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中國經濟之狀況篇 – 開欄文
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瀏覽3,542 ｜回應25｜推薦1 |
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六月底各種經濟報表公佈，指數披露。中國的經濟狀況不如預期；唱衰之聲四起，見以下本欄彭博社的報導。我只看到《雅虎財經》上摩根史坦利的預測仍然看好中國經濟前景。
世事無常，未來難測；在此將各家分析存檔備查。到了九月底和今年年底，再做個檢驗印證。或許可以看出：誰有認知偏差；誰的資料不夠周全；誰的分析解讀功力鴉鴉烏。
可參看本城市《中國經濟體系正在進行(？)結構性改革》一文，和《中國相關新聞三則》一欄下《中國經濟糟透了》一文；以及《中國經濟之計劃篇》一欄。
本文於 修改第 5 次
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《中國盛乎？衰乎？》評介
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0. 前言
艾北爾博士這篇文章相當短小精幹(本欄上一篇)；在我看來，他對中國前景是盛、是衰的分析，旁徵博引(1)，理論平實，手法細緻，文風簡易；從而頗有參考價值。略做介紹，加以獻曝；故稱譯述，不言翻譯。也請參照此欄、此欄、此欄、和本欄其它貼文。
1. 內容譯述
艾北爾博士指出：學者/評論家們對中國前景盛、衰之所以見仁見智，在於很多人沒有搞清楚兩個基本問題：
1) 任何一個問題在「經濟」和「技術」兩個層面的區別。
2) 中共「黨國資本主義」體制的性質。
艾北爾博士就這兩點做了以下的分析。
1.1 「經濟層面」和「技術層面」
我們要從這兩個不同的層面來分析問題或現實狀況。
1) 「經濟層面」指的是：在「魚與熊掌不可得兼」情況下，「多中選一」這類「決策過程」需要考慮的種種因素。此層面的決定涉及取此捨彼的「宏觀成本」(2)。
2) 「技術層面」指的是：當我們選定了「目的」以後，「怎麼進行」才能取得最高「效率」和「效能」。「技術層面」的決定涉及韋伯提出的「效益理性」(3)。
1.2 黨國資本主義
1) 「黨國資本主義」性質
「黨國資本主義」具有以下三個特色(以下根據艾北爾博士的引述)。
a. (中國共產)黨的永續掌權優先於(國家的)經濟發展。
b. 在「黨國資本主義」體制下，處理經濟事務的方式包括：
b-1 國有企業
b-2干預市場
b-3 控管私有企業
c. 能夠高效率的運用國家資源來達到特定政治目的。
2) 「黨國資本主義」的優點
相較於其它類類型「資本主義」，它在取得、調動、和運用「資源」上具有更高的效率；因此，能夠快速達到「中、短期」成效。
3) 「黨國資本主義」的缺點
a. 在資源「分配」上具有高度的「朋黨性」，不能夠滿足基本的「公平原則」。
b. 在資源「調動」上缺乏「整體考量」，往往演變成「寅吃卯糧」和「挖東牆補西牆」。
c. 從而，「黨國資本主義」無法維持「長期」和穩定的經濟成長。
1.3 中國經濟發展的撇步和危機
1) 竊取它國的科技研發成果；導致中國科技缺乏堅實、全面的基礎。
2) 操縱「外匯率」；導致中國老百姓使用人民幣購買舶來品時，可能要付無形的「消費稅」。
3) 實施「大手筆式財政政策」；導致「不是不必付清，債務竟留子孫」的後遺症。
這些缺點造成「黨國資本主義」難以為繼是艾北爾博士全文的總結。
2. 評論
1) 艾北爾博士文章中還指出中共「黨國資本主義」體制所以成功的一些因素，以及中國當前的三項成就。大家對這一方面都很熟悉，我就略過不提。
2) 艾北爾博士在另一篇專論中討論到「會計」和「經濟」的不同，他認為「外匯存底」和「社會富裕」是兩碼子事。我沒有資格討論這個觀點是否說得通；不過以常識而論，我認為兩者不可能完全「無關」，某種程度的「相關性」須是有的。
3) 我說過：「政治是爭奪資源分配權的活動」；艾北爾博士全文一個重要論點就是：「黨國資本主義」體制下「資源」的分配和運用。如果接受我的定義和艾北爾博士的分析，則「專政」云云，不過是霸著大家的錢包不放而已；即使加上「無產階級」這個無所指的「主詞」(4)，該體制也根本沒有「正當性」可言。
4) 經濟穩定持續發展的具體因素很多，如資源、人口、技術、和制度等等。在有形因素之外，一個最大又難以定性的因素是「創新活動」。「創新」需要一個公平、公正、和開放的社會。在獨裁和「朋黨性」的雙截棍下，「黨國資本主義」體制很難提供這樣的環境；這大概是在週期性循環外，總是讓人對中國經濟盛乎？衰乎？感到難以捉摸的原因之一。
3. 結論
「中國模式」的確做到了「和平崛起」；但是，「中國模式」能夠在今後50 - 100年內做到「長治久安」嗎？(5)
附註：
1. 對中國問題或前景有興趣的朋友，不妨參考原文中所提供的各個超連結。
2. 這是我對這個術語的意譯；艾北爾博士大作的超連結將此詞解釋得簡明扼要。基本上，此概念從全方位的角度來思考「成本效益」、「投資報酬率」等所傳達的意思；也可以說，當我們動用(有限)資源到某個特定項目時，如何整體的來評估「成本」和「成果」。
3. 請參看：《理性、法治、和革命》第2節、行動理性1、和行動理性2。
4. 中國既然步入「小康社會」已經三年，「無產階級」自然成為稀有動物，甚至瀕臨絕種了。
5. 關於「中國模式」，請參看此欄、此欄、和此欄。
本文於 修改第 4 次
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中國盛乎？衰乎？--D. Hebert
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Is China Failing or Thriving?
David Hebert, 12/19/24
Analysts regularly predict that China is either on the verge of collapse or greatness.
If there is one thing we can count on, it is the annual warning that China is on the verge of collapsing. Don’t believe me? Here are articles from 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024. And here is another article with citations going back to 1990, all warning about the same thing: that China’s economy will crash and it will crash hard.
Remarkably, we also routinely hear the tale that China is poised to become the world’s next economic superpower. And while China’s economic output is impressive in raw terms, once we realize that China has a greater population than the combined populations of eight of the other nine top-ten manufacturing superpowers, it becomes clear that their impressive manufacturing output is entirely driven by their population, not their economic viability. On a per-capita basis, they certainly do not qualify as a “superpower.”
Despite these contradictory warnings, China has not collapsed or become a bona fide economic superpower. So, what gives? How can a country simultaneously be on the verge of disaster and greatness?
