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中國經濟之計劃篇 -- 開欄文
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瀏覽6,772 ｜回應23｜推薦1 |
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轉貼相關評論於下。可參看本城市《中國經濟體系正在進行(？)結構性改革》一文，和《中國經濟之狀況篇》一欄。
如我在《中國經濟之狀況篇》一欄的開欄文中所說：
「到了九月底和今年年底，再做個檢驗印證。或許可以看出誰有認知偏差；誰的資料不夠周全；誰的分析解讀功力鴉鴉烏。」
我就藏拙不聒噪了。
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「內捲」釋義 -- 鄭海麟
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我這兩天第二次試圖了解 “involution” 此字時，在網路上找到鄭海麟教授這篇文章；它酸然不無待商酌之處，但仍然是值得一讀的「內捲」概念入門介紹。不過，我在網上沒有找到丘小海先生的大作。
鄭教授在他的專長領域之外，也是一位研究「釣魚台議題」的學者；我跟鄭教授有數面之緣。
內卷化的對應詞及其社會學意義
內卷化一詞在中國大陸的網路上廣為流傳，但對於這個詞的來龍去脈卻鮮有人去探究。
鄭海麟，2021/07/28
近來，內卷化(involution)一詞在中國大陸的網路上廣為流傳，但對於這個詞的來龍去脈卻鮮有人去探究。最近讀到署名丘小海的〈社會內卷化的根源〉一文，覺得甚有意思。丘小海這篇文章將內卷化的表現形式分為7個方面：
1. 無意義的精益求精是內卷。
2. 將簡單問題複雜化是內卷。
3. 為了免責，被動的應付工作也是內卷。
4. 與預期的目標嚴重偏離的工作也是內卷。
5. 低水準的模仿和複製是典型的內卷。
6. 限制創造力的內部競爭是制度性的內卷。
7. 在同一個問題上無休止的挖掘研究是內卷。
然後，該文又從制度和文化兩個層面剖析內卷化的成因。可謂分析透徹，議論縱橫。
內卷化的對應詞不是演化而是革命
不過，丘小海這篇網路紅文將「內卷化」(involution)的對應詞說成是「演化」 (evolution)，則明顯是錯的。之所以錯，主要是作者不瞭解「內卷化」一詞的來龍去脈所至。
「內卷」一詞無疑是舶來品，它的英文 “involution”，原意是指圍繞中心圓點由外向內旋轉。它的對應詞是「外卷」revolution，原意是指圍繞中心圓點由內向外旋轉。
無論「內卷」抑或「外卷」，原本都是數學和天文學的概念，科學家用它來描述天體演化和自然界發展的一般規律。即事物圍繞中心圓點由外向內旋轉發展到極限，便會從根本上倒轉過來，變為由內向外旋轉(revolution)。後來，社會學家發現，天體演化和自然界發展的這種規律同樣也適合人類社會。也就是說，社會「內卷化」發展到了極限，就會從根本上倒轉過來變為「外卷化」，也就通常說的「革命」。
上世紀三十年代，美國學者首先將「內卷化」這一概念用於社會學和歷史學。如美國學者紀爾茲(Clifford Geertz)便寫有一本討論農業的「內卷化」導致印尼的生態變化過程的書(Clifford Geertz: Agricultural lnvolution:The Process of Ecological Change in lndonesia . Berkeley and Los Angeles:University of California Press,1963)。
又比如美國華人學者黃宗智寫的《華北的小農經濟與社會變遷》一書，也用了「內卷化」的概念，來分析1930年代中國農村的地主經濟與農民的關係。
國民黨於中國在1930年代便已丟掉民心
但這些學者並沒有追根溯源去探討「內卷化」這一詞的原始含義，更沒有結合「內卷化」的對應詞revolution去探討其社會學及歷史學上的意義。他們只是機械地將「內卷化」一詞運用於分析農村中土地兼併後出現的一些現象，即愈來愈多的小農被捲入身兼半自耕農(佃農)和傭工的雙重角色，並且得出結論認為：內卷化即土地兼併和商品經濟發展不能引發中國農業向資本主義過渡(黃宗智)。 (相關報導： 風評：網路原民的逆襲─PTT如何成為「中共同路人」？｜更多文章)
這些社會學或歷史學家，就像社會達爾文主義者機械地將進化論引入社會歷史學一樣，他們作出的解釋自然是非常局限和令人費解的。由於缺乏馬克思主義的唯物史觀，他們更加不可能理解「內卷化」發展到其極限，便會走向它的反面即「外卷化」或曰革命(revolution)的深層次社會原因。
事實上，1930年代中國農村中出現的「內卷化」現象，其結果引發了中國廣大農村異常嚴重的惡性競爭。即土地兼併不斷加劇，使越來越多的農民失去土地，淪為雇農或流民。
一方面，地主可以用更低廉的工資僱傭到雇農或流民；另方面，雇農或流民為了生存被迫接受地主不斷下調的工資待遇。這種惡性競爭的現象就叫內卷化。內卷化現象發展到極限，則會轉向外卷化，這就是為什麼1930年代許多雇農或流民踴躍參加紅軍，也就是參加革命的原因。國民黨失去政權就是由1930年代農村內卷化開始的。而內卷化的對應詞就是外卷化或曰革命。
梁啟超首用論文形式解釋revolution
至於外卷化或曰革命的概念應用於社會學和歷史學，則比內卷化要早得多，中國學者最早用論文形式解釋revolution概念的應推梁啟超。他在1902年寫有《釋革》一文，發表在日本出版的《新民叢報》(1902年12月14日)。梁啟超在文章中寫道：「Revolution者，若轉輪然，從根柢處掀翻之，而別造一新世界，如法國1789年之Revolution是也，日本人譯之曰革命」。
將revolution譯成漢文之「革命」，最早是由日本人翻譯過來的。梁啟超認為並不十分準確(「非確譯也」)，但由於約定俗成的原因，也就難於更改了。梁啟超當年流亡至日本，便將它介紹至中國知識界。這便是有關「內卷化」和「外卷化」概念的來龍去脈。
至於「演化」(evolution)這一概念，則是由嚴複翻譯的《天演論》才有系統地介紹到中國來的，但它並不是「內卷化」的對應詞。
＊作者為香港亞太研究中心主任、教授
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中國經濟均衡性發展「未見成效」原因小探
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羅琪教授在本欄上一篇貼文中，列舉了一般學者認為中國民間消費疲軟不振的6個原因。他認為其中最重要的「結構性」缺陷是(1)：
「『社會福利制度』不夠周全完備」(2)。
也就是說，老百姓擔心它的保障力道不夠強、不夠廣、不夠深。從而，導致民間長期的「『未雨綢繆性』儲蓄」(3)。他還用了「『全家憂慮』症候」一詞(4)。
在「『社會福利制度』不夠周全完備」外，還有另一個造成「『全家憂慮』症候」和「『未雨綢繆性』儲蓄」這兩個現象的「結構性」因素。它就是：
老百姓對社會前景「不樂觀」或「缺乏『安全感』」。
造成這種「居安思危」心理的原因有兩個：
1) 中國過去近200年來的戰亂和動亂(5)。
2) 當下政治體制所顯示和蘊含的「不穩定性」(6)。
以上因素也同時可以解釋：：
即使計入羅琪教授提到的「統計失誤」(7)，中國「『民間消費/國內生產毛額』比率」在過去20年不見增長(8)，仍然是個實打實的隱患。
在此順帶說幾句：中國過去「經濟成長」的模式，以「投資」和「外銷」為火車頭(9)。一旦發生戰爭，這兩個火車頭或發動機就泡湯了；中國共產黨的「統治正當性」也會立馬變成一件「皇帝的新衣」。
相信羅琪教授對我以上說的「因素」其實了然於心；只是他不願意戳破「皇帝沒穿衣服」這個「難以面對」的現實而已(10)。只好由我「胡大砲」來說三道四了。
附註：
1. 請見該文第6段最後一句話。
2. 「『社會福利制度』不夠周全完備」請見該文第6段 “inadequate social safety net”
3. 請見該文第6段 “precautionary saving”。
4. 請見該文第7段 ”household insecurity”。
5. 從「虎門之戰」(1841)算起。
6. 例如，「文化大革命」的記憶和衍生的「街頭巷尾傳說」；沒完沒了的「整肅」/「反貪打腐」。
7. 請見該文第8段 “statistical mirage”。
8. 「『民間消費/國內生產毛額』比率」請見該文第5段 “household consumption as a share of GDP”；「不見增長」評論請見該文第5、8兩段的最後一句話。
9. 請見該文「前言」中的 “Nearly two decades after former Premier Wen Jiabao bemoaned the Chinese economy’s excessive dependence on investment- and export-led growth, …”
10. 在「中國通」圈子裏，羅琪教授是少數對中國友好並尊重的學者之一；我能想到的另一位是史提格里茲教授。可能因為兩位都是經濟學家。
參考文章：
* 「中國經濟」現況雜感 (胡卜凱，該欄2025/12/17)
* 內需能維持中國經濟成長嗎？ (作者：Keyu Jin，該欄2026/04/07)
* China’s Rebalancing Imperative (Roach, Stephen S., 2024)
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中國經濟均衡性發展未見成效 - Stephen S. Roach
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China’s Failed Rebalancing
Stephen S. Roach, 06/26/26
When China’s leaders first acknowledged the need to rebalance the economy nearly two decades ago, it seemed like a matter of when, not if. But with the household consumption share of Chinese GDP remaining stubbornly low, officials’ promises to boost domestic demand have lost all credibility.
NEW HAVEN—China’s efforts to rebalance its economy have been an abject failure. Nearly two decades after former Premier Wen Jiabao bemoaned the Chinese economy’s excessive dependence on investment- and export-led growth, the problem has gone from bad to worse. The lack of meaningful consumer-led rebalancing implies increased reliance on these time-worn sources of economic activity, raising critical questions for China and the rest of the world.
