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中國經濟之計劃篇 – 開欄文
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瀏覽4,862 ｜回應19｜推薦1 |
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轉貼相關評論於下。可參看本城市《中國經濟體系正在進行(？)結構性改革》一文，和《中國經濟之狀況篇》一欄。
如我在《中國經濟之狀況篇》一欄的開欄文中所說：
「到了九月底和今年年底，再做個檢驗印證。或許可以看出誰有認知偏差；誰的資料不夠周全；誰的分析解讀功力鴉鴉烏。」
我就藏拙不聒噪了。
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中國巨額出超的兩個根本因素 - Shang-Jin Wei
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我不是經濟學家，這大概是我認為下文的邏輯有點搞笑的原因吧。
What Really Drives China’s Massive Trade Surplus
Shang-Jin Wei, 04/20/26
China’s trade surplus is often blamed on its industrial policies. In reality, however, it reflects a persistent gap between savings and investment, driven by demographic pressures and financial constraints that shape household behavior and restrict private firms’ access to credit.
NEW YORK—China’s massive trade surplus, which reached a record of $1.2 trillion in 2025, has become a central fault line in its economic relations with other countries. As competition from Chinese imports increasingly weighs on domestic industries, French President Emmanuel Macron as warned that Europe faces a “Chinese tsunami” and called for a “rebalancing.” Policymakers across the continent have voiced similar concerns.
This pressure is unlikely to ease anytime soon. The Chinese economy is growing faster than those of its trading partners, so even if its current-account surplus remains stable as a share of China’s own GDP, its bilateral trade surpluses could continue to grow.
While China’s trade surplus is often attributed to its industrial policies and trade barriers, this explanation is misleading. Industrial policies do matter at the sector level, with government subsidies boosting exports in industries like shipbuilding, solar panels, and electric vehicles (EVs), but these gains do not necessarily carry over to the trade balance.
The Lerner Symmetry Theorem, which states that import tariffs have the same long-term effects as export taxes, helps explain this pattern. Export subsidies tend to increase both exports and imports: as export sectors expand, they draw resources away from import-competing industries, which then contract, leading to greater reliance on imports. By the same logic, import restrictions often reduce both imports and exports. In other words, such measures primarily affect the composition of trade rather than its overall balance.
China’s own experience is a case in point. Since 2017, the government has actively promoted imports through initiatives like the China International Import Expo. While most countries use taxpayer-funded programs to promote exports, few subsidize imports. But despite strong political backing, these efforts have done little to reduce China’s trade surplus, in line with the Lerner Symmetry Theorem.
To understand the persistence of China’s trade surplus, one must look beyond industrial policies. The key lies in the gap between national savings and investment, which determines the current-account balance. In China, investment is high by global standards, but its savings rate is even higher, exceeding 40% of GDP.
China’s high household savings rate is driven by structural forces, such as its skewed sex ratio. Decades of strict family-planning policies, combined with a cultural preference for sons, have created a surplus of men. The resulting imbalance has given rise to what I call a “competitive saving motive,” as families with sons save aggressively to improve their children’s prospects in an increasingly tight marriage market. These pressures often spill over to households with daughters and those without young children, raising the national savings rate.
The numbers tell a clear story: regions with higher male-to-female ratios consistently exhibit higher household savings rates, and households with sons tend to save more, especially where the gender imbalance is most pronounced. This factor alone may account for up to half of the rise in China’s savings rate since the 1990s, yet it is rarely acknowledged in policy discussions.
A structural factor behind China’s high corporate savings rate is financial underdevelopment. The country’s financial system has long favored state-owned enterprises, leaving private firms, which are often more productive, with limited access to credit. As a result, many firms must rely heavily on retained earnings to finance investment.
Together, these forces generate a sustained gap between savings and investment, which, in today’s globalized economy, manifests as a large trade surplus. Government savings, by contrast, play a limited role, as they have been negative for many years and thus contribute little to the overall surplus.
Could increased government spending, particularly on social programs, help reduce China’s trade surplus? To some extent, yes. Higher public spending would lower government savings and diminish households’ need for precautionary savings. But this approach has its limits. China’s social spending is already broadly in line with that of other middle-income countries, and moving toward a Western European-style welfare model could weaken incentives to work, innovate, and invest, thereby slowing growth.
To be sure, short-term measures such as monetary and fiscal stimulus could boost domestic demand and imports, temporarily narrowing the trade surplus. But a lasting solution requires deeper structural reforms to address the gender imbalance and improve private-sector firms’ access to finance. While these reforms will take time to bear fruit, without them China’s trade surplus is bound to remain a source of friction for years to come.
Shang-Jin Wei, a former chief economist at the Asian Development Bank, is Professor of Finance and Economics at Columbia Business School and Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. He’s been writing for PS since 2015.
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《15-5計劃》將衝擊歐洲未來 -- N. Grünberg/A. Davey
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請自行參考、斟酌；並參看本欄相關報導和評論。
Four key points to keep in view as China implements its 15th Five-Year Plan
China’s new 15th Five-Year Plan is a high-level framework offering something for every policy field – and it triggers a months-long cascade of regional and sectoral plans, each detailing goals and priorities in more concrete terms. Nis Grünberg and Alexander Davey have identified four policy trajectories that are set to have an impact on Europe’s own strategic choices.
Nis Grünberg/Alexander Davey, 04/15/26
European decision makers need to keep in mind that China’s new 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP) is less a concrete plan than a high-level framework offering something for every policy field – and that it triggers a months-long cascade of regional and sectoral plans, each detailing goals and priorities in more concrete terms. To stop this abundance turning into confusion, MERICS has identified four policy trajectories that look set to have an impact on Europe’s own strategic choices: increasing supply-chain dominance, mainstreaming the energy transition, boosting and going beyond AI, and dealing with demographic pressures.
Compared to its predecessor, the 15th FYP signals smaller adjustments on socio-economic targets, but doubles down on growing China's industrial power and manufacturing base, increasing technological self-reliance, advancing energy security through systemic decarbonization, and betting on being able to lead the world in sectors barely on the horizon beyond AI – like quantum technology nuclear fusion energy or brain-computer interfaces. In the Chinese Communist Party’s own words, “system thinking” is meant to integrate economic resilience, energy security and technological self-reliance across policy fields.
Exhibit 1 關鍵詞在《15-5計劃》中出現次數統計圖
Beijing’s belief in the link between technological progress, economic development and national security remains steadfast. A MERICS analysis of 14 key policy terms shows that “innovation” and “security” are the most mentioned in the 15th FYP (see Exhibit 1), albeit slightly less often than in the 14th FYP. The term “AI” appears five times more frequently – at the expense of “digital,” which occurs three times less. “Investment” and “consumption” are mentioned one-and-a-half times more often, ranking third and fourth among the most frequently used key words, and aligning with the four policy trajectories identified below.
Securing the supply chain to boost both economic resilience and geopolitical leverage
Domestic demand is expected to play a more significant role in driving economic growth than over the last five years. But the 15th FYP makes also clear that China aims to remain a manufacturing powerhouse along the entire economic value chain, neither relinquishing downstream sectors like consumer goods nor upstream ones like rare earths. Control over value chains is seen as way to increase economic resilience and geopolitical power. While expanding trade is certainly a goal, national security and economic de-risking are the main drivers of supply-chain control, alongside industrial upgrading and the transition to renewable energy.
