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中國經濟之計劃篇 – 開欄文
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瀏覽3,769 ｜回應12｜推薦1 |
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轉貼相關評論於下。可參看本城市《中國經濟體系正在進行(？)結構性改革》一文，和《中國經濟之狀況篇》一欄。
如我在《中國經濟之狀況篇》一欄的開欄文中所說：
「到了九月底和今年年底，再做個檢驗印證。或許可以看出誰有認知偏差；誰的資料不夠周全；誰的分析解讀功力鴉鴉烏。」
我就藏拙不聒噪了。
本文於 修改第 2 次
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從人工智能看中、美能源政策 - Eva Roytburg
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AI experts return from China stunned: The U.S. grid is so weak, the race may already be over
Eva Roytburg, 08/15/25
A drone photo shows staff members of State Grid Bortala Electric Power Supply Company patrolling near Sayram Lake scenic area to ensure power supply in Bortala Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture, northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, July 17, 2025. (Yin Tianjie/Xinhua via Getty Images) 請至原網頁觀看照片
“Everywhere we went, people treated energy availability as a given,” Rui Ma wrote on X after returning from a recent tour of China’s AI hubs.
For American AI researchers, that’s almost unimaginable. In the U.S., surging AI demand is colliding with a fragile power grid, the kind of extreme bottleneck that Goldman Sachs warns could severely choke the industry’s growth.
In China, Ma continued, it’s considered a “solved problem.”
Ma, a renowned expert in Chinese technology and founder of the media company Tech Buzz China, took her team on the road to get a firsthand look at the country’s AI advancements. She told Fortune that while she isn’t an energy expert, she attended enough meetings and talked to enough insiders to come away with a conclusion that should send chills down the spine of Silicon Valley: in China, building enough power for data centers is no longer up for debate.
“This is a stark contrast to the U.S., where AI growth is increasingly tied to debates over data center power consumption and grid limitations,” she wrote on X.
The stakes are difficult to overstate. Data center building is the foundation of AI advancement, and spending on new centers now displaces consumer spending in terms of impact to U.S. GDP—that’s concerning since consumer spending is generally two-thirds of the pie. McKinsey projects that between 2025 and 2030, companies worldwide will need to invest $6.7 trillion into new data center capacity to keep up with AI’s strain.
In a recent research note, Stifel Nicolaus warned of a looming correction to the S&P 500, since it forecasts this data-center capex boom to be a one-off build-out of infrastructure, while consumer spending is clearly on the wane.
However, the clear limiting factor to the U.S.’s data center infrastructure development, according to a Deloitte industry survey, is stress on the power grid. Cities’ power grids are so weak that some companies are just building their own power plants rather than relying on existing grids. The public is growing increasingly frustrated over increasing energy bills – in Ohio, the electricity bill for a typical household has increased at least $15 this summer from the data centers – while energy companies prepare for a sea-change of surging demand.
Goldman Sachs frames the crisis simply: “AI’s insatiable power demand is outpacing the grid’s decade-long development cycles, creating a critical bottleneck.”
Meanwhile, David Fishman, a Chinese electricity expert who has spent years tracking their energy development, told Fortune that in China, electricity isn’t even a question. On average, China adds more electricity demand than the entire annual consumption of Germany, every single year. Whole rural provinces are blanketed in rooftop solar, with one province matching the entirety of India’s electricity supply.
“U.S. policymakers should be hoping China stays a competitor and not an aggressor,” Fishman said. “Because right now they can’t compete effectively on the energy infrastructure front.”
China has an oversupply of electricty
China’s quiet electricity dominance, Fishman explained, is the result of decades of deliberate overbuilding and investment in every layer of the power sector, from generation to transmission to next-generation nuclear.
The country’s reserve margin has never dipped below 80%–100% nationwide, meaning it has consistently maintained at least twice the capacity it needs, Fishman said. They have so much available space that instead of seeing AI data centers as a threat to grid stability, China treats them as a convenient way to “soak up oversupply,” he added.
That level of cushion is unthinkable in the United States, where regional grids typically operate with a 15% reserve margin and sometimes less, particularly during extreme weather, Fishman said. In places like California or Texas, officials often issue warnings about red-flag conditions when demand is projected to strain the system. This leaves little room to absorb the rapid load increases AI infrastructure requires, Fishman ntoed.
The gap in readiness is stark: while the U.S. is already experiencing political and economic fights over whether the grid can keep up, China is operating from a position of abundance.
Even if AI demand in China grows so quickly renewable projects can’t keep pace, Fishman said, the country can tap idle coal plants to bridge the gap while building more sustainable sources. “It’s not preferable,” he admitted, “but it’s doable.”
By contrast, the U.S. would have to scramble to bring on new generation capacity, often facing years-long permitting delays, local opposition, and fragmented market rules, he said.
Structural governance differences
Underpinning the hardware advantage is a difference in governance. In China, energy planning is coordinated by long-term, technocratic policy that defines the market’s rules before investments are made, Fishman said. This model ensures infrastructure buildout happens in anticipation of demand, not in reaction to it.
“They’re set up to hit grand slams,” Fishman noted. “The U.S., at best, can get on base.”
In the U.S., large-scale infrastructure projects depend heavily on private investment, but most investors expect a return within three to five years: far too short for power projects that can take a decade to build and pay off.
“Capital is really biased toward shorter-term returns,” he said, noting Silicon Valley has funneled billions into “the nth iteration of software-as-a-service” while energy projects fight for funding.
In China, by contrast, the state directs money toward strategic sectors in advance of demand, accepting not every project will succeed but ensuring the capacity is in place when it’s needed. Without public financing to de-risk long-term bets, he argued, the U.S. political and economic system is simply not set up to build the grid of the future.
Cultural attitudes reinforce this approach. In China, renewables are framed as a cornerstone of the economy because they make sense economically and strategically, not because they carry moral weight. Coal use isn’t cast as a sign of villainy, as it would be among some circles in the U.S. – it’s simply seen as outdated. This pragmatic framing, Fishman argued, allows policymakers to focus on efficiency and results rather than political battles.
For Fishman, the takeaway is blunt. Without a dramatic shift in how the U.S. builds and funds its energy infrastructure, China’s lead will only widen.
“The gap in capability is only going to continue to become more obvious — and grow in the coming years,” he said.