As the first Western economist to stress China’s perspective on the need for such rebalancing, I am especially disappointed to write these words. I remember sitting in a Beijing meeting room in March 2007, watching Wen’s press conference following the conclusion of the National People’s Congress. There was a small group of us in attendance, including some senior Chinese officials, when Wen uttered his now-famous critique of China’s economic structure. While seemingly strong on the surface, he cautioned, the economy was becoming increasingly “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.”
There was an audible gasp from the Chinese officials present in the room, who translated the premier’s remarks and underscored their significance, presaging a vigorous debate in the country’s policy community. I went back to my hotel room and wrote my first piece on China’s rebalancing imperative, which became the basis for my testimony before the US Senate Finance Committee nearly two weeks later.
I stressed China’s newfound sense of urgency to shift its development model from investment and exports to consumer-led growth. I underscored the other structural changes this shift would entail: moving from manufacturing to services, and from excess saving to saving absorption, which would lower the current-account surplus and fund a larger social safety net. I took Wen’s “four uns,” as I later dubbed them, as an important signal from the Chinese leadership of its readiness to do what was necessary to rebalance the economy. I was convinced that it was a matter of when, not if.
But it’s high time to face reality. China’s retail sales fell 0.6% year on year in May 2026, an unexpected drop following an anemic 0.2% increase in April, and the first monthly decline in three and a half years. Meanwhile, the latest reading of household consumption as a share of GDP is just 39.9%—virtually identical to the 2005 level (39.8%), which Wen had in hand when lamenting the “four uns” in early 2007. Given that the latest reading is from 2024, and that Chinese consumption showed continued weakness in 2025 and early 2026, there is good reason to believe that the economy’s current proportion of consumption has fallen below Wen’s 2005 benchmark.
Several explanations for this outcome have been put forward: a protracted property crisis, the low share of household income, post-COVID scarring, demographic shifts, and high youth unemployment. My favorite explanation has long been an inadequate social safety net, which boosts fear-driven precautionary saving, that, in turn, inhibits discretionary consumption. While all these factors could very well be at work, excess precautionary saving is, in my view, the most important longer-term structural impediment to Chinese consumer demand.
Whatever the explanation, these developments have not gone unnoticed by senior Chinese leaders. President Xi Jinping recently emphasized the strategic importance of boosting domestic demand, which Premier Li Qiang’s March 2026 “work report” also stressed. Unfortunately, this has been trotted out as a priority so often over the past two decades that it has lost all credibility. While it is encouraging that China’s State Council recently relaxed some hukou restrictions, making migrant workers’ access to social insurance more portable, much more is needed to reduce household insecurity and end the cycle of overpromising and underdelivering.
Some dismiss the failure of China’s consumer-led rebalancing as a statistical mirage, especially because it purportedly excludes government support for “social transfers in kind” like education, health care, cultural amenities, and subsidized food. While there may be some technical validity to this claim, it does not change the bottom line: household consumption as a share of Chinese GDP—whether adjusted or unadjusted—is no higher today than it was when Wen Jiabao first drew attention to the issue.
This inertia has two worrying implications.
First, the Chinese people remain on the outside looking in. The state, state-owned enterprises, and private companies continue to reap a disproportionate share of the fruits of Chinese economic development. This calls into question the prospects for the continued growth of the middle class, long seen as the aspirational beneficiary of prosperity in the People’s Republic of China.
Second, subpar consumption suggests that China will continue to rely on exports and investment to drive growth, especially the technology-led “new quality productive forces” that Xi Jinping continues to underscore. Yes, China set a lower GDP growth target of 4.5–5% for 2026, roughly half the spectacular 9.3% growth trajectory from 1980 to 2020. But with China’s share of world GDP (in terms of purchasing power parity) nearly ten times bigger than it was in 1980, its exports now have a far greater impact on global GDP. By some estimates, China’s share of global manufacturing (in terms of value added) will rise from around 30% today to an astonishing 45% by 2030. The rest of the world is unlikely to be receptive to such an outcome, broadening the prospects of anti-China protectionism, from the United States to Europe.
