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「三方經濟通道」 – 開欄文
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1. 「三方經濟通道」要點
九月初舉行G20高峰會後，由美國主導的「印度--中東--歐洲經濟通道計畫」搬上檯面。這個「三方經濟通道」號稱是：美國針對「一帶一路」的替代方案。本欄先轉載兩篇評論，以後也將持續觀察。
第一篇是由三位學者執筆的《美國能夠跟「一帶一路方案」互別苗頭嗎？》(請見本欄第二篇文章)。
該文內容並沒有具體獲確切的回答它標題所提出的問題；至少我看不出來 – 可能三位意在言外吧。三位從「經濟效益」和「地緣政治」兩個觀點分析美國和印度--中東--歐洲三方個別的動機/目的。語多可觀，值得參考。
第二篇是《觀察者》網誌記者瑟滴齊女士的報導：《印度-中東-歐洲經濟通道在對抗中國以外的影響》(請見本欄第三篇文章)。它對「三方經濟通道」的效益和難題有詳細報導。
此處請參看《「一帶一路」計畫如何贏得世界 》一欄。
2. 評論
從我的角度看，這個方案的結局大概脫不了「雷聲大雨點小」的命運。理由不多，我綜合成三點：
1) 平均而言，這幾個參與國家的口袋不夠深。
2) 平均而言，這幾個參與國家的技術不夠厚。
3) 整體而言，面臨「同床異夢」或「三個和尚沒水喝」的難局。「國際政治」的爾虞我詐將不斷的圍繞著這個方案。
這裏只談談第1)點，首先，如菲林漢先生報導，過去10年間中國對「一帶一路」下了1兆美元的本錢。其次，我不知道中國政府如何操作這個國際計畫；但我相信：其它國家「基礎建設」所需要的原材料如鋼鐵和水泥等等，大部份是中國企業供應；中國勞工和技術人員應該也占了一定比例。「經濟通道」方案的任何一個成員國不可能有這個底氣以及優勢。
對中國政府來說，這1兆美元有相當一部份不過是從一個帳戶轉到另一個帳戶；我戲稱「一帶一路」是「有中國特色的帝國主義」。
2)、3)兩點顯而易見，不必深入討論。加上西方政府人士經手的計畫大概70%以上都會「超出預算」和「逾期完成」；我認為：美國搞這個「經濟通道」的結果，不是「虎頭蛇尾」就是「無疾而終」。
其次，有兩點值得注意：
a. 目前中東地區正在進行的「合縱–連橫」，以及以巴戰爭引起的未知數。
b. 三位學者使用了許多新的和/或有趣的術語(請見文末「索引」)；這些術語也顯示我最近提到國際上「各國崛起」的趨勢。它的重要性在於：如果「(美、中)二元對立」局面被「多元」、「區域合作」、和「多邊聯盟」等趨勢取代，「蘇西迪底斯難局」的危險性自然降低。「冷戰」云云也就不過是政論家混飯吃或自說自話的假議題罷了。
索引：
connectivity
convergence
Corridorization
equidistance
geo-economics
geostrategy
infrastructural capitalism
middle power
minilateralism
multi-alignment
multi-networked economic diplomacy
strategic autonomy
本文於 修改第 2 次
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「印度-中東-歐洲經濟通道」在對抗中國以外的影響 - Sabena Siddiqui
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Impact of India-Mideast-Europe corridor extends far beyond countering China
Sabena Siddiqui, 10/02/23
The recently announced India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) project linking India with markets in the Middle East and Europe was the highlight of the G20 summit this year. The new corridor represents half the global economy and 40% of the world’s population.
According to the memorandum of understanding signed on Sept. 9 by the European Union, France, Germany, India, Italy, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States, the IMEC will include a multimodal rail channel employing both railway tracks and shipping routes over a distance of 5,000 kilometers (3,106 miles). In tandem, a network of undersea electrical cables and green energy pipelines will be laid between India and Greece.
Calling it “much more than just a railway or a cable,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has described the new corridor as “a green and digital bridge across continents and civilizations.”
Consolidates India’s outreach
The project offers a number of benefits.
