toward Zhang Youxia’s expressed preference for buying time to build up military capacity.
* The Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) has ramped up its media and social media presence in recent weeks, while other parts of the messaging apparatus are foregrounding the phrase “Taiwan’s inevitable return” across official media channels.
* The new chair of the Kuomintang, Cheng Li-wun, has shown a willingness to engage with Beijing. She exchanged letters with General Secretary Xi Jinping, and sent a newly appointed vice chair to meet with TAO director Song Tao, who announced a “new starting point” in their relations.
* Beijing sees its relationship with the United States as a key variable influencing its behavior toward Taiwan.
Beijing is shifting its approach to Taiwan. Over the course of 2025, it has intensified legal and cognitive pressure toward its small democratic neighbor, advanced a strategy of political warfare, and adapted its military posture. Several factors have informed this shift. Personnel changes within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may have played a role. Political developments within Taiwan also likely contributed. And behind all these considerations are the position of the United States under the new administration of President Donald Trump. As General Secretary Xi Jinping has often pointed out, U.S.-PRC relations are “one of the most important bilateral relations in the world” (世界上最重要的雙邊關係之一) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 16, 2024).
A question remains about whether Beijing’s evolving approach constitutes a change of degree or of kind. Some of the actions taken this year, especially in the legal domain, have relied on instruments that the PRC has created over the past few years for this purpose. Shifts in military posture may similarly have as much to do with the availability of new capabilities coming—or current capabilities meeting capacity limits—than with tactical changes. Possible avenues for political influence, chiefly through the nationalist Kuomintang, similarly are just now becoming clear following the election in October of a new party chair. Whichever the case may be, the general trend of Beijing’s actions is the same: toward greater coercion and a ratcheting up of pressure across all domains.
Beijing Steps up Lawfare With Puma Shen Investigation
On October 28, Chongqing City’s public security bureau announced that it was opening an investigation into the “diehard ‘Taiwan Independence’ activist Puma Boyang [Puma Shen]” (“台獨”頑固分子沈伯洋). Shen is a member of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan. He is also a co-founder of the Kuma Academy (Black Bear Academy; 黑熊學院), a Taiwanese non-profit civil defense organization. [1] According to the bureau’s announcement, public security officials will “resolutely crack down on Puma Shen’s criminal activities aimed at splitting the nation” (為堅決打擊沈伯洋 … 分裂國家犯罪活動) (People’s Public Security News, October 28).
This is the first time PRC authorities have opened a criminal investigation into a sitting Taiwanese lawmaker. But it is not the first time that the PRC has sought to use lawfare to harass Puma Shen or his family. In October 2024, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) added Puma Shen to a list of “diehard ‘Taiwan Independence’ activists,” according to the announcement. In March 2025, the TAO relaunched a webpage (originally introduced the preceding year) for reporting “malicious acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists and accomplices persecuting fellow Taiwanese” (‘台獨’打手、幫兇迫害臺灣同胞惡劣行) (TAO, August 2, 2024). And in June, the office unveiled sanctions against a company owned by Shen’s father (TAO, June 5). This latter measure is part of Beijing’s long history of using intimidation and coercive techniques against the family members of its critics in an attempt to silence them (The Wall Street Journal, March 30, 2018; Council on Foreign Relations, November 23, 2021; Human Rights Watch, May 4; Amnesty International, accessed October 31).
PRC authorities have used law enforcement to pursue additional targets this year. In June, a separate Public Security Bureau, this time in Guangzhou, offered a reward of renminbi (RMB) 10,000 ($1,400) for information leading to the apprehension of 20 retired and active personnel in Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). This was the first known instance of PRC public security authorities targeting Taiwanese military personnel via law enforcement framework (China Brief, July 25).
The legal basis for the bureau’s investigation into Puma Shen include provisions of the PRC’s Criminal Law (刑法) and the Opinions on Punishing Diehard ‘Taiwan Independence’ Activists for Crimes of Secession and Inciting Secession (關於依法懲治“台獨”頑固分子分裂國家、煽動分裂國家犯罪的意見) (China Law Translate, June 21, 2024). The latter opinions were drafted collectively by the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Justice and released in mid-2024. Laws invoked in other cases include the Cybersecurity Law (網路安全法), the Counter-Espionage Law (反間諜法), and the Anti-Secession Law (反分裂國家法). The PRC has little ability currently to enforce its laws extraterritorially in Taiwan. But as with other legal instruments drafted to apply beyond the PRC’s borders, these opinions have symbolic force and psychological weight. And while they may have little effect on dampening Puma Shen’s individual efforts to enhance Taiwan’s resilience, they may well affect the considerations of others who might wish to speak out against Beijing.
Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) now fears that the next step Beijing could take is to leverage Interpol and issue an arrest warrant for Puma Shen (CNA, October 30). This would not be unprecedented. The PRC’s Ministry of Public Security has issued a number of “red notices” in recent years, not against criminals, but against critics of its regime (Human Rights Watch, September 25, 2017; Safeguard Defenders, October 23, 2024; Red Notice Monitor, February 24; International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, April 25).
Personnel Changes Behind PLA’s Tactical Switch
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also appears to have changed its approach in recent months. In 2024, the percentage of aerial sorties by the PLA Air Force that crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait was not markedly higher than the previous year. The same was true for the frequency of peak incursion periods. Analysts have argued that this plateauing could indicate that the operational capacity of the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command Air Force had reached its limits (China Brief, January 17). PLA activity so far in 2025 has not provided dispositive evidence of this thesis. Instead, there has been a notable slowdown in recent PLA air and maritime activities around Taiwan, according to Ma Cheng-kun, director of the Research Project on China’s Defense Affairs (RCDA). [2] Not only have the scale and frequency of activity around the Taiwan Strait decelerated, but August—a typical peak time for drills and exercises—was relatively quiet this year.