Integrating renewable energy and technologies into the economic mainstream
Electric vehicles (EVs) and photo voltaic panels (PV) are no longer singled out in the FYP as technologies requiring special support, signaling that green tech and energy transition have become mainstream. Renewables have moved to the center of efforts to build a resilient energy system. Beijing wants to double its world-leading solar and wind capacities over ten years. As China plans to widely deploy power hungry AI, it is building a power system increasingly independent of oil and coal that can deliver everywhere. By highlighting green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol to decarbonize industry and transport, the 15th FYP shows a widening recognition of green tech as key to sustainability, business and security.
Boosting scientific self-reliance, artificial intelligence and “future industries”
The 15th FYP makes science and technological self-reliance a key goal. Beijing anticipates this generational agenda to produce "landmark achievements" and a marked increase in the number of fields in which China is in the global vanguard. The Five-Year Plan sees China becoming stronger and more self-sufficient in AI by improving its science, hardware and software. Beyond AI and seven other “emerging sectors” that will drive near-term advances, the 15th FYP also highlights “future industries” – including quantum technology, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy, and brain-computer interfaces – that warrant close attention.
Addressing the challenges of an ageing population even as public budgets are tight
The plan’s welfare agenda is positive, although less ambitious than its technological aspirations, reflecting constrained public finances. Given Beijing’s attempt to bolster domestic resilience amid economic and demographic woes, some services are receiving particular attention. The 15th FYP emphasizes building a “birth-friendly society” through more support for families – but also highlights the need to improve elderly care and education for the young. By listing 20 social-welfare and other indicators, Beijing is signaling that welfare outcomes – not just economic growth or industrial upgrading – must improve measurably.
Aligning political, administrative and economic decisionmakers around overarching objectives is the core strength of every FYP.
Hundreds of administrative actors at all levels of government and companies all over China will now formulate their own detailed responses to the 15th FYP. Not all will meet the targets they set for 2026 to 2030, but not all need to. The corporate sector as a whole only has to marginally outperform foreign competition over the next five years – and Beijing only has to be marginally more successful than other governments in managing geopolitical headwinds and ensuring buy-in from its populace.
European policy and corporate decisionmakers need to follow the coming implementation of sectoral FYPs carefully. China has made good on many of its past technology plans, such as Made in China 2025. The new FYP is likely to turn out to be one of the most consequential industrial policies for Europe and its tech leaders. Europe needs to adapt or face an evergrowing challenge from Chinese competition.
Author(s)
Nis Grünberg, Lead Analyst
Alexander Davey, Analyst
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內需能維持中國經濟成長嗎？- Keyu Jin
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Can China Grow From Within?
Keyu Jin, 04/01/26
At a time of intensifying geopolitical volatility, China’s embrace of a consumption-led model is not only about rebalancing growth, but also about anchoring it more firmly at home. Domestic demand offers insulation from external shocks, and along with developed capital markets, it can go a long way toward strengthening autonomy.
LONDON – China manifests a striking paradox. It is among the world’s most dynamic technological powers, producing breakthroughs in AI, electric vehicles, and advanced manufacturing at an accelerating pace, yet economic growth continues to slow. The reason is no mystery. As the government’s latest Five-Year Plan (2026-30) recognizes, China is experiencing a structural transition, not a cyclical slowdown. The old model is giving way to a new one, which has yet to take hold.
This transition is about more than economics. It reflects a deeper objective: strategic autonomy. The question is no longer simply whether China can grow, but whether it can grow on its own terms. A system that depends heavily on external demand, foreign capital, or imported technology is inherently exposed – a reality that recent energy shocks have thrown into sharp relief. So, the 15th Five-Year Plan aims to reduce structural dependencies.
The investment-driven and export-led model that powered Chinese growth for decades was highly effective at scaling up supply, delivering extraordinary results through a time of rapid globalization, favorable demographics, surging urbanization, and a property boom. But it was inadequate at raising demand and welfare – and it has now reached its limits. While advanced-technology sectors are strategically vital, their macroeconomic weight is limited. High-end manufacturing, for example, accounted for roughly 6% of GDP last year and contributes relatively little to local-government revenues compared to the property sector it is meant to replace.
There is now only one engine capable of sustaining growth at the scale China requires: consumption. For a country that has managed to overcome powerful constraints to innovation – a record exemplified by Huawei’s resilience and the rise of leading AI players like DeepSeek – getting households to consume more might not seem like a difficult task. But given that under-consumption has long been embedded in the Chinese system, it might be the toughest challenge China has faced.
The gap between China’s current consumption levels and global norms implies trillions of dollars in unrealized demand. The divergence is particularly pronounced in services. Whereas China’s real consumption stands at roughly 50-80% of US levels – broadly consistent with a middle-income OECD economy – service consumption lags significantly behind, falling short of developed-economy levels by an estimated 15-20 percentage points.
The 15th Five-Year Plan marks the Chinese government’s most concerted effort yet to address this imbalance – though results will take time to emerge. At its core is a new doctrine: boosting domestic demand by investing in people.
Start with pensions. As it stands, social support in China is distributed unevenly, with rural pensions averaging only around $35 per month – less than 7% of urban retirees’ benefits. But rural pensions are set to rise to about $85 per month within three years, and to some $140 per month within five years. Some estimates suggest that this change alone could ultimately lift consumption by 5-10 percentage points of GDP.
But this is just a first step. Given the constraints on consumption – weak income expectations, high precautionary savings, and lingering balance-sheet pressures – persuading Chinese households to spend will depend less on delivering short-term stimulus than on improving the distribution of income, security, and opportunity across the economy. This is why China will have to shift the focus of its investments from physical capital to people.
Recognizing this, the 15th Five-Year Plan aims to expand the scope of free education and increase the number of years of compulsory school attendance, lower childcare costs, and scale up vocational training. Moreover, it sets the stage for reforms to the hukou (household registration) system that would more fully integrate migrant workers into urban welfare systems. And it will seek to unlock household wealth and stabilize living costs through rural land reform, improved public housing, and urban renewal initiatives.
For households to feel secure enough to spend on the necessary scale, opportunities for broader wealth accumulation are also essential. As of 2025, China’s stock-market capitalization stood at roughly CN¥100 trillion ($14.5 trillion) – about 77% of GDP. That is well below the 100-120% ratio typical of mature markets.
Expanding China’s capital markets is not only a financial imperative, but also a structural and strategic one, as it is essential to reducing reliance on external capital. Capital markets channel savings into more productive sectors – particularly services and high-tech industries – and give households opportunities to invest their savings and participate in sustainable wealth creation. They are thus vital to enable a shift from property-based to financial wealth, and from investment-led growth to consumption-driven demand.
But, as the 15th Five-Year Plan also recognizes, expanding China’s capital markets will require deep institutional reforms to improve initial public offering systems, strengthen corporate governance, encourage dividends and buybacks, and mobilize “patient capital” from pension funds and insurers. Meanwhile, gradual financial opening and greater foreign participation will enhance market depth and integration.
It remains to be seen whether these policies will translate into meaningfully higher consumption in the near term. But they do represent a departure from previous five-year plans, which treated consumption as secondary to more traditional growth engines like investment and exports. This reflects changing external conditions, which have made reliance on others – for demand, technology, capital, or energy – synonymous with vulnerability.
