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「兩岸關係」 – 開欄文
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瀏覽8,018 ｜回應46｜推薦2 |
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俄烏戰爭在一年半以後，俄國憑藉其龐大的國力和人員，似乎拖垮了烏國的戰力、士氣、和民心。以巴戰爭又平地一聲雷的爆發，不但以國周邊的阿拉伯諸國虎視眈眈、蓄勢待發；也讓美國軍力和軍援左支右絀。這些發展勢必影響美國當下和未來在台海的軍事部署和決策。
我曾預估：2027年前台海無戰事。但俗話說，世事難料；我們升斗小民只能期望政治領袖們不以老百姓為芻狗，盡量發揮理性和睿智以和平方式解決利益衝突。
兩岸關係從過去的和平對峙隨著中、美國力的長消，逐漸進入外弛內張的狀況。雖然還說不上戰雲密布或圖窮匕見；但讓關切時局者緊張兮兮應該是有的。這個部落格過去也常有報導和評論；現在開一個專欄，今後將把相關議題集中討論。
本文於 修改第 4 次
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台海戰爭：中、美誰將勝出？ - Andrew Latham
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下文深度雖稍嫌不足，論述相當完整；值得一讀。
索引(僅含難以「望文生義」者；中譯如有不妥，請指教)：
asymmetric defense：非勢均力敵戰爭中劣勢方的防禦戰術
denial (「防禦成功」)：請參見：海空聯防戰術
forward basing：海外基地；駐外基地(在其他國家的軍事基地)
sea-denial：海防，制海權；請參見：海空聯防戰術
strategic balance (「均衡戰略」)：a. 指試圖避免核武衝突的全球性戰略(請見本欄下一篇《讀後》所附「相關閱讀」- 6))；b. 指維持敵對雙方各自優勢的戰略(請見請見本欄下一篇《讀後》所附「相關閱讀」-2)、3)、4))
A U.S.-China War over Taiwan: Who Wins?
Andrew Latham, 09/13/25
Key Points and Summary – War in the Taiwan Strait wouldn’t yield a clean U.S. win. China’s missiles, submarines and proximity threaten carriers and forward bases.
-Taiwan is shifting to asymmetric defense—mobile missiles, hardened infrastructure, civil resilience—but the U.S. industrial base, munitions stocks and repair capacity lag.
-Likely phases: opening missile/cyber/space strikes; a brutal sea-denial fight against invasion convoys; possible blockades and urban combat if a beachhead forms, with nuclear risk overhead.
-The most plausible outcome is denial—China fails to conquer—but at staggering cost. To deter or prevail, Washington must surge production, harden bases, lock in allied access and prepare publics now.
A Taiwan War: Who Wins and At What Cost?
On any given day in the not-too-distant future, the Taiwan Strait could erupt in war. Missiles and aircraft could race across the Strait’s skies; warships and submarines could fight in its waters. And the world will ask: did America—and its friend Taiwan—have a fighting chance?
This question is not idle speculation. More than a year of stepped-up Chinese military exercises, an expanding Chinese submarine fleet, and accelerating defense reforms in Taiwan have given new urgency to the question.
The answer, uncomfortably, is that the United States can probably prevent a Chinese conquest of Taiwan. But it can do so only at far greater cost, risk, and uncertainty than most public debates suggest.
Preemptive Efforts
Deterrence is the best hope, but if deterrence fails, America will not “win” cleanly. Indeed, the most likely outcome is a bloody denial of Beijing’s objectives, one that depends on the industrial depth of the American and allied response and the strength of Taiwan’s asymmetric defenses.
Beijing has prepared extensively. Carrier strike groups that once symbolized unchallengeable dominance are now vulnerable to salvos of DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles. The PLA Navy is the largest in the world, while its rocket force and counterspace systems are designed to blind, disrupt, and overwhelm American power projection.
Geography compounds these challenges: Beijing fights on its doorstep with short supply lines and the ability to mass firepower quickly, while Washington would have to operate across thousands of miles, threading its way through missile envelopes and cyber disruption into a battlespace engineered to destroy it. The strategic balance has shifted because China has deliberately built the tools to tilt it.
Taiwan Bolsters Defences
Taiwan, aware of this shifting environment, has responded by moving away from overreliance on the promise of American rescue. In recent years, it has stood up a fourth Patriot missile battalion, begun receiving PAC-3 MSE interceptors, and tested its indigenous Tien Kung-IV air defense system. It has also created a Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee to coordinate civil-defense training, secure critical materials, and harden infrastructure.
Earlier this month, Taipei issued an updated handbook to prepare its citizens for disinformation and attack. These initiatives are not just about Taiwan’s self-defense; they are recognition that China’s buildup makes it impossible for the United States to guarantee salvation. Taiwan is preparing to fight because it understands that it may have to hold out on its own.
By contrast, the picture for the United States is more ambiguous. Washington still teeters uncomfortably on the knife-edge of “strategic ambiguity,” a policy that buys flexibility but invites doubt. On the one hand, the FY-2025 Pacific Deterrence Initiative allocates nearly ten billion dollars to improve logistics, forward basing, and allied integration. The Marine Corps has converted its Okinawa regiment into a Littoral Regiment designed to survive inside the PLA’s missile envelope. Access to nine Philippine bases has been secured, including northern Luzon sites positioned near the Taiwan Strait.
These are serious steps that respond directly to Chinese capabilities and Taiwan’s vulnerabilities. On the other hand, the US defense industrial base is fragile. Production of long-range anti-ship missiles, hardened aircraft shelters, and naval repair capacity lags far behind the demands of a major conflict.
Magazine stores (彈匣庫存) are shallow, logistics are overstretched, and repair yards are inadequate. And while American access to bases in Japan and the Philippines enhances the ability of US forces to sustain their campaign, China’s opening salvos against these facilities might become the brutal prelude to a wider war.
Staged Conflict
The conflict itself would likely play out in several phases. The opening week would be defined by missile barrages aimed at Taiwan’s defenses and US forward bases, along with cyber and space attacks to blind command networks. Taiwan’s dispersal plans and mobile launchers would mitigate, but not eliminate, the damage.