Wen Jiabao may be China’s forgotten premier, but the contradiction he highlighted in 2007—growth without rebalancing—remains the country’s greatest macroeconomic challenge. I have warned about this for years. And now, amid all the talk of China’s global ascendancy, the country’s failure to address its rebalancing imperatives could well end up being its Achilles’ heel.
Stephen S. Roach, a faculty member at Yale University and former chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, is the author of Unbalanced: The Codependency of America and China (Yale University Press, 2014) and Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives (Yale University Press, 2022). He’s been writing for PS since 2011.
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中國年輕人「受夠了」的原因 - 易富賢
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我沒有資格就這類問題說三道四。根據常識來看，中國經濟發展「疲軟」，應該是一個多面向的複雜議題；例如我曾提到：中國人民對未來的「信心」。不過，易教授根據他專業角度，針對過去中國「人口政策」造成後果的分析和意見，值得當政者和關切中國前途者深思。
Why Are China’s Young People Fed Up?
Yi Fuxian, 05/21/26
Decades of misguided economic policymaking have left China in a demographic hole that it seems incapable of climbing out of. As the “world’s factory,” the country is churning out everything except the people whom it will need to sustain its economic development and social stability over the long term.
MADISON—For several years now, a significant share of young Chinese people, disillusioned with their economic prospects, have embraced “lying flat,” a principled rejection of careerist competition (the proverbial “rat race”). Since such attitudes do not bode well for the country’s economic future, Chinese authorities have responded by portraying the movement as a foreign-backed effort to undermine national development and morale.
This is not a new tactic. When I spearheaded opposition to China’s one-child policy, I was accused of colluding with hostile foreign interests to undermine the country through overpopulation. Now that China’s population decline is undeniable, I am accused of exaggerating the crisis and bashing China.
In fact, “lying flat” is a direct result of the one-child policy. Just as biological homeostasis—avoiding deviations in blood pressure or blood sugar, for example—is necessary to prevent illness or death, so economic homeostasis requires maintaining the right balance between consumption and production. Introduced in 1980 in the belief that a smaller population would improve employment, the one-child policy produced the opposite result. By reducing children—well-known “super-consumers”—it weakened household bargaining power, driving the share of household disposable income in GDP from about two-thirds in the 1980s (broadly in line with peer economies) to just 44% today.
That is why Chinese domestic consumption and job creation remain subdued. Faced with less income accruing to households and a weak social safety net, many workers are compelled to log longer hours to make ends meet. And competition for employment is so intense that those who hold a job feel pressure to work overtime just to keep it. As a result, the average Chinese work week has risen to around 49 hours—and as high as 60 hours in some cases—compared to 38 hours in the United States, 33 in Germany, 37 in Japan, and 42 in Vietnam.
Moreover, Chinese youth unemployment (ages 16–24) is especially high, reflecting a mismatch between surging higher-educational attainment and an underdeveloped services sector. Policies promoting a “talent dividend” and “new productive forces,” along with family pressures, have increased the number of annual graduates from 1.01 million in 2000 to 12.22 million in 2025. Yet weak consumption still limits the growth of the services sector—the main employer for recent graduates—to just 47% of jobs, far below the 70–80% typical of advanced economies with similar levels of higher education.
After China’s youth unemployment rate hit 21.3% in June 2023, the government halted data releases for months before issuing revised, lower figures. But this obviously did not change the harsh underlying reality. During last year’s civil-service exams, 2.8 million applicants competed for just 38,100 positions. With the job market so bleak, some universities are adopting “educational downshifting,” offering vocational training to undergraduates and encouraging PhD candidates to pursue more employment-oriented master’s degrees. No wonder graduates who can rely on financial support from their one-child families are “lying flat.”
But “lying flat” reflects privilege. Among the millions of young Chinese who can neither find stable employment nor rely on family support, many have been forced into the gig economy, working as food deliverers, ride-hailing drivers, couriers, or live-streamers. China now has about 240 million flexible workers—nearly one-third of its labor force.
Yet heavy investments in AI, robotics, drones, and autonomous driving are already squeezing these jobs, pushing unemployment among those aged 25-29 to a record 7.7% in March—a trend that is likely to accelerate. Worse, unlike in the US, where AI adoption may ease persistent inflationary pressures, China’s aggressive push into AI will intensify deflationary pressures alongside already weak consumption.
Of course, China’s combination of too few consumers (children), low household incomes, and long working hours has also pushed hundreds of millions of workers into export-oriented manufacturing. The decline in household income as a share of GDP mirrors the expansion of state fiscal capacity and extensive industrial subsidies, which have produced a pathological manufacturing boom—akin to hypertension and hyperglycemia in the human body. Hence, China now accounts for about 17% of global GDP and 28% of global manufacturing value-added, but only 12% of global household consumption.
A more balanced economy would be healthier for both China and the world. China’s export-driven model has harmed manufacturing abroad, especially in the US, its largest export market. The US has responded by imposing tariffs, cutting its share of goods imports from China to 8%, down from 22% in 2018. If other countries follow suit, the five million-plus STEM graduates that China produces annually for manufacturing may struggle to find jobs.
These weaknesses undercut the argument that China’s “engineer-led governance” model is worthy of emulation. If anything, its manufacturing success and infrastructure achievements reflect a continuation of the status quo. It is China’s strong state control over resources that enables rapid mobilization toward specific goals—often at the cost of social and economic homeostasis. The Qin Dynasty (221-206 BC), which pioneered this approach and built the Great Wall, lasted only 15 years. The Communist Party of China’s Great Leap Forward and one-child policy then followed the same logic.
Today’s manufacturing boom likewise comes at the cost of demographic and even civilizational sustainability. China’s household income share is so low that many families struggle to raise even a single child. Long working hours deprive young people of time to build relationships. The government’s pursuit of “new quality productive forces,” together with “educational downshifting,” is narrowing the window for family formation, leading to delayed marriage, rising singlehood, and lower fertility. High youth unemployment further discourages marriage while eroding the financial capacity to raise children. China’s share of global manufacturing may have risen from 3% in 1990 to 28% today, but its share of global births has fallen from 17% to 6%, and it is projected to drop below 3% by 2050.
China is churning out everything except the people it will need to sustain its economic development over time. The problem is not that Chinese youths are lying flat. It is that the country’s leaders are lying to them—and to themselves.
Yi Fuxian, a senior scientist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, spearheaded the movement against China’s one-child policy. His book Big Country with an Empty Nest (China Development Press, 2013), initially banned, now ranks first in China Publishing Today’s 100 Best Books of 2013 in China. He’s been writing for PS since 2021
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中國巨額出超的兩個根本因素 - Shang-Jin Wei
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我不是經濟學家，這大概是我認為下文的邏輯有點搞笑的原因吧。
What Really Drives China’s Massive Trade Surplus
Shang-Jin Wei, 04/20/26
China’s trade surplus is often blamed on its industrial policies. In reality, however, it reflects a persistent gap between savings and investment, driven by demographic pressures and financial constraints that shape household behavior and restrict private firms’ access to credit.