At a time of intensifying geopolitical volatility and global fragmentation, China’s embrace of a consumption-led model is not only about rebalancing growth, but also about anchoring it more firmly at home. Strong domestic demand offers a degree of insulation from external shocks, and together with developed capital markets, it can go a long way toward strengthening autonomy.
In this sense, the trajectory is clear. China aims to recreate, in its own way, the conditions that some privileged economies have long enjoyed: the ability to grow from within.
Keyu Jin, Professor of Economics at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, is the author of The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism (Viking, 2023). WShe’s been writing for PS since 2012.
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中國「15-5 計畫」分析 ----- Bert Hofman
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我不是經濟學家；也不再有精力細讀「15-5 計畫」。但是，下文的分析讓我對中國的經濟前景難以抱持觀態度。
由於：「政改」是「經改」的基礎和前置條件；所以，沒有深度和全面的「政改」，再多的「計畫」終究不過是一劑「OK繃」。
下文是德國墨卡托中國研究協會資深研究員霍夫門先生的大作；該協會由德國墨卡托基金會創辦於2013年；它是歐洲專門研究中國最大的智庫。有趣的是：下文作者的分析方法和我的方法相同(該欄開欄文)。
Deciphering the 15th Five Year Plan
Bert Hofman, 03/19/26
China’s 15th Five Year Plan, spanning 2026-2030, was approved by the National People’s Congress in its March 2026 session. The plan, a good 80,000 Chinese characters long, offered few major surprises. This is for two reasons, says MERICS Senior Associate Fellow Bert Hofman: one, there is a lot of continuity with the 14th, and even the 13th Plan, and two, the “guidance” that the central committee of the communist party provided last October was, as expected, duly incorporated.
Still, the Plan is worth a thorough review—first and foremost for aspiring Chinese bureaucrats, but also for those who that want to understand where the Chinese economy is heading, which new technologies we can expect coming out of China, and whether China will finally manage to rebalance its economy and reduce its increasingly contested trade surpluses.
Today’s plan is a far cry from the original Soviet style 5-year plans first introduced in 1953. Gone are the days of the thousands of tons of steel, the millions head of cattle and bushels of grain. Instead, the plan can best be understood as a strategic guide to the Chinese party, government and people, and a communication tool for the party leadership to coordinate individual actions across the vast economy of 1.4 billion people. The transition from Soviet to Strategic plan took place in the 1990s, with the 9th Five Year Plan, after China had declared itself a “socialist market economy” at the 14th National Party Congress.
The “Outline of the 15th Five Year Plan (2026-2030) for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China” as it is formally called is an “Outline” in the sense that it is an Apex plan sitting on top of many other plans. Each Ministry, agency, province, and municipality has their own 5-year plan based on the national plan. The main indicators plan a role in shaping these plans, but they do more than that: these indicators help shape the key performance indicators of the government officials and party cadre and central and local level. Meeting those targets is key for promotion, and a powerful mechanism to steer the ship of government.
The Plan still has targets, such as for GDP growth, the growth in spending on Research and development, air pollution etc. But most of these targets are indicative—only 1/3 of the indicators in the table of Key Indicators are mandatory (Annex Table). The development of key indicators over time suggests a somewhat reduced role of the indicators compared to the past (Exhibit 1a). The number of indicators peaked at 33 in the 13th Five Year Plan, with almost 60 percent binding. In the 15th plan the total is 21, and less than 40 percent is binding. Breaking the indicators down by the categories as per the 15th Plan (Exhibit 1b), suggests a growing emphasis on innovation and people’s livelihood, and, after peaking in the 13th Plan, somewhat less focus on environment, perhaps because much has been achieved since. Notably, a new indicator on carbon intensity of the economy was introduced in the 15th plan, replacing an indicator on energy intensity. This indicator links well to the government “twin carbon” goal: peaking before 2030, and net zero by 2060.
Exhibit 1 五年計畫「指標」比較圖
The target for GDP growth is no longer a real target since the last plan. It merely states that growth should be maintained “within a reasonable range.” The formulation as it came about in 2021 would have been convenient in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, when growth over the next 5 years was anybody’s guess. But it also emphasized the policy shift away from simply growth to what the authorities now dub “High Quality Development.” Nowadays, the growth target is set annually, in chambers during the Central Economic Work Conference in December, and publicly revealed at the opening of the National People’s Congress in the prime minister’s work report. For this year, it is to be 4.5-5 percent, a bit less than last year’s 5 percent, but still enough to stay on track for the informal goal to double GDP from 2020 to 2035.
High Quality Development, the overarching objective of the Plan, is defined as being innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared. The “toolkit” for achieving High Quality Development is the “New Development Philosophy (or Paradigm), The New Development Philosophy includes Supply-side structural reforms, the New Quality Productive Forces, Dual Circulation, Common Prosperity, and Ecological Civilization, elements that were included over time. In Xi Jinping’s words: “Accelerating the construction of a new development pattern is the strategic basis for promoting high-quality development.” The 14th Five Year Plan (2021-25) started to take a stab at translating concepts into policy, and the 3rd Plenum of the 20th Party Congress spells out a number of specific policy reforms many of which will have an impact on the goal of High-Quality Development.
How does all this party ideology translate into the 15th Five Year Plan?
To get a grip on that I like word counts. I took a count on the main policy terms in the past 3 plans to determine what is in, what is out and what is the focus of the authorities in the coming 5 years (Exhibit 2). Clear winners in the word count are the innovation and technology related terms: Artificial Intelligence (人工智慧) has the highest count followed by high-quality development (高品質發展), and scientific and technological innovation (科技創新). National security (國家安全) has been very stable from the 13th-15th plan at about 20 occurrences. This reflects one of the major shifts in focus under Xi Jinping, who has consistently argued that national security is the basis for development—and vice versa!
Exhibit 2 五年計畫「字彙」比較圖
New terms in the 15th Plan are New Quality Productive Forces (新質生產力), unified national market (全國統一大市場), modern industrial system (現代化產業體系), and technological self-reliance (科技自立自強), and carbon peaking (碳達峰). While none of the key terms that were included in the 14th plan disappeared completely from the 15th plan, several saw a major drop in word count, including: Reform and Opening Up, Industrial Chains, Supply Chains, and strategic emerging industries, ecological civilization, rural revitalization, common prosperity, and dual circulation (雙迴圈) which was absent in the 13th, peaked in the 14th, and is only mentioned once in the 15th plan.
Overall, the word count suggests a continued strong emphasis on innovation and technology, reduced emphasis on reform and opening (and market development), and still limited attention to "people first" and common prosperity. The Plan suggests also stronger emphasis on basic research, and a stronger link between technological innovation and growth. The link is the first and foremost the “Modern Industrial System” a term new to the 5 Year Plan, but which had been circulating for some time. Also, the AI+ initiative of the government, based on a plan issued last year fall, receives abundant attention. It sees the main value of AI in its application, and in particular in its application to industry and business. The open access approach that China’s tech companies such as DeepSeek have taken fits this well and could lead to more rapid adoption of AI than in countries that rely on proprietary systems.
The greater adoption of technology and more unified market should, in the Plan’s philosophy, lead to higher productivity. Labour productivity is, as in the past plans, included as a key indicator. “Total factor productivity,” concept that refers to the overall efficiency of resource use in a society, is considered as a key objective, and has been mentioned several times by Xi Jinping in his speeches. Nevertheless, it is not included in the main indicator table, which is understandable, given the issues of measurement and methodology of the concept. Meanwhile, the investment in basic research should pay out in future technologies, the “new quality productive forces” and the plan mentions a range of them, from brain-computer interface to quantum computing to fusion energy.
