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兩岸關係 – 開欄文
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俄烏戰爭在一年半以後，俄國憑藉其龐大的國力和人員，似乎拖垮了烏國的戰力、士氣、和民心。以巴戰爭又平地一聲雷的爆發，不但以國周邊的阿拉伯諸國虎視眈眈、蓄勢待發；也讓美國軍力和軍援左支右絀。這些發展勢必影響美國當下和未來在台海的軍事部署和決策。
我曾預估：2027年前台海無戰事。但俗話說，世事難料；我們升斗小民只能期望政治領袖們不以老百姓為芻狗，盡量發揮理性和睿智以和平方式解決利益衝突。
兩岸關係從過去的和平對峙隨著中、美國力的長消，逐漸進入外弛內張的狀況。雖然還說不上戰雲密布或圖窮匕見；但讓關切時局者緊張兮兮應該是有的。這個部落格過去也常有報導和評論；現在開一個專欄，今後將把相關議題集中討論。
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嚴肅思考和戰！ -- 張競
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歷史拒絕浪漫 嚴肅思考和戰！
張競，台灣好報，2020/09/14
【編按】漢光演習可能舉行政軍兵推(總統府指應為電腦兵推)，民間版「戰爭狂想曲─預告武統紀事」研討工作坊已於九月十一日由海軍軍官校友會在高雄左營登場推演。多位退伍將領、退伍轉業民間經營事業有成，以及具有碩博士學位、在學術界任職之海軍官校校友踴躍出席，並有深入研討互動。海軍官校校友、中華戰略學會研究員張競，在會中發表專文並提出「假若能夠預知三個月後北京將對台進行武力統一，鄉親與政府將會如何面對情勢？」作為工作坊研討主軸，分享工作坊推演過程的觀察心得。
面對戰爭所可能產生之衝擊，基本上可從體制面、市場面以及社會面三個不同視角切入。其實，傳統兵學分析戰略要素，強調政軍經心，政治就是涉及體制面，經濟就是顯現市場面，心理自然就是直指社會面，而每個面向都會影響到軍事作戰，只是程度有所不同，若未能妥善處理前述各個面向所將產生之衝擊，必然就會讓軍事作戰無法充分發揮戰力。
國家面對戰爭，是整個社會必須承擔之共業，沒有任何人得以置身事外。儘管兩岸分離以來，台灣與大陸軍事對峙，時時都要面對戰爭威脅，此種狀況直到北京從「血洗台灣」、「解放台灣」，最後將政策作出重大調整，開始以爭取和平統一作為對台政策基調，再透過各項交流互動，雙方情勢才逐漸轉趨和緩，兩岸經濟商貿關係也才日趨密切。
平時轉換戰時 應避措手不及
但此種情勢在陳水扁執政後，兩岸交流歷經嚴重波折與衝擊；馬英九政府八年執政期間內，依據連戰與胡錦濤會談所建構的互信共識，才逐漸讓雙方關係解凍並轉趨穩定。 但是，蔡英文政府接掌政權後，從根本上否認「九二共識」，再加上北京與華盛頓雙方因為貿易關係產生摩擦，大國強權競逐架構套牢台北與北京的互動關係，且狀況愈加惡化，讓兩岸發生武裝衝突成為民眾必須認真思考的議題。
在整個研討過程中，針對體制面，很嚴肅的思考國家法條如何從平時體制轉換至戰時體制。特別是，當前軍法審判係移轉至司法體系負責運作，在何種狀況下，將其轉換回復至軍法體系，確實是優先關切重點；其次，戰爭準備的軍事動員，無論是人力、財力或是物力，都必須依據法令，但政府要在何種環境前提要件下下達決心，以免事到臨頭措手不及，也引起參與研討者密切關注。
戰火威脅 應防社會經濟失序
多年來，儘管面對戰爭威脅，但政府盡全力維持承平體制，其實是有其必要性。過去數十年來，政府透過發展經濟與國際商貿，改善社會生活與增強本身國力。若是保持面對戰爭之戰時體制，必然就會干擾民生與影響經濟活動，特別是對吸引國際社會來台投資，更會引起負面效應。
然而，只要戰火威脅浮上檯面，經濟代價與企業營運成本都會逐漸升高。因此，政府在面臨和戰抉擇時，如何掌握正確時機轉換戰時體制，以便維護社會秩序，同時又須避免過早下達決心影響經濟活動，必將考驗主政者政治智慧。
再從市場面與社會面來看，當國家面臨戰爭威脅產生社會動亂時，必然會產生囤積物資、哄抬物價情事。如何穩定民生物價、確保物資供應及管制金融秩序，必須藉由政府下達政治決心，將國家運作轉為戰時體制，讓執法者獲得足夠法律權限與適用法條，因應戰爭發生時所帶來的社會經濟活動失序現象。
體制、市場、社會 三者互相連動
目前，台灣經濟生產與社會運作已相當程度仰賴外籍勞工，許多產業高階工作，也有相當數目的外籍專業人士。當戰爭迫在眉睫時，不可能期待外籍人士會留在台灣與鄉親們共存亡，當外籍人士或僑民離境後，如何能夠保持社會正常運作，更值得嚴肅思考。
我們必須認清前面所提到體制面、市場面以及社會面的三個面向，相互之間都具有連動關係。當經濟失序、市場崩盤，當然會影響社會秩序；宣布進入戰時體制雖有助於恢復社會穩定，但同時也會對經濟活動、投資意願以及金融流通產生影響。如何權衡各項決策輕重緩急，也是政府決策無法迴避嚴肅責任。
特別是，當軍事動員必須召集後備役役男入營備戰時，必然會讓許多經濟生產體系受到影響。許多役男正在就學，學業也會因此中斷，社會上絕對不再會有旁觀者，畢竟，戰爭不是隔著螢幕、運用鍵盤與滑鼠所進行電競遊戲，而是隨時會讓周遭親友喪失生命、帶來傷亡的殘酷場景。
認知差距 與世代結構相結合
但是，目前整個社會氛圍在面對戰爭時，不但缺乏嚴肅思考，在態度上更是輕慢嘲弄，此種認知差距，其實是與世代結構相互結合的。在兩岸戰爭威脅下，奮力打拚、創造台灣經濟成長的中年族群憂心無比，但在兩岸關係穩定中坐享社會富裕生活的年輕族群，對於戰端可能開啟，卻是嗤之以鼻。
當中年世代嚴肅思考與研討和戰時，網際空間討論室內卻充滿了毫不負責的瘋狂叫囂，以及認定其本身能夠置身事外、隔岸觀火的無知。歷史拒絕浪漫，所有最讓人刻骨銘心的教訓，都將透過極為痛苦的過程達到學習成果，人類愚蠢不斷重蹈覆轍，讓人不禁感嘆！
圖：民間版「戰爭狂想曲─預告武統紀事」研討工作坊於海軍軍官校友會左營會址登場推演。(主辦單位提供) 請至原網頁觀看圖片
作者張競先生為中華戰略學會研究員
卜凱：
我在網上搜尋蕭功秦教授《歷史拒絕浪漫》這本書的時候，找到張競先生這篇四年前的舊作。原版本一氣呵成，整篇文章沒有分段；為了方便閱讀，我權且扮演一下編輯的角色，略分段落。如有不當或錯誤，是我的責任。
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《「聯合利劍」之「圍點打援」排練》導讀
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這篇報導的重點在於(請見本欄上一篇)：
「聯合利劍」演習表面上在演練並展示中國「封鎖」台灣的能力；其實，它真正目的在警告美國政治和軍事領袖：
中國在「封鎖」台灣外，也有伏擊和圍殲「馳援」美軍的規劃與軍力。
一旦美國政治和軍事領袖接受這個「警告」；It is game over for Taiwan Independence.
