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「中國突然間面臨崩潰」之胡說八道
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0. 前言
本文討論王劍先生【新聞茶座：中國突然瀕臨崩潰】這段視頻的內容(下稱視頻)。SCFtw2兄將這段視頻轉貼在此部落格；我曾做了簡短的回應。
1) 我相關的論述「前提」和判斷「立場」就不在此贅述。本文引用了部分拙作；請對我不熟悉的新網友自己琢磨、琢磨。
2) 我沒有財經專業背景，最近也沒有上網查資料的精力和時間；所以，對於王先生節目一開始所列舉的一連串數據無能置評。王先生和我都提到：中國和中國經濟的前景如何，不是三、兩天甚至一年半載能夠「論定」的事。我們大家不妨拭目以待九月底和今年年底的報表數據，再來回顧這一部分。
3) 本文重點在討論德國《世界報》原文的十大論點以及它們對中國和中國經濟的打擊力道(以下第1節)。由於我不懂德文，只能用英文搜尋；在網路上沒有找到原文的英文版本。不過，我搜尋到《自由時報》上盧永山先生的編譯/報導；下文「條目」部分就是引用盧先生的文字。
4) 王先生說，他並不同意「中國崩潰」的看法；但他直接引用了《世界報》原文標題。我推測其目的在增加「點擊率」。市場經濟時代這種行為雖然無可厚非，它至少沒有殺人越貨那樣血腥；不過，王先生為人和發言的「可信度」就得因此打打折扣了。
5) 最後，克魯格門教授在經濟學上近於「古典自由主義」(該文第1.2小節)；在政治上他近於「新政派」、華倫大法官、以及韓福瑞參議員等的「新自由主義」(同上文，第2.1小節)。我自己也傾向這兩個主張，所以訂閱了他在《紐約時報》上的專欄。由於克魯格門教授的名望和地位，我將另有一文分析王先生提及他觀點的文章。
1. 德國《世界報》原文的10大論點
如上所述，我沒有讀到這篇原文的英文版。以下它所謂「中國經濟面臨的10大問題」的「條目」摘錄自《自由時報》(超連結見上)。這些「問題」內容的概要則請參考王先生視頻。
我相信原文作者試圖用這「10大問題」來支撐他/她「中國突然間面臨崩潰」這個觀察或結論；因此，我稱之為(原文作者的)「論點」。以下就我所知，和/或引用我讀到的相關分析、評論，與報導，來討論它們成為關鍵性議題的程度，從而幫助各位自行判斷：原文作者的結論是否成立。
1) 房地產泡沫
我沒有能力評論這個問題的衝擊有多大。此處請參考《中國經濟並無財政危機》一文對房地產問題的分析。該文作者的主旨是：
中國並沒有房地產危機；政府之所以不處理這個「問題」，目的是要藉它來清除盤據地方而又尾大不掉的勢力(請參見原文標題)。其中有以下這段畫龍點睛的話：
”The central government could push a button and stop the bleeding in the property market whenever it wants. But it won’t let a good crisis go to waste, in Rahm Emmanuel’s phrase.”
最後一句是調侃性的俏皮話。Rahm Emmanuel 是歐巴馬當選第一任總統後的第一位白宮幕僚長，後參選並當選芝加哥市長；一位典型的，浮沉宦海的美國政客。這句話的意譯是：解決危機沒什麼好洋洋自得；怎麼利用一個危機來解決另一個困難才叫高竿。
我在另一篇文章中看到(但未存檔)以下評論；作者認為：中國經濟高速成長時，大量農村人口湧入城市，帶動了房地產的興盛。目前這一波的人口遷移已經過去，但中國「城市化」尚未完成。因此，至少在此文發表的當時，作者認為「房地產泡沫化」只是經濟發展趨緩的暫時現象。
我不清楚這個分析是否仍然適用；我只想指出：任何現象和問題都是各種各樣因素在「因緣合和」或相互衝擊過程下造成。如果只就單一因素做「表層分析」，以「說到風就是雨」方式來下結論，那是「政治吶喊」而說不上是「政治評論」。
2) 債務堆積如山
此處請參考《中國經濟並無財政危機》一文中對財政議題的分析。其中有以下這段話：
In an extreme hypothetical case of mass local government defaults, the cost of transferring the cost of debt service to the central government would be trivial compared with overall government revenues.