The answer lies in understanding China’s economic system (party-state capitalism) and the difference between economic problems and technical problems. Party-state capitalism can be an effective way to solve technical problems for a short while, but the system’s inability to solve economic problems dooms the system and the people who live under it.
Economic problems are those that are present when there are multiple, mutually conflicting ends present, which necessitates choice among them. This is the source of opportunity cost reasoning. For matters of economic problems, there is always an opportunity cost—an option that must be forgone—in order to make any decision. For example, in the summertime, I am often faced with a choice: should I go play golf today or should I sit down and write? These choices are mutually conflicting for me: I cannot play golf and write at the same time; thus “writing” has an opportunity cost of “playing golf” and “playing golf” has an opportunity cost of “writing.”
Technical problems refer to efficiency. They compare inputs and outputs. Given a specific and identifiable goal, what is the best way to achieve it? For example, once I have decided to go play golf instead of writing, there is an objectively best way to do so: use the correct club for the upcoming shot and execute a proper swing. Error happens (and when I play, there are a lot of errors), but there is still an objectively best way to achieve the primary goal of golf: take as few strokes as possible and thus, to play as little golf as one can.
So how does this relate to party-state capitalism? Pearson et al state it best when they write that party-state capitalism is a system where “the political survival of the Communist Party trumps developmental goals. Its tools for managing the economy include not only state ownership and market interventions, but also increasing use of party-state power to discipline private capital. China’s entrepreneurs are now expected to adhere to the party line.”
In other words, party-state capitalism is an economic system that allows far more political control over the nation’s resources than, e.g., the capitalism found in the United States. It allows the Communist Party to direct the nation’s resources toward politically determined ends and, in doing so, achieve them with tremendous technical efficiency in much the same way that communist countries can. Unfortunately, like their communist counterparts, this only works in the short- to medium-term.
We saw this in the late 1950s and early 1960s with the space race. Given that the Soviet Union was a command-and-control economy, they were able to marshal an incredible portion of their nation’s resources toward the specific and identifiable goal of putting a man in space and bringing him back to Earth. Despite this, the Soviet Union would collapse under its own weight a mere 30 years later. As it turns out, the Soviets had focused a tremendous amount of their nation’s resources on “winning the space race” but had done so at the cost of, among other things, properly feeding the nation.
In a similar vein, China has a storied history of politically determining ends. Over the past 30 years or so, the Chinese economy has prioritized manufacturing and, specifically, manufacturing for export. This has intuitive appeal. Manufacturing jobs often do not require advanced educational attainment and are, in countries such as the United States, highly paid. In some ways, they are the perfect sector for political leaders to focus their efforts.
To encourage manufacturing for export, the Chinese government heavily subsidized specific firms and industries. This can only be done by taxing the citizens and workers in other industries so that additional government money can be allocated to the politically preferred industries. This carries with it two deleterious effects.
First concerns the question of which industries and firms will be the beneficiaries of the government subsidies. This opens the door to cronyism, where those who are politically well-connected but less competitive are more likely to receive benefits.
Second, it cannibalizes the base from which the resources used to provide the benefits are being expropriated. Without this base, the Chinese government finds itself without the resources necessary to provide the benefits, the firms who have been planning on receiving these benefits quickly run out of funds, and the threat of the Chinese economy’s collapse returns.
To get around this, the Chinese government has used every trick in the book. First, they send corporate spies to steal intellectual property from, e.g., American companies. This allows their firms to skip the costly research and development phase and jump straight into the low-cost manufacturing phase. This allows them to undercut the prices of firms in other countries, which must be higher to offset the cost of research and development. In doing so, the hope is that Chinese manufacturing firms will have a competitive advantage. However, we should note that there is tremendous tacit knowledge in the failures during the research and development phase. Because Chinese firms are only using the knowledge of the successes, they cannot know what did not work, thus their attempts at imitation are no facsimiles, but are instead cheaper, lower-quality knockoffs.
Second, they have manipulated the value of their currency in an attempt to secure more favorable exchange rates and encourage other countries to purchase Chinese-made products. In doing so, Chinese products become relatively cheaper on the world stage for non-Chinese buyers. This is clearly an attempt to reinvigorate their economy through boosting net exports. This strategy might work in the short term, and indeed it does look like it is, as China has recently recorded a $1 trillion trade surplus. However, to call this a victory confuses an accounting identity with an economic one. Trade surpluses do not reflect increased wealth, they simply reflect changing patterns of consumption. To think otherwise is to embody the pre-Adam Smith notion of European-style mercantilism. In the long term, currency manipulation is little more than a hidden tax on the people who use the Chinese currency, i.e. the citizens of China.
Finally, they have engaged in what can only be described as massive and persistent expansionary fiscal policy. The most recent of which is a $1.4 trillion debt package, revealed in early November. The hope from this measure is to replace what Beijing calls “hidden debt” with “official debt,” which comes with lower interest rates given that the Chinese government effectively owns the banking system. In doing so, Beijing hopes to save about $83 billion in interest payments over the next five years.
All of this belies the simple truth: China is hoping to paper over the inability of governments to solve economic problems with increasingly costly technical solutions. This can work for a while—decades even—but the inevitable result of such a plan is the same: collapse.
All of this is particularly remarkable for a country like China. The simple fact is that China has an abundance of land and resources, incredible infrastructure, a container port system that outperforms all others in the world, and a famously massive (and cheap) labor force. These give China the ability to achieve tremendous levels of short- and medium-term success economically. Unfortunately, their economic system of party-state capitalism is fundamentally incompatible with long-term, sustained economic progress.
The Chinese economy will continue to fluctuate between soaring heights and crushing lows for the foreseeable future. However, like all economic systems that are not based on market principles, this will only last so long as there are resources from the non-government sectors available to expropriate and give to the politically well-connected industries. Once that dries up, the Chinese government will quickly find themselves without resources to prop up their otherwise doomed industries. As Margaret Thatcher once said, “Socialist governments traditionally do make a financial mess. They always run out of other people’s money.” While China may not be socialist per se, its party-state capitalist system contains within it many socialist undertones.
Without serious, market-based reforms in China, they will run out of other people’s money. What happens at that point is anyone’s guess.
David Hebert, PhD, is a senior research fellow at AIER. He was formerly a professor at Aquinas College, Troy University, and Ferris State University. He has also been a fellow with the US Senate Committee on the Budget and has worked for the US Joint Economic Committee. He also serves as an associate director of The Entangled Political Economy Research Network.