此文可與本欄前幾篇關於「封鎖」/「隔離」的報導與評論參看。
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「聯合利劍」之「圍點打援」排練 -- Eryk Michael Smith
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Encircling Taiwan was a smokescreen for China's real goal of convincing US not to intervene, expert says
Eryk Michael Smith. 10/20/24
KAOHSIUNG, TAIWAN – Contrary to what much of the world’s media has reported, China’s 13-hour simulated blockade of Taiwan that began on Monday, Oct. 14, using a record-breaking number of planes, an aircraft carrier, and both Navy and Coast Guard vessels, was not quite so simple as China "punishing" Taiwan’s new president William Lai for comments he’s made since taking office in May of this year.
"China planned the exercises in advance and would have carried them out regardless of what Lai said," nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global China Hub Elizabeth Freund Larus told Fox News Digital. "The military exercises are intended to wear down Taiwan’s military hardware and personnel. The purposes of the exercises are to threaten Taiwan’s security to the point that the Taiwan people lose confidence in their government and to change the status quo of a Taiwan separate from China."
All those reasons would be enough to justify the military maneuvers if one views them from Beijing’s tactical standpoint, but senior research fellow with the R.O.C. Society for Strategic Studies, Dr. Chang Ching, who also served in the Navy for several decades, told Fox News Digital that people are missing the big picture. Chang pointed to publicly available military logs from Japan that tracked both Russian and Chinese ships over several days before the 13-hour exercise.
A joint staff press release from Japan’s Ministry of Defense on Monday, Oct. 14, stated, "On October 11, 2024 (Friday), around 5 PM, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force confirmed the presence of six vessels [four Chinese and two Russian] in the waters approximately 400 km (approx 248 miles) northeast of Okinotorishima Island (Tokyo)." These were just some of the ships identified, and Japanese press releases noted that they had been tracking both Chinese and Russian naval actions since late September.
The location of these ships at those times, Chang asserted, means they cannot have been plausibly connected to the short Taiwan blockade. "The real target is the United States," he told Fox News Digital. "They were using a very old Chinese strategy called ‘encircling the point/striking the reinforcement;’ (「圍點打援」) in other words, practicing ways to ambush the U.S. Navy if it heads towards an already held-hostage Taiwan. If China can convince the U.S. that intervening in any actions it chooses to take in the Taiwan Strait is not worth the risk, then Beijing wins."
Other local experts had similar takes on the situation. Taiwan’s Central News Agency quoted assistant professor at Tamkang University Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies Lin Ying-yu, who argued that the timing of the military drills was an attempt by China to probe the United States’ ability to respond to simultaneous crises on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait.
People look at the view from an observation point in Nangan Township, in the Matsu Islands on Oct. 15, 2024, a day after China conducted the "Joint Sword" (「聯合利劍」) military drills around Taiwan. 請至援網頁觀看照片
The Chinese Navy, depending on what matrix is used to measure it, is either in second place after the U.S., has overtaken the U.S., or is basically even. Regardless of rankings, the Chinese have a formidable navy that is often dismissed as inexperienced. Analysts such as Chang, however, who’s spent his adult life studying military strategy and threats, say those who underestimate China’s navy do so at their peril.
China’s fleets boasts many smaller and more modern ships. According to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, about 70% of Chinese warships were launched after 2010, while only about 25% of the U.S. Navy’s were.
Unlike in the past, for Joint Sword 2024B there was no 24-hour prior notification, no specific latitude or longitude parameters were announced, and to add a final touch of menace, no date or time was given for when the exercise was scheduled to end.
Despite this, the general mood on the streets of Taiwan during the encirclement was calm, with almost no one telling the media they felt scared or threatened. Some say such nonchalance is worrying as it implies that the Taiwanese people are beginning to accept that their government and military are powerless to stop China’s incursions that inch closer each time – Joint Sword 2024B, for example, pushed to within 24 nautical miles of Taiwan.
China’s large and well-armed Coast Guard also took part in Joint Sword 2024B. Many Chinese Coast Guard ships are essentially warships, and the fleet includes several 10,000-ton vessels equipped with 76 mm guns, and capable of top speeds of 25 knots (28.7 MPH).
In a move Elizabeth Freund Larus described as "rather macabre," and Chang called "a cynical reflection of their ‘abusive relationship’ mindset," an image was released on the official China Coast Guard Weibo account (China’s version of X), depicting a drill route around Taiwan in the shape of a heart. The image featured Chinese characters that translate roughly to "Hello my sweetheart! Our patrol is our way of loving you."