This story was originally featured on Fortune.com
本文於 修改第 2 次
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反內卷政策分析篇 - BBC
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習近平罕見直批地方扎堆發展新能源和AI：「反內卷」運動背後的政績焦慮
比亞迪在2024年超越特斯拉，成為全球電動車銷量最高的製造商 -- 請至原網頁觀看照片
BBC 新聞中文版2025年7月24日
7月14日，中國召開中央城市工作會議，這是10年來首次。會後，中共黨媒《人民日報》罕見發表了習近平以直白措辭批評地方政府「一窩蜂」上馬新能源和人工智能項目的報道。他向與會者提問：「上項目，一說就是幾樣：人工智能、算力、新能源汽車，是不是全國各省份都要往這些方向去發展產業？」
彭博社稱，直接且口語化的批評較為罕見，因為官方媒體通常會發佈他更正式的講話或政策指引。
習近平發表上述言論之時，正值中國「反內卷」運動之中 -- 3月政府工作報告強調整治「內卷式」競爭；6月修訂出台《中華人民共和國反不正當競爭法》；7月中央財經委會議提出「反內卷」，治理無序競爭，推動落後產能退出。
這一口語化的質疑，一方面揭示了當前中國地方政府在新興產業佈局上的嚴重同質化問題；另一方面，也展現出中國政府的執政弊端 -- 「大政府、大市場」的體制在推動經濟增長的同時，也埋下了產能過剩的隱患。
「零公里」二手車亂象
習近平名的三個產業，目前都不同程度地出現了過剩現象，並且在業界持續引發關注。
人工智能作為中國最新引以為傲的產業，今年初因「深度求索」(DeepSee)技術的爆火而備受矚目。這一現象被稱為中國的「斯普特尼克時刻」，不僅被官方用來宣傳高價值產業發展的優越性，也被認為是中美競爭的關鍵領域之一。
然而，阿波羅全球管理公司首席經濟學家托爾斯滕·斯洛克(Torsten Sløk)近日發出警告，認為人工智能的泡沫可能比上世紀90年代的互聯網泡沫更為嚴重。他的依據是，目前標準普爾500指數前十名公司的市盈率持續攀升，已經超過了90年代的紀錄。
市盈率通常用來衡量股票價格相對於公司盈利水平的高低。換句話說，雖然這些公司的股價不斷上漲，但盈利水平並未同步增長，市場的熱情正在脫離理性。
相比之下，新能源汽車雖然是席捲全球的熱潮，但更像是中國獨有的優勢產業。不過，這一產業也因激烈的競爭而陷入內卷和重復投資的困境。最引人注目的是兩個月前關於「零公里二手車」的討論，起因是長城汽車董事長魏建軍批評目前各大二手車平台上廣泛存在的「零公里二手車」現象。
「零公里二手車」是指一些經銷商為了緩解庫存壓力，將庫存時間較長的新車註冊為二手車進行出售，以便快速處理庫存。同時，一些新能源汽車廠商為了營造持續熱銷的假象，增強投資者信心，也默許甚至縱容這種行為，甚至在新車下線生產後直接上牌照。
針對這一現象，官方也已直接介入整治。中國國家發展和改革委員會就「零公里二手車」問題約談了相關企業，要求整頓行業亂象，並將其列為汽車行業內卷的典型表現。
算力泡沫的問題也可以從部分上市公司的公告中窺見端倪。例如，城地湘江、平治信息等多家上市公司在2024年發佈的相關公告中，透露出算力資源的閒置現象。根據官方發佈的《數據中心綠色低碳發展專項行動計劃》，到2025年底，全國數據中心的整體上架率要達到不低於60%。這意味著，即便實現這一目標，仍有相當一部分算力資源處於閒置狀態。
上海超算中心主任李根國在接受中國媒體採訪時表示，過去各地數據中心建設存在同質化競爭，加之建設週期較長，早期的數據中心往往只是把老舊服務器一排排地擺進去。後來發現，實際需求並沒有那麼大，尤其是雲計算發展以後，大家都開始使用虛擬服務器，導致部分算力資源被長期閒置。
圖像來源，Getty Images -- 請至原網頁觀看照片
2021年4月7日，中國車企蔚來第10萬輛車下線。而僅在2022年蔚來就交付了12.2萬輛車，增幅34%。
政府引導下的重復投資
無論是哪些新興行業，其背後幾乎都能看到政府的身影。中國政府一直在主動推動、積極介入產業的規劃和投資，這已經不是什麼新聞了。最為知名的例子，就是李克強在任期間推出的「中國製造2025」計劃。該計劃從2015年到2025年，歷時十年，針對十大新興領域進行重點扶持和推薦。
這一計劃取得了顯著成果。有媒體估算，到2025年，「中國製造2025」計劃的完成度將超過80%。不過，這種政府主導的產業升級背後，也帶來了一些爭議。政府的推動意味著大量補貼、政府性基金的投資，以及產業政策的傾斜。這些做法讓一些國家對貿易公平性產生了質疑和摩擦。
以新能源汽車為例，多年來該行業享受了數以千億計的補貼。幾家炙手可熱的公司也都獲得了政府性基金的注入。例如，小鵬汽車主要獲得了來自廣東的產業發展基金支持；理想汽車則主要獲得了來自北京的政府基金投資；蔚來汽車則得到了安徽省相關基金的支持。
2025年上半年，中國一級市場的創投格局也發生了深刻變化。第三方機構IT桔子的數據顯示，在前20名活躍機構名單中，地方國資背景的機構佔據了半壁江山，而以往活躍的高瓴創投、紅杉中國等投資者則退居二線。
從投資佔比來看，一季度國資背景的投資金額超過900億元，佔市場總投資金額的約67%。各地也紛紛設立大規模投資基金。例如，北京設立了100億元專項債券，投向政府投資引導基金。這些政府支持的基金高度聚焦於半導體、人工智能、新能源、生物醫藥等高端領域。
當然，支持者則認為，這種模式可以在短時間內快速趕上大國競爭的步伐。尤其是在AI等領域快速崛起的當下，如果有政府的強力資金注入，從長期來看有可能獲得超額收益。
不過，也有批評者提出了不同觀點，比如中國人民大學學報發表的研究論文《地方政府引導基金與高技術製造業佈局 -- 基於國有建設用地出讓數據的觀察》明確指出：政府引導基金的設立可能會惡化城市之間高技術製造業投資的產業同構化問題和低水平重復建設問題。
文中提到，政府引導基金的設立使得城市新增高技術投資項目的產業分布更分散且相似度更高。此外，中國知名經濟學家張維迎長期以來批評政府主導的投資基金模式，認為這種做法違背了市場經濟規律。因為這類基金往往缺乏退出機制，人為延長了「僵屍企業」的生命週期，扭曲了市場正常的競爭秩序。
圖像來源，Getty Images -- 請至原網頁觀看照片
讓各地方政府競相發展經濟，然後以此考核官員，成為過去幾十年來中國推動經濟發展的重要手段。
政績焦慮
新能源汽車產業就是一個典型的例子。
近期倒閉的多家新能源企業背後都有政府基金的影子，這也導致了國有性質基金的損失。例如，剛剛陷入資金鍊困境的哪吒汽車，其背後就包括桐鄉市、宜春市和南寧市三個市屬財政引導基金的支持。地方官員的政績焦慮成為推動重復建設的重要推手。哈佛大學肯尼迪學院的威廉·奧弗霍爾特博士在其著作《中國成功的危機》中指出，這種競賽型發展模式「讓地方官員更關心項目的政治影響力，而非經濟效益」。
中國從官方到學者都在進行對「反內卷」的聲討之中，但是「內卷」並非中國的企業所願，而是不得已為之 -- 一位在長三角地區從事製造業的企業主匿名向BBC中文表示，目前行業內卷嚴重，他們正處於非常痛苦的階段。
他說，對於他們這種較為傳統的製造業來說，困境在一定程度上源於疫情期間全球貨幣政策寬松，導致海外需求暴漲，他們因此大力擴充產能。然而，近兩年海外需求收縮，國內消費信心不足，需求也持續低迷，導致此前擴建的許多產能如今面臨困難，利潤大幅下滑。
這位企業主表示，現在他們接單甚至願意在微虧的情況下運營，雖然虧錢，但至少能保證工廠運轉、員工不失業，企業得以存續。但如果這種狀況長期得不到改善，企業最終還是難逃倒閉的命運。
他個人對未來仍抱有一定希望，一方面寄望於中美能夠達成較好的關稅協議，讓中國企業繼續抓住部分海外市場；另一方面也希望中國經濟能夠復蘇，消費者更願意花錢，從而帶動內銷業務的回暖。但他坦言，目前無論是外銷還是內銷，都還沒有看到明顯的好轉跡象。
這種內卷的危害還有外溢性，比如低價的新能源汽車對歐盟市場的衝擊。經濟學人智庫(EIU)首席中國經濟學家蘇月此前向BBC中文分析，中國決策者主要擔心無序競爭和產能利用率低，而貿易夥伴則更關注中國整體產能和產量的快速增長。
這也解釋了為什麼耶倫對電動汽車(EV)市場供過於求和潛在的不公平補貼表示擔憂，儘管按照中國的標準，電動汽車(EV)的產能利用率並不低。這種情況下，會看到更多針對中國製造業的反補貼和反傾銷調查，尤其是在許多發達經濟體對通脹的擔憂減弱的情況下。這些調查可能會延伸到中國的海外工廠，包括東盟國家的工廠。
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反內卷政策文宣篇 -- 黃偉棠
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中國共產黨除了在行政效率上屬於可圈可點的一把手外，在玩文字遊戲和創造新名詞上其文膽們也不遑多讓，他/她謙稱第二，大概全球沒有人敢稱第一(且不論背後是不是有槍桿子)。我這幾天才看到「反內卷」這個文明詞兒；略收集解讀一、二，存檔備查。
下文作者把同義詞，甚至同一句話，翻來覆去、不厭其煩的說它個三、五遍；不知道這是「行為修辭學」的手法，還是因為這個政策空洞、乏善可陳。
反內卷政策：引領中國經濟高質量發展
2025-07-15，香港《文匯報》財經版
作者：黃偉棠 寰宇天瀜投資管理行政總裁、香港都會大學客席講師、註冊會計師、特許金融分析師
國家近期推出「反內卷」政策，針對產業過度競爭與產能過剩問題，為穩定經濟、振興股市及支援企業發展提供強而有力的方向。內卷描述企業在有限市場需求下，通過惡性價格戰爭奪份額，導致利潤下滑、創新受限及資源浪費。這一政策不僅表現在直接面對當前經濟挑戰，更體現政府對可持續發展的深遠考量。通過規範無序競爭、提升企業盈利能力及刺激內需，反內卷政策正為國家經濟注入新活力。
化解產能過剩 重塑產業結構
內地部分產業如太陽能、電動車及鋼鐵，因過度投資導致供給遠超需求，引發價格戰及企業虧損。大行數據顯示，2025年第一季度五大太陽能企業合計虧損超過80億元人民幣。反內卷政策通過規範價格競爭，推動供給側結構性改革，類似2015-2018年間的去產能政策，當時煤鋼行業成功削減過剩產能，價格回升，企業盈利顯著改善。政府可進一步鼓勵產業整合與技術升級，減少低效產能，提升企業定價能力。這不僅有助於穩定產業鏈，還能促進經濟內生增長，為企業創造更健康的競爭環境，進而為經濟長期穩定奠定基礎。
點燃市場信心 助力股市復甦
反內卷政策明確信號顯著提振投資者信心，推動股市積極反應。這個7月為止，滬深300指數上漲2%，太陽能及鋼鐵股如新疆大全新能源和柳州鋼鐵分別上漲19%及50%以上。從行為金融學角度看，政策透明度降低市場不確定性，吸引長期資本流入。政府可通過財稅優惠或定向補貼，鼓勵企業專注高附加值產品，進一步提升A股市場估值，特別是在汽車、電池及化工等行業。這種市場信心回暖不僅為企業融資創造有利條件，也為經濟復甦提供強勁動力，充分展現政策前瞻性。
盼多措並舉創造新機遇