Will the Plan solve China’s Domestic Demand Issue?
The Plan, as well as the government work reports and the central economic work conferences in the past few years, have made domestic demand a priority. Rightfully so, as growing supply with insufficient demand would further increase trade surpluses, and trade tensions. Perhaps more importantly, the authorities want growth to translate into more consumption and “people’s needs.” In fact, the 19th National Party Congress made this the central “contradiction” or challenge for the Party.
Higher domestic demand will have to predominantly come from consumption and perhaps form government investment. As Alicia Garcia Herrero, Chief Asia Economist for Natixis, an investment bank, has argued, corporate profits are now too low to finance much growth in investment. Moreover, the government’s “anti-involution policy” is targeted at the excessive investment that local governments pursue. Furthermore, with much better technology, AI, and robotization, industrial growth may simply require less investment. And finally, the property sector, previously a major investment destination, is still in the doldrums, and given the modest policy plans, is unlikely to bounce back. Lower investment growth would be good for total factor productivity, if indeed wasteful investments are reduced. But it would further suppress domestic demand.
Common prosperity and “people first” still receive relatively limited attention. Lots of initiatives are mentioned in the text, including further aligning the urban and rural pension and health system, the development of a “fertility friendly” society (free kindergartens, child money), and the objectives for greater equality in service delivery across regions would all contribute, but it is hard to see that they add up to a major shift in consumption power for households. In the Plan’s (and the Party’s) thinking better employment, more education, “investment in people” and a growing middle class is the way to common prosperity, not income redistribution.
The Plan states the objective to increase the household consumption rate, though that is not a main indicator. What is in is that per capita income should develop in line with GDP, so apparently the authorities count on a lower household savings rate. With the continued slump in property prices, a lacklustre labour market and modest improvements in social safety and insurance, it is hard to see how household consumption could majorly contribute to higher domestic demand as a share of GDP.
Government spending, either investment or consumption, could take up the slack. Whether the next five years will the major reforms needed to shore up government finances and make the fiscal system ready for high quality growth remains to be seen. Reform initiatives are sprinkled throughout the Plan, but putting public finances on a solid footing requires a comprehensive plan at par with the 1994 fiscal reforms.
Annex Table 「15-5 計畫」主要「指標」表
This article was first published in Bert's Newsletter on Substack on March 13, 2026.
Endnotes
Bert Hofman, Senior Associate Fellow
相關報導：
Party and State
China in 26: War in Iran + 15th Five-Year Plan + Homework for Europe
China and the war in Iran + The new Five-Year Plan + NPC outcomes
Following the party line: A calendar of key Chinese government and Communist Party meetings
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0. 前言
讀了本欄2025/12/14和2025/12/16的兩篇報導/分析後，有些感想。我不是經濟系或相關領域出身，更不是財經問題專家，照理不該撈過界。但是，在觀察70多年豬走路的身份外，古有「肉食者鄙」的說法(《左傳・曹劌論戰》-3)，也就讓我得到閒話幾句的底氣。還請看官們不吝指教。
1. 計畫與現實
由於「經濟為國力之本」，我非常期待：明年前半年能看到這些「重點任務」被逐漸落實(請見本欄2025/12/14)；2026年底能看到它們的成果被展現在相關指標和重要數據上。
根據我所了解的「歷史經驗」，在「對症下藥」式的有效政策之外，落實這些「重點任務」還得需要兩個「客觀現實」：
1) 一般受到進階教育的菁英有一個：自己能夠「發揮潛能」的社會空間，以及保障自己能夠享受勞心，勞力所得成果的政治制度。
2) 一般30歲以上的老百姓，能看到一個：至少未來30 - 40年自己仍然生活在穩定、富庶社會的前景。
本欄2024/12/16轉載了兩篇關於那一年「中央經濟工作會議」結論的報導。我現在沒有能力對這兩次「工作會議」內容做深入的比較和分析。不過。以目前中國經濟欲舉乏力的情況來判斷：
a. 或者2024年制訂的政策不對症；
b. 或者落實這些政策的方案不靠譜。
總而言之，統而言之，中南海大老們在公佈明年「重點任務」的執行方案前，不妨認真思考一下：
目前在中國，以上所列舉的兩個「客觀現實」是否沒有到位，以至於：讓有才能者不能或不願意充分發揮，經濟發展必須得有的創新活力。另一方面，在顛沛流離兩千年的文化薰陶(陰影？)下，老百姓如果看不到一個無憂無慮的未來，自然也就提不起今朝有酒今朝醉，盡情享受眼前歡的興致。
如果的確如此，恐怕需要回到書桌上或會議室，另起爐灶、重新規劃。否則，到了2026年這個時節，固然可以照例張燈結綵，召開另一個「中央經濟工作會議」；但是，在「經濟為國力之本」這個鐵律前，2027年轉瞬即至，「中央」總不好讓經濟實況拖解放軍完成大業的後腿吧。
2. 長期規劃
如佩西克先生大作所引用李其博士的評論(請見本欄2025/12/14)，中國政府的「改革政策」，20年來似乎總是脫不了「又要馬兒好，又要馬兒不吃草」的「雙贏」(僥倖？偷雞？)心態。這當然不是因為政府領導人「頭髮稀，見識短」；而是因為：全球經濟環環相扣，瞬息萬變，中國免不了受到池魚之殃或「蝴蝶效應」的波及(該欄2024/06/17)。從而，也就不得不做些頭痛醫頭，腳痛醫腳之類的應急、救火措施。
但是，該來的遲早要來，「拖延」不能代替消除或化解。站在個人立場，或許頭過身就過；站在黨的立場，把擔子甩給下一任、下兩任、或下n任總不是個辦法。習總即使並非不世之才，但他的確是個時勢或時代創造的領袖。我的意思是：以後10到20年中，中國想要再出一個無所不抓的「總主席」(該欄開欄文附註1)，應該屬於不可能的事件。如果習「總主席」當下不能做到「壯士斷腕」，貫徹小平同志當年毅然決然訂下的經濟「改革開放」政策，積重難返的慣性和壓力下；過去50年的成果和中國夢的基礎難免毀於一旦。
3. 結論
根據《中國將給美國經濟來記陰招》(該欄2025/12/16)和《從人工智能看中、美能源政策》(本欄2025/08/16)這兩篇內容，中國有進行長遠規劃的人才和技術；以中國國力的深厚，「資本」也不是個問題。
中國政府能不能正視當前經濟在本質上的問題，以及能不能對症下藥的提出和執行解決中國經濟根本困難的政策和方案，就看習「總主席」及其團隊的知識、格局、魄力、和勇氣了。
不要嫌我烏鴉嘴，老祖宗這一方面的諄諄教誨很多：「人無遠慮，必有近憂」，「當斷不斷，反受其亂」等等，政治局諸常委慢慢琢磨吧。
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中國經濟2026展望 -- William Pesek
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索引：
cross-cyclical policy：跨週期政策
new productive forces：新性質生產力
supply-side economice：生產面經濟活動及政策
supply-side reform：生產面經濟改革
China’s 2026 stimulus plan isn’t exports, it’s economic reform
The leadership of Xi’s Communist Party has made strengthening domestic demand the No. 1 goal for 2026
William Pesek, 12/12/25
TOKYO — There’s little doubt that China’s export engine is working its magic to get Asia’s biggest economy across the finish line to 5% growth.