One potential reason for this change relates to personnel changes. In March, Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman He Weidong (何衛東) disappeared (his expulsion from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was confirmed on October 17) (China Brief, October 17). He had been responsible for planning and executing the PLA’s exercises encircling Taiwan following U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to in August 2022, after which he was promoted to CMC vice chair. Following his promotion, He oversaw the military’s Political Work Department, which emerged as a key driver of the PLA’s gray-zone operations. But his tenure also coincided with heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the election in Taiwan of a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) president for a third consecutive term, and worsening relations with the United States, including over Taiwan. He’s downfall may not be a direct result of his handling of PLA activities toward Taiwan, but Xi Jinping may not have appreciated heightened instability in the Taiwan Strait and a lack of success in intimidating Taiwan’s public.
Since He’s disappearance, the CMC’s other vice chair, Zhang Youxia (張又俠), likely has had more influence over the PLA’s approach to Taiwan. Ma Cheng-kun argues that Zhang is more pragmatic than He, and sees buying time to build capabilities as a priority, instead of escalating tensions through persistent gray-zone operations. New capabilities have been detected in recent months, which lends credence to this argument. Some have been deployed for testing and others used for training. These include a Type 072 tank landing ship, pontoon-style landing barges, a Chinese-flagged tug boat circumnavigating Taiwan, and large roll-on/roll-off cargo ships repositioned to Fujian Province, across the strait from Taiwan.
Influence Operations Intensify
If military gray-zone operations have reduced in salience in recent months, the same cannot be said for the PRC’s approach in the social media and discourse domains. Influence efforts on social media stepped up on October 18, when the Taiwan Affairs Office launched a Facebook page. Across its first two weeks, the TAO has been active, posting multiple times daily; though most of the comments and reactions under its posts suggest that it will not succeed in winning the hearts and minds of Taiwanese (Facebook/TAOspokesperson, accessed October 23). [3] The office has also doubled the frequency of its press conferences and appointed a new spokesperson, Peng Qing’en (彭慶恩), who has been working on Taiwan issues since 1995 (CNA, October 29). In traditional media, the TAO also published a trilogy of articles with Xinhua under the pseudonym Zhong Taiwen (鐘台文) to coincide with “Taiwan Retrocession Day” (Xinhua, October 26, October 27, October 28). These changes within the TAO could signal a desire to emphasize the material benefits of warmer cross-strait ties. For instance, Peng, the new spokesperson, remains head of the office’s economic bureau. One of the Xinhua articles, meanwhile, highlighted the positive economic returns that national unification would bring.
These supposed carrots are also coupled with rhetorical sticks. A PRC television drama about Taiwan has recently popularized the phrase “Taiwan’s inevitable return” (臺灣必歸) (Xinhua, October 24). The phrase has been around for a number of years. Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) used it at a press conference in 2022. And CCTV unveiled a poster featuring the phrase in mid-2024. But its use in the show “Silent Honor” (沉默的榮耀) has driven its promotion, to the extent that it has now been used by an official at the Ministry of National Defense (MND). Its mention came at a press conference hosted by the Office for International Military Coordination (OIMC; 國際軍事合作辦公室). The OIMC is in part responsible for foreign intelligence and information operations and is directly subordinate of the CMC. [4] The office spokesperson used a question about the TV show to state that “Taiwan’s inevitable return is an unstoppable force. The unfinished cause of our martyrs shall be fulfilled” (臺灣必歸，勢不可擋，先烈們未竟的事業必將完成). He also argued that President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) was positioning himself “on the opposite side of history” (到歷史的對立面) and would “inevitably be buried by the tide of history and face the most severe judgment of justice” (必將被歷史潮流埋葬，受到正義最嚴厲的審判) (MND, October 30).
The press conference also provided an opportunity for further intimidation. A state media journalist noted that a commercial satellite had recently released multiple high-definition satellite images of Taiwan, in which “every street in Taiwan is clearly visible” (臺灣的每條街道都清晰可見). The journalist then wondered whether, given such clear images were available from commercial satellites, the PLA’s military satellites are even more precise. The spokesperson simply responded that it is “perfectly normal for Chinese satellites to observe the beautiful landscapes of Taiwan, China” (中國的衛星看看中國臺灣的大好河山很正常) (MND, October 30).
The KMT’s ‘New Starting Point’ With the CCP
Taiwan’s domestic politics has also provided fertile ground for advancing influence. October saw a former spokeswoman for the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), Ma Chih-wei (馬治薇), handed a two-year sentence for taking CCP money to run as a legislator in 2024 and providing information to her CCP handlers, including a list of contacts for central government agencies and business cards for personnel involved in national security (UDN, October 16). But perhaps the most significant change this year is the KMT’s recent election of a new party chair.
The arrival of Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) as chairwoman of the KMT could herald a new approach for the CCP. Cheng, who identifies as Chinese (“我是中國人”), received a congratulatory letter from Xi Jinping, to which she responded in kind. According to Xinhua, in her letter she called for “opening up a grand future for national rejuvenation (為民族復興開闢宏偉前程) (China Brief, October 4; Xinhua, October 19). To provide a sense of Cheng’s politics, she used her first interview with international media to double down on her stance that Russia is a democracy and Putin a “democratically elected” (民主選舉產生的) leader (DW, October 30). Her first appointments also indicate her desire to engage with the CCP. At an October 28 meeting with the TAO’s director Song Tao (宋濤), her new vice chair Hsiao Hsu-chen (蕭旭岑) echoed the language from her letter to Xi and criticized Taiwan’s administration. Song responded by saying that they were “Standing at a new starting point” (站在新的起點上).
Cheng is content to call for unification, but her statements to date suggest that she believes unification can be achieved on terms other than those dictated by Beijing. This is not what the CCP means when it talks of unification. As laid out in a recent op-ed by the PRC’s consul in Denpasar, Indonesia, reunification means “fully sharing the dignity and honor of the People’s Republic of China on the international stage” (將來海峽兩岸實現統一後，海內外臺灣同胞將更能夠與全國各族人民一道，充分共用中華人民共和國在國際上的尊嚴與榮譽) (PRC Consulate in Denpasar, Indonesia , October 25). The Republic of China is not mentioned.