In a recent poll, some 70% of Taiwanese said they expected some type of U.S. help in the event of a Chinese attack, but the U.S. reaction to Joint Sword 2024B was seen by some as being tepid and confusing.
"The United States is seriously concerned by the People’s Liberation Army joint military drills in the Taiwan Strait and around Taiwan," State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said in a statement. "The PRC response with military provocations to a routine annual speech is unwarranted and risks escalation."
The State Department Asia Pacific Media Hub issued a statement via X on Oct. 15 that read in part, "We have closely monitored the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) exercise, JOINT SWORD 2024B, around Taiwan. This military pressure operation is irresponsible, disproportionate, and destabilizing."
Some in Taiwan are asking why the State Department chose to use the word "disproportionate," as Taiwan has done nothing that would warrant even a "proportionate" response. With just weeks to go before the American presidential election, all official comments coming out of D.C. are likely to be carefully vetted, which makes the State Department’s comments all the more puzzling.
Considering that almost anything Taiwan does is seen by Beijing as some sort of "pro-independence provocation," there are calls in Taiwan for the democracies of the world, led by the United States, to come together and prepare concrete reactions to China’s continual attempts to change the status quo, militarize the Taiwan Strait, and deprive the people of Taiwan of their hard-won democracy.
Assistant Director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, Kitsch Liao, told Fox New Digital that it's "imperative for Taiwan to provide an update to its National Security Strategy, last updated in 2007, to act as a North star, and to galvanize collective efforts toward peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait."
* Taiwanese People Ready To Fight As China Ramps Up Aggression, Ambassador Says
* China Seeks To ‘Wear Down Taiwan’s Reliance’ With Covert Economic And Cyber Operations, Us Wargamers Say
* Taiwan Reacts To Trump’s They 'Should Pay Us For Defense' Comments
* For China's Military Planners, Taiwan Is Not An Easy Island To Invade
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有老友寄來下列視頻：
https://youtu.be/jSJn3hyKEJo?si=IXJbo6fwl6QBx8j1
並附了評論，以「山雨欲來風滿樓」為結語。
我的回應是：
安啦。
「擦槍走火」描述個別的、低層人員的行為；政策層級則只可能是「謀定而後動」。當然，「謀定」並不排除「決策錯誤」的可能性。
如果「戰爭」不是政策的選項，「擦槍走火」將被審慎處理和化解。就我記憶所及，本世紀以來，中、美之間至少發生過兩次。
如果「戰爭」是政策的選項，「擦槍走火」會是「謀定而後動」的戰術(或撇步)。
以我看，2027前中國沒有能力挑起台海戰爭。軍演除了演習功能外，部分作用在「內銷」。2030後中國不必挑起台海戰爭(= 美國沒有能力招架)；中國象徵性的給點「交換」，就能和平統一。
不過，我們大概也不需要擔心身後事了。
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美國海軍備戰2027-Matthew Loh
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美軍的「計畫」是兵聖孫子說的：「不恃其不來，恃吾有以待之」；習總的否認，也就不過是「虛實」之變。
請見本欄多篇相關分析、台海-1、和台海-2等。
The US Navy is planning for possible war by 2027, when China expects it will be ready to invade Taiwan, US admiral says
Matthew Loh, 09/19/24
* The US Navy is preparing for possible war by 2027, with China in focus, Adm. Lisa Franchetti said.
* She outlined a seven-goal plan for the US Navy, including having 80% of its forces ready to fight.
* Franchetti said her focus is based on the assessment that Xi wants China to be ready to attack Taiwan by 2027.
The US Navy has outlined a seven-target plan to boost its readiness for war by 2027, with its eye on China as Beijing ramps up its own military strength and the possibility of a Taiwan invasion looms.
Adm. Lisa Franchetti, chief of naval operations, released the plan on Wednesday, saying she had spent a year taking stock of the Navy's direction and what it must prioritize in the near future.
Her seven goals include streamlining maintenance for warships and submarines to eliminate delays, a bigger push to develop and field drones and unmanned vessels, and focusing on recruitment and ways to retain personnel.
In a speech at the Naval War College in Rhode Island, Franchetti said the heart of her strategy was "prioritizing raising our level of readiness for potential conflict with the People's Republic of China by 2027."
Fears of war by 2027
The 2027 deadline has been a focal point for US officials and defense chiefs, who say it was set by Chinese leader Xi Jinping as the year that China should be ready to seize Taiwan militarily.
Franchetti referenced that assessment again in her speech, saying that it's "what Chairman Xi told his forces, that they should be ready for war by 2027."
Xi has denied such claims, or even that he's set the bar at 2035, according to a senior US official who told reporters in November about the leader's conversation with President Joe Biden.
But China has increasingly stepped up aggression against Taiwan in recent years, especially after the self-governed island re-elected the Democratic Progressive Party in January. Fears of a US-China war have further been stoked by Beijing turning more hostile in its territorial disputes with Japan and US allies in the South China Sea.
In her speech, Franchetti acknowledged that the US has other competitors to tackle, such as Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah.
But she added that the US Navy's focus would primarily be on Beijing.
"By 2027, the Navy will be more ready for sustained combat," she said. "Prioritizing the People's Republic of China as the pacing challenge and focusing on expanding the Navy's contribution to the Joint warfighting ecosystem."
The Chinese embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment sent outside regular business hours by Business Insider.
The US Navy's new 'North Star'
Accomplishing Franchetti's goals will be no easy feat. The admiral aims to have 80% of US naval forces ready to deploy and fight anytime.
She also hopes the Navy can undertake an across-the-board repair effort for critical infrastructure like piers and runways. Another goal is to assess every fleet's command center for war readiness, starting with the Pacific Fleet, and have them up to standard by 2027.
The admiral herself acknowledged that these were stretch goals, or BHAG — big, hairy, audacious goals, as she called them in her speech.