NEW YORK—China’s massive trade surplus, which reached a record of $1.2 trillion in 2025, has become a central fault line in its economic relations with other countries. As competition from Chinese imports increasingly weighs on domestic industries, French President Emmanuel Macron as warned that Europe faces a “Chinese tsunami” and called for a “rebalancing.” Policymakers across the continent have voiced similar concerns.
This pressure is unlikely to ease anytime soon. The Chinese economy is growing faster than those of its trading partners, so even if its current-account surplus remains stable as a share of China’s own GDP, its bilateral trade surpluses could continue to grow.
While China’s trade surplus is often attributed to its industrial policies and trade barriers, this explanation is misleading. Industrial policies do matter at the sector level, with government subsidies boosting exports in industries like shipbuilding, solar panels, and electric vehicles (EVs), but these gains do not necessarily carry over to the trade balance.
The Lerner Symmetry Theorem, which states that import tariffs have the same long-term effects as export taxes, helps explain this pattern. Export subsidies tend to increase both exports and imports: as export sectors expand, they draw resources away from import-competing industries, which then contract, leading to greater reliance on imports. By the same logic, import restrictions often reduce both imports and exports. In other words, such measures primarily affect the composition of trade rather than its overall balance.
China’s own experience is a case in point. Since 2017, the government has actively promoted imports through initiatives like the China International Import Expo. While most countries use taxpayer-funded programs to promote exports, few subsidize imports. But despite strong political backing, these efforts have done little to reduce China’s trade surplus, in line with the Lerner Symmetry Theorem.
To understand the persistence of China’s trade surplus, one must look beyond industrial policies. The key lies in the gap between national savings and investment, which determines the current-account balance. In China, investment is high by global standards, but its savings rate is even higher, exceeding 40% of GDP.
China’s high household savings rate is driven by structural forces, such as its skewed sex ratio. Decades of strict family-planning policies, combined with a cultural preference for sons, have created a surplus of men. The resulting imbalance has given rise to what I call a “competitive saving motive,” as families with sons save aggressively to improve their children’s prospects in an increasingly tight marriage market. These pressures often spill over to households with daughters and those without young children, raising the national savings rate.
The numbers tell a clear story: regions with higher male-to-female ratios consistently exhibit higher household savings rates, and households with sons tend to save more, especially where the gender imbalance is most pronounced. This factor alone may account for up to half of the rise in China’s savings rate since the 1990s, yet it is rarely acknowledged in policy discussions.
A structural factor behind China’s high corporate savings rate is financial underdevelopment. The country’s financial system has long favored state-owned enterprises, leaving private firms, which are often more productive, with limited access to credit. As a result, many firms must rely heavily on retained earnings to finance investment.
Together, these forces generate a sustained gap between savings and investment, which, in today’s globalized economy, manifests as a large trade surplus. Government savings, by contrast, play a limited role, as they have been negative for many years and thus contribute little to the overall surplus.
Could increased government spending, particularly on social programs, help reduce China’s trade surplus? To some extent, yes. Higher public spending would lower government savings and diminish households’ need for precautionary savings. But this approach has its limits. China’s social spending is already broadly in line with that of other middle-income countries, and moving toward a Western European-style welfare model could weaken incentives to work, innovate, and invest, thereby slowing growth.
To be sure, short-term measures such as monetary and fiscal stimulus could boost domestic demand and imports, temporarily narrowing the trade surplus. But a lasting solution requires deeper structural reforms to address the gender imbalance and improve private-sector firms’ access to finance. While these reforms will take time to bear fruit, without them China’s trade surplus is bound to remain a source of friction for years to come.
Shang-Jin Wei, a former chief economist at the Asian Development Bank, is Professor of Finance and Economics at Columbia Business School and Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. He’s been writing for PS since 2015.
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《15-5計劃》將衝擊歐洲未來 -- N. Grünberg/A. Davey
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請自行參考、斟酌；並參看本欄相關報導和評論。
Four key points to keep in view as China implements its 15th Five-Year Plan
China’s new 15th Five-Year Plan is a high-level framework offering something for every policy field – and it triggers a months-long cascade of regional and sectoral plans, each detailing goals and priorities in more concrete terms. Nis Grünberg and Alexander Davey have identified four policy trajectories that are set to have an impact on Europe’s own strategic choices.
Nis Grünberg/Alexander Davey, 04/15/26
European decision makers need to keep in mind that China’s new 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP) is less a concrete plan than a high-level framework offering something for every policy field – and that it triggers a months-long cascade of regional and sectoral plans, each detailing goals and priorities in more concrete terms. To stop this abundance turning into confusion, MERICS has identified four policy trajectories that look set to have an impact on Europe’s own strategic choices: increasing supply-chain dominance, mainstreaming the energy transition, boosting and going beyond AI, and dealing with demographic pressures.
Compared to its predecessor, the 15th FYP signals smaller adjustments on socio-economic targets, but doubles down on growing China's industrial power and manufacturing base, increasing technological self-reliance, advancing energy security through systemic decarbonization, and betting on being able to lead the world in sectors barely on the horizon beyond AI – like quantum technology nuclear fusion energy or brain-computer interfaces. In the Chinese Communist Party’s own words, “system thinking” is meant to integrate economic resilience, energy security and technological self-reliance across policy fields.
Exhibit 1 關鍵詞在《15-5計劃》中出現次數統計圖
Beijing’s belief in the link between technological progress, economic development and national security remains steadfast. A MERICS analysis of 14 key policy terms shows that “innovation” and “security” are the most mentioned in the 15th FYP (see Exhibit 1), albeit slightly less often than in the 14th FYP. The term “AI” appears five times more frequently – at the expense of “digital,” which occurs three times less. “Investment” and “consumption” are mentioned one-and-a-half times more often, ranking third and fourth among the most frequently used key words, and aligning with the four policy trajectories identified below.
Securing the supply chain to boost both economic resilience and geopolitical leverage
Domestic demand is expected to play a more significant role in driving economic growth than over the last five years. But the 15th FYP makes also clear that China aims to remain a manufacturing powerhouse along the entire economic value chain, neither relinquishing downstream sectors like consumer goods nor upstream ones like rare earths. Control over value chains is seen as way to increase economic resilience and geopolitical power. While expanding trade is certainly a goal, national security and economic de-risking are the main drivers of supply-chain control, alongside industrial upgrading and the transition to renewable energy.
Integrating renewable energy and technologies into the economic mainstream
Electric vehicles (EVs) and photo voltaic panels (PV) are no longer singled out in the FYP as technologies requiring special support, signaling that green tech and energy transition have become mainstream. Renewables have moved to the center of efforts to build a resilient energy system. Beijing wants to double its world-leading solar and wind capacities over ten years. As China plans to widely deploy power hungry AI, it is building a power system increasingly independent of oil and coal that can deliver everywhere. By highlighting green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol to decarbonize industry and transport, the 15th FYP shows a widening recognition of green tech as key to sustainability, business and security.