Clearly, China blowing past his tariffs in 2025 to rack up a record $1 trillion trade surplus wasn’t on Donald Trump’s bingo card. Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s economy did it in just 11 months. That, while scoring yet another delay in trade deal talks – this one for 12 months. It means that the earliest the US president could hope for a ribbon-cutting ceremony with Xi is early 2027.
Yet, Xi’s Communist Party also knows that this same playbook won’t work in the 12 months ahead. Trump’s trade war is hitting US households hard, and demand from elsewhere is unlikely to enable China to export its way to 5% growth. This has Xi turning inward and relying on reforms to get households to deploy US$22 trillion in savings, which is key to ending deflation.
That was the clear signal from Monday’s Politburo huddle in Beijing. The leadership of Xi’s Communist Party made strengthening domestic demand the No. 1 goal for 2026. As the readout from the confab put it: “We must adhere to domestic demand as the main driver and build a strong domestic market.” The party’s decision-making body is also telegraphing a doubling down on Xi’s “new productive forces.” (新性質生產力)
Xi is believed to have coined this phrase in September 2023. And its reappearance since then suggests that the goal in 2026 is less to curtail manufacturing’s role in driving GDP than to harness new technologies to make factories more efficient and globally competitive. Other slogans getting media attention this week include the Politburo’s talk of “cross-cyclical” policy (跨週期). This, it’s believed, means a focus more on the long run than on immediate gratification.
That’s not to say Team Xi won’t be adding stimulus in the year ahead. Count Societe Generale economist Wei Yao among those who think benchmark Chinese bond yields could fall to their lowest-ever level in 2026 as the central bank eases monetary policy. As Yao told Bloomberg: “To support the economy there needs to be more easing. If deflation is still the dominant factor here, then, yes, bond yields will be lower or cannot rise.”
But, as Team Xi is signaling, the real growth driver will come from supply-side reforms. And herein lies the risk. The year ahead will be one in which the costs of overpromising and underdelivering may be higher than ever.
The degree of difficulty in terms of what Xi is planning is significant.
“Aligning fiscal expansion with structural reform, strengthening household demand without amplifying financial vulnerabilities and advancing industrial upgrading while preserving market discipline will be central to navigating the next phase of China’s economic transition,” says Lizzi Lee, an economist at the Asia Society Policy Institute.
“Yet,” she adds, “structural imbalances accumulated over the past decade, compounded by an increasingly unsettled geopolitical environment, ensure that the road ahead will remain complex and uncertain.”
Since 2013, when Xi formally became China’s strongest leader since Mao Zedong, he has pledged to let market forces play a “decisive role” in economic decision-making. Too often, though, Xi’s promised reforms take a back seat to current events.
One such example was in the summer of 2015, when Shanghai stocks lost nearly a third of their value in just three weeks. That prompted an all-of-government response, particularly as China’s selloff slammed markets from Tokyo to London to New York and fueled contagion fears.
Had Team Xi used that episode to accelerate moves to strengthen capital markets, increase government and corporate transparency, reduce the size of the state sector or make the yuan fully convertible, China would be in a better place as 2026 approaches.
China’s over-the-top Covid lockdowns were an epic own-goal that set back consumer spending. The same goes for Xi’s 2020 crackdown on internet giants. The wealth-destroying inquisition started with Alibaba Group founder Jack Ma and snowballed from there. The fallout had Wall Street debating whether China was “uninvestable.”
The year ahead is an ideal opportunity to get back to reformist basics. Topping the to-do list:
* end the property crisis that is causing deflation;
* reduce opacity;
* level playing fields so that the private sector can thrive;
* address dangerously high youth unemployment;
* repair the finances of local governments buckling under trillions of dollars of debt; and
* build vibrant social safety nets to prod households to save less and spend more.
Any of these upgrades is challenging enough, never mind several at once. A wise first step is to stop announcing annual GDP targets. Having to achieve some arbitrary number, year after year, warps all economic incentives. It forces municipal leaders across China’s 22 provinces to prioritize stimulus short-term sugar highs over big-picture reforms to craft a more dynamic economy.
This dynamic explains why China inds it so hard to pivot away from rapid, debt-fueled growth. The way local government officials with national ambitions get on Beijing’s radar screen is by producing above-target GDP year after year. The odds are exceedingly low that the giant infrastructure projects on which municipalities rely to fuel growth are necessary for financed productively.
Any shot China has to grow better, not just faster, relies on breaking this cycle. Granted, efforts by Xi and Li Qiang, the premier since March 2023, to deleverage the economy have gained traction. As such, China is no longer on the “treadmill to hell” about which hedge fund manager Jim Chanos warned in 2010.
Also, the “Made in China 2025” extravaganza Xi rolled out in 2015 had quite a year. It set out to expand China’s footprint in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, electric vehicles, renewable energy, semiconductors and other future technologies.
In 2025, the strategy put some major wins on the board. Case in point: the runaway success of EV-maker BYD and AI sensation DeepSeek.
The trouble is that the economy underlying China Inc. is being undermined by the slow pace of reforms. The annual GDP target game still keeps China in a cycle that has been playing out since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. The way China avoided the worst of the Lehman shock was by ordering up trillions of dollars of infrastructure projects to keep GDP well above 5%.
The good news is that 2026 could be remembered as the year China shifted to a more sustainable growth model.
The key is to avoid the perception in some quarters that the Politburo might just be repackaging previous pledges. As Cheng Hao, fund manager at Zhejiang Feiluo Assets Management, tells Bloomberg: “This is old wine in new bottles.”
Part of the worry is how Trump might blow up Asia’s 2026. As his approval rating at home slides and the US economy struggles, might he pivot to making tariffs great again? Only time will tell. But it’s quite the imponderable.
Bill Bishop, who writes the Sinocism newsletter, notes that subtle rhetorical changes by the Politburo could matter greatly.
“The absence of any specific mention of real estate or the stock market, as there was in the 2024 readout, may be noteworthy,” Bishop says. “The stock market has performed very well over the last year so it may be less of an immediate concern, but the real estate market is far from stabilizing and so more policy support is needed if the leadership is sticking to its call to stabilize real estate.”
What’s more, he says, China’s “leadership seems to believe that some of the more acute problems the system was facing in the summer of 2024 have been effectively addressed by the more aggressive policy response that began in September 2024. The placement of the task about resolving risks in the last spot this year, as opposed to the fifth spot last year may indicate confidence in progress in managing those risks.”
And in raising China’s economic game once and for all.