The next phase would be the battle for sea denial. Submarines, mines, and long-range anti-ship weapons would be hurled against convoys carrying PLA troops and supplies across the Strait. Geography favors the defenders, but China’s proximity and numerical advantage mean some ships would get through. The outcome of this battle for sea denial would turn on whether enough could survive repeated strikes to sustain a lodgment.
If the lodgment falters under relentless attrition, America and its allies will have succeeded in denying conquest, though at staggering cost in lives, matériel, and economic disruption. If Chinese forces succeed in securing even a tenuous beachhead, the war would slide into urban combat, blockade, and prolonged attrition, with Taiwan devastated and America drained by the effort. Nuclear escalation would loom over every stage of the war, raising the risk that the conflict could spill beyond the conventional theater.
Outcome Factors
Factors decisive for the outcome of the conflict include industrial capacity, Taiwan’s asymmetric defenses, allied access, and public resilience. Industrial capacity remains the first. Without a dramatic surge in missile production, sustainment, and repair, America’s ability to outlast China in a protracted struggle is in doubt.
Taiwan’s asymmetric defenses are the second decisive factor. If its mobile missile batteries, hardened infrastructure, and civil defense systems perform as advertised, they could tip the scales in a drawn-out campaign. Allied access is the third. Basing rights in Japan and the Philippines could prove the difference between rapid reinforcement and dangerous delay.
Finally, public resilience matters. Taiwan has invested heavily in civil defense and social cohesion, but disinformation, bombardment, and casualties could erode morale. For America, the test would be whether its public would accept the scale of sacrifice required.
The United States today could likely prevent Beijing from conquering Taiwan outright. The most plausible outcome is denial: Taiwan survives as a de facto independent polity, the PLA fails to consolidate control, and Beijing’s gamble ends in frustration. But this would be a pyrrhic success, with allied forces bloodied, Taiwan shattered, and America’s global posture degraded. A less frequent outcome is a contested stalemate: a campaign in which Chinese troops cling to a fragile beachhead.
The possibility of outright defeat—China achieving conquest while the US fails to dislodge them—remains low, but cannot be dismissed. In each case, the costs would be immense and enduring.
If Washington truly believes Taiwan is worth defending, it must act now. Industrial capacity must be expanded at speed and scale, especially in the realm of missiles, hardened bases, and sustainment. Allies must be clarified and commitments synchronized to eliminate the ambiguity that tempts aggression. Civil defense must be strengthened both in Taiwan and in the United States, where the public must be prepared for sacrifice if deterrence fails.
Deterrence will hold only if its credibility is real, and credibility does not rest on rhetoric but on readiness.
America could save Taiwan. But unless it sharpens its tools, steels its will, and invests now in the grim requirements of denial, it risks fighting not for victory but merely to stave off defeat.
Andrew Latham is a Senior Washington Fellow with the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, a non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities, and a professor of international relations and political theory at Macalester College in Saint Paul, MN. You can follow him on X: @aakatham. He writes a daily column for National Security Journal.
本文於 修改第 2 次
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台灣問題和「人民自決權」
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力工兄的分析當然一貫的深入和引經據典(請見本欄上一篇)。我且從一個小鼻子、小眼睛的「政治現實主義者」角度略表淺見。敬請指教。
1. 釐清概念
英文的”people”這個「指號」，並非只有「人民」一個「所指」；依上、下文脈絡，可以詮釋為「民族」。因此，「人民自決」或「民族自決」，與歷史、政治等語境並無直接關聯，端視作者的「用法」而定。
在基因學普及之後，「民族」一詞在「學術」領域並無精準「所指」；只有「政治」或意識型態等面向的意義。說白一點，只有「戰鬥口號」或「炮製口實」的「用法」。
2. 政治現實主義
我多年前曾有一個觀察(該欄開欄文第0.5小節)：
「權利」不是：
天生的，天賦的，被施捨的，或吶喊著「自由」、「民主」、和「法治」等口號(咒語？)，就會無中生有的。
「權利」是：
希望擁有它的人，個別或集合起來爭取到的。從古到今，爭取的方式是用石頭、竹竿、木棒、白布條、槍桿子、莫洛托夫雞尾酒、或選票。更直接或露骨地說，要享受權利，就要有為它付出代價的準備。
天下某個角落興許找得到「白吃的午餐」；但在當今的世道，絕對沒有「白嫖的權利」。不了解這個硬道理，談政治不過在玩電腦麻將。
3. 烏克蘭人民「權利」的來源
以烏克蘭為例，沒有美國或歐洲各強國的支持，這場戰爭很可能如普丁一廂情願的會在一個月內結束。但是，戰爭在飛彈、大砲、無人機、裝甲車、和機器狗這些武器裝備之外，還要死人的。烏克蘭人有沒有出國躲避兵役的，多了去了。烏克蘭士兵有沒有臨陣逃脫的，不在少數。三年半打下來，烏克蘭雖然敗相已露，前線戰況還在拉鋸。只要看看俄、烏雙方在人口、領土面積、和GDP值的對比，就知道這個「奇蹟」可不是一句「西方帝國主義」可以抹殺、糊弄、或遮羞；且不提普丁也說不上在單打獨鬥。