Conclusion
Across legal, military, social, and political dimensions, Beijing has engineered a shift in its approach to Taiwan. It is difficult to gauge what level of coordination exists between the PLA/CMC, the TAO, the MPS, and other relevant parts of the system on a unified strategy. But in each of these areas—with the possible exception of military gray-zone activity (though not overall PLA pressure)—the ratchet has tightened. Whether this constitutes a “new starting point,” in TAO director Song Tao’s words, remains to be borne out. For now Beijing is making its intentions clear, seeing no reason to stop forging ahead in its pursuit of unification.
Notes
[1] Puma Shen has previously written for China Brief (China Brief, February 16, 2024).
[2] The information in this section comes from a paper that Ma Cheng-kun titled “China’s Military Posture Toward Taiwan” delivered at the International Conference on U.S.-China Strategic Competition in 2025: Implications for China and Cross-Strait Relations. The conference, hosted by the MAC, was held in Taipei on October 21, 2025.
[3] Most comments either troll the TAO or contain pro-Taiwan content. And on the account’s first post, by far the largest proportion of engagements were “angry” reactions.
[4] Miller, Frank, Tung Ho, Kenneth Allen, and Arran Hope, eds. The People’s Liberation Army as Organization Volume 3.0. Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation; Vienna: Exovera, 2025. p.85.
[5] The press conference also provided an opportunity for further intimidation. A state media journalist noted that a commercial satellite had recently released multiple high-definition satellite images of Taiwan, in which “every street in Taiwan is clearly visible” (臺灣的每條街道都清晰可見). The journalist then wondered whether, given such clear images were available from commercial satellites, military satellites are even more precise. The spokesperson simply responded that it is “perfectly normal for Chinese satellites to observe the beautiful landscapes of Taiwan, China” (中國的衛星看看中國臺灣的大好河山很正常).
本文於 修改第 1 次
|
|
自作孽之莽夫賴清德 ---- Lyle Goldstein
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
美國老大哥發話了，賴清德還要「作死」嗎？你要找死是你自家的事，可別拉著台灣老百姓跟你陪葬！
The U.S. Must Beware of Taiwan's Reckless Leader
Lyle Goldstein, 10/23/25
With all the news out of the Middle East and the ongoing war in Ukraine, it’s easy to forget that Taiwan is the world’s most dangerous flashpoint. China has long laid claim to the island and acting on those claims could lead to a spiral where Washington and Beijing come to blows over the issue—and nuclear use would remain a terrifying possibility.
Now, a confluence of factors have made the situation in the Taiwan Strait even less stable. The U.S. has been burned badly by Asian nationalism more than a few times in the past, and so should act with utmost prudence today.
At the heart of this growing storm is the brash, new leader of Taiwan, President William Lai of the nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Instead of taking a low profile and playing down any claims to Taiwan’s independent status like his more cautious DPP predecessor Tsai Ying-wen, Lai has lurched toward formal independence with a succession of speeches making the case for Taiwanese nationhood.
One columnist at Taipei Times succinctly summarized Lai’s first address: “Never before has a Taiwanese president devoted an entire speech to laying out clearly, point-by-point, and unequivocally how Taiwan is unquestionably a sovereign nation.”
Not surprisingly, Beijing has reacted to Lai’s address with a string of invective. A June 26 editorial in the state-run Chinese newspaper the Global Times said that he “once again exposed his radical ‘Taiwan independence’ stance” and accused him of “pushing cross-strait relations and Taiwan's development to the edge of more conflict and risk.”
The political milieu on Taiwan is polarized, with islanders in July rejecting an unprecedented recall vote of opposition lawmakers from the Kuomintang (KMT), which controls the legislature and opposes formal independence. When the KMT this week elected a new chairperson, Cheng Li-wun, the party was accused of falling victim to an influence campaign orchestrated by Beijing.
When Taiwan held its annual Han Kuang military exercises earlier this year, it involved numerous innovations meant to address the growing Chinese military threat. The exercises lasted longer than usual, involved the extensive use of reservists, showcased new weaponry, and practiced urban warfare.
But it was another sign of Taipei misdirecting its defense efforts. That money would be better spent, as military experts have long said, on asymmetric weapons like mines given that Taiwan’s ports and air bases would be the main targets for China’s initial air and missile campaign. Shifting the focus to more affordable and widely dispersed ground combat systems makes sense for Taiwan.
But even that approach has problems. American M1 Abrams tanks joined Taiwan’s forces for the first time, but they have been paraded around Russia as trophies from the war in Ukraine. It’s beyond any doubt that the PLA has secured from Russia the very latest intelligence on this platform’s weak points and doctrine on defeating it. The same is true on the vaunted HIMARS system that have also arrived in Taiwan.
Other factors don’t bode well for Taiwan. There has been much talk about the shortage of American-made Patriot anti-missile batteries thanks to the Russia-Ukraine War, so the PLA may wish to act before that shortfall can be rectified. Nor can it be ruled out that China, while normally cautious, might instead act decisively against Taiwan at a point of crisis for Kyiv, since the West would likely be more distracted.
Beijing is obviously trying to read the tea leaves in Washington. President Donald Trump has judiciously taken a cautious approach on Taiwan, especially when compared to his predecessor. But some of his top advisors, including Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, have adopted a notably hawkish tone. Elon Musk, the Trump advisor who was most knowledgeable about China and whose experience with Beijing goes back decades, is now nowhere near the Oval Office.
On the high-stakes Taiwan issue, Washington should tread carefully. Taiwan constitutes a core interest for China and the military balance gets ever more lopsided against Taiwan by the day.
American leaders should not hesitate to rein in Taiwan’s evidently reckless leader, perhaps with a private warning. It would not be the first time that Washington has rebuked Taipei for threatening the status quo.
In the meantime, the U.S. should refocus its defense efforts in the Pacific on protecting actual treaty allies Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea—a wholly realistic and sensible goal. But Taiwan does not represent a vital U.S. national security interest. It is not a treaty ally, nor are the various geostrategic or economic rationales to defend Taiwan enough to risk a potentially catastrophic great power war.