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2025年「中央經濟工作會議」要點 -- 中國財經
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中央經濟工作會議在北京舉行 (摘錄)
中國財經，2025年12月12日(轉載自《人民日報》)
會議確定，明年經濟工作抓好以下重點任務：
一、堅持內需主導，建設強大國內市場。深入實施提振消費專項行動，制定實施城鄉居民增收計劃。擴大優質商品和服務供給。優化「兩新」政策實施。清理消費領域不合理限制措施，釋放服務消費潛力。推動投資止跌回穩，適當增加中央預算內投資規模，優化實施“兩重”項目，優化地方政府專項債券用途管理，繼續發揮新型政策性金融工具作用，有效激發民間投資活力。高品質推進城市更新。
二、堅持創新驅動，加緊培育壯大新動能。制定一體推進教育科技人才發展方案。建設北京(京津冀)、上海(長三角)、粵港澳大灣區國際科技創新中心。強化企業創新主體地位，完善新興領域智慧財産權保護制度。制定服務業擴能提質行動方案。實施新一輪重點産業鏈高品質發展行動。深化拓展「人工智慧+」，完善人工智慧治理。創新科技金融服務。
三、堅持改革攻堅，增強高品質發展動力活力。制定全國統一大市場建設條例，深入整治「內卷式」競爭。制定和實施進一步深化國資國企改革方案，完善民營經濟促進法配套法規政策。加緊清理拖欠企業賬款。推動平臺企業和平臺內經營者、勞動者共贏發展。拓展要素市場化改革試點。健全地方稅體系。深入推進中小金融機構減量提質，持續深化資本市場投融資綜合改革。
四、堅持對外開放，推動多領域合作共贏。穩步推進制度型開放，有序擴大服務領域自主開放，優化自由貿易試驗區佈局範圍，紮實推進海南自由貿易港建設。推進貿易投資一體化、內外貿一體化發展。鼓勵支援服務出口，積極發展數字貿易、綠色貿易。深化外商投資促進體制機制改革。完善海外綜合服務體系。推動共建“一帶一路”高品質發展。推動商簽更多區域和雙邊貿易投資協定。
五、堅持協調發展，促進城鄉融合和區域聯動。統籌推進以縣城為重要載體的城鎮化建設和鄉村全面振興，推動縣域經濟高品質發展。嚴守耕地紅線，毫不放鬆抓好糧食生産，促進糧食等重要農産品價格保持在合理水準。持續鞏固拓展脫貧攻堅成果，把常態化幫扶納入鄉村振興戰略統籌實施，守牢不發生規模性返貧致貧底線。支援經濟大省挑大梁。加強重點城市群協調聯動，深化跨行政區合作。加強主要海灣整體規劃，推動海洋經濟高品質發展。
六、堅持「雙碳」引領，推動全面綠色轉型。深入推進重點行業節能降碳改造。制定能源強國建設規劃綱要，加快新型能源體系建設，擴大綠電應用。加強全國碳排放權交易市場建設。實施固體廢物綜合治理行動，深入打好藍天、碧水、凈土保衛戰，強化新污染物治理。紮實推進「三北」工程攻堅戰，實施自然保護地整合優化。加強氣象監測預報預警體系建設，加緊補齊北方地區防洪排澇抗災基礎設施短板，提高應對極端天氣能力。
七、堅持民生為大，努力為人民群眾多辦實事。實施穩崗擴容提質行動，穩定高校畢業生、農民工等重點群體就業，鼓勵支援靈活就業人員、新就業形態人員參加職工保險。推進教育資源佈局結構調整，增加普通高中學位供給和優質高校本科招生。優化藥品集中採購，深化醫保支付方式改革。實施康復護理擴容提升工程，推行長期護理保險制度，加強對困難群體的關愛幫扶。倡導積極婚育觀，努力穩定新出生人口規模。紮實做好安全生産、防災減災救災、食品藥品安全等工作。
八、堅持守牢底線，積極穩妥化解重點領域風險。著力穩定房地産市場，因城施策控增量、去庫存、優供給，鼓勵收購存量商品房重點用於保障性住房等。深化住房公積金制度改革，有序推動「好房子」建設。加快構建房地産發展新模式。積極有序化解地方政府債務風險，督促各地主動化債，不得違規新增隱性債務。優化債務重組和置換辦法，多措並舉化解地方政府融資平臺經營性債務風險。
編後記：
在另一論壇上，看到胡承渝兄介紹中國「中央經濟工作會議」的要點；轉貼於此。
本文於 修改第 2 次
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從人工智能看中、美能源政策 - Eva Roytburg
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AI experts return from China stunned: The U.S. grid is so weak, the race may already be over
Eva Roytburg, 08/15/25
A drone photo shows staff members of State Grid Bortala Electric Power Supply Company patrolling near Sayram Lake scenic area to ensure power supply in Bortala Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture, northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, July 17, 2025. (Yin Tianjie/Xinhua via Getty Images) 請至原網頁觀看照片
“Everywhere we went, people treated energy availability as a given,” Rui Ma wrote on X after returning from a recent tour of China’s AI hubs.
For American AI researchers, that’s almost unimaginable. In the U.S., surging AI demand is colliding with a fragile power grid, the kind of extreme bottleneck that Goldman Sachs warns could severely choke the industry’s growth.
In China, Ma continued, it’s considered a “solved problem.”
Ma, a renowned expert in Chinese technology and founder of the media company Tech Buzz China, took her team on the road to get a firsthand look at the country’s AI advancements. She told Fortune that while she isn’t an energy expert, she attended enough meetings and talked to enough insiders to come away with a conclusion that should send chills down the spine of Silicon Valley: in China, building enough power for data centers is no longer up for debate.
“This is a stark contrast to the U.S., where AI growth is increasingly tied to debates over data center power consumption and grid limitations,” she wrote on X.
The stakes are difficult to overstate. Data center building is the foundation of AI advancement, and spending on new centers now displaces consumer spending in terms of impact to U.S. GDP—that’s concerning since consumer spending is generally two-thirds of the pie. McKinsey projects that between 2025 and 2030, companies worldwide will need to invest $6.7 trillion into new data center capacity to keep up with AI’s strain.
In a recent research note, Stifel Nicolaus warned of a looming correction to the S&P 500, since it forecasts this data-center capex boom to be a one-off build-out of infrastructure, while consumer spending is clearly on the wane.
However, the clear limiting factor to the U.S.’s data center infrastructure development, according to a Deloitte industry survey, is stress on the power grid. Cities’ power grids are so weak that some companies are just building their own power plants rather than relying on existing grids. The public is growing increasingly frustrated over increasing energy bills – in Ohio, the electricity bill for a typical household has increased at least $15 this summer from the data centers – while energy companies prepare for a sea-change of surging demand.
Goldman Sachs frames the crisis simply: “AI’s insatiable power demand is outpacing the grid’s decade-long development cycles, creating a critical bottleneck.”
Meanwhile, David Fishman, a Chinese electricity expert who has spent years tracking their energy development, told Fortune that in China, electricity isn’t even a question. On average, China adds more electricity demand than the entire annual consumption of Germany, every single year. Whole rural provinces are blanketed in rooftop solar, with one province matching the entirety of India’s electricity supply.
“U.S. policymakers should be hoping China stays a competitor and not an aggressor,” Fishman said. “Because right now they can’t compete effectively on the energy infrastructure front.”
China has an oversupply of electricty
China’s quiet electricity dominance, Fishman explained, is the result of decades of deliberate overbuilding and investment in every layer of the power sector, from generation to transmission to next-generation nuclear.
The country’s reserve margin has never dipped below 80%–100% nationwide, meaning it has consistently maintained at least twice the capacity it needs, Fishman said. They have so much available space that instead of seeing AI data centers as a threat to grid stability, China treats them as a convenient way to “soak up oversupply,” he added.
That level of cushion is unthinkable in the United States, where regional grids typically operate with a 15% reserve margin and sometimes less, particularly during extreme weather, Fishman said. In places like California or Texas, officials often issue warnings about red-flag conditions when demand is projected to strain the system. This leaves little room to absorb the rapid load increases AI infrastructure requires, Fishman ntoed.
The gap in readiness is stark: while the U.S. is already experiencing political and economic fights over whether the grid can keep up, China is operating from a position of abundance.