烏克蘭人民在戰場的犧牲，和菁英們在後方研發武器的心血，是他/她們今天仍然有「權利」自稱「烏克蘭人」的底氣。
4. 台灣問題的本質
「台灣人民」有沒有「自決」的「權利」，不在於：
1) 《聯合國憲章》的文字或意旨；
2) 美國和她所剩無幾「盟國」的實力；
3) 學者對「人民」、「民族」、「自決」這些鬼畫符「指號」的詮釋。
「台灣人民」中如果：
a. 1/10的人有烏克蘭老百姓的意志和勇氣，賴某大概可以開始幻想「自決」。
b. 1/5的人有烏克蘭老百姓的意志和勇氣，賴某大概可以開始起草「獨立宣言」。
c. 1/4的人有烏克蘭老百姓的意志和勇氣，賴某大概可以開始「調兵遣將」，擬定「海-陸-空佈防規劃」。
d. 1/3的人有烏克蘭老百姓的意志和勇氣？賴某吞下500公克LSD都做不出來的春秋大夢！
我敢打賭：
台灣如果有100,000位人民能夠有烏克蘭人那樣的意志和勇氣，老夫就表演倒立吃屎；外加直播。
本文於 修改第 3 次
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從普京的辯解看「人民自決權」與台灣問題 – 俞力工
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普京昨天在北京接受採訪、被問及「烏東併入俄羅斯」問題時，特地提及《聯合國憲章》第一條有關「民族自決」的規定。言下之意，烏克蘭東部四個地區投票決定併入俄羅斯，為國際法所允許。
其實，《憲章》第一條，僅僅提及「人民自決權」，而其內容與「民族自決」還不盡相同。
簡單地說，「人民自決」是指每個國家的人民，具有自由選擇政治體制(如共和、帝制)，與經濟體制「資本主義或社會主義）的權利。這與烏克蘭境內的俄羅斯少數民族，沒有直接關係，或說，並不適用。
至於「民族自決權」，第一次世界大戰期間，首先由美總統威爾遜提出，其目的在於懲治奧斯曼與奧匈這兩個戰敗國：以民族為劃分，將帝國境內不屬主要民族的少數民族切割出去。
因此，「民族自決權」剛提出時，並非當作「普世原則」。
第二次世界大戰結束前後，國際社會才遲遲在「民族自決」問題上，達成共識：即殖民主義(十九世紀)擴張下的被統治、被壓迫的少數民族，具有獨立權或分離權利。至於此前傳統帝國時代「自然擴張」下的被統治少數民族，並沒有獨立權。其「民族自決權」僅限於「行政自治權」。這麼規定，當然首先是為了保障傳統帝國的既得利益。
這個國際「共識」，維持到冷戰結束(1990年左右)，大體受到普遍的尊重。
但步入後冷戰時代，美國迅即將過去的「多邊」、「多極」，轉化爲「單邊主義」、「單極主義」；更有甚者，還試圖以美利堅意志，取代國際法與國際組織。於是乎，先後他在蘇丹南部與科索沃，不顧主權國家的領土管轄權不容侵犯原則，公然協助這兩個少數民族地區建立成獨立國家。
彼時，俄羅斯當局便曾多次提出警告，美國如此製造惡劣先例，將促使俄羅斯仿效。如今，果不其然，普京依樣畫葫蘆，先後將克里米亞與烏東四個地區，通過公投，完成「獨立」與「併入俄羅斯」兩個程序，最終劃入俄羅斯版圖。
提及此問題，目的不外是對台灣問題加以點評：即第一，台灣並非少數民族。其次，該島嶼屬滿清自然擴張後併入中國的版圖。鑒於此，按過去的國際共識，並不具有獨立權或分離權。
如今，當國際法淪喪爲叢林法當頭，台獨分子的願望是否能實現，就要看他背後是否有大國、強國撐腰；而且，其後台必須強大到無視中共存在的地步。 -- 2025/9/6
編後記：
在另一「論壇」上看到朋友轉來：旅歐學者和名政論家俞力工博士的大作。未經同意，逕行轉載，特此致歉。
我比較關注兩岸關係、中國動態、國際現勢、和科學新知，對台灣政局興趣缺缺。轉載此文和寫它的「讀後」，也算略盡「家事、國事、天下事，事事關心」之意。
本文於 修改第 1 次
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《中國尚未進攻台灣的真正原因》小評
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1. 「表面分析」只能得到「表面原因」
該文作者伊士伍德博士的「分析」在強調：
只要台灣政治領袖不正式宣佈「獨立」，中國領導人不會武裝進攻台灣(請見本欄2025/08/28，13:52)。
他在該文中沒有用政治層面的「(執政)正當性」；而用了個人層面的「身後之名」或「歷史定位」。不客氣地說，伊士伍德博士所謂的「真正原因」，只是中國領導人用來敷衍急統派和國內網軍的「表面原因」。真正的「真正原因」還得看看老夫「能近取譬」所言(該欄2025/08/22)；或參考此文(本欄2025/08/06)。此外也可參見此文(該欄2025/08/31)。
2. 1995-1996台海危機
我當時已經回國兩年多。雖然因為工作和個人興趣，對台灣政局的了解並不深入；但我人在台灣，比起伊士伍德博士這種坐在象牙塔內霧裡看花的自封「全球戰略家」，就台海形勢脈動的掌握而言，還真高幾個層次，多兩把刷子。
我認為他對1995-1996「台海危機」的分析，無異於只懂得看熱鬧的傻B；完全不知道北京領導人走秀功夫一流，演技堪比克林•伊斯威特。「拳頭有多大，分貝提多高」的道理，一般中國人大概從穿開襠褲時就被灌輸了。
此外，20年後，中國軍力和軍備大幅度提升；美國並沒有退步，但原地踏步者遠多於小有進展者。1995-1996「台海危機」在今天的中、美角力戲碼中，雖然說不上「主客易勢」；卻也不具參考價值。
3. 結論
1) 我認為：伊士伍德博士這篇文章，做為「政治分析不能這樣寫」的「反面教材」價值，大於其推理過程和結論幫助人們了解問題「所以然」的能力。
2) 我絕對沒有認為「台灣議題」不重要或不值得「一戰」的意思。我只是認為：「台灣議題」雖然有「重要性」，但並不具備「急迫性」。其次，戰爭的「風險度」、「後遺症」、和「不確定性」都過大過高；「成本--效益」比則過低；故不可不查、不宜輕舉妄動。此所以孫子說：「不戰而屈人之兵，善之善者也」！這才是：中國尚未進攻台灣的「真正原因」。
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中美博弈及臺海危機 - 胡承渝
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看到一部「2027攤牌前夜三部」系列的視頻；視頻的講者以館長訪陸、臺積電、九三閲兵三件事為出發點(1)，引用了兩個理論來分析當今的「中美博弈」及「臺海危機」：
1. 李光耀的「三層棋盤」理論(2)，即軍事經濟的「物理棋盤」、國家意志的「心理棋盤」、文明宿命的「終極棋盤」；
2. 約翰•米爾斯海默的「進攻性現實主義」理論(3)，認為國際政治的本質是一場由實力決定的權力鬥爭。
我認為：講者在程度上誇大了館長對臺灣的影響；但同意他關於臺積電從「硅盾」到「陷阱」的變化；我也同意閲兵是要震懾美國及臺灣。只是不知道最後一項是否能達到講者所期望的程度。
1) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HpnzgIL1KaY (27：32分鐘)
2) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ZC5TM_7kgk (21：50分鐘)
3) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iAu_9KG5FV4 (27：45分鐘)
希望聽到進一步的討論。
附註(編者)：
1. 該視頻的講者為艾森先生。
2. 編者在網上沒有找到「三層棋盤」的詳細解說。如艾森先生接著說的，「三層棋盤」名詞有點偷懶；應該用「三層面博弈論」。第一，中文的「層」(層級)和「層面」不是同義詞；第二，我雖然不知道李光耀本人想使用那一個意思；但一般來說，在這種思考模式中，英文字是”dimension” (as in “The social dimensions of the problem must also be taken into account.”)，而不是”level” (as in “My apartment is on the first level of the building.”)。
3. 此術語(「進攻性現實主義」)為講者所使用；編者認為：《維基百科》所用的「攻勢現實主義」比較信、達。米爾斯海默此理論以「攻擊行為」/「攻擊心態」作為解釋「國際關係」錯綜複雜互動的基礎；我會使用「國際關係攻擊中心論」來翻譯它，簡稱「國關攻勢論」。它相對於以「防衛行為」/「防衛心態」為解釋「國際關係」錯綜複雜互動基礎的「國際關係防衛中心論」；後者可簡稱為「國關防衛論」。
編後記：
此文是承渝兄在另一論壇的短信兼報導。標題為原文；我略加編輯(含文字、標點符號的更動/增加；並加上「附註」；使它成為一篇獨立報導。請承渝兄見諒。
我這樣做是因為：
我非常贊同承渝兄：「中美博弈」及「臺海危機」是兩個值得討論議題的建議。除了由於其重要性需要大家清楚明白的認知現實外，通過充分和廣泛討論，即使無法取得共識，但可能化解一些具有負面影響的誤解和歧見。
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中國尚未進攻台灣的真正原因 - Brent M. Eastwood
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請參看本欄上一篇和此欄2025/08/22和2025/08/21兩篇。
The Real Reason China Hasn’t Invaded Taiwan
Brent M. Eastwood, 08/26/25
J-20 Fighter in the Dark. Image Credit: Creative Commons. 請至原網頁觀看中國J-20及其它型戰鬥機照片
Key Points and Summary – A Chinese invasion of Taiwan is not imminent, despite constant military rehearsals and bellicose rhetoric. Beijing’s strategy is one of patient deterrence, not immediate conquest.