請注意 ”trivial” 一字。此字直譯為：「微不足道的」；意譯為：「算不上個屁」。
3) 通縮。
在經濟實務上，這是一個嚴重的，對經濟成長有相當 大負面影響的議題。很多評論家，如克魯格門教授，的確以此拿當下中國經濟的狀況和1990年代日本經濟狀況相提並論。
4) 人口問題
我對這個問題的看法請參考《《《中國10年崩潰論》簡介》讀後》(該文第2節)。基本上我認為它不是個「問題」。
5) 美國制裁
「經濟制裁」並不是殺傷力很大的工具；美國對北韓、伊朗、和俄國的「經濟制裁」起了個鳥作用。套用《射鵰英雄傳》中的一句話：「你有禁運；我會走私」。何況，任何一本經濟學教科書都會諄諄勸導：貿易戰是個「傷敵一千，自損八百」的下下招式。如果有人認為：「美國制裁」能導致「中國突然間面臨崩潰」，那不是「政治評論」而是「政治起乩」。
此處請參考《淺談「經濟制裁」和中國反制措施》、《中國開始反擊西方經濟制裁》、《《中國相對於美國的長期優勢》譯述》、《中國相對於美國的長期優勢》、《中國經濟對世界經濟影響以及其現況與前景分析》等各篇評論。
6) 投資人逃離
由於目前中國經濟景氣低迷，投資人裹足不前或採取觀望策略是理性行為。這是一個暫時現象還是常期狀態，目前難下定論。它會導致「中國突然間面臨崩潰」？我看這是原文作者在湊字數，或想玩個「十全十美」文字遊戲。
7) 中國人民銀行政策
此處請參考本節以上第1)、2)兩小節評論。此處也請參考下一小節的討論。
8) 政府治理
中國政府和中共領導階層「治理方式」的確有改進空間。我過去討論這個議題的文章很多；最近兩篇請參考《《中國的內在危機》讀後》和《《何以中國政府慢步調復甦經濟？》讀後》。
首先，針對原文作者和克魯格門教授對這個議題的看法，我想指出：
中國是所謂的「國家資本主義」，政府官員沒有向股東或「人民」交代的壓力；她/他們具有被從宏觀和長期兩個角度來進行績效評估的優勢；以及「慢工出細貨」的奢侈。因此，從短期表現來判斷中國政府官員的「治理方式」和「治理能力」，即使說不上「夏蟲不可以語冰」，至少難逃「見樹不見林」之譏。
哈斯博士和至少80%的西方評論家(就我的印象)有兩個盲點：
a. 對中國文化和社會一知半解；導致他/她們的觀點不是霧裡看花，就是受到「夜間觀牛效應」的誤導 -- 「晚上一眼望去，所有的牛都是黑的」(《精神現象學》79頁)。
b. 根據他/她們自以為是「真理」的「當下美、歐霸權主導的國際秩序」，來評判在這個框架以外運作的中國和其它國家政府；導致他/她們如果不是「以管窺天，以蠡測海」，至少也是戴了一付有色眼鏡來看其它國家的事務。
前者可以拿「清零政策」為例；2022年的「解封」，也顯示中共領導階層並非「一言堂」，更不是「決策毫無章法」。後者可以拿《習近平中國經濟計劃注定失敗》一文為例；請參見《《習近平的中國經濟計劃注定失敗》讀後》中我批評該文的最後四段。
這個問題之所以成為「問題」，在我看來，只是因為原文作者的無知或虛驕。
9) 缺乏信任
我完全同意中國老百姓對政府的「信任度」不高。另一方面，中國老百姓對政府的「服從度」和「容忍度」大概在全世界排名前五。做為中國人，我不認為它們是值得吹噓或自傲的「社會性」。但就中國社會是否能繼續穩定運作來說，後兩者的重要性遠遠超過「信任度」。
歷史上，我也沒有聽說對政府「缺乏信任」會或能導致「面臨崩潰」的先例；這個論點連「政治吶喊」都說不上，大概可以歸入「政治天方夜譚」。
10) 居高不下的青年人失業率
這是一個嚴重的社會問題。中國政府在拒絕公佈「失業數據」外，很可能需要提出一些「頭痛醫頭」式的臨時紓困方案。至於它會或能導致「面臨崩潰」？笑一笑就好。
2. 結論
2.1 「10大問題」之「政治吶喊」
以上是我對德國《世界報》所刊登《中國突然間面臨崩潰》原文列舉十大論點的批評。在我和某些專家學者看來，有些「論點」根本不成立，有些「論點」涉及問題的衝擊力道不足以支撐「突然間面臨崩潰」這個觀察。總而言之，言而總之，我的看法是：
該文介於「政治吶喊」和「政治評論」之間，或許給個前七後三分吧。
當然，個別問題的衝擊力道不足，並不代表這10個問題的「綜效」或累積的「蝴蝶效應」不足以導致「中國面臨崩潰」。「中國崩潰」與否是未來事件，我可沒有通天眼，自然不敢妄加論斷；以免折了我所剩無幾的陽壽。且待明年此時的局勢再見端倪(如果我還在活蹦亂跳)。
2.2 「盡信書不如無書」之「漢兒盡作胡兒語」
請見以上和《《中國的內在危機》讀後》一文中語重心長的分析。
本文於 修改第 6 次
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中國還沒有崩潰-Brandon J. Weichert
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下文作者比起一拖拉庫自欺欺人的「中國通」要務實；其內容也算打臉本欄開欄文所批判的那位德國政論家。在務實觀察家之外，他也同時扮演著高喊「狼來了」小調皮鬼的角色。
他認為張幼俠將軍「通敵」罪名純屬「莫須有」；其邏輯和結論跟我的分析相通(該欄2026/01/28)。不過，他所說的：「整肅(大多數情況下)顯示獨裁者自認掌握了全局」只是銅板的一面；另一面可能是我說的：「顯示獨裁者感覺到芒刺在背」。目前很難判斷：我們看到的習政權到底屬於銅板的那一面。