Contact us at letters@time.com.
Read More:
Taiwan in the Shadow of War
How Trump Can Avoid War Over Taiwan
本文於 修改第 7 次
|
|
從中國政府的角度思考「統一台灣」策略 -- Jeffrey Michaels/Michael John Williams
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
基本上這是一篇值得細讀和探討的分析；可惜，我腦力空空外，也興趣缺缺。
全文兩個敗筆：
1) 沒有給予「封鎖」(或「隔離」)戰略適當和充分的討論。
2) 全文最後一段中的： “the U.S.-led rules-based order in Asia …” 這句話。
A Wargame to Take Taiwan, from China’s Perspective
Jeffrey Michaels/Michael John Williams, 10/07/25
In August 2025, 25 international experts gathered at Syracuse University to do something unusual: plan China’s invasion of Taiwan. For two days, academics, policy analysts, and current and former U.S. officials abandoned their typical defensive postures and attempted to inhabit Beijing’s offensive strategic mindset in a wargame. They debated not how America should respond to Chinese aggression, but how China might overcome the obstacles that have so far kept it from attacking the island nation.
This role reversal yielded an uncomfortable insight. The invasion scenarios that dominate U.S. military planning — involving massive amphibious assaults on Taiwan and preemptive strikes on American bases — may fundamentally misread Beijing’s calculus. As the wargame revealed, analysts seeking to understand China’s intentions should pay greater attention to plausible alternative military pathways to reunification that involve far less force and far more political calculation.
Thinking Like Beijing
Our intention in designing the wargame in this way was motivated by concern that insufficient attention has been given to understanding how China’s leadership and war planners may conceptually approach the problem of bringing Taiwan to heel. This was particularly important given our participant composition: while predominantly U.S.-based, the group included a few international players. Participants brought diverse high-level experience, including former U.S. officials from the State Department, Department of Defense, and CIA, as well as the UK Cabinet Office. Several participants had military backgrounds, having served in the U.S. Army or Navy, and a few were established scholars in international relations. Around half the participants had expertise in the Chinese military or the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore, we deliberately designed the game to force participants to confront practical questions Chinese strategists would face when they draft and update their war plans, such as: How much force is enough to compel surrender without triggering U.S. intervention? What surrender terms would Taipei accept? How does Beijing transition from military action to political control of Taiwan to a favorable post-war status quo in the region and beyond?
These types of questions expose a gap in American strategic thinking. Most U.S. wargames focus on operational and tactical military interactions — ship movements, missile salvos, casualty counts, what percentage of Chinese troops land in the north of Taiwan vs. the south. The focus is overwhelmingly on the invasion scenario. They rarely examine the political context that shapes military decisions. This narrow focus produces a dangerous blind spot: the United States prepares for the war it can fight or prefers to fight, not the one China expects to win.
The exercise revealed three scenarios that generated the most debate among participants.
First, a limited missile barrage followed by diplomatic ultimatum — essentially, coercion without invasion.
Second, a graduated escalation that stops short of attacking U.S. forces.
Third, an assault designed to cripple U.S. forces at the outset and present Taipei with a new reality of isolation. Each path reflected different risk tolerances and assumptions about American resolve.
Calculated Restraint
Participants quickly discovered that when confronted with the decision to attack U.S. forces, this seemed to make little strategic sense when they attempted to look at it from Beijing’s perspective. A typical assumption held by many analysts, including most participants prior to the game, and one that features prominently in American wargames, is that China will simply launch a preemptive surprise strike against U.S. forces in a manner somewhat analogous to Pearl Harbor. But why start a war with America when you might avoid one? As the game participants soon found, there is no guarantee of U.S. military involvement, nor Japan’s, nor other countries‘, if China refrains from attacking them in an opening round. By placing themselves in the shoes of Chinese planners — who in real life are presumably familiar with the contemporary American political scene and the historical record of how Washington reacts to unprovoked attacks — participants recognized there would almost certainly be a natural hesitancy to initiate a war against the United States. In other words, rather than assume Chinese planners simply ignore the difficulties any U.S. administration would face in starting a war with China if American forces are not attacked first, they might instead use these difficulties to Beijing’s advantage and design their war plans accordingly. Indeed, it is precisely because of these difficulties that most U.S. wargame designers wanting to get a war going between Chinese and American forces begin with the Chinese attacking American forces rather than the other way around.
This logic shaped the exercise’s most plausible hypothetical scenario. China launches precision strikes against Taiwan’s military infrastructure while simultaneously offering generous surrender terms: local autonomy, preservation of democratic institutions, and minimal mainland administrative presence. The message to Taipei is clear: accept reunification on favorable terms or face devastation. The message to Washington and the American public is equally clear: this is a Chinese civil matter, not worth American lives.
The comparison to Hong Kong’s former autonomy arrangements, once seemingly reasonable, now rings hollow given Beijing’s crackdown there. Participants struggled with this credibility gap. Would Taiwan believe any Chinese promises after Hong Kong? Even if the Taiwanese don’t believe them, do they have a better alternative to accepting them? The debate highlighted a crucial uncertainty: China’s ability to make its threats credible while keeping its surrender terms sufficiently enticing.
A Military Reality Check
The exercise forced participants to confront an uncomfortable truth about China’s military capabilities. Despite decades of modernization, the People’s Liberation Army has not fought a major conflict since 1979. It has never conducted an amphibious assault on a major scale. Its logistics remain untested. Its command structure is riddled with political interference. In contrast to most wargames that portray the Chinese military as a competent machine operating at maximum efficiency, the perspective from Beijing is likely more sobering.
These limitations don’t make China weak — they make it cautious. Why attempt a Normandy-style invasion when missile strikes and economic strangulation might achieve the same goal? Why risk military humiliation when political victory remains possible? Participants found themselves naturally gravitating toward strategies that minimized operational complexity and maximized the potential to de-escalate if things went badly wrong and then re-escalate later at a more favorable time.