筆者認為，為確保政策成效，政府將制定清晰行業指導意見，規範競爭行為；加大對創新型企業財政支持，鼓勵技術升級；通過定向降息或補貼刺激消費需求；並推動區域協調發展，避免地方政府過度產業競爭。這些措施將有效緩解內卷現象，提振企業盈利能力，穩定股市表現，並為國家經濟注入長期活力。反內卷政策的推進不僅為企業和股市創造了新機遇，也為全球經濟復甦貢獻方案。
題為編者所擬。本版文章，為作者之個人意見，不代表本報立場。
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中國推出提振消費方案 -- Lim Hui Jie
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請參見：中國推出提振消費專項行動，試圖刺激經濟。
China announces plan to ‘vigorously boost consumption’ in bid to shore up economy
Lim Hui Jie, 03/16/25
Key Points
* China announced a “Special Action Plan to Boost Consumption” on Sunday in a bid to prop up domestic consumption in the world’s second largest economy.
* The wide-ranging release also outlined other steps, such as taking “multiple measures” to stabilize the stock market and developing more bond products suitable for individual investors.
* China is currently facing a sluggish consumer landscape, with the most recent CPI in February registering its steepest fall in over a year and the PPI in negative growth territory since September 2022.
China announced a “Special Action Plan to Boost Consumption” on Sunday in a bid to prop up domestic consumption in the world’s second largest economy.
The General Office of the Central Committee, an office directly under China’s ruling party, said the plan was to vigorously boost consumption, expand domestic demand, and “enhance consumption capacity by increasing income and reducing burdens,” according to a Google translation of the report.
The wide-ranging release also outlined other steps, such as taking “multiple measures” to stabilize the stock market and developing more bond products suitable for individual investors.
China’s CSI 300 index and Hong Kong’s Hang Seng index were slightly up on Monday, registering gains of about 0.1%.
This comes a week after China’s Premier Li Qiang delivered an annual report on government work that named boosting consumption as the top task for the year ahead.
Back then, Chinese policymakers had increasingly acknowledged the need to counter deflationary pressure at home.
China is currently facing a sluggish consumer landscape, with the most recent consumer price index in February registering its steepest fall in over a year and producer price index in contractionary territory since October 2022.
The plan announced on Sunday also called for support to promote inbound and domestic tourism, with support planned to be given to ice and snow regions to help them develop into globally recognized winter tourism destinations. Unilateral visa-free arrangements will be expanded and regional entry policies will be optimized.
While the plan does not seem to contain “anything too new, setting this out as an action plan signals that concrete steps at local levels will follow.” said Lynn Song, ING’s chief economist for Greater China told CNBC.
More importantly, she said the plan shows China’s commitment towards addressing long-term structural issues such as the the slowdown of wages, the negative wealth effect from the property and stock markets, and the insufficient social safety net.
The plan calls for actions to increase incomes of both urban and rural residents, as well as farmers, such as employment support plans and continuing to implement the unemployment insurance policy.
Song pointed out, “these are likely multi-year directions rather than something that can be fixed in a few months. Directionally, it is quite encouraging that policymakers are taking a sober look at these themes, and it should help the longer term transition to a consumption driven economy.”
“As they say, Rome wasn’t built in a day – neither was BYD and China’s EV dominance – many of China’s major policy directives take time to bear fruit, and this document plants the seeds for the long-term development of the consumer industry,” Song said.
Back in March, Chinese policymakers said China must focus more on domestic demand given the possibility of “new shocks” to overseas demand, according to Shen Danyang, head of the drafting group of the Government Work Report and director of the State Council Research Office.
Chinese leaders also pledged at an annual parliamentary meeting in January an additional 300 billion yuan (41.45 billion) of ultra-long special treasury bonds for consumers’ subsidy support.
Richard Harris, chief executive at investment management firm Port Shelter Investment Management, told CNBC’s “Squawk Box Asia” that Chinese authorities really have to focus on fixing the domestic economy.
“The authorities are determined to stimulate the economy, determined to keep it going, and even if we see some issues with the export side of the economy, they are determined to get the domestic economy going. Because they have to,” Harris added.
— CNBC’s Anniek Bao contributed to this report.