Boosting scientific self-reliance, artificial intelligence and “future industries”
The 15th FYP makes science and technological self-reliance a key goal. Beijing anticipates this generational agenda to produce "landmark achievements" and a marked increase in the number of fields in which China is in the global vanguard. The Five-Year Plan sees China becoming stronger and more self-sufficient in AI by improving its science, hardware and software. Beyond AI and seven other “emerging sectors” that will drive near-term advances, the 15th FYP also highlights “future industries” – including quantum technology, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy, and brain-computer interfaces – that warrant close attention.
Addressing the challenges of an ageing population even as public budgets are tight
The plan’s welfare agenda is positive, although less ambitious than its technological aspirations, reflecting constrained public finances. Given Beijing’s attempt to bolster domestic resilience amid economic and demographic woes, some services are receiving particular attention. The 15th FYP emphasizes building a “birth-friendly society” through more support for families – but also highlights the need to improve elderly care and education for the young. By listing 20 social-welfare and other indicators, Beijing is signaling that welfare outcomes – not just economic growth or industrial upgrading – must improve measurably.
Aligning political, administrative and economic decisionmakers around overarching objectives is the core strength of every FYP.
Hundreds of administrative actors at all levels of government and companies all over China will now formulate their own detailed responses to the 15th FYP. Not all will meet the targets they set for 2026 to 2030, but not all need to. The corporate sector as a whole only has to marginally outperform foreign competition over the next five years – and Beijing only has to be marginally more successful than other governments in managing geopolitical headwinds and ensuring buy-in from its populace.
European policy and corporate decisionmakers need to follow the coming implementation of sectoral FYPs carefully. China has made good on many of its past technology plans, such as Made in China 2025. The new FYP is likely to turn out to be one of the most consequential industrial policies for Europe and its tech leaders. Europe needs to adapt or face an evergrowing challenge from Chinese competition.
Author(s)
Nis Grünberg, Lead Analyst
Alexander Davey, Analyst
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內需能維持中國經濟成長嗎？- Keyu Jin
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Can China Grow From Within?
Keyu Jin, 04/01/26
At a time of intensifying geopolitical volatility, China’s embrace of a consumption-led model is not only about rebalancing growth, but also about anchoring it more firmly at home. Domestic demand offers insulation from external shocks, and along with developed capital markets, it can go a long way toward strengthening autonomy.
LONDON – China manifests a striking paradox. It is among the world’s most dynamic technological powers, producing breakthroughs in AI, electric vehicles, and advanced manufacturing at an accelerating pace, yet economic growth continues to slow. The reason is no mystery. As the government’s latest Five-Year Plan (2026-30) recognizes, China is experiencing a structural transition, not a cyclical slowdown. The old model is giving way to a new one, which has yet to take hold.
This transition is about more than economics. It reflects a deeper objective: strategic autonomy. The question is no longer simply whether China can grow, but whether it can grow on its own terms. A system that depends heavily on external demand, foreign capital, or imported technology is inherently exposed – a reality that recent energy shocks have thrown into sharp relief. So, the 15th Five-Year Plan aims to reduce structural dependencies.
The investment-driven and export-led model that powered Chinese growth for decades was highly effective at scaling up supply, delivering extraordinary results through a time of rapid globalization, favorable demographics, surging urbanization, and a property boom. But it was inadequate at raising demand and welfare – and it has now reached its limits. While advanced-technology sectors are strategically vital, their macroeconomic weight is limited. High-end manufacturing, for example, accounted for roughly 6% of GDP last year and contributes relatively little to local-government revenues compared to the property sector it is meant to replace.
There is now only one engine capable of sustaining growth at the scale China requires: consumption. For a country that has managed to overcome powerful constraints to innovation – a record exemplified by Huawei’s resilience and the rise of leading AI players like DeepSeek – getting households to consume more might not seem like a difficult task. But given that under-consumption has long been embedded in the Chinese system, it might be the toughest challenge China has faced.
The gap between China’s current consumption levels and global norms implies trillions of dollars in unrealized demand. The divergence is particularly pronounced in services. Whereas China’s real consumption stands at roughly 50-80% of US levels – broadly consistent with a middle-income OECD economy – service consumption lags significantly behind, falling short of developed-economy levels by an estimated 15-20 percentage points.
The 15th Five-Year Plan marks the Chinese government’s most concerted effort yet to address this imbalance – though results will take time to emerge. At its core is a new doctrine: boosting domestic demand by investing in people.
Start with pensions. As it stands, social support in China is distributed unevenly, with rural pensions averaging only around $35 per month – less than 7% of urban retirees’ benefits. But rural pensions are set to rise to about $85 per month within three years, and to some $140 per month within five years. Some estimates suggest that this change alone could ultimately lift consumption by 5-10 percentage points of GDP.
But this is just a first step. Given the constraints on consumption – weak income expectations, high precautionary savings, and lingering balance-sheet pressures – persuading Chinese households to spend will depend less on delivering short-term stimulus than on improving the distribution of income, security, and opportunity across the economy. This is why China will have to shift the focus of its investments from physical capital to people.
Recognizing this, the 15th Five-Year Plan aims to expand the scope of free education and increase the number of years of compulsory school attendance, lower childcare costs, and scale up vocational training. Moreover, it sets the stage for reforms to the hukou (household registration) system that would more fully integrate migrant workers into urban welfare systems. And it will seek to unlock household wealth and stabilize living costs through rural land reform, improved public housing, and urban renewal initiatives.
For households to feel secure enough to spend on the necessary scale, opportunities for broader wealth accumulation are also essential. As of 2025, China’s stock-market capitalization stood at roughly CN¥100 trillion ($14.5 trillion) – about 77% of GDP. That is well below the 100-120% ratio typical of mature markets.
Expanding China’s capital markets is not only a financial imperative, but also a structural and strategic one, as it is essential to reducing reliance on external capital. Capital markets channel savings into more productive sectors – particularly services and high-tech industries – and give households opportunities to invest their savings and participate in sustainable wealth creation. They are thus vital to enable a shift from property-based to financial wealth, and from investment-led growth to consumption-driven demand.
But, as the 15th Five-Year Plan also recognizes, expanding China’s capital markets will require deep institutional reforms to improve initial public offering systems, strengthen corporate governance, encourage dividends and buybacks, and mobilize “patient capital” from pension funds and insurers. Meanwhile, gradual financial opening and greater foreign participation will enhance market depth and integration.
It remains to be seen whether these policies will translate into meaningfully higher consumption in the near term. But they do represent a departure from previous five-year plans, which treated consumption as secondary to more traditional growth engines like investment and exports. This reflects changing external conditions, which have made reliance on others – for demand, technology, capital, or energy – synonymous with vulnerability.
At a time of intensifying geopolitical volatility and global fragmentation, China’s embrace of a consumption-led model is not only about rebalancing growth, but also about anchoring it more firmly at home. Strong domestic demand offers a degree of insulation from external shocks, and together with developed capital markets, it can go a long way toward strengthening autonomy.
In this sense, the trajectory is clear. China aims to recreate, in its own way, the conditions that some privileged economies have long enjoyed: the ability to grow from within.