本文於 修改第 1 次
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「中國衰退論」之胡說八道 -- Diana Choyleva
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我雖然也認為「中國衰退論」盛不住水(1)，但下文難稱客觀；有時間我試著提出拙見。相關訊息請參見本欄2024/09/26後的四篇報導/評論。
附註：
1. 中文有「盛水不漏」一詞；比喻：「理論、思想、見解等嚴謹縝密毫無破綻」。英文則有 ”It can’t hold water” 的說法；後者表達：一個說法「站不住腳」或「XX不通」的意思。口語中can’t hold water還有另一個意思；不可混淆。
The China-Decline Narrative Gets It All Wrong
Diana Choyleva, 10/17/24
Beijing has just fired an economic salvo that’s reverberating through global markets. Make no mistake, this is not your garden-variety stimulus package. China is fundamentally realigning its growth strategy. That demands the undivided attention of every serious investor.
The prevailing China narrative in the West has been one of inevitable decline. The sense that we were witnessing “peak China” has given way to the notion that “China is the next Japan.” But those writing off the world’s second-largest economy may soon find themselves on the wrong side of the story. Beijing began to roll out stimulus measures in late September. These bold move aims to tackle deflation and anemic consumer demand head-on, while simultaneously countering the headwinds of continued U.S. decoupling pressures.
The sheer scale of this economic overhaul is notable. With more fiscal firepower on the way, the overall size of the stimulus package is likely to range from 4 trillion to 12 trillion yuan. That’s equivalent to about $561 billion to $1.7 trillion, or a whopping 3.2% to 9.5% of China’s gross domestic product. But here’s the kicker: the real game-changer lies in the intangible effects this stimulus will have on consumer and business confidence, and on the system’s renewed capacity for innovation. These factors, while hard to quantify, could be the rocket fuel that propels China’s economy to new heights.
This pivot shatters two prevailing narratives that have long depressed investor sentiment.
First, forget everything you thought you knew about China being anti-growth under President Xi Jinping. Beijing has unleashed a barrage of pragmatic, pro-growth measures that signal a clear break from past policies. We’re talking targeted demand stimulus, with a laser focus on boosting consumer spending and rekindling confidence across households and private entrepreneurs.
The equity market stimulus isn’t just about steadying the ship; it’s meant to drive a wealth effect that could boost consumer confidence. And in the housing sector? Beijing is loosening the reins on property purchases and mortgage rates while keeping supply tight—a textbook move to boost house prices and, by extension, consumer wealth and spending.
But perhaps the most crucial shift is Beijing’s renewed embrace of local-level innovation and risk-taking. This marks a return to the “crossing the river by feeling the stones” approach that catapulted China to economic superpower status. The renewed emphasis on the “three exempts” policy encourages tolerance for well-intentioned officials. That is a clarion call for the kind of grassroots experimentation that defined China’s meteoric rise under Deng Xiaoping.
Second, Beijing’s policy makers are meeting concerns about China’s “Japanification” head-on. Unlike Japan’s dual bubble in equities and housing in the 1990s, China’s stock market is far from frothy, even after recent gains. Beijing’s market-support measures are part of a broader strategy to professionalize what was once derided as a casino, aiming to boost returns and stave off a balance sheet recession.
China’s runway for productivity growth dwarfs what Japan faced three decades ago. From its world-leading digital economy to burgeoning prowess in 5G, smart manufacturing and AI, China is poised for a productivity revival that will counterbalance the drag from its challenging demographics and excess capital accumulation. This technological leap forward could be the key to unlocking sustained economic growth, even in the face of structural headwinds.
Now, let’s address the elephant in the room: the “China is uninvestable” mantra. This view fails to grasp the nuanced reality of China’s evolving global position. While geopolitical tensions may give some Western portfolio investors pause, China is actively cultivating its appeal to the Global South. Xi will attend next week’s summit in Russia of the BRICS, an emerging-markets grouping. That is just one piece of a larger strategy to diversify economic relationships and cement China’s role as the developing world’s partner of choice.
Of course, challenges remain. The success of this economic pivot hinges on effective local implementation, the restoration of consumer and investor confidence, and China’s ability to navigate the treacherous waters of global decoupling. Balancing productivity growth with security concerns will be a delicate act, but recent measures suggest Beijing is up to the task.
For investors willing to look beyond the headlines, China’s economic trajectory could offer exciting opportunities. This comprehensive reform package—spanning monetary and fiscal stimulus to fundamental changes in growth incentives—demonstrates Beijing’s unwavering commitment to addressing both cyclical downturns and structural challenges.
Diana Choyleva is chief economist at Enodo Economics and a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.
本文於 修改第 2 次
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中國在刺激方案外須合宜清償債務 -- Dylan Butts
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China must employ a “beautiful deleveraging” in addition to its latest stimulus measures in order to avoid debt crisis, says Ray Dalio.
Dylan Butts, 10/18/24
Key Points
* China must employ a “beautiful deleveraging” in addition to its latest stimulus measures in order to avoid debt crisis, says Ray Dalio.
* According to the billionaire investor, pulling off a “beautiful deleveraging” would help China avoid the economic troubles suffered by Japan in the 90s.
China must employ a “beautiful deleveraging” in addition to its recent stimulus measures in order to avoid a debt crisis, said Bridgewater Associates founder Ray Dalio at a conference on Friday.
The billionaire investor defines a “beautiful deleveraging” as a balanced approach to deficits that utilizes debt restructuring along with the printing of money and debt monetization.
He said that while restructuring is deflationary, the creation of money is inflationary; thus, it is the best way to reduce debt burden.
“That’s the real interesting question of China, in terms of how it’s approaching its debt issue,” Dalio said, speaking at the FutureChina Global Forum in Singapore.
“They have the capacity to do that, and I believe they have the willingness to do that. That’s being demonstrated by [recent] policies,” he added.
Since the end of September, Beijing has announced several waves of stimulus and reform measures aimed at boosting its economy.
“I think the changes that are taking place are terrific changes, but you still have to do the debt restructuring,” Dalio said.
In addition to Beijing’s latest stimulus measures, markets have been watching to see if the policymakers will roll out a fiscal stimulus package, which some economists suggest should be as large as 10 trillion yuan ($1.4 trillion).
While it’s easy to create money and credit and throw it into the economy, Dalio said that this could reinforce other problems.
“You need to do it correctly, and that’s as part of a restructuring. That becomes the challenging part of it. I think that will be the test.”
However, Dalio also outlined other challenges, including the fact that much of China’s debt is at the local level as well as the country’s aging population.
The Bridgewater founder recently warned that Beijing has become less favorable toward capitalism in recent times.
On Friday, he said it remains to be seen if China can maintain the “vitality of the private markets” and foster the entrepreneurship and inventiveness that comes from individuals in capital markets.
It remains a question if it’s still “glorious to be rich in China.”
This year, Beijing has cracked down on “wealth flaunting.” The government also has a history of keeping wealthy entrepreneurs in check.