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展望中國兩會：2025 -- Neil Thomas/Jing Qian
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看了這個分析，我不禁從「審慎樂觀」向「提心吊膽」移動了幾步(開欄文第3節)。雖然我不是經濟學家，嗅覺也不靈敏；但畢竟看過至少成千，幾乎上萬隻豬從我眼前走過。在我聽起來，中國政府所謂的「改革」，越來越像是「老調重彈」或「照本宣科」的同義詞。
索引：
中國人民政治協商會議
全國人民代表大會
民營企業座談會1、民營企業座談會2
What to Watch at China’s Two Sessions in 2025
Neil Thomas/Jing Qian, 02/26/25
Click on section headings to see sub-sections.
Policy: How Much Stimulus Will Be in the Government Work Report?
Politics: How to Respond to Trump 2.0?
Personnel: Major Moves Unlikely
Key Dates
The annual Two Sessions is the closest thing to a carnival in Chinese politics. Thousands of leaders, bureaucrats, experts, reporters, and celebrities from across the country flock to Beijing for a week of political pageantry. While the premier’s annual “state of the union” address is more restrained than its American counterpart — U.S. President Donald Trump is scheduled to address a joint session of Congress just a day earlier — it remains a key indicator of China’s economic direction.
The Two Sessions refers to the concurrent annual meetings of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which opens on March 4, and the National People’s Congress (NPC), which begins on March 5. These meetings are expected to conclude on or around March 11.
Both institutions answer to the Chinese Communist Party, led by General Secretary Xi Jinping. The CPPCC National Committee, with 2,169 members, serves as the overarching organization of the United Front system, which mobilizes various social groups to support and advise the Party. Meanwhile, the NPC, with 2,977 delegates, functions as a single-chamber parliament that is, at least notionally, the supreme organ of state power.
Anticipation surrounding this year’s event has been heightened by a rare “symposium on private enterprises” that Xi hosted on February 17, attended by some of the country’s top entrepreneurs. This uncommon symposium, last held in 2018, raised hopes for China’s struggling economy — particularly following the January return of President Trump, a self-proclaimed “tariff king” who has already imposed an additional 10% levy on Chinese imports. Now, attention shifts to how much Beijing is willing to boost stimulus, support businesses, and respond to Trump’s trade policies.
The Two Sessions is expected to reveal a more pro-growth agenda compared to last year, with approximate targets of 5% for GDP growth, 4% of GDP for the fiscal deficit ratio, and 2% for consumer inflation. Further stimulus will come from roughly 3 trillion yuan in ultralong special treasury bonds and 4.5–5 trillion yuan in local government special-purpose bonds. Measures to boost consumer spending and encourage private-sector innovation will also be introduced. While Beijing aims to stabilize growth, it is unlikely to unleash the proverbial “bazooka” stimulus, as it needs to conserve fiscal resources for a potential trade war. Similarly, sweeping structural reforms remain improbable as the government remains committed to Xi’s vision of high-tech industrial self-reliance.
Policy: How Much Stimulus Will Be in the Government Work Report?
A key focus of the Two Sessions will be the Government Work Report (GWR), which Premier Li Qiang will present to the NPC on behalf of the State Council on March 5. The report will review the government’s work in 2024, outline economic priorities for 2025, and set major policy tasks for the year ahead. Headlines will center on annual targets for growth, deficits, and inflation.
The GWR is expected to reinforce priorities set by the Party late last year. On December 9, the Politburo announced a shift in China’s monetary policy stance from “stable and prudent” to “appropriately loose” — an expansionary move and the first of its kind since 2010. It also signaled stronger fiscal stimulus, calling for a “more proactive fiscal policy” and an enhancement of “extraordinary counter-cyclical adjustments.” A few days later, at the Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) held on December 11–12, officials pledged to “increase the fiscal deficit ratio” and prioritize “vigorously boosting consumption, improving investment efficiency, and expanding all-round domestic demand.” Beijing is poised to take further steps to support growth in the coming year — though it is unlikely to diverge from Xi’s overarching economic strategy.
Key targets will reflect stronger stimulus
China will likely maintain a GDP growth target of “around 5%” for the third consecutive year. Provincial governments, which present work reports to local parliamentary gatherings ahead of the Two Sessions, have set growth targets with a weighted average of 5.1%. This target is ambitious, given higher U.S. tariffs, skepticism about Beijing’s claim that it met its 2024 target, and ongoing struggles with a property market correction, weak consumer sentiment, and strained local finances. To achieve this target, Beijing will expand fiscal stimulus, lower bank reserve requirements, and cut interest rates — though concerns over potential capital flight will constrain its monetary policies. The more U.S.-China trade and technology tensions escalate, the more aggressively Beijing may implement stimulus measures.
請至原網頁查看GDP成長標的統計圖表
Reports indicate that China will set a record-high fiscal deficit ratio target of 4% of GDP. This implies an additional 1.3 trillion yuan in spending within the general budget but does not fully capture the extent of fiscal stimulus. Beijing will also raise more off-budget funds through ultralong special treasury bonds, first introduced last year with a 1-trillion-yuan issuance, and local government special-purpose bonds, which had a target issuance of 3.9 trillion yuan in 2024. Speculation suggests that these figures will rise substantially this year, reaching at least 3 trillion yuan and 4.5 trillion yuan, respectively.
請至原網頁查看財政赤字比例統計圖表
China is expected to lower its consumer inflation target ceiling from 3% to around 2%. This adjustment aligns with expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, as Beijing has consistently fallen short of its targets in recent years, recording just 0.2% inflation in both 2023 and 2024. Deflationary pressures persist as the ongoing property correction continues to erode household wealth and suppress consumer spending. Every provincial-level government has set a 2% inflation target. If applied nationally, this would mark the lowest target since the early 2000s and the first time in over two decades that the figure falls below 3%.
請至原網頁查看通貨膨脹標的統計圖表
China will also announce annual targets for new urban jobs and the urban unemployment rate. Last year, Beijing set these targets at 12 million new jobs and 5.5% unemployment, and this year’s figures will likely be similar. Employment remains a politically sensitive issue due to its potential link to social unrest, making it one of the few economic indicators for which official targets are always met — at least according to government statistics.
請至原網頁查看城市失業率標的統計圖表
China’s underlying economic strategy is unlikely to see fundamental change
The Party mapped out China’s political economy for the remainder of this decade during its Third Plenum in July 2024. Xi reaffirmed his commitment to the concept of “high-quality development,” which prioritizes central guidance, industrial capacity, technological self-reliance, environmental protection, and social welfare over rapid growth and market forces. This approach has favored investment in high-tech “new productive forces” — last year’s Two Sessions buzzword — rather than boosting household consumption.
Despite the CEWC placing consumption at the top of its priority list, Beijing has a history of failing to follow through on its commitments to boosting domestic demand. No transformative policies appear to be in the pipeline, although the GWR is expected to announce an expanded “cash-for-clunkers” subsidy scheme to encourage the replacement of outdated appliances and machinery. Efforts to stabilize the housing market and increase social spending on pensions, healthcare, and child-rearing will provide some relief to households, but most stimulus is still expected to flow to enterprises and local governments.
Any stimulus package that Li Qiang unveils at this year’s Two Sessions should be seen as a short-term stabilization measure aimed at supporting Xi’s longer-term economic strategy. The most optimistic outcome that could plausibly make it into the GWR would be a commitment to aggressively implementing the structural reforms proposed at the Third Plenum but not yet meaningfully enacted. These include decentralizing fiscal responsibilities, strengthening the tax system, and removing internal market barriers — all of which were highlighted in the CEWC readout. However, whether the political will exists for such reforms remains uncertain, as concrete details and action plans have yet to emerge.
Beyond these broad measures, the CEWC has outlined seven priority areas for boosting consumption in 2025, signaling where policy support is likely to be concentrated. These include positioning China as a hub for product launches, winter tourism, and the “silver economy” focused on catering to an aging population. Other priorities involve recalibrating platform economy regulations, stimulating economic activity in smaller cities, integrating the Greater Bay Area, and expanding investment in maritime industries. On February 20, Li hosted a State Council study session on “vigorously boosting consumption to expand domestic demand,” emphasizing experience-based services as a top priority.