The China Collapse That Wasn’t
Comforting narratives about Chinese internal dynamics are not just wrong, but dangerous.
Brandon J. Weichert, 02/11/26
It’s a story Washington tells itself whenever reality grows uncomfortable: China is about to collapse. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), we are assured, is a brittle, illegitimate regime on the brink of popular revolt. Once it falls, a friendly democratic China will emerge—and America’s ruling class won’t have to change anything that they’ve been doing or thinking about since the end of the Cold War.
That means all the elites’ spending—along with all other forms of elite excess—is irrelevant. In their view, China, a country that is both America’s greatest strategic challenger as well as one of its most important trading partners, is going to implode. It’s a house of cards, they say.
It’s all wishful thinking. Could China collapse? Sure. Any regime could collapse. Is the system in China a house of cards? Maybe. But one could—and probably should—argue that the American financial and political order is also a house of cards, cards that are already teetering.
For the last year, the corporate press and their fellow travelers in the Chinese expat community here in the United States have been sharing totally unconfirmed stories about China’s President Xi Jinping having been placed under house arrest. We’ve heard whispers about senior generals in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) revolting. One prominent geopolitical analyst informed me last July that, by the 2025 plenum of the Communist Party’s Central Committee, Xi was going to announce his resignation as part of a secret deal between himself and his rivals (who were set to take power from Xi).
It never happened.
As if that wasn’t enough, when Xi recently directed a massive purge against senior military leaders in the Central Military Commission (CMC), a powerful committee of top People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military officers chaired by Xi himself, the Wall Street Journal depicted it as some form of successful counter-coup led by a reinvigorated Xi against his internal party enemies.