This caution extends to the timeline. Any major amphibious operation requires weeks, if not months, of visible preparations. Participants recognized this transparency as China’s greatest vulnerability but also noted the world’s failure to deter Russia in 2021–2022 despite similar warning signs. International condemnation means little without credible threats of military intervention.
What Successful Deterrence Requires
The wargame’s insights challenge conventional deterrence thinking in three ways.
First, deterrence can’t focus solely on defeating an invasion. If China’s theoretically preferred strategy involves limited strikes and political coercion, Taiwan needs resilience against pressure campaigns, not just beach defenses. This means hardening critical infrastructure, preparing the population psychologically, and maintaining political unity under extreme stress. It also means understanding the dynamics of how China will attempt to lure Taiwan into an early surrender and then taking steps to undermine these.
Second, the exercise showed that uncertainty about U.S. intervention shapes every Chinese decision. But credibility isn’t just about presidential statements or forward deployments. It’s about Chinese assumptions about the circumstances in which the president would authorize force, Congress would support military action, whether the American public would accept casualties, and whether allies would provide meaningful support. A key takeaway from the game was that Chinese strategists will be focusing at least as much on these basic issues about whether the United States will use force as opposed to what forces they will use.
Third, deterrence requires denying China easy political victories, not just military ones. If Beijing believes it can achieve reunification through limited force and favorable terms, traditional military deterrence fails. Therefore, arguably more important than Taiwan’s military vulnerabilities are its political vulnerabilities. While Taiwan has so far remained steadfast in maintaining its independence, the combined effects of China finally crossing the military threshold, limited prospects of outside military help, and Beijing offering favorable surrender terms (backed by threats of massive escalation for refusal), might prove sufficient to undermine the will to fight.
The Unresolved Questions
Several critical debates remained unsettled when the exercise ended. Participants disagreed sharply on whether China would choose to blockade Taiwan — some saw it as perfect graduated pressure, others as an invitation for U.S. naval intervention, an opportunity for Taiwan to bring its forces to maximum readiness, or prone to rapidly escalate to a full-blown confrontation if attempts are made to break through it.
Most revealing was the disagreement over timing. Some participants argued China must move within this decade while it maintains a favorable military balance. Others speculated the timing might be tied to the 72-year-old Xi Jinping wanting to achieve reunification before his death. Alternatively, it was contended that time favors Beijing — Taiwan’s economy increasingly depends on the mainland, younger generations lack their parents’ anti-communist fervor, and the conventional and nuclear balance may become even more lopsided in China’s favor.
These unresolved debates matter because they reflect legitimate uncertainties about Beijing’s decision calculus. American planners who assume they know China’s timeline or red lines are deceiving themselves.
Next Steps
The Syracuse exercise represents just one attempt to understand Chinese strategic thinking. Its participants brought their own biases and blind spots. They may have overcorrected for perceived American misunderstandings. They certainly lacked access to classified Chinese planning documents.
Yet the exercise’s value lies not in perfect prediction but in expanding imagination. By forcing Americans to try and think like Chinese planners, it revealed possibilities that U.S. planning overlooks. It showed that the most dangerous scenarios might not be the most dramatic ones. And it demonstrated that effective deterrence requires understanding not just China’s capabilities, but also its images of future war, the doubts of its leaders, and the difficulties of its planners to confidently provide winning options.
The next step is translating these insights into policy. This means wargaming not just military scenarios but political ones. It means understanding Beijing’s conceptions of what a war over Taiwan looks like and the content of Chinese war planning. It means testing assumptions about alliance cohesion and domestic resolve. It means preparing for the many types of wars China is developing options to wage, not just the one we’re comfortable planning against.
The stakes couldn’t be higher. Taiwan’s future, regional stability, and the U.S.-led rules-based order in Asia all hang in the balance. We can’t afford to misunderstand Beijing’s thinking. The Syracuse exercise offers a start — thinking like the adversary to avoid becoming its victim.
Jeffrey Michaels is an associate of RAND Europe and a strategic adviser at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. He is the co-editor with Tim Sweijs of Beyond Ukraine: Debating the Future of War (2024), and co-author with Lawrence Freedman of The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 4th Edition (2019).
Michael John Williams is director of the Carnegie-Maxwell Policy Planning Lab and associate professor of international affairs at Syracuse University. He is the coauthor of International Security: Theory and Practice (2025) and of Science, Law, and Liberalism in the American Way of War (2015).
BECOME A MEMBER
本文於 修改第 4 次
|
|
台海戰爭：中、美誰將勝出？ - Andrew Latham
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
下文深度雖稍嫌不足，論述相當完整；值得一讀。
索引(僅含難以「望文生義」者；中譯如有不妥，請指教)：
asymmetric defense：非勢均力敵戰爭中劣勢方的防禦戰術
denial (「防禦成功」)：請參見：海空聯防戰術
forward basing：海外基地；駐外基地(在其他國家的軍事基地)
sea-denial：海防，制海權；請參見：海空聯防戰術
strategic balance (「均衡戰略」)：a. 指試圖避免核武衝突的全球性戰略(請見本欄下一篇《讀後》所附「相關閱讀」- 6))；b. 指維持敵對雙方各自優勢的戰略(請見請見本欄下一篇《讀後》所附「相關閱讀」-2)、3)、4))
A U.S.-China War over Taiwan: Who Wins?
Andrew Latham, 09/13/25
Key Points and Summary – War in the Taiwan Strait wouldn’t yield a clean U.S. win. China’s missiles, submarines and proximity threaten carriers and forward bases.
-Taiwan is shifting to asymmetric defense—mobile missiles, hardened infrastructure, civil resilience—but the U.S. industrial base, munitions stocks and repair capacity lag.
-Likely phases: opening missile/cyber/space strikes; a brutal sea-denial fight against invasion convoys; possible blockades and urban combat if a beachhead forms, with nuclear risk overhead.
-The most plausible outcome is denial—China fails to conquer—but at staggering cost. To deter or prevail, Washington must surge production, harden bases, lock in allied access and prepare publics now.
A Taiwan War: Who Wins and At What Cost?