Beijing is betting that a massive Party-led push for research, innovation, commercialization, manufacturing, and digitalization can create new economic growth drivers to replace the real estate sector and generate productivity gains that help mitigate issues related to debt, demographics, and dependence on the West. Trump’s return has heightened concerns over the latter, prompting Li to tell the State Council on February 5 that the GWR must “integrate resolving domestic economic problems with responding to external challenges and be good at turning pressure into motivation.” Li emphasized the need to “create more outstanding highlights that can provide impetus to our overall situation,” possibly alluding to DeepSeek, China’s AI sensation, whose founder, Liang Wenfeng, briefed him two weeks prior.
Beijing’s AI push is gaining momentum, with central state-owned enterprises now explicitly tasked with making AI a strategic priority in the 15th Five-Year Plan. The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council recently directed them to seize the “strategic window” for AI development by leveraging China’s vast market demand, deep supply chains, and diverse application scenarios. Beyond deployment, Beijing is emphasizing the mastery of “root technologies” and fostering “zero-to-one” breakthroughs, particularly in large language models and open-source ecosystems. Notably, the directive calls for major investments in data, computing power, and “patient capital” to sustain long-term innovation.
However, the current process of structural change is reinforcing an export-reliant growth model, which could have long-term consequences for China’s economy. It is depressing consumption, driving down prices and incomes, and restraining profits and private investment. This makes exports even more crucial both economically and politically, which runs the risk of creating a vicious policy cycle that could prove difficult to break and risk exacerbating trade tensions by fueling overcapacity concerns abroad.
Positive developments for private firms and foreign investors
Xi’s private enterprise symposium successfully generated widespread attention, reinforcing the prospect of a more business-friendly environment in Beijing. He shook hands with top entrepreneurs, including the once-sidelined Alibaba founder Jack Ma, and pledged to “promote the healthy development and high-quality development of the private economy.” Beijing is clearly working to restore confidence after years of regulatory crackdowns, bureaucratic interference, and sluggish private investment. The government is sending a strong message — not just to entrepreneurs but also to regulatory bodies and local governments — that China needs its private sector. In recent days, there have been moves to improve market access, expand private participation in major government policies, and fast-track the Private Economy Promotion Law.
This endorsement is aimed at improving business sentiment, but its primary goal is to mobilize the private sector to advance tech-driven productivity and supply-chain resilience, both of which are key to Xi’s state-guided economic strategy. Xi emphasized that entrepreneurs should “dedicate themselves to serving the country,” urging them to align with national policies and support government priorities. Unsurprisingly, many speakers at the symposium represented industries central to U.S.-China competition. The event largely reaffirmed existing Party commitments to the private sector, meaning most firms are likely to wait for tangible improvements before making significant changes to their business plans.
請至原網頁查看民營企業座談會發言者名單
Concerns over last year’s record-high foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows and a 27.1% drop in actual utilized foreign investment may prompt further policies to attract foreign investors. The CEWC affirmed Xi’s call for greater “independent opening” and “unilateral opening” at last November’s APEC summit. The release of a Foreign Investment Stabilization Action Plan on February 19 marks China’s first standalone recalibration of FDI policy in nearly four decades — an acknowledgment of Beijing’s urgency to stem capital flight.
The plan reflects a strategic shift in Beijing’s approach — moving away from tax breaks and subsidies toward sector-specific liberalization, regulatory streamlining, and reinvestment incentives. It codifies new measures offering expanded access to value-added telecommunications services, wholly foreign-owned hospitals, and streamlined drug approvals, aligning FDI more closely with government priorities. There is also a strong push to retain FDI through eased restrictions on mergers and acquisitions and improved access to domestic financing channels.
This strategy underscores Beijing’s broader goal: anchoring foreign businesses within China’s regulatory framework to turn them into long-term stakeholders, making local expansion more appealing than reallocating capital to other markets. However, while the FDI plan signals strong intent, global investors will look beyond rhetoric for concrete regulatory improvements, expanded market access, and greater capital flow flexibility. The Center for China Analysis will closely monitor FDI trends in key sectors, including telecommunications, healthcare, pharmaceuticals, and education.
Foreign policy and Taiwan are red herrings
Li Qiang is unlikely to announce any major shifts in foreign policy or Taiwan policy. Each year, analysts closely examine the GWR for new changes in wording on these issues, but such variations are rarely significant, as Xi remains the primary decision-maker. For instance, Li omitted the phrase “peaceful unification” from last year’s GWR, yet the very next day, Xi urged CPPCC members to promote that exact principle.
The most important Two Sessions data point related to foreign policy is Beijing’s military budget. Last year, China announced military spending of RMB 1.67 trillion, a 7.2% increase from 2023 — the same proportional annual change as the previous year. However, these figures should be interpreted with caution when compared to GDP statistics, as they represent nominal rather than real increases.
Additionally, Wang Yi is expected to hold the annual foreign minister’s press conference on March 7, where he will provide a more detailed overview of China’s foreign policy than what is outlined in the GWR. He will likely stress China’s red lines and address the U.S.-China economic and trade relationship. However, major policy shifts or groundbreaking statements are unlikely — the key watchpoint will be whether Xi himself makes direct comments on U.S.-China relations.
Politics: How to Respond to Trump 2.0?
One of the most pressing questions in Chinese politics — particularly for international observers — is how Xi will respond to the tariffs and threats issued by U.S. President Donald Trump. How much will Beijing be willing to compromise to secure a deal? How will China retaliate against future U.S. economic measures? Will Xi adopt a stance of restraint, or will he engage in mutual escalation with Washington? And how will China navigate the evolving U.S.-Russia rapprochement?
Xi has a limited role but massive influence
Xi does not deliver a major speech at the Two Sessions, but he will address an NPC provincial delegation, a CPPCC sectoral group, and the NPC delegation from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police. Last year, he met with the NPC delegation from Jiangsu Province and CPPCC members representing the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, the environmental sector, and the technology sector.
Xi could use these addresses to send key signals about U.S.-China relations. Two years ago, he told a CPPCC group that “Western countries, led by the United States, have implemented comprehensive containment, encirclement, and suppression against China.” If he revives such language, it would suggest a shift back toward confrontation with the United States — especially after its omission last year, following the stabilization of bilateral ties at the Woodside Summit in November 2023.
So far, Trump’s disruption of traditional U.S. diplomacy has enabled China to position itself as a defender of the global economy and international order — a dynamic that seemingly serves Xi’s interests. Beijing’s response to Trump’s initial 10% tariffs was measured — restrained enough to signal openness to negotiations yet firm enough to demonstrate its willingness to escalate if necessary. Xi is treading carefully, likely seeking to avoid provoking Trump, as he may view an in-person meeting as a way to slow the momentum of U.S. tariffs, sanctions, and export controls.
Xi’s remarks often reveal his stance on economic issues, sometimes in unusually personal terms. Last year, he expressed skepticism about direct consumer stimulus, stating that the Party must “motivate the broad masses to rely on their own two hands to create a happy life.” He also outlined Beijing’s three-pronged industrial policy of “upgrading traditional industries, expanding emerging industries, and cultivating future industries.” Any concessions to foreign concerns about overcapacity seemed doubtful after he delivered a lengthy tribute to China’s “arduous struggle for self-reliance” in manufacturing.