Keyu Jin, Professor of Economics at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, is the author of The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism (Viking, 2023). WShe’s been writing for PS since 2012.
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中國「15-5 計畫」分析 ----- Bert Hofman
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我不是經濟學家；也不再有精力細讀「15-5 計畫」。但是，下文的分析讓我對中國的經濟前景難以抱持觀態度。
由於：「政改」是「經改」的基礎和前置條件；所以，沒有深度和全面的「政改」，再多的「計畫」終究不過是一劑「OK繃」。
下文是德國墨卡托中國研究協會資深研究員霍夫門先生的大作；該協會由德國墨卡托基金會創辦於2013年；它是歐洲專門研究中國最大的智庫。有趣的是：下文作者的分析方法和我的方法相同(該欄開欄文)。
Deciphering the 15th Five Year Plan
Bert Hofman, 03/19/26
China’s 15th Five Year Plan, spanning 2026-2030, was approved by the National People’s Congress in its March 2026 session. The plan, a good 80,000 Chinese characters long, offered few major surprises. This is for two reasons, says MERICS Senior Associate Fellow Bert Hofman: one, there is a lot of continuity with the 14th, and even the 13th Plan, and two, the “guidance” that the central committee of the communist party provided last October was, as expected, duly incorporated.
Still, the Plan is worth a thorough review—first and foremost for aspiring Chinese bureaucrats, but also for those who that want to understand where the Chinese economy is heading, which new technologies we can expect coming out of China, and whether China will finally manage to rebalance its economy and reduce its increasingly contested trade surpluses.
Today’s plan is a far cry from the original Soviet style 5-year plans first introduced in 1953. Gone are the days of the thousands of tons of steel, the millions head of cattle and bushels of grain. Instead, the plan can best be understood as a strategic guide to the Chinese party, government and people, and a communication tool for the party leadership to coordinate individual actions across the vast economy of 1.4 billion people. The transition from Soviet to Strategic plan took place in the 1990s, with the 9th Five Year Plan, after China had declared itself a “socialist market economy” at the 14th National Party Congress.
The “Outline of the 15th Five Year Plan (2026-2030) for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China” as it is formally called is an “Outline” in the sense that it is an Apex plan sitting on top of many other plans. Each Ministry, agency, province, and municipality has their own 5-year plan based on the national plan. The main indicators plan a role in shaping these plans, but they do more than that: these indicators help shape the key performance indicators of the government officials and party cadre and central and local level. Meeting those targets is key for promotion, and a powerful mechanism to steer the ship of government.
The Plan still has targets, such as for GDP growth, the growth in spending on Research and development, air pollution etc. But most of these targets are indicative—only 1/3 of the indicators in the table of Key Indicators are mandatory (Annex Table). The development of key indicators over time suggests a somewhat reduced role of the indicators compared to the past (Exhibit 1a). The number of indicators peaked at 33 in the 13th Five Year Plan, with almost 60 percent binding. In the 15th plan the total is 21, and less than 40 percent is binding. Breaking the indicators down by the categories as per the 15th Plan (Exhibit 1b), suggests a growing emphasis on innovation and people’s livelihood, and, after peaking in the 13th Plan, somewhat less focus on environment, perhaps because much has been achieved since. Notably, a new indicator on carbon intensity of the economy was introduced in the 15th plan, replacing an indicator on energy intensity. This indicator links well to the government “twin carbon” goal: peaking before 2030, and net zero by 2060.
Exhibit 1 五年計畫「指標」比較圖
The target for GDP growth is no longer a real target since the last plan. It merely states that growth should be maintained “within a reasonable range.” The formulation as it came about in 2021 would have been convenient in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, when growth over the next 5 years was anybody’s guess. But it also emphasized the policy shift away from simply growth to what the authorities now dub “High Quality Development.” Nowadays, the growth target is set annually, in chambers during the Central Economic Work Conference in December, and publicly revealed at the opening of the National People’s Congress in the prime minister’s work report. For this year, it is to be 4.5-5 percent, a bit less than last year’s 5 percent, but still enough to stay on track for the informal goal to double GDP from 2020 to 2035.
High Quality Development, the overarching objective of the Plan, is defined as being innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared. The “toolkit” for achieving High Quality Development is the “New Development Philosophy (or Paradigm), The New Development Philosophy includes Supply-side structural reforms, the New Quality Productive Forces, Dual Circulation, Common Prosperity, and Ecological Civilization, elements that were included over time. In Xi Jinping’s words: “Accelerating the construction of a new development pattern is the strategic basis for promoting high-quality development.” The 14th Five Year Plan (2021-25) started to take a stab at translating concepts into policy, and the 3rd Plenum of the 20th Party Congress spells out a number of specific policy reforms many of which will have an impact on the goal of High-Quality Development.
How does all this party ideology translate into the 15th Five Year Plan?
To get a grip on that I like word counts. I took a count on the main policy terms in the past 3 plans to determine what is in, what is out and what is the focus of the authorities in the coming 5 years (Exhibit 2). Clear winners in the word count are the innovation and technology related terms: Artificial Intelligence (人工智慧) has the highest count followed by high-quality development (高品質發展), and scientific and technological innovation (科技創新). National security (國家安全) has been very stable from the 13th-15th plan at about 20 occurrences. This reflects one of the major shifts in focus under Xi Jinping, who has consistently argued that national security is the basis for development—and vice versa!
Exhibit 2 五年計畫「字彙」比較圖
New terms in the 15th Plan are New Quality Productive Forces (新質生產力), unified national market (全國統一大市場), modern industrial system (現代化產業體系), and technological self-reliance (科技自立自強), and carbon peaking (碳達峰). While none of the key terms that were included in the 14th plan disappeared completely from the 15th plan, several saw a major drop in word count, including: Reform and Opening Up, Industrial Chains, Supply Chains, and strategic emerging industries, ecological civilization, rural revitalization, common prosperity, and dual circulation (雙迴圈) which was absent in the 13th, peaked in the 14th, and is only mentioned once in the 15th plan.
Overall, the word count suggests a continued strong emphasis on innovation and technology, reduced emphasis on reform and opening (and market development), and still limited attention to "people first" and common prosperity. The Plan suggests also stronger emphasis on basic research, and a stronger link between technological innovation and growth. The link is the first and foremost the “Modern Industrial System” a term new to the 5 Year Plan, but which had been circulating for some time. Also, the AI+ initiative of the government, based on a plan issued last year fall, receives abundant attention. It sees the main value of AI in its application, and in particular in its application to industry and business. The open access approach that China’s tech companies such as DeepSeek have taken fits this well and could lead to more rapid adoption of AI than in countries that rely on proprietary systems.
The greater adoption of technology and more unified market should, in the Plan’s philosophy, lead to higher productivity. Labour productivity is, as in the past plans, included as a key indicator. “Total factor productivity,” concept that refers to the overall efficiency of resource use in a society, is considered as a key objective, and has been mentioned several times by Xi Jinping in his speeches. Nevertheless, it is not included in the main indicator table, which is understandable, given the issues of measurement and methodology of the concept. Meanwhile, the investment in basic research should pay out in future technologies, the “new quality productive forces” and the plan mentions a range of them, from brain-computer interface to quantum computing to fusion energy.