On any given day in the not-too-distant future, the Taiwan Strait could erupt in war. Missiles and aircraft could race across the Strait’s skies; warships and submarines could fight in its waters. And the world will ask: did America—and its friend Taiwan—have a fighting chance?
This question is not idle speculation. More than a year of stepped-up Chinese military exercises, an expanding Chinese submarine fleet, and accelerating defense reforms in Taiwan have given new urgency to the question.
The answer, uncomfortably, is that the United States can probably prevent a Chinese conquest of Taiwan. But it can do so only at far greater cost, risk, and uncertainty than most public debates suggest.
Preemptive Efforts
Deterrence is the best hope, but if deterrence fails, America will not “win” cleanly. Indeed, the most likely outcome is a bloody denial of Beijing’s objectives, one that depends on the industrial depth of the American and allied response and the strength of Taiwan’s asymmetric defenses.
Beijing has prepared extensively. Carrier strike groups that once symbolized unchallengeable dominance are now vulnerable to salvos of DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles. The PLA Navy is the largest in the world, while its rocket force and counterspace systems are designed to blind, disrupt, and overwhelm American power projection.
Geography compounds these challenges: Beijing fights on its doorstep with short supply lines and the ability to mass firepower quickly, while Washington would have to operate across thousands of miles, threading its way through missile envelopes and cyber disruption into a battlespace engineered to destroy it. The strategic balance has shifted because China has deliberately built the tools to tilt it.
Taiwan Bolsters Defences
Taiwan, aware of this shifting environment, has responded by moving away from overreliance on the promise of American rescue. In recent years, it has stood up a fourth Patriot missile battalion, begun receiving PAC-3 MSE interceptors, and tested its indigenous Tien Kung-IV air defense system. It has also created a Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee to coordinate civil-defense training, secure critical materials, and harden infrastructure.
Earlier this month, Taipei issued an updated handbook to prepare its citizens for disinformation and attack. These initiatives are not just about Taiwan’s self-defense; they are recognition that China’s buildup makes it impossible for the United States to guarantee salvation. Taiwan is preparing to fight because it understands that it may have to hold out on its own.
By contrast, the picture for the United States is more ambiguous. Washington still teeters uncomfortably on the knife-edge of “strategic ambiguity,” a policy that buys flexibility but invites doubt. On the one hand, the FY-2025 Pacific Deterrence Initiative allocates nearly ten billion dollars to improve logistics, forward basing, and allied integration. The Marine Corps has converted its Okinawa regiment into a Littoral Regiment designed to survive inside the PLA’s missile envelope. Access to nine Philippine bases has been secured, including northern Luzon sites positioned near the Taiwan Strait.
These are serious steps that respond directly to Chinese capabilities and Taiwan’s vulnerabilities. On the other hand, the US defense industrial base is fragile. Production of long-range anti-ship missiles, hardened aircraft shelters, and naval repair capacity lags far behind the demands of a major conflict.
Magazine stores (彈匣庫存) are shallow, logistics are overstretched, and repair yards are inadequate. And while American access to bases in Japan and the Philippines enhances the ability of US forces to sustain their campaign, China’s opening salvos against these facilities might become the brutal prelude to a wider war.
Staged Conflict
The conflict itself would likely play out in several phases. The opening week would be defined by missile barrages aimed at Taiwan’s defenses and US forward bases, along with cyber and space attacks to blind command networks. Taiwan’s dispersal plans and mobile launchers would mitigate, but not eliminate, the damage.
The next phase would be the battle for sea denial. Submarines, mines, and long-range anti-ship weapons would be hurled against convoys carrying PLA troops and supplies across the Strait. Geography favors the defenders, but China’s proximity and numerical advantage mean some ships would get through. The outcome of this battle for sea denial would turn on whether enough could survive repeated strikes to sustain a lodgment.
If the lodgment falters under relentless attrition, America and its allies will have succeeded in denying conquest, though at staggering cost in lives, matériel, and economic disruption. If Chinese forces succeed in securing even a tenuous beachhead, the war would slide into urban combat, blockade, and prolonged attrition, with Taiwan devastated and America drained by the effort. Nuclear escalation would loom over every stage of the war, raising the risk that the conflict could spill beyond the conventional theater.
Outcome Factors
Factors decisive for the outcome of the conflict include industrial capacity, Taiwan’s asymmetric defenses, allied access, and public resilience. Industrial capacity remains the first. Without a dramatic surge in missile production, sustainment, and repair, America’s ability to outlast China in a protracted struggle is in doubt.
Taiwan’s asymmetric defenses are the second decisive factor. If its mobile missile batteries, hardened infrastructure, and civil defense systems perform as advertised, they could tip the scales in a drawn-out campaign. Allied access is the third. Basing rights in Japan and the Philippines could prove the difference between rapid reinforcement and dangerous delay.
Finally, public resilience matters. Taiwan has invested heavily in civil defense and social cohesion, but disinformation, bombardment, and casualties could erode morale. For America, the test would be whether its public would accept the scale of sacrifice required.
The United States today could likely prevent Beijing from conquering Taiwan outright. The most plausible outcome is denial: Taiwan survives as a de facto independent polity, the PLA fails to consolidate control, and Beijing’s gamble ends in frustration. But this would be a pyrrhic success, with allied forces bloodied, Taiwan shattered, and America’s global posture degraded. A less frequent outcome is a contested stalemate: a campaign in which Chinese troops cling to a fragile beachhead.
The possibility of outright defeat—China achieving conquest while the US fails to dislodge them—remains low, but cannot be dismissed. In each case, the costs would be immense and enduring.
If Washington truly believes Taiwan is worth defending, it must act now. Industrial capacity must be expanded at speed and scale, especially in the realm of missiles, hardened bases, and sustainment. Allies must be clarified and commitments synchronized to eliminate the ambiguity that tempts aggression. Civil defense must be strengthened both in Taiwan and in the United States, where the public must be prepared for sacrifice if deterrence fails.
Deterrence will hold only if its credibility is real, and credibility does not rest on rhetoric but on readiness.