But there was no evidence of any coup to necessitate a counter-coup.
Western intelligence services, such as the CIA, piled on, claiming that the main PLA officer removed by Xi, General Zhang Youxia, was secretly on the CIA’s payroll, providing the American intelligence services with detailed accounting of China’s nuclear weapons capabilities in exchange for gobs of cash.
The only problem with that claim is that Zhang was fabulously wealthy (as were all of the PLA leaders whom Xi purged earlier this year). Zhang and his cohort got wealthy by sitting at the top of the Chinese Communist Party and protecting and supporting Xi Jinping. Given that the punishment of treason is exactly what befell these generals, why would they have risked their futures by risking their wealth and status to feed U.S. intelligence about the state of China’s nuclear arsenal and disposition?
Right after the removal of those older generals, multiple “open-source intelligence” (OSINT) accounts on social media began spewing baseless claims that troops were appearing on the streets of Beijing following the purge of the CMC. The implication was that a potential civil war could erupt at any moment. But these accounts are often tied to larger propaganda pushes in the West, which is why it is important to point out what they have been claiming on social media (and these accounts have massive followings, notably on X).
In case you’re wondering, no civil war has occurred since Xi’s major purges.
But these are the sorts of narratives that pervade Western media, dominate the discourse in the halls of power throughout the West, and shape the perception of Western leaders. (This is why we keep getting China wrong.)
Even as the claims that Xi’s rule was at an end circulated throughout the West, the New York Times published a story revealing that the most recent Pentagon Overmatch Brief found that, if a war over Taiwan erupted, the Chinese military would decisively defeat the U.S. military in a relatively short order.
Clearly, China cannot both be collapsing and have a conventional military that today could rapidly defeat the U.S. military in a fight over the First Island Chain (the region stretching from the Kamchatka Peninsula through Taiwan down to the Philippines). Frankly, I’ll take the Pentagon’s assessment on this one over the flights of fancy our feckless political and media elites are engaging in when it comes to their China analysis.
American elites have embraced what amounts to a strategic coping mechanism because, fundamentally, they understand that the Chinese have caught up to—or even surpassed—the United States in critical ways. The only reason China has achieved this is because of the generous trade policies as well as the strategic ambivalence that American elites have had toward China since the 1970s. In other words, it’s the American establishment’s fault that China is even in the position it is to threaten us, militarily and economically.
This tiresome strategic coping mechanism of the Western elite when it comes to China’s rise could not even hide the fact that China’s economy is doing better than our own, contra the endless heralding of a new American golden age. The Financial Times was forced to admit earlier this year that China’s trade surplus was an astonishing $1.2 trillion in the last quarter of 2025 (even after President Trump subjected China to a grueling trade war).
Cue the rejoinder: “China lies about its figures!” Certainly. Others will say the data coming from China are unreliable for other reasons. But the folks over at the FT know this. Their reporting accounts for these realities. Here’s why the Financial Times used China’s trade surplus figures. Beijing participates in international statistical frameworks promoted by organizations, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Their data—notably customs trade data, which is so important for determining trade surpluses—follow broadly accepted definitions and reporting practices. External economists can (and do) audit and compare these global sets, which is how they concluded that China’s trade surplus was so large.
Western elites have spent the last year telling us not to worry about China because Xi is about to be removed from power. When that didn’t happen, they insisted that the purges of the CMC by Xi signaled that China was growing weaker, not stronger (even though Xi removed any potential impediments from the CMC to his rule). Meanwhile, those same voices argue that China’s economy is done—even though their trade surplus went stratospheric last year.
As my former editor at the Asia Times, David P. Goldman, used to constantly remind me: “Don’t worry about what China does wrong. Worry about what they do right.
With cutthroat alacrity, Beijing has transitioned its economy from a backward, agrarian, North Korea–style cult of personality in the 1970s into a dynamic, vibrant state-capitalist society. In just 50 years, they have gone from being a non-factor in the global economy to the second-largest economy in GDP terms and the largest economy in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), which most economists argue is a superior measurement of economic strength compared to traditional nominal GDP.