"But I also know that moving out with purpose and urgency on these targets will deter the PRC and any other potential adversary and make us even more ready to fight and win decisively should that deterrence fail," she added.
Franchetti pointed to one of the US Navy's more unique advantages: real and recent combat experience.
It's been watching Ukraine's fight against Russia in the Black Sea, with Franchetti noting that Kyiv has used a "combination of missiles, robotic surface vessels, and agile digital capabilities."
The fighting there has drawn particular attention to how Ukraine, considered to have no real navy in its own right, held back the Russian navy and sank some of its warships.
"We have learned a great deal about the future of war at sea," Franchetti said. "Including the role of robotic platforms, cheaper munitions, and disaggregated forces in gaining and exploiting sea control."
The Navy has also been gleaning lessons from combat against Yemen's Houthi rebels, who have for nearly a year been attacking merchant vessels in the Red Sea with drones and ballistic missiles.
Franchetti told The Associated Press in an interview on Wednesday: "I think probably no one is learning more than the Navy, because really, this is the first time we've been in a weapons engagement zone for this sustained period."
Franchetti assumed her duties as naval chief of operations in November. She previously commanded two carrier strike groups and held command of the 6th Fleet, and is the first woman to serve on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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中國封鎖台灣的三種方式 ---- Bonny Lin等
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這兩篇CSIS報告應該是本欄前幾篇相關報導的「所本」(本欄上一篇和2024/06/22、2024/08/23、2024/08/24等貼文)。原網頁有更多數據、照片、和示意圖，請前往查看。
How China Could Blockade Taiwan
Part 2 of a ChinaPower Series, 08/22/24
Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Matthew P. Funaiole, Samantha Lu, and Truly Tinsley
Chinese leaders are determined to prevent Taiwan’s permanent separation and eventually bring it under their control. Beijing’s growing use of its military to put pressure on Taiwan in recent years has stoked concerns that it may invade the island. Yet China has options other than invasion, one of which is a blockade designed to break the will of Taiwan’s people to resist.
Drawing on Chinese military writings, tabletop exercises, private consultations, and expert surveys, this report lays out China’s potential motivations for a blockade and maps out possible scenarios of how China could approach blockade operations.
Why China Might Blockade Taiwan
Chinese military planners have long considered a blockade to be one of the main campaigns for which the PLA needs to prepare.
Science of Campaigns, a textbook published in 2006 by China’s National Defense University, defines a “joint blockade campaign” (聯合封鎖戰役) as “an offensive campaign that is implemented by Navy-, Air Force-, Second Artillery- and Army campaign large formations with the assistive concerted efforts of the armed police force and militia . . . to sever enemy economic and military connections with the outside world.”
A blockade would aim to take advantage of Taiwan’s status as an island with limited natural resources. Taiwan is much more dependent on trade than other large economies. In 2022, Taiwan’s imports and exports amounted to 61 and 69 percent of its GDP, respectively. By comparison, China’s imports and exports were only 15 and 20 percent of its GDP.
Taiwan is particularly reliant on foreign energy supplies, importing about 97 percent of its energy. It also imports approximately 70 percent of its food, though it is self-sufficient in certain staples that could help sustain its population.
Reportedly, Taiwan has less than two months of coal and natural gas reserves for electricity generation, six months of crude oil reserves, and six months of food stockpiles. In the most likely blockade scenarios, these stockpiles would be subject to Chinese bombardment, reducing Taiwan’s ability to resist. Making matters more challenging, a survey conducted by the CSIS China Power Project found that many experts believe China could sustain major military operations against Taiwan for at least six months.
China does not need to hermetically seal off Taiwan to achieve its goals. Curtailing trade into Taiwan by even 50 percent would prove detrimental for Taiwan, especially if Beijing stops all or most imports of oil, natural gas, and coal, which would eventually cause progressive failures in electric power distribution around the island.
However, a blockade would not be without its drawbacks for Beijing. There is no guarantee that a blockade alone will achieve Beijing’s goals. If Taiwan proves resilient, and if it receives assistance from the United States or others, China may find it impossible to force Taiwan’s capitulation without forcefully occupying the island.
In all, there are numerous factors at play that likely shape Chinese decisionmakers’ thinking about the advantages and disadvantages of a blockade:
This mixture of pluses and minuses shows that a blockade of Taiwan would be a serious gamble and would not guarantee China more success than an invasion. There is also the possibility that China would need to escalate a blockade into an invasion if Taiwan is not willing to capitulate or if the U.S. and other forces intervene.
Yet in the near term, a blockade could be more appealing for Beijing. In a 2023 CSIS China Power Project survey of experts from the United States and Taiwan, a highly kinetic joint blockade was seen as more likely than an invasion in the next five years—though only by a small margin.
This likely reflects beliefs that China currently lacks the capability to successfully invade Taiwan, but this strategic calculus could shift as the PLA’s capabilities grow.
How China Could Implement a Blockade
A blockade would be an unprecedented undertaking for China, requiring it to overcome complex operational and logistic hurdles. Chinese decisionmakers would have to not only command joint military operations but also coordinate law enforcement and maritime militia forces to support the PLA. They would also need to prepare for war with Taiwan and the possibility of war with the United States and its allies and partners.
Nevertheless, China is rapidly enhancing its capabilities, including the kinds of forces needed for a blockade.
Joint blockade operations would rely most heavily on six main types of PLA forces: naval surface and submarine fleets; air forces (including the PLA Air Force, Naval Aviation, and Army Aviation); conventional rocket forces; coastal and air defense forces; and support forces.
PLA writings emphasize that seizing the “three dominances” (三權) in key domains—information, maritime, and air—is crucial to executing a joint blockade campaign. China’s varying forces each play a role in this.
Missile strikes could, therefore, play a pivotal role. PLA writings stress the importance of degrading key enemy capabilities like air and coastal defense batteries before widely deploying China’s forces close to Taiwan to enforce a blockade. China may also target key civilian targets to limit Taipei’s ability to govern and respond.
China could instead launch a less kinetic blockade to try to reduce international backlash—as outlined in the second and third scenarios below. However, this would risk exposing China’s blockading forces to counterattacks and not putting enough pressure on Taiwan to achieve Beijing’s desired goals.