-The memory of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, when a U.S. carrier strike group forced China to back down, still looms large.
-Since then, China has built a formidable military to prevent a repeat of that humiliation.
-However, an actual invasion would likely only be triggered by a dramatic shift in Taipei, such as a formal declaration of independence by a new, more defiant political party—a line the current leadership has not crossed.
No, China Will Not Attack Taiwan in the Near Future
The Taiwan question is the biggest issue facing the Chinese military. It drives the Middle Kingdom’s grand strategy and has obsessed leaders for decades. Xi Jinping is no exception. Every military move he makes has implications for future China-Taiwan relations.
An attack to reunify the island with the mainland is always imminent. Xi will be judged by Chinese historians on how well he handles the Taiwan issue. He cannot “lose” the island.
Taiwan has always been considered a wayward renegade province that annoys the Chinese like a bee in a bonnet. Taiwan is seen as rightfully owned by Beijing. Full independence would be a nightmare for the People’s Republic.
I have written that I don’t see China attacking Taiwan anytime soon, though. The Chinese do not do anything quickly without ample strategic foresight. They plod along, simmering with irritation, and always talk a big game. They do rehearse amphibious landings to overthrow the government of Taiwan, but that doesn’t mean an attack will come in the next year or two.
A More Belligerent Taiwanese Political Party Would Cause an Attack
What would put the Chinese over the edge would be if a new, highly defiant ruler or a different rebellious political party came to power in Taiwan and claimed complete independence. Lai Ching-te has been head of state since 2024. He leads the Democratic Progressive Party, which is vaguely pro-independence and favors more human and civil rights on the mainland.
Lai is considered a pest in China. The Chinese believe he is deceptive and manipulates historical facts to favor independence. He supports more military hardware purchases from the United States and would like to continue combined arms exercises with the Americans. This rankles Beijing, but not necessarily enough to convince the Chinese to invade Taiwan.
The 1995-1996 Taiwan Crisis
However, there is one event that Xi remembers well, which is a historical catalyst for a worsening of cross-strait relations. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Crisis remains a sore point for many Chinese who now govern the country.
The “third” crisis began when the United States gave a tourist visa to Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui in May 1995. Lee was the first native born Taiwanese political leader. He challenged the “One China” concept and even wanted Taiwan to join the United Nations. Lee yearned for the days when Taiwan could have official diplomatic relations with the United States and European countries. This rankled China and created immense bad blood. Lee also wanted to purchase F-16s from the United States.
What Happened?
China answered by recalling its ambassador to the United States. The People’s Republic then practiced an amphibious landing against Taiwan and placed a huge force of 100,000 military personnel on the east coast province of Fujian. The Chinese also fired six different ballistic missiles launches near Taiwan. President Bill Clinton ordered two aircraft carrier strike groups to the region – the USS Nimitz and the USS Independence. As a result, China’s live fire exercises finally ended in 1996.
The Crisis Taught the Chinese Well
China learned lessons from that crisis. President Jiang Zemin believed the United States would intervene militarily in a kinetic action against China’s army and navy. The Middle Kingdom recognized that additional military exercises would be necessary to rehearse an amphibious attack. They also wanted mobile missile launchers that could take out American aircraft carriers. The Chinese desired their own carriers and a bigger surface fleet.
Jiang vowed to keep the Americans from intervening. He wanted a weak Taiwan and a severing of U.S.-Taiwan relations. The Chinese wanted to have high-level communications during future crises. Jiang believed his political leadership should never take its eyes off the main prize – Taiwan’s loyalty to the mainland. The Chinese also desired more military options – better ballistic missiles, new amphibious warfare craft, and stealth fighter jets and bombers.