“I don’t think it’s clear yet what is the direction and plan exactly. I am sure about this: there is a lot of uncertainty. More clarity would be good,” he told the conference.
However, discussions occurring in China about tax reform and raising the retirement age are good policy signs, he added.
According to Dalio, pulling off a “beautiful deleveraging” could see China energize productive forces and avoid a debt crisis, as he laid out in a social media post earlier this month.
On the other hand, he believes a mishandling of debt restructuring could lead to the economic and psychological malaise of 90′s Japan, often referred to as the “The Lost Decade.”
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中國救經濟八招 -- 任澤平
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力度空前 - 政治局會議傳遞八大重磅信號
任澤平 2024-10-03
9月26日，中央政治局會議召開。大規模經濟刺激政策呼之欲出，力度為近年空前。本次會議傳遞八大重磅信號：一是總基調上非常積極，強調加力加量；二是財政與貨幣政策強調加大力度；三是房地產強調促進止跌回穩；四是大力提振資本市場；五是調整消費結構，促進招商引資；六是推出促生育配套政策和完善養老產業；七是幫助民營企業渡過難關；八是兜底民生，就業優先，保大學生等重點群體就業。
我們此前一直呼籲推出10萬億大規模刺激計劃，現終於登場，財政貨幣政策大力加碼，全力以赴拚經濟。建言的大規模住房銀行收儲正在變成現實。一線城市放開限購有望打開。保護民營經濟信心的措施出臺。加油！中國經濟！正心正念，堅持做長期正確的事！
1、總基調：表述積極，加力加量
政治局會議一般於 4月、7月和 12月召開，本次非常規時段凸顯會議的重要性，也和會議強調的「抓住重點、主動作為」相呼應。
政治局會議首先肯定「我國經濟的基本面及市場廣闊、經濟韌性強、潛力大等有利條件並未改變」；同時承認「當前經濟運行出現一些新的情況和問題」。經濟發展目標上，從 7月的「堅定不移完成全年經濟社會發展目標任務」變為本次的「努力完成全年經濟社會發展目標任務」。
會議提出，「有效落實存量政策，加力推出增量政策，進一步提高政策措施的針對性、有效性」。
政策若均能成功落地，全年5%的經濟目標仍可預期，當下需要加力加量。目前存量政策較多，如房地產放鬆限購下調存量利率、大宗消費以舊換新、民企融資支援等，但落實效果仍待評估，需仔細打通其中堵點；新政上，9月24日國務院發佈政策大禮包，降準降息力度較大，大力支援資本市場，順應形勢和民眾呼籲，降低存量房貸利率，全力以赴抓經濟，預計後續各地推出新政。
執行層面上，會議提出「三個區分開來」：把幹部在推進改革中因缺乏經驗、先行先試出現的失誤錯誤，同明知故犯的違紀違法行為區分開來；把尚無明確限制的探索性試驗中的失誤錯誤，同明令禁止後依然我行我素的違紀違法行為區分開來；把為推動發展的無意過失，同為謀取私利的違紀違法行為區分開來。
這三個區分開來有助於激發幹部推進改革的積極性，通過明確界限減少不必要的顧慮，同時確保違紀違法行為受到應有處罰。此舉可改善部分地方政府因害怕出錯而「不作為」的情況，既鼓勵創新嘗試，又維護了法規制度的權威性。
我國經濟潛力大，面臨的經濟困難雖然嚴峻、但是暫時的，辦法總比困難多，只要採取長短結合的大力度措施，就可以重啟經濟復甦進程、提振各方信心。良好的經濟增長和就業狀況，是應對美國戰略遏制的根本，是實現人民美好生活的保障，是邁向高質量發展的基石。我們深信中國經濟發展的長期前景是無限光明的！
2、財政與貨幣政策：加大力度，保證必要財政支出
會議提到，「要加大財政貨幣政策逆周期調節力度，保證必要的財政支出」、「要降低存款準備金率，實施有力度的降息」、「要發行使用好超長期特別國債和地方政府專項債，更好發揮政府投資帶動作用」。
9月24日，貨幣政策放大招，降準降息共同推出，彰顯政策加碼推動經濟恢復的決心。下調存款準備金率 0.5個百分點，預計釋放長期資金一萬億元；以 OMO 作為主要政策利率、調降 20bp，引導 MLF、LPR 和存款利率同步下行，增強貨幣政策傳導靈活性，降低融資成本，緩解銀行凈息差壓力。
財政政策接棒穩增長，發力可期。今年廣義財政支出規模為「4.06萬億赤字規模 + 3.9萬億地方專項債 + 1萬億新增不列入赤字的超長期特別國債 + 1萬億去年四季度發行的特別國債 + PSL」，後續可期待財政政策、樓市政策，協同推出一攬子大規模經濟刺激計劃，採取組合拳，一攬子提振市場信心措施的規模在10萬億以上，包括4-5萬億元的超長期國債，用於地方化債，緩解地方政府的財政困難，減輕被拖欠企業的負擔；3-5萬億規模的住房銀行，收儲地方政府庫存土地和開發商庫存商品房，用於保障房；放鬆限購、限貸、限售、限價等此前市場過熱時期的收緊措施，回歸市場化，一線城市可以從放開郊區和大戶型限購開始放開；大力推動新基建、新能源、新質生產力投入；加大生育補貼力度。規模要大，資金成本要低，民眾獲得感要強。
3、房地產：「促進止跌回穩」
政治局會議提到，要「促進房地產市場止跌回穩」，這是首次出現的表述，彰顯維穩房地產市場的決心。
對供應方，「商品房建設要嚴控增量、優化存量、提高品質，加大『白名單』項目貸款投放力度，支援盤活存量閑置土地」。
維持供需平衡是房地產市場健康發展的關鍵。當下我國人口已來到週期性拐點，空置房屋呈增多趨勢。「嚴控增量」，即政府將對新建商品房的規模和速度進行嚴格控制，以避免房地產市場再次過熱和無序擴張；對於把控過關的項目，要加大支援力度。對於存量，要提升品質、改善居民生活品質。
對需求方，「要回應群眾關切，調整住房限購政策，降低存量房貸利率」。
517新政後，房地產市場 6-7月經歷了脈衝式回暖，但7、8月以來房地產成交有明顯回落，新政提振效果有限。8月商品房銷售面積和銷售額同比分別為 -12.6%和 -17.2%，分別較 7月降幅收窄 2.8和 1.3個百分點。
9月24日，地產再次發佈五大利好政策，是 517地產新政後的又一史詩級組合拳，政策力度空前。具體包括：引導銀行降低存量房貸利率，平均下降 0.5個百分點左右；最低首付比例首套、二套住房全國層面統一為 15%、創歷史最低；優化保障性住房再貸款政策，將保障性住房再貸款政策中人民銀行的資金支援比例由60%提高至100%；將房企存量融資展期、經營性物業貸款等階段性政策等政策兩項房地產金融政策檔期限延期至2026年底，緩解房企壓力；支持收購房企存量土地。