根據戰略需要，也可以首先建立偵察巡邏配系，而後建立火力打擊配系，對敵實施綜合火力打擊。組織綜合火力打擊時，應根據封鎖兵力行動的需要和戰場實際情況，精心選擇對我封鎖戰役全域影響大的重要軍事目標和對我封鎖兵力行動威脅大的目標。同時，應充分利用綜合火力突擊的效果，使用航空兵和潛艇對敵港口、航線實施大規模強行佈雷。 其他海上封鎖兵力可根據綜合火力突擊時間來確定進入預先展開海域的時間，以便及時展開，逐步形成封鎖態勢。《戰役學》
"When organizing comprehensive firepower strikes, we should carefully select important military targets that have a significant impact on our blockade campaign and targets that substantially threaten our blockading forces. . . . Simultaneously . . . we should employ aviation units and submarines to conduct large-scale mine-laying operations against enemy ports and shipping lanes." — Science of Campaigns
The PLA would not be operating alone in executing a blockade.
Chinese maritime law enforcement forces would play a key role. The China Coast Guard (CCG) is the largest coast guard in the world by number of oceangoing vessels. Once the PLA has established the “three dominances,” the CCG—with help from China’s civilian maritime law enforcement agency, the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA)—would help maintain and enforce the blockade by interdicting noncompliant ships. This is critical to allowing China to portray the blockade as a domestic law enforcement matter.
Rounding out China’s blockading forces would be the maritime militia—a network of organized, trained, and armed personnel operating in fishing vessels and other civilian craft.
These militia would not engage in force-on-force operations, but they could fill gaps in China’s ISR and complicate Taiwan’s maritime domain awareness by swarming in certain areas. The militia could also potentially aid in logistics by ferrying limited amounts of equipment and personnel to PLA vessels supporting the blockade operations.
China could also receive support from partners like Russia. As China and Russia have grown closer in recent years, their militaries have conducted joint naval and aerial exercises in the Western Pacific and elsewhere. Russia may not intervene directly, but Beijing could request that Moscow take action to show support for China.
The scenarios outlined below are only three examples of potential blockade approaches. There are other conceivable scenarios. In each of these scenarios, Beijing assesses that it must use military force to either deter an outright shift toward independence or force Taiwan to accept unification.
Scenario 1
All-Out Kinetic Blockade
This scenario aligns most closely with PLA doctrinal writings and is believed by many U.S. analysts to be the most likely approach China might take if its goal is to use a blockade to force Taiwan to capitulate, negotiate on unification, or set the conditions for successful invasion.
It is predicated on the PLA establishing the “three dominances” (in the information, air, and maritime domains) to set the conditions for effectively imposing and sustaining a blockade.
A week after offensive operations begin, Beijing pauses kinetic strikes to offer an opportunity for negotiations and time for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). China offers to establish humanitarian corridors for Taiwan citizens to seek refuge on the mainland and says Chinese civilian airplanes and vessels would take part in the evacuation. These actions are aimed at weakening Taiwan’s internal cohesion and willingness to fight.
If Taiwan continues to resist after this initial pause, China periodically engages in more missile strikes to stop Taiwan’s military from reconstituting damaged equipment and deploying additional mobile weapons systems.
Beijing is prepared to enforce the blockade for months but builds in subsequent pauses if Taiwan is willing to negotiate. Implementing a protracted blockade will require the PLA to periodically rotate personnel and equipment—a tall order for a military that last engaged in a war more than four decades ago.
On top of military operations, China engages in massive efforts to stir up pro-Beijing and other elements within Taiwan to advocate for negotiating with Beijing. This includes spreading false rumors, sabotaging counter-blockade efforts, and inciting unrest and public demonstrations against Taiwan’s government. Beijing could further elevate the status of a particular opposition leader or proxy in Taiwan and offer to negotiate with them instead of Taipei.
Scenario 2
Mining Blockade
While the first blockade scenario is representative of the likeliest approach China may take, it is not the only plausible option. China can vary the level of forces it deploys and adjust its rules of engagement to manage escalation. This second scenario is a scaled-down version of the all-out kinetic blockade.
Like the first scenario, China begins by announcing major live-fire exercises to take place in five air and maritime exclusion zones off Taiwan’s major ports. As part of the exercises, China’s rocket forces fire over a dozen ballistic missiles over and around Taiwan, but they splash down in the water rather than hitting targets in Taiwan. This is intended to intimidate Taiwan and international shipping companies and deter other countries from intervening.
During the exercises, PLA submarines covertly lay sea mines at the entrances of Taiwan’s major ports. The mines are timed to activate later to coincide with the start of blockade operations.
After five days of exercises, the PLA announces the start of “special law enforcement operations” and releases the coordinates for an air and maritime exclusion zone around Taiwan. Whereas in scenario one the zone covered the entire Taiwan Strait, in this scaled-back scenario, the zone only covers the eastern half of the strait.
Crucially, the PLA does not conduct joint firepower strikes against targets in Taiwan. However, PLA cyber forces conduct non-kinetic attacks to disrupt military and civilian communication systems and internet access and to disable energy and transportation infrastructure.
To enforce the blockade, the PLA Navy positions seven SAGs around Taiwan, and Beijing announces that mines have been laid near the entrances of key ports. China also deploys approximately 20 law enforcement vessels around Taiwan throughout the maritime exclusion zone.
Dozens of maritime militia vessels are also positioned alongside law enforcement ships to provide ISR and swarm vessels attempting to enter the exclusion zone.
Commercial ships are to be engaged by law enforcement and maritime militia vessels unless only PLA Navy ships are in range, and they are to first try nonlethal measures such as ramming and spraying water cannons. Taiwan navy vessels are to be engaged by PLA forces.
To enforce the no-fly zone, the PLA regularly flies aircraft around Taiwan. Since Taiwan’s air defense capabilities are still intact, the PLA relies more heavily on unmanned systems.
All Chinese forces are ordered to not strike first, but they are authorized to return fire if they are attacked.