Xi Jinping Has Seen It All Before
Xi has now concluded that Taiwan will make or break his legacy. The 1995-1996 crisis fuels his thinking, and he considers this a seminal event in his country’s history. China now has three aircraft carriers with a fourth on the way. There are hundreds of land-launched ballistic missiles pointed at Taiwan. China executes “grey zone” tactics with airplanes and amphibious seacraft encroaching on Taiwan’s sovereignty regularly. He repeatedly warns the United States not to interfere in the China-Taiwan relationship.
China is always ready for an attack against Taiwan. But such an event is not imminent unless the island’s political leadership makes more defiant moves toward independence. This would necessitate a much more assertive and rebellious new political party coming to power that would prod Xi into action. The current Taiwanese president is not the leader who will push China over the edge. However, many U.S. military leaders and China watchers believe that an attack could come in 2027 when Chinese military capabilities in the strait are fully mature. This is plausible but not likely. China prefers warning Taiwan to maintain the “One China” status quo with an arms build-up to deter any rebellious instincts.
The United States could intervene, but China is not prepared for the eventuality. As it stands, China will continue to rehearse attacks against Taiwan but will not execute full reunification by military force. Xi does not want to lose the island to independence, but Taiwan is not making the kind of strategic moves that would lead to a complete break from China. Thus, no full-scale Chinese attack is imminent.
About the Author: Dr. Brent M. Eastwood
Brent M. Eastwood, PhD is the author of Don’t Turn Your Back On the World: a Conservative Foreign Policy and Humans, Machines, and Data: Future Trends in Warfare plus two other books. Brent was the founder and CEO of a tech firm that predicted world events using artificial intelligence. He served as a legislative fellow for U.S. Senator Tim Scott and advised the senator on defense and foreign policy issues. He has taught at American University, George Washington University, and George Mason University. Brent is a former U.S. Army Infantry officer. He can be followed on X @BMEastwood.
See Also：
America Needs 200 B-21 Raider Bombers
Nimitz-Class: The Best Aircraft Carrier Ever
7th Generation Fighters are Coming…
The F-20 Tigershark: The Best Fighter Jet That Failed
Canada’s Military Is Back
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中國2027前不會攻打台灣 --- U-Ming Lee
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作者針對兩個因素做分析來支持他的結論：
1) 解放軍內部議題 – 派系鬥爭和貪汙腐敗；
2) 川普的自作孽；請參見這篇拙作，以及本部落格和川痞/川瘋相關各欄 – 「貿易戰」、「川普觀察」、「川普經濟學」、「川、普野合後之歐洲」等。
作者的重點在川痞/川瘋的「亂搞」(全文最後兩段)；這部份論述相當到位。我一度打算把下文放在「川普觀察」一欄。
No, China Won’t Invade Taiwan in 2025, 2026 (Or 2027). This is Why.
Don’t believe the hype. China has every reason not to start a war.
U-Ming Lee, 06/24/25
The swirling uncertainty over whether the United States will get drawn into a war between Israel and Iran is raising concerns about whether China will take advantage of the chaos to start its invasion of Taiwan.
The rationale behind these concerns is straightforward.
With President Donald Trump’s tariff war, the decoupling of the United States and Chinese economies, and a potential Middle East conflagration drawing American attention, China has little reason to hold back.
How accurate is this assessment?
We’ve been here before. The narrative of an “imminent Chinese invasion of Taiwan” has been floated for years.
I wrote an article criticising this narrative in 2022. And just as I predicted, in 2025, there still hasn’t been an invasion of Taiwan.
In fact, I consider it even less likely now that China will invade Taiwan than I did in 2022.
To see why, let me first briefly summarise what I wrote back in 2022. Then, I’ll explain why I think an invasion is less likely now than it was back then.
Why Invading Taiwan Isn’t Just Hard. It’s Suicidal.
Back in 2022, I laid out why a full-scale invasion of Taiwan would be a logistical nightmare for China.
Doomsayers who argued that Beijing could “go for it” ignored a basic reality: invading Taiwan would require a level of effort from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) equivalent to the Normandy D-Day landings.
To achieve a successful invasion, the PLA would need to coordinate a massive movement of men and materiel over several months, all in full view of surveillance satellites.
When (if) it happened, creating a beachhead in Taiwan would be deadlier than Normandy.
Taiwan has been preparing for an invasion for decades. Its military will use every inch of the island’s mountainous terrain to turn it into an impregnable fortress.
CingShui Cliffs (清水斷崖) in Hualien County (花蓮縣) on the east coast of Taiwan. Photo by Fred Hsu on Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0. 請至原網頁查看照片
Launching an invasion of Taiwan would be an all-in gamble for President Xi Jinping. And Xi Jinping didn’t get to where he is today by being an inveterate gambler.
Finally, I highlighted that China’s primary ambition is to regain its millennia-long position as a pre-eminent global civilisation. Any large-scale invasion would horrify the world, undoing China’s decades-long soft power efforts to rebuild its prestige.
Why would China throw away all its efforts on a hugely expensive military adventure in Taiwan when it could bide its time, build its reputation, and potentially merge with Taiwan peacefully?
2025 Looks Different: War Looks Less Likely (Not More)
When I wrote my earlier article, I stopped short of making predictions beyond 2024. The future looked too uncertain.
Now that we’re halfway through 2025, I’m confident enough to say this.
China will not invade Taiwan by 2027.
Two major factors are behind my reassessment.
Firstly, I overestimated the degree to which the PLA was prepared for an invasion of Taiwan.
Previously, I assumed that Chinese military capabilities were advancing steadily. I thought that the PLA could mount an invasion. The ruinous cost of such an invasion was the only thing stopping President Xi Jinping from issuing the order.
I now realise that the PLA’s readiness may be in question.
Secondly, I assumed that United States policy would remain rational.
In 2022, the prospects of Donald Trump returning to the White House seemed distant.
I didn’t expect the American electorate would so willingly re-elect a man whose bungling policies led to the unnecessary deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans in the early pandemic days.