但需要關注三大方面：金融機構對涉房類信貸仍持謹慎態度，房企合理融資需求落地難；需求端疲弱，資產價格預期下降疊加居民收入預期下行；低能級城市地產項目紓困進度較慢、庫存較高。
「抓緊完善土地、財稅、金融等政策，推動構建房地產發展新模式」。
長期看，以「城市群戰略、人地挂鉤、金融穩定、租購併舉、房地產稅和租購併舉」為核心加快構建房地產新模式。
4、資本市場：引導中長期資金入市
會議提到，要「努力提振資本市場，大力引導中長期資金入市，打通社保、保險、理財等資金入市堵點」。
9月24日，國務院送出資本市場「大禮包」，平準基金呼之欲出，創設創新兩項貨幣政策工具，促進資本市場健康繁榮發展。央行創新推出兩項工具支援股市，證券、基金、保險公司互換便利和股票回購增持再貸款，資金只能用於投資股票市場，「真金白銀」提升投資者獲得感；匯金中長期入市，托底股市；鼓勵上市公司加強產業整合，支援併購重組，優化投資環境。
9月26日，《關於推動中長期資金入市的指導意見》推出，主要舉措有三：一是培育鼓勵長期投資的資本市場生態。通過提高上市公司品質、鼓勵回購增持、打擊違法行為和完善市場基礎制度來塑造健康市場環境；二是大力發展權益類公募基金和支援私募證券投資基金穩健發展；三是完善各類中長期資金入市的配套政策制度，建立長週期考核機制，培育耐心資本。
9月24日當天，市場大受鼓舞，上證指數大漲4.15%；新政後三個交易日，市場連續放量大漲，站上3000點。短短三日，上證指數拉漲250餘點，交易活躍。
「要支援上市公司併購重組。」
9月24日，證監會發佈《關於深化上市公司併購重組市場改革的意見》。隨著「併購六條」政策的逐步推行，預計併購市場的活躍度和運作效率將顯著提高。這有助於資本市場更好地服務於實體經濟的轉型和升級，滿足企業在升級過程中的資本需求；同時，這些措施也將促進上市公司通過併購重組提升自身的經營品質和市場投資價值，為實體經濟的高質量發展提供支援。
「穩步推進公募基金改革，研究出臺保護中小投資者的政策措施。」公募基金的改革可能包括提高基金運作的透明度、加強風險管理、優化基金產品結構、提升基金管理人的專業性和服務品質等方面。
政策支援提振情緒，讓居民能真正從資本市場受益，反哺實體經濟、提振消費，一定能讓中國經濟回到良性發展的循環。
5、消費和投資：調消費結構，加大引資力度
政治局會議提到，「要把促消費和惠民生結合起來，促進中低收入群體增收，提升消費結構。要培育新型消費業態」。
通過創新政策和市場機制來實現消費的持續增長和民生的實質性改善。具體來說，通過稅收優惠、提高最低工資標準、增加就業機會等提升居民收入，在改善民生的同時釋消費潛力；更進一步，發展消費新業態來提升消費結構。促進消費和改善民生相輔相成，為經濟增長提供持久動力。
「要加大引資穩資力度，抓緊推進和實施製造業領域外資准入等改革措施，進一步優化市場化、法治化、國際化一流營商環境」。
8月，國務院印發《關於進一步優化外商投資環境 加大吸引外商投資力度的意見》。《意見》中提出了24項政策措施，覆蓋六個主要方面：一是提升外資利用的品質並拓展吸引外資的途徑；二是確保外商投資企業享有國民待遇；三是不斷強化對外商投資的保護；四是增強投資運作的便利性；五是增加財政和稅收上的支持，激勵外資企業在中國境內的再投資；六是優化外商投資的推廣方式。
對內擴消費、提結構，對外引外資，打通內外雙循環。此舉不僅有助於穩定經濟增長，還能提高經濟的韌性和抵禦外部風險的能力，確保國家經濟的長期健康和可持續發展。
6、積極應對老齡化
政治局會議提到，「要支援和規範社會力量發展養老、託育產業，抓緊完善生育支援政策體系」。
當前中國老齡化程度在全球屬於中上水準，少子化和長壽趨勢使得老齡化持續加深。從老齡化程度看，2000年中國 65歲及以上人口佔比超過 7%、開始進入老齡化社會，2021年65歲及以上人口佔比超 14%、開始進入深度老齡化社會，2022年、2023年 65歲及以上老年人口佔比分別為 14.9%、15.4%。根據育媧人口《中國人口預測報告2023》「中方案」，預計中國在2030年左右進入佔比超 20%的超級老齡化社會，之後持續快速上升至2060年的約 37.4%，企穩一段後將再度上升至2080年及之後的46%左右，屆時中國8億總人口中近一半是老年人。
在此背景下，要實現兩手抓：一手抓生育，一手託養老。此前開放的全面三孩政策效果不理想，配套支援力度需進一步加大，一方面通過真金白銀補貼減輕生育養育成本，另一方面通過促進家庭-工作平衡提振生育意願；建立多支柱養老金體系，讓公共養老金支出與老齡化程度挂鉤，減輕代際負擔，發揮二三支柱作用。OECD 將養老金體系分為三層：第一層次為強制性、與收入無關的養老金計劃，全部為公共養老金；第二層次為強制性、與收入挂鉤的養老金計劃，包括公共和私人養老金；第三層次為自願性、與收入挂鉤的養老金計劃，全部為私人養老金。
7、幫助企業渡過難關
政治局會議提到，「要幫助企業渡過難關，進一步規範涉企執法、監管行為。要出臺民營經濟促進法，為非公有制經濟發展營造良好環境」。
民營經濟在國民經濟中具有重要地位，發揮了「56789」的重大作用，即貢獻了 50%以上的稅收，60%以上的國內生產總值，70%以上的技術創新成果，80%以上的城鎮勞動就業，90%以上的企業數量。
民營企業利潤持續負增長，1-8月非稅收入累計高達 2.67萬億，同比 11.7%。當下，以罰沒等為代表的非稅收入異常高增，惡化營商環境，導致民營企業不敢投資，應該儘快予以規範。可以考慮將罰沒等非稅收入上收中央財政。過度嚴苛的問責機制，導致地方政府不敢作為，倒查手段被過度使用導致民營企業充滿不安全感。應該以建立制度和機制為主，減少運動式措施和層層加碼的執行方式。未來制度設計上，繼續加強民營經濟產權保護，完善法律制度、規範行政行為；加強法治，適當約束地方政府對民營企業、外資企業正常經營的干預，將更多領域向民企、外企開放，實施負面清單制，「法無禁止即可為」，提升民營企業和外資企業的安全感以及對未來的信心。
8、民生：做好應屆大學生等重點群體就業工作
會議提到，「重點做好應屆高校畢業生、農民工、脫貧人口、零就業家庭等重點人群就業工作，加強對大齡、殘疾、較長時間失業等就業困難群體的幫扶。要加強低收入人口救助幫扶」。
就業是民生之本，日前《關於實施就業優先戰略促進高品質充分就業的意見》已頒布，重點包括：將就業目標納入發展規劃，實現政策協同；增強產業體系對就業的帶動作用，創造更多高質量崗位；支持服務業和先進位造業的發展，擴大就業容量；培育數位經濟、綠色產業和康養產業等新動能，增加就業機會；完善對高校畢業生等重點群體的就業支持體系，優化創業和靈活就業環境；提升勞動者權益保障，消除就業歧視，完善初次分配機制，擴大社會保障覆蓋面。
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中國政府刺激景氣方案之不被叫好 -- Huileng Tan
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請參見本欄上一篇報導。
Beijing is no longer hiding its panic about the state of its economy
Huileng Tan, 09/25/24
* On Tuesday, China unveiled aggressive stimulus measures to support its struggling economy.