What’s more, China today is not animated by the Marxist ideology that the CPC was founded upon. The party’s core legitimizing narrative is national rejuvenation 「民族復興」), and the reversal of what Chinese leaders refer to as the “Century of Humiliation.” Even though so many Westerners have said Xi is the closest leader to Mao since Mao, Xi appears to govern less like a Marxist ideologue and more like a civilizational nationalist.
In authoritarian systems, purges rarely signal collapse. They signal that the leader believes he is strong enough to act. That is precisely what you are witnessing with Xi’s ousting of these PLA generals. He is consolidating and expanding his power as he is pressured by his American competitors in a variety of areas. Under these conditions, contrary to the “China is collapsing simply because they’re not Star-Spangled Awesome like the U.S.” narrative, Xi Jinping and China are set to become more powerful and aggressive, not less.
Of course, China is not invincible. It is struggling to transition to a postmodern, high-consumption model economy. As a result, its economy is currently experiencing a downturn. There is an overhang from China’s housing crisis in 2022. There is real demographic decline that threatens future prosperity. Even though you won’t hear it in the media, there is a true youth unemployment crisis.
But how many economic downturns has the United States endured? Why assume China’s regime will implode during a downturn but not the American one under similar conditions?
Especially when China today possesses around 30 percent of all global manufacturing capacity by value. Its dominance in rare-earth refining, battery supply chains, and industrial inputs has ensured that Beijing is already dictating terms to Washington (and the world).
Indeed, China makes the world’s electronics, along with the world’s electric vehicle batteries, solar panels, industrial chemicals, and machine tools. The United States, on the other hand, primarily flips financial assets. In the twenty-first century, manufacturing power is strategic dominance.
A country like China that makes everything rarely collapses suddenly. Financial empires, like the American empire, historically collapse faster than industrial ones. Just ask the British, who effectively abandoned their domestic industry in favor of over-financialization beginning in the mid-19th century, leading to the inevitable collapse of British economic power by the 1960s.
Under these conditions in China, then, a Japanese-style stagnation is plausible. A Soviet-style implosion is highly unlikely.
We should not seek to overestimate Chinese weakness, and we must stop underestimating Chinese resilience. Foreign policy built upon such fantasies leads to the Iraq War. One built on realistic assessments, however, creates strategic opportunities and relatively bloodless victories of the kind we enjoyed in the Cold War.
China’s collapse is not inevitable. Nor is America’s ongoing decline irreversible. Only one of these two outcomes is being taken seriously by the American elite. Getting it wrong means America’s decline becomes inexorable—and China’s rise, however bumpy, becomes unstoppable.
Brandon J. Weichert is a senior national security editor at The National Interest. Recently, Weichert became the host of The National Security Hour on America Outloud News and iHeartRadio, where he discusses national security policy every Wednesday at 8 pm Eastern. He is also a contributor at Popular Mechanics and has consulted regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, the American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Articles by Brandontrending flat Brandon J. WeichertBrandon J. Weichert
本文於 修改第 2 次
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何以中國沒有未來--Jonathan Stephen Harry Riley
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轉載這篇文章是把它做為一個反面教材；稍後評析。
Why China Does Not Have a Future
The politics of why China will fail
Jonathan Stephen Harry Riley, 11/22/25
China is in crisis; according to geopolitical analyst and author Peter Zeihan, this decade will be China’s last decade as an international power, and the entire system of the Chinese Communist Party may also implode with the breakup of China.
It’s not clear exactly what is happening in China, but it is in crisis, with youth unemployment reaching 21.3% in June 2023 among people aged 16–24.
In 2025, youth unemployment stands at 17.3%, and the overall unemployment rate is 5.1% of the population. That’s the data, which may not even be true.
Still, most likely we will not know the truth for decades, but what is happening with China’s youth is the issue of jobs not being there for them, with a mismatch between the education and training they receive and what is available in the Chinese job market.