But here we are today with Donald Trump firmly behind the Resolute desk.
Let’s see how these two factors combine to make a Chinese invasion of Taiwan unlikely by 2027.
The People’s Liberation Army is Unsure About The Feasibility of an Invasion
Since 2022, there has been significant turmoil in the upper echelons of the PLA, suggesting considerable disagreement between PLA factions.
China has had three defense ministers in as many years. Two generals who previously served in this post were fired, investigated for corruption, and expelled from the Communist Party.
The removal of high-ranking ministers followed a purge of nine generals, several of whom led the PLA Rocket Force, with operational control of China’s missile and nuclear capabilities.
Then, in November 2024, the axe fell on Admiral Miao Hua, a member of the Central Military Commission and former close protege of Xi Jinping, allegedly for “disciplinary violations.”
Miao’s defenestration ended his accelerated move up the ranks, which began in 2014, thanks to his close relationship with Xi Jinping.
Xi Jinping’s willingness to purge erstwhile loyalists implies the top ranks of the PLA are tainted with factionalism or corruption.
Bloomberg News has previously cited intelligence reports claiming that corruption is rife in the PLA. Several nuclear-capable missiles were filled with water instead of fuel, while malfunctioning silo lids could prevent the launch of ICBMs.
Whether the PLA is experiencing factionalism or corruption, or some combination of both, the conclusion is the same.
President Xi Jinping is less likely to contemplate military action than would otherwise have been the case.
Donald Trump’s Second Presidency is the Best Thing to Happen to China
However, it is the return of Donald Trump to the White House that is a more significant factor in necessitating the re-evaluation of my initial assessment.
Simply put, Donald Trump has been the greatest gift from the American electorate that Xi Jinping could ever have hoped for.
Since taking office, Donald Trump has damaged the United States’ primacy in international relations at every turn. He has gutted foreign aid, imposed tariffs on imports from every country, and undermined NATO, amongst others.
These actions alienate traditional US allies. They threaten to unravel the entire system of alliances that the United States itself established post-World War 2.
While these moves might placate MAGA diehards, they also invite other powers to step into the vacuum created by the United States’ hasty retreat from global affairs.
Donald Trump has been notably and inexplicably hostile to Western Europe — the United States’ oldest ally. Donald Trump has been explicit in his desire to annex Greenland, a territory of Denmark, which is a core member of the EU and NATO.
Donald Trump has also threatened 50% retaliatory tariffs on all EU imports. These are not the acts of a friend.
And on the most pressing strategic question facing contemporary Europe — what to do with Russia — Donald Trump has repeatedly voiced his admiration for Vladimir Putin.
Donald Trump may not be a Russian asset in the formal sense. But he sure as hell comes across as a Putin fanboy (小迷弟).
Donald Trump’s bizarre Russophilia has severely impacted European opinion of America.
More Europeans now view America as a “necessary partner with which we must strategically cooperate” instead of an ally who shares Europe’s interests and values.
And we’re still only six months into the second Donald Trump presidency.
But the increasingly negative view with which Europeans see the United States means there is less motivation for Europeans to do America’s bidding on issues that solely affect American interests.
Thus, the relationship between Europe and the United States will become more transactional. This would open the door for China, which is looking to expand its influence in Europe.
There’s a good reason for Europe to pay attention to China’s entreaties.
Europe is already China’s biggest trading partner. Meanwhile, China is Europe’s second biggest trading partner after the United States.
China is trying to position itself as the stable and mature great power alternative to the United States.
By realising their febrile isolationist dreams, Donald Trump and the MAGA cultists are helping China achieve its long-held goal.
Final Thoughts
China is no more willing to invade Taiwan than it was in 2022.
In fact, I’d argue that China is less willing to invade Taiwan in 2025 than it was in 2022.
Donald Trump is the primary factor meriting this change in assessment.
Trump’s policies risk removing the United States from the global web of alliances that have anchored the United States’ position as the world’s sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The United States’ removal from this global system is creating a void that China will be happy to fill.
Xi Jinping’s goal is clear. He wants to return China to what he sees is its rightful position as a global civilisation.
In doing so, Xi Jinping wants to create an alternative to today’s American-centred world order.
Xi Jinping rose to the top of the Chinese political system with ruthless calculation, not reckless gambling.
He won’t throw away the advantage that Donald Trump is handing him on a silver platter with an ill-considered invasion of Taiwan.
When I’m not writing about international affairs, I have a free newsletter where I share my insights on finance, freelancing, Southeast Asia and more.
If you enjoyed this article, you might like my earlier article on the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
No, China Won’t Invade Taiwan in 2022, 2023 (Or 2024). This is Why.