One of the most significant potential developments would be if Xi comments on the 15th Five-Year Plan, which will define China’s economic and social development priorities for 2026–2030. The plan is scheduled for release at the Two Sessions in March 2026, and Xi is expected to convene a Fourth Plenum of the Party’s Central Committee later this year to provide high-level guidance on its content.
請至原網頁查看歷屆兩會政府工作報告得票率統計圖
What about other leaders? Will Li Qiang reappear?
The biggest surprise at last year’s Two Sessions was the cancellation of the premier’s annual press conference, a tradition dating back to the 1990s. Li Qiang’s absence from the spotlight underlined the State Council’s subordination to the Party under Xi, a political reality that was formally codified at the same event through a revision to the State Council Organic Law. A revival of the press conference seems unlikely, but if it were to return, it would signal Xi’s growing trust in Li.
The Two Sessions also provides insights into Beijing’s broader political landscape. Any changes in the visibility of senior leaders could indicate shifting political dynamics. State media will highlight certain delegates and policy proposals, offering a glimpse into the government’s priorities — or at least what it wants to be perceived as prioritizing. Some attendees may even seize the spotlight to make bold or provocative statements, much like Peking University Professor Jia Qingguo, who last year called for relaxing restrictions on scholarly exchanges and travel.
Two officials to watch are Pan Gongsheng, governor of the People’s Bank of China, and Zheng Shanjie, director of the National Development and Reform Commission. Pan played a central role in launching Beijing’s most recent stimulus push, leading a press conference on September 24 that introduced a series of monetary policy measures — a move that immediately reinvigorated Chinese capital markets. Two days later, Xi chaired a Politburo meeting that reaffirmed this new direction. However, Zheng’s follow-up press conference dampened market enthusiasm, as it failed to identify any tangible new fiscal policy measures. Pan’s influence appears to be on the rise, with the CEWC pledging to “explore expanding the central bank’s macro-prudential and financial stabilization functions.” Meanwhile, Zheng has come under pressure to improve his performance in economic policymaking.
Personnel: Major Moves Unlikely
The annual NPC session has the authority to appoint and remove State Council leaders but rarely serves as a venue for major personnel changes, except during the quinquennial turnover following a Party Congress. Last year, speculation swirled that Beijing would appoint a new foreign minister to replace Qin Gang, but Wang Yi — whose primary role remains director of the CCP Central Foreign Affairs Office — retained the position after reassuming it following Qin’s dismissal.
The NPC could also elevate Defense Minister Dong Jun to the higher-ranking concurrent role of state councilor, a position held by many of his predecessors. However, this seems unlikely, as Xi has already passed up multiple opportunities to promote Dong. His lower status may serve as a form of political retribution against the PLA for the ongoing corruption scandals that continue to shake its top ranks.
Key Dates
Beijing will not release agendas for the CPPCC and NPC meetings until the day before they begin, but based on past practice, the dates in the table below should be reasonable estimates. Observers can also monitor the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau’s forthcoming annual notice on low-altitude aircraft restrictions during the Two Sessions to determine the end date. Much of the time will be dedicated to CPPCC members and NPC delegates deliberating the drafts of various reports — though meaningful revisions are rarely made before final adoption at the end of the Two Sessions.
請至原網頁查看本屆兩會預估日程表
The authors are grateful to CCA members Lizzi C. Lee, Lobsang Tsering, and Shengyu Wang for their contributions to this report.
Neil Thomas is a Fellow on Chinese Politics, Center for China Analysis
Jing Qian is the Co-Founder and Managing Director, Center for China Analysis
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2025中國經濟著力點-新華社
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從中央經濟工作會議看2025年中國經濟著力點
《新華社》2024-12-13
中央經濟工作會議12月11日至12日在北京舉行。習近平總書記出席會議併發表重要講話，總結2024年經濟工作，分析當前經濟形勢，部署2025年經濟工作，為中國經濟高質量發展把舵定向。
堅定信心不斷深化對經濟工作的規律性認識
今年是實現“十四五”規劃目標任務的關鍵一年。
“經濟運行總體平穩、穩中有進，高質量發展紮實推進，經濟社會發展主要目標任務即將順利完成。”中央經濟工作會議這樣總結今年經濟運行情況。
會議認為，實踐中，我們不斷深化對經濟工作的規律性認識：
“黨中央集中統一領導是做好經濟工作的根本保證”；
“必須統籌好有效市場和有為政府的關係”；
“必須統籌好總供給和總需求的關係”；
“必須統籌好培育新動能和更新舊動能的關係”；
“必須統籌好做優增量和盤活存量的關係”；
“必須統籌好提升質量和做大總量的關係”。
會議提出的“根本保證”“五個統籌”，進一步豐富和發展了習近平經濟思想，為做好明年經濟工作提供了根本遵循。
“這些規律性認識，既是應對當前困難挑戰、鞏固經濟回升向好態勢的重要著力點，也是促進經濟結構轉型升級、推動高質量發展的科學方法論。”國家發展改革委經濟研究所副所長郭麗岩説。
南方科技大學副校長金李認為：“深化對經濟工作的規律性認識，科學分析當前經濟形勢，有助於我們採取更加有效舉措，有力破解發展難題，穩定發展預期，提振社會信心，充分調動各方面積極性，凝聚推動高質量發展的合力。”
實施更加積極有為的宏觀政策
會議要求，明年要堅持穩中求進、以進促穩，守正創新、先立後破，系統集成、協同配合，充實完善政策工具箱，提高宏觀調控的前瞻性、針對性、有效性。