Will the Plan solve China’s Domestic Demand Issue?
The Plan, as well as the government work reports and the central economic work conferences in the past few years, have made domestic demand a priority. Rightfully so, as growing supply with insufficient demand would further increase trade surpluses, and trade tensions. Perhaps more importantly, the authorities want growth to translate into more consumption and “people’s needs.” In fact, the 19th National Party Congress made this the central “contradiction” or challenge for the Party.
Higher domestic demand will have to predominantly come from consumption and perhaps form government investment. As Alicia Garcia Herrero, Chief Asia Economist for Natixis, an investment bank, has argued, corporate profits are now too low to finance much growth in investment. Moreover, the government’s “anti-involution policy” is targeted at the excessive investment that local governments pursue. Furthermore, with much better technology, AI, and robotization, industrial growth may simply require less investment. And finally, the property sector, previously a major investment destination, is still in the doldrums, and given the modest policy plans, is unlikely to bounce back. Lower investment growth would be good for total factor productivity, if indeed wasteful investments are reduced. But it would further suppress domestic demand.
Common prosperity and “people first” still receive relatively limited attention. Lots of initiatives are mentioned in the text, including further aligning the urban and rural pension and health system, the development of a “fertility friendly” society (free kindergartens, child money), and the objectives for greater equality in service delivery across regions would all contribute, but it is hard to see that they add up to a major shift in consumption power for households. In the Plan’s (and the Party’s) thinking better employment, more education, “investment in people” and a growing middle class is the way to common prosperity, not income redistribution.
The Plan states the objective to increase the household consumption rate, though that is not a main indicator. What is in is that per capita income should develop in line with GDP, so apparently the authorities count on a lower household savings rate. With the continued slump in property prices, a lacklustre labour market and modest improvements in social safety and insurance, it is hard to see how household consumption could majorly contribute to higher domestic demand as a share of GDP.
Government spending, either investment or consumption, could take up the slack. Whether the next five years will the major reforms needed to shore up government finances and make the fiscal system ready for high quality growth remains to be seen. Reform initiatives are sprinkled throughout the Plan, but putting public finances on a solid footing requires a comprehensive plan at par with the 1994 fiscal reforms.
Annex Table 「15-5 計畫」主要「指標」表
This article was first published in Bert's Newsletter on Substack on March 13, 2026.
Endnotes
Bert Hofman, Senior Associate Fellow
相關報導：
Party and State
China in 26: War in Iran + 15th Five-Year Plan + Homework for Europe
China and the war in Iran + The new Five-Year Plan + NPC outcomes
Following the party line: A calendar of key Chinese government and Communist Party meetings
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0. 前言
讀了本欄2025/12/14和2025/12/16的兩篇報導/分析後，有些感想。我不是經濟系或相關領域出身，更不是財經問題專家，照理不該撈過界。但是，在觀察70多年豬走路的身份外，古有「肉食者鄙」的說法(《左傳・曹劌論戰》-3)，也就讓我得到閒話幾句的底氣。還請看官們不吝指教。
1. 計畫與現實
由於「經濟為國力之本」，我非常期待：明年前半年能看到這些「重點任務」被逐漸落實(請見本欄2025/12/14)；2026年底能看到它們的成果被展現在相關指標和重要數據上。
根據我所了解的「歷史經驗」，在「對症下藥」式的有效政策之外，落實這些「重點任務」還得需要兩個「客觀現實」：
1) 一般受到進階教育的菁英有一個：自己能夠「發揮潛能」的社會空間，以及保障自己能夠享受勞心，勞力所得成果的政治制度。
2) 一般30歲以上的老百姓，能看到一個：至少未來30 - 40年自己仍然生活在穩定、富庶社會的前景。
本欄2024/12/16轉載了兩篇關於那一年「中央經濟工作會議」結論的報導。我現在沒有能力對這兩次「工作會議」內容做深入的比較和分析。不過。以目前中國經濟欲舉乏力的情況來判斷：
a. 或者2024年制訂的政策不對症；
b. 或者落實這些政策的方案不靠譜。
總而言之，統而言之，中南海大老們在公佈明年「重點任務」的執行方案前，不妨認真思考一下：
目前在中國，以上所列舉的兩個「客觀現實」是否沒有到位，以至於：讓有才能者不能或不願意充分發揮，經濟發展必須得有的創新活力。另一方面，在顛沛流離兩千年的文化薰陶(陰影？)下，老百姓如果看不到一個無憂無慮的未來，自然也就提不起今朝有酒今朝醉，盡情享受眼前歡的興致。
如果的確如此，恐怕需要回到書桌上或會議室，另起爐灶、重新規劃。否則，到了2026年這個時節，固然可以照例張燈結綵，召開另一個「中央經濟工作會議」；但是，在「經濟為國力之本」這個鐵律前，2027年轉瞬即至，「中央」總不好讓經濟實況拖解放軍完成大業的後腿吧。
2. 長期規劃
如佩西克先生大作所引用李其博士的評論(請見本欄2025/12/14)，中國政府的「改革政策」，20年來似乎總是脫不了「又要馬兒好，又要馬兒不吃草」的「雙贏」(僥倖？偷雞？)心態。這當然不是因為政府領導人「頭髮稀，見識短」；而是因為：全球經濟環環相扣，瞬息萬變，中國免不了受到池魚之殃或「蝴蝶效應」的波及(該欄2024/06/17)。從而，也就不得不做些頭痛醫頭，腳痛醫腳之類的應急、救火措施。
但是，該來的遲早要來，「拖延」不能代替消除或化解。站在個人立場，或許頭過身就過；站在黨的立場，把擔子甩給下一任、下兩任、或下n任總不是個辦法。習總即使並非不世之才，但他的確是個時勢或時代創造的領袖。我的意思是：以後10到20年中，中國想要再出一個無所不抓的「總主席」(該欄開欄文附註1)，應該屬於不可能的事件。如果習「總主席」當下不能做到「壯士斷腕」，貫徹小平同志當年毅然決然訂下的經濟「改革開放」政策，積重難返的慣性和壓力下；過去50年的成果和中國夢的基礎難免毀於一旦。
3. 結論
根據《中國將給美國經濟來記陰招》(該欄2025/12/16)和《從人工智能看中、美能源政策》(本欄2025/08/16)這兩篇內容，中國有進行長遠規劃的人才和技術；以中國國力的深厚，「資本」也不是個問題。
中國政府能不能正視當前經濟在本質上的問題，以及能不能對症下藥的提出和執行解決中國經濟根本困難的政策和方案，就看習「總主席」及其團隊的知識、格局、魄力、和勇氣了。
不要嫌我烏鴉嘴，老祖宗這一方面的諄諄教誨很多：「人無遠慮，必有近憂」，「當斷不斷，反受其亂」等等，政治局諸常委慢慢琢磨吧。
本文於 修改第 6 次
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中國經濟2026展望 -- William Pesek
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索引：
cross-cyclical policy：跨週期政策
new productive forces：新性質生產力
supply-side economice：生產面經濟活動及政策
supply-side reform：生產面經濟改革
China’s 2026 stimulus plan isn’t exports, it’s economic reform
The leadership of Xi’s Communist Party has made strengthening domestic demand the No. 1 goal for 2026
William Pesek, 12/12/25
TOKYO — There’s little doubt that China’s export engine is working its magic to get Asia’s biggest economy across the finish line to 5% growth.