It would be a colossal mistake
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池魚之殃 -- 張森皓
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這篇報導內容是：一旦兩岸開戰，日本政府的「護僑」和「撤僑」政策。並未涉及日本政府是否「協防」台灣議題；也沒有表示日商目前有「撤離」意圖。
兩岸若開戰？傳日本政府告知「自求多福」 在台日商揭撤離困境
張森皓，07/19/25
近年來兩岸局勢不斷升溫，更有不少軍事專家評估中國將採取武力強行侵台。針對台灣可能爆發戰爭危機，傳出日本政府警告在台日商要「自求多福」，若在台灣有過多資產，需要自行承擔風險。對此，有日商透露這變相在限縮對台灣的投資意願，因為有意投資的日商清楚，若兩岸真的開打，有可能不會受到日本政府的撤離協助。
這則消息源自《金融時報・Financial Times》報導，當中提到日本官員近年來多次向在台日商給予警告，若中國發動戰爭侵略台灣，到時日本政府無法保障相關企業的撤離行動。更有一位企業主管表示，官員直言就是要大家「自求多福」，如果在台灣有大量資產，要自行承擔風險。
報導分析，日本官員們的警告可能與憲政體制有關。依《日本國憲法》其中的第九條，俗稱的《和平憲法》規定，自衛隊除非經過政府同意，否則不得在海外執行任務。一位官員表示，日本與台灣並無外交關係，加上中國強硬的立場，幾乎篤定不會同意日本進行撤離作業。
對此，日商透露這變相是讓企業限縮對台灣的投資，因為有意投資的日商清楚，若兩岸真的開打，有可能不會受到日本政府的撤離協助，形成投資寒蟬效應。一位美國官員指出，近幾年相較美國資本大量進入台灣，反觀日本企業的投資幾乎陷入停滯，這正是日本政府警告的最好證明。
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漢光演習：兩岸開戰躲山裡 --- 許庭瑛
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看此文的標題(「終須一戰？終須一談？」)，該場討論會的主辦方似乎認為：台灣政府有「主導」兩岸「和」、「戰」的能力與空間。我相信，以深靖兄的見識，這個標題的目的在引起大家參與那場「兩岸論壇」和「新書發表會」的興趣。
如部落格各篇報導/評論一再指出：各國領袖和台灣政府既沒有胃口，更沒有能力進行「台海戰爭」。下文戳穿了民進黨政府藉軍購、軍演等來利益輸送美國政府以鞏固本土政權和牟取私利的本質與行徑。
《每日電訊報》原報導：
On Taiwan’s forgotten front line, all the defensive drills in the world may not matter
漢光演習遭評無濟於事 外媒：台將領戲稱「兩岸開戰躲山裡」
許庭瑛，中時新聞網，07/15/25
台灣史上規模最大的「漢光演習」正在進行中，為抵禦陸攻台而準備，而金門的演習格外受到關注，因其地理位置鄰近大陸而被稱為台灣的前線。然而，當地許多居民認為演習沒有太多實質效益。此外，一名金門政府的官員更透露一名將領私下玩笑話，該將領稱，若兩岸真的起衝突，部隊會直接撤到山裡，這樣才能避免戰事升級，也能把金門的破壞降到最低。
《每日電訊報》(The Telegraph)報導，記者曼德爾森(Allegra Mendelson)前往金門採訪漢光演習實彈演練，報導指出，今年的演習規模與時長均創歷史新高，共動員超過2.2萬名後備軍人，展開為期10天的武器訓練與各種實地操演，包括深夜在台北捷運系統中奔跑的城市作戰演練。而金門的演習格外受到關注，因為其地理位置緊鄰中國大陸，被稱為台灣的「前線」。
然而，金門在地的居民與駐軍認為，「前線」這個稱號如今恐怕已經不再適用；以當今中國大陸擁有的先進武器而言，若真要對台灣發動攻擊，完全可以直搗要害、直接攻擊首都台北。
代表金門擔任立法委員的陳玉珍說：「過去軍事技術不夠先進，中共只能轟炸金門島，但現在他們可以發射飛彈越洋攻擊，甚至可以打到美國。」
作為今年更大規模「漢光演習」的一部分，軍方也加入了「無腳本」的環節，以更真實地模擬遭遇攻擊時的應變情境。在金門，這代表參與夜間演習的部分士兵，事前並未獲知關鍵資訊。如同整體漢光演習，今年金門的操演規模同樣創新高，全島約3,000名駐軍全數參與。
一名金門防衛指揮部指揮官受訪問時表示：「這是歷來規模最大的一次。雖然這些小島過去也曾納入年度漢光演習，但今年我們特別調整，讓所有島嶼能同時進行實彈射擊。」
然而，對於住在金門的人來說，許多人並不認為這些軍演真的有多大實質效益。任職於金門縣政府的官員王頌瑋(Wang Song-Wei，暫譯)說：「我曾經跟一位將軍開玩笑，他說如果真的打起來，部隊會直接撤到山裡，這樣才能避免戰事升級，也能把金門的破壞降到最低。」
過去金門島上曾駐紮約10萬名士兵，但多年來人數大幅減少，如今僅剩約3,000人，對比中國大陸超過200萬的軍力，這個數字幾乎無力防守。立委陳玉珍解釋，金門駐軍變少，某種程度上也是為了讓這座島嶼「不那麼具攻擊價值」，以降低其成為攻擊目標的風險。
此外，金門如今也早已不像一座前線應有的模樣。許多昔日的軍事基地已改建為博物館，砲台成為觀光展示用道具，老舊的戰車則被棄置在戶外，鏽蝕腐敗、任其風化。
而最令金門處於劣勢的關鍵因素在於，一旦遭到攻擊，這座島幾乎只能自力更生、孤立應戰。
立法委員陳玉珍表示，台北的國防部對金門的「官方態度」是：如果金門遭到攻擊，當地居民將必須「自行奮戰」。這樣的觀點也獲得多位金門居民的共鳴，其中包括一名已退休、曾是台灣本島軍中作戰單位的高階指揮官，該軍官坦言：「如果真的與北京發生衝突，對台北來說，派兵增援金門不會是優先事項。」
王頌瑋(Wang Song-Wei，暫譯)認為，台灣總統賴清德之所以決定擴大今年「漢光演習」的規模，其中一個原因是為了對美國展現姿態，而作為所謂「前線」的金門，自然必須納入演習之中。王頌瑋：「賴清德很可能是在向川普示好，他是一個會基於忠誠行動的人，而川普要的是別人低聲下氣，賴現在就是在做這件事。」