First, IMEC consolidates India’s geoeconomic outreach to the Middle East by cutting costs, as shipping containers can reach from the port in Mumbai to Dubai and onward to the port in Haifa in 40% less time.
Even as New Delhi’s dependence on the Middle Eastern energy industry grows, this corridor can provide secure connectivity and upgrade ties with Arab states where there is a large Indian diaspora.
At the same time, New Delhi plans to continue working with Russia on advancing the International North-South Transport Corridor — the first Russia-Saudi Arabia direct freight train arrived in Jeddah only last month. In fact, its trade relations with Moscow have grown exponentially since 2022.
Second, the India-Gulf venture could politically speed up the normalization of ties between Riyadh and Tel Aviv, synchronizing with Washington’s efforts to establish an understanding between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
In fact, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed the move. The initiative is a major diplomatic breakthrough between Saudi Arabia and Israel as well as offering multinational transport and communications benefits.
Third, this project can help Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in balancing both Washington and Beijing, as the compatibility and “cohabitation” factor of the IMEC is a definite plus point.
Comprising two separate corridors, the eastern end of the IMEC connects India to the Arabian Gulf while the northern side connects the Gulf to Europe.
As Beijing has been running Greece's Port of Piraeus and maintains a presence at the Haifa port, the new corridor can function in parallel with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Finally, since the IMEC fits in with Riyadh’s Saudi Vision 2030 agenda and connects the UAE with a wider global audience, it can become a vital transit hub geopolitically.
Nevertheless, some challenges await the IMEC.
For starters, countries like Iran and Turkey have not been included in the trade corridor. At the G20 summit, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that “there is no corridor without Turkey” as it is an “important production and trade base” and “the most convenient line for traffic from east to west.”
Instead, he suggested another route: the Iraq Development Road project. Egypt and Algeria are also cut off from the northern corridor, while Iran, Iraq, Oman and Yemen cannot benefit from the eastern part.
Ashok Swain, a professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University in Sweden, told Al-Monitor, “The absence of Iran and Turkey from the planned India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor renders it a nonstarter. Additionally, India has struggled to fulfill its commitment to developing Chabahar Port in Iran — a project it has envisioned for the past two decades to counter China-backed Gwadar Port in Pakistan.”
Also, by taking up the limelight, the IMEC could present a challenge to Iran’s Chabahar Port, which is already stagnating due to India’s inability to develop the port due to continuing US sanctions. Last month, both sides agreed not to seek foreign commercial arbitration for disputes over the lagging bilateral projects.
However, Roberto Neccia, an Italian diplomat formerly posted in Tehran, told Al-Monitor that the IMEC initiative will not affect India’s interest in developing Chabahar Port, as recent developments seemed to suggest.
Neccia noted, “In Iran, it didn’t go unnoticed that countries like Yemen, Syria and Lebanon, all with close ties to Tehran, were not included. On the other hand, the exclusion of Turkey is significant from the point of view of Tehran as it leaves open the possibility … in the future — if and when talks with the United States resume — to link its gas infrastructure to the energy corridors toward Europe, which is an old project, frozen due to the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.”
From an economic point of view, Neccia said the project “fits quite well into the Saudi plan for economic diversification and should not be seen in the context of the old zero-sum regional game, and the same goes for the other GCC countries.”
He added, “The circle of power in Tehran — interested in this phase to assure the sustainability of the detente with Riyadh — is aware that from the point of view of the Saudis, the corridor is likely viewed neither as a part of a strategic competition with Tehran nor as a part of any effort to push for a relation with Israel.”
Meanwhile, the IMEC needs more time.
Since the corridor consists of both sea and land sections, it lacks vital connections such as roads and railway tracks that will take time to build.
Swain expressed “serious doubts about the viability of executing the planned India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor” and questioned whether “they possess the necessary financial resources to carry out such a project.”
Though the basic infrastructure already exists, Greece — the European port closest to the IMEC — has a mountainous geography and an insufficient railway system. Likewise, building extensive railway networks across deserts in Saudi Arabia and the UAE will require extra financing and a lot of time.