America could save Taiwan. But unless it sharpens its tools, steels its will, and invests now in the grim requirements of denial, it risks fighting not for victory but merely to stave off defeat.
Andrew Latham is a Senior Washington Fellow with the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities, and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham. He writes a daily column for National Security Journal.
本文於 修改第 2 次
|
|
台灣問題和「人民自決權」
|
|
|
推薦2 |
|
|
|
力工兄的分析當然一貫的深入和引經據典(請見本欄上一篇)。我且從一個小鼻子、小眼睛的「政治現實主義者」角度略表淺見。敬請指教。
1. 釐清概念
英文的”people”這個「指號」，並非只有「人民」一個「所指」；依上、下文脈絡，可以詮釋為「民族」。因此，「人民自決」或「民族自決」，與歷史、政治等語境並無直接關聯，端視作者的「用法」而定。
在基因學普及之後，「民族」一詞在「學術」領域並無精準「所指」；只有「政治」或意識型態等面向的意義。說白一點，只有「戰鬥口號」或「炮製口實」的「用法」。
2. 政治現實主義
我多年前曾有一個觀察(該欄開欄文第0.5小節)：
「權利」不是：
天生的，天賦的，被施捨的，或吶喊著「自由」、「民主」、和「法治」等口號(咒語？)，就會無中生有的。
「權利」是：
希望擁有它的人，個別或集合起來爭取到的。從古到今，爭取的方式是用石頭、竹竿、木棒、白布條、槍桿子、莫洛托夫雞尾酒、或選票。更直接或露骨地說，要享受權利，就要有為它付出代價的準備。
天下某個角落興許找得到「白吃的午餐」；但在當今的世道，絕對沒有「白嫖的權利」。不了解這個硬道理，談政治不過在玩電腦麻將。
3. 烏克蘭人民「權利」的來源
以烏克蘭為例，沒有美國或歐洲各強國的支持，這場戰爭很可能如普丁一廂情願的會在一個月內結束。但是，戰爭在飛彈、大砲、無人機、裝甲車、和機器狗這些武器裝備之外，還要死人的。烏克蘭人有沒有出國躲避兵役的，多了去了。烏克蘭士兵有沒有臨陣逃脫的，不在少數。三年半打下來，烏克蘭雖然敗相已露，前線戰況還在拉鋸。只要看看俄、烏雙方在人口、領土面積、和GDP值的對比，就知道這個「奇蹟」可不是一句「西方帝國主義」可以抹殺、糊弄、或遮羞；且不提普丁也說不上在單打獨鬥。
烏克蘭人民在戰場的犧牲，和菁英們在後方研發武器的心血，是他/她們今天仍然有「權利」自稱「烏克蘭人」的底氣。
4. 台灣問題的本質
「台灣人民」有沒有「自決」的「權利」，不在於：
1) 《聯合國憲章》的文字或意旨；
2) 美國和她所剩無幾「盟國」的實力；
3) 學者對「人民」、「民族」、「自決」這些鬼畫符「指號」的詮釋。
「台灣人民」中如果：
a. 1/10的人有烏克蘭老百姓的意志和勇氣，賴某大概可以開始幻想「自決」。
b. 1/5的人有烏克蘭老百姓的意志和勇氣，賴某大概可以開始起草「獨立宣言」。
c. 1/4的人有烏克蘭老百姓的意志和勇氣，賴某大概可以開始「調兵遣將」，擬定「海-陸-空佈防規劃」。
d. 1/3的人有烏克蘭老百姓的意志和勇氣？賴某吞下500公克LSD都做不出來的春秋大夢！
我敢打賭：
台灣如果有100,000位人民能夠有烏克蘭人那樣的意志和勇氣，老夫就表演倒立吃屎；外加直播。
本文於 修改第 3 次
|
|
從普京的辯解看「人民自決權」與台灣問題 – 俞力工
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
普京昨天在北京接受採訪、被問及「烏東併入俄羅斯」問題時，特地提及《聯合國憲章》第一條有關「民族自決」的規定。言下之意，烏克蘭東部四個地區投票決定併入俄羅斯，為國際法所允許。
其實，《憲章》第一條，僅僅提及「人民自決權」，而其內容與「民族自決」還不盡相同。
簡單地說，「人民自決」是指每個國家的人民，具有自由選擇政治體制(如共和、帝制)，與經濟體制「資本主義或社會主義）的權利。這與烏克蘭境內的俄羅斯少數民族，沒有直接關係，或說，並不適用。
至於「民族自決權」，第一次世界大戰期間，首先由美總統威爾遜提出，其目的在於懲治奧斯曼與奧匈這兩個戰敗國：以民族為劃分，將帝國境內不屬主要民族的少數民族切割出去。
因此，「民族自決權」剛提出時，並非當作「普世原則」。
第二次世界大戰結束前後，國際社會才遲遲在「民族自決」問題上，達成共識：即殖民主義(十九世紀)擴張下的被統治、被壓迫的少數民族，具有獨立權或分離權利。至於此前傳統帝國時代「自然擴張」下的被統治少數民族，並沒有獨立權。其「民族自決權」僅限於「行政自治權」。這麼規定，當然首先是為了保障傳統帝國的既得利益。
這個國際「共識」，維持到冷戰結束(1990年左右)，大體受到普遍的尊重。
但步入後冷戰時代，美國迅即將過去的「多邊」、「多極」，轉化爲「單邊主義」、「單極主義」；更有甚者，還試圖以美利堅意志，取代國際法與國際組織。於是乎，先後他在蘇丹南部與科索沃，不顧主權國家的領土管轄權不容侵犯原則，公然協助這兩個少數民族地區建立成獨立國家。
彼時，俄羅斯當局便曾多次提出警告，美國如此製造惡劣先例，將促使俄羅斯仿效。如今，果不其然，普京依樣畫葫蘆，先後將克里米亞與烏東四個地區，通過公投，完成「獨立」與「併入俄羅斯」兩個程序，最終劃入俄羅斯版圖。