儘管台北不少人對於攻台一事相當擔憂，但對金門人而言，他們普遍不相信中國大陸會攻擊「自己人」。正如一位居民所說：「金門和廈門本來就是一家人。」報導指出，兩地文化相近，許多住在金門和廈門的人彼此都有親屬關係。
近年來，北京政府正積極利用這種情感連結，發展出所謂的金門模式，這指的是陸方海警在金門周邊活動，藉此推動「法理上的兩岸關係」，其最終目的是削弱台北對台灣海峽的管轄權。多年來，中方已派出大量公私船隻進入台灣海峽，作為其「灰色地帶戰術」的一環，試圖以非軍事手段恐嚇與施壓台灣。
而報導指出，就在軍演正式展開時，一艘大陸漁船悄然靠近海灘，這一幕對現場的人來說一點也不意外，正好揭露了這場對峙的本質。
本文於 修改第 3 次
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根本就沒有馬英九時代了
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根本就沒有馬英九時代了
【每一個受難者背後，往往是一個堅強母親的故事】
徐征，1909年生於中國北平(與蔣經國同歲)。日本時代帶著妻兒
來臺教書，曾於臺北帝國大學醫學部教授中國語文，並在多所
學校任教。
二戰後臺灣學華語需求暴增，徐征免費授課受到民眾歡迎
堂堂爆滿，還曾在永樂座大戲院上課，並被邀請擔任大明報編輯。
(大明報主編艾璐生是中共地下黨員)
1947年3月，228事件爆發後，出身中國的徐征，3月15日
傍晚竟也被便衣人員帶走，自此人間蒸發，留下無助的妻子與
四個兒女。
據徐征女兒徐光口述：「母親在二二八那年某個秋天傍晚，
帶著四個孩子到圓山基隆河邊玩，打算天黑後，就將四個孩子
推下河，自己再投河自盡。突然，才三歲的弟弟興奮地撿到
小毛蟹，跑去向媽媽要手帕包起來，說:「要將毛蟹養大生好多
好多的毛蟹」，母親頓時被孩子天真的話驚醒，放聲大哭，
徐光回憶，母親的哭聲在四下無人的向晚圓山橋下，迴盪許久，
迄今仍令她感到心悸。印象中母親不曾再哭過，貴族出身的母親
擺菸攤、幫傭、洗衣、甚至賣血，什麼事都做過就為了要將我們
撫養長大，一家五口決不輕易分離。」(引述自：https://goo.gl/SE7Trv)
李筱峰教授問:
『為何連出身中國的華語教師也會被殺？在一些機密檔案陸續曝光後
逐漸有了線索，1947年3月13日國府內部的第一波
「首要人犯姓名調查表」中，至少有一半新聞界人士。其他則不乏
企業家、主張改革者等等。在事件初期不管這些人立場、血統如何，
恐怕早已被決定趁勢剷除、甚至謀財害命。由國府官方曾以特務組織
「忠義服務隊」對「外省人」打砸搶燒製造事端來看，連「自己人」
都不過只是拿來達成目的可犧牲的工具，不難看出這個政權暴力邪惡、
視人命為草芥、為達目的不擇手段的本質。幾十年過去，加害者陣營
依然毫無反省，繼續用各種話術矇騙大眾，轉型正義遙遙無期。』
楊克煌《我的回憶》給出一個答案:
『 11月16日下午，廖瑞發帶我和謝雪紅到台北大橋頭一個民家，
說是要介紹徐征給我們認識。徐征是北京人，日本投降後才到台灣的，
當時他是台北大學的教授、文學家，又在那裡組織一些青年學習；
他生活很艱苦。我們到那民家時，上了二樓，但徐征不在，只看到
李碩楷等幾個青年。
(說明:徐征為中共黨員但不表明身分，此處楊克煌有一誤解，
徐征在日據時代已派來台北，擔任台北帝國大學醫學院的中文教授)
11月18日上午，謝和楊克煌即再去長官公署找張錫祺，
針對所謂“人民團體暫行組織辦法”打聽他的意見，張這次
也和上次一樣不大發表意見，只說：「你們就去辦理重新登記的手續吧！」
11月18日晚上（這個日期不甚確定），林良才叫楊克煌到他家
（在台北「新集益商行」的後樓。）一會兒，徐征也來，就和
楊克煌及林良才談話，因當時還不會講普通話，故用筆談。
徐征問楊克煌一些情況後，又講了一些話給兩人聽，最後他在紙上
寫“閒談誤國”四個字，勉勵兩人多做些實際工作。 後來在1948年
在香港時，楊克煌看到報紙報導說：徐征在台北被反動派殺害了。
在上海的民主人士為徐征舉行了追悼會，會中譴責反動派殺害徐征的罪行。
( 說明: 徐征被林頂立列入奸偽名冊，後來被許德輝忠義服務隊暗殺。)』
2024/02/28 18:41
〔記者楊心慧／台北報導〕台北市政府主辦的台北市二二八紀念活動
今天下午登場，前總統馬英九、台北市長蔣萬安到場，邀請受難者
王添灯家屬張四維、受難者徐征家屬徐光致詞。徐光談到父親被失蹤
的過去，以及在沒有父親後，和母親度過艱辛的生活，但她仍希望
社會要永遠和平，永遠的愛，不要怨恨，「我愛大家，也希望大家可以愛我」。
徐光說，二二八事件，因為父親遭遇到冤枉、被抓失蹤，這幾十年來，
她一直在別人面前不敢提起父親，還好她有個很有智慧的母親，
告訴她爭取自由是父親的理想，為了理想、和平犧牲生命，
媽媽從來沒有抱怨任何一件事，從她母親嘴裡，知道父親有
很大的理想，能為了理想失去生命。
徐光難過地說，當她知道父親不會再回來，她常會回到父親
過去帶她去的新公園，以前她下課都會背著書包到新公園，
這是她最喜歡去的地方，也是最懷念的地方。
徐光提到，當年她父親在台大教書，還有很多學生跟她父親學中文，
她父親還在各校教國語。沒有父親後，家裡更辛苦了，母親去
台大醫院賣血，卻因血紅素不夠，剛好有醫學院學生過去跟父親
學中文，幫忙母親找工作、到病房教受日本教育的護士說中文。
徐光說，在這樣的生活下，從來沒有怨天怨地，她常會背著母親哭，
但母親說，那是爸爸的理想，讓她心情開放是在第一次東吳大學
舉辦追思音樂會，當時的外交部長蔣孝嚴送的帖子，到音樂室
聽音樂，當時才慢慢釋懷，不過這永遠都不會忘記，雖是痛、是恨，
也是個撫傷的良藥，
「我真的希望，我們的社會要永遠和平，永遠的愛！」
徐光最後強調，愛是最容易的，有了愛就有和平，有了和平，
就有一切的自由，還是希望大家和和平平，不要怨恨，
要拿出自己心裡的愛，「我愛大家，也希望大家可以愛我」。
徐征犧牲時徐光還是小學生，根本不知道父親在幹什麼，
更不知道父親是中共地下黨員，懷抱共產主義的偉大理想。
如今七十七年過去了，徐征也是中共所紀念的烈士，
請問馬英九還要繼續向徐光女士道歉嗎?
當年中共地下黨員如果革命成功，根本就沒有馬英九時代了!
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