This approach has advantages and disadvantages compared to the all-out kinetic scenario. By not cutting off the entire strait, Beijing would aim to allow commercial traffic to continue transiting, which may reduce the economic fallout for China.
China would also seek to avoid U.S. intervention since a partial blockage of the Taiwan Strait does not significantly impact international trade and is less likely to be seen by the United States and many other countries as violating international customary laws on freedom of navigation and overflight.
By not launching joint firepower strikes against targets in Taiwan and by maintaining more strict rules of engagement, Beijing may hope to avoid rapid escalation of the conflict and reduce the willingness of the United States and other countries to intervene. However, failing to degrade Taiwan’s defensive capabilities and the island’s energy infrastructure will leave China’s air and maritime forces exposed to counterattacks and leave Taiwan with a greater ability to withstand Chinese pressure for longer.
If Taiwan escalates significantly, Beijing could intensify its own approach and evolve operations to resemble the all-out kinetic blockade.
Scenario 3
Limited Blockade
This final blockade scenario is largely consistent with the second scenario but lacks mining. It is the least kinetic and escalatory of the three scenarios.
Similar to the second scenario, China stages large-scale drills around Taiwan, including live firing of ballistic missiles that splash down in the waters near Taiwan. Beijing then announces the start of “special law enforcement operations” and publishes the coordinates for a maritime and air exclusion zone that covers the main island of Taiwan but does not cut off the entire Taiwan Strait.
China deploys air, maritime, cyber, and other forces in much the same way as in scenario two, and they operate under the same rules of engagement.
The key difference from scenario two is the lack of mining. Mines serve to deter vessels from attempting to run the blockade, and they offer a more passive means for the PLA to threaten noncompliant ships. Without mines, China’s forces will need to play a more active role in stopping entry into Taiwan and may therefore be put in more situations in which commanders have to make decisions about exactly how to engage.
This approach could have potential upsides. This limited blockade is easier to implement since covert minelaying can be difficult—especially in the shallow waters of the Taiwan Strait. This limited blockade is also more reversible. Mines typically cannot be easily removed or deactivated, meaning that once the mines are laid China is committed to its approach.
By avoiding the use of mines and kinetic attacks against Taiwan, Beijing would seek to control potential escalation spirals between the PLA and Taiwan’s forces. More broadly, by taking this approach, Beijing would seek to demonstrate restraint to the international community, which could lend China’s actions greater credibility among countries seeking to remain neutral.
This scenario is the least likely of the three. The lack of kinetic operations and mining leaves the PLA highly exposed to escalation by Taiwan or interventions by the United States.
Conclusion
The three scenarios are intended only to offer three illustrative ways China could blockade Taiwan. Of these three scenarios, the all-out kinetic blockade is the more plausible one and most in line with Chinese military doctrine.
It is also possible that China could pair a blockade with other kinetic military operations. For example, Beijing could combine a blockade of the main island of Taiwan with a seizure of one or more outlying islands administrated by Taiwan, such as Kinmen or Matsu near China, the Penghus near Taiwan, or Pratas in the South China Sea.
A blockade would cut off Taiwan’s ability to reinforce and defend these islands, and seizing an island could provide Beijing a “win” even if the blockade does not lead to Taipei’s capitulation.
The success or failure of a Chinese blockade depends on many factors. Taiwan’s resilience and willingness to defend itself and the extent to which Washington and its allies intervene are critical. How well prepared the PLA is and how Beijing controls its frontline forces and manages escalation are important not only to a successful blockade but also to ensure that a blockade does not unintentionally escalate into an invasion or war.
Given its current military capabilities, some in Beijing may assess that a blockade carries a higher chance of operational success than an invasion in the near term. Yet Chinese decisionmakers likely recognize that a blockade would be an immensely risky choice with no guarantee of success.
This is part two of a series. To see part 1, click here.
This report was made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report.
Credits
Written by: Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Matthew P. Funaiole, Samantha Lu, and Truly Tinsley
Special thanks to David S. Bury, John K. Culver, Lonnie Henley, Vern Huang, Isaac Kardon, Jennifer Kavanagh, Phillip C. Saunders, Joel Wuthnow, and Allen Yu for their detailed insights, and to all experts who participated in our tabletop exercises, workshops, and surveys.
Production by: Michael Kohler
Maps by: Mariel de la Garza and Michael Kohler
Data Visualization by: Fabio Murgia
Copyediting by: Katherine Stark
Video by: Cameron Glass
Footage: Getty Images
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中國為什麼可能對台灣進行警戒隔離？ -- Bonny Lin等
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這兩篇CSIS報告應該是本欄前幾篇相關報導的「所本」(本欄下一篇和2024/06/22、2024/08/23、2024/08/24等貼文)。原網頁有更多數據、照片、和示意圖，請前往查看。
Why China Might Quarantine Taiwan
Drawing on in-depth research, tabletop exercises, private consultations, and expert surveys, this report lays out China’s potential motivations for a quarantine and maps out two possible scenarios of how China could approach quarantine operations.
The term “quarantine” is sometimes used interchangeably with “blockade.” However, this report differentiates the two, defining a quarantine as a law enforcement–led operation to control maritime or air traffic within a specific area. A blockade would be a military-led campaign to significantly curtail the flow of traffic into Taiwan.
The purpose of a quarantine is not to completely seal Taiwan off from the world but to assert China’s control over Taiwan by setting the terms for traffic in and out of the island. A key goal is to compel countries and companies to comply with China’s terms. If foreign actors largely comply with the quarantine, it strengthens China’s narrative that it has control over Taiwan and undermines Taipei’s sovereignty claims.
A quarantine offers several potential advantages for China:
Limited in Scope
Unlike an invasion or blockade, a quarantine would not be seen as an act of war. It is also more reversible and would not require closing off the Taiwan Strait.
Feasible
Threats alone could compel most shipping companies to comply, meaning China may not have to interdict many shipping vessels to achieve desired effects.
Flexible
There are several approaches China could take. Successful implementation would set a precedent, making it easier to carry out additional operations in the future.