提及此問題，目的不外是對台灣問題加以點評：即第一，台灣並非少數民族。其次，該島嶼屬滿清自然擴張後併入中國的版圖。鑒於此，按過去的國際共識，並不具有獨立權或分離權。
如今，當國際法淪喪爲叢林法當頭，台獨分子的願望是否能實現，就要看他背後是否有大國、強國撐腰；而且，其後台必須強大到無視中共存在的地步。 -- 2025/9/6
編後記：
在另一「論壇」上看到朋友轉來：旅歐學者和名政論家俞力工博士的大作。未經同意，逕行轉載，特此致歉。
我比較關注兩岸關係、中國動態、國際現勢、和科學新知，對台灣政局興趣缺缺。轉載此文和寫它的「讀後」，也算略盡「家事、國事、天下事，事事關心」之意。
本文於 修改第 1 次
|
|
《中國尚未進攻台灣的真正原因》小評
|
|
|
推薦2 |
|
|
|
1. 「表面分析」只能得到「表面原因」
該文作者伊士伍德博士的「分析」在強調：
只要台灣政治領袖不正式宣佈「獨立」，中國領導人不會武裝進攻台灣(請見本欄2025/08/28，13:52)。
他在該文中沒有用政治層面的「(執政)正當性」；而用了個人層面的「身後之名」或「歷史定位」。不客氣地說，伊士伍德博士所謂的「真正原因」，只是中國領導人用來敷衍急統派和國內網軍的「表面原因」。真正的「真正原因」還得看看老夫「能近取譬」所言(該欄2025/08/22)；或參考此文(本欄2025/08/06)。此外也可參見此文(該欄2025/08/31)。
2. 1995-1996台海危機
我當時已經回國兩年多。雖然因為工作和個人興趣，對台灣政局的了解並不深入；但我人在台灣，比起伊士伍德博士這種坐在象牙塔內霧裡看花的自封「全球戰略家」，就台海形勢脈動的掌握而言，還真高幾個層次，多兩把刷子。
我認為他對1995-1996「台海危機」的分析，無異於只懂得看熱鬧的傻B；完全不知道北京領導人走秀功夫一流，演技堪比克林•伊斯威特。「拳頭有多大，分貝提多高」的道理，一般中國人大概從穿開襠褲時就被灌輸了。
此外，20年後，中國軍力和軍備大幅度提升；美國並沒有退步，但原地踏步者遠多於小有進展者。1995-1996「台海危機」在今天的中、美角力戲碼中，雖然說不上「主客易勢」；卻也不具參考價值。
3. 結論
1) 我認為：伊士伍德博士這篇文章，做為「政治分析不能這樣寫」的「反面教材」價值，大於其推理過程和結論幫助人們了解問題「所以然」的能力。
2) 我絕對沒有認為「台灣議題」不重要或不值得「一戰」的意思。我只是認為：「台灣議題」雖然有「重要性」，但並不具備「急迫性」。其次，戰爭的「風險度」、「後遺症」、和「不確定性」都過大過高；「成本--效益」比則過低；故不可不查、不宜輕舉妄動。此所以孫子說：「不戰而屈人之兵，善之善者也」！這才是：中國尚未進攻台灣的「真正原因」。
本文於 修改第 5 次
|
|
中美博弈及臺海危機 - 胡承渝
|
|
|
推薦1 |
|
|
|
看到一部「2027攤牌前夜三部」系列的視頻；視頻的講者以館長訪陸、臺積電、九三閲兵三件事為出發點(1)，引用了兩個理論來分析當今的「中美博弈」及「臺海危機」：
1. 李光耀的「三層棋盤」理論(2)，即軍事經濟的「物理棋盤」、國家意志的「心理棋盤」、文明宿命的「終極棋盤」；
2. 約翰•米爾斯海默的「進攻性現實主義」理論(3)，認為國際政治的本質是一場由實力決定的權力鬥爭。
我認為：講者在程度上誇大了館長對臺灣的影響；但同意他關於臺積電從「硅盾」到「陷阱」的變化；我也同意閲兵是要震懾美國及臺灣。只是不知道最後一項是否能達到講者所期望的程度。
1) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HpnzgIL1KaY (27：32分鐘)
2) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ZC5TM_7kgk (21：50分鐘)
3) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iAu_9KG5FV4 (27：45分鐘)
希望聽到進一步的討論。
附註(編者)：
1. 該視頻的講者為艾森先生。
2. 編者在網上沒有找到「三層棋盤」的詳細解說。如艾森先生接著說的，「三層棋盤」名詞有點偷懶；應該用「三層面博弈論」。第一，中文的「層」(層級)和「層面」不是同義詞；第二，我雖然不知道李光耀本人想使用那一個意思；但一般來說，在這種思考模式中，英文字是”dimension” (as in “The social dimensions of the problem must also be taken into account.”)，而不是”level” (as in “My apartment is on the first level of the building.”)。
3. 此術語(「進攻性現實主義」)為講者所使用；編者認為：《維基百科》所用的「攻勢現實主義」比較信、達。米爾斯海默此理論以「攻擊行為」/「攻擊心態」作為解釋「國際關係」錯綜複雜互動的基礎；我會使用「國際關係攻擊中心論」來翻譯它，簡稱「國關攻勢論」。它相對於以「防衛行為」/「防衛心態」為解釋「國際關係」錯綜複雜互動基礎的「國際關係防衛中心論」；後者可簡稱為「國關防衛論」。
編後記：
此文是承渝兄在另一論壇的短信兼報導。標題為原文；我略加編輯(含文字、標點符號的更動/增加；並加上「附註」；使它成為一篇獨立報導。請承渝兄見諒。
我這樣做是因為：
我非常贊同承渝兄：「中美博弈」及「臺海危機」是兩個值得討論議題的建議。除了由於其重要性需要大家清楚明白的認知現實外，通過充分和廣泛討論，即使無法取得共識，但可能化解一些具有負面影響的誤解和歧見。
本文於 修改第 1 次
|
|
|
本城市首頁
看回應文章
等級：8