This means there aren’t enough graduate jobs being created in the Chinese economy to develop its middle class. Still, it’s also affected by the rise of AI technology and by the fact that most people now have access to computers.
Also, in the past, in the 1990s, only people at university had the tech skills to work with computers; nowadays, everyone carries a computer in their hands in the form of a modern smartphone.
This means there are now fewer barriers to white-collar work, and office jobs are no longer as highly valued due to the abilities of people with the right computer skills and willingness to learn, which means those jobs are no longer as highly skilled as they were in the past.
A great example is that a financial analyst in the UK can earn £35,000 per year, but an expert can earn £40,000 or more after completing training.
As for China, and the same goes for many places in the West as well, there is a mismatch between Chinese university graduates and the jobs available within the Chinese economy.
The last time there was this imbalance in China was the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989, with mass protests on the Chinese mainland.
China is also facing a crisis: its population is miscounted by at least 100 million people, including millennials who have not been born, which has increased labour costs in China and will continue to do so as the Boomer generation retires and ages.
Furthermore, in China, the Boomer generation is now entering mass retirement at 60, unless the government changes its policy and increases the working age by decree or law.
This will further harm China’s ability to export manufactured goods at low prices, as the United States shifts its manufacturing suppliers from China to Mexico to ensure Americans still have the choice and convenience of cheap manufacturing goods.
The rest of the world has not noticed the growing issues and crises within China due to distractions in domestic politics, with the United States focusing on the Orange Man, a.k.a. Donald Trump, and Japan rearming, as governments look inwards rather than outwards.
China Dynasties Wikimedia 請至原網頁觀看中國歷朝更迭圖
What does this mean with China in crisis?
The Chinese Communist Party put forward a grand vision of China being a united entity for at least over 2000 years, if not more, going back around four millennia; this is, unfortunately, complete and utter horse shit.
As a united entity, China has spent more years divided into separate warring kingdoms than it has spent united.
China is a monoculture dominated by the Han Chinese, who make up 92% of its population, though the figure varies by a few percentage points.
China is typically disunited, but at different points in its long and bloody history, a power in northern China unites under new dynasties or regimes that then go on to conquer the other regions of China.
China is a massive country that requires a centralised government typically run from northern China, with the other regions breaking away at different points in history, only to be reintegrated into greater China.
China faces many crises that could see the nation shatter and then reintegrate after a period of Civil War.
Main maritime shipping routes map wikimedia 請至原網頁觀看主要航運路線圖
Food and Energy
China is dependent on food and energy imports, and this is why it is facing a crisis: its supply routes stretch from the Bosporus and the Aegean, through the Persian Gulf, and into the Indian and Vietnam seas, which are vulnerable supply lines for China.
All it takes is China’s enemies or state-sponsored privateers to seize these goods, which could devastate the Chinese economy.
If the USA and China went to war today, China would starve to death within six months.
China is dependent on global supply chains and global security, which have historically been maintained by the Pax Britannica from 1815 to 1914 and, from 1945 to the present day, by the Pax Americans.
The Chinese depend on infrastructure and, more importantly, on the protection of the seas, which the Royal Navy historically guaranteed and then the U.S. Navy.
With the United States no longer interested in global affairs and that system going away, the U.S. Navy focused on constructing supercarriers, which are nation-killers, rather than a destroyer-heavy Navy that is essential for protecting global shipping lanes.
As of writing this article, the USA has 72 destroyers and 17 cruisers, which is not enough to keep the seas safe.
China had to get rich and develop a strong international Navy before the Americans pulled out of the global system they had created.
Unfortunately, China is ageing before it can get rich and has not made the transition from an industrial to a consumer economy.
Its domestic population can no longer meet the required domestic consumption, which is no longer optional.
Written by Jonathan Stephen Harry Riley
I have been writing from 2014 to the present day; my writing is focused on history, politics, culture, geopolitics and other related topics.
Published in The Geopolitical Economist
In The Global geopolitics, truth is one, but the wise interpret it differently.— Here, we interpret these diversions.
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