Difficult to Counter
A law enforcement–led gray zone operation complicates the ability of Taiwan, the United States, and other actors to respond.
This fourth point is crucial. In a recent survey of experts from the United States and Taiwan, the China Power Project found that experts were more skeptical of U.S. and allied willingness to intervene militarily in a quarantine than in a Chinese blockade or invasion of Taiwan. Only 13 percent of surveyed U.S. experts and 9 percent of Taiwan experts were “completely confident” that the United States would intervene militarily to defend Taiwan from a quarantine.
How China Could Implement a Quarantine
A quarantine would be an immense and unprecedented undertaking for China, requiring it to overcome complex logistics hurdles and jointly command law enforcement, military, and other forces. Nevertheless, China has immense capabilities at its disposal, and there are a range of approaches China could take.
Law enforcement would play the leading role. Chief among these forces would be the China Coast Guard (CCG), which would deploy its forces to patrol the waters around Taiwan and interdict vessels not complying with the quarantine. China’s Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), which is the primary civilian agency in charge of maritime security, could also deploy patrol ships alongside the coast guard.
Two other key forces would support these law enforcement vessels. First, China’s military can deploy naval, air, missile, cyber, and other forces to intimidate Taiwan, deter outside intervention, and provide crucial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Second, China’s maritime militia could fill gaps in ISR and significantly complicate Taiwan’s operating environment.
Because China can employ a range of forces to lead the quarantine, it is challenging for other countries to respond to their activities. Taiwan’s coast guard possesses a fraction of the number of oceangoing ships in China’s coast guard fleet. Taiwan also lacks an equivalently large force to the maritime militia, meaning Taiwan would have to lean on its coast guard to respond to China’s militia activity.
With a wide range of forces at its disposal, China has great flexibility in how it approaches a quarantine.
China can scale up or down its deployment of forces based on the extent of compliance and other factors. If China can successfully compel most companies to cooperate through threats of fines or market access restrictions, it may not have to deploy additional forces. Conversely, if Taiwan responds strongly or other countries intervene, China could increase its own deployments as a countermove.
China can also choose what kind of traffic to target. It could focus on specific domains (e.g., maritime, air, or both), or be selective or encompassing in terms of the types of goods targeted. It can also significantly scale up or down the duration of the quarantine according to Beijing’s desired effect.
The scenarios outlined below are only two examples of potential maritime quarantines. There are many other conceivable approaches China could take. There are no publicly available Chinese doctrinal writings on how China could conduct a quarantine, but these scenarios align with operations and capabilities China has demonstrated through past activities.
Scenario 1
Limited Maritime Quarantine
In this first scenario, Beijing leverages its law enforcement forces to conduct a limited maritime quarantine focusing on one main port.
Days or weeks before the start of quarantine operations, China readies the CCG, MSA, and the military. It also calls up maritime militia fishing vessels in the area.
China begins by publicly announcing “enhanced customs inspection rules” that require all cargo and tanker vessels entering Taiwan to file advance customs declarations with relevant Chinese authorities. To minimize international pushback, China does not use terms like “quarantine” or “blockade” to describe its declared customs regime.
Chinese law enforcement vessels are authorized to board vessels, conduct on-site inspections, question personnel, and undertake other measures against noncompliant ships. Authorities threaten fines and market access restrictions for companies flouting the new rules.
The quarantine is set to enter into force 48 hours after announcement. This allows China time to deploy forces into position and provides shipping companies with vessels in transit warning time to comply with China’s new rules.
If China meets relatively limited pushback and most companies comply with Chinese customs rules, China begins to draw down operations after about one week. However, a considerable law enforcement and military presence persists around Taiwan in the weeks that follow—an indication of the new normal China has established.
Scenario 2
Full Maritime Quarantine
This scenario is a significantly scaled up version of the first scenario. Like in the first scenario, China declares new “enhanced customs inspection rules,” requiring companies to request authorization from Chinese authorities to enter Taiwan.
As the operation stretches into multiple days, Chinese ships and personnel need to be rotated. After the large initial deployment, China can fluctuate the number of forces depending on factors like capacity, the level of compliance with the quarantine, Beijing’s desired intensity, and U.S. and allied military posturing, if any.
These operations continue at varying levels for over two weeks before beginning to wind down. However, a significant CCG and PLA presence continues to operate indefinitely around Taiwan at a greater level than before the quarantine.
Conclusion
For both these scenarios, Beijing’s goal is not to hermetically seal Taiwan. Instead, these campaigns are designed to punish Taiwan, assert Beijing’s claimed sovereignty over the island, test the response from international shipping companies, and put significant pressure on Taiwan, the United States, and others.
While China has the capabilities to successfully execute these and other quarantine variations, these would require operations that are far more complex than anything China has demonstrated to date. Such moves would carry significant risk for China, and its success would depend to a large degree on how Taiwan, the United States, and others respond.
Read the CSIS commentary on how Taiwan, the United States, and U.S. allies and partners can prepare to respond to a quarantine scenario.
Even if successfully implemented, there are limits to what a quarantine can achieve. If Beijing’s goal is to inflict enough pain to force Taiwan’s surrender, China would need to move beyond the gray zone into overt military action. A military blockade would be a key option for China if it seeks to forcefully unify Taiwan without launching an all-out invasion.
For more detailed analysis, view the accompanying in-depth PDF report. Stay tuned for part two of this series, which will explore how China could blockade Taiwan.
This report was made possible by general support to CSIS.
Credits
Written by: Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Matthew P. Funaiole, Samantha Lu, and Truly Tinsley
Special thanks to David S. Bury, John K. Culver, Lonnie Henley, Vern Huang, Isaac Kardon, Jennifer Kavanagh, Phillip C. Saunders, Joel Wuthnow, and Allen Yu for their detailed insights, and to all experts who participated in our tabletop exercises, workshops, and surveys.
Production by: Michael Kohler
Maps by: Mariel de la Garza, Lindsay Allison, José Romero, and Michael Kohler
Design support by: Fabio Murgia
Editorial by: Claire Smrt
Copyediting by: Katherine Stark
Video by: Jim Dyson
Getty Images/Footage: Feng Li, Chien Chih-Hung/Office of The President of Taiwan, CCTV+, Licet Studios, Bloomberg
Established in Washington, D.C. over 60 years ago, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas that address the world’s greatest challenges.