中國財政科學研究院研究員石英華表示，針對明年較為複雜的國內外形勢，會議釋放了宏觀政策將更加積極有為的信號，有利於進一步堅定各方發展信心，穩定市場預期，積極主動應對困難挑戰，有助於確保高質量完成“十四五”規劃目標任務、為實現“十五五”良好開局打牢基礎。
提高財政赤字率，確保財政政策持續用力、更加給力；加大財政支出強度；增加發行超長期特別國債……會議明確，要實施更加積極的財政政策。
“會議圍繞財政赤字、財政支出、超長期特別國債、專項債等多種政策工具作出積極部署，惠當前也利長遠。通過實施更加積極、更加給力的財政政策，將進一步加大逆週期調節力度，積極對衝外部不確定性，為明年經濟穩定增長、持續向好提供支撐。”石英華説。
會議提出，要實施適度寬鬆的貨幣政策。“我國貨幣政策從‘穩健’調整為‘適度寬鬆’，是基於當前經濟形勢的需要和明年經濟工作的謀劃，有助於增強逆週期調節效果，提振市場信心，推動經濟回升向好。”上海金融與發展實驗室主任曾剛説。
對於會議提出的“適時降準降息”，曾剛認為，在適度寬鬆的貨幣政策基調下，降準降息將為我國經濟提供更強的逆週期調節支持，有助於保持流動性合理充裕，降低社會綜合融資成本，進一步擴大內需，釋放消費和投資潛力。
會議強調要打好政策“組合拳”。中國稅務學會常務理事、學術委員會委員羅志恒表示，當前宏觀經濟治理的複雜性上升，必須用系統性的思維、方法和措施，強化政策統籌和部門協同，圍繞經濟社會發展主要目標出臺取向一致的宏觀政策，形成各方面共同推動高質量發展的強大合力。
全方位擴大國內需求
擴大內需，既是應對外部衝擊、穩定經濟運行的有效途徑，也是增強發展主動性的長久之策。會議將“大力提振消費、提高投資效益，全方位擴大國內需求”擺在明年9項重點任務之首。
“當前，國內需求不足的挑戰仍然較大。需要注重改善居民收入、提升消費能力，進而提振消費，擴大國內需求。”國務院發展研究中心宏觀經濟研究部第二研究室主任李承健説。
“推動中低收入群體增收減負”“適當提高退休人員基本養老金”“加力擴圍實施‘兩新’政策”“積極發展首發經濟、冰雪經濟、銀發經濟”……圍繞大力提振消費，會議作出系列部署。
李承健表示，隨著消費品以舊換新及一攬子增量政策效應逐步顯現，汽車、家電、家居等大宗消費回升較快。要持續鞏固消費回暖勢頭，積極培育定制消費、體驗消費、服務消費等新引擎，不斷拓展消費新空間。
投資既是當前的需求，也是未來的供給。加強自上而下組織協調，更大力度支持“兩重”項目；適度增加中央預算內投資；大力實施城市更新……會議作出系列部署。
“不管是從建設現代化的産業體系，還是從滿足人民群眾美好生活需要的角度看，我國投資都蘊藏著巨大的潛力空間。”郭麗岩表示，要更加注重投資的精準性和有效性，充分發揮政府投資的帶動放大效應，持續優化投資結構，激發社會投資活力。
以科技創新引領新質生産力發展
會議強調，“以科技創新引領新質生産力發展，建設現代化産業體系”，釋放了創新驅動發展的鮮明信號。
加強基礎研究和關鍵核心技術攻關，超前佈局重大科技項目，開展新技術新産品新場景大規模應用示範行動；開展“人工智慧+”行動，
“綜合整治‘內卷式’競爭，規範地方政府和企業行為”，會議的這一表述引人關注。
中國社會科學院工業經濟研究所副研究員李偉表示，走出“內卷”困境就不能忽視産業發展規律和自身條件，要因地制宜發展新質生産力，不同地區、不同技術路線、不同産業類型都要結合各自的特點和優勢，採取不同發展路徑，避免一哄而上、泡沫化。
會議指出，針對産業轉型升級的瓶頸制約，推動新舊動能平穩接續轉換。
李偉表示，傳統産業轉型升級為先進技術和新興産業發展提供市場空間，新興産業發展壯大也離不開傳統産業在生産工藝、製造設備等方面的支撐保障。推動新舊動能平穩接續轉換，就要增強産業發展的接續性，積極運用數字技術、綠色技術改造提升傳統産業，實現傳統産業改造提升和新興産業培育發展的雙贏。
以改革開放增強發展內生動力
“出臺民營經濟促進法”“開展規範涉企執法專項行動”“制定全國統一大市場建設指引”“促進平臺經濟健康發展”“統籌推進財稅體制改革”“深化資本市場投融資綜合改革”……會議提出，發揮經濟體制改革牽引作用，推動標誌性改革舉措落地見效。
商務部國際貿易經濟合作研究院副院長崔衛傑表示，會議的系列重要部署聚焦當前經濟重點領域關鍵環節、深層次矛盾和緊迫性問題，著力打通堵點，補齊短板，形成可預期的制度安排，有利於牽引和帶動其他領域改革，形成破除深層次體制機制障礙的強大合力。
會議還提出，擴大高水平對外開放，穩外貿、穩外資，部署“有序擴大自主開放和單邊開放”“積極發展服務貿易、綠色貿易、數字貿易”“持續打造‘投資中國’品牌”“穩步推進服務業開放”等具體舉措。
當前外部環境不穩定、不確定和難預料因素增多，我國外貿外資發展承壓。崔衛傑説，會議提出的一系列舉措適應了我國開放重點從製造領域拓展至服務領域的發展趨勢，也適應了數字經濟和數字貿易發展新形勢，有利於發揮外貿發展和吸引外資的創新優勢，進一步激發增長潛能。同時，這一系列舉措制度型開放特徵明顯，將進一步倒逼國內制度改革與創新，以高水平對外開放的制度建設推動改革向體制機制的“深水區”“無人區”邁進。
會議提出，加大區域戰略實施力度，增強區域發展活力。郭麗岩説，要深入實施區域重大戰略，通過自貿試驗區建設穩步推進制度型開放，推動形成更高層次改革開放新格局，培育新的增長極。
加大保障和改善民生力度
“統籌推進新型城鎮化和鄉村全面振興”“協同推進降碳減污擴綠增長”“加大保障和改善民生力度”……會議多項部署聚焦群眾關切，增進民生福祉。
會議明確，“健全糧食價格形成機制”“進一步深化生態文明體制改革”“加強自然災害防治體系建設”“促進重點群體就業”“推動義務教育優質均衡發展”“實施醫療衛生強基工程”。
“在發展中保障和改善民生是中國式現代化的重大任務，一系列部署涵蓋城鄉融合發展、經濟社會發展全面綠色轉型等，既著眼當下，解決好人民群眾急難愁盼，也著眼長遠，不斷滿足人民高品質生活需求。”金李表示，落實好會議部署，各方要細化任務，推動利民惠民舉措落實落細。
保障和改善民生，需要統籌好發展和安全。會議指出，有效防範化解重點領域風險，牢牢守住不發生系統性風險底線。
“房地産是需要化解風險的重點領域之一，近期政策成效初步顯現。”中國宏觀經濟研究院研究員劉琳表示，在行業恢復發展的關鍵時刻，會議提出“持續用力推動房地産市場止跌回穩”“加力實施城中村和危舊房改造”“盤活存量用地和商辦用房”等措施，堅持從供需兩端持續發力的政策思路，將有助於延續當前向好勢頭，進一步把政策利好轉化為市場信心和發展效益。
明年經濟工作的大政方針已定，關鍵在於抓好落實。會議強調，要加強黨對經濟工作的領導，堅持幹字當頭，增強信心、迎難而上、奮發有為，確保黨中央各項決策部署落到實處。
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2024中共中央經濟會議 -- 澎湃新聞
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中央經濟會議在北京舉行
提高財政赤字率，增加發行超長期特別國債，增加地方政府專項債券發行使用
《澎湃新聞》2024-12-12
中央經濟工作會議12月11日至12日在北京舉行。
會議指出，明年要保持經濟穩定增長，保持就業、物價總體穩定，保持國際收支基本平衡，促進居民收入增長和經濟增長同步。 會議要求，明年要堅持穩中求進、以進促穩、守正創新、先立後破，系統集成、協同配合。 要實施更加積極的財政政策，提高財政赤字率，增加發行超長期特別國債，增加地方政府專項債券發行使用，優化財政支出結構，兜牢基層三保底線。
卜凱：
以上是《澎湃新聞》對「中共中央經濟會議」的重點報告；同一網頁另有《【專題】中央經濟工作會議深讀》超連結可以接至其他深入分析。另請參考本攔下一篇。
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《習近平的中國經濟計劃注定失敗》讀後
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原文由中國問題專家劉博士和經濟學家史泰爾博士共同執筆(。以下略抒讀後感想。
中國「零容忍」政策的功能性，和中國政府就該政策改弦易轍的變通性當然可以評論；但在我看來，原文「開場白」的第一段明顯表現出兩位作者相當偏頗。從而，不得不讓我對她/他們以下分析/評論「就事論事」或「依理說理」的程度提高警覺。
接下來的兩段呈現的仍然是「主見」多於「事實」。
第四段則與事實不符。中國早在2020就提出「雙循環規劃」；此規劃的重點正是「基於國內消費的成長」。2023年只是再度宣示和繼續強調此政策。
第五段提出經濟發展過程中「中等收入困境」這個一般性現實，可參考。
兩位作者在第六段又回到她/他們「主見」多於「事實」的困境。的確，直到20世紀後期，中國人民的儲蓄行為很強；但「儲蓄行為」並非由基因主導，它不屬於俗稱的「民族性」。「儲蓄行為」由「社會建構」過程而來，它是一種「社會習慣」。我們可以從韋伯的「新教倫理觀」來了解；也可以從馬克思的「『社會存在』決定『意識』論」來了解。抓住過去中國老百姓的「儲蓄行為」來討論21世紀的中國社會走向，兩位作者難免缺乏「歷史感」及社會學素養之譏。此處可參看《中國經濟之狀況篇》一欄中《中國經濟成長下半年度可望回升》一文。順帶一提：如果使用中國「傳宗接代」的倫理觀來理解中國目前生育率偏低這個現象，勢必落個牛頭不對馬嘴。
正文第一節《優先順位的衝突》列舉了許多中國經濟發展中相互衝突的勢力，以及隨之而來在政策上的困局，可參考。它們是否到位或切中要害，則非我有有能力置喙。
正文第二節討論中國老百姓的「儲蓄行為」；請見以上相關討論。
正文第三節討論「消費衰退」；請見以上引用的《中國經濟成長下半年度可望回升》一文。
正文第四節《黨先於消費者》以香港為例指出，執行「基於國內消費的成長」的前置條件，可參考。
以上我提出一些兩位作者「論述」有爭議之處；她/他們的「判斷」是否成立，等到年底可能會有些眉目。
最後，我對兩位作者「論述」的基本「前提」提出一個淺見。
天下沒有十全十美的人、東西、制度、或政權。雖然「存在」並不蘊含「合理」；但是，在絕大多數情況下，「存在」通常表示「存在者/物」有其「存在之道」。兩位作者「論述」基本本「前提」是：以歐、美社會在「民主制度下的市場機制」為立論模型及判斷標準。
可惜的是：如果以歐、美社會在「民主制度下的市場機制」為立論模型及判斷標準，中華人民共和國「應該」活不到20歲。事實是：中華人民共和國不但活到74歲，還活得活蹦亂跳，橫衝直闖。因此，要有根有據的討論中國現況或預測她的未來，學者們得加把勁，先搞清楚：
一個完全不照「民主制度下的市場機制」原則出牌的社會，為什麼有這麼強勁的生命力。
如果各位覺得以下正文過於冗常，本欄轉貼《財經內幕》上的《不再依賴投資：中國經濟復甦注定失敗》一文為以下原文「精華版」。
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《習總書記重振中國經濟之道》讀後
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任淑莉女士此文分析中國經濟當下面對的困境以及復甦之道。
前者為：政府過去的政策和措施導致投資者裹足不前。
後者為：政府改變角色，從管理者與調控者轉換為買家和投資者。
這味藥不過是「政府撒錢」的老偏方、舊戲碼。現在是否管用還真難說。我不是財經專業人士，以下只根據看過豬走路的常識略表淺見。
1) 投資回收效益議題：「報酬遞減律」應該是經濟學最早被發現的硬道理之一。例如，10年或20年前，進行基礎建設(蓋機場、修高速公路等等)除了擴大就業和帶動景氣外，還有增加諸如運輸效能的價值(貨暢其流)。但基礎建設有一定的飽和值或臨界點，超過這個飽和值的基礎建設就成了蚊子館、蚊子公路、和蚊子機場。
2) 後續發展議題：這是上個議題的延伸。俗話說，「錢要用在刀口上」。如果政府撒了錢只能維持短期的就業和景氣，主事者必須三思。理論上，政府要規劃「公共支出」，這筆預算的對象應該以建立一個可持續發展的產業為優先；例如當年台灣政府扶植「半導體產業」。又例如南韓政府當年扶植「服裝設計產業」。