Considering this factor, Neccia said, “The implementation of the IMEC corridor — taking into account that its actual implementation requires an intense modernization of the supporting infrastructure — will not affect the overall geopolitical regional scenario.”
Iran’s priority is China
Regarding any immediate impact of the IMEC on the region, Neccia argued that in the absence of significant progress in talks with the United States, Tehran would have more interest in developing stronger economic relations with Beijing.
In the meantime, Swain holds reservations about the “willingness of Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to take on a leading role in a project perceived as countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative.”
The domestic impact may be more favorable within India as it boosts the current government’s popularity.
“India’s Prime Minister Modi’s interest in this endeavor seems to stem primarily from the potential benefits to his favored businessman, Gautam Adani, who is currently facing economic challenges and holds extensive business interests along this route, including control over some ports,” said Swain.
For now, the deal is only on paper. The memorandum is a declaration of intent, but there is not yet “any obligation on any partner to take action toward the implementation of the IMEC," noted Abdul Aziz AluWaisheg, assistant secretary-general for political affairs at the Gulf Cooperation Council, in a recent op-ed for Arab News.
Ostensibly, the signatories will meet again in November to announce an action plan. An investment of around $17 billion is required and around 100,000 jobs need to be created to complete the scheme.
本文於 修改第 1 次
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美國能夠跟「一帶一路方案」互別苗頭嗎？ -- M. Mayer/G. Afterman/N. Janardham
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Can the US compete with China's Belt & Road Initiative?
The US is key to an ambitious new plan connecting India, the Middle East, and Europe.
MAXIMILIAN MAYER, GEDALIAH AFTERMAN, and NARAYANAPPA JANARDHAN, 09/29/23
Ten years after Chinese President Xi Jinping announced China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Kazakhstan and Indonesia, a new connectivity initiative was unveiled with great fanfare by the United States, India, and the Arab Gulf and European countries during the G20 meeting in New Delhi earlier this month.
Since the announcement was made without the presence of the Russian and Chinese presidents, it has stirred conflicting interpretations. Some see it as a potential alternative to BRI, while others, pointing to the failure of similar projects backed by Western powers in the past, view it as a paper tiger.
Details are still missing, but the project’s ambition is enormous. It follows a transregional approach as noted by the White House statement: “Through the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), we aim to usher in a new era of connectivity with a railway, linked through ports connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.”
The idea of this corridor dates back to 2021 and has also been discussed as part of the I2U2 group that includes India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the United States. Like the BRI, its design vision follows the corridor's logic. This is no surprise. “Corridorization” is the most significant spatial manifestation of infrastructural capitalism and geo-economics since the beginning of this century.
Corridorization, which is part of the thriving “minilateralism” space, could be viewed as contradictory because middle powers are trying to navigate between two hardening geopolitical blocs. But the ongoing process of reshaping the global supply chain connectivities created by decades of globalization could make it a viable proposition.
The BRI and the IMEC seem to share many similar goals. But there are also critical geographical differences. Most importantly, the new initiative features India, which has never been part of the BRI, as a central cross-regional player amid rearranged geo-imaginations.
Each of the parties to the new initiative comes with its own perspective and interest.
For the United States, the I2U2 and IMEC serve as platforms for infrastructure investment, bringing together Middle Eastern and South Asian partners and providing an alternative to Chinese projects. Washington sees this approach as an opportunity to encourage its regional partners to take a more active and independent role in shaping the region’s future, allowing the United States to reduce its own resource investment while maintaining its presence and influence.
For the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the goal is to strengthen their increasingly diversified and multi-networked economic diplomacy covering a wider geography. Both countries are active members of the BRI, and their cooperation with China is growing. Apart from burgeoning trade, they are dialogue partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and will soon become full members of the expanded BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Both countries are trying to expand their strategic autonomy and vying to become influential regional and international players. Getting involved in multiple new minilateral groupings is a key ingredient of their approach to strengthening their middle power status.
As Saudi Arabia opens to the world with a tilt towards China, the UAE has found its new unique selling point in connectivity and multi-alignment. While diverging approaches toward geostrategic and regional issues, particularly China’s rising power and global influence, remain a concern, Gulf Arab countries’ participation in U.S.-led initiatives reflects their new penchant for equidistance amid U.S.-China competition.