Even if AI demand in China grows so quickly renewable projects can’t keep pace, Fishman said, the country can tap idle coal plants to bridge the gap while building more sustainable sources. “It’s not preferable,” he admitted, “but it’s doable.”
By contrast, the U.S. would have to scramble to bring on new generation capacity, often facing years-long permitting delays, local opposition, and fragmented market rules, he said.
Structural governance differences
Underpinning the hardware advantage is a difference in governance. In China, energy planning is coordinated by long-term, technocratic policy that defines the market’s rules before investments are made, Fishman said. This model ensures infrastructure buildout happens in anticipation of demand, not in reaction to it.
“They’re set up to hit grand slams,” Fishman noted. “The U.S., at best, can get on base.”
In the U.S., large-scale infrastructure projects depend heavily on private investment, but most investors expect a return within three to five years: far too short for power projects that can take a decade to build and pay off.
“Capital is really biased toward shorter-term returns,” he said, noting Silicon Valley has funneled billions into “the nth iteration of software-as-a-service” while energy projects fight for funding.
In China, by contrast, the state directs money toward strategic sectors in advance of demand, accepting not every project will succeed but ensuring the capacity is in place when it’s needed. Without public financing to de-risk long-term bets, he argued, the U.S. political and economic system is simply not set up to build the grid of the future.
Cultural attitudes reinforce this approach. In China, renewables are framed as a cornerstone of the economy because they make sense economically and strategically, not because they carry moral weight. Coal use isn’t cast as a sign of villainy, as it would be among some circles in the U.S. – it’s simply seen as outdated. This pragmatic framing, Fishman argued, allows policymakers to focus on efficiency and results rather than political battles.
For Fishman, the takeaway is blunt. Without a dramatic shift in how the U.S. builds and funds its energy infrastructure, China’s lead will only widen.
“The gap in capability is only going to continue to become more obvious — and grow in the coming years,” he said.
This story was originally featured on Fortune.com
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反內卷政策分析篇 - BBC
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習近平罕見直批地方扎堆發展新能源和AI：「反內卷」運動背後的政績焦慮
比亞迪在2024年超越特斯拉，成為全球電動車銷量最高的製造商 -- 請至原網頁觀看照片
BBC 新聞中文版2025年7月24日
7月14日，中國召開中央城市工作會議，這是10年來首次。會後，中共黨媒《人民日報》罕見發表了習近平以直白措辭批評地方政府「一窩蜂」上馬新能源和人工智能項目的報道。他向與會者提問：「上項目，一說就是幾樣：人工智能、算力、新能源汽車，是不是全國各省份都要往這些方向去發展產業？」
彭博社稱，直接且口語化的批評較為罕見，因為官方媒體通常會發佈他更正式的講話或政策指引。
習近平發表上述言論之時，正值中國「反內卷」運動之中 -- 3月政府工作報告強調整治「內卷式」競爭；6月修訂出台《中華人民共和國反不正當競爭法》；7月中央財經委會議提出「反內卷」，治理無序競爭，推動落後產能退出。
這一口語化的質疑，一方面揭示了當前中國地方政府在新興產業佈局上的嚴重同質化問題；另一方面，也展現出中國政府的執政弊端 -- 「大政府、大市場」的體制在推動經濟增長的同時，也埋下了產能過剩的隱患。
「零公里」二手車亂象
習近平名的三個產業，目前都不同程度地出現了過剩現象，並且在業界持續引發關注。
人工智能作為中國最新引以為傲的產業，今年初因「深度求索」(DeepSee)技術的爆火而備受矚目。這一現象被稱為中國的「斯普特尼克時刻」，不僅被官方用來宣傳高價值產業發展的優越性，也被認為是中美競爭的關鍵領域之一。
然而，阿波羅全球管理公司首席經濟學家托爾斯滕·斯洛克(Torsten Sløk)近日發出警告，認為人工智能的泡沫可能比上世紀90年代的互聯網泡沫更為嚴重。他的依據是，目前標準普爾500指數前十名公司的市盈率持續攀升，已經超過了90年代的紀錄。
市盈率通常用來衡量股票價格相對於公司盈利水平的高低。換句話說，雖然這些公司的股價不斷上漲，但盈利水平並未同步增長，市場的熱情正在脫離理性。
相比之下，新能源汽車雖然是席捲全球的熱潮，但更像是中國獨有的優勢產業。不過，這一產業也因激烈的競爭而陷入內卷和重復投資的困境。最引人注目的是兩個月前關於「零公里二手車」的討論，起因是長城汽車董事長魏建軍批評目前各大二手車平台上廣泛存在的「零公里二手車」現象。
「零公里二手車」是指一些經銷商為了緩解庫存壓力，將庫存時間較長的新車註冊為二手車進行出售，以便快速處理庫存。同時，一些新能源汽車廠商為了營造持續熱銷的假象，增強投資者信心，也默許甚至縱容這種行為，甚至在新車下線生產後直接上牌照。
針對這一現象，官方也已直接介入整治。中國國家發展和改革委員會就「零公里二手車」問題約談了相關企業，要求整頓行業亂象，並將其列為汽車行業內卷的典型表現。