* The stimulus blitz is sparking market speculation that Beijing is panicking over the state of its economy.
* Most analysts think China still needs to do more to boost its economy, particularly in spurring domestic demand.
China pulled out an aggressive stimulus package on Tuesday.
At a rare press briefing about China's economy, People's Bank of China governor Pan Gongsheng unveiled a swathe of measures, including slashing interest rates and reducing the amount of cash banks need to hold in their reserves.
The measures were significant because Beijing has been holding back on a "bazooka" stimulus even though China's economy has been struggling to stage a convincing recovery post-pandemic.
To be sure, this is not the first attempt China has made at boosting its economy in the past few years. Chinese authorities have implemented various support measures to prop up the country's ailing economy, but analysts have typically viewed them as piecemeal and limited in their scope and impact. In the past, Beijing has also been known to take steps like hiding unflattering data and trying to project an image of economic health, rather than addressing it publicly.
In contrast, there was a "sense of urgency" in the concerted effort Beijing demonstrated on Tuesday, Swiss private bank Lombard Odier's CIO office wrote in a note on Tuesday.
Investors thought so, too, sending Chinese stock markets on a tear. On Tuesday, mainland China's benchmark CSI 300 Index saw its best day in over four years.
However, Beijing's display of resolve also triggered market speculation that it's alarmed and panicked over the state of its economy, which is facing multiple challenges. They include an epic property crisis, high youth unemployment, and deflation.
A state of panic
"China Stimulus: Does it Signal Panic?" wrote Andrew Rocco, a stock strategist at Zacks Investment Research, who called Beijing's new measures "drastic."
Rocco didn't answer the question, but market watchers said China's 800 billion yuan, or $114 billion, worth of liquidity support for the stock markets was surprising. Pan also said authorities are considering a market stabilization fund.
"PBOC involvement in equity markets marks a clear departure from previous policy. The bank, which usually cautions against speculation, now seeks to encourage it!" wrote Freya Beamish and Rory Green at Global Data.TS Lombard, a London-based research firm.
This "suggests an element of panic in Beijing," they added. "The fact that the PBOC feels the need to engage in unorthodox policy supports our prediction of an imminent growth recession."
Anthony Sassine, a senior investment strategist at KraneShare, echoed the sentiment.
"The Chinese government is really looking to boost growth before year-end, and you can see there's a little bit of panic," Sassine told Yahoo Finance.
China is eying a GDP growth target of around 5% this year, which analysts have said will be difficult to achieve.
Notably, even on the heels of China's big stimulus announcement, most analysts also think Beijing still needs to do more to boost China's economy, particularly in boosting gloomy domestic demand.
Get in on the market hype anyway
Despite reservations about China's economic outlook, analysts think investors should join the bull party — for the short term.
"Investors should ignore the noise and instead focus on the liquidity and price action," wrote Rocco of Zacks Investment Research. He added the signals for both are bullish.
After all, "Chinese policymakers injected the economy with a lot of liquidity and promised to increase that liquidity in the coming months," Rocco added.
Global Data.TS Lombard analysts agree, describing current market conditions in Chinese equities as a "tradable rally."
"Onshore stocks are a policy- and momentum-driven market, and policy signals don't get much clearer than this," they wrote.
However, since China's macroeconomy is still weak, investors should remember to take the position that they are trading, not investing.
"Relief rallies since 2021 have been fast and furious but ultimately short-lived," they cautioned.
China's CSI300 extended gains on Wednesday to close 1.5% higher. Hong Kong's Hang Seng Index closed 0.7% higher.
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中國政府大手筆刺激景氣 –-- R. Woo and L. Gao
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兩個評論：
1) 希望不是飲鴆止渴，或頭痛醫頭、腳痛醫腳的亂投醫。
2) 不知道這個「大手筆」是否符合這次三中全會「決定」的宣示？
China's central bank unveils most aggressive stimulus since pandemic
Ryan Woo and Liangping Gao, 09/25/24
Summary
* PBOC to cut rates, RRR and provide more property market support
* China facing deflationary pressures, growth target at risk
* Analysts say more fiscal stimulus needed to restore confidence
BEIJING (Reuters) - China's central bank on Tuesday unveiled its biggest stimulus since the pandemic to pull the economy out of its deflationary funk and back towards the government's growth target, but analysts warned more fiscal help was vital to hit these goals.
The broader-than-expected package offering more funding and interest rate cuts marks the latest attempt by policymakers to restore confidence in the world's second-largest economy after a slew of disappointing data raised concerns of a prolonged structural slowdown.
But analysts questioned how productive the People's Bank of China's liquidity injections would be, given extremely weak credit demand from businesses and consumers, and noted the absence of any policies aimed at supporting real economic activity.
"This is the most significant PBOC stimulus package since the early days of the pandemic," said Capital Economics analyst Julian Evans-Pritchard.
"But on its own, it may not be enough," he added, saying more fiscal stimulus may be needed to return growth to a trajectory towards this year's official target of roughly 5%.
Chinese stocks and bonds rallied and Asian stocks hit 2-1/2 year highs as Governor Pan Gongsheng announced plans to lower borrowing costs and inject more funds into the economy, as well as to ease households' mortgage repayment burden. The yuan currency jumped to a 16-month high against the dollar.
Pan told a news conference the central bank will in the near future cut the amount of cash that banks must hold as reserves - known as reserve requirement ratios (RRR) - by 50 basis points (bps), freeing up about 1 trillion yuan ($142 billion) for new lending.