Indeed, the United States might see the IMEC as a vehicle to counter China’s growing influence in the region. In the Middle East, however, competition and convergence are mixed and less black and white than the increasing U.S.-China bipolarity would suggest. If the United States expects this to be a “counter BRI” move for the region, it will likely be disappointed. Competition in the Indian Ocean could escalate, but potential synergies and convergencies should allow for some degree of mutual accommodation.
India, which the United States treats as an “indispensable partner,” has been showcasing a good template of multi-alignment for others to follow. It is a member of the Quad and I2U2, both comprising the United States, and it’s also a member of BRICS and SCO, with China in both, despite New Delhi’s feud with Beijing over border issues. The IMEC adds another thread to its longstanding multi-alignment policy, as it highlights the other connectivity corridor that India is promoting — the International North South Transport Corridor — with Iran and Russia. Together, these projects add value to India’s development story and its boast that it is the fastest growing economy in the world.
The new economic corridor also envisions the potential addition of Israel. This should be seen as a step in the renewed U.S. efforts to expand the Abraham Accords by facilitating the normalization of Israeli-Saudi relations. This form of regional engagement also allows Israel to manage tensions with the United States, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia in the wake of the politics of a far-right coalition led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
For Israel and the United States, expanding the Abraham Accords, especially to include Saudi Arabia, remains a top priority despite Riyadh’s insistence on linking the normalization of relations to progress on the two-state solution. There are tentative indications that Netanyahu might agree to some concessions on the Palestinian front, even at the cost of his right-wing coalition falling apart, in order to capitalize and sustain Israel’s broader regional integration.
For China, which will soon host the first in-person BRI summit in Beijing after major COVID-19 shutdowns, IMEC throws up a challenge and an opportunity. It could dismissively treat the IMEC like the United States has done with the BRI. The other option, as indicated soon after the G20 meeting, is to demonstrate its openness to support multidirectional connectivity, even if it is not part of this corridor, as long as such projects are “open, inclusive, and form synergy,” and do not become “geopolitical tools.”
The last piece in this new connectivity saga would be Europe, especially the Eastern Mediterranean countries. The IMEC is a welcome development because the “Global Gateway,” the European Union’s own connectivity project, has not gained adequate momentum because European diplomats in Brussels are hesitant about multi-alignment strategies and transregional corridors.
While the IMEC is an economic-diplomatic-security interplay, its prospects will depend on its ability to promote connectivity and translate its economic potential into commercial success. Critics have already pointed out that the initiative may be unviable in terms of profit. However, it could also be argued that there are virtues other than economic efficiency. In a world of de-risking and politically induced supply chain shifts, the new corridor could be viewed as a tool for promoting strategic resilience, friendshoring, and tech cooperation, especially for middle powers.
作者簡介：
Maximilian Mayer
Maximilian Mayer is Junior-Professor of International Relations and Global Politics of Technology at the Center for Advanced Security, Strategic and Integration Studies (CASSIS), University of Bonn. He is currently leading the research group on „Infrastructures of China’s Modernity and Their Global Constitutive Effects”, funded by the Ministry of Culture and Science of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia.
Gedaliah Afterman
Dr. Gedaliah Afterman is the head of the Asia Policy Program at the Abba Eban Institute for Diplomacy & Foreign Relations at Reichman University (IDC Herzliya). He previously served as an Australian foreign service officer working on Asian regional security issues and a diplomat at the Australian Embassy in Beijing, where he focused on issues related to China’s foreign policy, including the Middle East.
Narayanappa Janardhan
Dr N. Janardhan is Director, Research & Analysis, Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, Abu Dhabi. He specializes on Gulf-Asia-Africa relations and offers PGD & MA courses on them. His last book was Arab Gulf’s Pivot to Asia: From Transactional to Strategic Partnerships. With a PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, he is Non-Resident Fellow, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, & Managing Assistant Editor, Journal of Arabian Studies.
The views expressed by authors on Responsible Statecraft do not necessarily reflect those of the Quincy Institute or its associates.
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