算力泡沫的問題也可以從部分上市公司的公告中窺見端倪。例如，城地湘江、平治信息等多家上市公司在2024年發佈的相關公告中，透露出算力資源的閒置現象。根據官方發佈的《數據中心綠色低碳發展專項行動計劃》，到2025年底，全國數據中心的整體上架率要達到不低於60%。這意味著，即便實現這一目標，仍有相當一部分算力資源處於閒置狀態。
上海超算中心主任李根國在接受中國媒體採訪時表示，過去各地數據中心建設存在同質化競爭，加之建設週期較長，早期的數據中心往往只是把老舊服務器一排排地擺進去。後來發現，實際需求並沒有那麼大，尤其是雲計算發展以後，大家都開始使用虛擬服務器，導致部分算力資源被長期閒置。
圖像來源，Getty Images -- 請至原網頁觀看照片
2021年4月7日，中國車企蔚來第10萬輛車下線。而僅在2022年蔚來就交付了12.2萬輛車，增幅34%。
政府引導下的重復投資
無論是哪些新興行業，其背後幾乎都能看到政府的身影。中國政府一直在主動推動、積極介入產業的規劃和投資，這已經不是什麼新聞了。最為知名的例子，就是李克強在任期間推出的「中國製造2025」計劃。該計劃從2015年到2025年，歷時十年，針對十大新興領域進行重點扶持和推薦。
這一計劃取得了顯著成果。有媒體估算，到2025年，「中國製造2025」計劃的完成度將超過80%。不過，這種政府主導的產業升級背後，也帶來了一些爭議。政府的推動意味著大量補貼、政府性基金的投資，以及產業政策的傾斜。這些做法讓一些國家對貿易公平性產生了質疑和摩擦。
以新能源汽車為例，多年來該行業享受了數以千億計的補貼。幾家炙手可熱的公司也都獲得了政府性基金的注入。例如，小鵬汽車主要獲得了來自廣東的產業發展基金支持；理想汽車則主要獲得了來自北京的政府基金投資；蔚來汽車則得到了安徽省相關基金的支持。
2025年上半年，中國一級市場的創投格局也發生了深刻變化。第三方機構IT桔子的數據顯示，在前20名活躍機構名單中，地方國資背景的機構佔據了半壁江山，而以往活躍的高瓴創投、紅杉中國等投資者則退居二線。
從投資佔比來看，一季度國資背景的投資金額超過900億元，佔市場總投資金額的約67%。各地也紛紛設立大規模投資基金。例如，北京設立了100億元專項債券，投向政府投資引導基金。這些政府支持的基金高度聚焦於半導體、人工智能、新能源、生物醫藥等高端領域。
當然，支持者則認為，這種模式可以在短時間內快速趕上大國競爭的步伐。尤其是在AI等領域快速崛起的當下，如果有政府的強力資金注入，從長期來看有可能獲得超額收益。
不過，也有批評者提出了不同觀點，比如中國人民大學學報發表的研究論文《地方政府引導基金與高技術製造業佈局 -- 基於國有建設用地出讓數據的觀察》明確指出：政府引導基金的設立可能會惡化城市之間高技術製造業投資的產業同構化問題和低水平重復建設問題。
文中提到，政府引導基金的設立使得城市新增高技術投資項目的產業分布更分散且相似度更高。此外，中國知名經濟學家張維迎長期以來批評政府主導的投資基金模式，認為這種做法違背了市場經濟規律。因為這類基金往往缺乏退出機制，人為延長了「僵屍企業」的生命週期，扭曲了市場正常的競爭秩序。
圖像來源，Getty Images -- 請至原網頁觀看照片
讓各地方政府競相發展經濟，然後以此考核官員，成為過去幾十年來中國推動經濟發展的重要手段。
政績焦慮
新能源汽車產業就是一個典型的例子。
近期倒閉的多家新能源企業背後都有政府基金的影子，這也導致了國有性質基金的損失。例如，剛剛陷入資金鍊困境的哪吒汽車，其背後就包括桐鄉市、宜春市和南寧市三個市屬財政引導基金的支持。地方官員的政績焦慮成為推動重復建設的重要推手。哈佛大學肯尼迪學院的威廉·奧弗霍爾特博士在其著作《中國成功的危機》中指出，這種競賽型發展模式「讓地方官員更關心項目的政治影響力，而非經濟效益」。
中國從官方到學者都在進行對「反內卷」的聲討之中，但是「內卷」並非中國的企業所願，而是不得已為之 -- 一位在長三角地區從事製造業的企業主匿名向BBC中文表示，目前行業內卷嚴重，他們正處於非常痛苦的階段。
他說，對於他們這種較為傳統的製造業來說，困境在一定程度上源於疫情期間全球貨幣政策寬松，導致海外需求暴漲，他們因此大力擴充產能。然而，近兩年海外需求收縮，國內消費信心不足，需求也持續低迷，導致此前擴建的許多產能如今面臨困難，利潤大幅下滑。
這位企業主表示，現在他們接單甚至願意在微虧的情況下運營，雖然虧錢，但至少能保證工廠運轉、員工不失業，企業得以存續。但如果這種狀況長期得不到改善，企業最終還是難逃倒閉的命運。
他個人對未來仍抱有一定希望，一方面寄望於中美能夠達成較好的關稅協議，讓中國企業繼續抓住部分海外市場；另一方面也希望中國經濟能夠復蘇，消費者更願意花錢，從而帶動內銷業務的回暖。但他坦言，目前無論是外銷還是內銷，都還沒有看到明顯的好轉跡象。
這種內卷的危害還有外溢性，比如低價的新能源汽車對歐盟市場的衝擊。經濟學人智庫(EIU)首席中國經濟學家蘇月此前向BBC中文分析，中國決策者主要擔心無序競爭和產能利用率低，而貿易夥伴則更關注中國整體產能和產量的快速增長。
這也解釋了為什麼耶倫對電動汽車(EV)市場供過於求和潛在的不公平補貼表示擔憂，儘管按照中國的標準，電動汽車(EV)的產能利用率並不低。這種情況下，會看到更多針對中國製造業的反補貼和反傾銷調查，尤其是在許多發達經濟體對通脹的擔憂減弱的情況下。這些調查可能會延伸到中國的海外工廠，包括東盟國家的工廠。
本文於 修改第 1 次
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反內卷政策文宣篇 -- 黃偉棠
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推薦1 |
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中國共產黨除了在行政效率上屬於可圈可點的一把手外，在玩文字遊戲和創造新名詞上其文膽們也不遑多讓，他/她謙稱第二，大概全球沒有人敢稱第一(且不論背後是不是有槍桿子)。我這幾天才看到「反內卷」這個文明詞兒；略收集解讀一、二，存檔備查。
下文作者把同義詞，甚至同一句話，翻來覆去、不厭其煩的說它個三、五遍；不知道這是「行為修辭學」的手法，還是因為這個政策空洞、乏善可陳。
反內卷政策：引領中國經濟高質量發展
2025-07-15，香港《文匯報》財經版
作者：黃偉棠 寰宇天瀜投資管理行政總裁、香港都會大學客席講師、註冊會計師、特許金融分析師
國家近期推出「反內卷」政策，針對產業過度競爭與產能過剩問題，為穩定經濟、振興股市及支援企業發展提供強而有力的方向。內卷描述企業在有限市場需求下，通過惡性價格戰爭奪份額，導致利潤下滑、創新受限及資源浪費。這一政策不僅表現在直接面對當前經濟挑戰，更體現政府對可持續發展的深遠考量。通過規範無序競爭、提升企業盈利能力及刺激內需，反內卷政策正為國家經濟注入新活力。
化解產能過剩 重塑產業結構
內地部分產業如太陽能、電動車及鋼鐵，因過度投資導致供給遠超需求，引發價格戰及企業虧損。大行數據顯示，2025年第一季度五大太陽能企業合計虧損超過80億元人民幣。反內卷政策通過規範價格競爭，推動供給側結構性改革，類似2015-2018年間的去產能政策，當時煤鋼行業成功削減過剩產能，價格回升，企業盈利顯著改善。政府可進一步鼓勵產業整合與技術升級，減少低效產能，提升企業定價能力。這不僅有助於穩定產業鏈，還能促進經濟內生增長，為企業創造更健康的競爭環境，進而為經濟長期穩定奠定基礎。
點燃市場信心 助力股市復甦
反內卷政策明確信號顯著提振投資者信心，推動股市積極反應。這個7月為止，滬深300指數上漲2%，太陽能及鋼鐵股如新疆大全新能源和柳州鋼鐵分別上漲19%及50%以上。從行為金融學角度看，政策透明度降低市場不確定性，吸引長期資本流入。政府可通過財稅優惠或定向補貼，鼓勵企業專注高附加值產品，進一步提升A股市場估值，特別是在汽車、電池及化工等行業。這種市場信心回暖不僅為企業融資創造有利條件，也為經濟復甦提供強勁動力，充分展現政策前瞻性。
盼多措並舉創造新機遇
筆者認為，為確保政策成效，政府將制定清晰行業指導意見，規範競爭行為；加大對創新型企業財政支持，鼓勵技術升級；通過定向降息或補貼刺激消費需求；並推動區域協調發展，避免地方政府過度產業競爭。這些措施將有效緩解內卷現象，提振企業盈利能力，穩定股市表現，並為國家經濟注入長期活力。反內卷政策的推進不僅為企業和股市創造了新機遇，也為全球經濟復甦貢獻方案。
題為編者所擬。本版文章，為作者之個人意見，不代表本報立場。
本文於 修改第 2 次
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