3) 財政健康議題：「撒錢」是銅板的一面；這個銅板另一面刻著的是「透支」。帳總有結算的一天，只是遲早問題。債務危機先引爆？經濟停滯先搞垮政府？恐怕不是那個精算師或政治領袖敢打包票。
從而，任女士大作的標題不無浮誇之嫌。
索引：
deleveraging – 降低資產負債比
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習總書記重振中國經濟之道 -- Shuli Ren
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This Is How Xi Jinping Can Fix China's ‘Great Recession’
Beijing has been too busy with regulations. It’s time it stepped in and became a buyer of last resort.
Shuli Ren, 06/06/23
As it turns out, reopening alone is not enough to get China’s economy back on track. Only six months after the end of Covid Zero, manufacturing is already spluttering, one in five young people are jobless, and private businesses are not investing for the future.
There is a sense that the People’s Bank of China’s easing measures are no longer working. In a cover story last weekend, Caixin, an influential local news outlet, asked where all the central bank’s money went. M2, a broader measure of money supply, has been growing in double digits since the Shanghai lockdown more than a year ago. But there’s been little economic growth, and no inflation.
Consumers, for one, are not taking advantage of the central bank’s lower rates on new home purchases. Rather than buying more apartments, they’re speeding up payments on existing mortgages. Private businesses don’t seem to be expanding their fixed-asset investments either. Instead, consumers and entrepreneurs are cutting down debt, and putting excess cash into bank deposits.
In its article, Caixin asked if China is starting to exhibit an unusual economic aberration that has plagued Japan. Drawing on economist Richard Koo’s works, including The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession, the magazine worried that China might be suffering from what Koo called “balance sheet recession,” in that rather than maximizing profit, most companies are busy minimizing debt and repairing their balance sheets.
In a way, President Xi Jinping’s deleveraging campaign, which got under way in late 2017, has worked too well. However, this kind of risk-averse mindset is also dangerous. It renders traditional stimulus measures ineffective and takes China out of the normal rhythms of business cycles. Just look at what happened to Japan’s lost decades.
Beijing therefore needs to act now to nip China’s “Great Recession” in the bud. It’s time for top policymakers to put away the regulator hat, and learn to be an investor.
Right now, the economy’s biggest problem is that there are few buyers left, leading to deflationary expectations on asset prices. Last year, amid brutal tech crackdowns, foreigners’ equity holdings tumbled by $1.1 trillion. A recent rule overhaul of hedge funds and private equity, designed to curb trading irregularities, shrank the $2.9 trillion industry. Last month, only two new private funds registered with the regulatory body.
With few buyers around, even fewer expect asset prices will rise over time. It is thus only rational that a business takes a wait-and-see attitude on capital investment or new hires, when its exit options and returns on equity are not clear.
Dalian Wanda Group’s recent attempt at a corporate turnaround showcases how much China has changed in the last five years. In 2017, founder Wang Jianlin managed to save his commercial real estate empire from bankruptcy by quickly selling his hotels to Guangzhou R&F Properties Co. and his tourism and theme-park projects to Sunac China Holdings Ltd. in a deal that brought in $9.4 billion.
Nowadays, divesting shopping malls — even in the wealthiest parts of China — is a tedious exercise. Wanda’s past saviors are going through debt restructuring themselves, while foreign investors are feeling cautious, reported Caixin. Wang is unlikely to fetch a good price.
Extreme times call for extreme measures. During the depth of the pandemic, the Federal Reserve stepped in, going all the way to purchasing corporate bonds issued by fallen angels. So why is the PBOC’s balance sheet still squeaky clean, while households and businesses are struggling? The last time the central bank broadened the range of collateral it accepts for its medium-term lending facility was in 2018.
Caixin’s cover story is a mere reflection of a hot topic that, in recent weeks, has been widely discussed among academics and investors in the mainland. Xi’s administration has been refraining from large-scale quantitative easing, but perhaps the time has finally arrived. Having scared away investors — foreign and domestic alike — the government itself has to be the buyer of last resort now.
Shuli Ren is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asian markets. A former investment banker, she was a markets reporter for Barron’s. She is a CFA charterholder. @shuli_ren
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This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
To contact the author of this story:
Shuli Ren at sren38@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Andreea Papuc at apapuc1@bloomberg.net
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