Depending on the market liquidity situation later this year, the RRR may be further lowered by 0.25-0.5 percentage points, Pan said, in rare forward-looking remarks.
The PBOC will also cut the seven-day reverse repo rate, its new benchmark, by 0.2 percentage points to 1.5%, as well as other interest rates.
"The move probably comes a bit too late, but it is better late than never," said Gary Ng, senior economist at Natixis.
"China needs a lower-rate environment to boost confidence."
Pan did not specify when the moves will take effect.
PROPERTY CRISIS MEASURES
The property market support package included a 50 bps reduction on average interest rates for existing mortgages, and a cut in the minimum downpayment requirement to 15% on all types of homes, among other measures.
China's property market has been in a severe downturn since peaking in 2021. A string of developers have defaulted, leaving behind large inventories of unwanted apartments and a troubling list of uncompleted projects.
Beijing has removed many home purchase restrictions and sharply lowered mortgage rates and downpayment requirements in response, but has so far failed to revive demand or arrest slumping home prices, which fell at the sharpest pace in more than nine years in August.
The property crisis has weighed heavily on the economy and crippled consumer confidence, given that 70% of household savings are parked in real estate. Analysts remain unconvinced the latest measures will have a significant impact.
"Households who are uncertain over their income prospects in a weak job market may not be willing to take on higher leverage," Gavekal Dragonomics analysts said in a note on the latest measures.
The PBOC also introduced two new tools to boost the capital market.
The first - a swap programme sized at an initial 500 billion yuan - allows funds, insurers and brokers easier access to funding in order to buy stocks; and the second provides up to 300 billion yuan in cheap PBOC loans to commercial banks to help them fund other entities' share purchases and buybacks.
NO BAZOOKA
August economic data broadly missed expectations, adding urgency for policymakers to roll out more support.
On the fiscal side, local governments have been quickening bond issuance to help fund infrastructure projects, but analysts say more may be needed.
"An aggressive fiscal policy is required to inject genuine economic demand," ANZ analysts said in a note on the PBOC moves, which they described as "far from being a bazooka."
Investment banks including Goldman Sachs, UBS and Bank of America have recently cut their 2024 growth forecasts.
China's latest measures come after the U.S. Federal Reserve last week delivered a hefty rate cut, allowing the PBOC to ease monetary conditions without putting too much pressure on the yuan.
"There is still room for further easing in the months ahead," said Lynn Song, chief economist for greater China at ING.
"If we see a large fiscal policy push as well, momentum could recover heading into the fourth quarter."
($1 = 7.0456 Chinese yuan renminbi)
(This story has been corrected to remove Nomura from the list of banks that have cut China's growth forecast in paragraph 23)
(Additional reporting by Joe Cash; Writing by Marius Zaharia; Editing by Shri Navaratnam and Kim Coghill)
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中國五月份工廠產量不如預期 – K. Yao等
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三個消息中有兩個不錯，大家就該慶幸了。
China's factory output disappoints, property sector stuck in doldrums
Kevin Yao, Albee Zhang and Ellen Zhang, 06/17/24
BEIJING (Reuters) -China's May industrial output lagged expectations and a slowdown in the property sector showed no signs of easing despite policy support, adding pressure on Beijing to shore up growth.
Apart from retail sales that beat forecasts due to a holiday boost, the flurry of data on Monday was largely downbeat, underscoring a bumpy recovery for the world's second-largest economy.
May industrial output grew 5.6% from a year earlier, National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data showed, slowing from the 6.7% pace in April and below expectations for a 6.0% increase in a Reuters poll of analysts.
However, retail sales, a gauge of consumption, in May rose 3.7% on year, accelerating from a 2.3% rise in April and marking the quickest growth since February. Analysts had expected a 3.0% expansion due to a five-day public holiday earlier in the month.
"May activity data and our high-frequency trackers for the first half of June suggest significant cross-sector divergences remain in the economy - strong exports and manufacturing activity, relatively stable consumption, and still-depressed property activity," Goldman Sachs analysts said in a note.
Fixed asset investment rose 4.0% in the first five months of 2024 from the same period a year earlier, versus expectations for a 4.2% rise. It grew 4.2% in the January to April period.
Manufacturing investment in the first five months showed robust growth of 9.6%, underpinned by China's emphasis for "quality growth" through technological breakthroughs and innovation this year.
But economists have warned that rising trade tensions with the West over China's so-called over-capacity may impose more challenges to Chinese solar and electric vehicle producers.
Private sector investment grew 0.1% in January-May, down from 0.3% in the first four months, pointing to still weak confidence among private businesses. By comparison, investment in the state sector jumped 7.1% in the first five months.
Asian share markets were mostly softer following the mixed data with the Chinese blue chip CSI300 index slipping 0.2%.
EXPORTS-LED RECOVERY
Exports helped bolster the economy, with steel and aluminium output posting sharp jumps in May.
"Exports drove industrial growth and manufacturing investment significantly, but real estate weakness still hit household consumption and investment," said Zhao Peng Xing, senior China strategist at ANZ.
China's property market slump, high local government debt and deflationary pressure remain heavy drags on economic activity. The latest figures point to an uneven growth that reinforces calls for more fiscal and monetary policy support.
With banks facing narrowing interest margins and a weakening currency remaining key constraints limiting Beijing's scope to ease monetary policy, China's central bank left a key policy rate unchanged as expected on Monday.
"We still see the likelihood of a cut to the Loan Prime Rate (LPR) this month, particularly on the 5-year tenor, as this will help banks to retain households' mortgage loans," said Zhou Hao, chief economist at Guotai Junan International.
But chief China economist at Citi Yu Xiangrong expects a total 20-basis-point policy rate reduction in the second half of this year, but no LPR cut on June 20.
PROPERTY DATA WORSEN
China's economy grew a faster-than-expected 5.3% in the first quarter, but analysts say the government's annual growth target of around 5% is ambitious as the property sector remains in the doldrums.
Property investment fell 10.1% year-on-year in January-May, deepening from a decline of 9.8% in January-April.
New home prices slipped 0.7% in May from April, marking the 11th straight month-on-month decline and steepest drop since October 2014, according to Reuters calculations based on NBS data.
The central bank last month announced a relending programme for affordable housing to accelerate sales of unsold housing stock.
NBS spokesperson Liu Aihua told a media briefing on Monday that the property market is undergoing adjustment and it will take some time for policy measures to kick in.
The property sector, which accounted for around a quarter of economic output before the downturn, has been hit by a regulatory crackdown as well as demographic and broad economic pressures. The government has launched a slew of measures to help homebuyers, such as easing mortgage rules.