Clearly, China blowing past his tariffs in 2025 to rack up a record $1 trillion trade surplus wasn’t on Donald Trump’s bingo card. Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s economy did it in just 11 months. That, while scoring yet another delay in trade deal talks – this one for 12 months. It means that the earliest the US president could hope for a ribbon-cutting ceremony with Xi is early 2027.
Yet, Xi’s Communist Party also knows that this same playbook won’t work in the 12 months ahead. Trump’s trade war is hitting US households hard, and demand from elsewhere is unlikely to enable China to export its way to 5% growth. This has Xi turning inward and relying on reforms to get households to deploy US$22 trillion in savings, which is key to ending deflation.
That was the clear signal from Monday’s Politburo huddle in Beijing. The leadership of Xi’s Communist Party made strengthening domestic demand the No. 1 goal for 2026. As the readout from the confab put it: “We must adhere to domestic demand as the main driver and build a strong domestic market.” The party’s decision-making body is also telegraphing a doubling down on Xi’s “new productive forces.” (新性質生產力)
Xi is believed to have coined this phrase in September 2023. And its reappearance since then suggests that the goal in 2026 is less to curtail manufacturing’s role in driving GDP than to harness new technologies to make factories more efficient and globally competitive. Other slogans getting media attention this week include the Politburo’s talk of “cross-cyclical” policy (跨週期). This, it’s believed, means a focus more on the long run than on immediate gratification.
That’s not to say Team Xi won’t be adding stimulus in the year ahead. Count Societe Generale economist Wei Yao among those who think benchmark Chinese bond yields could fall to their lowest-ever level in 2026 as the central bank eases monetary policy. As Yao told Bloomberg: “To support the economy there needs to be more easing. If deflation is still the dominant factor here, then, yes, bond yields will be lower or cannot rise.”
But, as Team Xi is signaling, the real growth driver will come from supply-side reforms. And herein lies the risk. The year ahead will be one in which the costs of overpromising and underdelivering may be higher than ever.
The degree of difficulty in terms of what Xi is planning is significant.
“Aligning fiscal expansion with structural reform, strengthening household demand without amplifying financial vulnerabilities and advancing industrial upgrading while preserving market discipline will be central to navigating the next phase of China’s economic transition,” says Lizzi Lee, an economist at the Asia Society Policy Institute.
“Yet,” she adds, “structural imbalances accumulated over the past decade, compounded by an increasingly unsettled geopolitical environment, ensure that the road ahead will remain complex and uncertain.”
Since 2013, when Xi formally became China’s strongest leader since Mao Zedong, he has pledged to let market forces play a “decisive role” in economic decision-making. Too often, though, Xi’s promised reforms take a back seat to current events.
One such example was in the summer of 2015, when Shanghai stocks lost nearly a third of their value in just three weeks. That prompted an all-of-government response, particularly as China’s selloff slammed markets from Tokyo to London to New York and fueled contagion fears.
Had Team Xi used that episode to accelerate moves to strengthen capital markets, increase government and corporate transparency, reduce the size of the state sector or make the yuan fully convertible, China would be in a better place as 2026 approaches.
China’s over-the-top Covid lockdowns were an epic own-goal that set back consumer spending. The same goes for Xi’s 2020 crackdown on internet giants. The wealth-destroying inquisition started with Alibaba Group founder Jack Ma and snowballed from there. The fallout had Wall Street debating whether China was “uninvestable.”
The year ahead is an ideal opportunity to get back to reformist basics. Topping the to-do list:
* end the property crisis that is causing deflation;
* reduce opacity;
* level playing fields so that the private sector can thrive;
* address dangerously high youth unemployment;
* repair the finances of local governments buckling under trillions of dollars of debt; and
* build vibrant social safety nets to prod households to save less and spend more.
Any of these upgrades is challenging enough, never mind several at once. A wise first step is to stop announcing annual GDP targets. Having to achieve some arbitrary number, year after year, warps all economic incentives. It forces municipal leaders across China’s 22 provinces to prioritize stimulus short-term sugar highs over big-picture reforms to craft a more dynamic economy.
This dynamic explains why China inds it so hard to pivot away from rapid, debt-fueled growth. The way local government officials with national ambitions get on Beijing’s radar screen is by producing above-target GDP year after year. The odds are exceedingly low that the giant infrastructure projects on which municipalities rely to fuel growth are necessary for financed productively.
Any shot China has to grow better, not just faster, relies on breaking this cycle. Granted, efforts by Xi and Li Qiang, the premier since March 2023, to deleverage the economy have gained traction. As such, China is no longer on the “treadmill to hell” about which hedge fund manager Jim Chanos warned in 2010.
Also, the “Made in China 2025” extravaganza Xi rolled out in 2015 had quite a year. It set out to expand China’s footprint in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, electric vehicles, renewable energy, semiconductors and other future technologies.
In 2025, the strategy put some major wins on the board. Case in point: the runaway success of EV-maker BYD and AI sensation DeepSeek.
The trouble is that the economy underlying China Inc. is being undermined by the slow pace of reforms. The annual GDP target game still keeps China in a cycle that has been playing out since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. The way China avoided the worst of the Lehman shock was by ordering up trillions of dollars of infrastructure projects to keep GDP well above 5%.
The good news is that 2026 could be remembered as the year China shifted to a more sustainable growth model.
The key is to avoid the perception in some quarters that the Politburo might just be repackaging previous pledges. As Cheng Hao, fund manager at Zhejiang Feiluo Assets Management, tells Bloomberg: “This is old wine in new bottles.”
Part of the worry is how Trump might blow up Asia’s 2026. As his approval rating at home slides and the US economy struggles, might he pivot to making tariffs great again? Only time will tell. But it’s quite the imponderable.
Bill Bishop, who writes the Sinocism newsletter, notes that subtle rhetorical changes by the Politburo could matter greatly.
“The absence of any specific mention of real estate or the stock market, as there was in the 2024 readout, may be noteworthy,” Bishop says. “The stock market has performed very well over the last year so it may be less of an immediate concern, but the real estate market is far from stabilizing and so more policy support is needed if the leadership is sticking to its call to stabilize real estate.”
What’s more, he says, China’s “leadership seems to believe that some of the more acute problems the system was facing in the summer of 2024 have been effectively addressed by the more aggressive policy response that began in September 2024. The placement of the task about resolving risks in the last spot this year, as opposed to the fifth spot last year may indicate confidence in progress in managing those risks.”
And in raising China’s economic game once and for all.
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