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《台灣海峽警戒區戰術》小評
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本欄2024/06/22貼文跟這篇報導相互輝映(請見本欄上一籃)；兩文主題大體相同，細節、重點有別。也請參看後者「編輯前言」中提供的超連接。
該文所報導「智庫報告」主旨應該是「狼來了！」。其目的在鼓吹大賣軍火給賴凱子；或主張美國政府增加國防預算，讓各軍種能買更多裝備。畢竟，美國過去兩年來通膨嚴重；這些智庫的秘書、公關、寫手之流又需要加薪了。不得不替智庫金主打打生財之道的廣告。
在我看來，該報導中所引用智庫學者建言，都是近於窒礙難行的廢話。不過，依照「美式民主」的運作模式，只要議員們能在國會廳中有所本的GGYY，再由白手套們打通幾位種量及委員的關節(如相關委員會正、副主席)，通過一些浪費老百姓血汗錢的法案，不是什麼了不得的事。
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台灣海峽警戒區戰術 -- Chris Panella
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請參看下一篇《小評》。
China could seize key islands from Taiwan in as little as 6 months, war analysts warn
Chris Panella, 08/23/24
Certain aspects of recent aggressive Chinese behavior around some of Taiwan's most vulnerable islands hint at how it could seize those territories within as little as six months, war analysts warn.
A short-of-war coercion campaign could raise questions about how the US and its allies should respond, a key element in maintaining Taiwan's resistance to Chinese control.
A new report from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute details what a potential Chinese effort to seize Taiwan's Kinmen Islands could look like. The report assesses a recent spike in aggressive actions by the Chinese Coast Guard this year and notes how China could escalate its actions to take control of the island group within just six months.
Earlier this year, the people of Taiwan elected the Democratic Progressive Party's Lai Ching-te as president, a historic move that highlighted voters' concerns about curbing Chinese hostility and preserving Taiwan's autonomy.
Lai's win was unprecedented, marking a third consecutive presidential term for the DPP. It was also the least favorable outcome for China; Beijing has branded Lai a separatist and, in response to his win, pursued a series of punishments aimed at Taiwan.
Of those, the report said, the most notable appeared to be that China "launched new efforts to erode Taiwan's control over its outlying islands," switching from previously respecting Taiwan's "de facto jurisdiction in waters around Kinmen and Matsu" to denying Taiwan's claim over those areas.
During the exercises, China asserted "its right to conduct law enforcement patrols in these waters at will," the report said, noting a capsizing incident off Kinmen as a catalyst for developments involving the boarding, searching, and detaining of ships.
Kinmen and Matsu are two vulnerable islands in close proximity to mainland China, sitting off the coast of Xiamen and Fuzhou, respectively. Over the past few months, Chinese activities, particularly by the Coast Guard, around them have increased, notably spiking in May during Lai's inauguration,as well as during a massive Chinese military drill surrounding Taiwan later.
China's regular incursions into Taiwan's waters are a concern, but the report says that an escalatory turning point could involve China using its Coast Guard "to set up a 'quarantine' zone around Kinmen and prevent the delivery of any additional weapons or 'contraband' to the islands"
In that case, China could then "search all Taiwanese vessels passing into this zone to confiscate supposed 'contraband' and arrest 'separatists.' The quarantine still allows most civilian ships to pass after an inspection but blocks the passage of most ROC [Republic of China] government vessels," the report said.
Unlike a blockade, an act of war which prevents any and all movement whatsoever into an area, a quarantine, such as the US approach during the Cuban Missile Crisis, wouldn't be considered the same way, as they restrict only the movements of certain goods.
The line between the two is notably thin and, in a China-Taiwan scenario, would probably come down to controlling the narrative and how information about the incident was disseminated. It's difficult to know how those actions might be perceived.
China could maintain the status of a quarantine by framing its actions around its efforts to prevent the movement of weapons and what it calls 'contraband.' With its quarantine, China could effectively cut off Kinmen and/or Matsu's access, communications, and connections to the rest of Taiwan, leaving them isolated and potentially forcing them to succumb to Beijing's control.
Perhaps the biggest problem here is that such an event would put the US and its allies in a grey area where the proper response is potentially less clear to decision-makers. In the near-term, this could be further complicated by US domestic politics.
Another report from the conflict and security experts at the Institute for the Study of War and American Enterprise Institute published earlier this year said the US was unprepared for a "coercion campaign that remains far short of invasion but nevertheless brings Taiwan under Beijing's control," noting that many elements of such a campaign were already underway.
Concerning the potential for the quarantine of Kinmen and Matsu in the near term, though, there are a few steps the US must take to deter — and possibly counter — Chinese actions, the new report said.
The US, Taiwan, and their partners should, the report argued, be doing the following: "pre-bunking" Chinese "propaganda narratives that justify such a campaign, strengthening the resilience of communication infrastructure in Taiwan's outlying territories, and bolstering Taiwan's maritime law enforcement around the islands."
The report's authors also argue the US should also beef up its defense commitment to Taiwan, both to alleviate the Taiwanese people's fears the US won't come to its aid and to communicate deterrence to Beijing. And in case of an attempt to quarantine or a successful quarantine, the US should come to Taiwan's assistance and significantly increase "its troop deployments and arms sales to Taiwan, coordinating joint coast guard patrols with Taiwan and other partners, and amending relevant laws to help protect Taiwan's outlying islands from further coercion," the report said.
In this situation, Washington finds itself in a precarious situation, needing to maintain a working relationship with China while showing support for Taiwan, but any failures in defending Taiwan could have profound implications for other alliances.
"The United States' failure to effectively respond to such a crisis would have cascading negative effects on the faith of US allies like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines in the US defensive umbrella," the authors note. Therefore, "maintaining Taiwanese sovereignty over these islands is thus a precarious but vital task."
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中國武統方略 – 來自網路
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本城市首頁
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等級：8