But tepid demand at home has kept a lid on consumer prices as confidence remains low in the face of a protracted property sector crisis. New bank lending rebounded far less than expected in May and some key money gauges hit record lows.
The job market overall was steady. The nationwide survey-based jobless rate hit 5.0% in May, the same as that in April.
Beijing has vowed to create more jobs linked to major projects, promote domestic demand and pledged greater fiscal stimulus to shore up growth.
(Reporting by Albee Zhang, Ellen Zhang and Kevin Yao; Editing by Jacqueline Wong)
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《中國五月份進出口數據》讀後
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我不是經貿達人，但看過豬走路，貓打滾；聽過烏鴉枝頭亂叫；此處就凱席先生的深入分析(本欄上一篇)，略表淺見。
1) 美國大選轉瞬即至，拜登政府一系列打壓中國的政策宣示或言談行為，內銷性質居多。是否有效其實不在拜登考慮之列；他除了不得不耍耍嘴把式外(該欄2023/03/31和2023/08/31兩文)，主要目的在抵銷或中和川罪犯的攻擊。
2) 該文提及中國五月份外銷成長在意料之外的兩點原因：
2a) 受到匯率的幫助。
2b) 受到歐、美市場需求的幫助。
3) 因此，如凱席先生指出，內銷疲弱顯示中國仍要加把勁來提高內需。否則，中國經濟前景老是得為外部因素的變動而提心吊膽。
4) 根據第一季和這兩個月來的報表數據，中國經濟可說「審慎樂觀」；它自然延伸到對中國國力的評估。這和我一向的判斷相合；也再次打臉那些唱衰或高喊「造假」的小丑們。
5) 在以上第2)段點出的兩個「因素」之外，國際政治對經貿的影響更深遠。我曾說過，戰爭不僅僅造成短期的貿易停擺；外銷中斷和生產停滯將導致現有「市占率」下滑。第二個傷害將難以挽回。從而，維持台灣海峽與中國南海的和平局勢，是維繫中國經濟穩定發展的前提。
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中國五月份進出口數據 – Joe Cash
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China's exports rise solidly, but slower imports temper outlook
Joe Cash, 06/07/24
Summary
* China's May exports top forecasts, imports slow
* Imports data underline weak domestic demand concerns
* Exports growth suggests hi-tech sectors giving China a boost
* Western tariffs unlikely to immediately slow exports, analyst says
* Economists expect fiscal stimulus to help boost domestic demand
BEIJING, June 7 (Reuters) - China's exports grew more quickly and for a second month in May, suggesting factory owners are managing to find buyers overseas and providing some relief to the economy as it battles to mount a durable recovery.
The jury is still out, however, on whether the export sales are sustainable while a protracted property crisis has led to persistent weakness in domestic demand - a factor highlighted again in last month's imports figures.
"Headline export numbers are surprisingly good, and that confirms the underlying trend, volumes are running very high," said Frederic Neumann, chief Asia economist at HSBC.
“China is currently so competitive, that even trade restrictions wouldn’t really slow the export juggernaut that’s underway.”
However, "if U.S. demand buckles, then the global trade cycle is quickly going to fizzle," Neumann said, adding that a sustainable longer term growth strategy for China requires its domestic engine to fire up.
Outbound shipments from the world's second-largest economy grew 7.6% year-on-year in value in May, customs data showed on Friday.
But imports increased at a slower 1.8% pace, from a 8.4% jump in the previous month, highlighting the fragility of domestic consumption.
請至原網頁查看進出口統計圖
The export figure beat a forecast 6.0% increase in a Reuters poll of economists and a 1.5% rise seen in April, though growth was likely also aided by a lower base of comparison, after rising interest rates and inflation in the U.S. and Europe squeezed external demand in the previous year.
Over recent months, a flurry of data has shown different parts of the $18.6 trillion economy recovering at varying speeds, heightening uncertainty about the outlook.
While first quarter growth blew past forecasts and strong March export and output data suggested improving global demand might aid officials' efforts to get the economy back on an even keel, more recent indicators reflecting soft domestic consumption have eroded much of that earlier optimism.
DEPRESSED DOMESTIC DEMAND
Indeed, separate data for May on commodities imports also released on Friday highlighted a mixed picture of demand conditions at home, with purchases of crude oil and soybeans down year-on-year, while copper and iron ore saw a solid uptick.
A protracted property sector crisis remains the biggest drag on China's economy, with low investor and consumer confidence hurting domestic consumption and undermining business activity.
However, Friday's trade data should give authorities some breathing space as they continue their efforts to foster a broad-based economic recovery.
Analysts expect China to roll-out more policy support measures in the short term, while a government pledge to boost fiscal stimulus is seen helping shore up domestic demand.
The International Monetary Fund last month upgraded its China growth forecast for 2024 in line with Beijing's growth target of "around" 5%, but warned of risks to the economy from the property sector troubles.
China's stocks slipped as the better export numbers were eclipsed by a report that U.S. lawmakers pushed to ban Chinese battery firms with ties to Ford and Volkswagen from exporting to the U.S.
HI-TECH BOOST
Friday's shipments data possibly also suggests a global cyclical upturn in the electronics sector is helping China's sales of components and finished manufactured goods.
Integrated circuits exports from the Asian giant increased 28.4% year-on-year in value in May, according to Reuters calculations, in line with robust chip shipments from neighbouring South Korea last month, a leading indicator of China's trade performance in technology sectors.
Beijing has come under growing criticism from the West that Chinese industrial overcapacity in technologically advanced and green sectors is flooding markets in the European Union and the United States, an assertion China has refuted and it has accused Washington and the EU of engaging in trade protectionism.
China's trade surplus grew to $82.62 billion last month, compared with a forecast of $73 billion and $72.35 billion in April, which the U.S. has repeatedly highlighted in the past as evidence of one-side trade favouring the Chinese economy.
Last month, the Biden administration unveiled steep tariff increases on $18 billion of exports, including a quadrupling of tariffs on Chinese new energy vehicles. The China trade data shows vehicles exports, including chassis, increased 16.6% year-on-year by value last month.
"We expect exports to stay strong in the coming months, supported by a weaker real effective exchange rate. Foreign tariffs are unlikely to immediately threaten exports," said Zichun Huang, China economist at Capital Economics.
"If anything, they may boost exports at the margins as firms speed up shipments to front-run the duties."
Reporting by Joe Cash Editing by Shri Navaratnam
Joe Cash reports on China’s economic affairs, covering domestic fiscal and monetary policy, key economic indicators, trade relations, and China’s growing engagement with developing countries. Before joining Reuters, he worked on UK and EU trade policy across the Asia-Pacific region. Joe studied Chinese at the University of Oxford and is a Mandarin speaker.
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles
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